BEING AND NEOLIBERALISM:

A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF THE SUBJECT

By Kiasha Naidoo

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Supervised by Professor Maurits van Bever Donker

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PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

I, Kiasha Naidoo, declare that Being and Neoliberalism: A Conceptual History of the Subject is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

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ABSTRACT

The idea of neoliberalism, as both a guiding principle for economic policy decisions and a governing rationality, is a pertinent issue of our time. The concept itself is often used to describe the contemporary mode of political economy but when we look closer, it is notoriously elusive. Scholars such as Michel Foucault and Wendy Brown seek to conceptualize neoliberalism as a governing rationality. What these scholars share is a reading of neoliberal governmentality in terms of *the subject*. In social and political philosophical critiques of neoliberalism which inherit from this Foucauldian line of thought, the subject is a central figure. However, thinking on the subject did not begin with a consideration of neoliberalism, it has a long philosophical history. I discuss this through a conceptual history of the subject and in doing so, understand the neoliberal subject as another iteration of subjectivity. I will unsettle various important notions of the subject by considering how they involve the production of a radically inaccessible other. I develop the idea that racialisation is often the mark of this othering, produced through apprehending this other as ontologically deficient, as ill-being. I interpret key texts with this ontological interest in mind, as well reading them in the domain of means and ends. I seek to develop an idea of racialisation as inheriting from and a logic whereby the ontological ends of the racialised subject are foreclosed. By placing an importance on an idea of the ontological subject as open, we can note that racialisation works to close this off. To understand this openness and closedness, we consider the mediation between ontology and elaboration in relation to the subject. Moreover, the neoliberal subject inherits this logic of the production of ill-being, a reading which is revealed through situating the neoliberal subject in a conceptual history of thinking on the subject, not only an economic history. We are ultimately interested in the end of helping us to our search for ontologies which do not inscribe difference at the level of ontology.

The key texts of this thesis are central to animating discussion in each of the chapters. We consider the citizen in the philosophical works of Plato and Aristotle; the Cartesian subject in his *cogito*; Kant's transcendental subject; Heidegger's *Dasein*; and the neoliberal subject.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to my grandmothers, Vialy and Vasantie

for teaching me that a little bit of rebellion can go a long way

CHAPTER 1: THE SUBJECT

> *Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto*
>
> I am human, I consider nothing human alien to me.
>
> - Terence (1888)

Neoliberalism can be counted among the most destructive and yet elusive forces of our time. The primacy placed on individualism and meritocratic distributive arguments lead neoliberal reason create a perpetual desire to expand and accumulate and, as Hannah Arendt might put it, force everything to yield their secrets (Arendt, 1998: 27). In a double gesture, the ultra-rich unelected leaders of the world speak without restraint about their readiness to jump the ship that is Earth (leaving the rest behind) when made necessary by environmental catastrophe for which they themselves bear a great responsibility. In a striking and terrifying way, this orientation to the world which places value on exorbitant growth and planetary colonization is not only allowed but revered. While what I have described is frequently attributed to the proliferation of neoliberalism, it continues to be referred to in a way which is somewhat conceptually confused. There is a lack of consistency in what economists, political theorists, the political left, and the political right mean when they speak about neoliberalism.

Theorists who attempt to conceptualise neoliberalism often do so with a focus on its detrimental implications and, as is evident in the work of Wendy Brown and Michel Foucault, some do so by trying to describe the *subject* of neoliberalism. In general, analyses of neoliberalism seek to describe it's emergence as by tracing the first uses of the term, *neoliberalism*. As a result, they fail to consider that, as one iteration of subject production, the neoliberal subject might be informed by a much longer history of the subject. This is a gap in the intellectual history of neoliberalism which I aim to consider in this thesis through the use of *conceptual history*.

On what is in the title: conceptual history, the subject, and neoliberalism

The title of this thesis project is *Being and neoliberalism: a conceptual history of the subject.* This thesis gets its subtitle from Reinhart Koselleck's Conceptual History (2002) which serves here as a guide for my hermeneutic readings of texts, as well as forming the basis on which it was decided to read certain texts alongside one another.

Koselleck's idea of conceptual history is premised on the notion that *historical* explanations of social history involve *conceptual* histories. According to Koselleck in his chapter entitled, "social history and conceptual history" (2002: 20), he posits that an analysis of concepts and their linguistic history is "as much a part of the minimal condition for recognizing history as is the definition of history as having to do with human society" (Koselleck, 2002: 20). He speaks of the "the destruction of natural *chronology*" as that which "can quite easily be exposed as a fiction" (Koselleck, 2002: 8). What this suggests is that chronology is not necessary to historical readings. We should "learn to discover the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous in our history" (Koselleck, 2002: 8). This is the approach I will use in my reading of various texts on the subject. My analyses will not constitute mediation or synthesis of these texts but a hermeneutic reading along three axes of interpretation. In a simultaneous consideration of nonsimultaneous notions and critiques of the *subject*, we can access this concept's interesting dimensions as well as to consider its place in the context of (and perhaps in the formation of) a social history. I draw from Koselleck's disavowal of the possibility of a *histoire totale* (a total history), taking it as a cue to conduct a reading with opens up texts to interpretation. In this interpretive spirit, the subsequent chapters of this thesis focus especially on the problem of racialisation. More on this will follow, but first there are two points of clarification worth making. The first explains why I have chosen to conduct a conceptual history of the subject (rather than of neoliberalism) and the second concerns why I have chosen to read the texts which appear in this thesis.

To begin, why a conceptual history of the subject? While literature on neoliberalism is rife with accounts of an intellectual history, many such considerations take the subject to be a starting point yet do not seem interested in subjectivity more generally. There are two main streams of neoliberal thought, one focuses on economic policy and the other is interested in neoliberalism as a governing rationality. Of the latter, theorists do so by describing the emergence of the neoliberal subject. That is, despite clarifying the difference between neoliberal policy and neoliberal subjectification, theorists such as Wendy Brown and Michel Foucault see the emergence of neoliberal subjectivity as coextensive with the emergence of explicit neoliberal economic policy. In doing so, they assume that the neoliberal *subject* exists only when neoliberalism is given its name. To do so, as I will argue, is to underplay the subtleties of power and governmentality involved in the production of this subject and ignore a long history of theories of the subject which may bear on the neoliberal production of the subject. A conceptual

history *only* of neoliberalism rather than also on the subject, is limited in its capacity to offer a comprehensive understanding of neoliberal subjectivity.

While the concept of neoliberalism is central in such analyses, a consideration of this alone leads to an understanding in which a description of the resulting subjectivity is wanting. To understand the bearing of neoliberal governmentality on the subject, I will consider a long history of thinking on the subject to give us a language and logic of apprehending the neoliberal subject more clearly. It is an endeavour premised on an awareness that the neoliberal subject did not just fall out of the sky one day but instead has been produced through a long history of thought on subjectivity. With this in mind, I will conduct a conceptual history of the concept of the subject and in doing so, concur with Deleuze who states,

> [n]othing of what the great philosophers have written on the subject grows obsolete, but this is why, thanks to them, we have other problems to discover, problems that save us from a "return" that would only show our incapacity to follow them (Deleuze, 2001: 95).

To turn to a second clarificatory point: an important decision has been made in regard to *what* is read. Many of the key texts at hand originate from Continental Europe since in trying to understand the subject of neoliberalism and the production of race, we cannot simply gloss over them. It is important to note that they are *key* texts since many are something of a philosophical apologism for the creation and practice of both racialisation and extractive practices. The field of studies of the subject is large and underpins the humanities in general. What you will find in these pages is certainly a narrow selection, but one informed by the focused project of understanding the neoliberal subject. To use an analogy, the theories which I consider in the pages that follow make up a mountain range of important but extensive philosophical projects. I will focus on capturing the peaks of these mountains, as contained in their respective notion of the subject. Leaning into the hermeneutic, critical stance of this conceptual historical account, I will at every turn comment on core texts by drawing on work from what is typically described as "the global South."

The subject

Throughout the history of social analysis and critique, we have seen pivotal philosophical systems with notions of the subject at their cores. It is a line of questioning which has demonstrated significant staying power, taking on a variety of forms in a plethora of academic

approaches. The problematic of the subject ultimately forms the basis of *the humanities* where it is the idea of, and questions about the *human* which guides inquiry. Work in the humanities is often animated by (or sometimes critical of) *humanism* — ideas of the human; how humans come to be subjected and subjugated; and how governing rationalities and structures bring about certain modes of being and doing. The tradition of thinking about the subject as we have come to understand it, is inaugurated in philosophical thought primarily from the European continent, appearing as a central question in the work of those we see as important thinkers including Descartes and subsequently the German idealists, and later, Sigmund Freud, Edmund Husserl, Karl Marx, Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. The subject is also an important topic of interest in 20th Century French thought, notably, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Louis Althusser, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Jean-Luc Nancy and Etienne Balibar. These are viewed as essentially subject-based philosophies, but it is worth noting that even in the critique of this set of theory, the subject is still often central. In theory and its critique, consideration of the subject is key to understanding many epistemic, political, ontological, metaphysical positions.

The centrality of the subject in philosophical enquiry has recently warranted the question of whether the time has come to pronounce the death of the subject. This was a challenge posed from within the French-speaking philosophical world and is discussed in a collection of works which respond to a concept note by Jean-Luc Nancy (1991). The volume includes essays by Jacques Derrida, Etienne Balibar, Alaine Badiou, Emmanuel Levinas, and Gilles Deleuze among many other major French theorists. What makes this collection noteworthy is that each scholar offers a reflection in response to the same question posed by Nancy: "*Who comes after the subject?*" Nancy's initial letter to contributors is, as he describes it, not an attempt to do away with the subject in the way that much critique of metaphysics have "involved putting subjectivity on trial" (Nancy, 1991: 5). As elaborated by Balibar, Nancy's question of "*who?*" challenges the idea that we can move away from an idea of the subject altogether, "since it can only be accomplished by articulating (or naming) the function of the "overcoming" of subjectivity that ends up reproducing it as an imputed or self-referential figure" (Balibar, 2017: 2). In the very attempt to do away with the subject, we slip right back into making it central. Rather than proclaiming the death of the subject, Nancy argues that it "move[s] toward *some-one* else" (Nancy, 1991: 5). In the pages of this thesis, I aim to move closer to understanding the subject; to attend to Nancy's question: *who?*

As I have mentioned, much contemporary social and political philosophical critique begins from the presupposition the social structure or governing rationality in question produces a *subject*. Simply, social critique has a history of positing the subject as the central unit of analysis and its subjection as the basis for critique thereof. Karl Marx, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm, all notable critics of the manifestation of capitalistic reason conducted critique on two fronts: 1) by highlighting the internal inconsistencies of capitalistic logic and, importantly for my project, 2) highlighting the way in which this governing reason comes to bear on those who are condemned to live under such structures. These are structures which later theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition refer to as *normative orders* (see (Forst & Guenther, 2020). [1] A normative order is a social grid of intelligibility; the rendering of this as a plural (normative order*s*), makes room for the possibility of competing orders of subject production, so that we might attend to the question of how we move closer to a better order. What frequently guides this sort of enquiry is the question: what sort of society is conducive for human flourishing and how do we get there? This concern has been the basis of much of the tradition of critical theory and Continental philosophy which I have noted and is undergirded by what can be described as the unyielding humanism of its time. Even Jean-Paul Sartre, accused of being both anti-Marxist and overly pessimistic, felt compelled to clarify the humanistic consequences of his existentialism (Sartre, 2007).

Humanism, however, has not gone unchallenged. [2] For those who are critical of humanism, it is not self-evident that ethical or normative sensibilities should be based on a view of human beings at the centre of the moral universe. They frequently emphasise the responsibilities we have, as humans, to also consider the environments which we inhabit, as well as those non-human beings alongside whom we reside. This specific argument posits that the basis of humanism must rest on a specific conceptualisation of the human; a conceptualisation which might be flawed, in containing the biases of their authors. The understanding of this risk leads some to challenge the humanistic logic by highlighting the historical propensity of humanism(s) to lend it- or them-selves to the creation of exclusionary concepts beginning with that of the human. While some refer to the *subject* and the *human* as coextensive, this is an

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[1] The book by Forst and Guenther which is referenced is written in German, entitled *Normative Ordnungen* (Forst & Guenther, 2020). For a description of the Normative Orders project written in English, see their website: ("Normative Orders: About", n.d.).
[2] Notable anti-humanist positions include those of Foucault (see Han Pile (2010) and Paden (1987)) as well as Nietzsche (see Lukits (2022)), and critique what they see as the valorisation of Man in philosophical theory.

unjustified slippage. We can understand the concept of *humanism* in dual: as both a description of the human, along with the resultant human-centered normative framework which emerges from this description. The notion of the *subject*, on the other hand, offers us perhaps a more precise way to describe the interplay of the aspects of humanism. The subject is both conceived of as a basic existential category, and as produced by systems of norms, knowledge, power, law, and so on. This diverges from the basis of humanism, which is interested in the human as that which can be *fully encapsulated* so that some special, differentiating quality of being human becomes the clear basis for an ethics. On the other hand, to focus on the subject is to allow for mediation between elaborations upon whatever baseline existence might be there, or not. Studies of the subject give us greater space for making sense of this complexity. We have the possibility of two levels of analysis, allowing for the consideration of the *mutual relationship* between the base subject and the governmentalities in which they are produced as elaborated subjects. Humanism gives us one direction for reasoning: the notion of the human must first be established and then only can we formulate the ideal normative order. Humanisms are a subset of notions of the subject, since they presuppose a subject called the human and, unlike theories of the subject (which are first and foremost descriptive), humanisms contain a normative principle.

Humanism

Michel Foucault's trouble with humanism (Foucault, 1984) relates to the extent to which this strand of Enlightenment humanism worked to exclude from its category all those who were thought to be lacking the mental capacities to appreciate reason and art. That is, it holds a particular kind of subject at its core: the rational subject, and so allows for the possibility of a deficiency defined as the converse. Similarly, the Marxist anti-humanists criticised this form of humanism for its association with class elitism and the establishment of bourgeois hierarchies. It seems clear then, that criticisms of humanist philosophy and ethics comes from a historically valid worry about exclusion. How, then, do humanists address this critique? Sylvia Wynter suggests that in light of exclusionary humanisms, we should attend to the project of undoing which for her, involves the creation of new humanisms, or what (Rodriguez, 2018: 831) refers to as "Wynter's unrelenting advocacy of a new humanist revolution in the twenty-first century"; to "give humanity a different future" (Wynter & McKittrick, 2015: 72–73). Steve Biko shared this sentiment, referring to his project as a "quest for a true humanity" (Biko &

Stubbs, C.R., 2019: 98). To answer this call to make emancipatory concepts, we ought to consider the basis (or bases) from which we should like to proceed. This will inform that to which we are attentive when assessing formulations of the human. In thinking the subject rather than the human, we open up a way to think not only how the idea of the existence of the subject informs an ideal normative order, but how, historically, normative orders have themselves also informed theories of the existence of the subject.

We can then consider the extent to which humanistic formulations are tied up with governing rationalities, which draws attention to the exercise of power informing these humanisms. Those who are critical of humanistic theory are almost always critical of what they see as a conceptual subjection/subjugation which then come to inform practical subjection (especially emerging from the Global South). Subjection is what these critics would like to move away from, while conceptual emancipation (the definition or re-definition of a concept to become more inclusionary, open, perhaps *freeing*) is something that they would like to move toward. Scholars in the existential tradition have as a central aspect of their project a concern with understanding and urging toward human freedom; in undertaking this thesis project, I have ultimately the same intention. Freedom also seems to be an idea which comes to bear on humanist thought, although the idea of freedom is cashed out in often very distinct ways. [3] The idea of freedom in this context is seen as marking something significant about the human condition. This point of departure is also where we might evaluate them: as writing bases which contain the biases of normative orders and thus reproducing these, such as the falsity that race has a legitimate justification.

The concept of the *subject*

To commence this conceptual history of the subject, we can begin with the etymology of the word, starting with the Greek notion of *hypokeimenon*, meaning something like *subjecthood*. This is the conceptual starting point of that which later comes to be referred to as the *subject*, due to the translation of *hypokeimenon* into Latin as *subjectus* (Balibar, 1991: 19). *Hypokeimenon* is discussed, by Aristotle alongside the idea of *ousia*, substancehood; according to Balibar (1991: 19), *hypokeimenon* is the other of the object. These concepts are posited

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[3] This is not to say that there are no specificities, for instance, Wendy Brown's movement toward what she deems true democracy (2015). Nevertheless, freedom seems to be the baseline concern in critiques of particular subject formations.

together in Aristotle's theory of substance. The difference is understood as follows: *hypokeimenon* refers to that which remains throughout change, or as Aristotle puts it in *Categories,* that which can be predicated but cannot itself become a predicate (Legomsky, 1996: 695). *Ousia*, on the other hand, is the essence of substance, which allows us to offer a negative (yet important) understanding of *hypokeimenon* — it does not refer to the substantial (substrate) properties instantiated by human beings. Another way for us to understand the difference between between *ousia* and *hypokeimenon* is to draw on the definitions of a parallel set of concepts, between the ontic and the ontological. The study of the ontic, the study of the fact of existence while ontology is the study of Being (Richardson, 2012: 57). Heidegger states the difference, "[o]ntological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences" (1985: 31). With this distinction we see that positivistic inquiries which seek to explain the natural occurrence of subjects cannot aid in the description of primordial Being. Levinas (1978) helps us to see that *Being* (with a capital "B") refers to a question of existence, while *being* (with a lower case "b") relates to existents themselves, in their specificity.

The Aristotelean idea of *hypokeimenon* comes to be referred to as *subiectum* in Latin. *Subiectum* later informs what we refer to as the *subject* in English. Martin Heidegger describes the idea of the *subiectum* etymologically with "sub-" indicating *under,* and "iectum" coming from the suffix, "-ject" which in Latin means, to throw. The *subiectum* is that which is thrown under. In this, there is the retention of the meaning of *hypokeimenon* as that which endures permanence throughout change. Heidegger interprets the *subiectum* in an existential frame. It is the *subiectum* as that which underlies existential Being and moves our interest in the subject to the realm of ontology. In further developing this, he uses a method of formal indication. We see once again, the possibility that theories of the subject (rather than humanism) offer a thinking between basic subject and the subjection which shapes them. The language I will use throughout this thesis are the ontological (basic subject), and the elaborations (the subject of a certain discursive or normative structure). In the former, we are brought to a to return to ontological thinking as this baseline — to consider ways of being and doing which might cohere with the Being of beings themselves.

While humanistic theories make use of the human as a starting point, they frequently neglect the ontological grounding of precisely the human condition in which they are interested. A venture into thinking about *Being* allows us to speak of the subject truly as the baseline of existence and ask of more than what constitutes individuals *qua* individuals. For our way of

thinking the subject, we can turn briefly to Martin Heidegger, who treats the question of humanism in his *Letter on humanism* (2018), where he discusses Sartre's lecture, *Existentialism is a humanism* (Sartre, 2007) and helps us with a language to speak about subjectivity as a basis. To draw on Heidegger's ontological mode means to deploy a method of thinking about the subject called *formal indication*, in which the subject can be seen as an opening and which allows us to not only think about ontology, but also elaboration of the subject.

Formal indication and ontology

Heidegger speaks about *hypokeimenon* as referring to that which gathers everything onto itself. It also denotes that which endures through change but is not the same as essence (to which Aristotle refers by the name of *ousia*). Heidegger's reading of this notion of the *sub-iectum* is existential — it is a postulation which relates to the very basis of the existence of the subject. When discussing the notion of the *subiectum* in his essay, *The age of the world picture* (Heidegger, 1977) Heidegger describes the modern age as one which centres Man (as the subject) and, as he says Edmund Husserl does, brackets off the world. Heidegger's insight is that while the modern age inaugurates subjectivism, it also firmly holds an objectivism through which it seeks to understand the world. This mode of enquiry through objectivism is what he refers to as metaphysics. Heidegger writes,

> [t]he word names that-which-lies-before, which, as ground, gathers everything onto itself. This metaphysical meaning of the concept of subject has first of all no special relationship to man and none at all to the I. However, when man becomes the primary and only *subiectum*, that means: Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man becomes the relational centre of that which is as such (Heidegger, 1977: 128).

Heidegger here marks the relation between subjectivism and objectivism in the modern age. He states that, "What is decisive is not that man frees himself from himself from previous obligations, but that the very essence of man itself changes, in that man becomes subject" (Heidegger, 1977: 128). For Heidegger, the strict dichotomy between subject and object cannot help us to understand existence since it cannot make sense of Being as a totality. It is when we see that there is no subject-world dichotomy that we can understand human Being, what he calls *Dasein,* as *thrown* into the world (Heidegger, 1985: 174). He states, "sub-iectum (hypo-

keimenon) [is understood] as something lying before from out of itself, which, as such, simultaneously lies at the foundation of its own fixed qualities and changing circumstances" (Heidegger, 1977: 148). It is at this point that we find ourselves returned to the notion of the sub-iectum which directly later comes to be referred to as the subject, where *-ject* refers to thrownness. The sub-ject for Heidegger, as Naidoo puts it, "minimally indicates that being beneath *(sub-)* which reality is thrown as it is *(-iectum)*" (Naidoo, 2020: 137). The subject does not simply dissolve when we assert its thrownness into the world, Heidegger states, "[t]he certainty lying at the foundation of this *subiectum* is indeed subjective, i.e., is holding sway in the essence of the *subiectum;* but it is not egoistic" (Heidegger, 1977: 150). Rather than offering an all-encompassing *definition* of the subject, we can come to understand it as that which is thrown under existence itself. Since *existing* is logically subsequent to existence itself, this means, then, that metaphysics (the domain of the ontic) cannot give us insight into the human as subject. For this, we can turn to ontology. It is through his analysis of *hypokeimenon* (that which endures through all change) as subject (that which is thrown under) through which Heidegger offers an alternative point of departure,

> [t]hat which is does not come into being at all through the fact that man first looks upon it. Rather, man is the one who is looked upon by that which is; he is the one who is – in company with itself – gathered toward presencing, by that which opens itself (Heidegger, 1977: 131).

Formal indication is a response to Husserl's phenomenological method which involves the suspension of "world" – the *epoché* – in an attempt to understand pre-theoretical Being. Heidegger is critical of suspending world, arguing that if we are to understand Being, we ought to be concerned with our fundamental condition as beings-*in*-the-world, as beings who are thrown into the world. While this is not an attempt to displace subjectivity from its central consideration in philosophy, he tries to develop a method which urges us away from idea that "the self of pretheoretic life is […] a point in space-time standing over an array of objects" (Burch, 2013: 267). The phenomenological method of Husserl relies on *reflection*, according to Kisiel (Burch, 2013) which, rather than bringing us closer to an understanding of our ontological condition as fundamentally residing in the every-day, requires us to put it at a distance.

For Heidegger, this means that phenomenology is incapable of offering an approach to understanding pre-theoretical Being precisely because reflection distances us from the pre-theoretical. Addressing this, he uses formal indication as an approach to thinking the subject from the basis of ontology. Shockey (2010) describes formal indication as,

> Formal in two senses: it officially designates or signals certain first-person singular phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological form of the entity in question. It is thereby the method by which a legitimately transcendental account of our being may be begun to be generated by each of us from out of our factical, immanent existence (Shockey, 2010: 525).

Formal indication urges us to consider Being as such, the ontological nature of Being not as *definition* (something which can be fully encapsulated) but rather of the subject as *opening*.

While it is with formal indication in mind that I seek to read notions of the subject (what I will refer to as the *ontological axis* of interpretation), it does not capture every understanding of the concept of the *subject*. It only explains some part of the instances in which we use the concept and fails to explain its use in the more common sense. As is pointed out by Etienne Balibar (2017), a difficulty arises from the equivocation between two etymological roots of the English concept of the *subject*: *subjectum* and *subjectus*. Balibar's emphasis is on the relation between the subject (as such) and the subject as subjugated, and he uses different terms for each to build an understanding thereof. The first relates to our use of subject in the sense I have been describing so far: the subject in terms of its ontological being *(subjectum* in Latin, *Subjekt* in German)* and the second is subject to the power of (originally) a prince *(subjectus)*. The latter formulation describes the subjection (or subjugation) of the subject. In German this is signified by the word *Untertan*, referring to subservience. *Der Untertan* translated literally means "the underling." We have, then, a dual meaning to the concept of the subject which Balibar remarks that Heidegger neglects "by a retrospective projection of the question of the *Subjekt* as *subjectum (subiectum)*" (Balibar, 2017: 24).

