The Un/timely Death(s) of Chris Hani: Discipline, spectrality, and the haunting possibility of return

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Declaration

I, Samuel Longford, declare that 'The Untimely Deaths of Chris Hani: Spectrality, Uncertainty, and the Haunting possibility of Return', is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination other than the University of the Western Cape, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Samuel Longford

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Abstract

This dissertation takes Chris Hani beyond the conventionally biographic by thinking through his multiple lives and deaths and engaging with his legacy in ways that cannot be contained by singular, linear narratives. By doing so, I offer alternative routes through which to understand historical change, political struggle and subjectivity, as well as biographical and historical production as a conflicted and contested terrain. I attend to these conflicting narratives not as a means through which to reconcile the 'good' and 'bad' sides of history, struggle, or the political subject. Nor to sacrifice either to what Frederick Jameson has referred to as a dialectical impasse: a "conventional opposition, in which one turns out to be more defective than the other", and through "which only one genuine opposite exists… [therefore sharing] the sorry fate of evil… reduced to mere reflection."[1] Instead I place contested narratives about Hani and the anti-apartheid struggle into conversation with one another, and treat them as "equally integral component[s]"[2] of the life and legacy of Hani. This I argue, provides fertile ground through which to rethink the lives and times of Martin Thembisile 'Chris' Hani, and the political subject more generally.

Through a study that focuses on performance and memorialisation, violence, revolution, and spectrality, this dissertation also engages with a number of issues surrounding Hani's assassination, the transitional period in southern Africa, justice, armed struggle, and the work of mourning in the postapartheid. It begins by revealing the contested ways in which Hani's legacy was produced during the anti-apartheid struggle, and how it was contained and acted out in the immediate aftermath of his assassination. This thesis then goes on to trace how the postapartheid state's narrative about the struggle against apartheid, has been challenged and undermined, and how differing modes of narrative emplotment have shaped the ways in which we understand this period. Critically, I argue that the operative and contested qualities of historical production mean that Hani's revolutionary legacy is always already uncontainable. As such this type of legacy and politics haunts the ANC's postapartheid project and, to paraphrase Jameson, makes the present waver like a mirage on the landscape of postapartheid South Africa.[3]

Within this framework I ask if rumour and conspiracy surrounding Hani's assassination merely represent a yearning for 'truth', or if these have become a means through which the nation comes to terms with the violence that remains in apartheid and colonialism's wake, and to call on activists like Hani to judge and denounce capitalism, state violence, corruption, and exploitation. Rather than attempting to reveal the truth of his assassination and political legacy, I end by asking what possibilities might be opened up when we dwell upon the uncertainty and plurality of Hani's lives and deaths and take seriously the continued presence of Hani and the spectralities that remain in his and apartheid's wake. I do so in order to work against the monumental projects of nationalism and the nation-state, and to keep open our horizon of expectation in the face of what David Scott has called the 'stalled present' of postcolonial and postsocialist worlds.[4]

[1] Frederick Jameson, *Valences of the Dialectic* (London: Verso Books, 2010), 19.
[2] Ibid. 20.
[3] Frederic Jameson, 'Marx's Purloined Letter', in M. Sprinker (ed), *Ghostly Demarcations: A symposium on Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx* (London: Verso Books, 1999), 38.
[4] David Scott, *Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014), 2.

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Preface: Why Chris Hani?

Some of my earliest childhood memories in Nottingham, England, revolve around my parents' work with the Labour Party: playing games with my brother in local Labour offices; university activism and time spent with child-minders on campus; being ferried around while my parents canvassed for prospective Members of Parliament; a strong sense of solidarity with 'minority groups' who in fact were not a minority in inner city Nottingham; genuine hatred for Thatcher and the Tories; my father on strike with other British Telecom (BT) workers in 1987 for better pay and conditions, and my mother taking extra work as a temp secretary to help pay the bills.[1] This latter experience is particularly important for me now. I was only two at the time, so my memory cannot be entirely trusted. But I do remember (more likely sometime after the strike itself) my father coming off the phone one day and telling me that one of our neighbours across the road was a 'scab', a supervisor who had refused to strike in solidarity with BT workers. Although my mother and father never spoke to him again, they still would not 'give him up', because giving him up would mean they would be responsible for the reprisals that he would more than likely face.

These remain experiences that continue to inform me about the importance of solidarity, politics, and ethics in a world where these guiding principles appear to have largely dissipated. But the most important lesson I learnt was tied up with my mother and father's insistence that I read and consume texts with political intent. One such text was *The Communist Manifesto*, which at the time (I do not remember how old I was when I first

[1] Mudlark121, 'Today in London's radical history: BT workers strike, 1987', *Past tense: London radical histories and possibilities*, 26 January 2016 https://pasttenseblog.wordpress.com/2016/01/26/today-in-londons-radical-history-bt-workers-strike-1987/.

read its opening lines), felt like a work of fiction, a romantic and utopian narrative about freedom from oppression and the downfall of the upper classes. The opening lines continue to haunt my work and history:

> A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.[2]

The reason I begin here is to point out the ways in which revolutionary politics (and their texts) differ across time and space. In an English, democratic socialist home, struggle – or at least the type I was exposed to – was oriented around the ballot box, through Union work and university activism for the Labour Party and was enacted in organisations like Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the International anti-apartheid Movement. In other words, the type of struggle I knew growing up in the UK was more often than not contained within the boundaries of law and democracy. Revolution on the other hand, more specifically armed struggle, was something that happened in a different time and place: over there in Russia, in Vietnam, and in the so-called 'Third World'.

With the undermining of unions and the systematic defunding of public institutions by Thatcher's government in the 1980s, the rise of neoliberal economics and the idea that, in Thatcher's words, there was no such thing as society**,** only "individual men and women and… families,"[3] and with the arrival of Tony Blair and 'New Labour' on the political scene in the 1990s, this sense of systemic change and politics as distant, over there, in another time, was compounded. Many years later, I would suggest that this was a

[2] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970), 30.
[3] Unknown author, 'Margaret Thatcher: A life in quotes', *The Guardian*, 8 April 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/08/margaret-thatcher-quotes.

determining factor in the Brexit referendum, which exposed the majority of British people as unable to see the other and beyond their front gardens. In many ways, this dissertation is a response to this systematic attempt to depoliticise society, history, and public space in Britain, but also globally.

In contrast to the political space that I experienced in Nottingham, when I arrived in South Africa, I was immediately struck by the country's legacy of struggle, which at the time, I naively and narrowly associated with Mandela, the Congress Alliance, and the South African Communist Party. I remember being awestruck that a communist party was effectively part of a government in 2010, and although I now realise that the SACP is a shadow of its former self, at the time, this knowledge and experience left me with a feeling of the immediacy and proximity of revolutionary politics. It also left me with a sense of living in a different time: not in terms of chronology, but in terms of a time that is still potentially liberatory, and a sense of the past which for me felt more immediate, but also more tragic and less utopian. In short, for naïve outsiders like myself, texts like *The Communist Manifesto* seemed alive and well in South Africa, lived, thought and experienced, in conversation with and against the nation and its history.

Before beginning my studies at the University of the Western Cape (UWC), the most accessible means through which to 'get to know' and understand South Africa and its history, was through political biographies. First, of course, was Mandela's *Long Walk to Freedom*, which I see as a brilliant work of Rainbow Nation propaganda, one through which the mythologisation of Mandela as always already destined to become the "the

greatest moral figure of our age", was masterfully accomplished.[4] But over time, after volunteering at the District Six Museum and beginning my studies at UWC's Department of History and Centre for Humanities Research, my sense of history and struggle was thickened and deepened, partly because of being privileged enough to learn with activists and academics who had lived through the anti-apartheid struggle. This experience also taught me that far from being an anathema, a history removed from my life in Nottingham, the South African experience of apartheid, serves as a mirror through which to understand global history and what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have generatively referred to as global apartheid.[5]

My work has always revolved around political biographies, and the history of struggle and communism in South Africa. For my Honours thesis I focused on the biographies of Johnny Gomas and Victoreen Gilbert. Whereas my MA turned its attention to Bram Fischer and the Rooi Gevaar. Importantly, during the latter stages of writing that thesis, my attention turned toward Hani, whose assassination I interpreted as a tragic result of propaganda concerning the 'rooi' and 'swaart gevaars'.[6]

The main point I am trying to make is that this dissertation is grounded by my experiences in the interstices between these two places, and these two times. For it is important to stress that this study is not only about the political lives of struggle during the apartheid period, or about the life and times of Martin 'Thembisile' Chris Hani. It is also

[4] Alan Little, 'NEWSNIGHT: How Mandela responded to the assassination of Chris Hani', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOn24d9xwYQ
[5] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social: Desiring the postapartheid* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2017), 15.
[6] Samuel Longford, 'The Suppression of Communism, the Dutch Reformed Church, and the Instrumentality of Fear during apartheid.' (MA mini thesis: University of the Western Cape, 2016), 109.

constitutive of my own experience in a world between Britain and South Africa, one that I see in relation to Stuart Hall's notion of the 'familiar stranger.'[7]

Furthermore, it is located between two opposing ideas about revolution and political struggle: the romantic and utopian idea of inevitable overthrow of the ruling classes, and the tragic realisation that "the future does not grow triumphantly out of the wicked turmoil of the past."[8] And this brings me to another encounter: that with Marx, Hani, and Jacques Derrida's *Spectres of Marx*, which was written in the wake of the supposed victory of neoliberalism and capitalism over global communism and Marxism. For me, it speaks to the times, to the unfinished business of apartheid, the anti-apartheid struggle, and of revolution, and, importantly, to the tragic fate that Hani received at the hands of white racists and anti-communists on 10 April 1993:

> [O]ne should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure, not even an exemplary figure in the logic of an emblem, a rhetoric of a flag or of martyrdom. A man's life, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol. And this is precisely what a proper name should always name.
>
> As yet … I recall that it is a communist as such, a communist as communist, whom a Polish emigrant and his accomplices, all the assassins of Chris Hani, put to death a few days ago, April 10th. The assassins themselves proclaimed that they were out to get a communist. They were trying to interrupt negotiations and sabotage and ongoing democratization. This popular hero of the resistance against Apartheid became dangerous and suddenly intolerable, it seems, at the moment which, having decided to devote himself to a minority Communist Party riddled with contradictions, he gave up important responsibilities in the ANC and perhaps any official political or even governmental role he might have held in a country freed of Apartheid.
>
> Allow me to salute the memory of Chris Hani and to dedicate this lecture to him.[9]

[7] Stuart Hall, *Familiar Stranger: A Life Between Two Islands* (London: Penguin, 2018).
[8] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 166.
[9] Jacques Derrida, 'Dedication', *Specters of Marx* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), xiv-xv.

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Introduction

The untimely deaths of Chris Hani

The legacy of Martin Thembisile 'Chris' Hani is an unsettled and contested one. On the one hand, his life might represent what Daniel Herwitz has called "the heritage of the victim, the battle, and the brave."[1] Hani was born in 1942 into what he described as the "extreme poverty" of the rural Transkei,[2] was pursued throughout his life by a violent apartheid state while serving in the command structures of the South African Communist Party (SACP), the African National Congress (ANC), and the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and survived a number of attempts on his life before he was ultimately assassinated outside of his Dawn Park home by Janusz Waluś on 10 April 1993.

During their Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearing, Waluś and Conservative Party MP, Clive Derby-Lewis, stated that they had carried out Hani's assassination in order to destabilise negotiations between the National Party government and organisations aligned with the anti-apartheid struggle, and to plunge South Africa into civil war. Indeed, news of his assassination almost had this effect. According to popular accounts, it was only Nelson Mandela's live televised address to the nation that calmed the situation. Hani's assassination is therefore remembered as one of the pivotal moments in the transition to democracy. Not only was this because of its immediate after-effects, but also because after this event, the ANC under Mandela's leadership, was affirmed as the new sovereign power, the only organisation that could manage the diverse interests of

[1] Daniel Herwitz, 'Heritage and Legacy in the South African State and University', in Derek R. Peterson, Kodzo Gavua and Ciraj Rassool (eds), *The Politics of Heritage in Africa: Economies, Histories, and Infrastructures* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 38.
[2] Reiner Leist, interview with Chris Hani, 1992 (Wits Historical Papers (WHP), University of the Witwatersrand, A3395).

the tripartite alliance and the South African people and establish peace in a society marked by the postapartheid.

This narrative, which depicts Hani as martyr whose death guaranteed post-apartheid freedom, has been reproduced and performed at the annual Hani Memorial in Ekurhuleni, Gauteng, in many of Hani's biographies,[3] in exhibitions,[4] and in '1994: The Bloody Miracle', an eNCA film that opens with the tragic and violent death of Hani, and culminates in the 'miracle' of elections just over a year later.[5] In this film, Hani's assassination, along with Mandela's speech, and South Africa's first free and fair elections, became a founding moment of the new South African nation. Representative of the violence of apartheid, Hani's dead body was visually juxtaposed with South Africa's eventual emergence into a new era of freedom and democracy. To paraphrase Ciraj Rassool, Hani's assassination was "made to speak" for an experience of violence that the nation itself lived through.[6] It is clear, however, that particularly in the wake of events like Marikana and the Fallist Movement,[7] Hani's legacy has become a contested space of historical production, serving as what Richard Werbner, writing about state-led memorialisation in Zimbabwe, has called a 'wounding trace' of political violence.[8]

[3] See for example: Michelle Berger, *Chris Hani: They Fought for Freedom* (Johannesburg: Maskew Miller Longman, 1994); Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp, *Hani: A life too short* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015).
[4] For example: *Red in the Rainbow*, permanent exhibition at The Slave Lodge, Cape Town.
[5] 'The Bloody Miracle', eNCA films, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0qp3jtJzf7Q and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6VBQp7668K1.
[6] Ciraj Rassool, 'Rethinking Documentary History and South African Political Biography', *South African Review of Sociology*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2010), 28.
[7] I began writing my PhD in the wake of the Fees Must Fall movement. Unsurprisingly, much of my thinking around these issues are informed by this time.
[8] Richard Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the Dead, Memory, and Reinscription in Zimbabwe', in Richard Werbner (ed), *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power* (London: Zed Books, 1998), 77.

It is my contestation in this dissertation, that the legacies of activists like Hani have increasingly become fissures through which South Africans attempt to come to terms with political and historical uncertainty in a postapartheid society, and to challenge the truth claims and monumental projects of the nation-state. In other words, in death, activists like Hani, but also Stephen Biko and Robert Sobukwe, haunt the postapartheid project. They are made to speak to the unfinished business of colonialism and apartheid and the violence that remains in their wake, and as a result "make the present waver."[9]

Chapter outline

This dissertation consists of five thematic chapters that unpack and discuss four main areas of concern: dead body-politics and memorialisation; the political subject and struggle; the historical event; and spectrality. Chapter One focuses on Hani's funeral, which I see as a founding symbolic event of the new postapartheid nation and what Nicky Rousseau has referred to as the state to come.[10] This chapter will primarily draw from debates about dead-body politics and the modes through which the dead were conscripted during the anti-apartheid struggle and the time of transition. A key aspect will be to focus on how, in stark contrast to the role political funerals played during the anti-apartheid struggle, Hani's funeral may have worked to discipline the new nation, and to contain the revolutionary potential that was sparked in the immediate aftermath of his assassination. It will also begin to ask how the memorialisation and the mythologisation of Chris Hani contributed to the production of specific ideas about armed struggle, revolution, and Hani himself.

[9] Frederick Jameson, 'Marx's Purloined Letter', 38.
[10] Nicky Rousseau, 'Identification, Politics, Disciplines: Missing persons and colonial skeletons in South Africa', in Elisabeth Anstett and Jean-Marc Dreyfus (eds), *Human Remains and Identification: Mass Violence, Genocide, and the 'Forensic Turn'* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 182.

Chapter Two will turn its attention to the annual Hani memorial and will consider how it has become a contested space through which different groups and individuals have employed Hani as martyr, as a symbol of revolution, or as disciplined cadre in the present. On the one hand, this chapter discusses how the annual Hani Memorial has been used as a space through which to re-establish the revolutionary credentials of successive ANC governments, and their presidents. On the other hand, it works to disrupt this claim by demonstrating how Hani's political legacy has been contested and unravelled at these memorial occasions.

In Chapter Three, I focus on the becoming of Hani's assassination as historical event. This chapter takes its cue from Tom Lundborg's Deleuzian notion of the pure event and David Scott's reading of romance and the tragedy as modes of historical narration, in order to further elaborate the competing ways in which the 'truth' of Hani's assassination was produced over time.

Whereas the first three chapters are more concerned with memorialisation, dead-body politics, and heritage and historical production, Chapter Four of this dissertation turns its focus to the exile period, and the archive of the anti-apartheid struggle. Here, I am interested in the contradictions between the ways in which the mythologisation of Hani as disciplined cadre par excellence both worked to inspire and motivate MK cadres in exile, but also to discipline the supposedly undisciplined cadre and to police and maintain the limits of the ANC's struggle against apartheid. More specifically, this chapter focuses on two key moments of the exile period: the Wankie Campaign, Hani Memorandum and Morogoro Conference (1969) and the Mkatashinga mutinies which occurred at several MK camps in Angola during the 1980s. I am primarily concerned with the conflicting

roles Hani played during these times. In the first instance, Hani criticised the ANC and was subsequently disciplined by its leadership. Whereas in the second, Hani was sent to Angola to discipline supposedly undisciplined cadres, whose demands during the Mkatashinga mutinies were strikingly similar to those of the Hani Memorandum.

I end this dissertation by returning to Hani's assassination in Chapter Five. However, in this final chapter I focus more acutely on the historical event, the fragment and the notion of spectrality as iterated through Jacques Derrida's *Spectres of Marx*. Here I ask what possibilities might be opened up when we dwell upon the uncertainty of Hani's lives and deaths and take seriously the continued presence of Hani and the spectralities that remain in his and apartheid's wake. I do so, as a means through which to work against the teleologies of capital and of 'the Enlightenment', and to keep history open to new ideas and potential.

Dead Body Politics, heritage production and public history

From a heritage and public history lens, the contests surrounding Hani can best be understood in terms of the reading by Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool of the 'postanti-apartheid heritage complex', which focuses on the processes of "historical productions and their meanings",[11] rather than thinking heritage as mediation or authorising discourse.[12] Critically for Witz, Minkley, and Rassool public history and heritage production should be understood in relation to the idea of heritage practices and the museum as forum, as debate, open, and always in the process of reproduction and critique. Rather than situating heritage as consigned to the past, as state-authored, as

[11] Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool, *Unsettled History: making South African public pasts*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017), 225.
[12] Ibid. 218.

'monumental mythology', or as "part of the domain of nation-building", Witz, Minkley, and Rassool, privilege negotiation and performance as salient features of heritage practice.[13] Far from functioning as authorising discourse, the contested character of heritage production and public history suggest that the 'truth' of history is always already a site of struggle, and therefore holds open the possibility for different ways of remembering the past, experiencing the present, and imagining futures free from apartheid, colonialism and capitalism.

Katherine Verdery's study of postsocialist Eastern Europe and ceremonial reburials of the dead offers another useful lens for thinking through what she describes as the 'political lives of dead bodies', and the ways in which relationships with the dead enable the living to "reorder worlds of meaning" during moments of political transition.[14] According to Verdery, dead bodies (and our relationships with them) help us to see politics "as something more than a technical process – of introducing democratic procedures and methods of electioneering, of forming political parties and nongovernmental organizations, and so on".[15] In short, they provide a window through which to trace the "meanings, feelings, the sacred, ideas of morality, nonrationality" that make up the psycho-social fabric of a nation, and, importantly, point toward the ambiguous and contested ways in which the living and the dead coalesce and speak.

The modern political subject

As well as being grounded by heritage studies and public history, this dissertation is informed by ideas and debates about the political subject. As Luise White has argued in

[13] Ibid. 14.
[14] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 34.
[15] Ibid. 25.

The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo, liberation struggles in southern Africa were deeply fractious and uncertain, and as a result, "even the hard evidence [of history] does not provide a particularly stable ground on which to write".[16] In other words, any attempt to flatten or simplify a complex political movement that, in the case of the ANC and SACP, was marked by askari infiltrations, informers who sometimes changed sides several times, political assassination, and rumor, myth and political intrigue, tends to produce problematically neat narratives that distort the historical record and our understandings of historical change and human action.

In light of this unstable ground, White suggests a different approach, one that attends to the ways in which "armies negotiate their tensions and ambiguities", for example between the rank-and-file and leadership, and between different political and ideological tendencies.[17] This, she suggests, might provide a means through which to trouble and complicate the ways in which we understand military and political struggle. Her words on military discipline are particularly instructive:

> The 'new' military history provides a way to look at how armies negotiate their tensions and ambiguities. The study of resistance to authority, might be at least as important a way to understand the constitution of warfare as is the assumption of disobedience. In this literature, ideas about 'friction' come from nineteenth-century notions of war, in which disobedience was not unnatural: it was another impediment to victory, like the weather or mechanical failure. Friction and tensions were things skilled generals could overcome; they were not sufficient, however exacerbated, to cause mutiny. More important, perhaps, is the insight that military discipline is not a matter of loyal cadres, obedient to a cause and to the zeal of their commanders. Military discipline is negotiated between cadres and commanders in their everyday practices and frictions, and in how they address extraordinary situations… .[18]

[16] Luise White, *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
[17] Ibid. 36.
[18] Ibid. 36.

Rassool's work on political biography further complicates the ways in which we might approach what I call the mythologisation of Hani. As he argues, political biographies themselves were inflected by different tendencies, which sought to clear the ground for specific understandings of political and military struggle, the political subject, and of history itself.[19] In Chapter Four, I attempt to write this history, one that attends to the contested modes of biographical production and to the plurality of political struggle and the political subject. I do this, not as a means through which to reconcile the political subject, the 'good' and 'bad' sides of history, nor to judge and make claims on Hani's conflicting roles during these periods. Rather I aim to hold different and contested sides of struggle in conversation with one another, and to treat them as "equally integral component[s]" of the life and legacy of Hani, and of the anti-apartheid struggle.[20] This I suggest, might offer a more productive lens through which to think biographical production, the modern political subject, and the struggle by the ANC and its allies against apartheid.

The event of History, spectrality, and the work of mourning

This dissertation is underpinned by a desire to take Hani beyond the biographical. This desire is not only motivated by Rassool's call to "reflect on the individual in a more complex way,"[21] but also as a means to challenge the conventions of Western teleology, and the 'stageist' conceptualisation of time and history. This, as we know, has at least since Hegel, both defined the ways in which we understand and conceptualise history as epochal, incremental and ultimately progressist, and provided theoretical impetus for the thinking of various Marxist organisations, including Hani's SACP. There have been

[19] Ciraj Rassool, 'Rethinking Documentary History and South African Political Biography'.
[20] Frederick Jameson, *Valences of the Dialectic*, 20.
[21] Ciraj Rassool, 'Rethinking Documentary History and South African Political Biography', 46.

numerous critiques of this reasoning,[22] and many attempts by organisations like the SACP, to justify and clarify their thinking in the wake of sustained critique and crisis.[23] For now though, it is enough to say that "the once enduring temporalities of past-present-future that animated (indeed, that constructed, even *authorised*) our Marxist historical reason, no longer line up quite so neatly, so efficiently, so seamlessly, so instrumentally – in a word, so *teleologically* – as they once seemed to do".[24]

This line of thought takes its cue from two key texts. The first, David Scott's *Omens of Adversity*, tracks the Grenadian revolution of 1979 through to its collapse in 1983. As with this dissertation, one of Scott's departure points is the historical event and revolutionary time. More specifically, his focus is on "the temporality of the aftermaths of political catastrophe, the temporal disjunctures involved in living *on* in the wake of past political time, amid the ruins … of postsocialist and postcolonial futures".[25] Scott begins *Omens of Adversity* by arguing that "the idea of revolution has been a founding paradigm for the modern organization of political time, for connecting old endings to new beginnings and, therefore… connecting our dissatisfactions with the past to our hopes for alternative futures".[26] From this starting point, Scott frames the Grenadian revolution as "a revolutionary beginning" and the beginning "of a sort of end… the end of a whole era of revolutionary socialist expectation – indeed of revolutionary socialist possibility".[27] Importantly for Scott, "what we are left with are aftermaths in which the present seems

[22] See: Gayatri C. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271-313; Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Baruch Hirson, 'Colonialism of a Special Type and the Permanent Revolution', *Searchlight South Africa*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (January 1992), 48-55.
[23] Joe Slovo, *Has Socialism Failed?* (WHP, University of the Witwatersrand, A3345).
[24] David Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 6.
[25] Ibid. 2.
[26] Ibid. 3.
[27] Ibid. 4.

stricken with immobility and pain and ruin".[28] In other words, "[the] past is a wound that will not heal." It is a "psychological trauma… a past that returns, unbidden, involuntarily, to haunt or unsettle or somehow mangle the present."[29]

It seems that Scott's meditation on the Grenadian Revolution and the end of 'revolutionary socialist expectation', might be instructive for thinking through the historical event and the supposed 'end' of apartheid. Another way of approaching this question, then, is to frame it through different ideas about the historical event and historical change, and the ways in which these understandings inform how we think past, present and future struggle. Following Heidi Grunebaum, I see events as being present in their pastness.[30] The ways in which we organise those events "transform our sense of life lived" and produce certain frames through which to view the past, navigate the present, and conceive of the future. As Grunebaum puts it at the beginning of her book, *Memorialising the Past*:

> in the global political and moral imaginary the "new" South Africa, has come to figure in two fairly stark and rather reductive ways: either as the "miracle" of reconciliation in which the moral victory of good (the struggle against apartheid) has prevailed against evil (white supremacist rule), or, increasingly, as yet another instance of the failure of neoliberal macro-economics where huge class disparities, social inequity, entrenched racialized poverty increasingly foretell a society in crisis. Whilst both views hold implicit assumptions about time, about historicity, and, of course, about oppression, they are seldom interrogated in the light of what remains vexing, inassimilable to or in excess of the illusionary promises of the "new" times; in light, also, of what is creative, resilient, hopeful, human and, therefore, irreducible in both pictures.[31]

[28] Ibid. 6.
[29] Ibid. 13.
[30] Heidi Grunebaum, *Memorialising the Past: Everyday Life in South Africa after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2011), 21.
[31] Ibid. 1.

It is somewhat in this spirit that I approach the question of transition in South Africa, a 'spirit' which I trace back to Walter Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History'.[32] I will say more about Benjamin throughout this dissertation. For now, I want to briefly sketch what I see as an intrinsic relationship between our ideas about the historical event and our relationships with the dead. For it seems that the event of history, and the eventfulness of history, are constituted through the ways in which we understand our relationships with the past, and importantly, through the ways in which we remember and mourn the dead. In short, I argue that modes of organising and understanding the past and the historical event in South Africa, are tied up with desires about putting the dead (and the past) to rest, and about our desires to keep history open and to put the world into motion.