Balibar's contribution (1991) on this topic comes in response to a question posed by Jean-Luc Nancy (1991): "*Who comes after the subject?"* I would like to focus here a little more on how Balibar conceives of the mediation of *subjectus* and *subjectum* which frames his approach to this question.[4] He argues that, "the idea of the rights of the citizen at the very moment of his emergence […] institutes an historical figure that is no longer the *subjectus*, and not yet the *subjectum*" (Nancy, 1991: 46). By distinguishing between the *subjectus* and the *subjectum,* Balibar returns us to (or perhaps gives us) the language which allows us to think *between* them. When we consider Heidegger's subject as formally indicative alongside the formulation by Balibar above, we arrive at a way of reading conceptions of the subject as mediated by the

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[4] In Balibar's essay in *Who comes after the subject?* (Nancy, 1991) and later in *Citizen subject: foundation for philosophical anthropology* (Balibar, 2017).

relation between *subjectus* and *subjectum*. More specifically, how does Balibar's thinking of the subject, which can be rendered as "subjectus ←becoming→ subjectum" relate to the formally indicative, ontological notion of the *subiectum* given to us by Heidegger?

Balibar's view of *subjectus* and *subjectum* as mutually produced helps us to avoid rendering this formulation as a firm distinction with a single direction of logic. It would indeed be simpler to imagine that ontology simply precedes elaboration in theorizing who comes *after* the subject, but Balibar conceives of them as operating on different planes — *subjectus* only comes after *subjectum* in the sense that it is an elaboration of existence (he refers to a specific elaboration: the citizen). He is careful to insist upon their interplay and goes on to develop his notion of the citizen accordingly by putting forth not only the becoming-citizen-of-the-subject but also the becoming-subject-of-the-citizen. Balibar's mediation between ontology and elaboration becomes clearer when we see it as adopting something of Heidegger's formal indication, which illuminates two points that guide us in our readings of the subject.

One, of the becoming *of the subject(um)*: The subject is conceived as an opening by both philosophers. This coheres with the idea that the difference between *subjectum* and *subjectus* ought not be formulated as a strict distinction, since the *subjectus* is also always *subjectum.* In this formulation, the ontological subject can be elaborated upon but this does not negate its ontological necessity. It is incoherent to imagine a subject without a mode of Being, since it is this very thing which, at the level of existence marks the subject as subject rather than object or something else. A formally indicative concept, which sees the ontological subject as an opening makes room for alterity and difference at the level of elaboration, or what we might refer to as discursive structures. To draw, once again, on an etymology, *discourse* comes from the Latin, *dis-* (away) and *-currere* (to run), and thus *discursus* (running to and from). Heidegger interprets this as "aheadness and return," which puts a name to what we have been describing: the relation between the ontological *subiectum* and elaborative *discursus*. We can put ontological principles and alterity in conversation with one another while still holding that the former does not wholly encapsulate the latter. The subject is the primary baseline for making sense of both existential reality and social reality. Although Balibar correctly accuses Heidegger of abandoning the idea of subject as *subjectus* (elaboration)*,* Heidegger's philosophical approach does not preclude it. He does, however, avoid treating it explicitly (while still producing an idea of Nazism — a social reality) while Balibar attends to it directly. The mediation between ontology and elaboration informs the first axis of interpretation which I will use to read various notions of the subject. This is, to draw out and interpret *ontological*

principles inhering in theories of the subject whether explicit or not. Considering this relationally means to discuss how elaborations might have come to inform the ontological principles produced. This leads us to the second point.

On the becoming *subjectum* of the *subjectus*: This relation in Balibar's mediation urges toward the consideration of something elaborative which still lingers in them informs them. These are what we can call bad ontologies — ontologies which hold in them assertions of radically inaccessible difference. Such ontologies have meant that in the history of describing human being, not all human beings have been counted among the subjects insofar as the word "subject" refers to ontology (*subjectum*). In reading the ontology of the subject, which allows us to see the subject as a basis or opening, we cannot forget to consider the other side, the ways in which that conceptual work of ontological principles has and still often can *close off*. As opposed to formally indicative concepts, closing occurs in the act of definition, which in doing so produces ontological exclusions as a matter of logical necessity.

Of what is not in the title: race

I have stated briefly that I will be considering both the emergence the neoliberal subject and exploring the logic of the racialised subject. The latter aspect forms a significant part of this thesis while remaining absent from the title. This is because through reading, it becomes clear that racialisation appears so markedly in a conceptual history of the subject — its history is tied up with that of the subject. This is why, in this thesis, race is an axis of interpretation of reading the subject. Race is salient and appears so frequently that any conceptual history of the subject would be insufficient without noting that it is often produced through the inscription of certain subjects and appears as a central issue in the theoretical critique thereof.

As I work through various notions of the subject in this thesis, I will examine exclusions with a particular focus on race. As I will seek to explain, race is the primary mode of exclusion from the openness of ontological subjectivity. Theories of the subject seem to produce an other in their supposedly inclusive humanistic theories and, as I will seek to show, primarily so on the basis of race, my second axis of interpretation.

Means-ends

The third axis I will use for interpretation arises in the relation between openness and closedness, between formal indication and definition, between *subiectum/subjectus* and the racialised subject: the axis of means and ends. This comes from a Kantian ethical framework which suggests that the ethical treatment of others involves never seeing them only as means but always also as ends (Khan, 2021: 15). Through my reading of opening and closing, I will use the domain of means and ends to describe the apprehension of human beings suggested in various notions of the subject and the extent to which these apprehensions heed the Kantian ethical call to see others never as means only, but also as ends.

The unfolding of this project will happen in what is sometimes referred to as a hermeneutic circle. This means that there are many layers of meaning to these three axes that I have outlined which will become clearer with each chapter since they have been chosen with these theories in mind, rather than with the idea that they have *a priori* significance. In my discussion, to refer to the different planes, I will use the idea of the ontological subject as my correlate for Balibar's *subjectum,* and for the *subjectus,* the elaborated subject.

What I have described above constitutes the way in which I will about reading various notions of the subject and captures the form that the various chapters of this thesis will take. A further discussion of philosophical method follows.

Symptomatic reading

The hermeneutic approach which I aim to practice is not a new one and is better understood by considering Louis Althusser's thoughts of a reading conducted by Marx, what Althusser calls a *symptomatic reading*. As Althusser explains,

> It divulges the undivulged event in the text it reads, and in the same movement relates it to *a different text,* present as a necessary absence in the first. [Marx's symptomatic reading] presupposes the existence of *two texts,* and the measurement of the first against the second. (Althusser et al., 2003: 8).

The relation between this symptomatic reading and Koselleck's conceptual history becomes clear when Althusser writes that in symptomatic reading, "we find the necessity and possibility of a reading on two bearings simultaneously" (Althusser et al., 2003: 8). Theories of the subject are formed through the ideological colourings which are an unavoidable consequence of

theorists themselves being embedded in a particular discourse. In this symptomatic reading, my use of contextual features and critiques will function to fully consider the logical implications of various notions of the subject with regard to their inclusionary/exclusionary conceptualization. That is, in a somewhat deconstructive gesture, by reading the margins (or perhaps, the *marginalized*), I describe the figure of the racialised subject as an other to the logos of the subject rather than merely external to it.

Where these are supposed to serve as "ontological" descriptions, they often proven deficient primarily because they produce a figure of the slave or the racialised, radically inaccessible other. In an analysis of various notions of the subject, we can distinguish between those which are ontological, and which are bad ontologies by drawing out how the (slave or racialised) other appears in each instance.

Overview of chapters

In this conceptual history of the subject and in moving toward an understanding of the neoliberal subject, there are three axes which I have identified as important. They come to bear on the production of the neoliberal subject and yet have a much earlier emergence than in neoliberal governmentality itself. If the neoliberal subject is *subjectus* (subjected, subjugated) and my claim is that an idea of the being of Man (*subjectum*) helps us to understand neoliberalism in terms of its operation on this being, I then have the responsibility of explaining why a description of neoliberal subjugation in terms of ontology is useful. That is, how does this analysis help us to better comprehend the subject of neoliberalism and what might an analysis of ontological presuppositions make available? We can begin by characterizing the first axis, which is to consider the conceptual-theoretical constellation insofar as they offer a first philosophy and along with it, an idea of Being. Keeping formal indication in mind allows us to see this axis of ontological interpretation as an enquiry into the opening upon which the subject comes to be elaborated. The other axes are race, and the domain of means and ends, which are noteworthy as important modes of inclusion (and thus exclusion) in ideas of the subject. In the chapters before we get to considering the neoliberal subject, I will consider the various important ways which the subject has been thought such that we might ultimately come to see the neoliberal subject as part of this conceptual history. While each chapter may focus on one axis more than another, it is important to note that the extent of their imbrication does not allow for them to be read in isolation; overlaps are unavoidable. I will focus on considering

the conceptual constellations of theories of the subject to draw out who, as Balibar puts it, is produced as having *ill-being*, a concept I will develop in the next chapter. In the final chapter, I will consider texts that have important insights regarding the neoliberal subject. The interpretive axes help us to apprehend the neoliberal, racialised subject with clarity, allowing us to place it in the surprisingly long history of the logic of the neoliberal subject. Race and means-ends allow for mediation between the ideas of ontological Being (subjectum) and their subjection (subjectus). Not only this, but this analysis reveals a path, through an ontological humanism, which offers an alternative to neoliberal subjection.

To conclude this introductory chapter below is an outline of the subsequent chapters which make up this thesis. In chapter two, I will cover the Greek subject as the citizen and discuss the appearance of the figure of the slave as the other of the subject, philosophically upheld by Aristotle's notion of the natural slave. This chapter contains contemporary work mainly by Achille Mbembe on the creation of race, Etienne Balibar on the workings of racialisation, and Fanon on what racialisation entails. In this chapter I will posit that, through understanding the Greek citizen as teleologically defined, we can see the Greek slave as producing a radical other, which the logic of racialised slave trade takes further. After this comes chapter three, a consideration of the subject as contained in Rene Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*. Here I discuss Descartes' emphasis on reflection and mind-body separatism. He formulates a subject of reason and mind through which embodiment comes to be regarded as the mark of the other, not as constitutive of the nature of Enlightenment's *Man*. I develop the point by drawing on engagements with Cartesian philosophy by Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Frantz Fanon. Chapter four turns to the Kantian transcendental subject and Kant's racism, described at the hand of Gayatri Spivak, containing the argument that his racism is not extraneous to his notion of the subject, but an inherent part of it. I focus here on the noumena/phenomena distinction and Kant's ethics. Heidegger's subject of *Dasein* animates discussion in chapter five wherein I describe *Dasein* as a response to Descartes and Husserl's neo-Cartesianism while considering the logic of destiny invoked by Heidegger to defend his Nazism. For this we also read Jean-Francoise Lytotard and once again consider the work of Frantz Fanon. Chapter six is where we arrive finally at the neoliberal subject, explaining its emergence through the work of Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, and Wendy Brown. We read Marx with Gayatri Spivak, Herbert Marcuse, Martin Heidegger, and Rahel Jaeggi. We then move on to the subjects of neoliberalism described by Brown and Foucault on the basis of the work done in earlier chapters. The concluding chapter highlights the shortcomings of

Brown and Foucault in apprehending neoliberalism as well as to discuss what we learned by reading theories of the subject along the axes of ontological principles, means-ends, and race.

CHAPTER 2: THE CITIZEN AS SUBJECT

Slavery's crime against humanity did not begin when one people defeated and enslaved its enemies (though of course this was bad enough), but when slavery became an institution in which some men were "born" free and other slave, when it was forgotten that it was man who deprived his fellow-men of freedom, and when the sanction for the crimes was attributed to nature.

Hannah Arendt (2013: 89)

This chapter on the Greek citizen and slave serves as a starting point to my consideration of the formation of the subject and of subjection. Although it may not be the case that all of philosophy is footnotes to Plato, ancient Greek philosophical it is certainly important in the history of thinking on the subject especially with regard to the important logics of means-ends (framed in terms of *telos*), citizenship, and idea of the natural slave as a mode of subjection.

The subject of ancient Greece: the citizen

Plato's Republic: an introduction to the Greek citizen

In Plato's *Republic*, he enquires into what makes the ideal city. He begins by expounding upon the nature of the city, its citizens, and their intertwinement, moving on to describe the good life and justice as the ultimate ends. I will focus on a reading of the subject as conveyed in the conceptualization of the citizen. In this view, the city and the citizen are both defined in terms of virtue. An important facet of both Plato's and Aristotle's work is the idea of *virtue* and how it fits into and guides a constellation of metaphysical, political, and moral beliefs. In *The Republic*, the central concern for Plato is the meaning of *justice*, where he attempts to remove the arbitrariness of "the connection between virtue and happiness" (Macintyre, 1998: 34). He wishes to elaborate on why and how the pursuit of virtue is the path to the good life. What Plato offers by way of resolution is the idea of the parallel *tripartite* constitution of the city and the soul of individuals. This is the three-way division of parts of the individual soul: rational, spirited, and appetitive which are in accordance with the city which consists of three classes: Guardians, Auxiliaries and Producers. The Guardians are ruled by the rational part of the soul

and for whom wisdom is a key virtue. Auxiliaries are the second class, those who are spirited and for whom courage is a virtue. Finally, there are producers: those driven by appetite and for whom temperance is a virtue. The reason possessed and deployed by Guardians is for Plato, the best virtue, and makes them most suitable for ruling. As per MacIntyre (1998: 38), "[m]en fall into three classes depending on which part of the soul is dominant." The parallel structure between individuals and the city is not conceived of as accidental and it is not the case that the individual and city are merely seen as analogous sorts of entities. Rather, the tripartite make-up of the individual and that of the city are inter-dependent in the sense that they mutually inform one another. It is following from a description of the city that Plato then seeks justice in the individual soul (Legomsky, 1996: 398), proceeding from the assertion that justice is the highest virtue (end) for both cities and citizens. In Plato's writings (where these ideas are presented as those of Socrates), the individual and city come to justice in similar ways: by the total ordering of their respective tripartite divisions (Neu, 1971: 242). That is,

> the arguments for the tripartite soul are independent of these for the tripartite state, but it is necessary for the doctrine of the tripartite state that at least something like the doctrine of the tripartite soul should be true (MacIntyre, 1998: 38).

The just city is one which adheres to the tripartite order and the implied division of labour. As described by MacIntyre (1998: 38), "justice belongs not to this or that part or relationship of the soul, but to its total ordering." In this view, who comes to have what role in the city ought to be strictly based on which part of the soul is dominant, whether rational, courageous or appetitive. As mentioned, this justice achieved through a total ordering is not necessary only for the ideal city, but also for the individual citizen: "Plato's account of the virtuous man is inseparable from his account of the virtuous citizen" (MacIntyre, 2007: 141). To be virtuous *as a man* is tied up with being virtuous as a *citizen*. This implies a shared telos, an ultimate *for-the-sake-of-which* between the subject as man and as citizen. The "just man," according to Plato, "sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three parts" (Legomsky, 1996: 471). Each individual has some degree of reason, spirit, and appetite (even though one will be dominant over the others), and it is through bringing into harmony these three parts of the soul that the individual is conducting himself for the sake of the ultimate end — justice.

Conversely, *injustice* is when individual actions and social ordering is at odds with the natural dispositions of the soul and the ordering of the city. Injustice on the level of the political, would be, as Plato puts it, to "establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to nature"

(Legomsky, 1996: 481). On what basis does Plato defend the so-called naturalness of these dispositions, and thus roles in the city? MacIntyre draws attention to Plato's defense of the idea of natural, "inborn" (MacIntyre, 1998: 43), intelligence. He states that, "Plato does not believe in a correlation between intelligence and some merely accidental property, such as the color of the skin" (MacIntyre, 1998: 42). MacIntyre puts distance between Plato's emphasis on birth from that of racism understood in the contemporary sense ("in South Africa and Mississippi" (MacIntyre, 1998: 42)). Although MacIntyre makes only this cursory comment on race, he presumes that racialisation is solely based on skin colour and in doing so, fails to account for the possibility that racism based on skin colour could be connected to (or even depend on) ideas of natural dispositions based on birth. Such a presupposition is worth attending to because it suggests that Plato's emphasis on birth/heritability is *any less arbitrary* than skin colour as a determiner of disposition. What Plato introduces when he speaks of naturalness here does come to inform logics of racialisation, in which there is a radically inaccessible "other" produced, as a deviation from the normal and entirely external to it. The other of the citizen who lurks in Plato's *Republic* has a name: the slave.

To re-state the important facets of Plato's *Republic* (for my purposes), the citizen is a citizen to the extent that the soul and city-state are brought into a state of justice through harmony of the tripartite structure of each. There is, however, an incongruency between the description of Plato's three classes: Guardians (ruled by reason), Auxiliaries (ruled by spirit) and Producers (ruled by appetite) and his assertion that "the rebellious part is by nature suited to be a slave" (Legomsky, 1996: 480). Here, slaves are described in the same breath as land and cattle, lumped together with other things also seen as property. Even if we are to consider the possibility that slaves occupied a formal role as participants in the city, if anything, we might say that they were producers, but they are never described as such. Rather than spirited or even appetitive, the slave is naturally passive and in need of guidance in order to be useful. We can begin to interrogate precisely what kind of "natural-ness" such systems of social ordering claim to pick out in the world, and in doing so, what kind of social divisions they create. In evaluating this assertion of natural dispositions, we can turn to Aristotle, who writes a more sustained defence of the notion of the "natural slave." With the background of some of Plato's thought in mind, my discussion of Aristotle in this chapter will be a reading of his thought along the axes outlined in the opening chapter: the domain of means and ends, race, and ontology.

Means and ends: telos

An important underlying logic which threads through Plato, Aristotle and subsequent philosophical works that draw on Ancient Greek philosophy (notably, Alisdair McIntyre (MacIntyre, 2007), Martin Heidegger (Heidegger, 1985) and Hannah Arendt (Arendt, 1998)) is that of the *telic*, which can be explained through understanding Aristotle's four causes.

Aristotle's philosophy (and Greek philosophy more broadly) draws substantially on the idea of *causes* as an epistemological frame (Falcon, 2019), the knowledge of which is seen as requisite for "proper knowledge" (Falcon, 2019) of anything else. This emphasis on causality stems from the idea that "some elements of the natural world explain others" (Stein, 2011: 705), a feature of Aristotle's theory which leads Hocutt (1974) to refer to Aristotle's four causes as the four *becauses*, since it offers an answer to metaphysical inquiry which is concerned with the fact of existence. The four causes are: the material cause ("that out of which"), formal cause (the shape), efficient cause ("the primary source of the change or rest") and final cause ("the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done") (Falcon, 2019). This can be better explained by citing a commonly used example: the sculpting of a statue. The material cause is the bronze used to make the sculpture, the shape of the statue is the formal cause, the artist is the efficient cause, and the final cause is the sculpture itself or perhaps the appreciation of the aesthetic. In his *Physics* Book II, Aristotle writes that the science of nature is the study of "both what something is for – i.e. the end – and whatever is for the end," (Legomsky, 1996: 744). It is the primacy of ends in Aristotle's philosophical system which makes it teleological. Given the logical structure which informs Aristotle's metaphysics of means (what is for the end) and ends, he extends this to an ethics of virtue. If ethics is the concern with what it means to live a good life, virtue ethics heeds this imperative by suggesting that the *ends* of human morality are synonymous with "the good." By "end," Aristotle says that "we mean not every terminus *but only the best one*" (Legomsky, 1996: 744), thus distinguishing the drive to complete everyday tasks from the grander pursuit of the good. An important clarification can be made here between the concepts, *teleology*, *telos,* and *telic*. Teleology (noun) refers to the philosophical approach whereby explanations are given in terms of final causes. Telos (noun) is the *ultimate* end, that which is considered the ultimate good. To be clear, telos is that for the *sake of which* something occurs instead of a kind of determinism — the fulfillment of the telos is not a natural necessity but explains a general towardness. The concept of the *telic* (adjective) refers to the directedness toward a telos (or "significant end" (Naidoo, 2020: 20)).

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Virtuosity is not conceived as a natural necessity either, for "without virtue [man] is the most unscrupulous and savage of animals, the most excessive in pursuit of sex and food" (Legomsky, 1996: 933). It is a *prescriptive* rather than *descriptive* basis of his ethics and politics. The final cause (*causa finalis*) in Aristotle's conception of the citizen, on which his *Politics* depends, makes virtue crucial. The telos, or final cause, of Aristotle's city is *justice*. [5] MacIntyre notes that this is a deficient translation from the Greek term which "has a flavor all its own and combines the notion of fairness in externals with that of personal integrity in a way no English word does" (MacIntyre, 1998: 11). Justice is the end emerging from the appropriate use of human intelligence and (capacity for virtue), and which in turn, ought to guide them. To stray from virtue is misuse and leads to a state of *injustice*. Political community is the social arrangement which Aristotle identifies as allowing for the pursuit of virtue and justice, which thus ought to serve as its ends. The community to which he refers is the *city*. The city is a self-sufficient entity whereas individuals are not (unless, of course, these individuals are beasts or gods). The Greek city, however, in the politics of both Plato and Aristotle is not separable from the citizen; neither city nor citizen can be described independently of the other. The city is not reducible to individual citizens and yet depends upon them for its constitution. Aristotle writes, "[a] city is by nature a mass of people [and] even if someone were capable of completely unifying a city, he should not do it, since he would destroy the city" (Legomsky, 1996: 933). And yet he also asserts that, "the city is naturally prior to the household and to the individual, since the whole is necessarily prior to the part. For if the whole animal is dead, neither foot nor hand will survive" (Legomsky, 1996: 932). [6] The city is thus neither reducible to its parts, nor independent of them – the city and its citizens are conceived of as being in a relation of ontological necessity from the outset. Despite an absence in Plato and Aristotle of an explicit formulation of the subject, the citizen is the proper subject of the city, the entity through which virtue or the highest good may be pursued, and which, definitionally, cannot be extricated from the city (in that case, they would no longer be a citizen).

Through understanding individual virtue as inherently involved with the telos of the city, we are led to the famous Aristotelean proclamation that man is a political animal (Mulgan, 1974). From considering the nature of this intertwinement of citizen and city, we can draw out a

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[5] Aristotle also writes extensively of eudaimonia as an end in relation to private individuals, but since my focus here is on the citizen as a subject, I will focus on the end of justice, which is the highest end of the citizen insofar as citizenship involves, what the ancient Greeks understood as a public life.

[6] The household is an important facet of Greek economic thinking, but for now I focus on the relation between citizen and city.

particular idea of humanness. In both Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics,* they are concerned with political duty *and* the apprehending human being in the relation to the functioning and nature of the city-state. Hence a concern with the nature of the soul and city, most evident in Plato. For Plato, the city is what it is because the citizens are what they are. This claim is not primarily, as brainyquotes.com ("Plato quotes", 2022) would have it, a source of inspiration encouraging civic engagement (although it may have this function), the quote is a comment on the relation between the city and its citizens in terms of their *Being*. We can read this as positing that the prior-ness of the city is not temporal but ontological. The city is an ontological entity over and above the state of individuals who form part of it. This idea is further developed by returning to the understanding of justice as the telos: according to MacIntyre (1998: 38), "justice belongs not to this or that part or relationship of the soul, but to its total ordering." Insofar as the city is conceived of here as prior to the individual, my focus on the *subject* means that the *citizen* is of primary interest here. We have just spoken about the relation between city and citizen and the following discussion focuses on clarifying the Greek idea of the citizen through this relation. Through a discussion on the Greek city, we will clarify that Being in the idea that "the city is what it is because citizens are who they are" not only holds ontological implications for the city, but also the citizen.

The ancient Greek city

The *polis* is the Greek city-state and is frequently referred to as the first site of Western classical democracy which came along with the principles of equality, liberty and the rule of law (Held, 2006: 13). Democracy entails rule *by the people*, whereby citizens have the duty to hold office in a set rotation between various positions in the Assembly (*Ecclesio*), and attended to "issues such as the legal framework for the maintenance of public order, finance and direct taxation, ostracism and foreign affairs" (Held, 2006: 14). Unanimity was sought in the *Ecclesio*, but if not attained, a vote would be held wherein the majority vote determined the outcome. The members of the democratic *Ecclesio* consisted only of a defined group and who were expected to act in accordance with *civic virtue* — "dedication to the republican city-state and the subordination of private life to public affairs and the common good" (Held, 2006: 14). David Held explains that justice was understood as the "securing and realization of the citizen's proper role and place in the city-state" (Held, 2006: 15). As we have discussed earlier, the teleological structure of the individual is thus coterminous with that of the citizen. It is through citizen engagement and duty that the *individual* realises their *causa finalis* — justice. The virtue

of the individual citizen stems directly from and is thus intertwined with engagement with and in the city-state.

The extent to which individual virtue was understood as related to the city-state is clear when we consider Plato's description of the soul of the individual as *analogous* to the tripartite structure of the city (Neu, 1971). Justice is to be the ultimate end of both the city-state and its constitutive individuals. For Plato, justice of the state is contingent on the just-ness of (the souls of) its citizens, both of which are required to bring into harmony their respective tripartite divisions (Neu, 1971: 242). The three-way division of parts of the individual soul: rational, spirited, and appetitive reflect what applies directly to the social three classes. The reason and wisdom of the Guardian is for Plato, the best virtue. It is considered important, for the just-ness of the *polis*, that individuals and the constituent classes of the city-state adhere to these supposedly natural divisions.

In this sense, while the citizen as subject is indeed defined in terms of political participation (*subjectus*, elaboration), he is also apprehended as *subjectum* (ontological subject)*,* who has a Being *for the sake of* the ends of the state – justice. Not only is the city ontologically prior, but in the Aristotelean formulation, the make-up and telos of the individual mirror the tripartite make-up and telos of the city; the being of individuals are described *in terms of* the being of state. If the citizens are just, then the city-state will be just. An accedence to the internal tripartite structure of Being, telic orientation and the implied role in the city is how one is to achieve this justice. Importantly, the telic structure of citizens is only a mode of the Being of citizens *by virtue of their being citizens.* If the individual mirrors the states and harmony allows for the citizen's pursuit of justice, then we cannot conceive of a non-citizen telic subject. The other of the citizen is apprehended as lacking directedness in accordance with a means-ends structure and thus as lacking Being itself. By suggesting that the fundamental aspects of human being inhere in the citizen by virtue of being citizen, we can understand the Greek analytic of the citizen as based on an ontological presupposition. The very principle of Being is posited in citizenship *qua* citizenship and leads us to ask: what of the non-citizen? The other side of this, are those who are produced as conceptually excluded from this defined space of Being, the slave. In examining this exclusion, we can draw on Balibar's idea of, "the *ill-being* of the subject" (2017: 275).

Ontological principles: Being in the Greek city

While the explicit notion of the "ontological principle" might be absent in the Greek formulation of the citizen, this does not mean that an idea of Being is also absent. As a hermeneutic reading suggests above, an ontological principle resides in the description of the Greek citizen as telic and thus inherently directed toward justice, also the telos of the city-state.

Ill-being

In his book, *Citizen Subject: Foundations for a Philosophical Anthropology*, Etienne Balibar (2017) addresses the idea of *ill-being* in terms of the view (inherited from ancient Greek philosophy) of man as a political animal. Man is not merely a practitioner of political relations, but what marks Man as distinct from other animals, is their propensity to engage in political affairs. He states, "[b]ecause the human and the political are coextensive "by right," the human being cannot be denied access to citizenship unless, contradictorily, he is also excised from humanity" (Balibar, 2017: 276). He adds that "the human being can be denied such access only by being reduced to subhumanity or defective humanity" (Balibar, 2017: 276). This excision is the relegation of the subject to the space of ill-being: wherein the full ontological status of the subject and so their very humanness is denied. As much as this is a principle of inclusion, it depends on the formation of an outside, those who fall outside of the city and therefore are not afforded citizenship.

To develop the idea of ill-being, Balibar (2017: 276) reads Marx, noting that the citizen is "a *bourgeois* who imaginarily separates himself from his own social condition by calling this condition *human.*" He draws on Marx's two propositions which lead to this assertion:

> (1) [T]hat the autonomy of the "rights of the citizen" belongs to a community of "generic being" that exists only in the "heaven" of ideas and state institutions, whereas the principle of such a community is constantly negated "on earth" by the reality of the conflicts and competition that take place between "egoistic" individuals in *social relations* and in what Hegel calls *burgerliche Gesellschaft*; and (2) that the "natural and inalienable" rights of "man," which constitute the foundation and horizon of the rights of the citizen, are in no way forms of universal emancipation but rather modalities of actualizing the primacy of *private property*.

It is, for Marx, *private property* in the rights of Man which functions implicitly to establish a "hierarchy of rights, forming a genus-species structure" (Sichel, 1972: 355). Marx argues in *On the Jewish Question* (Marx, 2009) that, "the political annulment of private property not only fails to abolish private property but even presupposes it." Balibar says that Marx holds

private property as the basis of exclusion, not only from the Rights of Man, but from the very concept of Man itself. This exclusion from the concept of Man is relegation to the space of ill-being, not simply relegation to the realm of objects. Ill-being notes the production of the other as *not-quite*, always deficient, and thus always subordinate. The formulation of the bourgeois citizen puts forth an idea of the being of Man, significant for those it *excludes*. It is through the assertion of a space of ill-being through which the space and status of Being earns its wholeness. For Marx, it is in the production of an underclass with serves to solidify the role of the bourgeois *as bourgeois* by making bourgeois synonymous with Man. Perhaps this logic can be applied to our reading of the Greek citizen? What then, precisely, is this space of *Being* (and thus *ill-being*) in the Greek city and who occupies it? To put the question more clearly, if the Greek citizen is the ontologically whole subject, who is produced as its other?

The radically other subject

A frequently critiqued aspect of ancient Greek democracy relates to the specificities attached to the ancient Greek idea of "the people." While the citizen is at the fore in the work of Plato and Aristotle, the field of reference of the term *citizen* is not without qualification. To repeat, what we have discussed, the justice of the individual (citizen) is the *for the sake of* the justice of the state.

We have seen that the citizen is defined in terms of the city but on what basis are citizens included and who is excluded from citizenship in the Greek formulation of the city-state? In Aristotle's *Politics* he states, "someone is not a citizen if he simply lives in a particular place; for resident aliens and slaves live in the same place <as citizen, but are not citizens>." (Legomsky, 1996: 937) Citizens are free men, Athenian, and are over the age of twenty. Women, children, the elderly, foreigners, and slaves are excluded from this category. The mere fact of exclusion from the category of the citizen does not necessarily mean that they are the other of the citizen. As described in the previous section, the other occupies a space of ill-being which allows for the citizen to assert himself as Man. Since the citizen is defined as intertwined with the telos of the city-state, we can consider the telic relation of these excluded groups to the telos of the city.

Women, children, the elderly, foreigners

Women are the bearers of boy children, future citizens and participate in duties which free up men to be able to conduct their civic duties (Held, 2006:19). Moreover, they are the bearers of girl children, future women. While a limited role, it is one in which women explicitly participate in the telos of the city. Boy children are potential/future citizens and elderly men, previously citizens. Similarly, they have futures or pasts of contribution to the telos. Foreigners who may now be slaves are also a distinct category of people who are not totally disconnected from citizenship, understood as citizens from elsewhere. Despite exclusion from the category itself, for women, children, the elderly, and foreigners, their very humanness was implied in terms of indirect participation in citizenship, thereby allowing them Being *in terms of citizenship*. If we are to look at the binary construction of Man/woman, then we may posit woman as the other which props up Man as the marker of the ontologically whole. A similar qualifier applies to analyses of children, the elderly and foreigners: while they may be an other, they are not the other of the citizen.

This indicates, perhaps counterintuitively, that ontological exclusion is not coextensive with political exclusion. Although women are excluded from citizenship and the associated political participation, they still participate in the city insofar as they are understood to be important in activities which allow for *being for the sake of justice*. Put simply, the Being of Athenian men, Athenian women, Athenian children, and foreigners is described *in terms of citizenship* even though they are not citizens in the practical sense. Being is described in terms of participation in the telos of the city, and not all human beings in the city are citizens — citizenship defines political participation but is *not* the principle of exclusion from the ancient Greek idea of the human. There are those who, although excluded from political participation associated with citizenship, are still afforded full ontological status, even when confined to certain roles within the city.

The natural slave

A yet unconsidered group in this chapter, who are theorized in the context of the Athenian city is the class of *natural slaves*. Those conceived as natural slaves in the polis allow us to see the way in which ontology and political participation are delinked in the idea of the Athenian citizen as subject. Unlike women, children and the elderly, the slave does not have any civic responsibility related to citizenship; they are biologically uninvolved in citizenship, coming from none and bearing none. Aristotle offers a philosophical treatment of the slave (based on

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the idea shared with Plato) of *natural* predispositions used to justify division of labour. This is the tripartite structure discussed earlier. This was premised on the systematisation of natural roles in the functioning of the city-state (Legomsky, 1996: 934). For Aristotle, the slave is described as naturally subservient and the master equally naturally a master. He states, "it is absurd […] to deny that some creatures are, and some are not, naturally suited to be ruled by masters" (Legomsky, 1996: 955). The slave appears described in texts often in the same breath as the property of said master, along with land and cattle. By conforming to their natural "slavishness," they cannot be imagined as contributing to any form of role in the production of circumstances necessary for the functioning of the state, as it is precluded by their natural subservience. Hannah Arendt remarks that,

> The slave's degradation was a blow of fate and a fate worse than death, because it carried with it a metamorphosis of man into something akin to a tame animal. A change in slave's status, therefore, such as manumission by his master or a change in general political circumstance that elevated certain occupations to public relevance, automatically entailed a change in the slaves "nature." (Arendt, 1998: 84).

Plato's philosophy makes the exclusion of slaves even clearer: even though the Auxiliary and Producer classes are not expected to participate in ruling (this is reserved for the Guardian Class), it is not the case that slaves would form part of any of these. Being neither soldiers nor producers, slaves are uninvolved in the *telos* of citizens of the Greek city, they are outside of it. The very Being of the Greek citizen is a reflection of the state and necessitates their involvement in it as a matter of partaking in the telos (justice). While the fulfilment of the telos is not described as a natural necessity, human Being as a function of a telic modality is implicitly posited as natural *through the description of the slave as natural*. The foreigner/not-Greek-citizen/captured citizen-of-elsewhere could be a subjected to slavery in Greece and thus could have a master. But it remains that they were a *citizen* elsewhere. This means that not all slaves are equal; despite all having masters, not all slaves are *naturally* so. Only natural slaves are precluded from any and all possibilities of, or relations to citizenship. Understanding the slave as a natural slave suggests that there is something not only such as a natural master, but as a natural citizen.

Plato argues that these natural divisions arise from a disposition and there is no noteworthy room made for generational social mobility between the three classes. While there may be exceptions, these prove the general rule that a person is thought of as ruled by that part of the soul in accordance with the class they are born into (Legomsky, 1996: 456). It is not that the

rational are placed in Guardianship or spirited in the Auxiliary class but members are *born into that class*.

Slave/citizen

While the slave is the other of the citizen, it is this very relegation of the slave to the space of ill-being which allows for the position of the citizen to become synonymous with Man. The idea of the citizen is dependent on the relegation of the slave. Arendt describes this as the relegation of the Greek slave to "calm animal" (Arendt, 1998: 84) status. Arendt argues that slaves are not first and foremost described in terms of meeting the calls of their own necessities of life but are busied with those of others. The ends of the slave are outside of themselves. The time of citizens is, in turn freed up because of the labour of the slave, allowing them to participate in political rule and commitment to the functioning of the city. Despite their absence from the citizenry, slaves make the ancient Greek participation in the telos of the city possible while themselves never participating in the telos.

As I have discussed in the previous section, the difference between slave and citizen is rather to do with who is apprehended as having a telos and thus Being. In defining the subject in terms of the city, it is the citizen who is thought to participate in telic ends which are unavailable to the slave in the sense of their natural being. The formulation of the natural Greek citizen is both ontologically dependent on the slave and practically dependent on the labour of the subservience of the slave to his "natural master," in order to retain his status as Man. It is the designation of the slave as excluded from citizenship by which the citizen attributes to himself humanity. That is, this distinction between slave and citizen is based on subjection — an ontological form of subjection — wherein the slave is apprehended as having a deficient sort of being: ill-being. The naturalness of the slavish condition is a deployment of a justificatory reasoning based on heritability.

The slave and black subject

What has been covered in the chapter thus far can be described in contemporary terms as an attempt to consider *difference*, its description and production, through a specific formulation of the subject as citizen. Importantly, I have sought to do so to the extent to which we can understand something about the *production* of difference through producing an other as though ontologically deficient. Ill-being is, as I have noted, a term borrowed from Etienne Balibar (2017: 276), whose consideration of race comes from his worry about the limits of Marxist

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historical materialism. For him, Marx's historical materialism precludes the study of reified difference beyond the view of private property as the principle of exclusion and subjugation. Balibar (2017: 281) notes that, "there are "borders" or "limit points: where civic-bourgeois universality turns into a procedure of exclusion or disqualification, and because *differences* (and consequently the exclusions that they determine) *are irreducible* to any single model or procedure."

This belief leads Balibar to consider difference described in the "missing voice" of Frantz Fanon, from which we can draw out his comments on racialisation. He asserts that their speaking *out of* and *in* difference rather than *about* it is an "unstable point – which is a matter of "ill-being" rather than "being" and thus disorients all ontology (even an ontology of relations)" (Balibar, 2017: 286). To speak *about* difference means that we are interested in how it is produced, rather than acceding the brute fact that *it is*. Of Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks*, Balibar writes that he attends to "a violent contradiction among *uses* of the name of man that enter into colonial (or postcolonial) practices and representations" (Balibar, 2017: 285). While political exclusion often comes along with an ontological subjection (ill-being), it is also the case that there is political exclusion which does not necessarily entail ill-being. In the context of the ancient Greek polis, the set of citizens as actors in public political life is not coextensive with those who are encompassed in the ontological wholeness offered through participation in the telos. The natural slave is different from others excluded from the activities of the polis as they are, as we have discussed, denied participation in the telos, and *their condition is heritable*. This combined logic of ill-being and of heritability indicates something which perhaps comes to inform the logic of racialisation which we will see in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. Balibar suggests, through reading Fanon, that race is the name we give to the exclusion of some from the category of "human" through "disorient[ing] all ontology" (Balibar, 2017: 286). He further demonstrates this point when, in his reading of Fanon, he asserts that,

> [f]or "bourgeois" man, woman is a subservient subject *(subjectus)*; whereas the black, and especially the former slave (which is precisely the overdetermination that Fanon describes), is precipitated into a state of *abjection*, which often appears in fantasies of animality (Balibar, 2017: 284).

It is noteworthy that many formulations of racialisation describe it as the making of the racialised subject into not-quite-human (abjection, ill-being, non-being, ontologically disoriented), often drawing from the logic of slavery to explain this, yet the Greek natural slave

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who is produced in the same logical structure is seldom identified as the emergence of racialised logic (but which later comes to relate to pigmentation).

In discussing the emergence of racialisation, the history of slavery is typically considered important, with specific reference to the history of the transatlantic slave trade. Achille Mbembe (2017), in his analysis of blackness, discusses the black slave as produced through an abolition of the distinction between means and ends. His argument is informed by Aime Cesaire (1950: 42) who writes of the "thingification" of the colonial subject. Mbembe connects the "Black Man, *[to] human-merchandise, human-metal,* and *human-money"* (Mbembe, 2017: 180). From this we see that Mbembe's critique rests on the understanding that the Black subject is not apprehended as a subject at all, but in the destruction of means-ends inaugurated by slavery, becomes an *object*. Mbembe falsely sees the distinctions of *means-ends* and *object-subject* as parallels — the subject whose ends are disoriented (such as the Greek natural slave, or the Black man) is not necessarily *objectified* (thingified). Mbembe's argument cannot make sense of the possibility of a state of *ill-being*, of *not-quite-Being*. It is only through following through our analysis of slavery further back than racialisation (as pigmentation) to slavery in the Greek natural slave that we are able to elaborate on the way in slavery is understood in the means-ends domain.

This, what we may refer to as abjection (etymologically, throwing away, casting off) or ill-being of "the black, and especially the former slave," is an abjection from being itself and as Kristeva (1982: 1) describes, it is "neither subject nor object." This is how we can make sense of Fanon's *zone of nonbeing*. Balibar correctly asserts that "Fanon's trope differs from Wollstonecraft's because, unlike "sex," the "color" that the white allows the black to own and to represent does not consist in anything that might, in return, evoke their "common humanity" (Balibar, 2017: 284). This is because it is precisely the humanity of the black person that is acted upon in the logic of racialisation. While Balibar carefully distinguishes between difference as it functions in sex and race, he implies that women can move from ill-being to being, *while remaining women* — the evocation of common humanity is possible, even in the wake of alterity. It may be more precise to suggest that women are not *denied* being but are attributed *different* being. The distinction is important because it is not sex which defines the bounds of who is considered human, but race.

We then have race/ontological exclusion and gender/political exclusion. While women are *subjectus*, with subjugation operating at the level of elaboration (political exclusion,

pathologization, relegation to cleaning and caring ("Françoise Vergès: Capitalocene, Waste, Race, and Gender on Vimeo", 2019)), the racialisation of the subject (as black subject) is an exclusionary *ontology*. Women have a telos tied up with the telos of citizens, whereas "the black, and especially the former slave" (Balibar, 1991: 284) has no telic end and no virtue to get them there.

On the black slave: the resonance of race in the natural slave

I have thus far explained racialisation as the subversion of telic ontology, the logic of the ancient Greek subject. The racialised subject to which we have been referring is who we can call *black*. Achille Mbembe, in *Critique of Black Reason* (Mbembe, 2017) addresses the problematic of the *black subject*. He states in the Epilogue,

> The birth of the racial subject – and therefore of Blackness – is linked to the history of capitalism. Capitalism emerged as a double impulse toward, on one hand, the unlimited violation of all forms of prohibition and, on the other, the abolition of any distinction between ends and means. The Black slave, in his dark splendour, *was the first racial subject*: the product of the two impulses, the most visible symbol of the possibility of violence without limits and of vulnerability without a safety net (Mbembe, 2017: 179).

Setting aside Mbembe's related remark on the history of capitalism, he marks the transatlantic slave trade as a moment out of which the (capital "B") Black subject emerges. A commitment to tracing Mbembe's line of thought both further back and deeper to the level of ontology allows us to assert that the abolition of means and ends (which he notes later in the book), is relevant even at the level of ontology. The ancient Greek slave, in being attributed a being outside telic logic, is denied ends altogether — a logic which apprehends him as inhabiting the space of ill-being and produces him as black. As described by van Bever Donker (2021) in his reading, "Mbembe […] argues that race, not the principle, but a recognisable difference, comes first historically." The suggestion that recognisable difference is essential to race is tenuous if the logic of the natural slave in the Greek polis echoes in other forms of slavery explicitly connecting heritability to pigmentation. Instead of attending to the historical abolition of means and ends, such an answer accedes to the false notions underpinning race "science" i.e., scientific difference between races. While it is frequently cited as the starting point of reified race in the philosophy of race, this has misled us in suggesting that perceptible racial difference (described as objective differences in melanin) is a *necessary* prerequisite for the production of a radically inaccessible (naturalised, racialised) other, despite constant assertions that this

skin colour is completely arbitrary. Indeed, if a certain pigmentation is all that forms racialisation, race is inevitable. This view of race is not only reductive, but it holds on to the basic justificatory logic on which scientific forms of racism rest and thus it cannot be escaped.

Despite the subtle reintroduction of race in his formulation, Mbembe makes an important point when he cites the "abolition" of the distinction between means and ends. While Mbembe seems to refer to this abolition as primarily that of capitalist logic (which it purportedly inherited from colonial slave trade) if we commit to exploring versions of the abolition of means-ends logic, we find ourselves faced with ancient Greek slavery and an earlier idea of the radical other, preceding but anticipating racialisation. By decoupling the unjustified emphasis on recognisable difference, we can understand racializing logic as emerging from the production of the ancient Greek slave. The slave is apprehended as lacking being and thus humanness insofar as the ontology of the time posited a telic ontological structure. The subject as citizen posited by Plato and Aristotle produces an idea of Being from which the slave is excluded. Moreover, despite the later importance of recognisable difference in racialisation, race can be read as the establishment of an ontological principle as exclusionary.

While I have discussed the seeds of racializing logic in the Greek slave, racialisation is not coextensive with slavery, it is the logic of the production of the other as ill-being which is important to note here. Holding this in mind, we can move on to a consideration of the subject as posited by Rene Descartes.

CHAPTER 3: THE CARTESIAN SUBJECT

O my body, make of me always a man who questions!

Frantz Fanon (1952: 181)

In the previous chapter I began reading the concept of the subject as implicit in the Greek notion of the citizen, attempting to reveal its philosophical structure along the axes of ontology, race, and means-ends. In this chapter, unlike the Greek subject, which was implicit, we will consider a conception which is often referred to as the inauguration of thinking on the subject, captured in Rene Descartes' *Discourse on Method and the Meditations* (2003). Descartes is held especially responsible for setting into motion a long philosophical history of conceiving of the subject as *ego*, or the self-conscious "I," as well as the concomitant belief of reason as epistemically superior. The primacy of reason, seen as the only form of legitimate knowledge acquisition, undergirds the philosophical landscape of the Enlightenment. The emphasis on reason coincides with what Sutcliffe says "characterizes the men of the generation of Descartes," as having "the will to dominate, to control events, to eliminate chance and the irrational" (Descartes, 1968: 21). It is then possible to argue that despite its humanism, Enlightenment reason, through a dichotomising impulse, depends on the production of an other who represents its antithesis. I will suggest that the other is a racialised subject of irrationality, the body, and the appetites, and that its production rests on Cartesian mind-body dualism. This itself is not a novel contribution to the topic of Enlightenment humanism, but I will develop the argument by reading Descartes along the axes I have introduced. By bringing in the axes of ontology, race and means-ends to a reading of Descartes, we can consider how the *cogito* slips from positing the "I" as an *opening* to instead producing a closed and restricted ontology of the subject. In order to explain what I mean by this, I will begin this chapter by outlining three aspects of Descartes' philosophical project: the *cogito ergo sum,* mind-body dualism, and his emphasis on consciousness. The latter concern about consciousness will lead us to the first axis in this chapter, ontology while the relation of reason and being will animate our discussion on the domain on means-ends. I will then move on to a section wherein I will raise the question of race, drawing mainly on Fanon.

Horkheimer and Adorno (2002: 2) state in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that "Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human

beings from fear and installing them as masters." The Enlightenment idea of *human being* is, however (as with the Greek notion of the citizen), not without qualification. I will argue that the most fundamental qualification here is of the racialised subject who is produced as excluded from of the category of human in the Enlightenment project. A consideration which concurs with an additional point by Horkheimer and Adorno, who assert later, "[w]hat human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002: 2), by pointing to racialisation as a mechanism for this domination.

Descartes' subject marks a philosophical point of departure for many subsequent notions of the subject insofar as he puts forth the idea of the self-conscious ego, mind-body dualism, and the primacy of reason. These ideas animate a wide range of philosophical discussion, but also reach beyond, shaping subjectivity itself in the sense of *subjection*. In telling the story of the co-emergence of race and neoliberalism, while the Greek citizen holds in it an iteration of otherness based on an idea of the natural slave, the Cartesian other (ultimately the subject of the Enlightenment) is produced in an altered yet not entirely distinct normative order, one in which the term *race* can be applied. Schematically, the other of the rational Cartesian subject of the mind is the irrational, subject of the body. This tracks the ancient Greek thought we have considered previously insofar as it is the idea of natural slavishness which relegates some to the tasks of manual labour — work with/of the body — since they are imagined to be governed by base desires — desires of the body (appetites). Descartes makes the distinction between mind and body explicit, and I am interested in reading the subject (and its other) which emerges.

Descartes' cogito ergo sum

Through a series of personal and philosophical reflections, Descartes begins the *Discourse on method* by describing what he sees as a lack of foundational principles on which his education in philosophy and the sciences was based. Based on the merit Descartes saw in mathematics, he holds that to obtain a degree of rigour, the sciences and philosophy ought to take their foundations from and enquire into axioms which cannot be doubted. In order to arrive at indubitable knowledge, Descartes introduces what he calls a *method of doubt* which begins by suspending that which is typically regarded as knowledge of the world including so-called knowledge of the fact of its existence. His starting point is the suspension of all which we are

certain that we *know* — at the outset of Descartes' philosophical endeavour, he doubts all that he thinks he knows.

For Descartes, if we begin by doubting the existence of everything, we can establish undeniable truths without believing that which, although it may seem real, is not. For this method of doubt to work Descartes suggests that the mode of acquiring knowledge through which we begin to establish that-which-cannot-be-doubted, matters. The first move in this argument is to cast doubt on all knowledge believed to be accessed through sensory experience. Descartes says in this regard,

> [e]verything I have accepted up to now as being absolutely true and assured, I have learned from or through the senses. But I have found that these senses played me false, and it is prudent to never trust entirely those who have once deceived us (Descartes, 1968: 82).