In this sense, I draw from Didi-Huberman's *Uprisings*, a text that traces the contours, desires and gestures of past struggles so that an 'I', a 'we', 'a people' might continue to resist in the face of racism, fascism, capitalism, and state violence. Didi-Huberman begins this book by asking what makes a people rise up, and answers by suggesting that "loss, which overwhelms us initially, can also, thanks to a game, a gesture, a thought, or a desire, make the world rise up entirely; and this is the principle force of uprisings."[33] The key reference for Didi-Huberman here is Sigmund Freud's text on mourning and melancholia in *Metapscychology*, which makes a distinction between mourning, as a necessary process through which we let go of the lost object of our desires, and melancholia, which Freud, in this early paper, saw as "a hallucinatory wish-psychosis."[34] According to Didi-Huberman, "Freud did not yet imagine, in this text, that the 'struggle'

[32] Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 253-264.
[33] George Didi-Huberman, *Uprisings* (Paris: Gallimard, 2016), 290.
[34] Ibid. 295.

when faced with loss might *create* a new reality corresponding to desire rather than *undergoing* a vain hallucinatory satisfaction of this same desire." Didi-Huberman suggests that far from "letting go", "moving on", and reconciling with the past, loss itself puts the world into motion. We do not necessarily have to let go of the lost object before we can "move forward".[35]

This tension between putting the past behind us, and the desire to put the world into motion, preoccupies the latter stages of this dissertation. For it seems that the life and future of the nation are consummately tied up with the past and the ways in which we mourn or do not mourn the dead. It is this contest, I argue, that circulated around and through the dead body of Hani: the difference between mourning as a cathartic experience, and as motion, as movement, and as 'wakefulness'.[36] It is also this contest that makes remembering Hani such a potent and contested terrain today.

It follows that far from functioning as authorising discourse, the operative qualities of historical production and memorialisation make it impossible for the ANC and its allies to contain Hani's revolutionary legacy, let alone manage the ways in which people remember and conceive of past, present, and future struggle. This, I suggest, is partly because the socialist and revolutionary politics that Hani died for are attached to political ideas rather than a political party. As such, Hani's legacy and the politics he represents always already rub up against and troubles the political systems that prop up and maintain capitalism and what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have called global apartheid: "the idea that apartheid was always already global or, rather, is lodged within a genealogy of

[35] Ibid. 295.
[36] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social*, 7.

the modern world system."[37] It is for this reason that Hani and the revolutionary legacy he is seen as representing haunts the ANC's postapartheid project and calls forth future struggles that cannot be contained by the 'truth' claims of capitalism and of the nation-state. In what follows I will attempt to speak with the spectres of the anti-apartheid past, in order to keep history and our ideas about historical change open to futures that are potentially unmoored from our current destinations.

[37] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social*, 15.

Chapter One

The funeral of Chris Hani: Mourning, melancholia and the state to come

> the dead, co-exist with the living; they are not past but present in their "pastness"; their biographies, or necrographies, are inherent to the constitution of the living and their possibilities, and they are ever-changing and mobile. The dead do not necessarily *say something* about people; they are constitutive of the living, in and through bodies, destinies, and forms of communion and oracular vision and counsel.[1]

The potency and power of dead bodies

As Katherine Verdery has noted, dead bodies have been imbued, often violently, with "political life the world over and far back in time", and South Africa is no exception.[2] In the Cape Colony, the dead bodies of rebels and criminals were displayed in public as a warning to the population, and in certain cases the heads of leaders of anti-colonial struggles were embalmed and transported to Britain for display to publics there.[3] The 18th and 19th centuries saw a rich trade in dead bodies across southern Africa that would fuel the disciplinary and ideological pursuits of racial science, and have led to postapartheid efforts to reclaim and repatriate those who had been abducted and housed in Europe's museums and universities.[4] As such, the dead body in postapartheid South Africa has constituted a key means through which national identity has been redefined. Attempts to re/humanise previously dehumanised

[1] Anastasios Panagiotopoulos and Diana Espírito Santo (eds), *Articulate Necrographies: Comparative Perspectives on the Voices and Silences of the Dead* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019), 3-4.
[2] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 1.
[3] Premesh Lalu, *The Deaths of Hintsa: Postapartheid South Africa and the shape of recurring pasts* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2009).
[4] Ciraj Rassool and Martin Legassick, *Skeletons in the Cupboard: South African Museums and the Trade in Human Remains* (Cape Town: South African Museum, 2000).

people have been carried out, both by the state and by families who had lost loved ones during the anti-apartheid struggle. Following Ciraj Rassool, this chapter argues that the 'new' nation in South Africa was founded on the dead body of anti-colonial and of anti-apartheid struggles.[5] As a result, postapartheid South Africa became imbued with dead-body-politics: it has been marked by the power relations channelled through and upon dead bodies; and has been shaped by "violent, unjust death"[6] and national funerals which can be seen as tracing and signalling the end of the struggle against apartheid and the becoming of the 'new' nation.

During the apartheid period, the potency and power of the dead body was, of course, a concern for the apartheid authorities, which attempted to disrupt and prevent gatherings around the fallen anti-apartheid activist, and to govern the ways in which the anti-apartheid dead would be remembered and memorialised. In the case of lawyer and leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP), Bram Fischer, who was the subject of my MA thesis,[7] the apartheid government curtailed any attempts to politicise his dead body after he died in 1975. After his death, the Security Police were at pains to stipulate that "the family could have Bram's body for a funeral, provided that it was held in Bloemfontein, that it was held within a week, and that his ashes, if there were a cremation, would be returned to the Department of Prisons."[8] As Stephen Clingman's biography of Fischer elaborated:

> Bram's ashes were never recovered. When the new democratic parliament first met, official questions were asked, but the answers were obscure. The most

[5] Ciraj Rassool, 'Human Remains, the Disciplines of the, and the South African Memorial Complex', in Derek. R. Peterson, Kodzo Gavua and Ciraj Rassool (eds), *The Politics of Heritage in Africa: Economies, Histories, and Infrastructures* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 133-156.
[6] Patricia Hayes, 'Political Funerals in South Africa: Photography, History, and the Refusal of Light (1960s-80s)', in G. Arunima, Patricia Hayes and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Love and Revolution in the Twentieth-Century Colonial and Postcolonial World: Perspectives from South Asia and Southern Africa* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2021), 1.
[7] Samuel Longford, 'The Suppression of Communism, the Dutch Reformed Church, and the Instrumentality of Fear during apartheid.'
[8] Stephen Clingman, *Bram Fischer: Afrikaner Revolutionary* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2013), 401.

> likely suggestion was that a chaplain had scattered his ashes in the Garden of Remembrance in Bloemfontein in the presence of a prison official. For the first time [however,] Ruth and Ilse [Fischer's children] also learnt that in the same garden a plaque for Bram had been installed, among the rows of many such items. It was the simplest of tablets, marking the date of his birth with a star and that of his death with a cross. There was no other memorial.[9]

Like other anti-apartheid activists, Fischer is now remembered and memorialised both in South Africa and abroad: in his case through street names and an annual memorial lecture held at Oxford University, largely dedicated to his work within the legal field. Such projects work against acts of disappearance and 'unjust burial' ("funerals banned or disrupted, bodies treated callously or just missing") that the apartheid state regularly practiced, and as Nicky Rousseau points out, affirms "a rights bearing citizen, a recognition of which is seen to embody the promise of 'never again'."[10] Of course, Fischer's fate is not entirely comparable to those who were disappeared by apartheid hit squads. These extra-judicial forces routinely disposed of murdered anti-apartheid activists in unmarked graves across South Africa, or individuals marked as 'unknown black males', buried by the apartheid state without the attendance and knowledge of the family of the dead.[11] However, Fischer's example does point toward the different layers (and hierarchies) of missing-ness and acts of recovery and re/humanisation which have shaped much of what Rousseau refers to as the "panoply of transitional justice measures" in postapartheid South Africa.[12]

[9] Ibid. 415-416.
[10] Nicky Rousseau, 'Identification, Politics, Disciplines', 176-178.
[11] Ibid. 177.
[12] Ibid. 175.

Today, and in concordance with the findings and mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the Missing Persons Task Team (MPTT) are responsible for tracing and uncovering the anti-apartheid dead which remain missing and missed. There have also been attempts to repatriate anti-apartheid activists who died in absentia, such as MK combatant Basil February who had been killed by Rhodesian forces during the 1967 Wankie Campaign and located by the MPTT in 2020. In that year, President Ramaphosa began his State of the Nation Address by announcing that February's body had been discovered in Zimbabwe, attesting to the continued importance of the recovery, repatriation, and re/humanisation of the anti-apartheid dead today.[13] Similarly, state-led memorials, such as those regularly held at Freedom Park and at the annual Hani Memorial in Ekurhuleni, Gauteng, attest to the importance of acts of reburial and re-commemoration that affirm the role of the anti-apartheid dead in liberating the nation from apartheid.

Such processes, however limited or limiting, have contributed to what Verdery has referred to as the reordering of "the meaningful universe", and point toward the ways in which nations are re/constituted through kinship ties and ancestor worship.[14] As such, dead bodies help us to see politics "as something more than a technical process – of introducing democratic procedures and methods of electioneering, of forming political parties and nongovernmental organizations, and so on".[15] In other words, they provide a window through which to trace

[13] President Cyril Ramaphosa, 'President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2020 State of the Nation Address', South African Parliament, Cape Town, https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2020-state-nation-address-13-feb-2020-0000.
[14] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, 26
[15] Ibid. 25.

the "meanings, feelings, the sacred, ideas of morality, nonrationality" that make up the psycho-social fabric of a nation.[16] As Verdery continues:

> A body's materiality can be critical to its symbolic efficacy: unlike notions of 'patriotism' or 'civil society'… a corpse can be moved around, displayed, and strategically located in specific places. Bodies have the advantage of concreteness that nonetheless transcends time, making past immediately present.[17]

However,

> the significance of corpses has less to do with their concreteness than with how people think about them… Remains are concrete, yet protean; they do not have a single meaning but are open to many different readings… In other words, what gives a dead body symbolic effectiveness in politics is precisely its ambiguity, its capacity to invoke a variety of understandings.[18]

Following a recent special edition of *Kronos* which in turn borrows from Allen Sekula, the 'truth' of the dead body is "up for grabs" and therefore open to varying interpretations and politics.[19] In a similar sense, people's relationships with the dead are intimately tied up with practices through which the 'truth' of history is produced and established. In short, the type of burial a dead body receives (or does not receive) is a foundational node through which the historian, the state, and the family attempt to "connect the dots, tell us how one thing led to another, and inform us about the true origin of our 'being' in the world."[20]

As Verdery again points out, the symbolic capital of dead bodies is often related to what she calls people's "'cosmic' concerns, such as the meaning of life and death".[21] Following this,

[16] Ibid. 25.
[17] Ibid. 27.
[18] Ibid. 27-29.
[19] Nicky Rousseau, Ciraj Rassool and Riedwaan Moosage, 'Missing and Missed: Rehumanisation, and Nation and Missing-ness', *Kronos*, Vol. 44, (Nov 2018), 15.
[20] Tom Lundborg, *Politics of the Event: Time, movement, becoming* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 2.
[21] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*. 31.

we might argue that dead bodies are constitutive of a crucial means through which individuals and collectives both organise and give meaning to the temporal order of things, and to think and live moments of transition. In other words, people's relationships with the dead are grounded by (and ground) the temporal and spatial worlds which they inhabit and navigate. The dead mark time, they provide a link to the past, and they enable people to lay claim to space. 'Proper burial' as Verdery suggests, helps individuals and collectives to order and reorder the shape of history, and "the shape people attribute to history infuses both individuals and groups' self-understanding" of their being in the world.[22]

It is this constellation of questions which I want to begin to address in this chapter. In what follows, I am specifically concerned with the ways in which beliefs and ideas about the nation, political struggle, and the modern political subject were mediated through Hani at the time of his funeral. Following Verdery, I want to think through "competing politicizations of space and time".[23] For it seems that during moments of political transition the re/organisation of time and space through the dead body is critical for establishing the limits and becoming of the 'new' nation. In this regard, I read Hani's funeral (and assassination) as part of a panoply of transitional moments in which the ANC under Mandela's leadership were affirmed as the new sovereign power and the "guarantor of national unity".[24] But I do not read this as a historical fact, nor as a process that was completed after the first democratic elections and the 'birth' of the 'new' nation. Rather, I want to think through the ways in which Hani's funeral and assassination became available as a means through which this idea,

[22] Ibid. 117.
[23] Ibid. 36.
[24] Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 41.

amongst others, would be actualised. As we will see throughout this dissertation, I am also interested in how it remains available today.

Ultimately, I do this because in this dissertation I want to think through the political effects of this actualisation, particularly in relation to the individual and collective experiences of past, present and future, and "the sovereign territorial… state's attempt to stay in control of the being and becoming of the modern political subject."[25] In the process, I want to suggest that this actualisation not only made available and was made available by a notion of the death of apartheid and the birth of the new nation, but also by the supposed end of the type of politics that had apartheid (and the state) as its target. The genealogy of political funerals in South Africa and the transformation of funerary practices within the anti-apartheid struggle which I trace below, point toward, as Rousseau puts it, a shift from 'defiance and resistance' to mourning and sorrow. Or, through Pillay's reading, the "indestructible energy" that had previously been channeled through the dead body of the freedom fighter, now had to be contained by an organisation that was preparing to take power by democratic means. And it is this contest, I want to suggest, that circulated around and through the dead body of Hani: the difference between, on the one hand, mourning as a cathartic experience, and on the other, as motion, as movement, as 'wakefulness'.[26] It is also this contest, I argue, that makes remembering Hani such a potent and contested terrain today. In this sense, Hani's assassination and the transitional period are surrounded and haunted by several deaths, deaths whose ghosts I want to speak with in the course of this dissertation.

[25] Tom Lundborg, *Politics of the Event*, 63.
[26] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social*, 7.

Political funerals: Mourning, resistance, sovereignty

It is widely acknowledged that political funerals constituted key sites of protest, resistance and political mobilisation in South Africa particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Under apartheid, political meetings, organisations and individuals were subject to strict banning orders, and religious and cultural events were often one of the only ways in which people could legally gather. As such political funerals constituted "protean spaces" through which different cultures of resistance and militarism mingled and intersected with religious forms of mourning, and spaces where the politics of the dead body of the anti-apartheid struggle were figured, appropriated and conscripted in complex ways.[27] As Patricia Hayes explains, "the funeral, by offering a space for mobilisation, opened a new possibility or potential. This included considerable movement and circulation of fellow-activists from different parts of the country to a particular funeral".[28] Suren Pillay's reflections on his time as a young activist within the UDF during the 1980s, highlight another consequence: the accumulation of a pantheon of struggle heroes and political martyrs who became potent symbols of protest and resistance to apartheid:

> We were accumulating martyrs to commemorate and to recall these deaths and the stories of repression. These stories took us out of the confines of our relatively middle class and comfortable existence in Rylands, and to the furthest corners of the country: to townships whose names we would have rarely encountered otherwise. Solidarity with the death of an activist allowed us to transcend the ethnic and racial identities imposed by apartheid, and no one was allowed to be an African, coloured, Indian or white person.[29]

[27] Patricia Hayes, 'Political Funerals in South Africa', 5.
[28] Ibid. 5.
[29] Suren Pillay, 'The Partisan's Violence, Law and Apartheid: The Assassination of Matthew Goniwe and the Cradock Four' (PhD Dissertation: Columbia University, 2011), 6.

In the above iteration, the dead body of the anti-apartheid struggle became a central means through which notions of collective struggle and protest were conceptualised, and one through which the system and ideology of apartheid itself could be challenged. In death, the fallen anti-apartheid activist became a symbol of national sacrifice but was also re/humanised as a political subject and as a subject of history, a comrade par excellence who, through being remembered by the living as part of a collective that aimed to "transcend the ethnic and racial identities imposed by apartheid", became a symbol of the "refusal to be… categorised and named".[30] Pillay's recollections therefore suggest that the death and sacrifice of the anti-apartheid activist became emblematic of resistance against a regime of violence that made political assassination possible in the first place. Continued struggle therefore involved conscripting the movement's (and the dead's) energies toward the systemic violence of apartheid and subsuming the individual dead into collective struggles to come. In short, during this period the political funeral often became a space grounded by collective defiance against a system of oppression, rather than of mourning the individual and of individual loss:

> When we had to organize meetings to mark the death or detention of a leader, of a comrade, the moment was filled with anger, but also a certain detachment from the person. The dead person was subsumed in the wider narrative of an unjust act, what it would mean for the rest of us, in the need to go on, and in the need to be defiant rather than defeated. In that space, as leaders of revolutionary struggles, political movements and armies well know, contemplating death as loss cannot be encouraged.[31]

Rousseau's description of the political funeral further textures the ways in which the funeral, the dead body, and the political martyr "came to constitute an important repertoire of resistance":

[30] Nicky Rousseau, Ciraj Rassool and Riedwaan Moosage, 'Missing and Missed', 24.
[31] Suren Pillay, 'The Partisan's Violence, Law and Apartheid', 9-10.

> The potency of *this* dead body's political life lay in its requiring, in the face of death, not mourning or sorrow, but defiance and resistance, conscripting its peers and families into freedom's struggle – the slogan, 'Freedom or Death: Victory is Certain' worn on T-shirts and painted on banners during the 1980s representing the pledge of those so conscripted. More militarized aspects celebrated the guerrilla – songs from military camps, the famous *toyi-toyi*, and guards of honour in khaki and berets flanking the coffin, fists raised. The funeral, rather than marking a moment of closure, can be seen here to open a ledger of debt, which could only be settled by intensified resistance and further deaths. Indeed, police and mourners regularly clashed at such occasions, generating new fatalities, thus occasioning new funerals. Attempts by the state to control or limit such occasions, deploying armed police, and later by imposing severe restrictions, which included prohibiting political speeches and regalia, never entirely quelled these powerful moments of mobilization.[32]

Pillay affirms that despite the precarity and uncertainty of the time in which police could open up with teargas and bullets at any moment, "there was somehow a sense of indestructible energy, the same energy that was received by another South Africa as a destructive energy that could not be contained, but that had to be contained".[33] It seems that these 'powerful moments of mobilization' and 'indestructible energies' speak to Georges Didi-Huberman's claims regarding the ineluctable relationship between loss, mourning and uprisings. As he sees it, following Sigmund Freud, uprisings are "born of a plaint in front of a dead body that 'calls for justice'".[34] For Didi-Huberman, "loss, which overwhelms us initially, can also, thanks to a game, a gesture, a thought, or a desire, make the world rise up entirely; and this is the principle force of uprisings."[35] Put another way, and as Pillay's and Rousseau's comments suggest, what Huberman points toward is the process through which loss, pain or anger was transformed into action rather than passive contrition. In short, the

[32] Nicky Rousseau, 'Identification, Politics, Disciplines', 182.
[33] Suren Pillay, 'The Partisan's Violence, Law and Apartheid', 8.
[34] George Didi-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 295.
[35] Ibid. 290.

type of mourning Didi-Huberman, Pillay and Rousseau speak of is one that refuses to lay the dead to rest. As Didi-Huberman puts it: "We cannot bring back someone's dead mother. But we can, perhaps, rebel against some of the constraints of the world that killed her."[36]

In light of this potential, embodied and channelled through the dead body of the anti-apartheid activist, it is not surprising that apartheid authorities went to such great lengths to control the ways in which activists would be remembered and memorialised. Patricia Hayes suggests that this was particularly because political funerals "opened up public spaces for mourning, denouncement, and formal spectacle, sometimes on a grand scale", and therefore held the potential to set the world into motion.[37] For example, "[a]fter the dispersals and shock caused by the [Sharpeville] shootings [in 1961], this massive event with its visual corollary worked to produce a sense of history having moved to a new stage."[38] Indeed, like the funeral of Emmit Till in the US and that of Stephen Biko in South Africa in 1977, the Sharpeville massacre and subsequent funeral became a central node through which South Africans would organise and galvanise the struggle to come. Many other uprisings in South Africa and across the world, emerged from similar circumstances or coalesced around experiences of pain, anger, and violence. Pillay points toward June 1976 as

> an event of immense importance for students to commemorate. It was an instructive reminder of the necessity to sacrifice, of the ethical burden young people carried based on the idea that their blood, the blood of the students shot in 1976 was not spilt in vain.[39]

[36] Ibid. 295.
[37] Patricia Hayes, 'The Refusal of Light', 1
[38] Ibid. 2.
[39] Suren Pillay, 'The Partisan's Violence, Law and Apartheid', 14.

In addition to clashes between police and mourners, organisations with different political affiliations competed for political and hegemonic dominance over the dead body. During the 1980s, political disputes between the UDF and AZAPO often boiled over at funerals, during which their respective 'conscripted youths' challenged each other's legitimacy and power. Within the Congress Alliance, on the other hand, different political organisations have competed over the different ways in which leaders of the Alliance would be remembered during and after funerary events. For Hayes such instances, rarely photographed and therefore little seen today, disrupt the all too familiar binary that separates the good and bad sides of history, the sell-out and the revolutionary, victim and perpetrator. As such, it also has the potential to nuance our understandings of history and historical change as heterogeneous and contested, rather than as linear and homogenous.[40]

Importantly, it seems that the act of being present, of taking part in the funeral, of seeing the dead body (or coffin), was of paramount importance, not only for mourners and political activists, but also for photographers. These congregations produced a vast photographic archive of political funerals which has overdetermined the ways in which we see (and do not see) the anti-apartheid struggle. As such, "South African history and its perceptibility around the world at key moments appear to hinge largely on violent, unjust death."[41] The point for Hayes is that if "photographs *move* history in certain directions at the time of their making, we must also acknowledge at the outset that there are situations where they do not". She refers to these instances as the 'refusal of light', photographs that have been "relegated to a dark archive for unspecified periods." These photographs, she suggests, offer "a potential to

[40] Patricia Hayes, 'Refusal of Light', 10.
[41] Ibid. 1.

intervene in the present or some unpredicted future, and thus allow… for a greater sense of contingency and indeed a more heterogeneous time that opens up the question of how we think about history."[42]

A further interrelated consequence of these contests was that the dead person would often be taken away "from the intimacy of a family".[43] As such, the liberation movement effectively "became the family that mourned the dead".[44] However, as Hayes points out, the apparent hegemonic dominance of political movements at funerals was never clear and definite. Certainly, in public, it seems that the family was often overshadowed by the political movement, and in certain cases, people who had died from causes not directly attributed to political struggle, were conscripted in service of different liberation movements. But privately, the family and individual mourning still occupied an important space, particularly during the night vigil, "a much more interior affair, almost always in the family home", and, unlike the masculinist ceremonies of political struggle, was almost always held by mothers, wives, and daughters.[45] Although rarely recognised, the Hani family experienced similar moments after Chris Hani's assassination. In her recent memoir Lindiwe Hani recalls:

> There was a memorial for Daddy on Sunday, 18 April, when his body lay in state so that mourners could have a chance to see him before the big funeral at FNB stadium on Monday. I have a single snapshot memory of Khwezi [Lindiwe's sister] standing next to Daddy's coffin the entire time, refusing to sit down, as a stream of people walked past to view his body. Years earlier I had stood beside our father in Moscow, holding onto his big warm hand, staring at the body of Lenin. Now it was he who was in the coffin.[46]

[42] Ibid. 2.
[43] Ibid. 6-7.
[44] Ibid. 6.
[45] Ibid. 14.
[46] Lindiwe Hani and Melinda Ferguson, *Being Chris Hani's Daughter* (Johannesburg: MF Books, 2017), 61.

Nomakhwezi Hani's refusal to leave the side of her father, to give him up to the other mourners, perfectly illustrates the tension between family and the nation. On the one hand, for his daughters, Hani was "just Daddy."[47] On the other hand, their father appears as Lenin, the revolutionary hero whose dead body had been embalmed and housed in Moscow's Kremlin for display to the world. Indeed, one of the central themes of *Being Chris Hani's Daughter* is Lindiwe Hani's struggle to reconcile with the reality that she had to share 'Daddy' with the nation. Another deeply intimate account from Lindiwe Hani's memoir came when Hani's extended family were called to view his dead body in the mortuary. The following is worth quoting in full:

> On the Tuesday morning I woke to hear that I was to be collected by relatives to view Daddy's body in the morgue downtown. I remember how freezing it was when I walked into the cold, bare-cement room lined wall to wall with coffins. I was led to a closed, rectangular mahogany wooden box in the middle of the room. We all stood around in silence, my mother, my two sisters, our relatives, and some of Daddy's comrades. A man opened the coffin and there he was – my Daddy, still in his blue tracksuit, the one he loved to wear when he went jogging. But this man lying there, so still and frozen, didn't look like my beloved Daddy at all. He seemed all puffed up and swollen, unreal, even slightly grotesque. Like some alien moulded from clay. They had applied heavy make-up but I could still see where the bullet had penetrated the side of his face. I stepped forward to touch him. I needed to touch him, to feel whether it was him, to feel whether he was real. When I looked up, the first person I saw was his bodyguard, Mazda. This big man, standing there, huge and imposing, just couldn't hold back his emotion. He caught my eye, and quickly looked up at the ceiling, blinking furiously, fighting back tears that now ran down his cheeks.
>
> For the first time, I saw with my own two eyes that my father was dead. Gone was my vibrant, loud and loving Daddy. There'd be no more morning runs, no long conversations, no watching *Agenda* together, swimming lessons, hugs and jokes. In that morgue, I knew he was never coming back.[48]

[47] Ibid. 25.
[48] Ibid. 58-59.

The above instances point toward the ambiguity of the dead body and foreground the contested modes through which the dead are remembered, appropriated, and conscripted. To paraphrase Rousseau, Rassool and Moosage, "we must caution against overstating the role of the state's [or the political party's] agency" during moments of memorialisation at political funerals, "as this occludes that of families, fellow comrades, activists and professionals, even the dead themselves."[49] Furthermore, in the postapartheid, "families have often welcomed, even expected the heroic script of sacrifice to the nation".[50] At times, such as with Lindiwe Hani, this heroic script has been rejected, both as a means through which to reclaim personal relationships and to invoke a different type of politics, one that decentres the state and the political party, and conscripts the dead body of Chris Hani for different political purposes.

These instances also point toward different 'worlds of meaning' that coalesced around Hani's dead body. During apartheid there was a widely "acknowledged horror that… [lay] deep in the psyche of many black South Africans since labour migration and urbanization took root in the late nineteenth century. This… [was] the horror of dying in the absence of the collective, especially at the hands of the state, ending in a pauper's burial."[51] A similar horror must have circulated amongst anti-apartheid activists who were "in very different scales and proportions… putting [their] lives on the line when [they] decided to become activists."[52] As Pillay suggests, this would have necessitated a certain detachment from the dead anti-

[49] Nicky Rousseau, Ciraj Rassool and Riedwaan Moosage, 'Missing and Missed', 22.
[50] Ibid. 22.
[51] Patricia Hayes, 'Refusal of Light', 4.
[52] Suren Pillay, *The Partisan's Violence, Law and Apartheid*, 16.

apartheid activist, and normalised the "twinning of death and liberation, as conditions of possibility for each other."[53]

Finally, Lindiwe Hani's words also highlight the deeply intimate experience of losing a loved one, and the difficulty in coming to terms with personal loss. For a moment at the mortuary, Lindiwe Hani refused to believe that the dead body in front of her was her father. He looked more like an 'alien', a 'grotesque' version of 'Daddy', whose violent death was still evident underneath his heavy makeup. It was only after seeing her father's bodyguard in tears, only once she had witnessed the living mourning the dead, that she began the long process of coming to terms with her loss. Elsewhere, however, and in contrast to this intimate scene, South Africans were channelling their loss through a different register.