Descartes makes this point through a lengthy example about a piece of wax: a piece of wax is melted, solidified, and moulded into various shapes, as he argues, the information gathered through sensory experience would lead him to assert that what he holds in his hand is an entirely different thing whenever this piece of wax appears in these different forms. It is only his *rational* faculties which allow him to understand that it is in fact the same piece of wax while his senses mislead him. Descartes' method of doubt and rationalism along this line extends famously to his argument featuring an evil demon. Since Descartes has already noted the fallibility of the senses, to maintain his method of doubt, he offers the supposition that an evil demon may be deceiving him into believing the existence of the external world (and his own body). He then doubts the existence of both and enquires into what it is that he cannot doubt. As the argument goes, if there is the possibility that he may be tricked into the awareness of certain things, then it follows that there must be a *mind* which can be tricked. Descartes asserts then that he can only be sure that *he exists*, this is an indubitable truth. This is the idea encapsulated in Descartes' Latin assertion that, "*cogito ergo sum*," popularly translated into English as, "I think therefore I am" (Audi, 1996: 147).

This line of thought leads Descartes to be a rationalist rather than an empiricist. Empiricism refers to gathering knowledge by attaining information of the physical world, often understood as an assemblage of sensory information — information attained as sense data. He affords primacy to reason in his endeavour to establish that which cannot be doubted and thus also proposes that legitimate knowledge claims are to be reached through the exercise of reason rather than the senses. That is, through the mind rather than the body.

Descartes' mind-body separatism

Descartes famously systematises what is known as the mind-body distinction in philosophy, a topic taken up in various branches of philosophy and approached in different ways. While originally described as the separation of the *soul* and body (Bergson, 2002: 83), Descartes' use of soul is seen as the correlate for the more contemporary term, *mind*.[7]

In Descartes' search for that of which he has a clear and distinct idea, he turns to the question of the body. Early in this section, the sixth meditation, he once again pronounces his doubt of that information which is attained through the senses. This follows from the argument discussed in the previous section explaining Descartes' rejection of empiricism and his turn to rationalism. His line of reasoning with regard to the body begins by noting that although he is closely familiar with his body, it is distinct from himself: he has "a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am only a thinking and un-extended thing, and because, on the other hand, [he] has a distinct idea of the body in so far as it is only an extended thing" (Descartes, 1968). Descartes' subject is thus one who may possess a physical extension in the form of a body, but which is not a necessary component of who a person *is*, in terms of their Being. In this way, Descartes writes the dichotomy between the subject and the world (of objects), of which the body is part of the latter. He describes this distinction in terms of the apartness of soul and body, stating that "our soul is of a nature entirely independent of the body" (Descartes, 1968). He makes this distinction by explaining the difference between mind and body in terms of their respective *natures* while holding what is known as a substance dualism. This means that mind and body are conceived of as distinct *substances* (Hannan, 2011).[8]

The difference between mind and body, for Descartes is that the soul is indivisible while the body is divisible, which for him makes it clear that the mind and body are distinct; they are different in nature. He argues that while the body can be divided up and limbs removed, the mind is not of a substance amenable to the possibility of division. If there is mind, there is always a *whole* mind. Mind is, for Descartes, *consciousness*.

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[7] Bergson is critical of Descartes' substance dualism but holds a dualistic position which is against the notion that there can be division at the level of being (Gare, 2020).

[8] This is as opposed to forms of mind-body dualism which do not depend on their being distinct substances, such as mind-body nominalism (a position held by Donald Davidson) (Kim, 2019).

Descartes' focus on consciousness

When Descartes describes his ideas of mind, he puts forth a notion of the rational, conscious "I." He makes clear that it is only through conscious reflection and the exercise of reason, which he arrives at indubitable truths. All else is part of the external world which may be doubted. The primacy afforded to the rational and conscious mind in Descartes presumes that to arrive at indubitable knowledge, we must exit a kind of everyday mode in which the senses may be deceived and enter into a reflective mode wherein this everyday "knowledge" is brought into doubt. Jean-Paul Sartre describes this Cartesian idea, "a reflective consciousness delivers to us absolutely certain data" (Sartre, 2004: 4). Edmund Husserl inherits the Cartesian idea of the reflective "I," and suggests that in order to understand phenomena we do so through understanding consciousness. In Husserl's neo-Cartesian phenomenological theory, he suggests the suspension (*epoché*) of the world, such that we may focus on the intentionality or directedness, of consciousness. Husserl (like Descartes) centres the *ego,* brackets off the world, and affords primacy to the capacity of reflection of the subject as the source of certain knowledge. For Descartes and Husserl, the subject is a reflective subject, it is *thinking* which leads him to the assertion of being, reflection is an *active* mode. Two levels of argument might be read from the *cogito ergo sum*. The first is an epistemic claim: that reason and reflection are the only means through which we can know anything about existence. The second is an ontological claim: that Being depends upon the capacity to reflect, that this is the essence. Heidegger reads Descartes as putting forward the latter claim and is critical thereof. He argues that it is not through an idea of the reflective mode that we attain an understanding of subjectivity, but through understanding the *pre-reflective* mode of the subject. In this view, *reflection* is limited in its capacity to help us to uncover the nature of Being. This emphasis on the pre-reflective means for Heidegger that the subject cannot be understood if apprehended as bracketed off from the world but must instead be conceived of as, and in terms of its, *being-in-the-world.* It is in terms of Husserl's Cartesian language and Heidegger's critique by which we can better comprehend the Cartesian subject as a subject described in terms of *consciousness*. Descartes' focus on consciousness presumes an intentional exercise of reason (thinking), which he argues implies that he "is" (the *sum*). "I think therefore I am" thus seems to depart from the realm of epistemology, to perhaps make an ontological claim and bringing to light a question about Descartes' famous assertion: being to the end of thinking, or thinking to the end of being?

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Means-ends and ontology

After having explained and highlighted aspects of Descartes' *Discourse on Method and the Meditations* with regard to the central aspects of the Cartesian subject, we can now turn to the endeavour of reading this subject along the axes, means-ends, ontology, and race. The concluding statement of the previous section brings us to first consider the axis of means-ends. Descartes' notion of the subject is on the receiving end of much critique relating to the gap between what he can sufficiently prove with the *cogito*, and what he actually claims to be the outcome. These are what we can call a slippage from his epistemological enquiry to an ontological implication.

Cavell (2006: 63) points out that along with taking the "solitary individual" as its starting point, an additional misstep on the part of Descartes was to take "reflection rather than purposive, worldly action as the paradigmatic expression of human thought." Cavell helps us to see that Descartes shifts from theorizing reason as a means for arriving at certain knowledge to ascribing reason as a/the central feature of the human condition — an ontology. The formulation of this logic in one direction, *being therefore thinking*, clarifies human access to indubitable knowledge when engaged in reflection. On the other hand, if the formulation is in the direction of *thinking therefore being*, then this is a claim which enters the realm of the ontological. From the outset, Descartes claims to be theorizing about what we can know. He sets out to establish an epistemic theory but the implications of his argument slip; a slip which happens in the ambiguity as to the direction of his claim. If restrained to an epistemological claim, Descartes' could not go further than to argue that there is being therefore thinking, but his statement is *I think therefore I am*.

In order to consider this supposed slippage, we can turn to the domain of means and ends as a hermeneutic device. We are interested in whether the subject which emerges from this notion of the subject is one attributed ontological ends, and whether thinking/reflection/reason are considered a necessary means to this end. In considering this question we can turn to Deleuze and Guattari. In their text, *What is philosophy?* they consider the Cartesian *cogito* as a tripled concept, a conceptual arrangement constitutive of doubting, thinking, and being. In parentheses they note a relation between these concepts, arguing that Descartes' constellation implies, "in order to think it is necessary to be" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 25). This view supports a reading of the Cartesian argument which sees him as positing thinking as an ontological necessity for the subject. This might be formulated as such: being (the *sum*), *is to the end of*

thinking. While the main point for Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 31–32) when writing on Descartes is to clarify what is involved in the creation of concepts, I would like to focus on a shift which they note in the components of the Cartesian *cogito.* In the wake of the Kantian critique arguing that Descartes is not warranted in asserting the "'I' in the claim, "I am a thinking subject" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2000: 31), they state,

> [t]he cogito now presents four components: I think, and as such I am active; I have an existence; this existence is only determinable in time as a passive self; I am therefore determined as a passive self that necessarily represents its own thinking activity to itself as an Other (*Autre*) that affects it. This is not another subject but rather the subject who becomes an other (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 32).

While they claim to be tracking a conceptual component shift in Descartes, they make clear the ambiguity which arises from presupposition of the *cogito* which is necessary to uphold the claim, "I think therefore I am." The presence of (reflective) consciousness which Descartes ascribes to the subject is not merely a *consequence* of being, but rather its prerequisite. That is, rather than asserting, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, that "in order to think it is necessary to be," he states, "I think *therefore* I am" (my emphasis).

Cavell (2006: 85) interrogates the Cartesian subject as one of reflection and that

> if by 'self' we mean a subject, a thinker who can perform Descartes' initial act of self-reflection, an agent who can doubt, reflect, and argue, then *one becomes a self through those very understandings* that allow him to speak for himself" (my emphasis).

Here we see Cavell read Descartes as defending a specific reading of the *cogito* as holding the idea of *thinking therefore* being. He suggests that Descartes gives us a subject whose logical structure is: reason to the end of being. Friedrich Nietzsche was critical of Descartes' *cogito* for depending on a description of the subject as necessarily tied up with thinking,

> [i]n other words, Descartes' statement is only possible because of his *a priori* concept of thinking (*cogito*) that already is derived from a concept of existence (*sum*), both of which amount to social constructions" (Monte, 2015: 14).

In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche turns the Cartesian *cogito* on its head and says, "*Sum, ergo cogito; cogito ergo sum*." A footnote clarifies this: "I am therefore I think: I think therefore I am. The second half of this statement is quoted from Descartes who made this formulation famous" (Nietzsche, 1974: 223). A tension is revealed when we put these side by side, the same tension which we have noted above. In the formulation, "I am therefore I think," thinking is

what follows from being whereas in "I think therefore I am," thinking (which stands for reason and conscious reflection) is constitutive of being — thinking is what makes Being. In this view, the use of reason is not merely a means to epistemic ends, but requisite for the very condition of being a subject at all. Descartes slips from an epistemological argument to an ontological implications – proposing that the essence of Man lies in the exercise of conscious rational reflection.

This ontological aspect is not addressed directly by Descartes as is noted by Heidegger who critiques the argument of *The Meditations* for its neglect of the question of Being in Descartes' explication of the conscious ego (Kisiel, 1993: 307). In the formulation, *I think therefore I am*, Heidegger criticizes Descartes for failing to adequately address the meaning of the "am" (*sum*). Although Descartes may not be putting forward an explicit ontological theory, I have suggested in the previous section that Descartes does *presume* a kind of Being — the thinking being. While it may be true that Descartes' *cogito* stems from an epistemic question, it is not the case that it is devoid of ontological content. There is a critique made by many, suggesting that Descartes' argument overreaches based on his own description. [9] Though Descartes sets out to make an epistemic argument, it seems as though he puts forth an ontological principle: if there is thinking then there is a being who is doing the thinking. There is thinking, therefore there is Being. He does so by moving from that which cannot be doubted (thinking) to an assertion that this, in a relation of necessity constitutes the being of an "I."

Descartes' *cogito* is understood as inaugurating the modern subject and thus the humanism of the Enlightenment era, which more generally puts the subject at the center of philosophical enquiry. This subject is the subject of the Age of Reason: fundamentally rational. The resultant humanism and human-centered discourse operated on a definition of the human as any being capable of reason in the Cartesian sense. [10] This conception, however, was deployed in such a way which sought to defend and reify preconceived ideas of who counts as human, thus excluding racial and cultural groups who did not conform to the highly specific Western modes of thinking, being and doing.

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[9] Jean-Paul Sartre describes this as slippage from epistemology to metaphysics. In the translator's introduction to Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel E. Barnes writes of Sartre that he "objects that in Descartes' formula — "I think; therefore I am" — the consciousness which says, "I am," is not actually the consciousness which thinks. […] Instead we are dealing with a secondary activity. Similarly, says Sartre, Descartes has confused spontaneous doubt, which is a consciousness, with methodical doubt, which is an act" (Sartre, 1978: xi).

[10] It may appear that there is slippage between *subject* and humanism: studies of the subject appear in general to be descriptive while humanism is normative.

Race

Descartes' slippage from epistemology to ontology means that in this frame, epistemic inferiority comes to imply a sort of ontological inferiority. Since there can be no such thing in actuality (since any enquiry into the baseline mode of Being must account for all of human being), what is created instead is the racialised subject as the other. While Descartes' absence of explicit race talk has meant that he is generally not held accountable for the rampant racialisation and racism of Enlightenment discourse, his philosophical complicity should not go unaccounted for. It is still possible, even for Descartes who writes of "barbarians or savages" of whom "many exercise as much reason as we do, or more" (1968: 35), to formulate a theory which lends itself to the formation of a racialised other. While Immanuel Kant is held to account for his systematisation of racial hierarchy (as we will see in the next chapter), the Kantian logic of racialisation[11] is premised on the then widespread notion that European Man is the rational subject of the mind, and the so-called savages and barbarians of elsewhere are of the body, and thus, to varying degrees, lacking in the capacity for reason. The slippage from epistemology to ontology which I have noted means that the subject conceived of as (capital "M") Man, European, produces an other who is epistemically deficient and thus is apprehended as what has been called in the previous chapter, an ontologically disoriented subject of *ill-being*.

Enlightenment humanism offers an idea of the human (thus, Enlightenment's subject) is an early iteration of what Badiou (2009: 190) refers to as *humanist idealism*. The purpose of which Badiou describes as "to make a subject out of an ontological region. To the constituent subject, to consciousness, to the for-itself, it opposes the flux of representations, the object, the in-itself" (Badiou, 2009: 190). That is, humanist idealism supposes that a universal principle of Being (ontology) can be asserted in a landscape of elaborations, a difference of planes which humanist idealism crudely tramples over, failing to heed this fine-grained distinction. Hannah Arendt puts plainly the qualm that many have with Enlightenment humanism in her reference to Cartesian doubt: its central characteristic is, "its universality, that nothing, no thought and no experience, can escape it" (Arendt, 1998: 275). Although universalism sounds as though it is a principle that should be applicable to all, Enlightenment universalism rests on exclusions,

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[11] John Harfouch discusses the interaction between Kant's mind-body formulation and his racism, "To grasp Kant's innovations on these fronts, one must consider how, in inventing a concept of race, Kant transfigures the terms of the problem such that the relationship between mind and body becomes not one of spatial interaction, but rather one of a persistent, invariable repetition in time across generations" Harfouch 2018:117.

proposing principles which are not truly universal. Specifically, the exclusion of people from the category of the human based on its Eurocentric notion of what constitutes human being. When we accede to the subject described by Descartes, we accede also to its supposed universality. It becomes clear from the theorisation of those who come directly after Descartes, (notably Immanuel Kant in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View)*, not all humans are understood to be equally capable of Cartesian reflection and reason despite the purported universality of this capacity. For this reason, not all are attributed Being in the full sense of the term. As I have been discussing, Descartes' idea of the subject underpins Enlightenment humanism, including in its relegation of some humans to subpar status in this regard. This can be thought of as the racialisation which comes about following from Descartes' subject of reason in the form of exclusion from the supposedly underlying stuff associated with Being. This is a connection which can be understood as arising in several steps: first in the theorisation of the body as object and secondly, the association of the black man with the body.

The body as part of the world of objects

Judith Butler notes (2015: 15) that while Descartes posits the distinction between *res cogitans* (mental substance, unextended) and *res extensa* (extended substance, having physicality), Descartes' idea that God is the engraver on the *soul* (understood as a blank slate, associated with *res cogitans*) invokes a language of materiality (*extension*), more specifically, of the *body*. She asserts that although the question of the body is posed in the Cartesian meditations, "the body escapes the terms of the question by which it is approached" (Butler, 2015: 34). The question of the body in Descartes is rendered unanswerable by the restrictive epistemic justificatory order of the mind and of presence. Descartes begins his *Discourse on Method* by casting doubt on all knowledge gained through the senses, leading him to reject empiricism in favour of the supposedly distinct and more reliable reasoning faculties of the mind. The body thus becomes part of the external world, included in the world of objects upon which we must cast doubt. Unlike the mind, the body is not for Descartes inherently tied up with what it means to be human. Others, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have argued otherwise. [12] There is resonance between Descartes' trivialisation of the body and the ancient Greek philosophical idea of the inferiority of appetitive motivation. This is in comparison with those who are compelled by, and capable of supposedly loftier pursuits such as philosophy and the task of governing. In both lines of philosophical reasoning, the body represents a site of base inferior

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[12] Merleau-Ponty argued against the mind-body distinction preferred by Descartes, stating in *The structures of behaviour* that, "the soul remains coextensive with nature" (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 189).

desires, and unreason, which stand in antinomy to reason. The body, for Descartes (who posits a view of existence based on essences) is not a necessary part of the subject, and incidental to it if it exists at all. In short, the body is another object in the world of objects.

The racialised subject as body-object

As is discussed by Souleymane Bachir Diagne (2016), Lucien Levy-Bruhl (falsely) contested the impossibility of "Bantu" philosophy on the basis that Bantu metaphysics and ideas of causality fail to cohere with Western logical principles, such as the principle of non-contradiction. That is, the Bantu was constructed as having fundamentally *other* epistemic modes (i.e., modes of acquiring knowledge) and as lacking the capacity for reason. When we read this manner of theorizing difference (as fundamental and linked to the capacity for "reason") alongside Descartes' universalist idea of the subject as a thinking being, it is not a reach to see that any practice of reason different from those determined in a Eurocentric universalism could be said to be lacking on this front. To combine this logical framework with preconceived racist notions yields a supposedly justified, yet misguided, basis for the idea that some, through an imagined lack, cannot be apprehended in the full extent of Being.

The Black man — the racialised other — associated with the body on account of his supposed lack of mind and the imagined givenness of him to desires of the flesh, comes also to be regarded as part of Descartes' world of objects. As stated by Francoise Verges, "[t]his body [the black man's body] is for the racist world a phobic object, an object of abjection, obsession, and fascination" (Verges, 1997: 583) Van Bever Donker et al. (2017: 18) trace the logic of apartheid in South Africa to this key Cartesian philosophical position which they describe as "the division, the separation, the apartness of mind and body, and the subjection of body to mind." On this point we can turn to Fanon, who writes, in an autobiographical mode, about the proclamation, "look, a Negro!" — "I came into this world anxious to uncover the meaning of things, my soul desirous to be at the origin of the world, and here I am an object among other objects" (Fanon, 1952: 78). He plays on this lack of recognition as a subject: "I was unable to discover the feverish coordinates of the world. I existed in triple: I was taking up room. I approached the Other…and the Other, evasive, hostile, but not opaque, transparent and absent, vanished. Nausea" (Fanon, 1952: 88). Fanon's final remark — "nausea" — notes a bodily response to a relegation of his subjectivity by the other from the world of subjects to that of bodies (objects). This remark evokes Jean-Paul Sartre's *Nausea,* in which nausea is a bodily response to the banal condition of existence. For Fanon, who is concerned with relationality,

his own subjecthood fails to be met with the recognizing, subject-making (subject-affirming) gaze of the other.

Fanon states that "[o]ntology does not allow us to understand the being of the black man, since it ignores the lived experience. For not only must a black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man" (Fanon, 1952: 78). Here Fanon makes clear the point we have been considering: that race is elaborative and operates on a different plane than ontology. One cannot describe race on the plane of ontology since race is not real at the level of being but only inscribed in the elaborations of man. Although this may be the case, the *racializing* tendency of the Enlightenment period produces an idea of Man (which has ontological presuppositions) from which the black man is excluded, which we see is tracked by Fanon. That is, although racialisation cannot be comprehended in the terms of an ontology (since race is not ontologically real), it can be understood as created in the exclusionary moment of certain ontological presuppositions, including as I have argued, as a consequence of Descartes' presuppositions. In the case of Cartesian philosophy, the subject apprehended as having ill-being is the black subject. While the slave other of the Greek citizen was also premised on the logic of naturalness, the racialisation yielded by the Enlightenment formulation of the subject focuses on *perceptible* difference. This lays the ground for scientific racism which argues that there is a link between skin colour and mental capacities. Just as the natural slave was associated with base desires and appetites, the idea of difference on the basis of blackness came to be associated with bodily desires. This is a formulation made in a philosophical project which serves to uphold philosophy as the epitome of endeavors of the mind, supposedly a high and more lofty pursuit. In order to maintain this position, a subject is produced as other — as the radically inaccessible black subject who cannot escape their condition and supposedly has no access to the thinking which would confer full Being upon them.

CHAPTER 4: THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT

We are the composers, [you] racists & gunbearers

We are the artists

Don't tell me shit about a tradition of deadness and capitulation

Of slavemasters sipping tea in the parlor

While we bleed to death in fields

Amiri Baraka (1995: 206)

Immanuel Kant is also an important thinker in the Western philosophical canon who offers us a thoroughgoing idea of the subject. He was a German philosopher who is considered important for influencing the philosophical underpinnings of the European Enlightenment, who wrote important works in epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Kant's influence on Enlightenment reason and his explicit attempts to systematize a racial hierarchy makes him an important figure for those who are interested in considering these aspects together. For example, in postcolonial theory, Deshpande notes the importance of Bhattacharyya's and Spivak's work on Kant " (Deshpande, 2015: 28) and cites Kant as assuming "a special significance for modern Indian philosophers" (Deshpande, 2015: 24), as well as for scholars of race such as Mills (2005). In this chapter we will be considering the subject which Kant proposes, drawing it from his idea of transcendence, teleology, and judgement. In relation to these ideas, we will reflect on Kant's racism and address the question of whether these beliefs cohere with or contradict his formation of the subject. I will begin by outlining the distinction Kant draws between phenomena and noumena and how this distinction informs what is known of as Kant's transcendental idealism. I will then move on to his teleology, and assertions about race.

Unlike Aristotle and Descartes, Kant explicitly addresses the idea of "races". In his *Anthropology*, Kant produces what is intended to be a systematic description of what he describes as the differences between the races. It is noted as an irony that Kant produced such a systematisation without ever leaving his town of Konigsberg, thus relying primarily on second-hand accounts from friends and colleagues. Gayatri Spivak's commentary on Kant will animate our discussion of his racism as consequent of his idea of natural cognition. As in the previous two chapters, we will read these central ideas in terms of the axes: means-ends, ontological principles, and race.

The distinction between noumena and phenomena: transcendental idealism

Immanuel Kant's idea of transcendental idealism is underpinned by a key distinction made in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1998): the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are the human experience of things as they *appear* rather than noumena, which are things in themselves (Kant, 2012: 150). At the outset, the distinction is an epistemological one, taking a cue from Descartes as to the question of what we can know. In their *Dictionary of untranslatables*, Cassin, Apter, Lezra, and Wood (2004: 283) argue that "[a]s objects of non-perceptual intuition, Noumena have only negative signification and do not serve any purpose other than to mark the limits of our perceptual knowledge." Mudimbe (2013: 13) states that Kant "taught us that our knowledge relies on what we perceive." In doing so Kant responds to Descartes' doubt of the external world, by arguing against the notion that subjectivity (as mind) could be possible independently of the reality of anything else. Kant suggests, rather, that the reality of subjectivity and experience are dependent on the reality of objects since, "experience would be impossible if its objects were not in their own right quantifiable, substantial, causally inter-related, and so on" (Schwyzer, 1997: 342). In this view, mind is not some distinct substance, but has a kind of directedness towards the world, and the contents of mind arise out of this directedness. That to which we have access is mediated by sense experience (it is *a posteriori),* and so the only way we can experience things is as *appearances* (Rohlf, 2020), or phenomena. Rohlf (2020) notes that both space and time are for Kant, forms of human intuition which only come about in the event of empirical intuition but otherwise do not exist in themselves (noumenally). Kant states,

> [t]hat space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the existence of things as phenomena; that, moreover, we have no conceptions of the understanding, and, consequently, no elements for the cognition of things, except in so far as a corresponding intuition can be given to these conceptions; that, accordingly we can have no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon (Kant, 1998: 16).

In the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant relates the noumenal to transcendence. He argues that the capacity of the human mind to conceive of the "given infinite without contradiction" (Kant, 2007: 85) and to conceive of the noumenal,

which latter, while not itself admitting of any intuition, is yet introduced as substrate underlying the intuition of the world as mere phenomenon, that the infinite of the sensible world, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, is *completely* comprehended *under* a concept, although in the mathematical estimation *by means of numerical concepts* it can never be completely thought (Kant, 2007: 16).