The funeral of Chris Hani and the state to come

According to Rousseau, in the early 1990s funerary practices shifted from "defiance and mobilisation" toward "a more sombre and official funeral of a state *to come*."[54] This shift, she suggests, was produced by two key funerals: those of Oliver Tambo and Chris Hani. Although "many of the earlier accoutrements and rituals were evident", Rousseau implies that these two funerals became nodes through which a different type of remembrance and memorialisation was inaugurated and re-inscripted into the fabric of the 'new' nation. As Rousseau notes, "for the first time, apartheid police rather than facing off with an enemy, escorted and protected mourners, a powerful symbolic moment marking an official, if

[53] Ibid. 12.
[54] Nicky Rousseau, 'Identification, Politics, Disciplines', 182.

reluctant, recognition that those regarded as 'bare life', were now citizens worthy of protection."[55]

Although Rousseau's genealogy of political funerals in South Africa is particularly useful for thinking through this symbolic shift during the 1990s, it is questionable that from the apartheid state's perspective this shift from treating black South Africans as disposable to worthy of protection, was a genuine one. Although this is clearly not Rousseau's point, at the FNB Stadium in Johannesburg on the day of Hani's funeral, Nelson Mandela criticised the apartheid government for its treatment of mourners in the days following Hani's assassination. Clearly still in grief and angered by the violent loss of a close friend and comrade, Mandela claimed that far from protecting mourners, apartheid President De Klerk and the apartheid state apparatus had purposefully inflamed the situation by deploying "troops against mourners" and shooting "innocent marchers in Pretoria". After this, Mandela stated:

> They say we cannot control our forces. We are not cattle to be controlled. And we say to De Klerk: it is your forces that lost control and, completely unprovoked, shot innocent marchers in Pretoria….
>
> They talk of peace as if wanting peace is pacifism. They paint a picture of us as militant youth, or mindless radicals. They want to present the ANC as the other half of the National Party. We want peace but we are not pacifists. We are all militants. We are all radicals. That is the very essence of the ANC, for it is a liberation movement fighting for freedom for all our people. It is our unceasing struggles… that have brought the regime to the negotiating table. And those negotiations are themselves a site of struggle….
>
> We warn all who seek to impose endless negotiations that any further delay will discredit the negotiation process itself and place on the national agenda the need for change by other means.[56]

[55] Ibid. 182-183.
[56] Nelson Mandela, 'The Mandela Diaries, 19 April 1993', *SABC News*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maWF__Omyrk.

This radical, militant register was indeed accompanied by 'earlier accoutrements and rituals': full military regalia, MK out in force, struggle songs, the blurring of different cultural and political traditions, and a twenty-one-gun salute at the funeral in Boksburg which was carried out after proceedings were completed at the FNB Stadium. A dispatch from the Religious Action Network, described the funeral as follows:

> A white-robed priest carrying a silver […] led the coffin as crowds pressed around clutching brightly coloured bunches of flowers. Two green-bereted MK woman guerrillas handed over the two flags and Hani's combat cap to Hani's grieving widow, Limpho. ANC President Nelson Mandela was at her side. Two Roman Catholic priests, one speaking Zulu and the other English, presided over the service. Hani's family, including his three young daughters, clutched white doves which they released seconds before the coffin was lowered into the grave to the chanting of a Zulu lament. Two doves flew into the grave as the coffin was lowered. Gunshots rang out, but Tokyo Sexwale, head of the ANC's Johannesburg area branch, quickly shouted: "Cease fire, the 21-gun salute has, ended... stop firing." Hani's children threw handfuls of earth and red carnations into the grave. Mandela and Communist Party National Chairman Joe Slovo each threw a single red carnation and a handful of earth. Outside the cemetery, white men with rifles peered from behind high concrete walls. A… group of blacks looted and set fire to a store on the outskirts of Boksburg, but the mood of the crowd was largely restrained.[57]

Perhaps the most striking and moving image from that day, was Hani's young daughters surrounded by soldiers and political activists dressed in black, releasing doves as their father's coffin was lowered into the grave. From footage available online, one can hear and feel the tension, anger, and trauma coursing through the crowd.[58] However, as the above dispatch tends to affirm, a more subdued atmosphere seems to have weighed heavily over proceedings, which indeed contrasted sharply with the ways in which the dead had been

[57] 'RE: Funeral of Chris Hani', American Committee on Africa (ACOA), 19 April 1993, https://www.aluka.org/stable/10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.acoa000777.
[58] See for example: Nelson Mandela, 'The Mandela Diaries, 19 April 1993'.

conscripted during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. To be sure, Mandela's speech, although couched in the language of the guerrilla fighter (and of Hani), had a sobering and measured message for the crowed gathered at FNB Stadium, one that, it seems, was guided by a politics of care for the violence routinely enacted on black South Africans:

> Chris Hani has a very special place in our hearts. But each and every one of you is precious to us. You are our people, our pride and joy, our future. We love you all. And we want all of you to reach home safely. When we leave here, let us do so with the pride and dignity of our nation. Let us not be provoked. The struggle is not over. You are our soldiers for peace, our army for the elections that will transform our country. Go back to your homes, your regions, and organise like never before. Together, we are invincible. That is how we will pay the greatest tribute we can to Chris Hani. Freedom in South Africa. Let Chris Hani live on through all of us.[59]

The reasons for Mandela's interventions at Hani's funeral and a few days earlier, live on television, were clear: to avoid further violence, a derailment of negotiations, and even civil war. In response to Hani's assassination, thousands of South Africans had taken to the streets in protest and uprising, and the AWB had mobilised two thousand armed members in Boksburg on the day of the funeral, in anticipation of their much-desired reckoning with black South Africa. Saul Dubow has described the late 1980s and early 1990s as a period of the 'balancing of forces' within a heterogeneous and complex struggle comprised of competing political traditions and organisations, a powerful labour movement, 'youth power' in the townships, tribalists in the country's homelands, far-right, white nationalists, and a wounded but still powerful apartheid government and military. As he explains:

> In the second half of the 1980s, the government's legitimacy and authority weakened, though its capacity to enforce its will remained largely intact. The anti-apartheid movement within the country withstood the assault of the state and in many ways deepened its associational roots and democratic culture. The ANC became the primary beneficiary of these developments. Its rising standing

[59] Ibid.

> within the country, and beyond, began to position it as the natural negotiating partner with, and the presumptive successor to, the white minority regime.[60]

Dubow further argues that despite political rhetoric about the revolutionary overthrow of apartheid, from the mid-1980s the Congress Alliance were increasingly committed to negotiations and pragmatically accepted that the "ANC would have to negotiate because it was 'deploying its weakest arm' – armed struggle – 'against the regime at its strongest point'."[61] In other words, although militants like Hani were still convinced in 1990 that "power could be seized through insurrection",[62] the ANC and the apartheid government, which was itself economically and politically weakened, became increasingly aware that to end the stalemate, negotiations and a commitment to constitutionalism and individual rights were necessary, even if both parties were initially dismissive and suspicious of the idea of a Bill of Rights. These had been embraced globally at the time as the only effective means to end apartheid.[63]

This was the political milieu that punctuated proceedings at Hani's funeral and, I argue, determined the modes through which Hani could be mourned. In short, to put an end to the

[60] Saul Dubow, *Apartheid: 1948-1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 226.
[61] Ibid. 256.
[62] Ibid. 254.
[63] The reasons for this scepticism were of course varied. According to Dubow, "Constitutionalists and rights-activists had to overcome a great deal of scepticism, not to say antagonism, within their own ranks. Within both the UDF and the ANC there were many who regarded a bill of rights as a sham form of bourgeois democracy. For its part, the government had long been ideologically opposed to the very concept of individual rights, viewing this as inimical to the tenets of Christian-Nationalism and the primacy of the volk. Individual rights were mistrusted since they might well be the route to majority rule in a unitary society, which would mean the effacement of white political power… The government and the ANC were also mutually wary of US foreign policy which, under the Reagan and especially the Carter administrations, increasingly pushed a human rights agenda. The ANC interpreted this as a form of imperialism, while the government resented external interference in its domestic affairs, often seeing human rights as a cover for Communism. Nevertheless, the growing global embrace of human rights was a palpable reality and opinion-formers on both sides saw this as an opportunity not to be squandered" (Ibid. 248-249).

violence of transition, Hani's dead body was necessarily conscripted for a struggle which, the ANC clearly affirmed, would continue in the ballot box. By doing so, Mandela and the ANC, also asserted the end of a type of struggle that had the state as its target, and the type of struggle that Hani had dedicated his life to. If, as Dubow and other commentators suggest, the idea of the revolutionary overthrow of apartheid was, at least since the Kabwe Conference of 1985, mainly employed by the ANC as political rhetoric and deployed to threaten the apartheid state as Mandela did at Hani's funeral, then the death of Hani, who was seen by many as the great revolutionary or transformative hope within the Congress Alliance, was, so to speak, the nail in the coffin of the possibility of socialist futures. This of course, does not mean that after Hani's assassination, other socialists, and revolutionaries (both within the Congress Alliance and among other political organisations) acquiesced to the demands of neoliberalism,[64] or that Hani's survival would have ensured the future of state socialism in southern Africa. But for many it did mark, symbolically and perhaps politically, "the end of a whole era of revolutionary socialist expectation" (to use David Scott's terms) in southern Africa.[65]

The modern political subject, and the postanti-apartheid memorial complex

If Hani's funeral marked the beginning of a shift in funerary practices toward those associated with the workings of the nation state, it should also be considered as a foundational moment of the emergence of an official postanti-apartheid memorial complex. As Rassool has explained, "since the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, human

[64] See this argument in Patrick Bond, *The Elite Transition: from Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
[65] David Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 4.

remains and body parts have featured significantly in debates and disputes over how aspects of the country's traumatic history should be remembered and how these pasts should be expressed in the institutions and spaces of public culture."[66]

In some ways, the history and legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle have been defined by ideas associated with the TRC and a commitment to "transitional justice involving truth seeking and amnesty".[67] This legacy has also been grounded by the return, reburial, and repatriation of freedom fighters, which has been deemed to contribute to the re/humanisation of previously dehumanised people. Along with the restitution of human remains abducted from southern Africa during colonialism, the return and reburial of freedom fighters who had either died in combat abroad or were disappeared in South Africa, has been crucial in attempts to form a postanti-apartheid citizenry. In the postapartheid state's memorial projects, these attempts have best been encapsulated at Freedom Park in Pretoria, which became "South Africa's official national memorial about human rights violations, reconciliation and freedom."[68] Combining the ideas of the "modern memorial complex and the tomb of the Unknown Soldier",[69] with "indigenous practices of remembering the dead", Freedom Park worked to situate freedom fighters as ancestors to the nation, whose collective deaths became symbolic of the foundations of the post anti-apartheid nation-state.[70] As Rassool further explains:

> As a recovered person with a biography, which saw violence narrated into democratic reconstruction, the bones of the dead were offered dignified closure through burial in a grave, in many ways the primary memorial. The material

[66] Ciraj Rassool, 'Human Remains, the Disciplines of the, and the South African Memorial Complex', 135.
[67] Ibid. 141.
[68] Ibid. 143-144.
[69] Ibid. 144.
[70] Ibid. 145.

> edifice of the grave, its headstone and the story of its creation, would be incorporated into a narrative of the making of democracy, whose telling might be part of a public history geared towards citizen formation.[71]

Because of the timing of Hani's assassination, and the particular shift in funerary practices during this time, Hani can be understood as being the postanti-apartheid state's originary martyr (not the first to die of course, but the first to be commemorated by the state to come) whose death, according to official narratives, helped guarantee the freedom of South Africa and its people. Hani's gravestone, located in what is now Ekurhuleni, Gauteng, could also, then, be understood as the primary memorial of the 'new' nation, and its story of creation – a story of violence, sacrifice, and re/humanisation – as the story of the becoming of postapartheid South Africa, which was simultaneously postanti-apartheid.

This of course does not mean that discourses about truth and justice began at the Hani Funeral. However, it does seem to mark a shift from a discourse concerned with a struggle aimed at taking state power, toward an official state discourse about truth and justice. This was one concerned with the necessary containment of an energy that had largely been channelled through the dead of apartheid atrocities, and that had propelled South Africa toward elections and the potential overthrow of the apartheid regime. The emergence of this type of discourse should, then, be seen as correlating with new prerogatives about the stabilisation of the nation-state and the necessary softening of revolutionary politics in order for, in Derrida's words, the nation "not to be overcome by paralysis."[72]

[71] Ibid. 142.
[72] Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 41.

Although I am not invested in writing an origin story for the postanti-apartheid memorial complex, it is important to draw attention to what might be seen as a precursor to the practices of this complex, and to what Rousseau describes as the official funeral of the state to come. For Rousseau's discussion also points toward an official recognition of those now deemed human, as subjects and citizens worthy of protection, and importantly as worthy of mourning by the state to come. Hani's 'proper burial', had the potential to allow previously dehumanised people, those who had been exiled abroad or to segregated homelands, to lay claim to space, land, and citizenship, and therefore, to symbolically undo the othering practices of apartheid and colonialism. The act of mourning Hani on a grand scale – on national television, and openly in public – had the potential to refigure time and space and to reorder South Africa's 'meaningful universe'.

However, as Rousseau, Rassool and Moosage warn, this process of mourning, burial, and memorialisation also has the potential to dehumanise the subject. Echoing Pillay, they suggest

> if colonial and apartheid raciologies constructed a hierarchy in which only white people were fully human, then political struggle constitutes a refusal to be categorised and named. Claiming to be a political subject rendered racialisation insufficient, [but it also generated] … new conditions for dehumanisation: in desubjectifying the political subject, apartheid sought to produce an absolute enemy, assigning categories such as 'terrorist' or 'communist proxy'.[73]

The point for Rousseau, Rassool and Moosage is that processes of re/humanisation and the status of the human are never guaranteed in advance. In the case of state-led funerals, they

[73] Nicky Rousseau, Ciraj Rassool and Riedwaan Moosage, 'Missing and Missed', 24-25.

suggest that because the human is often taken away from the family and framed as a political subject tied to the state or to the party, state-led funerary practices, including those associated with the recovery and return of the missing and missed of apartheid era atrocities, are always already both potentially dehumanising and re/humanising. In short, processes of burial, exhumation, recovery, and return are ambiguous and unsettled in character, and have been framed through competing notions of the human and different modes through which we recognise or do not recognise the human as such.

If these are some of the stakes of dead body politics in postapartheid South Africa, what are we to make of this apparent shift from defiance and mobilisation to the 'official funeral of the state *to come*', and how might we further trace the ways in which Hani's dead body may have been conscripted as a subject/object through which the new nation would be symbolically refigured? As I have already suggested, one post hoc reading of this period is that it marks a moment of the triumph of Western democracy over authoritarianism, namely apartheid and global communism. In this sense, the meta-narrative of transition, which encompasses a series of events that include Hani's assassination and funeral, Mandela's walk from Victor Vorster Prison in Pretoria, and South Africa's first free and fair elections, also mark the becoming of South Africa as a modern, democratic nation, or better still, the becoming of a specific iteration of the modern in South Africa. This narrative of the making of modern South Africa has largely been framed through the image of the becoming of Mandela as Great Man of History. However, as Uhuru Phalafala argues following Christopher Lee, "a more prescient image for the politics of post-apartheid South Africa may be the assassination of Chris Hani, leader of the SACP . . .. Political anxieties continued – particularly over the

fate of South Africa's economic future". In other words, if the release of Mandela marks the becoming of the postanti-apartheid nation and emergence of a globalising neoliberal world, then Hani's assassination and funeral marks "yet another end to the Cold War in southern Africa".[74]

It seems clear, then, that although the process of mourning Hani on a grand scale re/humanised him as a political subject worthy of official mourning by the state to come, the circumstances of his death – the reality that he was assassinated because Walus and Derby-Lewis were "out to get a communist"[75] – point toward a dual process of re/dehumanisation. Hani's violent death and subsequent funeral therefore might be seen to simultaneously mark the death and dehumanisation of a communist whose life was considered disposable by right-wing nationalists (and likely others), and the birth and re/humanisation of the modern political subject; a subject incorporated into the narrative of the making of a postanti-apartheid nation that had apparently placed the violence of apartheid and revolutionary struggle firmly in the remembered past. In short, the becoming of the modern political subject in postapartheid South Africa was coextensive with the death of the revolutionary and the necessary rechannelling of, to paraphrase Pillay, "a destructive energy that could not be contained, but that had to be contained."[76]

It follows that the symbolic shift in funerary practices that Rousseau describes, could be read in relation to the increasing global hegemony of a certain type of politics, one tied up with a

[74] Uhuru P. Phalafala, 'Decolonial opacities: Cold War Assemblages', *Social Dynamics* (2021) https://doi.org/10.1080/02533952.2021.1960722, 3.
[75] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), XIV
[76] Suren Pillay, 'The Partisan's Violence, Law and Apartheid', 8.

political shift associated with the end of the Cold War, as well as a "global embrace" of "constitutionalism and individual human rights" and a certain idea about the modern nation-state and the modern political subject.[77] In other words, contests over the dead body of Hani were and are tied up with varying notions of the political subject and the different ways in which political struggle, the human, and modernity were figured during and after the anti-apartheid struggle.

On the one hand, ideas about the autonomous sovereign subject, derived from Enlightenment ideals, informed the ways in which colonialism and apartheid were administered and maintained, and how different liberation movements organised and mobilised against oppression. Such ideas about the European as modern and rational, and the colonised as primitive, non-human, and disposable, have been largely demystified and delegitimised today. However, there remains a current of thought that sees apartheid as anathema to Enlightenment ideals. As such, problematic notions of the subject derived from this tradition and history of thought still hold some currency today. The book *Remains of the Social* draws our attention to this in its critique of Peter Vale and Heather Jacklin's *Re-imagining the Social in South Africa: Critique, Theory and Post-Apartheid Society*, which argued for the promotion of 'Enlightenment Values' in response to what they saw as a "shift from critique to subservience" after apartheid.[78] It is not so much Vale and Jacklin's arguments surrounding the end of critical thinking after apartheid that *Remains of the Social* is concerned with, but rather their promotion of 'Enlightenment Values' as if these 'values' are not intertwined with the racialised logic of apartheid and colonialism. As *Remains* argues:

[77] Saul Dubow, *Apartheid: 1948-1994*, 249.
[78] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social*, 2.

> Precisely what values might this mean? As if to respond to the question, they [Vale and Jacklin] refer, further on, to the 'counter-Enlightenment authoritarian tendencies' which the state assumed in South Africa during apartheid. So, in their construction of it, 'promoting Enlightenment values' is an antidote to apartheid as an 'authoritarian' impediment to the 'Enlightenment', leaving the postapartheid as the Enlightenment's fulfilment. To point out the Eurocentrism of this view is hardly necessary.[79]

The point for *Remains of the Social* is that so-called 'Enlightenment values' produced the ground through which apartheid and colonialism was implemented and maintained. Apartheid therefore "is not an impediment to but is, rather, coextensive with the Enlightenment, for apartheid is not purely an anomaly, a perversion of 'Enlightenment values', but their fulfilment."[80] From this Eurocentric lens, to be modern was to be an autonomous subject, capable of rational decisions, which at the time of South African transition from apartheid and global transition from the Cold War, were inflected by a certain political order that produced the limits and stakes of knowledge and a certain iteration of the modern. It is also through this lens that normative ideas about the modern nation-state have been conceived. As Tom Lundborg explains:

> The modern political subject is a subject defined by its aspirations for freedom, liberty, progress, and enlightenment, and whose conditions for realizing those ideals ultimately rely on the limits of the sovereign territorial state, operating in an international system of states.[81]

In short, Enlightenment ideals about the human are intimately tied up with ideas about the modern nation-state, normatively seen as an autonomous territory which organises citizens and subjects and governs in their best interest. For Foucault, the emergence of the modern

[79] Ibid. 2.
[80] Ibid. 3.
[81] Tom Lundborg, *Politics of the Event*, 4.

nation-state can be understood in relation to ideas about sovereignty, defined as a social or political body with the power of forgiveness, and the power to give life and administer death. Furthermore, these ideas about sovereignty have been grounded by "three 'primitive' elements: a subject who has to be subjectified, the unity of the power that has to be founded, and the legitimacy that has to be respected."[82] Through this Foucauldian lens we can understand the nation-state as founded upon a consensus surrounding a legitimacy to govern, a unification of a people (a collective sovereign) within a clearly demarcated territory, by individualised subjects recognised and recognising themselves as belonging to and within the state, and discourses of truth and right which are established by institutional and disciplinary regimes.

Verdery sees what she calls 'proper burial' as intrinsic to this process, particularly during moments of transition, when according to her, people's relationships to the nation-state, to authority, to the sacred, and to politics are reordered in new ways. To give 'proper burial' for Verdery, is then, intimately tied up with the workings of the modern nation-state. Conversely, to be worthy of mourning (and of a biography) is to be recognised as human, as a citizen of the state rather than an object of power, someone who belongs with and to the nation, and someone who to different degrees accepts and even welcomes powers effects. To be modern, through this lens, is to belong to the nation-state, constituted as a body that fulfils and acknowledges 'Enlightenment values.' To point out the irony of this view, particularly when read alongside the claims in *Remains of the Social,* is hardly necessary.

[82] Michel Foucault, *Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76* (London: Penguin, 2003), 44.

The words of Mandela spoken at the Hani funeral are worth repeating: "They say we cannot control our forces. We are not cattle to be controlled. And we say to De Klerk: it is your forces that lost control and, completely unprovoked, shot innocent marchers in Pretoria. They talk of peace as if wanting peace is pacifism. They paint a picture of us as militant youth, or mindless radicals." Through the above lens, Mandela's words should not only be read as a threat and warning to the apartheid government, but also as an affirmation to the world that the ANC were capable of both steering the ship toward negotiations, of governing afterwards, and, importantly, as worthy of joining the global community of sovereign territorial states. This is an important point, particularly when one engages with debates circulating throughout local and global media at the time, which questioned the ANC's ability to control the South African people, who were often depicted as a non-thinking, violent, and irrational mass. In an article 'Stilling the Anger', *Business Day's* analysis of the aftermath of Hani's assassination was as follows:

> The relative calm after the assassination of Chris Hani lessens the likelihood of a new cycle of violence, but does not remove the danger of virulent reaction which could permanently damage constitutional negotiations. Containing rising black anger will depend on Hani's friends and his political opponents and the appreciation of the authorities that their every move is being watched.
>
> The ANC leadership moved swiftly on Saturday to head off immediate violence, particularly by the militant township youths over whom they have influence but not control. Continued intervention yesterday may have prevented angry marches, some of them marked by stoning and vehicle burnings, from degenerating into widespread riots. Those calls for discipline will be even more necessary to help avert violent outbursts at Boksburg courts today, during tomorrow's stayaways, at Saturdays march and at Hani's funeral.
>
> Each of these occasions is likely to be a mass demonstration of grief and anger. The ANC and the SACP are intent on channelling the anger into a political force, but their leaders will need to be forceful and unambiguous in demanding restraint. Militant rhetoric can easily be misunderstood.[83]

[83] Unknown author, 'Stilling the Anger', *Business Day*, 13 April 1993 (WHP, University of the Witwatersrand, AG2543).

I have chosen to highlight this article in *Business Day* because it touches on many of the issues and contests discussed in this chapter, but it is just one of many such examples.[84] Clearly, for *Business Day*, the stakes of this critical juncture revolved around the potential use of violence by political parties, the apartheid state and the 'masses', and the need, in their opinion, for the Congress Alliance to prove that they could control 'militant township youths', but more importantly, to not mislead them toward 'virulent reaction'. The irony here is that according to many sources, Hani was the only leader within the Congress Alliance who could control South Africa's militant youth.[85] However, it could also be argued that the ways in which activists like Hani channelled the energies of the South African people was constituted through a different register, one that unsettled ideas about sovereignty and the emergence of the postanti-apartheid nation, and therefore had to be contained and pacified.

The TRC, psychoanalysis and the work of mourning

Against the notion of the rational, autonomous subject and of the nation-state, other ideas circulated about the political subject which were informed by various bodies of thought in the liberation movement, such as non-racialism, African nationalism, African socialism, Marxism, and communism. Hani's ideas and those of the Congress Alliance were closely entwined with each other. They each sometimes departed from and sometimes espoused European Enlightenment values, but were always in conversation with them. Within the

[84] For example, this question was central for debates between Mandela and De Klerk during the run up to elections in 1994, which were broadcast on television, both locally and globally. See: 'De Klerk, Mandela pre-election debate rebroadcast, 14 April 2019', *SABC News*, 14 April 2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTIeqLem67Q.
[85] Evelyn Groenink, *Incorruptible: The story of the murders of Dulcie September, Anton Lubowski and Chris Hani* (Self Published by Elizabeth Groenink, 2018), 197.

Congress Alliance itself, competing bodies of thought, including Christian, African socialist, Communist and Liberal thinking were held together through a commitment to democratic centralism. This was the idea and practice that the Congress Alliance could house and ultimately reconcile opposing ideas for the sake of the mass movement and its struggle against apartheid. Here, I want to focus on the supposed opposition between individual and collective struggle and the ways in which this problematic binary has been brought to bear on ideas of the political subject, human rights, justice, and mourning.

This tension between the collective and the individual is a well-worn debate, one that is best highlighted by ideological, political, and economic conflicts between Western capitalist societies and those broadly and often ambiguously aligned with Marxist values. However, rather than providing a summary of these debates and histories, it might be useful to turn to the TRC, which, correctly or not, marks any debate about the transitional period and the fate and future of politics and justice in South Africa. For this tension between collective and individual mourning (and between individualised and systemic human rights violations) played itself out at South Africa's TRC which has been seen as a central means through which the nation and the individual could come to terms with the past and potentially move on from it.

Two of the most powerful and useful insights into the TRC come from Rousseau and Heidi Grunebaum, who although not always in agreement, both accept that the TRC tended to individualise human rights violations and thus elide the collective, systemic, and ongoing abuses of apartheid and colonialism. Perhaps Rousseau's most important contribution to

debates about the TRC, is her attempt to push back against the often-universalising idea (particularly from South African scholars) that the TRC was a "conscript of neo-liberalism" or a "mere handmaiden of the state."[86] As she argues, "critics saw the TRC as providing a politics for a post-apartheid government, which had chosen not radical transformation but neo-liberalism, in which the reconciled citizen would be none other than the depoliticised citizen of neo-liberalism."[87] To counter this claim, Rousseau argues; "The TRC I knew was a highly fractious institution, with often opposing views and positions. As a researcher, my work largely concerned the truth-telling mandate of the TRC; in some senses it operated as a forum in which evidentiary claims and establishing truth was characterised by robust enquiry and debate."[88]

This idea of the TRC as forum and as contested is important for thinking through the differences between TRC as institution, and what Rousseau, following Charmaine McEachern, calls 'the media TRC'.[89] In short, Rousseau's arguments both demystify narratives that frame the TRC as neoliberal conscript and reveals the ways in which interpretations about the TRC and transition have been produced and made available for different critiques and political projects. However, what concerns me here is not whether the TRC produced and perpetuated narratives of reconciliation in South Africa at the time, but the reality that these narratives persist to this day. Put another way, the TRC itself is not my object of study or critique. Rather, I am interested in how the TRC was employed by the

[86] Nicky Rousseau, 'Itineraries: A return to the archives of the South African truth commission and the limits of counter-revolutionary warfare' (PhD Thesis: Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2019), 143.
[87] Ibid. 13.
[88] Ibid. 14.
[89] Charmaine McEachern, *Narratives of Nation: Media, Memory and Representation in the Making of the New South Africa* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002).

media in particular (both local and global) and what this made available for thought. Conversely, I am interested in what this idea of the TRC as geared toward reconciliation and as proxy for neoliberal economic and political policy does to the ways in which we think through the assassination of Chris Hani and the transitional period. In short, my claims above about Hani's assassination as representative of the death of revolutionary socialist expectation and the birth of neoliberal hegemony are not concerned with the truth as such, but what such claims made available for the work of mourning and forgiveness during the transitional period. For it is clear that regardless of the actual objectives and aims of the TRC, this idea about the TRC has had real political effects, both in South Africa and further afield.