This brings us to an understanding of transcendence as that of which we can conjure an idea (although never know in totality) *despite* its unavailability to perception. The distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal, allows us to see concepts such as *infinity* as noumenal while phenomenally inaccessible. There can be no tangible, numerically conceivable infinity, so that although it forms part of that which *is* (we can have an idea of infinity)*, it is unavailable to our sensible experience and thus can never be apprehended phenomenally. The infinite is a *transcendent*, we can have an idea of the concept, but cannot ever experience infinity. This point moves Kant to note the remarkable ability of the mind to have an idea of that which is sensorily inaccessible. He points out that "the *mere ability to even think* the infinite without contradiction is something that requires the presence in the human mind of a faculty that is itself *supersensible*" (Kant, 2007: 255, my emphasis). The idea of the noumenal, of things in themselves, "transcends every standard of sensibility" (Kant, 2007: 255) and implies something distinct inhering in the subject who has the faculty to conceptualise that which lies under or beyond sensible experience: it is through this line of reasoning that Kant develops the idea of the *transcendental subject*. Molina explains that "[t]his rational concept of the soul or subject, according to Kant, belongs to the field of noumena and completely exceeds the limits of our knowledge" (2017: 77–78). Molina seems to indicate here that since the subject is transcendental, that self-consciousness is unknowable. Such an interpretation would involve the assumption that Kant's distinction between noumena/phenomena contains a valorisation of *a posteriori* knowledge (appearance) as the only form of valid knowledge. When it comes to the subject, there is for Kant, self-consciousness which "involves *a priori* knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in the principle of apperception, and *a priori* knowledge cannot be based on experience" (Rohlf, 2020). [13] In order to clarify this

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[13] Regarding the meaning of Kant's use of apperception, we can draw from Cassin et al., (2004) they state that we can "differentiate between two levels of self-consciousness and apperception. On the one hand, self-consciousness as a determination of the changing state of the subject in the flux of internal phenomena will be called "empirical apperception," but we are interested here in *pure apperception*, "the unchanging consciousness of an identical "I think," one and invariant […] and the necessary and a priori condition of all consciousness." (Cassin et al., 2004: 767).

necessary and universal truth of self-consciousness to which Rohlf refers, we can turn to Kant's notion of teleology.

Means-ends: Kant's teleology

Teleology

In Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, he dedicates space to explaining what he sees as the role of teleology in the natural world and in the subject, with respect specifically to the human capacity for judgement. He begins this discussion with an argument from natural philosophy, positing that understanding the natural sciences entails an apprehension of organisms as having natural purposes. [14] I will not delve much further into this idea because I am ultimately interested in understanding how this logic comes to bear on his understanding of the subject. Rohlf (2020) notes a difficulty with Kant's explanatory separation of things in themselves with the phenomenal for its difficulty in allowing for a unified world view. Rohlf (2020) states that "Kant's solution is to introduce a third a priori cognitive faculty, which he calls the reflecting power of judgement, that gives us a teleological perspective on the world."

We can turn to Kant's remarks on the topic,

> Now we find in the world beings of only one kind whose causality is teleological, or directed to ends, and which at the same time are being of such character that the law according to which they have to determine ends for themselves is represented by them themselves as unconditioned and not dependent on anything in nature, but as necessary in itself. The being of this kind of man, but man regarded as noumenon" (Kant, 2007: 264).

It is the transcendence of the subject which not only allows it to conceive of noumenal concepts (such as infinity) but also to "set before itself as the highest end – the highest good in the world" (Kant, 2007: 264). This setting is precisely the capacity of judgement mentioned above. This has resonance with what we saw in the description of the teleology of the Greek subject, who is also understood as having an end, as telic. While the Greeks conceived of ends in relation to the city-state, Kant understands teleology as part of the noumenal aspect of man – *man in himself*. He states, "[o]nly in man, and only in him as the individual being to whom the moral

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[14] Ernst Mayr (1992)focuses on the idea of adaptability as an important part of Kant's natural theory but introduces the hand of God since the field of biology was at Kant's time, not well developed. See the paper for a further discussion on natural teleology more generally.

law applies, do we find unconditional legislation in respect of ends. This legislation, therefore, is what alone qualifies him to be a final end to which entire nature is teleologically subordinated" (Kant, 2007: 264). At this juncture, we must address the earlier assertion that is ascribed to Kant by Molina (2017): that the subject is noumenal and therefore beyond what we can know. While explaining the Kantian subject as conceived of in terms of teleology, it is important to note that Kant does not describe the subject in terms of any *defined end* (or telos), this is the transcendence of the rational subject even if understood as teleological. For Kant quote, Man is a subject of *moral being* who is end directed. Enter *judgement*.

Judgement: aesthetics and morality

Kant's moral philosophy is notable and offers a teleological principle which follows from seeing this as the natural logic of organisms, including humans. It is however his idea of *judgement* which bridges the explanatory gap between the transcendental subject and their being part of the world. For Kant, man is subject to the means-ends logic of natural organisms but has the capacity of judgement meaning that he is concerned with the *highest* (undefined, noumenal) ends. Kant writes of this judgement as being of the moral and aesthetic kinds.

It is here worth quoting Kant at length,

> Now since the *faculty of cognition through concepts* finds it's a *priori* principle in the pure understanding (in its concept of nature), and the *faculty of desire* finds its *a priori* principle in pure reason (in its concept of freedom), there remains amongst the general properties of the mind an intermediate faculty or receptivity, namely the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, just as there remains amongst the higher cognitive faculties a certain intermediate power, namely that of judgement. What is more natural than to suspect that the latter will also contain *a priori* principles for the former? (Kant, 2007: 322).

Kant makes clear that the capacity for judgement is an *a priori* principle. He links an idea of basic humanness with judgement, *a priori*, before he gets to an anthropology. This suggests that the marker of fundamental human Being is the capacity for judgement. Whether or not Kant intends to put forward an ontological principle, the Kantian subject is *at base* a subject capable of judgement. This principle which links judgement with the being of the subject toward the highest end. Cohen (2006: 684) states, "[t]he fact that Kant's account of human natural predispositions is teleological is thus central to his biological definition of human nature: man is a natural being whose predispositions are defined in terms of Nature's intentions for the human species." The Kantian subject can be described as having a capacity (judgement)

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which allows it a certain directedness (ends), and judgement is natural and prior to experience. This leads us to the famous Kantian moral position that the just treatment of others involves not seeing them only as means but also always as ends. If we are to think along the lines of ontology, then we can read Kant as suggesting that the moral treatment of others requires an *apprehension of them as fully teleological*. This principle, which calls for a recognition of the other as ontologically whole is, as we will soon see, contradicted in Kant's own work on anthropology.

Ontology: teleology

Spivak offers us much in her critique of Kant, who claims in the *Critique of Judgement* that "it is an *a priori* principle of reflecting judgement that nature is "purposive for a particular employment of our cognitive faculties" (Kant, 2007a: 80) or "purposive for our judgement" (Kant, 2007a: 131). Spivak describes this as Kant's move to ground moral impulse in cognition (Spivak, 1999: 13). We can thus see him as proposing an ontological understanding of human being. Spivak is incisive in this regard,

> [l]et us note this rather special inscription of a judgement programmed in nature, needing culture but not produced by culture, it is not possible to become cultured in this culture if you are naturally alien to it. We should read Kant's description of the desirability of the proper humanity of the human through culture within this frame of paradox, "[w]ithout development of moral ideas that which we, prepared by culture, call sublime presents itself to man in the raw […] merely as terrible" (Spivak, 1999: 12–13).

What we can glean from Spivak's analysis of Kant, is his proposition of a subject who at the level of *Being,* is excluded from the possibility of moral judgement. While Kant speaks of culture as related to the capacity for judgement, Spivak (1999) argues that for Kant there is no culture, which can aid in the development or attainment of the judgement at its base, as judgement is based in *naturality*. Faced with the idea of naturality, a red flag should go up since we have seen this idea at work in the production of the other of the Greek citizen, natural slave. The other of Descartes' subject of reason was seen as naturally lacking reason by being fundamentally *of the body*. Kant's subject defined teleologically, is a subject of means and ends not only at the level of judgement, but at the level for *capacities for judgement* which moves the discussion decisively back to the realm of assertions about fundamental Being. If capacities for judgement are neither a natural given for all people nor can be developed through

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acculturation, then Kant's theory produces a radical other: the subject for whom judgement is inaccessible. This is the philosophical moment in Kant in which racialisation occurs. Not only does Kant present judgement as grounded in cognition, but he also asserts *explicitly* that some are less capable of this judgement.

Race: Spivak's critique of Kant

Kant addresses his beliefs regarding the hierarchisation of races in a number of texts including in his *Anthropology* (Kant, 2007b). He remarks on anthropological observations, relating them to the notion of judgement, which, as we have seen, is important for understanding of aesthetics and morality. As is stated in the General Introduction to *Anthropology*, in this text Kant distances himself from a philosophical mode, stating that he writes "more with the eye of an observer than of the philosopher" (Kant, 2007b: 207). In the interpretive project of this thesis, we have been interested in thinking between two notions of the subject: *subjectus* and *subjectum*. We can understand Kant, in *Anthropology*, to be discussing the *subjectus* (elaboration)*,* the level of thinking the subject at which we difference is inscribed through governmentality. While Aristotle and Descartes make explicit reference to the heritability or naturality of the condition of the other, Kant is the first in our story to link pigmentation directly with this idea of naturality, which he does in his *Observations of the feeling of the beautiful and sublime*. Although contemporary forms of racism are also linked closely with pigmentation in racialisation, Kant's comments still seem especially crass:

> What ridiculous grotesqueries do the verbose and studied compliments of the Chinese not contain: even their paintings are grotesque and represent marvelous and unnatural shapes, the likes of which are nowhere to be found in the world (Kant, 2006: 58).

> The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous (Kant, 2006: 58). […] [N]ot a single one has ever been found who has accomplished something great in art or science or shown other praiseworthy quality, while among the white there are always those who rise up from the lowest rabble and through extraordinary gifts earn respect in the world (Kant, 2006: 58–59).

> The inhabitant of the Orient is of a very false taste in this point. Since he has no conception of the morally beautiful that can be combined with this drive, he loses even the value of the sensuous gratification, and his harem is a constant source of unrest for him (Kant, 2006: 59).

What is especially clear from these racist proclamations, is that Kant sees racialised subjects as incapable of judgement, specifically, aesthetic judgement. He comments repeatedly on the incapacity of the racialised other to appreciate or produce that which he understands as beautiful. Two points herewith are noteworthy. The first is that Kant excludes the racialised subject from having or possibly acquiring the capacity of judgement. Judgement, as we know, is for Kant the *a priori,* transcendental aspect of the subject (Man). In such a formulation, when Kant proclaims, of some, that they lack the capacity for this judgement, he thereby excludes them from ontological wholeness. This returns us, in a more substantial way, to the assertion that Kant's transcendental subject holds in it an ontological principle, which produces a radical other, incapable of the aesthetic and moral judgement he describes as *a priori*. Ronald Judy argues that "[b]ecause Kant's knowledge of *The Negro* is the sort of knowledge which has no empirical content, it is properly a concern of transcendental logic" (Judy, 2019). Judy links judgement to Kant's idea of humanity to find that those marked as *The Negro* apprehended as deficient in this regard (Judy, 2019). In grounding judgement in naturality, Kant suggests that at the very base of being (*subjectum*, related to judgement), some are excluded. This is exclusion from Being, summarily relegating all subjects other than those who represent European Man to the space of ill-being. Like Descartes, Kant moves from epistemological principle (phenomena and noumena) to an idea of the human (the transcendental subject) and subsequently to race. Kant's racist comments highlight once again the recurring idea of the natural slave, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Aristotle's notion of the natural slave) and the rationale of seeing this other as governed by the dictates of the body, which we first noted in Descartes' mind-body distinction.

Kant's understanding of judgement as cognitively given (or otherwise not given for the other), *a priori*, means that he goes further to link natural disposition to race in a form which resonates with forms of contemporary racialisation — linking it to skin pigmentation which, according to him, arise from natural circumstances. Although he might be correct in asserting that skin colour is linked to geographical location, be is unwarranted in the assumption that differences in skin colour yield differences in capacities for judgement. Ronald Judy argues that Kant marks "*The Negro*" as the a priori principle of stupidity; blackness is a signifier that spurs on the creation of the other as *Negro*, "a concept that is not empirical" (Judy, 2019:8). The highest end which Kant identifies as the end of man is noted also as that which allows him to subject all else in its name. As with the previous iterations of othering we have discussed, the slave is the figure who is the object (subject) of this form of subjugation. The highest end belongs to

Man, toward which he can be directed because of his capacity for judgement. We see in Kant, how his philosophical work contributed to the formation of Enlightenment principles. Consider Horkheimer and Adorno's (2002: 1) description, "Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters."

The second point is that in these comments, Kant is not claiming to put forward a personal, subjective taste in the aesthetic, but what he sees as a *universal* aesthetic standard. Charles Mills, a prolific philosopher on the question and problem of race, argues that "[f]ar from being in contradiction to modernist universalism and egalitarianism, […] racism is simply part of it – since the egalitarian theory's terms were never meant to be extended generally outside the European population" (Mills, 2005: 171). In thinking the relation between Kant's moral universalism and his racism, as Bernasconi (2003) does, the position I have been developing in this chapter is that Kant's moral universalism props up his racism (as an inherent part of his core philosophical system), mediated by the idea of judgement as a capacity afforded to some, namely, European Man. Allais (2016: 16) notes a critique of Kant by Adam Smith, "[t]he third way in which Smith presents Kant's account as significant is as the culmination of a development in which 'the universalism of the early Enlightenment gave way to a fragmented view of humanity, on which "barbarous" peoples lay beyond the pale of rationality and morality not just as a contingent consequence of their place of origins, but as a result of who they … were in their "natures"' (Smith 2015: 229- 30),"[15] The not-quite-human other of Kant's transcendental subject is a subject who needs guiding and ruling since they are conceived as lacking the basic capacities for guiding and ruling themselves.[16] In this way, Kant's transcendental philosophy alongside his views on race constitute a justification of slavery from same playbook as Aristotle and Descartes. Once again, the other of the subject put forward is seen as outside of the teleology of the good insofar as participation therein depends necessarily upon the *a priori* capacity for judgement which, of course, is not truly possessed by the racialised other.

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[15] Speaking of Kant's universalism, we can draw on Jean-Luc Nancy to aid us in understanding this a little better: "if *transcendental* means belonging to the order of a priori conditions of possibility, the condition of these conditions, if one may say so, is always the unity of the totality of a system" (Nancy, 2008: 39).

[16] Arthur Bradley states that "Kant insists that human being must be seen as having a naturally given predisposition to free rational activity" and then quotes Kant who says, "Man is indeed the only being on earth that has understanding and hence an ability to set himself ends of his own choice" (Bradley, 2011: 7). This view of autonomy is the Kantian subject rests on the capacity of judgement (which enables the setting of one's own choices). When a subject is apprehended as deficient in respect to judgement, he is not autonomous either.

CHAPTER 5: SUBJECT-IN-THE-WORLD

We must work and fight with the same rhythm as the people to construct the future and to prepare the ground where vigorous shoots are already springing up.

Frantz Fanon (1994: 44)

Martin Heidegger was a German philosopher who was focused on the project of trying to understand and describe the subject. Heidegger's subject, who will animate the discussion in this chapter, is *Dasein*. His work receives criticism on account of his precise yet complex way of describing what he means. To read Heidegger charitably involves understanding him as stretching the bounds of what can be described in both ordinary and philosophical language to explain the rife phenomenon of fundamental Being. Heidegger is often described as having two distinct philosophical projects: the first is the Heidegger motivated by the main question of *Being and Time* and the second is after the turn (*Die Kehre)* in/after which his project shifts to be concerned less with ontology and more with what I have been calling elaboration. I will note the turn as marking a philosophical shift in Heidegger's thought which was used to justify and systematize his Nazism. Since I am interested in the philosophical underpinnings of racist thought in respect to Being, I will focus on his idea of Being in *Being and time* and subsequently, the notion of destiny. Heidegger has rightly come under major criticism for his somewhat recently uncovered Nazism. A conversation about his racism is typically extricated from broader discussions of race and critique of racialisation. This chapter will discuss Heidegger's Nazism as a logic of racialisation which has resonance with the previous iterations of the other that we have been discussing. The usual note on reading stands in this chapter: I will focus here on the central aspects of his idea of Being for my reading along the axes of ontology, means-ends, and race.

Heidegger's central question

In order to understand the central question with which Heidegger was concerned, it is important to understand his critique of Rene Descartes, and Heidegger's neo-Cartesian teacher, Edmund Husserl, both of whom have been discussed in the earlier chapter on Descartes' subject. As we know, Descartes' philosophical system begins with his elegant argument, *cogito ergo sum,* (I think therefore I am) which forms the basis of his mind-body dualism. Heidegger is critical of Descartes' *cogito* for neglecting the question of Being (Heidegger, 1985: 44). While Descartes

has attended to the "I" in "I think therefore I am," it is the "am" (the *sum*) which remains unclarified in Descartes philosophical project. He states,

> [Descartes] investigates the "*cogitare*" of the "*ego*", at least within certain limits. On the other hand, he leaves the "*sum*" completely undiscussed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the *cogito* (Heidegger, 1985: 71).

It is with this that Heidegger turns to the question of Being. In this domain, he is critical of Husserl's neo-Cartesian approach to the question of human essences. This is a disagreement which, as we will see, informs his alternate theory of the nature of human *being* as *Being* (capitalised to indicate reference to the Being as a totality rather than as a reference to particular beings).

Edmund Husserl follows Descartes' by theorising the subject as extricated from the world, by positing what he calls the *epoché* (the suspension of the world). The *epoché* involves suspending judgement as to things in themselves and focusing on phenomena. Schmitt describes this suspension, "we generally believe that objects perceived are real; we believe that we live in a real world. This belief is 'put out of action,' suspended, we make no use of it" (Schmitt, 1959: 238). In bracketing off the world, Husserl turns our attention to the essence of human being understood in terms of consciousness — our experience of things. Husserl follows Kant in asserting that we cannot know things in themselves (noumena), only phenomena. It is this to which Husserl refers when describes his project as an attempt to get "back to the things themselves" (Husserl, 2001: 88), to redirect our engagements with the world from pure reason to things as they are given in experience. That is, he encourages a shift away from the realm of necessary truths in descriptions toward what they *actually are.* In order to do this, he introduces a description of consciousness in which *intentionality* is understood as the mode of encounter with objects of our experience (phenomena). He draws on Brentano's understanding of intentionality as directedness toward content, with consciousness understood as directed to objects, Husserl writes,

> We take intentional relation, understood in purely descriptive fashion as an inward peculiarity of certain experiences, to be the essential feature of 'psychical phenomena' or 'acts', seeing in Brentano's definition of them as 'phenomena intentionally containing objects in themselves' a circumscription of essence, whose 'reality' (in the traditional sense) is of course ensured by examples. (Husserl, 2001: 213).

Recalling Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, Husserl's focus on understanding objects through the lens of intentionality indicates the meaning of the name of the field which Husserl inaugurates, *phenomenology.* As he does frequently, Heidegger critiques this understanding of phenomenology by appealing to its etymology, which indicates that its root allows us to see the phenomenon not the simple fact of experience, but of *appearing*. As per Macquarrie (1973: 11), "phenomenology [for Heidegger] is letting be seen that which shows itself."

In clarifying his understanding of phenomenon, he redescribes phenomenological enquiry as actually being concerned with appearances,

> "*Phenomenon*", the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. "*Appearance*" on the other hand, means a reference relationship which is in an entity itself, and which is such that what *does the referring* (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself and is thus a 'phenomenon' (Heidegger, 1985: 54).

While Heidegger is described as said to be doing phenomenology, we should note that he does not have the same notion of phenomena as Husserl does. For Husserl, Being can be understood from a study of the conscious intentionality of the subject. For further clarification on Heidegger's understanding, he says that appearance "is what shows itself of itself as existing; it is encounters by life insofar as life stands towards its world in such a way that it sees the world" (Heidegger, 2005: 8). Heidegger is interested in things as they *show themselves from themselves*, decentring the subject from an understanding of Being, and moving away from consciousness to a concern with existence, or rather, what does it mean to say that something *exists* (Wheeler, 2022).

Ontology

The ontic and the ontological

Since I use a number of Heideggerian concepts in the opening chapter of this thesis to explain the hermeneutic phenomenological approach of this thesis, the distinction between the ontic and the ontological is not a new one. We have followed Heidegger in emphasising the ontological and gone beyond him when introducing the elaboration. In order to understand Heidegger when he speaks about Being, it is important to clarify the distinction between the ontic and the ontological. A lack of understanding in this regard results in the philosophical

neglect of the question of Being. A footnote by Macquarrie and Robinson in their translation of Heidegger's Being and Time clarifies the difference between the ontic and the ontological,

> [w]hile the terms, 'ontisch' (ontical) and 'ontologisch' (ontological) are not explicitly defined, their meanings will emerge rather clearly. Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with entities and the facts about them (Heidegger, 1985: 31).

To focus on the ontic question of human being is then to seek understanding of the *brute fact* of existence rather than to ask what existence *means*. In other words, ontical inquiry is concerned with entities whereas ontology brings forth the question of Being as a totality. It is with this distinction in mind that Heidegger refers to ontic being as being with a lowercase "b" whereas ontological being is Being, with an uppercase "B." Heidegger states his intention to steer away from the ontic and focus on the ontological. Jussi Backman writes,

> [t]his is simply the turn from already constituted objectivities to the process of their constitution as meaningful, in Heideggerian terms, from an ontic to an ontological approach, from determinate beings or entities to their being (Backman, 2014: 281).

The question about Being as totality rather than the subjective phenomenology of entities also means that Heidegger brings into question Husserl's emphasis on consciousness and intentionality. He does so explicitly by challenging another Cartesian idea used by Husserl: an understanding of the subject from a position of drawing a firm distinction between the subject and the world. This is what is commonly known as the subject-object dichotomy. The subject which he names is *Dasein*, a German word used by Heidegger to denote to the human-specific state of Being, rather than as a kind of brute laying around somewhere. [17] Dasein is understood as a being for whom its own being is an issue. For an explication of Dasein, it is worth quoting Heidegger at length:

> Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that being — a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it.

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[17] Dasein translates to English literally as "Being-there" (Nancy, 2008: 2).

Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological." (Heidegger, 1985: 32).

What makes Dasein is that it is a being for whom its own Being is an issue, it "brings its Being into play, exposing it to having-to-be (and not to becoming) what it is" (Nancy, 2008: 2). While still a subject, Dasein is decentred by understanding it in terms of the world, thus dispensing with the subject-object dichotomy.

The subject-object dichotomy

Husserl's phenomenology depends on the dichotomisation of subject-world, as we have seen, this is reinscribed when he brackets off the world in order to focus on the phenomena through the subjectivity of consciousness and intentionality. To bracket the world as Husserl does is to see the external world as extraneous to understanding of the nature or essence of Being — the subject is understood as explainable independent of the world. This is a supposition which Heidegger challenges, critiquing the subject-object dichotomy. On his view, Being can never be fully grasped without explaining Dasein as *Being-in-the-world*. Heidegger makes the argument that the subject-object dichotomy gets in the way of describing our actual modes of existence. This is a point which can be understood by considering the mode of encounter, *Zuhandenheit*. *Zuhandenheit* translates to *ready-to-hand* and describes the encounter with things as tools. [18] Stapleton (2010: 51) explains readiness-to-hand as, "an expression that captures the serviceability or usability connotations that belong to the very being of implements." Our encounter with the ready-to-hand is not notable until they break down, causing us to reflect on them in their instrumentality. Ultimately, if we are thinking about Being we ought to note that our encounters with the world are not from the outset consciously *reflective*. There is a background of the everyday in which we engage, *pre-reflectively* with the world. As Thoibisana puts it, "Heideggerian worldly and embodied *Dasein* shares a pre-reflective bond between the body and the world" (Thoibisana, 2008: 2). The pre-reflective character of Dasein's everyday suggests that a theory such as Husserl's, which understands the subject as removed from the world, might inadequately explain the totality of Being.

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[18] *Zuhandenheit* is often described alongside the other mode of encounter described by Heidegger, *Vorhandenheit*. While "*Zuhandenheit* is the being of things when encountered in the context of our everyday concernful involvement and practical activities," "*Vorhandenheit* is the being of things when encountered in (seeming) isolation from everyday practical activities such that we simply regard things as having these or those intrinsic properties" (Weberman, 2001: 110).

Burch (2013) describes this as Heidegger's understanding of our being as essentially *pre-theoretical*. To see world as part of Being (a consequence of dissolving the subject-object dichotomy) and yet hold that our encounters are pre-reflective means that Heidegger needs to come up with a different way of describing this encounter in/with the world. The dissolution of the subject-object dichotomy, to relate it to our reading of Kant, also dethrones the subject from its position of being a *judging subject*. The Kantian transcendental subject judges that which is conceived of as external to itself — the world. In order to account for the explanatory gap he has described, Heidegger argues that the ontological mode of Dasein is *Being-in-the-world* with care (or concern) as the primary mode of engagement.

Being-in-the-world and concern/care

Since we have just seen that Heidegger's subject is not a Being of intentional reflection, nor distinct from the world, how does Heidegger explain the ontological mode of encounter of the subject? As put by Jean-Paul Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* (1978: 17), "[w]e know that for Heidegger the being of human reality is defined as 'being-in-the-world'." This idea is formulated in response to the Cartesian-Husserlian philosophical assertion that world is extraneous to Being. Rather, the Being of Heidegger's Dasein is described in terms of the world. The basic structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world is that of care (Sorge) (Backman, 2020: 22). Heidegger says that, "[b]ecause Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern" (Heidegger, 1985: 84). What Heidegger means by *concern* cannot be captured by our colloquial use of the term which indicates a feeling of worry about some state of affairs (this would be in the realm of the ontical). Concern is, for Heidegger, the *ontological* mode of Being as Being-in-the-world. Concern, or care, has three dimensions: projection, thrownness, and fallenness. Each of these dimensions is associated with specific time relations. It here wherein we can make sense of the title of the book with which we are working, as a fleshing out of the notion of Being *and Time*. Projection is associated with the future, thrownness with the present, and fallenness with the past. For the sake of structure and since the following section is dedicated to projectedness, I will begin by explaining the latter two: thrownness and fallenness.

Thrownness is central when explaining the basic tenets of the early Heidegger's ontological theory in *Being and Time* as it captures the notion of being-in, as opposed to the reflective, outside stance to the world by the subject as held by Descartes and Husserl. Heidegger writes that, "[a]n entity of the character of Dasein is its "there" in such a way that, whether explicitly

or not, it finds itself [sich befindet] in its own thrownness" (Heidegger, 1985: 174). Kisiel (1993: 335) says that thrownness is,

> the fact that Dasein is delivered over to its there […]. And in the German, it is but a short step from trust (*Verlasslichkeit*) to forsakenness (*Verlassenheit*), from "leaving it to" the world to "being left," abandoned to the world.

It is once again important to note that the notion of thrownness is ontological rather than ontic and describes the fact of being thrust into relations with other beings, the world, and as Heidegger also attends to, a history. We will set aside a description of Heidegger's notion of history and continue with our description of Heidegger's dimensions of concern, the next dimension of which is *fallenness*.[19]

Heidegger says in fallenness, "Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 'world'" (Heidegger, 1985: 220). Fallenness is manifested in three ways: through idle talk which is the absence of examination in conversation, curiosity, "a search for novelty and endless stimulation rather than belonging or dwelling" (Wheeler, 2022), and ambiguity which constitutes the blurring of the lines between idle talk and genuine understanding (Wheeler, 2022). This is a fallenness into what Heidegger refers to as the "They,' an everyday mode of Being-with, yet also an inauthentic mode of Being which does not have the sense of mineness, from which the idea of *authenticity* gets its root (Wheeler, 2022). We can understand the *mineness* to which Heidegger refers in relation to death. A challenge to Heidegger's assertion about the ontological importance of Being-with comes when this idea would seem to imply that the death of others is shared. Yet, Heidegger asserts that this is not something in which others (other than the dying) can share, it is foundationally my own — *mine*. Heidegger says, in reference to death,

> [i]n suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man 'suffers'. The dying of Others is not something which we experience in genuine sense; at most we are always just 'there alongside' (Heidegger, 1985: 282).

Death is also described by Heidegger as the moment of both the making whole of Dasein and the end of Dasein altogether. Wheeler (2022) describes this as important to note, "it is this awareness of death as an omnipresent possibility that cannot become actual that stops the phenomenological analysis from breaking down." Death is then something that is radically

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[19] On the topic of Heidegger's discussion of history, see Jacques Derrida's *Heidegger: the question of being and history* (Derrida, 2016) and Michael Gillespie's *Hegel, Heidegger, and the ground of history* (Gillespie, 1984).

one's own and is only something which we can be-*towards* and never *in*. We can never experience death since we cannot experience the death of others in the sense of Being-with, nor can we experience our own death since death is the cessation of you as Dasein. The ontological mode related to the future, projectedness, is then one of being-toward-the-end, the end which represents a kind of wholeness. Dasein's ontological aspect of projectedness captures the constant striving of the subject toward a kind of completeness which in the same moment (of death) marks its complete dissolution. [20]

How does Heidegger go from this understanding of Being-toward-death to what he calls Dasein's *potentiality-for-Being*? He writes, in *Being and Time,* "In anticipating [zum] the indefinite certainty of death, Dasein opens itself to a constant *threat* arising out of its own "there". In this very threat, Being-towards-the-end must maintain itself" (Heidegger, 1985: 310). To see death as the ultimate end, rather than justice (as for the Greeks), or the good (as for Kant), and simultaneously the end of Being suggests that the being-towards-death cannot be compared to the striving implied in the Greek or Kantian contexts of ends. Death is the inevitable end while Being involves *dwelling,* as we have just discussed. Heidegger's idea of Being constitutes both the is-ness entailed as temporally stretched — past, present, and future bear on the subject in terms of its Being. The futural notion of projectedness, or potentiality is the aspect of Being which is towards ends and animates the discussion as we move on to our next axis of analysis: the domain of means and ends.

Means-ends: being-toward-the-end

What I will discuss here is the fundamentally telic nature of Dasein. As opposed to being *teleological* (as in Aristotle's philosophy), Dasein's telic nature captures its condition as being-towards something; as futural, having a potentiality for being — what Heidegger refers to as the state of being *not-yet*. He states,

> just as Dasein *is* already its 'not yet' and is its 'not-yet' constantly as long as it *is* already its
> end too. The 'ending' which we have in view when we speak of death does not signify Dasein's

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[20] Nancy's description of the *inoperative community* puts forward similar ideas on death in relation to the political, likely inherited from Heidegger. He discusses communism as "a place from which to surmount the unravelling that occurs with the death of each one of us — that death that, when no longer anything more than the death of the individual, carries an unbearable burden and collapses into insignificance" (Nancy, 1991: 1).

Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein], but a *Being-towards-the-end* [*Sein zum Ende*] of this entity (Heidegger, 1985: 289).

What this means is that Dasein, as the subject, is directed toward the future as a condition of its Being, as a condition of its ontology. Just as fallenness and thrownness relate to dimensions of time (the past and present respectively), projectedness is Dasein's relation to the future, specifically, the end (death). This means that the future, including the certainty of death, bears on Being. Dasein is characterised by a being-in-the-world which approaches it in terms of goal-directedness and has a fundamental towardness. Heidegger asserts that death is not a universal condition of Dasein but instead profoundly Dasein's own (Heidegger, 1985: 290).

While Heidegger begins this conceptualisation of Dasein as directed toward the future in relation to death, this condition of being-toward, of Dasein as a subject of potential, is more general. This is where is it possible to reintroduce our concepts of the *subjectus* and the *subjectum*. Heidegger's subject is a description in fundamental ontology, focusing on the subject as *subjectum*. This means that Heidegger's subject is a subject as opening and, of course, have directedness. Since Heidegger's own descriptions are precise, we can turn once more to a quote,

> [t]he future makes ontologically possible an entity which is in such a way that it exists understandingly in its potentiality-for-Being. Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the projected possibility thematically just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a possibility (Heidegger, 1985: 385–386).

Dasein's telic aspect, its ontological character of *being-towards* allows us to see this notion of the subject as opening, a point which has been made by explaining formal indication in the introductory chapter of this thesis. As I have done in each previous chapter, Heidegger's subject, Dasein, can be interpreted in the domain of means and ends. What is notable in the descriptions of Dasein thus far is the absence of a means logic. The prevailing relations herewith have been the end of death and projectedness. Dasein is conveyed as being toward the final end, the end of Being itself (death) and as being fundamentally futural, open in its potentiality. For Heidegger, the subject cannot be encapsulated by being attentive only to what is present.

Whereas some of the previous ontological principles we have considered seem to propose a sort of teleological Being, with some kind of universal end (such as justice for the Greeks and the good for Kant), Dasein has in its place a kind of openness. Dasein has no ontological end

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aside from death which is the end of ontology itself. The telic end of Dasein described in *Being and Time* is thus not predetermined but rather the subject is understood as an opening. Although Heidegger describes Dasein as projected, he explains one dimension of fallenness: *curiosity*, as getting in the way of dwelling. What this suggests is that authentic Being involves dwelling, and in doing so he avoids what would be an easy slip into inscribing a logic of meansification. Rather than asserting that Being is always and only being-toward a certain realisation, he says that it is toward its own dissolution and that the thrownness of Being contains in it a kind of dwelling that ought to be brought into view. The incompleteness of Dasein as Being-toward-death cannot be *actually* fulfilled, there is no end in the Being of Dasein which might be met. That is, in the ontological notion of Dasein, it has no end other than death and yet remains futural precisely because we cannot experience our own deaths.

In previous chapters, presenting the other of the subject as having distinct ends (for some) were a signifier of the moment at which race enters the principles of ontology. Heidegger's analytic of Dasein in the early sections *Being and Time*, however, avoids such an indictment for the moment. This is of course, not to say that Heidegger did not have an idea of race, but this is absent from the *core ontological description of Dasein*. Race enters in his turn to elaboration. His idea of race was applied to his own deplorable decision to join to the Nazi Party in Germany and to vocalise and act on racism in the form of anti-Semitism. The philosophical argumentation undergirding Heidegger's racism are the intertwined ideas of destiny and *Volk*.

Race: destiny and *Volk*

Heidegger's Nazism has been a topic on which most Heidegger scholars have sought to discuss or address in some way or another. Emmanuel Faye (2011) published the English translation of *Heidegger: the introduction of Nazism into philosophy in light of the unpublished seminars of 1933-1935*, which drew significant attention to Heidegger's Nazism by commenting on then unpublished material. Faye reads *Being and Time* and argues that Heidegger's Nazism was intentional and thought-out rather than occurring in a moment of confusion. He argues that Heidegger's use of the destiny of a people is inherent to his formulation of the subject (Faye, 2011b: 278). In this section, I disagree with Faye by thinking between *subjectum* and *subjectus*. Deleuze and Guattari touch on the Heidegger affair, their consideration appears later in this section. We have been considering all along the question of which principles of ontology fall

into or out of the idea of the subject. Here we have one more: is Heidegger's notion of destiny a description of ontology or elaboration?

Heidegger's ideas of the *Volk* and destiny which go together in his racism, begin with just a description and analytic of destiny in *Being and Time*. As is typical with concepts deployed in Heidegger's thinking, the concept of destiny is understood differently than our colloquial use of the term. While the notion of the *Volk* depends on this idea of destiny, this connection is made later. Heidegger saw *Being and Time* as apolitical, yet Lyotard (1990: 67) argues that since the second section contains a hermeneutics of destiny and historicity in relation to inauthenticity, it is hard to see the text as strictly apolitical.

Destiny

On the topic of destiny, Heidegger's early ruminations can be found in *Being and Time*,

> [d]estiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have always been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein (Heidegger, 1985: 436).

He builds the view here that destiny is not merely an aggregation of distinct, individual destinies but rather is a whole which arises from the "Being with one another." In other terms, destiny is irreducible to individual projectedness. Although Heidegger begins his emphasis on destiny in *Being and Time*, Lyotard asserts that "any deduction, even a mediated one, of Heidegger's "Nazism" from the text of *Sein und Zeit* is impossible" (Lyotard, 1990: 67). The difference between ontology and elaboration which I have been describing throughout this thesis can, however, describe the movement from the first part of *Being and Time* (the analytic of Dasein) and the second part which includes the aspect which Lyotard says has political resonance, while allowing that destiny is where is begins. I am referring here to thinking these parts respectively in terms of ontology and elaboration: what Heidegger moves to in the second part involves not a description of Being in the world, but of *beings* in the world, as ontic. Although his description of destiny rests on non-reductionism, he is no longer only asserting this ontological fact but now is also proposes normative judgements (of *beings* in the world). Lyotard explains the normative claim in which destiny is couched,

> [T]he entire second section is devoted to the *power* that *Dasein,* and notably that destiny called *Volk,* has to escape from inauthenticity and to open itself to the future-as-coming-toward of its fate by giving (delivering) to itself the knowledge of its "having-been" — what is called *historicality* (Lyotard, 1990: 67).

While the idea of the *Volk* connects Heidegger's thought on destiny to his Nazism later on, we can focus on this new development which Lyotard reveals by reading Heidegger hermeneutically: the normative suggestion by Heidegger that Dasein *ought to* escape from inauthenticity. In the first part of *Being and Time*, he is insistent that inauthenticity cannot be understood as a bad (moral, existential or otherwise) — it just *is*. Nevertheless, inauthenticity is undeniably described in a negative light and in the same breath as his notion of *fallenness* to the They [*Das Man*].

Connecting destiny to Volk

To go from Heidegger's notion of destiny to the racialised notion of *Volk* is not a difficult leap to make. Destiny, as we have discussed above is understood as a concept of irreducibility. It is formulated in accordance with Heidegger's *Mitsein* (Being-with), and destiny is the force which guides an ontological collective (although not ontologically *necessary*). The question then arises: who is considered a part of this collective *Mitsein* for whom living inauthentically entails giving themselves over to destiny? Precisely where destiny meets Being-with is the moment at which the *Volk* is inscribed. The *Volk* is the people, rendered more as "The People," upon whom destiny acts. His politics enters notably when, in his elaborative (rather than ontological) move to describe destiny, he introduces *particular destinies*. When different collectivities have distinct destinies, we clearly have racialisation. Deleuze and Guattari say, "Heidegger lost his way along the paths of reterritorialization because they are paths without directive signs or barriers. Perhaps this strict professor was madder than he seemed" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 109). This cursory comment allows us to see their idea of reterritorialization here as a complex relation of what we have called elaboration, akin due to the constant back and forth (simultaneity) of this with absolute deterritorialization (ontology).[21] For them, terrain is more than just land, but a realm in which a concept has force. Deleuze and Guattari describe philosophy in terms which help us to understand the connection between ontological bases and deterritorialization,

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[21] Which, for Deleuze and Guattari, are mediated by *becoming*. See Deleuze, G. and Guattari (2000) where they develop this idea, and also Günzel (1998) for a summarised formulation of the concepts used by Deleuze and Guattari.

> Philosophy is at once concept creation and instituting of the plane. The concept is the beginning of philosophy, but the plane is instituting. The plane is clearly not a program, design, end, or means: it is a plane of immanence that constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 41).

To say that Heidegger introduces Nazism in the project of reterritorialization is also to say that his notion of destiny does not constitute the ontological ground of his philosophy, even if it contributes to the production of the subject as *Volk*. Destiny is elaborative. Destiny forecloses the imaginaries of a *Volk* and those presumed to be in the way of destiny, who were for Heidegger, the Jews.

Black radical thought and ontology

Despite Heidegger's own racism, his ideas in the early part of *Being and Time* have a surprising uptake in black radical thought as it sought to describe the condition of racialisation. A contribution to the Negritude movement by Senghor is the notion of "the 'being-in-the-world of the Negro' as Sartre defined Negritude using Heideggerian language," as quoted by Diagne (Diagne, n.d.). We can see that this idea has at its base, a notion of being-in-the-world, adding race to move from ontological worldliness to a consideration of particular modes of worldliness. This philosophical device is useful for two reasons, one which Sartre points out: that race is subjective, it bears on the subject. The second reason has to do with the description of the ontological basis of Dasein. In the Negritude movement, there is an idea of being-black-in-the-world is as an elaboration rather than ontology. Why must we understand it like this? To begin with, Fanon is correct when he asserts that,

> [o]ntology does not allow us to understand the being of the black man, since it ignores the lived experience. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man (Fanon, 1952: 78).

Blackness cannot be defined ontologically since ontology has to do with the nature of human Being, at its most underlying and basic level. To assert that one could understand race by understanding ontology would be to suggest that race exists at this ontological level. To do so would be precisely to reinscribe race and justify racism. What we are interested in is the negotiation between ontological principles and elaboration. These are elaborations which are presented as ontological insofar as they seek precisely to justify their racism by arguing that it is grounded in ontology. While this is blatantly ontologically incorrect, it nevertheless serves

the purpose for which it was intended: to provide a justificatory basis for race suitable to the prevailing episteme. Just as scientific racialisation flourished when scientific knowledge was afforded a great degree of legitimacy, ontological racialisation lands in an epistemic grid of intelligibility in which universalisms and the study of human essences are valorised. We are then left with the curious occurrence of black radical thinkers deploying Heideggerian concepts and ideas. While in the previous chapters on Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, race is systemised in their notions of Being, the case of Heidegger's Dasein is different. His notions of race appear not on the plane of ontology, but in elaboration. His notion of Dasein, is, to great surprise, prior to racialisation. Of course, he promptly re-introduces a most deplorable form of race later on, in the form of destiny and the Volk, but in his pure ontological principles, the black man can be Man (as Dasein), without foreclosed ends.

Grant Farred discusses David Farrell Krell's argument in *Ecstasy, Catastrophe* (Krell, 2015), stating that, "Krell is doing nothing other than 'thinking' about Heidegger's failure to think; Krell castigates Heidegger for failing himself and 'descending' into that form of discourse Heidegger most despised: polemic" (Farred, 2013: 30). Farred notes the irony of his own personal engagement with the work of Heidegger, the anti-Semite, who "puts [him], the black man from southern Africa, in a position to counter a racist question" (Farred, 2013: 75). In his memoir, *Looking through philosophy in black*, Mabogo Percy More notes that it is Heidegger's notion of *thrownness* as that which allows him to make sense of his (More, 2019: 109) *being-black-in-the-world*, which can only be for the reason that race is not produced as a necessary other to the ontology of Dasein, but rather outside of it. Polemic is what Farred refers to, and what I have discussed here, as a formulation of race on the plane of the elaborative aspect of the subject, Heidegger's form of racialisation forecloses ends, but does so elaboratively, while Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant use racialisation to deny the possibility for the racialised subject to possess an ontology at all. While More can think about being-black-in-the-world with Heidegger, he cannot think about his own being in Aristotle, Descartes or Kant, because there is no sense in which he is apprehended as an ontological entity in the first place.

The means-ends structure we have noted in the previous three chapters is at work slightly differently in Heidegger, perhaps moving us closer toward an ontological humanism: wherein the idea of the human is, at the level of ontology, not a raced subject. The Greek subject, Cartesian subject, and Kantian subject are constructed with an other as *necessary to the description of the subject.* This clearly requires that we stop reading Heidegger before his work on destiny but might help us to uncover the principles on which we might begin to base a truly

ontological idea of the subject. What is important is that *we can* have an idea of Dasein without necessarily producing a racialised other as an ontological description. Heidegger's notion of the subject as opening, as futural, which is the important understanding of Dasein is contradicted by the closing off which Heidegger conducts when he introduces destiny.

CHAPTER 6: THE NEOLIBERAL SUBJECT

The enthronement of the means as the end, which in late capitalism is taking on the character of overt madness, is already detectable in the earliest history of subjectivity.

Horkheimer and Adorno (2002: 43)

In this chapter, we turn finally to an explicit exposition of the neoliberal subject. It is this chapter in which I will track what is eventually a critique of neoliberalism through an analysis of its subject. It is through understanding neoliberalism as a subject producing governmentality that we can apprehend it and offer a critique thereof. In this chapter, I will draw on three thinkers to consider the subjects they describe in the effort to diagnose the problems of their respective times. Unlike the previous chapters in which critique was offered in response, the main theories here are themselves forms of critique. Karl Marx's subject of labour provides a basis for understanding and critiquing capitalistic logic, Michel Foucault's subject of discourse makes available an elaborative critique and apprehension of neoliberalism through an understanding of the subject, and Wendy Brown's subject of neoliberal governmentality offers a useful development of Foucault's argument. This reading has been constructed by taking a cue from the book, *Mutant Neoliberalism* (Callison & Manfredi, 2020), in which it is pointed out that the "three most influential approaches to theorizing neoliberalism [are]: Marxist, Foucauldian, and anthropological" (Callison & Manfredi, 2020: 10). My focus on notions of the subject means that I set aside the anthropological approach and focus on the former two, not only as distinct approaches but as situated in a conversation about diagnoses and understanding what these theorists see as the major problems of our time. [22] As I have been doing throughout this thesis, this chapter will also involve staying close to the text on a limited set of concepts which have been recurring and which resonate with our thematic structure. In this chapter, we address theorisations of the neoliberal subject and assess them through our three axes. We focus on what it might mean for our understanding of the neoliberal subject if it is seen as inheriting something of the prior subjects we have considered.

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[22] Anthropological accounts seek to focus on the ontic, manifestations of culture and society, whereas I am interested in thinking the relation between this and the proposition of ontological principles. Qadri Ismail develops this description of anthropology in his book, *Culture and eurocentrism* (Ismail, 2015).

Karl Marx: the subject of labour and the notion of value

We begin with Marx, since his critique and understanding of capital has come to inform swathes of subsequent critique. Although we should be clear not to equate neoliberalism with capitalism, they are not completely distinct. Marxist critique is important to understand as informing a way of thinking about neoliberalism. The approach I will take here is to heed what Marx notes about capitalism, suggesting later that neoliberal governmentality shares with it a kind of logic while operating on a different plane. I will focus here on Marx's notion of the subject as a subject of labour. In doing so, we can begin by understanding the ideas of exchange-value and use-value. Use-value is the value of a commodity determined by its utility. Marx says, "[t]he utility of a thing makes it a use-value" (Marx, 1906: 42) whereas exchange-value is the value of a commodity in relation to other goods on the market. What is present in the determination of use value is labour-power. Marx states, as quoted by Spivak (2000: 3) that,

> the common factor in the exchange-relation…is its value. We must now consider value independently of this [exchange] form of appearance. A use-value or good [*Gut*] therefore, has value only because *abstract* human labour is objectified in it.

Use-value then is determined by the abstract labour with which it is produced. Marx states,

> [W]hen commodities are exchanged, their exchange value manifests itself as something totally independent of their use-value. But if we abstract from their use-value, there remains their Value as defined above. Therefore, the common substance that manifests itself in the exchange value of commodities, whenever they are exchanged is their value […] a use-value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because human labour in the abstract has been embodied or materialised in it. How, then, is the magnitude of this value to be measured? Plainly, by the quantity of the value-creating substance, the labour, contained in the article. (Marx, 1906: 45).

Marx makes the point that the use-valuation of labour in the production of a commodity is higher than the exchange-value of labour determined by the owner of the means of production (the capitalist). In the exchange relation of determining the prices of commodities, the labour value is deemed lower than appropriate (or actual) and extracted by the owner of the modes of production. This is what Marx refers to as the extraction of surplus labour value. Gidwani explains this, the labour theory of value, by relating it to the advent of private property,

> Class power is sustained with the aid of a legal-juridical system of private property and an ideological apparatus that lends commodity exchange a phantom objectivity; and together they

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enable capitalist employers to extract surplus product from labor during the moment of production and recover it as surplus value in the realm of exchange (Gidwani, 2008: 156).

How then are we to understand Marx's conception of subject as the subject of labour? As discussed by Spivak, it is not *labour* which is inherently capitalistic, it is the seizing of labour-power by capital (Spivak, 2000: 4). The subject of Marx is then a subject of labour insofar as labour is abstract — a subject of *objectified* labour. This subject is not just a *labour-ing* subject, as though labour is just one mode of humanness, the subject apprehended by capital is a subject understood as a site of *potential* labour — as something which can be distinct from the subject but comes along with it. Capitalistic reason, in this view, apprehends the subject as the place where objectified labour resides and thus understands its subject only in terms of inputs to production — means of production of which capitalists might see themselves as the owner. This involves the negation of seeing the labour of the subject as part of the *subject*, instead, labour becomes the labourer's *object*. This is how we might begin to understand Marx's idea of *alienation*. He points out through the notion of alienation, or *estranged labour*, that the subject of labour is separated from their ends (the product). It is worth quoting Marx at length from the *Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts of 1844*,

> Labour produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a *commodity* — and does so in the proportion in which it produces commodities generally. This fact expresses merely the object which labor produces — labor's product — confronts it as *something alien*, as a *power independent* of the producer. The product of labor is labor which has been congealed in an object, which has become material: it is the *objectification* of labor. Labor's realization is its objectification. In conditions dealt with by political economy this realization of labor appears as *loss of reality* for the workers; objectification as *loss of the object* and *object-bondage*; appropriation as *estrangement,* as *alienation* (Marx & Engels, 1988: 71).