My concern is not so much about whether the TRC produced and perpetuated a focus on individual loss and human rights violations. Nor am I invested in a critique of the individual or an appraisal of the collective. To be sure, Rousseau points out the problematic ways in which a focus on the collective elides the "individual pain and suffering" that researchers like Rousseau were encountering during their work with the TRC.[90] Instead, I am interested in what this binary does to the work of mourning. Although Rousseau complicates the ways in which we understand the TRC in this regard, she also recognises that

> perhaps the most compelling criticism of the TRC has been the way in which its mandate penned a characterisation of political violence that excluded the structural violence of apartheid, and confined its gaze to the physical and repressive dimensions of apartheid rule that occurred in direct political repression and conflict, rather than the structural and everyday violence of apartheid. Whereas tens of thousands were affected by direct repression, millions endured the machinations of apartheid from cradle to grave through the system of racial classification, the pass laws and its associated systems of migrant labour, the creation of far-flung artificial ethnic homelands, and the loss of land and citizenship. Further, as noted earlier, even racist violence and murders were excluded and did not count. Consequently, the TRC's depiction

[90] Nicky Rousseau, 'Itineraries', 140.

> of the violence of the past was a shrunken and attenuated one, focused on a tiny minority of those who suffered direct physical violations. This truncation unfortunately represents the borders of violence as ending at the perimeter of the individual body rather than entire communities. As succinctly expressed by Mahmood Mamdani, this circumscription of the mandate had the effect of not only leaving thousands of apartheid functionaries unscathed, but allowing the majority of those who benefited from apartheid – mainly the broad white population – entirely off the hook. Instead of placing the complicity and culpability of beneficiaries centre stage, white South Africans by and large were able to claim a false innocence. The reconciliation project of the TRC, in this view, was effectively reduced to reconciliation between former [male] political enemies, state agents and political activists, rather than a reconciliation that addressed and challenged the major cleavages in South African society – namely the racial and economic divide.[91]

It is clear that the TRC cannot be solely held responsible for the lack of systemic and institutional transformation in postapartheid South Africa. However, as Paolo de Greiff points out, "the failure to implement the TRC's recommendations on reparations has affected the overall perception of its success, despite the fact that the South African TRC was not at all responsible for the implementation of the plan!"[92] In this sense, the TRC has functioned as a pyscho-social paradigm, a touchstone that harbours a critique about the failure of transition, reconciliation, and justice in the postapartheid nation. Hani, we might add, functions on a similar plane: a paradigm for the longing for total revolution and the loss of a world free from apartheid and racial capitalism.

Grunebaum has described the reconciliatory narrative associated with the TRC as a "palliative to managing the aftermath of 'conflict'", against which, according to her, there

[91] Ibid. 157.
[92] Pablo de Greiff, 'Justice and Reparations', *The Handbook of Reparations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 457.

was a growing sense that there is no one-fix 'cure' for hundreds of years of colonial violence, dehumanisation, exploitation and brutality.[93] As she argues:

> Unravelling the lived inscriptions of layer upon layer of sentient injustice that have marked everyday life over the past three hundred and fifty years in the southernmost parts of the African continent is still only beginning. Twenty years on and we have hardly scratched the surface of three and a half centuries of colonial and apartheid wars and many wars of resistance. We have barely begun to ask what these mean for a more human and humane life to be possible here in southern Africa.[94]

In the early stages of her book, Grunebaum's critique is directed toward Western psychology, which for her "renders a collective and truly democratic work of bereavement" as the "transformation tasks of the individual, envisaged as psychically interior." This, she argues "stands in stark contrast to the strong political and social relationships of burials to the social harnessing of collective energy to act in resistance and protest in South Africa, particularly in the 1980s during the peak of new forms of apartheid state political repression, security legislation and intensified mass-based anti-apartheid resistance."[95] Grunebaum's arguments return us to those forwarded by Pillay and Rousseau on the difference between the work of mourning as a cathartic experience, and ideas expressed in *Remains of the Social* about 'wakefulness', as movement, and as motion.[96] To repeat Pillay, during the anti-apartheid struggle freedom fighters were not mourned as individuals, but were rather subsumed into the collective, so that the dead might energise the movement for the struggle to come. In other words, loss for Pillay and other anti-apartheid activists at this time "could not be tolerated" because, as Rousseau puts it, "rather than marking a moment of closure", the funeral

[93] Heidi Grunebaum, *Memorialising the Past*, 38.
[94] Ibid. 1.
[95] Ibid. 42-43.
[96] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social*, 7.

necessarily opened "a ledger of debt, which could only be settled by intensified resistance and further deaths."[97]

Under certain circumstances, to mourn and to let go of the lost object means forgiving the transgression. But how is one to forgive the unforgivable?[98] And how are South Africans meant to attend to this ledger of debt and the question of justice and forgiveness after apartheid, particularly when this debt is located across society, on a systemic, institutional level that, according to De Greiff, "calls for more than an attempt to address the particular harms suffered by particular individuals."[99] Many would argue that since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the material, systemic, and institutional processes of restitution, redress and justice have not been adequately prioritised by successive ANC dispensations. Confirming De Greiff's claim about the slow decay of the legitimacy of symbolic reparations in the absence of material, institutional and systemic change,[100] there have been increasing calls, particularly from within the ranks of South Africa's increasingly marginalised youth, for a return to the type of politics that seeks to transform apartheid and colonialism rather than reform it. It is for this reason that remembering the violent and unjust deaths of activists like Hani, and also Stephen Biko, and Robert Sobukwe, have become potent symbols of defiance that haunt the struggle against apartheid and the ANC's post-apartheid project.

In 2016, students across South Africa, answered these questions by calling for the 'decolonisation' of universities and other institutions, the questioning of official narratives

[97] Nicky Rousseau, 'Identification, Politics, Disciplines', 182.
[98] Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness.*
[99] Pablo de Greiff, 'Justice and Reparations', 457.
[100] Ibid. 465.

about the end of apartheid and transition, and shattering the idea of the postapartheid as reconciled 'rainbow' nation. Furthermore, through the writing of figures like Biko and Frantz Fanon, they were, even if only momentarily, able to bring their collective voices to bear on the question of systemic reparations as well as existential questions that challenged, in Verdery's words, the 'meaningful universe' of postapartheid South Africa. Although highly contested and by no means homogenous, the Fallist Movement might be understood as an attempt to harness the "collective energy" of South Africa's student population as well as the heirs of the anti-apartheid struggle, in order to speak back to the systemic abuses of apartheid and the type of violence that remains in its wake. In short, part of the work of decolonisation articulated during the campaigns of Fallist Movement was to push back against the ways in which Western psychology rendered "a collective and truly democratic work of bereavement and transformations tasks of the individual."[101]

Perhaps one of the most powerful accounts of the Fallist experience came from Gugu Ndima's 'Forgive us Biko for we have betrayed you', an article published in *We Are No Longer at Ease.* Addressing Biko and the anti-apartheid generation, she explains:

> I have the utmost respect for heroes and heroines of your generation and those that came before you. Your fearlessness and gallantry became the cement towards liberation. However, I will admit that your generation in this new democratic dispensation is fast becoming a curse to us – the destroyers of our future and replicates of oppressors. There is a growing sense of entitlement amongst leaders who led during the struggle, that for some reason we owe them for realising their goal in the struggle. What then of the whole notion of voluntarism in the struggle and the realisation that participation in the struggle was a collective effort for all the people and for generations to come?
>
> This sense of entitlement has made leaders more comfortable with the enemy. We are fast being robbed of a chance to fight for the realisation of our generational mission and for future generations to come. … Betrayal has become a glaring phenomenon in the democratic dispensation where Africans

[101] Heidi Grunebaum, *Memorialising the Past*, 42.

> are becoming poorer and those Africans that have escaped those realities are hegemonising their narrow interests with neo-colonialists.[102]

It is important to note that I do not view the transition or the ANC as sell-out and betrayal on the one hand, or as triumphalist on the other. The process of transition and the history of the Congress Alliance is far too complex and contested to diagnose in such a way. Besides, the conditions through which the possibility of transition to democracy emerged – the threat of civil war and the official end of the Cold War – narrowed the ground through which transformation could be achieved. As De Greiff argues about much broader processes of restitution in 'post-traumatic societies', the effects of apartheid, colonialism and neo-colonialism have manifested themselves in multifarious and contested ways that rub up against the historian's truth claims about the character and history of transition. This trauma is expressed by Ndima in the following way:

> Forgive me, forgive us Biko for abdicating our responsibility to serve and trade our souls to become pimps prostituting our soil, wealth and children to neo-colonialists.
>
> Forgive me, forgive us Biko for we know not that we are a mere shadow of the very same oppressor that robbed us of you when the African child needed you to fight.
>
> Forgive me, forgive us Biko for we might have forgotten what it is to be black. Maybe we detest it to a point that we have conceded to the conceptions of white people on what is blackness.
>
> Forgive me, forgive us Biko for the betrayal of the struggle of the African people, allowing greed and short sightedness to blind us to the promises of the white man.
>
> Forgive me and forgive us for the man who leaves home in a suit to scavenge in trash bins to keep poverty at bay. What has become of his rights to human dignity and right to life if he has no means to even realise those rights?
>
> I might sound helpless, defeated and needy but my current realities don't make my struggles a choice but a necessity. My realities necessitate that I move on, fight on and that in the midst of all this despair, find courage to see beyond the pessimism. Giving up on my people is betraying myself, my

[102] Gugu Ndima, 'Forgive us Biko for we have betrayed you', in Wandile Ngcaweni and Busani Ngcaweni (eds), *We Are No Longer at Ease: The Struggle for Fees Must Fall* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2018), 43-44.

forebears and your legacy. It is in the hour of bleakness that a man's will is tested.

Power to the people![103]

Ndima's lament, for me, points toward an important aspect of the psycho-social fabric of South Africa 'after' apartheid: the conflict and contestation between the desire to 'move on' and 'put the past behind us', and the desire to continue the struggle and to put the past to work today. Put another way, one of the things that Ndima highlights is the question of mourning and forgiveness after the end of apartheid. According to Didi-Huberman, there are two contested ways in which mourning might be conceived and practiced: mourning, as a necessary process through which we let go of the lost object of our desires, and melancholia, which Sigmund Freud saw as "a hallucinatory wish-psychosis".[104] In short, mourning for Freud in his early text, *Metapscychology*, was a necessary process through which an individual might move on and let go of the lost object, whereas melancholia represented a manifestation of our psycho-social desires to hold onto the lost object and thus to encourage pathological symptoms. However, for Didi-Huberman, "Freud did not yet imagine, in this text, that the 'struggle' when faced with loss might *create* a new reality corresponding to desire rather than *undergoing* a vain hallucinatory satisfaction of this same desire."[105] In other words, as I read it, Didi-Huberman suggests that far from "letting go", "moving on", and reconciling with the past, loss itself has the potential to put the world into motion. As Ndima's lament attests, we do not necessarily have to let go of the lost object before we can "move forward".

[103] Ibid. 45-46.
[104] George Didi-Huberman, *Uprisings,* 295.
[105] Ibid. 295.

This reading of Freud's seminal text is not primarily concerned with the individual who suffered loss. For Didi-Huberman, it is a deeply political question that enables him to engage with the processes through which a people collectively rise up in the face of loss, and it seems more importantly, how they put their desires for the lost object (freedom, democracy etc.) to work today. But what, Didi-Huberman asks, makes a people rise up? And what are uprising's rhythms? As already stated, Didi-Huberman suggests that "loss, which overwhelms us initially, can also, thanks to a game, a gesture, a thought, or a desire, make the world rise up entirely; and this is the principle force of uprisings."[106] In the face of "Western bourgeois societies" that "seem to speak… with one voice to 'condemn all violence'", except the type carried out in the name of nation-states, is it possible to argue for a "human violence that could be said to be 'just' in the ethical sense, rather than 'legitimate' in the legal sense?"[107] Following Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, and to a lesser extent Frantz Fanon, Didi-Huberman answers this last question in the affirmative, and in the process argues that uprisings are not only desirable and necessary, they are also inevitable. As Mondzain puts it in her contribution to *Uprisings*: "The insurrectional uprising is a revolutionary energy without which there could be no order other than bureaucratic dictatorship."[108]

Conversely, it seems that establishing order during the transitional period required a necessary softening of the type of insurrectional uprising that coursed through South African society at the time. And this is perhaps the truth about compromise: not that South Africans

[106] Ibid. 290.
[107] Ibid. 365.
[108] Ibid. 56.

sold out to the demands of neoliberalism, but that tempering the steel was a priori to the supposed birth of the new nation. In short, the "twinning of death and liberation" during the transitional period constituted "conditions of possibility for each other."[109]

Finally, it also conditioned the possibilities of the return of apartheid's violence and the type of politics that has the state as its target. To quote Mondzain once more, for Didi-Huberman uprisings, which "can go from the tiniest gestures of retreat, to the most gigantic gesture of protest",[110] represent both "the best and worst of things",[111] because they are corporeal manifestations of a people's desire for freedom, and because they "will always risk falling back into the rut" and betraying the revolutionary potential of a people.[112] With these debates in mind, the last word in this chapter should go to Fanon whose thought marks the pages of this text, the transitional period, and the fate of Hani in ways that I still do not entirely comprehend. I will attempt to take up Fanon's words again later, but for now it seems best to allow the dead to speak, rather than to speak for them. First, Fanon on violence and decolonisation:

> National liberation, national reawakening, restoration of the nation to the people or the Commonwealth, whatever the name used, whatever the latest expression, decolonisation is always a violent event. At whatever level we study it – individual encounters, a change of the name for a sports club, the guest list at a cocktail party, members of a police force or the board of directors of a state or private bank – decolonisation is quite simply the substitution of one "species" of mankind by another. This substitution is unconditional, absolute, total, and seamless.[113]

[109] Suren Pillay, *The Partisan's Violence, Law and Apartheid*, 12.
[110] George Didi-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 16.
[111] Ibid. 56.
[112] Ibid. 331.
[113] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2017), 63.

And lastly, Fanon on 'The Trials and Tribulation of National Consciousness':

> History teaches us that the anti-colonialist struggle is not automatically written from a nationalist perspective. Over a long period of time the colonized have devoted their energy to eliminating iniquities such as forced labour, corporeal punishment, unequal wages, and the restriction of political rights. This fight for democracy against man's oppression gradually emerges from a universalist, neoliberal confusion to arrive, sometimes laboriously, at a demand for nationhood. But the unpreparedness of the elite, the lack of practical ties between them and the masses, their apathy and, yes, their cowardice at the crucial moment in the struggle, are the cause of tragic trials and tribulations.
>
> Instead of being the coordinated crystallisation of the people's innermost aspirations, instead of being the most tangible, immediate product of popular mobilisation, national consciousness is nothing but a crude, empty, fragile shell. The cracks in it explain how easy it is for young independent countries to switch back from nation to ethnic and from state to tribe – a regression which is so terribly detrimental and prejudicial to the development of the nation and national unity. As we shall see, such shortcomings and dangers derive historically from the incapacity of the national bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries to rationalise popular praxis, in other words their incapacity to attribute it any reason.[114]

[114] Ibid. 159.

Chapter Two

Governing the ungovernable: Performing and contesting Chris Hani's legacy at the Hani Memorial

> [O]ne should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure, not even an exemplary figure in the logic of an emblem, a rhetoric of the flag or of martyrdom. A man's life, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol.[1]

Introduction

Whereas the previous chapter focused on Hani's funeral and the ways in which his dead body was conscripted for different political, ontological, and symbolic purposes during the transitional period, this chapter turns its attention to the annual Hani Memorial which takes place each year at the Thomas Titus Nkobi Memorial Park in Ekurhuleni, Gauteng. It is grounded in a number of site visits and by a prolonged engagement with the politics of heritage and biographical production of Hani's legacy.[2] I will begin by establishing my central concerns and research concept, which will hinge on an approach that privileges contestation, negotiation and performance as salient features of heritage practice. Then I will discuss the ways in which the ANC and its allies, in their bid to reproduce political power, have attempted to govern how the nation remembers Hani and the anti-apartheid struggle, while drawing out some of the contested narratives which come to the fore at the memorial

[1] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, xiv.
[2] I was present at the 2017, 2018 and 2019 Memorials. Footage of successive Hani memorials can also be found online. For example, for the 2017 memorial, see: 24th Anniversary of Chris Hani's death, *SABC Digital News, available at* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=io6L3FvYQAY

site. The third section will foreground the ways in which Hani's legacy is contested at the annual Hani Memorial ceremony, particularly by his daughter Lindiwe Hani, whose interventions in the late 2010s have worked to highlight the tension between family and state, and the generational trauma left in the wake of apartheid. Throughout, I foreground Jenny Edkins' notions of state time and trauma time and Werbner's critique of the 'post-colonial memorial complex', arguing that the performative, theatrical, and operative character of memorial occasions, make them particularly vulnerable and open to alternative memorialisation, and alternative invocations of the past.

Werbner refers to this vulnerability as the "risk of theatrics at a sensitive interface for creating national identities,"[3] and suggests that memorials "offer a powerfully theatric arena, but one often full of risk, for proving the individual's subjection to the state, for asserting the state's encompassment of the personal identities of citizens, and for testing their identification with the nation."[4] Alternatively in Edkins' work these contested invocations – which I see as correlating with arguments made by Didi-Huberman regarding uprisings and the work of mourning – have been translated as 'trauma time': "a collective scream, a protest against the way people have been treated, a demand to hold open the temporality of trauma and a demand for a different politics."[5] Edkins' concern in 'Temporality, Politics and Performance' is the experience of the missing and the disappeared after the 9/11 and 7/7 bombings. However, in this article I foreground 'trauma time' in relation to the ways in

[3] Richard Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun', 88.
[4] Ibid. 72.
[5] Jenny Edkins, 'Temporality, Politics and Performance', in S. M. Rai and J. Reinelt (eds), *The Grammar of Politics and Performance* (London: Routledge, 2014), 131.

which Hani's legacy refuses to be buried and governed in the aftermath of apartheid, and arguments made in the previous chapter about mourning in postapartheid South Africa.

The politics of heritage production in southern Africa

Each year on the anniversary of Chris Hani's assassination on 10 April 1993, the ANC and its allies from the Tripartite Alliance gather at the Thomas Nkobi Memorial Park in Ekurhuleni (formerly known as Boksburg), Gauteng, to remember the revolutionary spirit of their leader, and to reaffirm a resonant but increasingly fragile message. If Hani died for the struggle, they assert, then that struggle is worth fighting and voting for. Situated just a few miles from his last home in Dawn Park, the usually silent cemetery where Hani's body lies, is animated on this day by the presence of the national media, political dignitaries and their security details, and by struggle songs sung by rank-and-file members, some of whom have travelled from across the country to be there.

At the Hani Memorial one gets a sense of the deep political and social traditions of the ANC and its allies. Protocol demands that all present are acknowledged by the day's speakers, and that everyone receives a meal. These seem like simple gestures that nevertheless work to remind us that this is still (or at least once was) a people's movement. One also gets a sense of the continued, if waning, political authority of the ANC and its allies, which perform and employ the symbolic currency of the anti-apartheid struggle, postapartheid nationhood, revolution, and of state power to great effect. MK is informally represented by a Military Veteran's Association carrying its name (MKMVA),[6] whose members wear the uniform of

[6] It is important to state that the MKMVA's status as officially representing the interests and views of former MK combatants is contested and not universally accepted.

the guerrilla fighter, and members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) stand to attention whilst dignitaries lay wreaths at Hani's grave. The SACP in the meantime distribute commemorative t-shirts and other political materials, which celebrate their role in the struggle against apartheid, and call for the continuation of the struggle against capitalism, state capture, and gender-based violence. The Hani Memorial is, in short, an occasion of national mourning, but also one of celebration and triumphalism through which the attendees and those who follow proceedings live on TV or online, are invited to share in and celebrate the nation's successful struggle against apartheid, and Hani's contribution to it.

This cursory description, of course, does not do justice to the contestations and rivalries that come to the fore at an event like the Hani Memorial. In 2017, when the Zuma administration was coming under increasing pressure from within the Alliance and from South African society more broadly, the SACP was booed for 'breaking ranks', and its Deputy President, Solly Mapaila, was reportedly threatened with a firearm by a member of the predominantly pro-Zuma audience.[7] At the 2019 Memorial, in contrast, it seemed that the unifying message of Hani's unconditional support (beyond the grave) for the ANC's postapartheid project was beginning to wear thin, particularly when ANC General Secretary, Ace Magashule, attempted to use this platform as a means through which to dismiss allegations of state capture and corruption levelled against him. Notwithstanding Magashule's speech, which was greeted by jeers from large sections of the audience, after the end of Zuma's Presidency, the Hani Memorial has increasingly become a contested occasion through which various organisations and individuals lay claim to Hani's legacy, and produce competing notions of history and

[7] Tshidi Madia, 'SACP claims there was a gunman at Hani memorial', *News24*, December 2017, https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sacp-claims-there-was-a-gunman-at-hani-memorial-20170412.

struggle. These sometimes conform with, and sometimes undermine government-aligned heritage practices and its varied attempts to produce a unifying message of postapartheid nationhood.

Herwitz has most recently provided a historical account of ANC-aligned heritage practice in postapartheid South Africa, and how through these practices, successive ANC governments have attempted to redress the violence of apartheid, and to unify the nation under a shared origin and destiny. According to Herwitz, "the turning of the past into a heritage is part of the symbolic currency of the nation, defining and driving its common future by marshalling the past into a mythic or religious form, an origin, a set of core values distinctive to the nation, a common destiny."[8] He refers to this practice as the "heritage of the victim, the battle, the brave", and situates it somewhere between 'reminder and ruin': a concept encapsulated at the Constitutional Court Building in Johannesburg, which both signals the end of apartheid in the form of the constitution that this building represents, and leaves a reminder of South Africa's violent past at the adjacent Old Fort Prison, now turned into a museum dedicated to laying this history bare.

As Herwitz rightly argues, by "turning history into memory or raising it, as litany, to monumentalising mythology", these heritage practices have a tendency to denature what he refers to as the real politics of the present.[9] However, "a new or weak state must do more if it wishes to legitimate itself. It must also show that the *legacy* of its activist politics continues into the new dispensation, that in its leadership role the new government is carrying on the

[8] Daniel Herwitz, 'Heritage and Legacy in the South African State and University', 37.
[9] Ibid. 40.

good fight."[10] In contrast to heritage, then, legacy according to Herwitz, "is the ongoing practice of something from the past, a direct inheritance that is still operative…", and has enabled the ANC to "claim political legitimacy (beyond mere litany or remembrance)." As Herwitz puts it:

> On the one hand the struggle politics of the past, now over and transformed into the new democratic dispensation, must reassert itself as heritage. Once a real-life activity, it must live a second life as a source of *value* for the new regime. On the other hand, the state must demonstrate that its capacity to struggle remains alive in the present; … Otherwise, it is simply sitting on its laurels.[11]

The contradictions underpinning the above distinction are clear to see. On the one hand, according to ANC-aligned histories, apartheid is over. South Africa, led by the ANC, has entered a new epoch of freedom and democracy. The state is no longer the peoples' oppressor. On the other hand, however, the new nation is still in transition, and thus, the struggle continues. Therefore, the people must be patient and defend the ANC from those who wish to derail democracy in South Africa. Shifting from white monopoly capital and the remnants of white racism to corrupt elements who have infiltrated government itself, as well as 'populist' politics usually associated with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), or most worryingly, African nationals who too often become scapegoats for government policy, the 'enemies of democracy' are pervasive and change according to the different pasts of the Alliance. Unlike the enemies of the anti-apartheid struggle and of other anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles of the twentieth century, the enemies of the postapartheid state are seemingly difficult to locate.

[10] Ibid. 42.
[11] Ibid. 43.

Although this new terrain of struggle appears to be situated on uncertain ground, one thing remains clear: according to this thesis, there is no struggle beyond the party politics of the ANC and its allies, or rather, for the 'ordinary' citizen, present and future struggles are located in the ballot box. Otherwise put in the words of Stephen Davis, state-authored histories and heritage practices are meant to "serve… the aims of the post-apartheid state not only because it proves the moral justification of the ruling party's future legitimacy, but that it pins all hopes for a better life on one way of thinking about past struggles".[12] From this perspective, then, politics is both enabled and contained by a specific notion of nationhood, one founded on the ashes of apartheid and the ANC's successful struggle against it, and one that attempts to silence and govern alternative histories of struggle in South Africa after apartheid.

State time vs trauma time, opening and closing history, governing the ungovernable

It seems that Herwitz's distinction between heritage and legacy is a potentially generative one. Not so much because it might demonstrate how legacies of struggle are employed as authorising discourse within nation-building projects. Nor because, as Herwitz claims, these legacies enable the ANC to contain past, present, or future struggle. To be sure, the type of symbolic currency Herwitz speaks of has been employed at the Hani Memorial. However, his overemphasis on the authority of ANC-aligned narratives, which he criticises but does not challenge in any significant way, leads toward an analysis that fails to attend to the ways in

[12] Stephen Davis, 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters: Everyday life in the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe (1961-present)' (PhD Thesis: University of Florida, 2010), 11.

which the ANC's legacy of struggle is always already contested and challenged. In short, by framing heritage practice as state-authored, Herwitz inadvertently positions 'ordinary' citizens as silenced, passive receivers of knowledge, and as merely formed and governed through the authorising discourses of the nation-state.

Rather than situating heritage as something consigned to the past, as state-authored, as 'monumental mythology', or merely as "part of the domain of nation-building", this chapter privileges contestation, negotiation and performance as salient features of heritage practice.[13] For it is clear that far from functioning as authorising discourse, the operative qualities of what Herwitz calls legacy, suggest that the ANC and its allies cannot contain Hani's revolutionary legacy, let alone manage the diverse narrativisations of the nation's struggle against apartheid and colonialism before that.

It should also be clear that citizens and subjects are not passive receivers of knowledge. As Gary Minkley and Phindezwa Mnyaka have generatively argued, ANC-aligned narratives of struggle are not always gratefully received or accepted by the South African public.[14] Take for example, the ways in which the 'Fallist Movement' has worked to unsettle our ideas about the Rainbow Nation the 'meaningful universe' of postapartheid South Africa. Elsewhere, Werbner has demonstrated that rather than unifying the nation, memorialisation at Heroes Acre in Zimbabwe's capital, Harare, has produced an elitist notion and hierarchy of struggle, and yet also served as conduits through which alternative histories and notions of

[13] Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool, *Unsettled History*, 14.
[14] Gary Minkley and Phindizwe Mnyaka, 'Seeing Beyond the Official and the Vernacular: The Duncan Village Massacre and the Politics of Heritage in South Africa', in Derek R. Peterson, Kodzo Gavua and Ciraj Rassool, *The Politics of Heritage in Africa*.

nationhood have been negotiated. In Mozambique and Namibia, triumphalist narratives and post-colonial projects have been significantly challenged in the public domain.[15]

In pursuing a different approach to thinking heritage and legacy practice at the Hani Memorial, I turn to Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool's contested and negotiated approach to the production of public history in postapartheid South Africa. Somewhat like Herwitz's 'reminder and ruin', they situate postapartheid heritage practice or "history-making" between "revelation and consignation", pointing toward history's paradoxical "dual function" of "opening and closing, appearing and disappearing, being exhumed and then reburied."[16] Unlike Herwitz, however, they insist on foregrounding "the contests over the content and forms of presentation, how these public histories are interpreted and understood, and the varied attempts to manage these processes."[17]

For Witz, Minkley and Rassool, state-led memorialisation certainly does operate as a key mode of historical production and subject formation in postapartheid South Africa. By participating in the ceremonies of the nation-state, South Africans, they tell us, are invited to become active citizens often in the mould of the nation's heroes. Having said this, critical public history, insist Minkley, Witz, and Rassool, attends to the "politics and political economy" of heritage production in South Africa today,[18] and importantly, the ways in which

[15] For example see: Aquino de Braganca and Jacques Depelchin, 'From the idealization of Frelimo to the understanding of the recent history of Mozambique', *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter, 1988); Reinhart Kössler, 'Public Memory, Reconciliation and the Aftermath of War: A Preliminary Framework with Special Reference to Namibia', in Henning Melber, *Re-Examining Liberation in Namibia: Political Culture Since Independence* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003).
[16] Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool, *Unsettled History*, 2-4.
[17] Ibid. 15.
[18] Ibid. 218.

these pasts are negotiated, performed and contested through 'visual codes' within the public domain:

> In undertaking these histories of public pasts from the vantage point of critical public history it is not just the textuality but also the visuality of their making that matters. Visual pasts have conventionally been composed as revelations and telling, cast into a framework of exposure, witnessing, and seeing. But, more than simply making history visible, public historical practice works with an understanding of visuality, of histories produced through their own constitutive visual codes: through curatorship, scripting, dramaturgical devices, visual languages, the choreography of oral and literate traditions, spatial design, and ritual performance.[19]

Minkley, Witz, and Rassool position their approach in relation to what they call the 'postanti-apartheid heritage complex', which for their purposes constitutes the ground "through which knowledges about pasts are articulated" and produced in South Africa.[20] A key aspect of this complex is the practice of refiguring the past through state-led memorialisation, which itself is often constituted through monumental reconstructions of the life histories of struggle heroes, and grounded in practices which aim to rehumanise of the anti-apartheid dead. As they argue:

> Through the spectacle of public education on how to see and be seen the new state encompasses and asserts personal identities and histories as the new, inclusive, citizenry. Pageantry, memory and inheritance are spatially located. On site, the national estate and its differentiated (apartheid) past and changed (anti-apartheid) present are publicly collected through declaration and the resources of heritage site managerialism and monumentality. This is confirmed through visitation, and memorialised and visualised in the commemorative state through official event openings and authorised spectatorship.