Alienation is the estrangement from the object of labour precisely because this labour is objectified. This objectification is a result of the way in which the owner of the means of production (or capitalist) apprehends labour: as purchase-able and thus distinct ("independent") from the producer. It is in this separation that labour becomes objectified and what is produced from this labour is alien to the maker or estranged from them. This is what Marx refers to as "the loss of the object, his product" (Marx & Engels, 1988: 72). It is to this object that the worker becomes a slave: his labour is object and for this labour he receives the means of subsistence. It is important to note here that for Marx, this constitutes the subjection of the worker to *his object* (Marx & Engels, 1988: 72).

Means-ends in Marx

What we have considered of Marx (and Spivak's Marx) can be developed by reading these ideas along our axis of means and ends. We can say about the objectification of the labour of the subject of capital, that the worker becomes subjected to the logic of *means*. The objectification of labour means that it comes to be understood in terms of utility for both the producer (in the form of the resultant product) and for the worker, who is "rewarded" with the means of subsistence. The idea of the potential of the subject is constrained to potential products and potential earnings which are *ends* for the capitalist. Ends, for the subject as a whole, are obscured when this subject is apprehended as a worker. While Marx here understands the alienated subject as subjected to the object, we can offer a revised notion of alienation as the subjection to *means*. Herbert Marcuse states, "[t]he enslavement of man by the instruments of his labor continues in a highly rationalized and vastly efficient and promising form" (Marcuse, 2007: 45). While we can read the use of "instrument" here as referring to objectification, the underlying logic of instrumentality is not simply objectification, but *meansification*. This is a logic to which Marcuse gestures when he states, "[l]ife as an end is qualitatively different from life as a means" (Marcuse, 2007: 19). In this, we find yet another occurrence of the figure of the slave which avails in our reading of theory in the domain of means and ends, revealing the other, once again, in the absence of ends. The one-dimensional man of which Marcuse writes is Man subjected to a logic of means. Marcuse (2007) quotes Gilbert Simondon's *du Mode d'existence des objects techniques* (Simondon, 2017) (writing about technics and slavery) in a footnote: "[t]he machine is only a means: the end of the conquest of nature, the domestication of natural forces through a primary enslavement." While Simondon is writing about the machine as the slave, the logic of slavery which he notes is that the slave is subjected to a logic of means. The subject in a capitalistic grid of intelligibility is apprehended as *being for* certain ends: the ends of the capitalist, just as, perhaps the Greek subject was involved with the ends of the city. There is an important difference though: the subject of capital does not have a teleology that is his *own*. The Greek citizen has justice and eudaimonia as his own end, even if the former puts this subject in an ontological relation with the city. The subject of capital is subject *only* to the ends of the capitalist; this subject is apprehended as having no telic ends of its own, but only seen as means. This notion of alienation is consistent with the mode of subjection which we have been tracking: the *subjugation* stemming from the foreclosure of the ends of the subject. We have been suggesting

that this kind of alienation (from ends) is an ontological alienation. Yet Marx's formulation is not conceived of on this level.

Ontology in Marx

In our conceptual history thus far, we have stumbled upon race through the figure of the other (and through the lack of end-ing in relation to Being). Yet in Marx, we do not find a discussion of race or racialisation. Marx's concept of alienation operates on a plane of elaboration rather than ontology[23]. It concerns the worker as they relate to their *material* reality, even while labour is understood as abstracted by the capitalist. The objectification of labour is not conceived in ontological terms — it does not suggest that the worker is apprehended as different (deficient) at the level of Being. Heidegger argues in his *Letter on Humanism* that,

> Because Marx by experiencing estrangement attains an essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history, is superior to other historical accounts. But since neither Husserl nor Sartre recognises the essential importance of the historical in Being, neither phenomenology nor existentialism enters the dimension within which a productive dialogue with Marxism first becomes possible (Heidegger, 2018: 96).

That is, Marx's theory of alienation, although astute, does not understand alienation in terms of ontology. Rahel Jaeggi points this out, arguing in her book *Alienation* that to critique alienation for its destruction of human "particularity and nonfungibility" (Jaeggi, 2014: 5) goes beyond a Marxist critique. Jaeggi makes clear the different levels of analysis from which Marx's and Heidegger's respective notions of alienation emerge. In her words, Marx focuses on "a paradigm of production" (Jaeggi, 2014: 11) while Heidegger describes this in terms of being-in-the-world — on the ontological plane. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world holds in it the assertion that "our relations to self and to world are equally primordial" (Jaeggi, 2014: 18) and Jaeggi refers to Heidegger's inauthenticity as an idea of alienation: alienation from self and world. Jaeggi's analysis notes this alienation as one form thereof, marking the absence of relationality. But her analysis ends there and does not heed Heidegger's temporal emphasis in *Being and Time,* a line of thought related also to inauthenticity. Heidegger's subject is a subject who is futural. In this understanding, alienation is not restrained to Marx's historical materialism which can refer to alienation in only past or present terms. Heidegger discusses in *Being and Time,* the alienation

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[23] While Marx's *alienation* is not an ontological concept, Hannah Arendt does note that Marx has an ontological principle which she says leaves us with the "rather distressing alternative between productive slavery and unproductive freedom" (Arendt, 1998: 105).

of falling into a Being-in-the-world without heeding the own-ness of Being; he says, "[t]his alienation *closes off* from Dasein its authenticity and possibility" (Heidegger, 1985: 222). To explain Heidegger's inauthenticity as a kind of alienation, we can understand this alienation as destructive of futurity/potentiality/ends. A Heideggerian idea of alienation, understood in relation to capital, calls on us to see the objectification of labour in terms of means and ends (as I have done above). This would mean to see capital as acting to determine not only the present, but as *limiting potentiality*.

Moreover, the loss of relationality noted by Jaeggi and the foreclosure of ends which I have just discussed are not just about the relation of the Marxian subject to their objectified labour and products, alienation in this formulation is the alienation *of self, from self*. Self has in its ontology a futurity which cannot be apprehended in the capitalist grid of intelligibility. In this discussion of Marx's subject of labour, I have used a discussion of two interpretive axes: means-ends and ontological principles. Where and how do we begin to talk about race in Marx, since the argument, unlike those in previous chapters has not naturally brought us there?

(Absence of) race in Marx

In what has been discussed throughout the chapters of this thesis, the racialised subject has appeared at the moment where ends are denied to the other at the level of ontology. Marx's project advocates the pragmatic principle of mobilisation along class lines and in doing so, renders analysis of racialisation detrimental to the outcome of revolution. It is, however, the case that Marx's analysis contains seeds of the very same exclusionary logic we have been discussing: the foreclosure of ends. How then, does he avoid the question and problem of racialisation in his formulations? Marx is only able to do so by remaining on the level of elaboration and, as we have seen argued by Heidegger, Marx's historical materialism neglects the question of Being. We have seen throughout this thesis, that racialisation comes about in the subjection of the subject to a logic of means; the relegation of the subject to the realm of ill-being. If we see racialisation as only relating to pigmentation, we cannot see its intertwinement with logics also deployed in capitalist logic. As stated by Richard Peterson,

> However we assess the importance of racism in earlier philosophy, our expectations for Marx can only be correspondingly greater. This is partly because he lives at the time racism becomes an explicit intellectual doctrine, but it is also because of his aim to challenge the failure of the modern world to deliver on the Enlightenment's promise to realize universal principals. If race

and racism are characteristic defects of the modern world, then any thinker who claims to challenge that world "at its roots" will have to address these defects (Peterson, 2005: 235).

All mobilisation following from Marx's Capital occurs along the lines of class, at the expense of acknowledging the inextricable emergence of racialisation in the logic of the other of the ontologically whole subject. In moving on to our analyses of contemporary conceptualisations of neoliberalism, we will see that the notion of race remains absent from the core descriptions of this mode of reason.

Foucault: the neoliberal subject of discourse

Michel Foucault was a philosopher rooted in the French tradition who was interested in understanding the workings of power by focusing on historicity. The primary unit of consideration for Foucault is the production of the subject. While we have, throughout this thesis, been referring to the subject by thinking between *subjectus* and *subjectum* (or ontology and elaboration), Foucault disavows a view of the subject as describable first in terms of fundamental being and *then* produced in a certain way by exercises of power. Rather, he focuses on describing the subject as a whole, as produced by these exercises which is why he is careful to offer a systematic understanding of power.

Foucault invokes genealogy (as a reference to Friedrich Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*) and focuses on describing the subject and its historical production through the deployment of power. Foucault was interested in diagnosing the overreaching and deeply prevalent problem of his time, but he did so by reading the subject of said time. These times are considered by Foucault with historicity in sight, yet he describes particular orders of subject production as *discursive formations*, somewhat more similar to the method of reading a conceptual history (as we have been doing). He says,

> I shall accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation; to break them up and then to see whether they can be legitimately reformed; or whether other groupings should be made; to replace them in a more general space which, while dissipating their apparent familiarity, makes it possible to construct a theory of them (Foucault, 2004: 29).

Like Koselleck (with his notion of conceptual history), Foucault is not interested in the possibility of a total history, and so turns to discourse instead. He says, "the questions proper

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to such an analysis might be formulated in this way: what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else?" (Foucault, 2004: 31). He is then, of course, at pains to explain the way he reads power and how it produces the subject, which he does brilliantly through his connection of power and knowledge. Power, says Foucault, is constituted through its link to the epistemological structures. The possibility to perform coercive acts (acts of power) depends upon what is deemed, in that specific discursive structure, to be a legitimate form of knowledge. What counts as knowledge informs the discourse and the specific logic on which the subject is constituted. Foucault captures this idea in the neologism, *power-knowledge*, which comes to be encapsulated in the concept of *governmentality*, denoting, *governing rationality*. That is, a governmentality is the mode of reason (what counts as reason), which makes up a prevailing discursive structure.

Given this schematic of Foucauldian philosophy, we can move on to his later conceptualisation of the neoliberal subject. His death prevented him from further developing this postulation and from producing a written text emerging from his lectures on *The birth of biopolitics* (Foucault, 2008). Foucault sees neoliberalism as a governmentality and in doing so, offers a critique which is on a different plane than Marxian critique. While Marx sees capital as having a material-historical effect on the subject, Foucault understands the subject as *produced* by and in certain historical-epistemological modes of reason (governmentality). The Foucauldian subject is conceived always already inscribed upon in the dual dispensation of power/knowledge.

It is important to note here that Foucault challenges a philosophical starting point in which there is an appeal to an ontologically basic humanness on which to explain his understanding of a particular discourse and its subject(s). Johanna Oksala describes this, "[r]ather than translating the true ontology into the right politics, he reverses the argument. The radicality of his method lies in showing how the ontological order of things is in itself the outcome of a political struggle" (Oksala, 2010: 445). For him, the subject is a *made* subject. Foucault states, that "there is no such thing as a neutral subject" (Foucault, 2003: 15), that there is no subject who is not a subject of a particular discursive structure of power/knowledge. If these are the terms on which Foucault understands the subject, then how can he conceive of liberation? As Foucault states in *On the Genealogy of Ethics,* "[f]rom the idea that the self is not given to us, I think there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (Foucault, 1984: 251). Jaeggi frames Foucault's understanding of the self as self-*invention* rather than *finding* oneself (Jaeggi, 2014: 186). It is not clear, however, that to view the self as self-inventive precludes (or does without) an ontological principle.

From our distinctly ontological emphasis on the subject as an opening, understood from within the Heideggerian frame of formal indication (what Balibar has referred to as the *subjectum*) the subject is a site of potential. Jaeggi describes the counter-Enlightenment quality of Foucault's self-invention, "producing oneself is a strategy of the subject for not simply abandoning itself without resistance to formation through power (which at the same time constitutes it)" (Jaeggi, 2014: 187). What Foucault must inevitably see as the base upon which the self is produced (as a work of art, as Jaeggi describes it) or as that upon which governmentality bears (or does not), as an opening. While Foucault is often read as distancing himself from an ontological formulation, it is not clear that this frees him from ontological presuppositions altogether. The only thing which he avoids is a full-fledged description of this condition. This project, nevertheless, concurs with Foucault's, which we can describe in the terms of Sylvia Wynter's project for the creation of new humanisms: to conceive of the subject as a site of potential and thus resistance. What I have been trying to offer is an alternative apprehension of the subject on the basis of ontology which makes clear the instances of misapprehension of the subject inherent in certain governmentalities (specifically, race and neoliberalism). In emphasising the subject as a site of self-invention, Foucault problematises the discursive structures which disallow for this apprehension of the subject as self-inventive. [24] By putting an emphasis on potential, self-making, and directedness, Foucault notes the own-ness of this self-invention from which we can garner the seeds of his critique (in Marxist terms) of capital as stifling the project of self-invention. He points this out, speaking about the subject of labour in *The Order of Things*, "when he attempts to re-apprehend himself as a labouring being, he cannot bring even the most rudimentary forms of such a being to light except within a human time and space which have been…institutionalised" (Foucault, 2005: 359). The subject is then subjected to the governing rationality of the institution; it is subject to the ends of this governmentality rather than having space for its own invention.

This is where we begin to see a connection in Foucault between the labouring subject (such as that of Marx) and understanding its (mis)apprehension. When Foucault turns later in his life to the question of the neoliberal subject, he describes its subject as *homo economicus,* "whose life is devoted to exchange and barter" (Foucault, 2003: 198). [25] Homo economicus is for Foucault,

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[24] Kendall R. Phillips (2002: 334) writes about Foucault's invention as residing in "spaces of dissension" and thus a resistance to what is often thought of as Foucault's discursive determinism.

[25] The term *homo economicus* is spelled like this by Foucault, but Wendy Brown (as we shall see later), refers to this subject as *homo oeconomicus*. I use these varied spellings to refer to the description of this subject in respective instances.

the subject of neoliberal discourse, "this does not mean that the whole subject is condensed as homo oeconomicus […] It simply means that economic behaviour is the grid of intelligibility one will adopt on the behaviour of a new individual" (Foucault, 2008: 252). Neoliberal governmentality entails that what comes to constitute this particular structure of power/knowledge are the principles of the market. Neoliberalism is, for Foucault, constitutes the subject in the field of elaboration.

Foucault locates the beginning of neoliberal thought in the Ordoliberal German circles, specifically the Freiburg School of economists formed by Walter Euken in 1948 (Foucault, 2008: 108). The ideas of the Freiburg School came to be known as *ordoliberalism* which posited the notion of the social market economy, "taking the formal principles of a market economy and referring and relating them on to a general art of government" (Foucault, 2008: 131) in order to "make it possible to nullify the social irrationality of capitalism" (2008: 130). Ordoliberalism is where Foucault locates the emergence of neoliberal logic (if not neoliberalism in name). What occurs in the advent of ordoliberal reason is the view of the state, not as a regulator of the economy, but as its dispenser; state dispensation becomes coextensive with an economic one. Bonefeld (2012: 343) notes about ordoliberalism, that "[t]his practice is fundamentally one of social policy to secure the sociological and ethical preconditions of free markets." Ordoliberal reason, rather than introducing the state logic to the market, encourages the state to operate on market principles. Foucault (2008: 160) puts it succinctly, "a state under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state." Foucault goes on, in this lecture on *The Birth of Bio-politics*, to describe what is contained in such a logic and whether the state can deliver on state duties in the context of this logical structure. He states that while the liberal order places purchase on the idea of exchange, the ordoliberal (and thus neoliberal) order operate on the logic of competition. This is the principle of the ordoliberals which mark them out as distinct from classical liberals – the idea that competition ought to become the logic to which even the state becomes subject. Social policy comes to be defined as that which allows for the free functioning of market competition. As Foucault (2008: 143) describes it, "[s]ocial policy cannot have equality as its objective. On the contrary, it must let inequality function." It is social policy which does not have society as the beneficiary of its welfare functions, but rather individuals are the unit whose well-being is of concern: "[t]his leads us to the conclusion that there is only one true and fundamental social policy: economic growth" (Foucault, 2008: 144). Well-being here denotes the capacity to purchase and sell yourself. While Foucault says much more about the specifics of

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Ordoliberalism, including developing its intellectual history, I would like to draw into focus two aspects of neoliberalism (understood through the ordoliberals) on which Foucault touches and which are significant for our later move to Wendy Brown in the next section: first, the centring of the *individual* in the ordoliberal idea of social policy, and second, the assertion that social policy comes to be subjected to an emphasis on economic growth as the central goal.

While Foucault refers to neoliberal governmentality as an individualising force, he points to what this tradition inherits from classical liberalism, despite understanding neoliberalism as much more than a mere resurgence of classical liberal assumptions. Foucault notes the atomism of liberal economics and ideology present in the suggestion that individuals are a central unit of analysis and can be assumed to be rational and self-interested. However, he argues that while there might be this individualising force, the

> true economic subject is not the man of exchange, the consumer or producer, but the enterprise, in this economic and social regime in which the enterprise is not just an institution but a way of behaving in the economic field – in the form of competition in terms of plans and projects (Foucault, 2008: 175).

Freedom in neoliberalism, argues Foucault, is not freedom to act as one might wish, it is the freedom of individuals to behave freely *through participation in enterprise* (Foucault, 2008: 175). He states, "for what is private property if not enterprise? What is a house if not an enterprise?"[26] (Foucault, 2008: 148). It is with the primary economic agent as enterprise through which economic growth can take centre stage as the end to which all is subject — natural resources and humans alike. Individual neoliberal humans are not themselves expected to do economic growing, they must participate in this through the activities of enterprise. It is economic growth, "and only economic growth" (Foucault, 2008: 144) which frees the individual. To sum up the important aspects of Foucault's ideas for our purposes: the neoliberal subject is one who is subject to neoliberal governmentality, which means that neoliberal discourse defines the grid of intelligibility, and so this subject, in every realm of existence is subjected to the overarching end of neoliberal governmentality: economic growth.

In thinking the neoliberal subject, Wendy Brown takes a Foucauldian approach, describing the neoliberal subject and the extent to which neoliberal governmentality can allow for genuine democratic practice. Her conclusion is critical: she argues that neoliberalism undoes

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[26] Foucault reminds us that the concept and practice of economics comes from management of the Greek household (*Oikonomia*) (Whyte, 2019: 15).

democracy, through undermining the possibility of an actively political *demos* from the title of the book, *Undoing the demos: neoliberalism's stealth revolution* (Brown, 2015)*.* In making this argument, Brown offers us an incisive description of the neoliberal subject, to which we will now turn.

Wendy Brown: the neoliberal subject as *homo oeconomicus*

Wendy Brown is a contemporary theorist on neoliberalism who focuses on understanding this phenomenon through subjectivity. She notes two dimensions of critique and comprehension of neoliberalism, the neo-Marxist dimension which is concerned with economic policies, and the Foucauldian dimension which is concerned with explaining neoliberalism as a mode of reason (governmentality) and as producing a subject (Brown, 2019). Along with Brown, we are focusing here on the latter dimension of neoliberalism, while drawing on similar analyses present in Marx (and our reading of Marx earlier in this chapter). Brown inherits much from Foucault, including the emphasis of the subject, and governmentality, as well as contributing to a development of his somewhat incomplete description of the neoliberal subject. Brown diverges from Foucault in two significant ways. The first way is that she locates the start of neoliberalism not with the ordoliberals, but with the first use of explicitly neoliberal policies. Here she speaks of Pinochet's neoliberal Chile, Friedrich Hayek's neoliberal theorisations, Margret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and Ronald Reagan in the United States of America. Brown draws on the discourse associated with this particular economic movement during the 1970's, noting especially the neoliberal assault on the *social.* The second important way in which Brown's theory of neoliberal governmentality differs from that of Michel Foucault's is in seeing this mode of reason as explained by *economization* rather than marketization or competition. She explains economization as the logic of neoliberal governmentality and follows from Foucault's point that in neoliberalism, everything becomes subjected to its logic. This is developed systematically and rigorously in her description of the *homo oeconomicus* as a little capital.

Neoliberal homo oeconomicus: the little capital

Wendy Brown asserts that "[i]n neoliberal reason and in domains governed by it, we are only and everywhere *homo oeconomicus*" (Brown, 2015: 10). As we have discussed, Foucault emphasises the role of marketization and thus competition as the ultimate mode governing the neoliberal subject. He does so by making the important assertion that it is the logic of the

enterprise the basis of which everything in neoliberal governmentality is apprehended. The logic of the enterprise, Foucault says is the logic of competition and comes to direct not only firms (enterprises) but also states and subjects. Wendy Brown concurs on the point that the rationale of the firm which comes to apply to every other realm, but her understanding of this is somewhat different. Rather than competition, she posits *economization* as the core operating logic. Brown states, "[p]ersons and states are construed on the model of the contemporary firm," they "maximize capital value in the present and enhance their future value" (2015: 22). She describes this neoliberal subject as a *little capital*. Brown's concept of the little capital has resonance (whether intentional or not) with Jacques Lacan's notion of the *little object* which is for him the object of desire towards which we constantly strive but never attain. It is perhaps possible to say of Brown's little capitals that they are constantly striving towards fulfilment in the form of maximised capital but never attain such a thing since it is impossible to reach final growth or capital accumulation in a mode of governmental reason which sees this as a perpetual endeavour. Enough can never be had. For a more extensive analysis of this perpetuity, see Satiaseelan Naidoo (2020). Naidoo (2020: 240) says, referring to a mode of Being of some organizations (citing Amazon as an example) that the perpetual organization does not have a sense of its own end-ing as constitutive of its Being. Connecting Brown and Lacan here allows us to read this, too, as a condition of neoliberal subjectivity.

We can clearly see the use of Marx's thinking Brown's argument that the logic of capital comes to dictate the terms every realm of existence. While in Marx's theory of capital, it is the owners of production who are constantly trying to maximise growth and profit by apprehending the labour of workers as a kind of capital to be used most efficiently, in neoliberalism this logic comes to be deployed in every aspect of existence. Brown states, "neoliberal *homo oeconomicus* takes its shape as human capital seeking to appreciate its value rather than as a figure of exchange or interest" (Brown, 2015: 33). The important coherence between what both Brown and Foucault to emphasise here is that the ultimate (and only) end valued in the proliferation of neoliberal governmentality is economic growth. The idea of the neoliberal subject as a little capital resolves the tension present in Foucault's *The Birth of Biopolitics* lectures in which he refers to neoliberalism as both having the enterprise as its subject and logic while simultaneously asserting that it is *individualizing*. In Brown's conception of the little capital, the individual *is* a kind of firm, subject to intelligibility only on the basis of the logic of the firm. The theory of economization here is more attuned to that and how neoliberal governmentality seeps into every realm of existence. The production of the subject as little

capital is one which Wendy Brown critiques vehemently and aptly. Her critique is made on two levels, one is a critique of neoliberalism for the sort of subject it produces and the other points to the incapacity of neoliberalism as a governing rationality to create the environment for a true democratic dispensation. With regard to the latter, Brown argues that the *homo economisation* of subjects is destructive of the possibility for a *homo politicus*. Since we are interested in conceptions of the neoliberal subject, we will focus on her former point.

Brown argues that the rendering of all individuals into little capitals means that these individuals are end directed (Brown, 2015: 37–38) since they are constantly maximising their own capital potential to the end of economic growth. With widely proliferated neoliberal governmentality comes accedence to the notion that economic growth is the only end for social policy. Social policy is conceived of as promoting freedom, but is freedom possible at all when economic growth is the end to which all neoliberal subjects are directed? The endeavour to improve capital potential cannot be understood as an individual *end* but really only a strengthening of their position as means, as contributors to the ultimate end of economic growth which is outside of themselves. Brown states that it is this function of neoliberal reason in which *neo*liberalism breaks with the humanistic character of liberalism: "we are no longer creatures of moral autonomy, freedom or equality. We no longer choose our ends or the means to them" (Brown, 2015: 42). Brown asserts that neoliberalism posits a "bad ontology" (Brown, 2015: 104), wherein the subject comes to be apprehended in terms of value and is subjected to market metrics not only in respect to labour, but in every domain of human existence. With the widespread proliferation of neoliberal governmentality comes the production of a subject which is apprehended as though it is in an ontological sense only a means.