[19] Ibid. 16.
[20] Ibid. 221.

This practice is perhaps best encapsulated by the postapartheid state's Legacy Project, which was set up in 1998 to "ensure that 'visible reminders' of the 'many aspects of our formerly neglected heritage'" would be imprinted upon the landscape. The Legacy Project's mandate covered "monuments, museums… plaques, outdoor artworks, history trails and 'other symbolic representations"", and was largely narrated through the lives of 'popular leaders' who were made to "represent a mass constituency" and to become "symbols of inspiration far beyond their borders."[21] At the risk of flattening what has been a complicated approach to memorialising the past, after independence from Portuguese rule in 1975, the Mozambican government undertook a similar nation-building project, largely through the decentralisation of colonial statues and their replacement with statues and monuments of post-colonial freedom.[22] Likewise, after independence "Zimbabwe's ruling elite sought to enhance their political legitimacy and to foster a national identity through the discarding of colonial symbols",[23] and through the creation of national, as well as regional Heroes Acres, where "the very biographies and personal identities of the dead [leaders of ZANU PF's liberation struggle] bec[a]me a means of nation-building."[24]

Taken together, nationalist memorialisation across southern Africa seems to confirm the Legacy Project's assertion that there has been "'a universal tradition in all cultures, of paying

[21] Ciraj Rassool, 'The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa' (PhD thesis: University of the Western Cape, May 2004), 220. Also see: Noor Nieftagodien, 'Public History in Alexandria: facing the challenges of tourism and struggle heroization', in Raymond A. Silverman (ed), *Museum as process: Translating local and global knowledges* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015).
[22] Amelia N. de Souto, 'Memory and Identity in the History of Frelimo: Some Research Themes', *Kronos*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2013).
[23] Norma J. Kriger, 'The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity', in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terrence Ranger (eds), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (London: James Currey, 1995), 139.
[24] Richard Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun', 88.

tribute to leaders'."[25] According to David Johnson, following Rassool, during the late 1980s and early 1990s the 'nationalist biography' was indeed the predominant mode of narrating the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa.[26] However, prior to this, People's History constituted the key means through which struggle in southern Africa was historicised and mobilised in aid of an anti-apartheid struggle that had been waged on all fronts, and largely 'from below'. Johnson sees this turn to nationalist biographies from People's History toward the official end of apartheid, as representative of a shift in ANC policy: from mobilising mass support in service of the people's war against apartheid, to mobilising votes for individual personalities, particularly Mandela who would contest the 1994 elections.[27] This firstly implies a shift from a commitment to collective struggle to an individualism more attuned to the globalising neo-liberal world that South Africa was entering at that time, and, secondly, that the 'tradition of paying tribute to leaders' might, as Werbner suggests, be better understood as a tradition of the post-colonial state, rather than of 'universal culture' itself.[28] According to Johnson:

> Much like that of the *Ur*-text of Western literature, the story of Ulysses, the great anti-apartheid hero's biography observes the generic sequence of the redemptive journey: the exceptional leader's difficult beginnings, his fraught departure, his time in the wilderness/exile and his triumphant return. Of course, not all life stories contained in these biographies satisfy all the elements of the genre – [Robert] Sobukwe, [Stephen] Biko and [Ruth] First died before apartheid ended. […] B]ut the best-selling life stories of [Oliver] Tambo (Callinicos 2004), [Walter] Sisulu (2002) and Mandela (1994) do follow these four stages and culminate at the destination of simultaneous individual and national freedom.[29]

[25] Ciraj Rassool, 'The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa', 220.
[26] David Johnson, 'Anti-apartheid people's histories and post-apartheid nationalist biographies', in Aziz Choudray and Salim Vally (eds), *Reflections on Knowledge, Learning and Social Movements* (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 99-100.
[27] Ibid. 97.
[28] Richard Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun'.
[29] David Johnson, 'Anti-apartheid people's histories and post-apartheid nationalist biographies', 93.

Echoing Herwitz's approach to state-led heritage practices in postapartheid South Africa, Johnson argues that 'nationalist biographies' work as models of emulation within South African society, serving to orient the new nation by locating its beginnings in the violence of apartheid and the transitional period, and charting a stable path into a predetermined future crowned by the *ANC's* successful struggle against apartheid. As Nicky Rousseau might argue, this is History-as-Lesson in its purest form, and is encapsulated most obviously in Mandela's biography, *Long Walk to Freedom*.[30] As Johnson puts it, after 1994 the 'nationalist biography' became internationally representative of "South Africa's progress from backward settler-racist state to modern liberal democracy". Whilst "for South African readers, they incite and encourage the production of new South African citizens by providing prescriptive narratives of flawed but nonetheless 'positive role models.'"[31]

Much like Grunebaum's assertions about Western psychology presented in the previous chapter, the point for Johnson, is a political one: that 'nationalist biographies', as opposed to 'People's History', transpose an individualised and heroic notion of struggle that inhibits South Africans' ability to act collectively today, and closes off "'alternative cultures of resistance'" and "memories which were essential to imagining radical alternatives to racial capitalism."[32] Following Rassool, Johnson urges a return to a historiographical practice that situates the leader as part of a much broader and contested movement, and one that, using Rassool's terminology, attends to the 'reciprocal constructions' of an individual life, whilst disrupting the dominant notion of history and struggle, as teleological, linear, and ultimately

[30] Nicky Rousseau, 'Popular History in the 1980s: The Politics of Production' (M.A. Thesis: University of the Western Cape, 1994).
[31] David Johnson, 'Anti-apartheid people's histories and post-apartheid nationalist biographies', 92.
[32] Ibid. 100. See also: Ciraj Rassool, 'The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa'.

decided by the 'Great Men of History'.[33] This, they suggest in different ways, might enable a rethinking of politics and the political biography, and in the process enable a deeper and more nuanced understanding of struggle, both historically and in the present.

Notwithstanding the dangers of romanticising 'People's History',[34] I want to argue that this closing off of politics and of history is illustrative of the time and temporality of the state.[35] I read this temporality as analogous to a specific mode of organising and making sense of the world, one that ultimately seeks closure by establishing a political consensus grounded on the ANC's successful anti-apartheid struggle, as well as an indefinitely deferred temporal horizon that attempts to govern alternative futures and alternative notions of the political. Having said this, and as Werbner, Edkins, and Witz, Minkley and Rassool have convincingly argued, there is always already resistance to this thesis. As previously stated, Edkins interprets this resistance as a collective scream, as the time of trauma, and it is my contestation that this 'collective scream' is brought to the fore at the Hani Memorial ceremony, where the living and the dead coalesce and speak. In short, although the memorials of the modern nation-state are conventionally understood as tangible sites of state power, authority, governmentality, and historical certainty, they are more generatively understood as contingent sites through which, to paraphrase Frederick Jameson, the spectral, intangible and ungovernable histories, legacies, and memories of the anti-apartheid struggle "make… the present waver."[36]

[33] Ciraj Rassool, 'Rethinking Documentary History and South African Political Biography', 46.
[34] Nicky Rousseau, 'Popular History in the 1980s: The Politics of Production'.
[35] Jenny Edkins, 'Temporality, Politics and Performance', 141.
[36] Frederic Jameson, 'Marx's Purloined Letter', 38.

In other words, state time – a time that is concerned with the organisation of capital, in short, a disciplinary time of surveillance and of profit[37] – is at odds with the time of trauma, and, according to some revolutionary thinkers of the 20th century, had to be dismantled in order to inaugurate a new, revolutionary time. As Herbert Marcuse, following Walter Benjamin, explains:

> Let us give one illustration of how this awareness, or half-awareness, of the need for such a total rupture was present in some of the great social struggles of our period. Walter Benjamin quotes reports that during the Paris Commune, in all corners of the city of Paris there were people shooting at the clocks on the towers of the churches, palaces and so on, thereby consciously or half-consciously expressing the need that somehow time has to be arrested; that at least the prevailing, the established time continuum has to be arrested, and that a new time had to begin – a very strong emphasis on the qualitative difference and on the totality of the rupture between the new society and the old.[38]

The Time of the State: governing the anti-apartheid dead

At the 2015 Hani memorial ceremony, President Jacob Zuma announced the official declaration of the newly completed Chris Hani Memorial site as a National Heritage Site.[39] With this declaration, Hani's status among the pantheon of struggle heroes was confirmed, placing him alongside other stalwarts whose memorials, monuments and gravesites have been made to serve as tangible landmarks of South Africa's 'postanti-apartheid heritage complex.'[40] As the South African Heritage Resource Agency (SAHRA) declared on their website, this declaration was, quoting Zuma, part of "an on-going programme of building a new inclusive heritage for the country", which included "identifying historic sites, individuals

[37] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Random House, 1995), 174-175.
[38] Herbert Marcuse, 'Liberation from the Affluent Society', in David Cooper (ed), *The Dialectics of Liberation* (London and New York: Verso, 2015), 177.
[39] For images of the unveiling see: Unknown author, 'PICS: Chris Hani memorial unveiled', *IOL*, 10 April 2015, https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/pics-chris-hani-memorial-unveiled-1843523.
[40] Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool, *Unsettled History.*

and organisations that have made outstanding contributions to the liberation struggle and history."[41] In keeping with this commitment to inclusivity, and echoing the Legacy Project's mandate, the prevailing message at the Hani Memorial site has been one of struggle, sacrifice, and the eventual triumph of the human spirit over adversity. The inscription visitors find on the site's 'Wall of Remembrance' frames this triumphalism through a discourse couched in the professional and disciplinary authority of architecture, the visual and symbolic codes of indigeneity and democracy, and the cultural and political traditions of a struggle that places the SACP and Hani's socialist legacy centre stage.

Commissioned by the Ekurhuleni municipality, the Hani memorial site was expanded in 2017, and became split into four sections: Hani and his daughter Nomakhwezi's grave; the Hani monument that rises like a monolith above the unbroken landscape of the Highveld; and, mimicking Freedom Park in Pretoria, a 'Wall of Remembrance' for the anti-apartheid dead, as well as a 'Walk of Remembrance', boarded by an indigenous garden that serves as a tangible and intangible bridge between the wall and the monument.[42] On entering the memorial site from Hani's grave, visitors are first greeted by the original Hani Memorial, four granite clad pillars representing gladioli ('the sword lily'), which tower above and surround a sand-blasted image of Hani on the four sides of a black granite cube. The Wall of Remembrance tells us that these pillars also represent the 'four pillars of the struggle': mass mobilisation, underground organisation, international solidarity work, and armed struggle. Radiating outward are circular stairs and an amphitheatre meant to "encourage interaction"

[41] More Matshediso, 'Chris Hani Memorial Declared a Heritage Site', *SA News*, https://www.sahra.org.za/chris-hani-memorial-declared-a-heritage-site/.
[42] Ciraj Rassool, 'Human Remains, the Disciplines of the, and the South African Memorial Complex', in Derek R. Peterson, Kodzo Gavua and Ciraj Rassool (eds), *The Politics of Heritage in Africa*.

and designed to represent Hani's famously warm personality and his socialist "philosophy of sharing". More than this, however, the monument represents the founding narrative of the new nation: the principles of the Tripartite Alliance's victorious anti-apartheid struggle, of transitional justice, post-apartheid freedom, and of a democracy that claims to represent the interests of the "workers and the poor". Tied together with an amphitheatre that traces its architectural form to the ancient Greek polis, and a legacy grounded in Hani's socialist principles, this monument bears the hallmarks of a modern, egalitarian nation which has overcome its racist past to confidently take its place alongside the global democratic community.

Leaving this monument to democracy behind, visitors are encouraged to walk through an indigenous garden, and to share in Hani's rural origins in the Transkei. As the Wall of Remembrance suggests, visitors should be reminded of "the cycle of life", "the trials of struggle heroes", and "the completed paths taken by all the heroes represented." The Walk of Remembrance, then, is meant to induce a cathartic experience through which visitors share in and potentially reconcile with the past. Life, so goes the lesson, has come full circle, the struggles undertaken by heroes like Hani are completed. The nations' martyrs and ancestors have been laid to rest. They return to the soil, rehumanised as heroes of the struggle against racial oppression.

After taking part in this "serene walk" below what is not yet a full "canopy of trees" and stopping for a moment on one of the benches "provided… for relaxed reflection", visitors reach the Wall of Remembrance which sits upon an elevated rectangular structure designed to

"demonstrate the martyrs' unflinching belief" and "to give the heroes appropriate recognition". In comparison to Freedom Park, the Wall is a modest monument to South Africa's anti-apartheid dead, but still induces a heightened sense of loss, of national mourning, and of martyrdom. Here, Hani is not the only fallen hero to be remembered. Next to the Wall of Remembrance stand three translucent glass columns, reserved for "all the fallen heroes" of the struggle. According to the Wall's inscription: "Three glass boxes are placed on the podium as symbols of democracy, transparency and inclusivity…. The names of all the fallen heroes are sand blasted on the glass walls and visitors are invited to walk around the glass boxes and share in the history of the heroes that helped shape the new political South Africa."

In contrast to the original Hani monument, which largely narrates postapartheid nationhood through Hani's biography, the Wall of Remembrance expands its scope, perhaps representing what Werbner has described as a "distinctly modern… complex for commemoration of the sacrifice of life in the cause of the nation-state,"[43] while accentuating the socialist, revolutionary values of Hani and the SACP. Architecturally, however, this expanded monumentalism does not resemble the 'brutalist' or constructivist designs that might be expected at a memorial to socialism. Instead, the memorial site feels distinctly postmodern: a pastiche of ancient Greek democracy, the rural Eastern Cape landscape represented by its indigenous flora, and the memorial of the post anti-apartheid nation-state. Through this symbolic coding, guided by the Wall of Remembrance's inscription and made tangible through architectural analogy, the expanded monument connects modern democracy with

[43] Richard Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun', 72.

socialism, and South Africa's indigenous origins. Hani too is positioned between his "simple", rural roots and the democratic principles enshrined in the South Africa's new constitution. He is thus marked as a son of the soil and the "workers and the poor", as rural, and as a progenitor of freedom and democracy, and as urban.

Situating Hani between these two worlds is intended to reconcile the old and the new, the 'pre-modern' and the 'modern', the rural and the urban, the supposedly underdeveloped and the apparently developed, the forever indigenous and the once foreign. But it also works to confirm what Witz, Minkley and Rassool have called the dual function of history in the postapartheid period. Like the TRC's 'philosophical principles', the time and place of the memorial site is "that of revelation: 'exposing,' 'illuminating,' 'reveal[ing],' open[ing],' and uncovering the past", but more so that of "completion: 'We now know,' 'Experience closure,' 'bury,' and 'close… the past."[44]

Through this narration the time of the postapartheid state is realised. As one period of struggle, now consigned to the past, gives way to a time of freedom, democracy and relative political stability, the nation is reconciled, the time of oppression is in the past. The Walk in particular serves to symbolise the relative peace of the postapartheid period. Unlike the segregated parks, cemeteries, and public spaces of apartheid, all South Africans can relax and reflect together in the Hani Memorial gardens. The Hani Memorial site is conceived not as a space of segregation, but as one that promotes inclusivity, whilst serving as a testament to the sacrifices made during the anti-apartheid struggle. In short, this both demonstrates the

[44] Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool, *Unsettled History*, 2.

"discursive, disciplinary, institutional and locational practices and knowledges", which make up the "postanti-apartheid heritage complex", [45] and begins to highlight how the time of the state is inculcated and made tangible within the post anti-apartheid memorial landscape.

Having said this, the Hani Memorial also has a tendency to denature the 'real politics of the present', and one might add paraphrasing Melissa Levin, 'forget' the violence of apartheid. In other words, like Levin's concerns about the Kathorus Memorial which commemorates the civil war in Thokoza in the early 1990s, at the Hani Memorial

> no-one or no group is responsible for the bloodiness of the early 1990s… [T]he new community, resembling the new nation are collectively victimized by violence and are thus unified in the present. This local commemorative inclination resembles the national imperative to achieve reconciliation that pivots on the objective of achieving peace rather than a reconciliation that foregrounds redress and social transformation. This commemorative imperative, though focused on agentic violence, or, perhaps through its focus on violence as agentic, buttresses the international claim that South Africa's transition was a 'peaceful' one. The implication of this strategy is that the historical event that is afforded significance and foregrounded is 'transition' rather than violence. Violence, on the other hand, is an 'aberration' at worst; and, at best, an illustration of Benedict Anderson's notion of 'reassuring fratricide'.[46]

Competing memorialisation at the Hani Memorial Complex.

As seen in the previous chapter, Nicky Rousseau, Ciraj Rassool and Riedwaan Moosage have argued that the burial and reburial of the anti-apartheid dead in South Africa constitutes a process and practice of rehumanisation which "extend[s] a dead person's biography", and "incorporates the person into the 'narrative of the making of democracy, whose telling might

[45] Ibid. 221.
[46] Melissa Levin, 'Unimagined Communities: Post-Apartheid Nation-Building, Memory and Institutional Change in South Africa (1990-2010)' (PhD thesis: University of Toronto, 2017), 103.

be part of a public history geared toward citizen formation.'"[47] Echoing comments made by Witz, Minkley, and Rassool, they suggest that through this process, previously dehumanised victims of apartheid become rehumanised as citizens of the new nation and as subjects of history. As the SACP might have it, all the fallen heroes remembered at the Hani Memorial, have completed their first historic task of overcoming national oppression. Not only are they now subjects of history, they have also fulfilled Marx's challenge in *The Eleven Theses on Feuerbach*, by changing the world.

As Rousseau, Rassool and Moosage also point out, however, this type of commemoration in South Africa, as with other examples from across southern Africa, has presupposed "a certain kind of personhood shaped to fit the script… inscribed within the particular biographic narrative of a liberation struggle activist."[48] In our case, it is fairly obvious that this script is not only overdetermined and framed by the image and contributions of the martyred anti-apartheid activist, but also one that situates the heroes of the ANC and its allies as liberation struggle activists par excellence, and as a homogenous body of soldiers who collectively represent the anti-apartheid dead. Despite Zuma's and SAHRA's claims, then, commemorating 'all the fallen heroes' at the Hani memorial site, merely means commemorating the lives of heroes of the struggle by the ANC and its allies against apartheid. Rather than an inclusive approach to historical production, then, the Hani Memorial site is overdetermined by an exclusivist and vanguardist notion of struggle that reproduces a specific hierarchy of heroes within the postanti-apartheid memorial landscape.

[47] Nicky Rousseau, Ciraj Rassool and Riedwaan Moosage, 'Missing and Missed: Rehumanisation, and Nation and Missing-ness', in Nicky Rousseau, Ciraj Rassool and Riedwaan Moosage (eds) *Kronos*, Vol. 44, (Nov 2018), 28.
[48] Ibid. 28.

This, most obviously, pushes other organisations such as the Pan-Africanist Congress and the Black Consciousness movement into obscurity, but it also fails to attend to sacrifices that reached beyond South Africa's borders, such as those unwillingly made by ten Lesotho nationals who were killed in the 1985 Maseru raid that specifically targeted Hani and his family.[49]

This is not, however, the only absence or contradiction which hangs over the Memorial site. On my last visit in June 2019, and in a strikingly ironic twist, the names of all the fallen heroes had yet to be sandblasted on the three glass boxes. A critical approach might suggest that this absence was the result of mismanagement, neglect, and marginalisation, and indicative of a much broader failing at the heart of the current government. From this angle, the Hani Memorial is therefore not a monument "for the workers and for the poor", but one that inadvertently produces the forgotten soldier. A more sympathetic approach, on the other hand, might chalk this absence off by highlighting difficulties in funding and the problems involved with managing a municipal site that clearly does not receive the same attention as nationally significant monuments and memorials such as Freedom Park. But nevertheless this 'absent presence', four years after Zuma's official declaration, seems to affirm Werbner's claims regarding post-colonial state memorialisation which has tended to glorify "above all the individuality of great heroes of the nation", whilst marginalising the voices of the rank-and-file of liberation struggles across southern Africa.[50]

[49] Thula Simpson, *Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC's Armed Struggle* (South Africa: Random House: 2016), 300-301; Lindiwe Hani and Melinda Ferguson, *Being Chris Hani's Daughter* (Johannesburg: MF Books, 2017), 16-17.
[50] Richard Werbner, 'Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun', 73.

As if in response to this absence, an unofficial cemetery of the Congress Alliance has emerged in the shadow of the Wall of Remembrance. This cemetery, which has grown considerably in the years since the Hani memorial site gained national heritage status, dominates the entrance to the Thomas Nkobi Memorial Park. On arrival, visitors have no option but to walk past gravestones inscribed with affiliations of the ANC and its allies, and the names of, for example, former Ekurhuleni Ward committee member for the ANC, Elsie Hlamkile Mulatana, as well as the graves of Jonannes Tebogo, Sipho Gift Mokoko, Simon Molelokoa Masilo, Piet Molahlei, former Robben Island Prisoner Theodore Vusimuzi Zwane, Lancelotte Bruce "King D" Mvungama, Peter Tumelo Mofokeng, Themba Aaron Dlamini, and Sechaba Aloys Cosmas 'Charles' Setsubi, a one-time SACP Central Committee Member and MK veteran.

Very little information is available at the cemetery, or in the public domain more generally, about these individuals apart from Setsubi, whose death on 12 March 2018, was recognised by several media outlets and officially commemorated by the SACP.[51] It is however clear that their positioning next to the Hani Memorial has political and personal significance for each individual. By choosing to be buried alongside the memorial, they have attempted to write themselves into political histories of the ruling party and its allies, and, at the same time, staked a claim to the legacy of Hani. For some, this might simply represent a desire to be incorporated into the nation's 'narrative of the making of democracy'. But it also serves to

[51] 'SACP-MK veteran Charles Setsubi dies, aged 70', *Times Live,* 12 March 2018, https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-03-12-sacp-mk-veteran-charles-setsubi-dies-aged-70/, retrieved 28 July 2019.

demonstrate that the political lives of struggle activists extended far beyond 1994, and not always in alignment with the reconciliatory narrative reproduced at the Hani memorial site.

The proximity of these graves to the Hani memorial site has served to accentuate any sense of ambiguity about Hani's place in that history, and of the presence of contestation and tension that contradict the seemingly settled national reconciliatory narrative. Setsubi for example, was one of the many outspoken critics of the Zuma government in his later years.[52] In a 2013 opinion piece in the *Sowetan*, which would turn out to be his last within the public domain, he employed Hani's legacy as a model of emulation, invoking his memory in order to speak back to a form of power which, for him, had begun to infiltrate and corrupt the Congress Alliance and the founding principles of the movement.[53] Setsubi referred to these corrupt elements as 'armchair pseudo-revolutionaries'. By doing so he directly tapped into a contested political line of thought which he traced back to the1969 Hani Memorandum, a document that was deeply critical of the ANC leadership in exile, which it, importantly, also marked as 'armchair revolutionaries.' Notwithstanding the SACP's role within the postapartheid government, Setsubi's comments, I think, stand testament to a desire to invoke other cultures of struggle in the wake of political uncertainty:

> A lot has been written about the life of the late Chris Hani and it is not my intention to repeat what has already been said about him over the years since that tragic day of April 10 1993. At the same time, however, it is imperative to elaborate on some of the outstanding qualities that Hani possessed. My first direct contact with South Africa's revolutionary martyr was in Lesotho in 1977 following my deployment in that country as an Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) operative…. He had succeeded in creating a solid and effective combat base for the ANC in Lesotho, but Hani was withdrawn in 1983 after several assassination attempts…. Hani had true revolutionary charisma and he was

[52] Charles Setsubi, 'Treat Mistakes as Lessons and never ever repeat them', *Sowetan*, 10 April 2013, https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sowetan/20130410/281758446760766.
[53] Ibid.

> stoical at the same time. He had great self-control and clarity of mind in adversity. He had iron nerves, resilience and revolutionary stamina. He had an excellent memory and remembered the names of most MK combatants. What made him an outstanding leader and a skilful commander was that he recognised his mistakes before some of us did. He did not justify his mistakes as many others would have nor did he blame other people for his mistakes. He said that every mistake must be a lesson never to be repeated. Hani taught us that he who does not make mistakes does nothing in the face of adversity, but is an armchair "pseudo-revolutionary".[54]

Put simply, Setsubi's comments invoke a political history which does not fit so easily into ANC-aligned narratives of struggle. After penning what would become known as the Hani Memorandum, Hani and his co-authors were expelled from the ANC, and for a time he contemplated leaving the organisation for good. There are also claims that leading members of the ANC and the MK had called for the execution of Hani and his co-authors.[55] Much later, during the latter years of apartheid, Hani was an outspoken critic of negotiations and the suspension of armed struggle, and was clearly mindful of the routes and destinations that a negotiated settlement might lead toward. This, it seems, prompted him to question the role of the SACP within the Tripartite Alliance. In an interview carried out after he had left the ANC's National Executive Committee to become the General Secretary of the SACP, Hani stated that if necessary he would remove the SACP from the Alliance in order to act as "watchdogs for democracy", and to advance the socialist and democratic ideals that he dedicated his life to.[56]

[54] Ibid.
[55] Lindiwe Hani and Melinda Ferguson, *Being Chris Hani's Daughter*, 38;
Stephen Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 68.
[56] Gregory Houston and James Ngculu, *Chris Hani: Voices of Liberation*: (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2014), 227.

Importantly for Hani, the official end of apartheid was not the end of struggle nor the 'End of History'. Neither, in this sense, was the fall of the Berlin Wall, nor the apparent 'death of socialism'. In the same interview, Hani claimed that "the crisis of socialism cannot spell the end of history." Instead for him in this interview, it appeared to signal a need to re-evaluate and to continue to work outside of government, and perhaps outside of party politics altogether. This it seems, was a pursuit that he was increasingly preoccupied with during the latter years of his life and is just one aspect of his political legacy that different groups, individuals, and political commentators invoke in the present.[57]

This, of course, does not prove Hani's indictment of the ANC's struggle against apartheid. To be sure, Hani never turned his back on the ANC even when its decision to suspend the armed struggle and to negotiate with the apartheid state conflicted with his own political position.[58] Besides, as Rassool points out, nationalist biographies have a tendency to consolidate events like the Hani Memorandum as moments of triumph, rather than dissent.[59] Having said this, these contestations do begin to point toward the ways in which Hani's biography and legacy disrupts rather than affirms the ANC's version of struggle against apartheid. Put another way, if the triumphalist narratives of Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo work to confirm the narrative of the 'triumph of the human spirit over adversity', then biographies and life-

[57] See for example: Sean Jacobs, 'Chris Hani's political legacy', *Africa is a Country*, https://africasacountry.com/2014/04/the-late-chris-hanis-political-legacy; Stephen Grootes, 'Chris Hani and the Arms Deal Bombshell: a death that still hangs over us', *Daily Maverick*, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-10-08-chris-hani-and-the-arms-deal-bombshell-a-death-that-still-hangs-over-us/; Marriane Thamm, 'Analysis: Morogoro conference – memorandums, wedge drivers and the saving of the ANC's soul', *Daily Maverick*, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-14-analysis-morogoro-conference-memorandums-wedge-drivers-and-the-saving-of-the-ancs-soul/

[58] In an interview Hani said that he was "angry" when he heard the news of the suspension of armed struggle from exile in the Transkei. Importantly, Hani – who was a high ranking member of MK at the time – was not consulted about this decision. 'Leaders – Chris Hani', *YouTube*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGKhN2BL1-U&t=948s

[59] Ciraj Rassool, 'The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa'.

histories like Hani's – as well as, those of Steve Bantu Biko and Robert Sobukwe – whose lives many claim ended in tragedy rather than triumph, work to disrupt it.

It is for this reason that successive ANC governments have needed to, but at the same time have been unsuccessful at fully claiming Hani's revolutionary legacy, as there is, in short, something ungovernable about this history. As Setsubi's invocation of the Hani Memorandum attests, rather than signalling an end to politics, it opens history to alternative futures and alternative pasts which unsettle ANC-aligned histories of struggle. After all, if revolution, in its most basic iteration, is defined as an unfinished process and as potential for progressive change, then the tangible monuments and memorials that attempt to inaugurate a temporal horizon that closes off history, and to govern the ways in which we remember past struggle, are always already haunted by this potential: those illusive, spectral, intangible and ungovernable memories, legacies and traditions that align to a political ideal rather than a party, and, as a result, "make… the [postapartheid] present waver."[60]

The annual Hani Memorial Ceremony

Unlike the sombre atmosphere associated with a cemetery and memorial site that commemorate the fallen heroes of the anti-apartheid struggle, on the anniversary of Hani's assassination, the Thomas Nkobi Memorial Park is animated as a space of national mourning, but also as one of celebration, triumphalism and of political infighting. My first visit to the annual Hani memorial ceremony was in 2017 and took place amongst heightened political tension both within the Tripartite Alliance and across broader South African society. At the

[60] Frederic Jameson, 'Marx's Purloined Letter', 38.

time, President Zuma was facing allegations of corruption, state capture, maladministration, misappropriation of state funds channelled to his residence in Nkandla, and for seemingly having a corrupt relationship with the Gupta family. Just a few days before, he had reshuffled his cabinet and axed Pravin Gordhan, who, for certain sections of South African society, was seen as one of the only competent, uncorrupt, and experienced members left in Zuma's cabinet. This opened up a deluge of protests, attacks from the national media, and attempts by organisations, including the SACP, which had previously supported Zuma in his bid for the Presidency in 2008, to call for a broad-based alliance that would work to remove Zuma from office.

On 6 April 2017, Gordhan attended what became seen as a rival memorial at St George's Cathedral in Cape Town, this time for Ahmed Kathrada, who had passed away on 28 March of that year. As Rebecca Davis claimed, this rival event was a memorial only in name, and became a node through which Kathrada's 'spirit' would be employed to call for Zuma's resignation, and during which Gordhan would be marked as a potential candidate for the Presidency.[61] Four days later at the annual Hani Memorial ceremony, and in response to the Kathrada Memorial, Reverend Joseph Maphatsoe, issued a statement from the President stating "that we should not use this platform to attack each other", after which he began proceedings by once again leading the nation in prayer. But unlike at the St George's Cathedral event, Maphatsoe's was not a prayer to save South Africa. It was the Lord's Prayer

[61] Rebecca Davis, 'Cape Town's Kathrada Memorial: "President Gordhan" receives hero's welcome', *Daily Maverick*, 6 April 2017, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-04-06-cape-towns-kathrada-memorial-president-gordhan-receives-heros-welcome/#.

employed to 'defend' South Africa, and clearly deployed in service of Zuma's Presidency and one faction within the Alliance.

After Mapahatsoe's prayer and the singing of *Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika,* the official wreath laying ceremony began. Flanked by the MKMVA and the SANDF, whose presence, like that of Reverend Maphatsoe, worked to affirm the authority of the state and of the Zuma administration, the Hani family and local and national dignitaries took it in turns to pay their respects to Hani. By doing so they renewed Hani's intimate relationship with the nation.[62]

Here, Hani's legacy served as both a reminder of Hani's sacrifice, and as a means to unite the nation under a shared vision of struggle, sacrifice and triumph. Having said this, and despite his statement issued through Maphatsoe, Zuma used this event as a platform through which to reassert his status as the 'people's president', and to silence dissenters by drawing a direct line between his administration and Hani's revolutionary struggle. For Zuma, Hani's struggle for a non-racial South Africa continued, and this struggle called on the ANC (as the nation's vanguard) to direct their energies against the remnants of white racism and white monopoly capital, rather than the state and the Zuma administration. Importantly, Zuma's claims were supported at this event by Limpho Hani, Chris Hani's widow and political figure in her own right:

> [W]e are living in a time of extreme paranoia and factionalism. I attended a prayer service on the 5th of April at Bethesda Methodist Church in Houghton to pray for our country. I was later informed… that I belonged to a faction that is against the Presidency…. Honorary President and comrades, I do not belong to a faction. I'm a member of the ANC and there's only one ANC. I refuse to play in the hands of those who ask, 'What would Chris say today?' I cannot

[62] Ciraj Rassool, 'The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa', 242.

answer that question. What I do know is Chris was a loyal, disciplined and responsible ANC cadre.[63]

Limpho Hani and Zuma went on to blame the media for distorting the news, and reserved particular criticism for 'civil society', which at least for Zuma, meant white dominated formations and the national media controlled by white monopoly capital. However, when the SACP's Deputy General Secretary, Solly Mapaila, came to the podium, it was clear that members of the crowd were intent on signalling their contempt for the SACP after their call for Zuma to be removed from office just a few days earlier. Mapaila's speech was interrupted by heavy rainfall and muffled by the crowd's jeers, leaving the remainder of the memorial event shrouded in an atmosphere of factionalism and dissent, that successive speakers had spoken against.

The SACP and the 'stalled' postapartheid present

To understand the present conjuncture, we may draw usefully on David Scott's notion of the 'stalled present' and his preoccupation in *Omens of Adversity* with "the temporality of the aftermaths of political catastrophe".[64] Writing in the wake of the failed Grenadan revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall, he argues that "the idea of revolution has been a founding paradigm for the modern organization of political time, for connecting old endings to new beginnings and, therefore… connecting our dissatisfactions with the past to our hopes for alternative futures".[65] Since the supposed triumph of neoliberalism, however, and what he sees as "the end of a whole era of revolutionary socialist expectation",[66] "what we are left

[63] Limpho Hani, 'Limpho Hani remembers Chris Hani', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXqWBuwbd90
[64] David Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 2.
[65] Ibid. 3.
[66] Ibid. 4.

with are *aftermaths* in which the present seems stricken with immobility and pain and ruin".[67] In other words, for Scott, the "past is a wound that will not heal." It is a "psychological trauma… a past that returns, unbidden, involuntarily, to haunt or unsettle or somehow mangle the present."[68]

Although South African society cannot be described as one in which the longing for revolution has dissipated entirely, Scott provides important insights into both the ways in which our experiences of time shape how we think past, present and future, and how this 'stalled present' has been deployed by political parties to sustain and reproduce their political power. As Beresford, Berry and Mann point out, this notion of the stalled present has been effectively employed by the ANC and its allies. They use the non-progressivist term 'productive liminality' "to explain countries suspended (potentially indefinitely) in a status 'betwixt and between' mass violence, authoritarianism, and democracy." Echoing Herwitz's distinction between legacy and heritage practices, they suggest that South Africa is "in a liminal status wherein a transition to democracy and socio-economic 'revolution' remains forestalled", and that "this liminality is instrumentalized to justify the party's extraordinary mandate".[69] In our case, this mandate revolves around the ANC's unfinished National Democratic Revolution and the SACP's Two Stage Theory of revolution, as well as a "social contract… sustained through a substantive offer of security and prosperity", and the production of the politically and socially abject subject. These are the 'enemies of

[67] Ibid. 6.
[68] Ibid. 13.
[69] Alexander Beresford, Mary E. Berry, and Laura Mann, 'Liberation movements and stalled democratic transitions: reproducing power in Rwanda and South Africa through productive liminality', *Democratization* (May 2018), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87764/, 1.

democracy', who, for different reasons and with varying degrees of credibility, are mobilised as an anathema to postapartheid democracy and the legacy of activists like Hani.[70]

This chapter does not seek to determine whether this stalled present is an 'authentic' or collective experience in South Africa. The point is rather to identify how this *sense* of a stalled present – what I see as a particular iteration of South African 'state time' – has been deployed by different organisations within the Alliance as a means to reproduce political power, and how the legacy of activists like Hani are employed with this aim in mind. Zuma's invocation of Hani may usefully be explained through this notion of productive liminality, which was in this case invoked as a means by which to justify his administration's political project. The SACP's role in government and invocations of Hani at the Memorial may equally be understood through this lens.

Since Mapaila's acrimonious appearance at the 2017 memorial ceremony, and in the notable absence of President Ramaphosa, the SACP's General Secretary and current Minister of Transport, Blade Nzimande, has become a prominent figure at this event. In 2018 he used this platform to distance himself and the SACP from criticism and scrutiny. In a similar vein to Setsubi, Nzimande employed Hani's legacy as a model of emulation, this time calling on rank-and-file members and 'some' leaders within the SACP, and the Alliance more broadly, to become cadres of a new type in Hani's image. By doing so he invoked Marxism's envisaged new man of history,[71] and intimated that despite him personally being a member of

[70] Ibid. 3.
[71] Yinghong Cheng, *Creating the "New Man": From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).

Zuma's and Ramaphosa's cabinets, the SACP should still be seen as a force of progressive change within government. Nzimande was at pains to explain to the audience that rather than having captured state power, many cadres who had been deployed into government had in fact been 'captured' by the state.

But unlike Setsubi, Nzimande's comments came from a position of relative power: both as a minister in Ramaphosa's government, and perhaps less so as General Secretary of a party which has since 1994 generally been unable to "exert decisive influence on the ANC,"[72] and which had been complicit, first, in helping Zuma gain power, and second, in contributing to "the 'factional destablisation' of the state."[73] Nzimande's speech, then, must be read with a pinch of salt. In short, it should be understood as an attempt to reaffirm the SACP leadership's "status as a principled and unwavering force of the socialist left,"[74] but also as one that propped up a postapartheid project which has been characterised by economic "[a]djustments considered normal when they were taken by conservative Western governments", but in South Africa, "painted as portents of revolution."[75]

Furthermore, Nzimande's invocation of a new man in the image of Hani allowed the SACP to simultaneously evade a self-reflective and critical engagement with Hani's legacy and its own legacy in government since 1994. In other words, by calling on the new man of history, Nzimande deferred further systematic change until a later date (until the arrival of a new

[72] Hein Marais, *South Africa pushed to the limit: the political economy of change* (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2011), 435.
[73] Ibid. 443.
[74] Ibid. 438.
[75] Stephen Friedman, 'Time to recognise that the red scare is a red herring', *Business Day*, 4 November 2019, https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/business-day/20091103/282591669018961.

man), and as a result affirmed the stalled time of the postapartheid and, seemingly, Zuma's famous mantra that "the ANC will rule… until Jesus comes."[76] Ultimately – and despite Jacques Derrida's warning in his eulogy for Hani at the beginning of his book *Spectres of Marx* – it seems, firstly, that within the Alliance, Hani (and the politics that he represents) has been reduced to nothing more than a symbol, an emblem, a martyr, and as a "rhetoric of a flag",[77] and secondly, that these representations have had real political effects.

Breaking the frame: the personal and the political

As Judith Butler has argued in *Frames of War,* something always exceeds, breaks out of the frame within which a discourse (or legacy) is managed and contained. Indeed, this very framing "permits – even requires – this breaking out".[78] "To call the frame into question", Butler argues, "is to show that the frame never quite contained the scene [or the individual] it was meant to limn, that something was already outside, which made the very sense of the inside possible, recognizable."[79] I turn to Butler here, because it seems that despite attempts by individuals and parties to manage and contain Hani's legacy at the Hani Memorial, something always exceeds the frame through which Hani is remembered. Posed through Werbner's critique of official state-led memorialisation at Heroes' Acre in Zimbabwe, we might simply say: "The official version is never the whole story", something always escapes the state's or the ruling party's obsession with order and control.

[76] News 24 Correspondent, 'ANC will rule until Jesus comes, Zuma says again', *News24,* https://www.news24.com/elections/news/anc-will-rule-until-jesus-comes-zuma-says-again-20160705.
[77] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx,* xiv.
[78] Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* (London and New York: Verso Books, 2009), 11.
[79] Ibid. 9.

One of the more recent invocations and appropriations of Hani's legacy, which directly challenged the ANC's and the SACP's legacy of struggle and the old alliance's postapartheid project, occurred a week before the 2019 Hani Memorial. Between the 4th and 6th of April, the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA)-backed, Socialist Revolutionary Worker's Party (SRWP), launched its bid to contest the general elections later that year.[80] In Johannesburg, one thousand delegates gathered to pledge their support for what the SRWP referred to as "the long and winding road of class struggle", and to commit themselves to "building an organisation of the revolutionary working class". This event was dedicated to the recently passed Fieldmore Mapeto, who the SRWP invoked in the following way:

> With the revolutionary spirit of Fieldmore Mapeto alive in us all, today we commit ourselves to the long and winding road of class struggle as we launch the Socialist Revolutionary Workers Party. We openly declare for all the world to know that we as Socialists are committed to building the organisation of a revolutionary working class. A class aware of its own interests. A class that will overthrow the capitalist parasites. A working class that will seize power for the project of building Socialism, in which no human will be exploited by another.

However, there were other figures present at the inaugural summit, including Hani, who took centre stage alongside the likes of Marx, Engels, Che Guevara, and other South African revolutionaries. In short, Hani's legacy was employed here through a different lens, a socialist lens which affirmed that the struggle, particularly the struggle for workers' rights, continued beyond 1994, beyond the state and the ruling party, and beyond what Herwitz referred to as the mythological foundations of the nation.

[80] Brian Sokutu, 'New socialist party set to challenge ANC at polls', *The Citizen*, 4 April 2019 https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2112148/new-socialist-party-set-to-challenge-anc-at-polls/.

But when I claim that Hani's legacy of struggle cannot be contained by the ANC, I should be more specific. For it seems that this legacy, more interestingly, evades the rhetoric and ideologies of party politics more generally. At the 2018 Hani Memorial, proceedings were overshadowed by Winnie Madikizela-Mandela's funeral which was to take place in Johannesburg a day after the Hani Memorial. But at this event, Winnie's death itself became a node through which two figures, who to different degrees had been left on the margins of South Africa's postanti-apartheid memorial complex, were brought to bear on postapartheid politics. As disparaging claims on her legacy had been circulating within the public domain, South Africans attempted to register a legacy that challenged unmeasured judgements from certain sections of the public. This legacy was voiced at the 2018 Hani Memorial by Lindiwe Hani, seemingly having replaced her mother Limpho as the new Hani family spokesperson:

> She [Winnie Mandela] has nothing to be sorry about. Last week, to participate and witness the beauty of social media, with the hashtag 'I am Winnie Mandela' was monumental. South African women who were donning black with a *doek* was such an inspirational movement that reminded me that together we are strong, that together as women, standing together, anything is possible. That uMama did not die but she did multiply. I am Winnie Mandela, my daughter is Winnie Mandela, and all the little girls who dream big are Winnie Mandela. It might be a system that is as old as time and ingrained in our society, but as sure as I am Lindiwe Hani, the daughter of Thembisile Chris Hani, patriarchy we are coming for you.[81]

After marking patriarchy within the hallowed halls of the Hani Memorial ceremony, Lindiwe Hani moved on to target racism and privilege in South Africa, where after she returned to her father, drawing a direct link between him, Winnie, and the continued struggle for justice after

[81] A section of this speech can be found online. See: Lindiwe Hani, 'Chris Hani's daughter remembers her late father, pays tribute to Mama Winnie', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9BfZCYuRxc.

apartheid. By highlighting the deeply personal and traumatic experience of losing a father, and by subverting the often taken-for-granted political and patriarchal hierarchy which presided over the Hani Memorial, Lindiwe Hani's words mobilised her father's memory alongside a different notion of struggle:

> It has been twenty-five years since Daddy was brutally assassinated in his driveway and to some, including myself, it feels like yesterday. Our family still miss him every day, and we will forever reflect on how our lives would have been different if he was still alive. A sentiment I know shared by many. Honestly I will never know, but I do feel that I tend to miss the leadership I grew up surrounded by. The pure selflessness of our Hanis, our Tambos, that they displayed. The concept of the course being larger than the individual. We were fed this simultaneously as we were told, or if you like indoctrinated, that our blood is black, green and yellow. Twenty-five years later we seem to have forgotten those basics. We need, and myself included, to stop looking for saviors, and realise that we all carry the gene of superb leadership. We are surrounded by greatness and inspiration. From the woman that takes menial jobs to feed her family, to the young children still walking many kilometres to get an education, we are the ones to lead our beautiful country to the kind of future we want to see.[82]

It was again in this romantic spirit that a more assertive Lindiwe Hani spoke at the 2019 Memorial. In a speech that criticised the leadership of the old Alliance, and distanced itself from party politics more generally, Lindiwe Hani invoked Hani's legacy in order to judge and discipline those who were present, including Magashule, who, as we have seen, had earlier used the platform for his own self-aggrandisement. She ended what was a moving speech by reciting one of Hani's best-known quotes:

> Socialism is not about big concepts and heavy theory. Socialism is about decent shelter for those who are homeless, it is about water for those who have no safe drinking water. It is about healthcare. It is about a life of dignity for the old. It is about overcoming the huge divide between urban and rural areas. It is about a decent education for all our people. Socialism is about rolling back the

[82] 'The SACP Remembers Hani', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSD0bUsF5pM, retrieved 15 September 2019.

> tyranny of the market. As long as the economy is dominated by an unelected, privileged few the case for socialism will exist.[83]

By invoking her father's legacy in this way, Lindiwe Hani worked to challenge the type of memorialisation and temporality inculcated at the Hani Memorial complex. For her, it seemed, the time was now. South Africans, she suggested, did not need to look for saviours, the arrival of the new man, or the return of Chris Hani. It was in the 'ordinary' people instead, where we might find 'inspiration and greatness'. It also seems clear that through this romantic lens, Lindiwe Hani employed her father's legacy in an attempt to recuperate a sense of socialist struggle from below and to undermine the heroic narrative of leaders, of vanguards, and of the Party, or at the very least to remind the Alliance of its supposed commitment to the 'ordinary' people of South Africa.

This type of invocation may of course be problematic. Amongst other things, it has the effect of romanticising the 'workers and the poor', and – as with state-led memorialisation at the Hani Memorial – flattening out what was a complicated and contested history of struggle. Having said this, Lindiwe Hani's words have not only been employed in this way. Elsewhere they have intersected with the personal trauma of losing a father, whilst highlighting the tension between family and state and the question of who lays claim to the dead body of apartheid. In her 2017 memoir, when recounting her memories of the first memorial occasion held after Hani's death (18 April 1993), in remembering the procession of mourners which had lined up to say farewell to their comrade, Lindiwe Hani reluctantly compared her father

[83] Lindiwe Hani, 'Chris Hani's daughter remembers her late father, pays tribute to Mama Winnie', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9BfZCYuRxc.

to Lenin.[84] On other occasions he has been described as the "Che Guevara of Africa".[85] These comparisons have marked Hani as a giant of the struggle, and as a symbol of revolutions won, revolutions lost, and for some, of hopes for revolutions to come. As we have seen in the previous chapter, for Lindiwe Hani, Chris "was just Daddy", not only a father of the nation, but a father who had been taken prematurely by the struggle. This brief statement – one tied up with Lindiwe Hani's struggle to overcome the personal trauma of losing her father, as well as her resentment at having to share Chris Hani with the nation – demonstrates the argument advanced here more clearly than anything else.

Despite attempts by successive ANC governments to organise and close off the past, the traces of personal and generational trauma which do not always align with ANC-aligned narratives of struggle, "blast… open 'the continuum of history'."[86] They also remind us that a "man's life, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol."[87] Following Edkins, there are, in short, "always remnants, remains, traces – in family members, in objects, in writings, in fragments of bone, in memories"[88] – that hold open the possibility for different ways of remembering the past, experiencing the present, and imagining futures free from apartheid.

Conclusion

[84] Lindiwe Hani and Melinda Ferguson, *Being Chris Hani's Daughter,* 61.
[85] 'Hani the Che Guevara of Africa – Vavi', *News24*, https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Hani-the-Che-Guevara-of-Africa-Vavi-20130410.
[86] Jenny Edkins, 'Temporality, Politics and Performance', 141.
[87] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx,* xiv.
[88] Jenny Edkins, 'Temporality, Politics and Performance', 145.

Remembering Chris Hani extends far beyond the nation-state, its tangible monuments to the past, and its forms of governmentality. At times this remembering is deeply personal, and at times it is deeply political. Often it is clearly both. Either way, and for whatever reason individuals have invoked Hani's legacy, their memories cannot be contained or governed by the discursive frames, monumental projects, and temporality of the state, which ultimately seek closure and the end of a politics that has the state as its target.

In our case this framing has served a number of functions. Firstly, it has served as a node through which individual claims on and connections to Hani's legacy have been legitimised, while silencing dissenting voices within the Alliance, and displacing competing political t in the public domain more generally. In Nzimande's case, Hani's legacy has been framed in aid of the SACP's attempts to retain or recapture 'radical left politics', while propping up the ANC's postapartheid project. In this process, and by turning Hani's legacy "into memory or raising it, as litany, to monumentalising mythology", Hani's politics were denatured, and consigned to the past.

Having said this, the contestations brought to the fore here begin to point toward the ways in which Hani's biography and legacy might disrupt rather than affirm the ANC's narration of the struggle against apartheid. In other words, rather than propping up the ANC's postapartheid project, which establishes a temporal horizon that places Hani's revolutionary politics firmly in the remembered past, these aspects point toward a different type of struggle, one that extends far beyond 1994, and one that exceeds representation and attempts by the postapartheid nation-state to contain and govern the past. In short, despite attempts by

successive ANC governments to manage the ways in which the nation remembers past struggle and how it conceives of present and future struggle, the memorials of the postapartheid nation-state, like the Hani Memorial Complex, serve as sites of temporal rupture through which the 'time of the state' is exposed, challenged and, for good or bad, potentially unravelled.

If, from one angle, Hani's legacy and biography has been 'made to speak' for an experience of violence that is now past, from another, his legacy has been 'made to speak' to what many see as the unresolved legacies of the anti-apartheid struggle, and in aid of the increasingly insistent 'collective scream' for decolonisation, land redistribution, and systematic change. As Edkins has argued, this is the time of trauma, a refusal to close off the past, and an attempt to open the future to alternative cultures of resistance after the end of apartheid. Perhaps then, instead of Herwitz's 'reminder and ruin' heritage production and history-making in South Africa might be better understood as 'remainder and ruin'. For it seems that apartheid and the legacies of struggle that were mobilised against it are not entirely finished with us.

Chapter Three

The assassination of Chris Hani as historical event: Romance, tragedy and emplotment

Up till now, I have traced a cursory genealogy of political funerals and memorial practices in South Africa, in order to begin an engagement with a series of questions regarding dead body politics, the political funeral of the nation to come, and the ways in which memorial practices continue to reaffirm and challenge nationalist liberation scripts. Here I return to and expand upon the same themes but now turn toward a discussion of the formation of the assassination of Hani as historical event, as a means of revealing the paradoxes and limits of the historical record, and the ways in which the 'truth' of Hani's assassination was produced over time. Here I employ what Tom Lundborg has called the double structure of the event and, following David Scott, what can be seen as a tension between romantic and tragic modes of emplotment. At the same time, I seek to chart a more generative, aleatory trajectory and genre through which to write the history and violence of the transition from apartheid to democracy.

This chapter also takes its cue from longstanding debates about 'truth', transitional justice and reparations in South Africa, and Luise White's preoccupation in *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo* with the ways in which "narratives about the past are produced and reproduced and how power is produced and reproduced by these narratives."[1] In White's words:

[1] Luise White, *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo*, 2.

> I am hardly the first historian to point out that an event takes on different meanings over time – even a very short time – to the different, sometimes opposing, groups who claim the event as part of their history. I argue that this is not a problem to be solved; instead, it is a basis for analysis…. Events have rough and complicated antecedents, and each has an afterlife, often in the form of more texts and more words that render the actual event obscure. To look closely at any event requires looking carefully at the texts it generates, both days and years after the event.[2]

Another way of putting this is to say that here I am primarily concerned with the aftermaths and circulation of events and histories of violence, and how different types of remembering and forgetting have been brought to bear on postapartheid South African society. In this regard, I do not consider events to be static temporal and spatial borders located in a past. Rather I think of them as circulating temporally and spatially in the 'present'. As Walter Benjamin posited in his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', "History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now."[3] In other words, events are present in their 'pastness', they "make time and mark time."[4] As Heidi Grunebaum has put it, the ways in which we organise those events "transform our sense of life lived" and produce certain frames through which to view the past, navigate the present, and conceive of the future.

As we saw in the first chapter, amongst other things, Hani's funeral became available as a means through which to establish a new time, and to re/establish the parameters and limits of the sovereign nation-state and modern political subject. In the second chapter we also saw how ideas about the 'stalled present' or what Beresford, Berry and Mann have called

[2] Ibid. 2-3.
[3] Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', 261.
[4] Heidi Grunebaum, *Memorialising the Past*, 21.

'productive liminality', might have been employed as a means through which to symbolically defer meaningful systemic change until a later date. In this chapter, I focus on the becoming of Hani's assassination as historical event in order to trouble and challenge these assumptions.

The double structure of the event

> This is a time to cry. I saw Chris Hani dead. I arrived about… ten to fifteen minutes, I'm not sure of my times after the call. In the street as I entered I found his daughter screaming and in the driveway next to the car his body lay. Shot behind his ear. A direct shot. Another shot on his jaw. Showing that it was a marksman. There could be other shots. I was devastated and could not search the body of Chris Hani for more shots. His wife is on his way here. Chris Hani who lies in his driveway today dead, was not a poet, was not a shopkeeper, he was not a musician. He was a revolutionary. He was a politician for his own people. The hand that pulled the trigger is merely a hand. Obviously there are greater forces, which are challenging Chris Hani for who he is and I have told you that he was not what he was not. He was who he is, and therefore the enemies of Chris Hani are the enemies of the people of this country.[5]

The above experience conveyed by Tokyo Sexwale perhaps just an hour after Chris Hani's assassination, cannot be adequately re-presented in this text, in the same way that images of Hani's dead body reproduced numerous times for film, publication and exhibition, cannot contain and 'fix' the scene or 'capture' the traumatic and violent event in its entirety. Indeed, in a certain sense, Hani's assassination (and any other event) is unreproducible, as something always exceeds the evidentiary frames of the historical record. Something always remains unspoken, unseen, unresolved, missing or missed.