We have been working, throughout this text with the idea of the subject as opening, as having a potentiality and I have here (above) asked about freedom. All of these concepts evoke the idea of human flourishing. Just as we have done in previous chapters, we can say once again that the foreclosure of ends of the subject as produced in neoliberal governmentality, does not allow for the apprehension of the subject in its ontology as opening or potential for self-invention, as Foucault has put it. It is interesting that Brown describes the neoliberal subject in these terms, drawing on Kant, ontology, and the domain of means and ends. In this framework she argues that "[n]eoliberalism is the rationality through which capitalism finally swallows the human" (Brown, 2015: 44) through its making means of the subject on the level of ontology. If something feels absent here it is because it is — throughout all the ruminations that precede this chapter, we have been reading this logic in the context of racialisation. Has racialisation

not been swallowing the human for much longer? In locating the emergence of the neoliberal subject as directly co-extensive with the explicit use of the *concept* of neoliberalism, rather than tracking the logic which she so poignantly describes, Brown's theory of the neoliberal subject is lacking in three ways. The first is that, since Brown tracks the emergence of neoliberalism, her arguments lack a recognition of the neoliberal subject as another subject in a long history of thinking on the subject. She invokes Kant, for example, but does not see neoliberal reason as inheriting aspects of the logic of subjection which we considered in chapter four, on the transcendental subject. Relatedly, Brown forgoes a rigorous description of the basis on which she deems neoliberalism a "bad ontology." This is clearly not the focus of her analysis as she is interested in the possibility of a political subject. It does, however, lead her to an oversight: the neglect of a notion of race as *interior* (rather than exterior) to the concept of neoliberalism. Brown refers to the subject of neoliberalism as, "a citizen who can be legitimately shed or sacrificed when necessary" (Brown, 2015: 72). She says "citizen" here, but through each of our chapters, this subject, the other, has showed up as the figure of the slave, other, and/or racialised subject in their various iterations. Brown hints to this but does not delve into a consideration of the unlikely marriage of race, which is discriminatory, and neoliberalism, in which meritocracy supposedly functions as its ordering principle. She states, "Aristotle discerns and embraces a certain instrumentalism that could easily get out of hand" (Brown, 2015: 88) through how it lends itself to a justification of slavery. Brown refers to the citizen as a distinct effort to elaborate on subjects which Foucault has not considered; she wants to read the elaborations, as is her prerogative. This project is concerned not only with elaboration, but the mediation of ontology and elaboration, to explain race as an ontological misapprehension. What this means, however, is that Brown might struggle to locate what I have been arguing is the inherency of race in the subjecting force of neoliberal reason. Neoliberal reason both inherits the logic of race while simultaneously asserting that the problem of racialisation is not a problem at all, since it seems to do away with everything except for economic growth.

What these notions of neoliberalism aptly point out is the individualising force of neoliberal reason. In doing so, this discloses human beings and unencumbered selves (a term used by Michael Walzer to oppose the liberal tradition of theories of (re)distribution). The human being is then denied the ontological possibility (or Heidegger would say ontological necessity) of Being and necessarily a being-with-others. Such a view cannot account for Nancy's assertion

that there needs to be a shift in thinking the subject in order to account for precisely this fact of being unencumbered.

These notions of the subject all employ means-ends logic. However, they neglect to see discourse as aheadness and return and fail to account for the long history of ontological principles which relegate certain humans to the realm of non-beings and are thus also cannot account for the imbrication of race which should appear in any full-fledged understanding of the conceptual history of the neoliberal subject. The logic deployed in the exercise of neoliberal governmentality does not come about in the 1970s even though neoliberalism in name, did. The absence of a name does not mean that the forces are not already in play. Capitalism is at play insofar as alienation of worker from product occurs, but neoliberalism, the making of people into little capitals, is an alienation of self from self and of self from others. The failure of neoliberal governmentality to allow for a fully human disclosure of humans is inherited from the extensive history of racialisation I have discussed and operates at the level of ontology. It precludes disclosure of the subject as human, and having ends, as full Being. By subjecting the human to the pursuit of means and improvement of nothing other than potential value, neoliberal governmentality forecloses ends, the logic of race, and does so by disorienting ontology.

CHAPTER 7: TOWARD AN ONTOLOGICAL NOTION OF THE SUBJECT

No attempt must be made to encase man, for it is his destiny to be set free.

The body of history does not determine a single one of my actions.

I am my own foundation.

Frantz Fanon (2008: 180)

In the five chapters prior, I have considered various notions of the subject which have been significant in the philosophical domain of Continental philosophy and the general humanities. I have considered the Greek subject as citizen, the Cartesian subject of reason, the Kantian transcendental subject, the Heideggerian subject as Dasein, and the neoliberal subject. From the outset, drawing on these notions of the subject has been more than a review of the literature, but a mode of reading which involves interpretation. Three main axes of interpretation have been: ontological principles, the domain of means and ends, and race. I explained in the introduction that the use of these interpretive lenses is not *a priori* but are revealed as salient with surprising generality when we turn to considering notions of the subject. In many ways, the conclusionary ideas below are contained in the recognition of this salience at the beginning, and which I have sought to make clear throughout — a hermeneutic circling back. Through the readings in each chapter, we have seen the plethora of ways in which race can be produced through the inscription of exclusionary ontological principles (so-called ontologies). At the same time, the notions of the subject we have considered are varied; they make up a philosophical history of the subject which is rife with disagreement. Heidegger's subject, for example, is a response to what he sees as the shortcomings of the Cartesian *cogito*, and yet both seem to bring in race through what I have been calling the foreclosure of the ends of the subject. With all their variation, race seems to re-enter when the subject is formulated in a way which bars some from ontological subjectivity through the (often implicit) move of not attributing *ends* to this other to the subject. Abiding by Brown, these are what we can call bad ontologies. In this reading, we see race come about when some are conceived of as lacking something at the very foundational level of Being which, as per Balibar, produces them as having ill-being. This is different to an analysis of race as elaboration, wherein race is taken to be something which has been created and now must be dealt with. Through the work of Steve Biko, we can see that Black Consciousness philosophy attends to this question directly, arguing that it is through the propping up of whiteness as normal that produces blackness as derivative, inferior.

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Biko (2019) discusses, importantly, that race is the elaborative production of difference — racialisation is produced, and so must be addressed, but it is not *ontologically real*. The elaborative falls into a space of analysis of discourse, of governmentality, of the social grid of intelligibility, and the functions of power and knowledge. We have been interested in how this ultimately elaborative production of the racialised subject as a radical other occurs by presenting elaboration *as though* it operates on the level of ontology.

When we consider the mediation between ontology and elaboration, we have the language to assert the possibility of bad ontologies: the discursive, elaborative formation of a subject *theorised* as though it is an incontrovertible character related to Being. An ontological account of racialisation highlights the sheer depth at which difference is theorised and allows us to trace similarities on this fundamental level. Where theorists have been attentive to this depth, they sometimes assert that race is an *objectifying* force. I have sought to draw attention to a view of racialisation as a creation of an other who is perceived of as ontologically deficient, as having ill-being, rather than simply objectified. There is another important assertion: the racialised subject, apprehended as the ontologically deficient other, allows us to also see this other as inextricable to the very characterisation of Man as ontologically whole. This ill-being of the other serves to prop up the idea of Man as whole in a way that understanding the racialised subject as object does not make available. The other is not only cast out from the categorisation of the subject as that of reason, the mind, reflection but serves to uphold this position as such.

To make this point, I have traced a conceptual history of the subject premised on the idea that in our attempt to understand the neoliberal subject, we cannot merely describe neoliberalism as an economic policy decision, but also ought to afford attention to its *subject*, its answer to the question of *who?* I have moved through notions of the subject which are important in providing an overview of this theoretical terrain. The analogy used in the opening chapter of this thesis was to describe this project as a look at a mountain range of pivotal philosophical theories and to focus on their peaks: their conceptions of the subject. We considered first the Greek notion of the citizen, understanding it as defined in terms of the city-state. The structure of the subject is as directed toward the telos of justice. Not only was this noted as a principle for living, but a kind of ontological state. The other of the citizen is the natural slave, a subject whose being cannot be apprehended or conceived in terms of the city and thus comes to occupy a space of ill-being. Subsequently, we turned to Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*. In this lies a subject for whom thinking, reason, and reflection not only indicates an epistemology but seems to go further to suggest that reason is what constitutes Being. In the context of Descartes' mind-

body dualism, while the subject comes to be understood as "of the mind", he who is apprehended as being "of the body" is barred from the full extent of Being. This is what occurs through the linkage of the body and the object, means that the other is conceived as motivated by supposedly lowly desires of the flesh which for Descartes forms part of the world of objects. In chapter four we considered Kant's transcendental subject, which has been described as transcendent in the sense that it is a subject with a capacity for aesthetic and moral judgement. Kant's apprehension of this subject as residing in the Europe of the European Enlightenment allows us to see his racial views as internal to this notion of the subject of Enlightenment as Kant conceives it. We subsequently moved on to an analysis of Heidegger's Dasein, a temporally stretched subject understood as ontologically involved with both world and other. Nevertheless, the being-towards-death and thus potentiality of this subject means that it retains a sense of *own-ness*. Lastly, we have looked at the neoliberal subject as described by Foucault and Brown (while seeing them as both inheriting some logic from Marx). This subject is conceived of becoming subjected to the only end available in this discursive structure, an end external to itself: economic growth.

As you will by now have seen in each distinct discussion, each of the major theories of the subject presented throughout this thesis has been read along three axes: the domain of means and ends, ontology, and race. At this point, these have been shown to be a relevant set of axes because of their continuous applicability, their intertwinement, as well as what they allow us to see once we have carried them through. Importantly, their incorporation has been with a particular kind of reading in mind: conceptual history and symptomatic reading. We have considered the concept of the subject, in part, by retaining some sense of linear historicity in the ordering of chapters but, with Koselleck, undoing the idea of total history by reading contemporary works at every turn. Reading symptomatically has allowed us to put our three axes into play with key texts, allowing us to see links and ideas which undergird notions of the subject. Let us bring these to light and trace the threads which run through each of the notions of the subject which we have considered.

Persistently relevant ways of thinking the subject

Ontology

The axis of ontology enabled a reading of various notions of the subject and involved drawing out principles sometimes beyond what is explicitly evident in the text. Given that the compilation of texts relate to subjectivity, we looked to two modes of *being thrown under*

which is implied the etymology of the *subject*: between *subjectum* (ontology) and *subjectus* (elaboration). In reading, this entails drawing out what aspects of various notions of the subject posit an idea of what it means to *Be*. We were then led to the production of an other or sometimes the racialised subject as a mediator between ontology and elaboration. In this frame, we can consistently hold that race resides on the plane of elaboration, it does not appear at the level of ontology. This does not mean, however, that theorists and philosophers have not used ontological principles in their attempts to justify racialisation. We have been trying to track the moments at which elaborations of racialisation seek their justifications through asserting the Being of the racialised other to be radically different. These are what we have been referring to as bad ontologies. What such a formulation makes available to us is the challenge to think of what it is that makes a *good ontology* — an ontological principle which does not inscribe race at the level of Being and yet allows us to speak about it in its elaborations. Race does not exist at the level of that which is thrown under existence as it is (*subjectum*) but is salient if we are to consider the subjection of the subject (*subjectus*). It has been through a commitment to reading how racialisation informs ontological notions by which I have sought to better understand its mechanisms. While race is revealed as a significant, dangerous, and mutable phenomenon throughout the history of thinking on the subject, academic literature concerning *neoliberal* subjectification somewhat stubbornly side-lines race, treating it as merely an additional social layer which warrants an intersectional consideration. Just as an economic history is important for understanding the emergence of neoliberal policy, a conceptual history of the subject is integral to understanding the emergence of the neoliberal subject. Placing the neoliberal subject outside of this history assumes that those subjects have all been laid to rest and makes it challenging to highlight any resonances and so also challenging to recognise this as elaboration and to think outside of it. We briefly touched on Deleuze's notion of terrain in the chapter on Dasein, which offers us a language to explain what this recognition of elaborations allows for; that is, changing the terrain. If, in relation to the concept of the subject, territorialisation refers to the realm in which the subject is marked and apprehended as such, the turn to subjectum/ontology mirrors a deterritorializing gesture in which elaborations can be considered. As discussed in the chapter prior, on the neoliberal subject, I am interested in what a conceptual-historical consideration of the subject allows us to see in the subject of neoliberalism.

Means-ends

The domain of means and ends has been an interpretive device useful for clarifying the structure of various notions of the subject. Unlike the search for ontological principles, to consider this domain is a more open-ended enquiry into the mediation between *subjectum* and *subjectus*. I have been suggesting that it is through applying a reading of means and ends by which we may point to the moment at which race enters. In the notions of the subject which we have considered, the ontological subject is often initially conceived as involved in ends/potentiality/openness as a condition of their Being. The Greek citizen as subject has the telic end of justice as a condition of its subjectivity formed in relation to the city; the Cartesian subject is directed toward reason; in Kant's formulation of the transcendental subject, it is teleologically oriented to the highest good through the capacity of judgement; Heidegger's Dasein is a being directed toward its own end, and is temporally stretched in the sense that its own potentiality and openness come to bear on its very Being. Even if these theories include race, they contain the seeds of a different approach. In our chapter on the neoliberal subject, we see in Marx, Foucault, and Brown the assertion that the subject under capitalism or neoliberalism becomes subjected to a logic of means, and yet do not clarify what it might mean for a subject to be ontologically open in the sense of having their own ends. This is where our discussion of the long history of the logic of racialisation becomes important.

Race

Although absent from the title, race has been an important aspect of understanding the subjects which we have been reading. In considering the ontological underpinnings of notions of subjectivity, we have been tracking the moments at which exclusion occurs and on what basis. This exclusion marks the moment in which the other of the subject is produced, an exclusion from the attribution of full ontological subjectivity and relegation to the space of ill-being. While this subject is produced as entirely external to the full ontological Being afforded to some, the other exists in direct relation to this subject, its production as other serves to strengthen the position of the whole subject as the marker of Being. In chapter one, we considered the formulation of the natural slave as a pivotal moment in a history of thinking difference. The Greek natural slave, though not a clearly *racialised* subject, inaugurates an other of the Greek citizen, who is apprehended as uninvolved in in the telos of the city, which is also the telos of the citizen. By being uninvolved in citizenship, the natural slave is denied a telic subjective structure. This is a subject apprehended as being without ends, or a sense of

own-ness. Although the natural slave comes to be described among objects of private property, it would be an oversimplification to assert that this subject was objectified. The production of the natural slave, he who tends to the tasks of necessity, is that being who makes available the possibility of the citizen as concerned with supposedly loftier pursuits of justice and governing. Achille Mbembe calls this the objectification and thus racialisation of the slave. In chapter two, I have noted that this is not quite objectification, but instead ill-being, and that although the slave as distinctly racialised in the wake of transatlantic slave trade, this logic echoes in the Greek natural slave. Through each chapter, I have gestured to moments of the production of the other which resonate with this mode of relegation to the space of ill-being. These have pointed to a logic of racialisation not inherently tied to a history of slavery but which is *also* present in the logic of the production of the slave as subject. When we move on to Descartes, we consider the emphasis on mind, reason, and reflection as markers of what it is to Be. It is here where we associate Cartesian philosophy with the creation of an other who is supposedly subject to the dictates of the body and is apprehended as having a deficient sort of Being. Moving on to Kant is where we find what we can explicitly call systematised *racialisation*. Kant's transcendental subject is teleological to an open ended, *good life*. For the Kantian subject, judgement (aesthetic and ethical) is the transcendental character of the subject which allows them to participate in the transcendental telos. Kant describes the "other" races as deficient of the capacity for judgement. Just as in the instance of the Greek citizen, Kant's transcendental subject is not only means, but also always ends which we can understand as the subject's ontologically inherent involvement in telos. The racialised other is written by Kant as lacking the very judgement which is indicative of telic Being; the racialised other for Kant is apprehended as lacking telos. Heidegger introduces race in his notion of destiny and the *Volk*, a clear move to foreclose the potentiality of the subject on which he insists in his description of Dasein which precedes this. Heidegger introduces race at the moment that the subject is subjected to ends outside of itself — the ends of the *Volk*.

In this discussion of racialisation, it is important to clarify two outcomes. The first is that the reading of means and ends, and ontology has helped us to track the foreclosure of ends in ontological apprehension as a fundamental and often covered over logic through which an other is produced, functioning as the basis on which *subjectivation* comes to be defended. Reading these axes together has allowed for the revealing of this mode of relegation to ill-being; that is, without recourse to a theory of *objectification*. This point was initially described in the chapter on the Greek citizen, as producing a slave other. Secondly, we have tracked that it is

racialisation which has often come to put this mode of exclusion to work. In considering race as we have done, we can read from the earlier chapter on the Greek citizen that the idea of natural slave, although not in name, inaugurates a logic by which some are apprehended as ontologically deficient. This is also a logic which applies to all slave trade subsequent to the Greek city. The creation of race as related to slavery does not mean that this is its penultimate iteration, just that it *is* an iteration of racialisation. racialised subject understood is produced in a grid of intelligibility in which the own-ness of their potentiality is undermined. This is the conceptualisation of race as ill-being which I have tried to develop, through reading the history of thinking on the subject. To place the thinking of the neoliberal subject in this conceptual history allows us to assert that these subjects (and the subject) are not dead, but rather, important for an understanding our prevailing modes of discourse which do produce a subject, in the sense of *subjugation*.

Rethinking the neoliberal subject

Addressing the neglect of ontology and inherency of race

In the final chapter of this thesis, we arrived at a discussion on the neoliberal subject. The starting point was to disconnect neoliberal reason from the specific economic policy decisions associated with the idea. In keeping with the project of conducting a conceptual history of the subject, the neoliberal *subject* was the focus. The neoliberal subject is theorised especially by Brown and Foucault, their descriptions begin from the neoliberal economic moment, whereas we have been interested in the logic of neoliberal subjection as involved with a long history of subjection. As regards subjection, Foucault and Brown make a number of important points about what neoliberal subjectivity entails. What I have pointed out is the contention that in extricating the neoliberal subject from a history of thinking on the subject, they are led to deflate the relevance of ontological underpinnings (although Brown hints at its relevance). More than that, they fall short of a descriptive account which can adequately make sense of the inherency of race in neoliberal subjection/subjugation. Wendy Brown points out that neoliberal governmentality disposes of the ends of the subject while turning the subject into a means to the pursuit of economic growth. This is a mode of subjection in which there are the echoes of the natural slave, Enlightenment's slave, Kant's *"negro,"* Heidegger's *"Jew,"* and who Marx says is a subject of labour. In the neoliberal subjection of all realms of life to valuation on the basis of economic growth, we find the logic we have been associating with racialisation: the foreclosure of the ends of the subject; its apprehension as only means to an end entirely outside

of itself. The subjection to means can be described as an alienation from Being, from one's ontology as both being-in-the-world and as being-with-others but whose end is its *own*. The deployment of this logic in neoliberal reason raises what I have been suggesting is the important connection between neoliberalism and racialisation. What is brought to light is that while neoliberal reason is explicitly associated with meritocracy, it inherits its foundational mode of subjectivation from the production of the idea of radical difference *par excellence* — racialisation. The role of race in neoliberal governmentality is more fundamental than theorists such as Brown are able to account for. What this recognition makes available for future lines of thought is thinking the relation between racialisation and neoliberalism. We are led to ask: what does it mean that race and neoliberalism both operate to undercut the humanity of their subjects? This question calls for a more extensive consideration of Foucault, particularly in regard to his discussion of biopolitics which opens up an approach to thinking this interrelation. In the wake of neoliberal reason, we encounter the dissolution of explicit formulations such as subject/other, citizen/slave due to its covering over of subjection. While slavery is pronounced to be over, and race said to no longer be relevant, how do we make sense of profound inequality and address a logical structure which inherits from a long history of subjugation?

To draw this thesis project to a close, I would like to focus on a subjugating logic which I have been reading and describing: the apprehension of the subject as means only, as Being without their own ends. We have traced various notions of the subject and have classified many as bad ontologies inasmuch as they close of the subject from its potentiality. They restrain through the mechanism of race. This is a subject who is closed off, who is one-dimensional. What is foreclosed upon in this ontological misapprehension, this bad ontology, is the idea of the subject as *open* — and so we have come full circle.

The subject as ontological potential, becoming, openness, invention

I have argued in the chapter on Dasein, that there still exists a full-fledged ontological description of Dasein which, for a moment, is free from an inherent production of a racialised other. This moment is the view of the subject as opening, as having potentiality, which informs an apprehension of the subject as formally indicative. In the opening chapter, I discussed that I would be using a method of formal indication in order to make sense of the ways in which it comes to be elaborated. This approach, as part of the method of reading the subject allowed us to see race as written onto the ontological aspect of the subject while resisting a language which

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falls back into reinscribing those bad ontologies. To see racialisation as acting on the openness of the subject by closing off potentiality, we see that this bears resemblance to what was challenged in the opening chapter: describing the subject in definitional terms (rather than as formally indicative). Racialisation defines the subject and in doing so, constrains it. At the outset of this project, the idea of the subject as formally indicative has helped us to critique and refer to racialisation as operating on the plane of ontology without allowing it to re-enter at this level. We now return to the notion of the formally indicative subject not only as a method, but as offering us a basis from which to conceive of the subject as ontologically open, while racialisation and neoliberal governmentality produce an other who is produced as ill-being. That is, it seems that thinking the conceptual history of the subject leads us to note the importance of apprehending this subject as open. This is not an idea which is entirely absent from the history of philosophical thought and which calls for further thought. Foucault, Sartre, and Heidegger offer lines of thought which lead us in this direction. In these final remarks, I will briefly discuss what it is to think the openness of the subject — a gesture which calls for a further consideration in future research.

Michel Foucault, although interested in discursive structures, suggests that at a basic level, subjectivity involves self-invention — the making of self as a work of art (Jaeggi, 2014: 86). Gordon (1999) challenges the idea that Foucault offers a passive subject by arguing that Foucault offers an ontological view of the subject as free (albeit a freedom which can be shaped or constrained by the work of power). Two quotes help us to see Foucault's argument more clearly, "[i]n a late interview, Foucault characterizes the care of the self as the deliberate practice of freedom. Care of the self means first and foremost relating to one's own self as a non-slave, as free, which, in turn, is a care for the other" (Gordon, 1999: 409). Gordon also writes (1999: 412) that Foucault's later conceptualisation of the subject of invention inherits something from Heidegger's subject, that "*Dasein* can never be fully defined or captured by factuality. Facticity, on the other hand, has to do with Heidegger's depiction of *Dasein* as a 'thrown projection'." Foucault makes available an important view of the subject as ontologically inventive, to be disclosed in terms of its own potentiality while also emphasising reciprocity. In the translator's introduction to Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel E. Barnes asserts that for Sartre, "man continually makes himself. Instead of being, he 'has to be'; his present being has meaning only in the light of the future toward which he projects himself" (Sartre, 1978: xix). Sartre discusses that to see being-with-others as constitutive of Being, the problem of the "other" is not a problem at all, "[t]he Other is the ex-centric limit which

contributes to the constitution of my being," and "[t]he Other is not an *object*. In his connection with me he remains a human-reality; the being by which he determines me in my being is his pure being apprehended as 'being-in-the-world'," "[o]ur relation is not a *frontal* opposition but rather an *oblique* interdependence" (Sartre, 1978: 245–246). In this formulation, we see Sartre emphasise both the subject (self) as open, while pointing out the importance of reciprocity.

Matthew Burch is interested in Heidegger's notion of formal indication and starts by noting that for Heidegger, Dasein is a being for whom his own Being is an issue. Nevertheless, Dasein must engage with this Being, while also arguing that ontological apprehension is not a given, but is a task (Burch, 2013: 264). While Burch notes Heidegger's individualisation of the task of apprehension, I would like to urge the consideration of how governmentality might make the possibility for this ontological apprehension (even if it is a self-responsible task), more or less possible. Burch moves from self-responsibility, arguing that the formally indicative subject has the function to,

> motivate me to go beyond the project of self-illumination to communicative disclosure — to make whatever light I have managed to shed on things for myself available to the other. What makes this claim ethical is that it poses a challenge to my right to see the world strictly from my standpoint — it challenges me to go beyond myself, to place my insight at stake, as I attempt to justify what I take to be the truth before the other. Phenomenology communication, then, is always a call and a response to some other, whether that other is a particular person, the phenomenological community, or the tradition (Burch, 2013: 273).

The assertion of the ontological openness of the subject, as we see from these few instances, has been done in varying ways but many ultimately seem to agree on this point even if they use different languages in a description thereof. This opens a line of consideration which considers these iterations wherein the subject is apprehended as ontologically open. This draws our attention to thinking about how we might constitute elaborations *without* dissolving the ends of the subject. Racialisation and neoliberal governmentality seem to disallow apprehension of ontological ends and reciprocity altogether, but can we imagine a political, social grid of intelligibility and normative orders in which this already complex work of phenomenological, ontological disclosure is not misapprehended and subjugated at every turn? Surely. Our task is to elaborate.

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