[5] Tokyo Sexwale, 'Tokyo Sexwale on the day #ChrisHani was assassinated.' https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcOjx45FYLI

One slippage in particular, one part of Sexwale's speech, gives us a glimpse of the fragmentary character of the event and the difficulty in translating it into history. The phrase "I'm not sure of my times" seems to reveal the trauma, violence and uncertainty of that day, and points toward an experience of time and the event as out-of-joint. In other words, this short comment which was preceded by a long pause – a moment to catch one's breath – seems to affirm an experience of what Deleuze and Guattari have called the pure event. Writing about the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, Tom Lundborg expressed the pure event as follows:

> What happens is sudden and strikes immediately, without warning and without falling back on a well-defined context or background. Lacking such a context or background, only instants remain, which disrupt the senses and established perception of what is real. These instants or pure events, open up something different and unknown, which is yet to come and still to be determined. The only thing that is certain is change itself, and this change is the process of displacing feelings of safety, and disrupting the entrenched notions of what is normal.[6]

Although it has been suggested that the assassination of Hani was South Africa's '9/11 moment',[7] it is important to note at this early stage that this event was not necessarily out of the ordinary. By 1993, thousands of South Africans had lost their lives to the direct and indirect effects of apartheid policies and the types of violence that apartheid and colonialism made available. However, it is clear that for those who witnessed Hani's assassination, this violent event was indeed exceptional. Some, like Hani's wife, Limpho, and daughters, Lindiwe and Nomakwezi, would have experienced this event with more intensity than others. But it also seems reasonable to suggest that many South Africans went through an analogous

[6] Tom Lundborg, *The Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, Becoming* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 18.
[7] Lindiwe Hani and Melinda Ferguson, *Being Chris Hani's Daughter* (Johannesburg: MF Books, 2017), 42.

experience on that day. Of course, as with all traumatic or 'exceptional' events, what is remembered is often something other than the event itself. One person remembers the gloomy, perhaps apocalyptic atmosphere, and her artist friend's spontaneous painting in a flat somewhere in Cape Town. Another recalls the street corner where he sat when he heard the news in Johannesburg, and apparently, that several years earlier he had witnessed an MK cadre blow himself up by accident on that same street corner. Yet another is permanently troubled by the sound of message notifications on his phone. At the time of Hani's assassination, he was working as a journalist and cannot forget the sound of his pager, now transferred to the sound of his mobile phone, which notified him of the tragic event. All of these examples point toward the significance of Hani's assassination for individual lives, and the ways in which this event has penetrated "multiple levels of culture, politics, society and everyday life."[8] Lundborg explains this phenomenon in the following way:

> There are moments that seem more crucial than others – when the event constitutes a border in time, separating a time that was 'before' from a time that comes 'after'; when the event becomes relevant throughout the whole social field…; when the event becomes known as 'historical', 'global' and 'exceptional'.[9]

The significance of the event, however, is not guaranteed in advance. There remains a retroactive process of production through which the event becomes 'historical', 'global', 'exceptional', and, in a word, eventful. Put another way, if Sexwale's statement points toward an experience of the pure event – an experience of time as out-of-joint, as fragmentary, uncertain, and contingent – it also highlights a moment of the formation of Hani's assassination as historical event through which the event's causes and effects are determined.

[8] Tom Lundborg, *The Politics of the Event*, 1.
[9] Ibid. 1.

Sexwale's statement was surely the first recorded attempt to give meaning to Hani's life after death, and therefore marked the beginnings of a process through which the violent, contingent experience of Hani's assassination was actualised, historicised, archived and made speakable. By providing the forensic information that would show "that this was a marksman" and biographical claims about what Hani was ("Hani was a revolutionary") and what Hani was not, as well as establishing modus operandi ("obviously there are greater forces at work"), Sexwale attempted to make sense of and to actualise, for himself and for the nation, what just happened. As Lundborg puts it, through this process the uncertainty of the pure event "is made into something that we can speak about and relate to in a number of ways."[10]

Phenomenologist Paul Ricouer has argued that this necessity to organise time enables people to give meaning to lives which would otherwise be out of joint, lost in an endless continuum of meaningless moments.[11] Sylvia Wynter, too, has suggested that although there is no "given semantic order" in human culture,[12] the ordering of life worlds, and the discourses that this ordering produces, "institute all human forms of life".[13] The point is that "[e]ach 'general notion of the world' contains within it… a 'specific idea of order'".[14] "What is imperative is not categorization of the world as it is", but the categorisations and orders of discourse that enable different cultures or societies to navigate and make sense of the worlds which they

[10] Ibid. 70.
[11] Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative: Vol 1* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
[12] Sylvia Wynter, 'Columbus, the Ocean Blue, and Fables that Stir the Mind: to Reinvent the Study of Letters', Bainard Cowan and Jefferson Humphries (eds), *Poetics of the Americas: Race, Founding, and Textuality* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 155.
[13] Ibid. 162.
[14] Ibid. 154.

inhabit.[15] In short, for Wynter, the stories which different cultures and nations tell themselves about their being in the world, are not representative of a 'false consciousness' as Marx famously argued. Instead, they come from a necessary process through which societies "best orient the collective behaviours of its subjects and thereby best enable its own replication as such a system, together with its mode of subjectivity (the I) and its conspecificity (the We)."[16]

Similarly, Lundborg has suggested that this ordering is a necessary process through which societies, cultures, and nations establish or re-establish some sense of 'normalcy', particularly in the wake of "ambiguous events that seem to lack a straightforward connection to a present state of affairs".[17] After "the dust has settled," Lundborg says,

> [w]e can begin to make plans for how to rebuild Ground Zero: reimagine what life in the city, in the nation, and the world should be like; establish a renewed sense of being, which takes us away from disruption and dislocation, away from trauma, and away from the uncertainty of movements…. Instead of movements, we can establish points, positions and moments in time, which are inscribed in the flesh and the body…. We can construct narratives, which tell us what really happened, and the order in which things happened… [and] represent the 'being' of subjects and objects.[18]

As with some of Wynter's concerns surrounding the voyage of Columbus and the breaks in "notions of order" which this event inaugurated,[19] the critical point for Lundborg was not whether this sense-making represents "the world as it is". In other words, theirs were not ontological concerns. Instead, what concerned them was what was made available through

[15] Ibid. 156.
[16] Ibid. 157.
[17] Tom Lundborg, *The Politics of the Event*, 3.
[18] Ibid. 27.
[19] Sylvia Wynter, 'Columbus, the Ocean Blue, and Fables that Stir the Mind', 155.

this process of actualisation. In the case of the 9/11 attacks, Lundborg has demonstrated how the reconstitution of the US as victim justified their War on Terror, Guantanamo Bay, doctrines of Preemption, Homeland Security, and the USA Patriot Act. All of these, as we too well know, legitimised violent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and curtailed the freedoms of those living in the US. In other words, it is not so much the ways in which narratives were organised and narrated that matters, but the political effects of such an organisation.

This is not to suggest that prior to 9/11 the US was a benign force in the world. Clearly it was not. But as Lundborg has pointed out, 9/11 became the point through which pre-emption, political and military intervention, war, torture, and assassination were reconstituted, reinvigorated, and remoulded through a 'new' sense of being US in the world. Much of this was centred around the idea of the US as victim rather than as perpetrator. In short, 9/11 signalled "the desire for a new beginning", but it also became "an important reference point for producing something rather familiar: a familiar understanding of history based on progress", and an interventionist policy which the Middle East in particular has continued to feel the violent effects of.[20] As such, the 'exceptional' historical event and the 'new' epochs, eras, and times that they apparently inaugurated might be best understood in terms of rupture and continuity, the merging of the familiar and the new, and the 'new' nation understood as at once different and the same.

[20] Tom Lundborg, *The Politics of the Event*, 64.

It would clearly be a mistake to merely reduce Lundborg's discussion of 9/11 and its aftermaths to what, many would argue, was a liberatory moment in South Africa. It seems that this approach might further shed light on the parameters and limits through which the 'new' nation in South Africa was inaugurated. It might also enable a reading of the transitional period which attends to the limits and paradoxes of historical production and the idea of history as progress and as succession. This might in turn provide a means through which to challenge the triumphalism and certainties of different nationalisms and their claims to 'truth' and help us to begin to engage with different ways of writing and thinking historical change. The distinction made in *Remains of the Social* between the post-apartheid (a time *after* apartheid) and the postapartheid (without hyphenation) as "neither a point in time nor a political dispensation, but rather a condition that names the labour of coming to terms with and working through the desires, principles, critiques and modes of ordering that apartheid both enabled and foreclosed",[21] constitutes the problem space of postapartheid nationhood 'after' the official end of apartheid. The type of violence that ended Hani's life remains as 'normal' today as it was during apartheid. It is for these reasons that this chapter focuses on a contested reading of the assassination of Hani and the transition from apartheid to democracy.

A bloody miracle or romantic mode of emplotment?

There is a vast archive surrounding the assassination of Hani and the transition in South Africa more generally, and this archive is too large to cover here in its entirety. It is therefore

[21] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social*, 1-2.

difficult to offer a conclusive account of the times, though it should be clear that this is not my intention. Rather, what I offer is a series of illustrations, not as conclusive 'proof' of the 'dominant mode' of historical production or that the idea of the 'Rainbow Nation' remains prevalent within the public domain, but as *expressions* of certain currents of thought and modes of narrative emplotment that were prevalent at the time. Narratives of the 'Rainbow Nation' have gone on to serve as objects of critique rather than as gratefully received and accepted by South African publics. I employ Giorgio Agamben's notion of the example as paradigmatic, rather than, as Lauren van de Rede has put it, exceptional "types, classes or kinds."[22] The following notes made by Themba Molefe, published in *The Sowetan*, that provided a reconstruction of Hani's final moments, offers a productive means through which to begin to do this:

> 'The last moments in the life of Hani'…
> Saturday (9:30am - 10am): Hani and his daughter Nomakwezi drive in his metallic grey Toyota Corolla to the Dawn Park supermarket… His bodyguard-cum-driver is off duty. 10am: Hani and Nomakwezi return, park in the driveway. "Daddy, someone is waving at you," Nomakwezi tells her father…. Hani gets out of the car with three newspapers under his arm. He is preparing to relax quietly as he is wearing a tracksuit and canvas shoes.[23]

This account of the assassination of Chris Hani suggested that Chris and Nomakwezi Hani began their Easter weekend like any other middle-class family might have: shopping trips to the local supermarket, morning newspapers, casual tracksuits, and (famously) no bodyguards. Then we have the moment of the assassination itself, during which Chris and Nomakwezi Hani's peaceful weekend was shattered by the calm and calculated movements of a

[22] Lauren van de Rede, 'Disappeared to Ethiopia's Bermuda: Tales by a Puppet', *Kronos* 44, (Nov 2018), 201.
[23] Themba Molefe, 'The Last Moments in the Life of Hani', *The Sowetan*, 13 April 1993 (Ronald Kasrils Papers, WHP, University of the Witwatersrand, AG2543).

professional, and at this time faceless, assassin: "A man in the red car walks towards Hani. He fires the first shot and misses Hani. Four more shots ring out. One hits Hani behind the right ear, another enters the jaw and two hit him in the body. Assassin walks back to the car and drives off."[24] From this moment on everything, including the rhythm of the piece itself changes and momentarily stretches into an unknown future:

> Nomakwezi screams as she watches her father die. A neighbour and television newscaster, Noxolo Grootboom, hears the screams, rushes out, sees the red car speeding off and goes to the scene. Another neighbour takes down registration number. Calls the police. 10:15am: Police stop a Red Ford Laser, seize two pistols and detain occupant later identified as Polish immigrant Janusz Waluś. 10:30am: Police cordon off area around Hani's neighbourhood. News of Hani's death breaks. 10:30-11am: Police and ANC leaders address journalists at the scene. Supporters throng to Hani's house. 12:25: Hani's corpse is put in mortuary van which slowly drives past an impromptu guard of honour. 12:30pm: ANC National Chairperson Mr Oliver Tambo arrives with his wife Adelaide. The Mortuary van stops. ANC PWV Chairman Tokyo Sexwale opens bag covering Hani for Tambo. Mrs Tambo bends and shuts Hani's eyes. Van leaves. 12:50pm: ANC Deputy President Mr Walter Sisulu arrives. Addresses journalists and the crowd outside Hani's house. He appeals for calm and restraint. Crowd swells.[25]

Despite all its factual inaccuracies, this article adheres to many of the conventions of reportage: a contextual background which sets the scene, the placement and naming of certain actors and protagonists, and the establishment of a timeline that clearly demonstrates how one thing led to another. By doing so, *The Sowetan* established itself as an authoritative voice that informed the reader of the exact timing of Hani's assassination and, importantly, the name of the assassin. As such, a clear understanding of what happened and how it began to emerge, one which would be corrected, ratified and deepened by the apartheid government

[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

and the ANC, the national and international media, and later by South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

At the same time, it seems that this article divided the event between three distinct moments (past, present and future), which in turn seemed to be bracketed by experiences of tranquillity and peace, chaos and uncertainty, and a return to relative order and 'normalcy'. Michele Berger's literary account in the youth history series, *They Fought for Freedom*, differs in certain key details but nevertheless affirms this narrative structure:

> The tenth of April 1993 began peacefully. It was Easter weekend and people wanted nothing more than to attend church services or to relax at home. Chris had given his bodyguard and driver, Master Sizani, the day off. His wife, Limpho, and daughter, Lindiwe, had gone to Lesotho to visit relatives. Chris was looking forward to relaxing at home with a second daughter, Nomakhwezi.
>
> At about 10:30 in the morning, Chris drove into his driveway having gone to buy a newspaper. A red car drove up behind him and a tall, thin, white man stepped out. As Chris got out of his car, the man took out his gun, aimed it at Chris and shot him four times. He got back into his car and drove away. Nomakhwezi ran outside to find her father lying dead on the ground. The man was later identified as Janusz "Koba" Walus.[26]

It seems equally clear that within Molofe's article in *The Sowetan*, two main actors or protagonists began to emerge. On the one hand we had the supporters and the crowd which gathers and 'swells', and on the other, we have leaders who appealed for 'calm and restraint'. The international media too, had a tendency to lean upon a similar mode of emplotment which has endured. So, on the eve of Nelson Mandela's funeral in 2013, the BBC's *Newsnight* chose the assassination of Hani to illustrate how Mandela had established himself

[26] Michelle Berger, *Chris Hani: They Fought for Freedom*, 1.

as a "moral authority", "a brilliant political operator", and "the indispensable figure at moments of great crisis." According to the BBC's correspondent, Alan Little:

> April 1993 was one such moment in which Mandela would prove himself a brilliant political operator, and save South Africa. The white government had still not conceded a date for free elections. The communist leader Chris Hani was a heroic figure, second only to Mandela in popular esteem. And then he was shot dead by a white racist. … Public rage tore through the country. Many Blacks lost patience with a peace process that seemed endless. … Mandela told the white government bluntly that there could be no more delay. He needed them to agree a date, immediately, for free elections. Only that could hold the slide. He then appeared on television at immense risk to his own public credibility to make a dramatic appeal for calm. … He knew the public mood was turning against reconciliation, but still he spoke of the white woman who had tipped of the police about the killer's identity. … The government committed to elections. Democracy was now only a matter of time. It had a date. Mandela had snatched from the greatest moment of peril, the biggest advance.[27]

This BBC report invoked history as progress and as succession, as driven by heroic figures standing at the forefront of history, controlling, and guiding the people toward democracy. As Little put it later in the piece, "the greatest moral figure of our age [Mandela], bequeaths a democratic South Africa", one which he suggested, had not fulfilled its promise. As such, the romantic narrative of the 'great men' of history was put into play, one that before served to ground both anticolonial struggles (in both Marxist and non-Marxist accounts) and the literary classics of nineteenth and twentieth century Europe. In his reading of the first edition of C.L.R. James's *Black Jacobins*, David Scott described the romantic mode of emplotment of nineteenth and twentieth century Europe in the following way:

> Their narratives move in sequential and processional form, moving steadily and rhythmically (one might even say teleologically) in the direction of an end already in some sense known in advance. It has the shape of a "quest": the protagonists (invariably associated with the new, with Light, with order)

[27] Alan Little, 'NEWSNIGHT: How Mandela responded to the assassination of Chris Hani', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOn24d9xwYQ

> undertake a perilous journey; there are encounters with antagonists and enemies (invariably associated with the old, with Darkness, with disorder); the inevitable conflict ensues between their irreconcilable principles; there are heightened moments when Darkness seems poised to vanquish Light; and finally the victorious deliverance or overcoming from bondage, from evil, comes.[28]

Perhaps one of the clearest examples of this narrative style today, came from an *eNCA* film, 'The Bloody Miracle', which charted a stable, if bloody, path from the chaotic moment of Hani's assassination, toward a new beginning in which freedom and democracy triumph. The following was its opening stanza:

> [Nelson Mandela] Now your day has come, because this election is about you. It is your election; it is your vote that counts. Years of imprisonment could not stamp out our determination to be free. We will not let a handful of killers steal our democracy.
>
> [Narrator] In April 1994 South Africa held its first democratic elections, bringing apartheid to an end. The African National Congress, or ANC, swept to victory and Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first President of the new South Africa.
>
> The negotiated transition to democracy is often hailed as a peaceful miracle. We forget that during the dying days of apartheid, South Africa was plunged into chaos by forces against change. It was a wonder that elections happened at all. Change was indeed a miracle, but it was a bloody one.[29]

'Beginning' at the 'end', with Nelson Mandela's Press Conference speech on the first day of elections, 26 April 1994, 'The Bloody Miracle' set a trajectory toward a well-known point, the first democratic elections in South Africa. Before reaching there, however, the film's narrator explained that viewers needed to witness the 'bloody miracle', and to remember that despite claims that South Africa underwent a peaceful transition, the 'new' nation's freedoms were won through blood. These opening scenes were narrated with a striking archival

[28] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 70.
[29] '1994: The Bloody Miracle – Part One', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0qp3jtJzf7Q

backdrop: lines and lines of Black South Africans queuing to vote for the first time on a cold April morning; an anonymous hand marking a cross alongside Mandela's face in the polling booth; and Mandela himself placing his vote in front of the television cameras. The film then took viewers back to the 'beginning', almost exactly a year before elections, to the assassination of Hani, which the majority of commentators confirmed, almost pushed South Africa "to the brink of chaos."[30] According to 'The Bloody Miracle' and the BBC, it was only Mandela's live televised address to the nation that saved the situation:

> A white man, full of prejudice and hate, came to our country and committed a deed so foul that our nation now teeters on the brink of disaster. A white woman, of Afrikaner origin, risked her life so that we may know, and bring to justice, this assassin. The cold blooded murder of Chris Hani has sent shock waves throughout the country and the world. Our grief and anger is tearing us apart. What has happened is a national tragedy that has touched millions of people, across the political and colour divide…. Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for: the freedom of all of us.[31]

It is my contention here that in 'The Bloody Miracle' Mandela's address became a moment in which rationality and order was deemed to triumph over chaos and uncertainty. From this moment on, the ANC was faced with several challenges posed by white and Zulu nationalists largely in the form of apartheid South Africa's military, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Once the ANC (presented as a homogenous body in this film) and Mandela had disciplined the people of South Africa after Hani's assassination, their triumphal march had become sealed.

[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.

As Scott has explained, through this romanticised lens the biography holds "special significance as a literary form". It allows for "the figuring of a certain kind of individuality: a man of action and achievement, of wisdom, courage, endurance, compassion, self-sacrifice, a man of both genius and virtue whose life could be thought of as exemplary and which in consequence could be deployed for didactic and inspirational purposes."[32] Here then, we have another possible version of what Ciraj Rassool has referred to as the reciprocal construction of individual lives, through which the death of Hani signalled the confirmation of Mandela's becoming as the 'great man' of history.[33] It follows that through this lens the assassination of Hani was a liberatory moment through which the ANC under Mandela's leadership was affirmed as the guarantors of freedom and democracy. In short, Hani's death signalled the becoming of Mandela as 'great man' of history and became emblematic of the liberation of South Africa from apartheid and of a 'new' nation that had 'progressed' beyond the types of violence that had made Hani's death possible. Hani's dead body and death (as emblematic of all the anti-apartheid dead) founded the new nation, triumphantly, in blood.

Read through the frame of 'The Bloody Miracle', the eventfulness of Hani's assassination marked the beginning of a process through which the impossible was made possible. But what type of South Africa did Hani die for? In 'The Bloody Miracle', we find a version of a 'new' nation akin to the rainbow and the reconciliatory message usually associated with the TRC, in which all South Africans, including old enemies, lived in a reconciled society. Perhaps one of the most striking aspects of this film, was its commitment to allowing all voices to be heard. Although accounts from leaders of the ANC/SACP alliance certainly

[32] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 71.
[33] Ciraj Rassool, 'Rethinking Documentary History and South African Political Biography'.

dominated, there was a staggering array of other voices that, on the one hand, troubled tired binaries between 'good' and 'evil', victim and perpetrator. At the same time, the film had a tendency to flatten the distinction between those involved in the struggle against apartheid, and those who had propped up white minority rule and apartheid.

Voices from the 'other side' included the notorious apartheid hit squad leader Eugene de Kock, or 'Prime Evil', Daluxolo Luthuli, an IFP leader who provided details about IFP attacks committed on civilians and ANC members during the early 1990s, General Constand Viljoen, a former South African Defence Force Commander and leader of the Volksfront, a far-right Afrikaner organisation which was opposed to democracy and negotiations, and Nico Prinsloo, a commander of the AWB who had expressed his indifference on hearing the news of the assassination of the 'terrorist', Chris Hani.

Not surprisingly, former apartheid President F.W. de Klerk did not appear in this list. Rather, his accounting of this period appeared alongside those of the leaders of the alliance and was framed as the comments of a leader committed to the official end of apartheid, not as one complicit in its violence and who had served successive National Party governments throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. But perhaps the most significant inclusion was that of Annalise Wolfaardt, the daughter of another AWB commander, Alwyn Wolfaardt, who had been killed by Bophuthatswana police during a failed coup attempt by the AWB in the former homeland.

In the second half of the film Wolfaardt offered a biographical account of her father: "a mechanic in Naboomspruit, a big-hearted man, a family man, loved animals, wanted to be a farmer but unfortunately never got to that. Funny, very naughty sense of humour, liked to play pranks on other people. That's the kind of man he was."[34] Amid a visual backdrop of live footage of Wolfaardt's death, Annalise then went onto give an account of hearing the news of the event:

> We were watching the news, and I saw them. I saw my father, and I started screaming. And I told her [her mother] that that was my father. And she said we have to make sure first. We can't become all hysterical and not know. So she was on the phone to the AWB, asking them, "is that my husband?" And I was in their room on the bed. I was just crying because I knew it was him.[35]

Wolfaardt's account of her father's death was a moving one meant to persuade the viewer to empathise with or, at the very least, attempt to understand the position of Alwyn Wolfaardt who, in this instance, was innocently framed as a man who thought "that he could help his people" – the Afrikaner people, Annalise told us – by joining the AWB.[36] Although accounts from victims of AWB violence in Bophuthatswana were included in the film, Annalise Wolfaardt's account had the effect of reconfiguring Alwyn Wolfaardt as a victim of violence rather than a perpetrator. Along a similar vein, one could not help but notice the ways in which 'The Bloody Miracle' had set up a comparison between the death of Chris Hani and the death of Alwyn Wolfaardt. Earlier in the film, Lindiwe Hani had offered a similar account of her father's assassination, which is now important to account here in full:

> On the 10th of April, 1993, I was twelve years old. It was now night time. I think we got there around seven. And we were seeing so many Black faces, lined on the streets. Singing. Singing. They were not doing anything else. They

[34] '1994: The Bloody Miracle – Part One'.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.

> were not shouting, they were not screaming, they were not… not even [doing the] *toyi toyi*. Just singing, so solemnly and sad. And I remember, as we drove up our driveway, I remember looking down to my right and seeing blood, and someone taking me quickly away.
>
> Never mind Chris Hani the leader. They killed my father. I was searching for him. I remember taking one of his jersey's, and just holding it and his tracksuit, and just sleeping with one of his tops. I was trying to hold onto his smell.[37]

Here we have two women, one white and one black, recounting their memories of their fathers' violent deaths during the transition from apartheid to democracy. Two beds, two girls crying.[38] The comparison that 'The Bloody Miracle' set up was indeed striking. What was more striking however, was the message that this apparently intended comparison invoked: that the 'bloody miracle' gave rise to a reconciled South Africa in which all had an equal voice, that all in a sense were victims of apartheid's violence, and all now enjoyed the same freedoms. This message was cemented in the final scenes of the film, which was accompanied by a reworking of the song 'Weeping' performed by Bright Blue,[39] and ended with a series of shots of the film's interlocutors at the time of filming: Lindiwe Hani swimming in a pool; a female victim of IFP violence tending to her livestock in a rural setting; another victim (this time of the attack by the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the military wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress, on St James Church) playing with her dog; Prinsloo bizarrely still dressed in the uniform of the AWB and flying the AWB swastika whilst riding a horse; Luthuli (perhaps born again) taking part in a church service amid a lively congregation; another former apartheid general surveying his land while in

[37] Ibid.
[38] In Lindiwe Hani's memoir, *Being Chris Hani's daughter*, she provided a similar account of sleeping in bed with her father's tracksuit and feeling like their "house was now a tomb, a prison of pain". See. Lindiwe Hani and M. Ferguson, *Being Chris Hani's Daughter,* 65.
[39] The chorus of this song includes the following lyrics: "It doesn't matter now, it's over anyhow".

conversation with a black man; Mangosuthu Buthelezi, still leader of the IFP, taking part in a peaceful march with his supporters; Annalise Wolfaardt embracing whom we presume is her female partner; De Kock in prison smiling and laughing for the camera; and finally, the old retired general, Viljoen, walking into the distance on his farm, wearing the typical two-tone uniform of farmers, which had replaced the uniform of the soldier.

Tragic times

If biographical accounts of the life of Hani (and that of Mandela) and the narrative of the transition from apartheid to democracy have been grounded by the modern romance, Hani's biography has also been tinged with more than a hint of tragedy. Another rendition of this tragic rendering of Hani's assassination was that developed by journalist, Evelyn Groenink, of the assassinations of Dulcie September, Anton Lubowski and Hani. In her book, *Incorruptible,* which largely focused on the assassination of September, Groenink revealed an elaborate and sometimes fantastical story of corruption, clandestine assassination squads at the personal behest of apartheid politicians and foreign governments, dodgy arms deals, and nuclear cover-ups.

Like Scott's interpretation of the modern romance, *Incorruptible* was shaped like a quest, but largely with tragic endings. Groenink, a fearless investigator, who had worked for many years with the Dutch Anti-Apartheids Beweging Nederland (AABN), took on a thankless task of finding Dulcie September's killers. Even the TRC, according to Groenink, had been

reluctant to uncover the truth. Therefore, she had a duty to "expose the death squads… because they seem[ed] to be getting away with impunity."[40]

From there, she embarked on an epic journey to find the killers. On many occasions she came across evidence to suggest the involvement of the apartheid government, the French and British Secret Services, Mossad, and members of the ANC, but somewhat tragically could never find conclusive proof. Her adversaries were always out of reach. One of the most significant aspects of *Incorruptible* was Groenink's re-interpretation of Hani's assassination, which included the possibility of two gunmen, what she saw as unreliable witnesses, and unfaithful - even complicit - anti-apartheid activists and friends of Hani. However, that one piece of forensic evidence that might have proven a conspiracy to kill Hani, as well as September and Lubowski, always eluded her.

I am sympathetic to Groenink's motives and to this reading as tragedy, as many would be hard pressed to argue that the deaths of Hani, September, Lubowski, and Nomakhwezi Hani were not tragic. Yet, it is important to recognise that this characterisation is not self-evident and given in advance. Tragic events, like their romantic counterparts, are produced and reflect different notions of what it means to navigate postapartheid society. Through this mode of emplotment, Hani has served as a conduit through which frustration at and criticism of the lack of transformation in postapartheid South Africa have been addressed by people, including Groenink. These frustrations have been expressed in many ways in the public domain, in which certain questions have recurred. Who killed Chris Hani? What would Hani

[40] Evelyn Groenink, *Incorruptible: The story of the murders of Dulcie September, Anton Lubowski and Chris Hani* (Self Published by Evelyn Groenink, 2018), 13.

do? What would Hani say? Would we have been like Chris Hani, and if Hani had survived that day in 1993 and become the next President after Mandela as many had predicted, South Africa would have become a completely different country. In this regard, Hani has served to function in South Africa in a way similar to Herbert Chitepo in Zimbabwe,[41] as an incorruptible figure, a martyr who in life spoke truth to power, and in death symbolised the type of politics, ethics and morals that, according to this reading, were missing in society. Indeed, across southern Africa it seems that the 'political ancestors' of different liberation struggles, have served to both buttress and challenge different and contested notions of past, present, and future struggles, and the different governments which gained political power 'after' those struggles.

Following Luise White, these types of narratives, which have often been accompanied by rumour and myth, point toward the ways in which people speak about and "participate in the civil societies that manage them", and might teach us about what it means to live on in the wake of apartheid in a way that triumphalist narratives ever can.[42] For it is clear that despite having a TRC hearing and report, an apparently complete account of Hani's assassination, and numerous interviews, articles, and biographies about Hani, there appears to be something left unsaid about his legacy and assassination and the transition to democracy. One way of putting this is to say that Hani as tragic figure speaks to the unfinished business of apartheid and attests to the desires and visions of a future free from its inheritance: xenophobia, racism, social, systemic and institutional violence, poverty and inequality.

[41] Luise White, *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo.*
[42] Ibid. 61.

Like White, I have been less interested in uncovering the 'truth' behind these narratives, as I have thought through the reasons why there is a persistent return to them. As we saw before, Scott's reading of the postcolonial suggests that one reason for this is that it reflects the 'tragic times' that we now inhabit:

> This, however, is not merely because our world is assailed by one moral and social catastrophe after another. It is rather because, in Hamlet's memorable phrase, our time is ''out of joint.'' The old languages of moral-political vision and hope are no longer in sync with the world they were meant to describe and normatively criticize. The result is that our time is suffering from what Raymond Williams (in his discussion of modern tragedy) aptly described as ''the loss of hope; the slowly settling loss of any acceptable future."[43]

As argued previously South African society cannot be described as one in which the longing for 'total revolution' has dissipated entirely. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that living on in the wake of apartheid traverses many of the same questions and experiences highlighted by Scott. I have already addressed what Scott referred to as the 'stalled present' of postcolonial and postsocialist worlds. For now, my concern pertains to the ways in which Scott has employed the tragic as a means through which to challenge the certainty of the romantic mode of emplotment, and the types of teleological histories inaugurated by them. For it is also clear that there are many parallels between Scott's rendering of the tragic, Lundborg's use of the pure event, and Jenny Edkins' distinction between state time and trauma time. In short, all point toward the contingent, aleatory, and precarious character of historical change and human action, one that highlights a different way of thinking and writing history.

[43] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 2.

Echoing Lundborg and Wynter, the point for Scott is not whether the romantic mode of emplotment represents a 'false consciousness'. After all, the modern romance served different anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements as an important means through which to mobilise support and "inspire the masses".[44] In the first edition of *The Black Jacobins*, James's rendering of Toussiant Louverture fashioned a heroic figure who elevated the status of the Haitian revolutionary and challenged the Eurocentric view of the slave.[45] In James's rendering, Toussiant, and in some ways, all Haitian revolutionaries, stood out as the first modern subject, a subject of history, whose actions sought to inspire, and warn against "the great danger to any revolutionary process" of "elitism and high-handedness, and… the bureaucratisation and sclerosis that can overtake and undermine revolutionary energies."[46]

As we have already seen, the mythologisation of Hani during the anti-apartheid struggle served the ANC and its allies in a similar way. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suggest that this romantic vision of struggle against apartheid inspired and motivated Hani himself. After all, Hani's love for nineteenth and twentieth century classics seemingly inspired his ideas about political struggle and revolution, and perhaps motivated him to dedicate his life to armed struggle and what he must have seen at times as the heroic overthrow of apartheid. It also, perhaps, influenced his ideas about the emergence of a new man who was seen as having the potential to create new worlds free from apartheid and from colonialism.

[44] Ibid. 74.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.74.

The two-stage theory of revolution, one that proclaimed the *certain* destruction of apartheid and the *inevitable* withering away of racial capitalism after that, also served well to reconcile Marxists and African nationalists within the ANC/SACP alliance during the anti-apartheid struggle. As a result, it enabled that Alliance to mobilise a broad base of support particularly after its unbanning in the 1990s. In line with Scott, I would argue that the romantic style has had a tendency to produce a teleological, patriarchal, and vanguardist notion of history and human action that has marginalised or silenced the agency of women in particular and the 'masses' more generally, as well as everyday struggles. And yet, during the anti-apartheid struggle, the romantic mode of emplotment also had a liberatory and potentially re/humanising effect.

Scott referred to this as the 'problem space' of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. It represented a social, political and historical paradigm within which those dedicated to such struggles navigated and acted. For Scott, the point was not to critique or challenge the ways in which James had rendered Toussaint, but to suggest that in these 'dark times', what we needed were new questions and concepts that moved beyond the frames and imaginaries that had galvanised anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. These needed to be questions and concepts, Scott explained, that no longer held the same relevance as before. He argued that one way of doing this, was to abide by a tragic reading of historical change and human action, one that challenged the romantic idea of autonomous human subjects making history as they pleased, and a romanticised idea about the struggle against apartheid and its supposed end. As he poignantly puts it in his reading of the second edition of *The Black Jacobins*, which had been altered to reflect James's increasing sensitivity to the tragic:

> [tragedy] oblige[s] us to adopt a certain scepticism to what has gone before and a certain caution in how we judge the remainder of the story to come…. In [it]… the progressive rhythm of Romance is interrupted… [past, present and future] do not line up neatly as though history were heading somewhere; from bondage to freedom, from despair to triumph… [I]f the past is a wound, it is one that may not heal; it cannot be evaded or clearly overcome. It doesn't go away by an act of heroic agency… the future does not grow triumphantly out of the wicked turmoil of the past.[47]

In other words, "tragedy has a less sanguine teaching to offer".[48] It reminds us to attend to history's contingent and aleatory character, and to refuse, both, "a complacent acquiescence to the totalizing languages of modern reason", and "the fantasy of an exit or escape from the modern conditions that have contributed definitively… to making us who we are".[49] For Scott, there was no escape from colonialism or the Enlightenment. Following Foucault, if we are "historically determined by the Enlightenment", as we are by apartheid, "it remains unavoidably, one of the conditions of the analysis of ourselves."[50] No amount of eschatological premonitions or prophesies will make history leap from apartheid and racial capitalism, to a future free from it. What we need instead, are new concepts, new ways of thinking and writing history, through which to anticipate and imagine other futures. In the process, Scott suggested, we might begin to come to terms with the aftermaths of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles and the 'stalled present' of postcolonial worlds, stalled presents that had left pasts behind that no longer felt quite as liberatory.

[47] Ibid. 166.
[48] Ibid. 135.
[49] Ibid. 189.
[50] Ibid. 179.

Tragedy at its limit

It is Hani's assassination that appears as one of the clearest example in South African historiography of the tragic event, the rupture that ultimately resulted in something new, or inversely, as what Slavoj Žižek refers to as the 'pure' Christian Fall: "the starting point which creates the conditions for Salvation in the first place."[51] This reading by Žižek points to the ways the Romanticised narrative of struggle, sacrifice, and redemption in particular, shares certain characteristics with a Christian eschatology. This in turn reaffirms the idea that Hani's death, sacrifice and in this case martyrdom created the conditions through which the 'new' or reborn nation would be realised.

The reality though, is that apartheid was not an event that arrived in 1948 and departed in 1994. Apartheid was a biopolitical structure of domination that had its roots in British colonialism, and did not simply 'end' with the inauguration of democracy and after Hani's 'fall'. To understand the assassination of Hani as an event that ushered in the 'end' of apartheid and the 'beginning' of a 'new' (or reborn) nation free from it, is then counter-intuitive. Instead, we might think this event as illustrative of a regime of violence that penetrated all levels of society and made the assassination of Hani possible. And this for Scott is the essence of tragedy. Not that a tragic event is reminiscent of Christ's Fall, but that the tragic figure's circumstances and actions lead irrevocably to his or her catastrophe. According to Scott's reading of the tragic, Hani was not destined to die at the hands of Waluś over Easter weekend in 1993. However, his circumstances and actions, which had been

[51] Slavoj Žižek, *Event* (London: Penguin Books, 2014): 44.

driven by what most commentators describe as an unmoving commitment to the ending of oppression, inequality, and racism in southern Africa, certainly made his assassination possible. In Scott's words, the tragic figure "could not have chosen otherwise",[52] and it was perhaps, as Groenink has argued, Hani's incorruptible character that led to his assassination. This, we might say, was in itself a tragedy.

There is, however, another lesson that tragedy potentially teaches us: that events often "unfold in such a way that they cannot be altered by the thought, will, or action of the very actors who initiated them." In other words, and as Adam Sitze has put it when discussing what he called the 'Tumult Commissions' of 20th Century South Africa, tragedy can be "a fatalistic discourse that functions to establish insuperable limits to the possibility of determining human responsibility for grievous actions."[53] Through this particular reading, to render Hani's assassination as a tragic event could be to render his assassin, Waluś, as an actor who could not have chosen otherwise, and as a result, could not have been responsible for his actions. This was of course, not how Waluś and his co-conspirator Clive Derby-Lewis were understood by South Africa's TRC, or the Supreme Court which had initially sentenced them to the death penalty after their request for amnesty had been rejected by the TRC. Nor is it to suggest that Scott's deployment of the tragic is comparable to the above. To be sure, Scott's rendering is meant to work against these types of fatalistic narratives, and to reinvigorate our sense of time and history as uncertain, open to the future rather than reeling

[52] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 155.
[53] Adam Sitze, *The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 166.

in the 'stalled present' of the postcolonial world. This suggests that the distinction Scott drew between romantic and tragic modes of emplotment, is not always an easy one to maintain.

Indeed, 'The Bloody Miracle' and *Incorruptible* invoke both forms. Pravin Gordhan's foreword to *Incorruptible* frames Groenink's quest in terms of the modern romance rather than the tragedy:

> This book shows us that what divides right from wrong is mainly ethical. Dulcie September, Anton Lubowski and Chris Hani were comrades and activists who put their people and their country first. They stood for what was right. They sacrificed for the democratic ideals of millions of South Africans. We see the same divisions and dynamics of right and wrong today. This book should be read so that we can, once again, be inspired by their lives and sacrifices and unite in a new national momentum to renew our commitment to a truly democratic, non-racial, non-sexist South Africa.[54]

'The Bloody Miracle', too, moves between romantic and tragic modes of emplotment. On the one hand, it renders Hani's assassination as inaugurating a 'new' nation that has triumphantly defeated apartheid. On the other hand, it renders all as victims of what often appears an abstract violence. As such all, including Alwyn Wolfaardt, are tragically framed as being unable to alter their actions under the weight of systemic violence.

One of the other concerns of this chapter has been to demonstrate how the becoming of the assassination of Hani as historical event, is variously tied up with the becoming of Mandela as 'great man' of history, the becoming of the 'rainbow nation', of the transitional period more generally, and of the TRC as institution geared toward reconciliation. Adam Sitze's intervention also seems to have important implications here for thinking through the TRC as

[54] Pravin Gordhan, 'Foreword', in Evelyn Groenink, *Incorruptible*, vii.

institution of reconciliation on the one hand, or, as Rousseau has argued, as a much more contested, fractious and divided institution, on the other. This contest over the TRC is much too large a debate to elaborate here. However, the tension between romantic and tragic modes of emplotment, might further complicate the ways in which we frame and interpret the TRC. It also seems that these complications trouble the ways in which the 'truth' of Hani's assassination, and conspiracies that continue to surround his death, come back to haunt the transitional period to democracy.

With these debates in mind (and ahead), I want to 'end' with Scott's brief rendering of the comedy in *Conscripts of Modernity*, which as Sitze suggests, might be the more appropriate mode of emplotment when thinking through the legacy of the TRC and the transitional period to democracy:

> In Comedy, hope is held out for the temporary triumph of man over his world by the prospect of occasional reconciliations of the forces at play in the social and natural worlds. Such reconciliations are symbolized in the festive occasions which the Comic writer traditionally uses to terminate his dramatic accounts of change and transformation.[55]

Fragments, the lost event and the blur of history

It seems clear that the 'truth' of Hani's assassination in 'The Bloody Miracle' served to produce a vision of a reconciled South Africa, one that was tied up with a specific rendering or interpretation of the TRC. As we have seen, this was an interpretation that viewed the TRC as an institution geared toward reconciliation, and the transition to democracy as a reconciliatory moment or employed as such by the postapartheid state. As Nicky Rousseau

[55] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 47.

has convincingly demonstrated, this interpretation is not an entirely accurate one.[56] However, it seems that, in 'The Bloody Miracle', this idea of the TRC was made to produce a specific iteration of the assassination of Hani as it pertained to, for want of a better word, the becoming of the 'rainbow nation'. In short, this narrative, at least the version of it developed in 'The Bloody Miracle', was one that proclaimed that Hani died so that all, including Viljoen and Prinsloo, could be free and reconciled with the past.

Yet even Mandela's speech was troubled by the archive of the anti-apartheid struggle. On 14 April 1993, a day after his famous address highlighted earlier, *The Citizen* reported that

> Mr Mandela was booed at a meeting in Soweto when he upset many in a crowd of around 30000 people with a friendly reference to the ruling National Party. The largely youthful crowd – many of whom accuse the government of complicity in the murder of Mr Hani – took exception when Mr Mandela said he had received sympathy messages from people in the National Party, among others…. "I understand your anger", Mr Mandela told the crowd in an attempt to pacify them. "There is no party that has been more responsible for your pain than the National Party." But he added, "We don't want to think about the past, we want to think about the present and the future." The crowed fell into sullen silence when he urged young people to turn their enemies into friends to build the new South Africa…. One of the biggest cheers of the two-hour event came when Mr Clarence Makwetu, leader of the radical Pan Africanist Congress, whose armed wing is accused of killing white civilians, strode into the packed stadium in the middle of Mandela's speech. Mr Mandela was forced to pause as the crowd cheered and whistled for a beaming Mr Makwetu who told them: "We have come to a time when leaders run out of words." The crowd rose to him and set off thunder crackers, while some ANC officials on the platform looked dismayed. A crowd of some 2000 people later broke away from the stadium, moving off in the direction of Protea Police Station…. The militant mood of the crowed was underlined by simulated gun play in the stands, exploding firecrackers and placards such as "De Klerk must be assassinated for Hani's death", and "All Polish must go back to Poland or else."[57]

[56] Nicky Rousseau, 'Itineraries', 143.
[57] 'Mandela Booed at Rally', *The Citizen*, 13 April 1993 (Ronald Kasrils Papers, WHP, University of the Witwatersrand, AG2543).

Despite its momentary character, this event, as encountered in an archival collection, points toward a more heterogeneous and ambiguous time, one that troubles assumptions produced by 'The Bloody Miracle' and by the BBC about historical 'truth', transition, and the primacy of the 'great man' as agent of history. I want to examine what this encounter with the archive, and the type of event that it signals, does to the historical record, and our sense of history as progress, succession and romance or as aleatory, contingent and tragic.

Lundborg has referred to this type of fragment, as found in the Kasrils papers, as a lost event: "those events that have been excluded from historical consciousness and historical representation; … [that] belong to the forgotten meanings of concepts and ideas, which now haunt our most well-established understandings of history and society."[58] In short, this type of fragment, according to Lundborg, has the potential to arrest history and time, and points to a much more contested, ambiguous and uncertain encounter with history.

Such fragments function in a similar way to photographs, especially, following Patricia Hayes, those that have previously been unseen, undeveloped and unexposed to light. Earlier, I drew from Hayes's work on political funerals in order to think through the politics of dead bodies in South Africa. However, her chief concern in 'Political Funerals in South Africa', was with what she called the "rejects of anti-apartheid photography"[59] and the ways in which these photographs "might heighten our understandings of the unspectacular and the

[58] Tom Lundborg, *The Politics of the Event*, 98.
[59] Patricia Hayes, 'Political Funerals in South Africa', 8.

everyday"[60], and most importantly for this study, might "unsettle the established temporal sense of a linear chronology of the struggle."[61] As she put it:

> As undeveloped images, do they constitute a kind of historical unconscious of apartheid? As the unseen, are they the unlived of history?" …[Are] these then unable to effect any opening of history? Or are they half-opened, still incubating? Are they … photographs 'at the edge of sight', a product of an intense desire but a failure to see?[62]

Although not centered on the photograph or on visual history, much of my thinking around the archival fragment and historical event, draws from Hayes's provocations about history, time, and temporality. Similarly, to Hayes's reading of 'reject photographs', I see 'lost events' as a critical mode through which to disrupt our sense of life lived and as opening history to new questions about truth and historical change. What, for example, does a largely 'unseen' event like the one that occurred at the Soweto stadium a day after Mandela's famous address to the nation, do to our understanding of historical chronologies and our sense of history as succession and as guaranteed in advance? And what does the historiographical gesture, the act of churning the soil of historical consciousness, do to our ideas about historical production and about past, present, and future struggle?

As seen in the first chapter, one of the points for Hayes is simply, that political funerals (and the anti-apartheid struggle more generally) were contested, protean spaces through which competing ideas about political struggle and our relationships with the dead manifested. However, it seems that just as important are the ways in which these types of photographs

[60] Ibid. 9.
[61] Ibid. 10.
[62] Ibid. 9. Hayes draws upon the ideas of Elizabeth Edwards and Shawn Michelle Smith.

and events put the world into motion and position the historian as political and ethical subject, someone who, Didi-Huberman has argued, must not shy away from the horrors of history, of Auschwitz, of colonialism, apartheid, and indeed of the anti-apartheid struggle.[63] In short, a historian who holds history to account, is attuned to the "unavoidable tragedy of human culture".[64] Such a historian is ethically obliged to churn up the ghosts of the anti-apartheid struggle and to gesture towards past, present and future struggles.

[63] Georges Didi-Huberman, *Images in spite of all: Four photographs from Auschwitz* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3.
[64] George Didi-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 307.

FOCO: LANDAU, 'SPEAR', P119.
DISCIPLINE: LANDAU, 'SPEAR', P122.
MAMRE CAMP, CT: MILITARY/BODILY DISCIPLINE: LANDAU, 'SPEAR', P202.

LOWY - ON LUXEMBURG: CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AS PRODUCT OF THE PRACTICE OF STRUGGLE. OPPOSED TO LENIN WHO ARGUED THAT IT NEEDED TO BE INSERTED FROM OUTSIDE, BYT INTELLECTUALS AND THEORISTS, P 78. (ALSO SEE LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSC (P79 OF LOWY).

Chapter Four

'Discipline is the mother of victory': Chris Hani, the (un)disciplined cadre

> [We] are living in a time of extreme paranoia and factionalism. I attended a prayer service on the 5th of April… to pray for our country. I was later informed… that I belonged to a faction that is against the Presidency…. Honorary President [Jacob Zuma] and comrades, I do not belong to a faction. I'm a member of the ANC and there's only one ANC. I refuse to play into the hands of those who ask, 'What would Chris say today?' I cannot answer that question. What I do know is Chris was a loyal, disciplined and responsible cadre.[1]

> We won elections in 1994, and our goal was to use State power to transform our country and to transform the conditions of our people for the better. But if we speak the truth, what has happened? The opposite has happened. We have been captured by State power, behind it big corporate interests, and led to the emergence of this phenomenon that we call State capture. We have to undo that …. I can see YCM [Young Communist Movement] is intensifying political education. It's very good; do so. Because what we need in the name of Chris Hani is a new cadre in our movement, who must treat deployment as service to the people, and not an opportunity for personal accumulation. We need a new cadre, and most of those new cadres will come from the youth. That's why we need a strong, radical, militant, progressive youth alliance, but also older cadres like ourselves …. Some of the older cadres also must become new cadres, as well. All of us. In honour and in memory of Comrade Chris Hani and Mama Winnie.[2]

This chapter is concerned with the disciplined cadre and the disciplining of the cadre. It takes its cue from a 1986 issue of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) journal, *Dawn* which Chris Hani contributed to. However, it begins with and expands upon the two extracts from speeches cited above. In the first, uttered as part of her Hani Memorial speech delivered in 2017,

[1] Limpho Hani (2017) quoted in Sarah Evans 'Hani Memorial: SACP Booed, Zuma Praised, And Limpho Hani Takes A Swipe At Anti-Zuma Protesters', *The Huffington Post* http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/04/10/hani-memorial-sacp-booed-zuma-praised-and-limpho-hani-takes-a_a_22033602/.
[2] Speech by Blade Nzimande at the 2018 Hani Memorial at which I was present. Nzimande's full speech can be accessed online: 'Blade Nzimande remembers Chris Hani.' *SABC News*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=owkaD9x16R4.

Limpho Hani denied any accusation of factionalism under the Zuma administration by referring to her late husband as "a loyal, disciplined and responsible cadre". In the second, delivered the following year, in 2018, Blade Nzimande, then newly appointed Minister of Transport under President Ramaphosa and General Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), invoked Hani's revolutionary legacy, alongside that of Winnie Mandela, to call upon the SACP to become cadres of a new type and to intensify the struggle against state capture and corruption.

Each speech was delivered at a time when the leadership of the ANC had come under increasing pressure from its political rivals, from South African society more broadly and from within the Tripartite Alliance itself. It would therefore be easy to draw a line between the invocation of Hani as loyal, disciplined cadre, and what Stephen Davis has referred to as the production of "didactic lesson books for dutiful students of the struggle that the state hopes to discipline."[3] As previously demonstrated, Hani remains a model of emulation in postapartheid South Africa, both within ANC and SACP circles and for those who call on Hani to critique, judge and denounce the ANC's postapartheid project. In this chapter though, I am less concerned with how Hani's legacy is employed today, than I am interested in the complex and contested histories that these speeches point toward, and the ways in which the disciplined cadre, and Hani as disciplined cadre par excellence was deployed during the Tripartite Alliance's anti-apartheid struggle. These contestations concern histories of

[3] Daniel Herwitz, 'Heritage and Legacy in the South African State and University', 41; Stephen Davis, 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters: Everyday life in the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe (1961-present)' (PhD Thesis: University of Florida, 2010), 11.

factionalism, of vanguardism and elitism, but also of comradeship, immense personal sacrifice and genuine commitment to the revolutionary overthrow of the apartheid regime.[4]

I will begin to address this concern through a close reading of the above-mentioned 1986 issue of *Dawn*, as well as other archival sources, particularly the Hani Memorandum and the lectures of Jack Simons which had been prepared for the political education of MK combatants during the exile period. Like the speeches of Limpho Hani and Blade Nzimande, *Dawn* and the Hani Memorandum were published at times of political crisis, arising from, among other things, ongoing tensions regarding the 'correct revolutionary positions', and the ever-present desire on the part of the rank-and-file to take the struggle home to South Africa. Like Nzimande's 2018 speech, these two documents also stressed the need for MK's rank-and-file to become cadres of a new type and to intensify the armed struggle, at those times, against the apartheid state. It seems, then, that when read together, the concerns expressed in The Hani Memorandum and *Dawn* make their reappearance in the Hani Memorial speeches, especially that by Nzimande. His semantic gestures seemed to have the effect of channelling the words of Hani and the discourses of political struggle and revolution in a way that reminds me of Aby Warburg's pathosformeln, or what Georges Didi-Huberman has described as "the survival of gestures throughout the duration of human cultures."[5] But how might we read these gestures which continue to call forth, and, some might argue, perform 'the revolution' and the becoming of a new disciplined cadre, a new man? And how might a historical reading of these gestures allow us to think with the complicated and contested

[4] One of the reasons for this approach is to avoid an analysis that simplifies and flattens the complex and contested histories imbedded within these speeches. I am not accusing of the two authors cited above of this, however. Davis in particular offers an invaluable, alternative history of the Tripartite Alliance's anti-apartheid struggle.
[5] Georges Did-Huberman, *Uprisings* (Gallimard: Jeu de Paume, 2016), 302.

histories and political tendencies in exile politics, and the ways in which these might manifest themselves today?

'The Demand of the Time', armed struggle and Kabwe: An unsettled perspective

In his article, 'The Demand of the Time', published in one of two 1986 editions of *Dawn*, Chris Hani addressed MK in preparation for "the escalation of armed struggle" in South Africa.[6] For him, conditions inside the country had never been more suitable for the military overthrow of the apartheid regime. The people were rising up in revolt and, for him, it was MK's responsibility to further render "the country ungovernable and the system of apartheid unworkable." Therefore, he argued, cadres "must be literally ready to walk, if necessary for hundreds of kilometres" to their country in order to contribute to, and ultimately lead the armed struggle against apartheid.[7]

To do this MK needed to prepare fully, both physically and mentally, and to eradicate "unfortunate examples" of the "frivolous requirements of life" which had been inherited "from the system of oppression". Instead of betraying the "trust given to them", Hani urged cadres to maintain a "high spirit of discipline, commitment, and revolutionary zeal", to foster a deep "love and respect for the people", sharpen their "hatred for the enemy", and in the process "become cadres, fighters and revolutionaries of a new type".[8] This was the demand of the time, and for Hani this required a special kind of revolutionary, one who, if committed

[6] Chris Hani, 'The Demand of Time: Chris Hani, the Deputy Commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe addresses the army', *Dawn*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1986), 3. According to Gregory Houston and James Ngculu, this article was a reproduction of Hani's address to cadres in Angola during the Mkatashinga mutiny. See: Gregory Houston and James Ngculu, *Chris Hani: Voices of Liberation* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2014), 161.
[7] Chris Hani, 'The Demand of Time', 4.
[8] Ibid. 4-6.

to what he elsewhere called the "correct positions", could help to bring about a new society free from apartheid.[9]

'The Demand of the Time' was accompanied by a rich array of articles that cemented Hani's position. These included an editorial, 'Apartheid in Crisis', which called for the destruction of apartheid not its reform; an article, 'MK Soldiers Viewpoint – Cadre of a new type' by Muntu Khoza; a history and diagnostic of the 'the most successful rifle [the AK47] ever designed'; a useful point-by-point guide to sabotaging railroads and communication lines in South Africa; a short story about resistance in Johannesburg by Mongane Serote; and articles on the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) and the ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) in Algeria, the 'first known explosion' of MK in 1961, as well as rural struggles in the Northern Cape.

Dawn began though, with a call to arms and, presented on its front cover, an archetypal photographic image of guerrilla fighters. In the foreground of this photograph, two soldiers appeared to be waiting, crouched in cover. One, clothed in the iconic uniform of the revolutionary, held what looked like an AK47. The other, camouflaged and barely visible, crouched behind with a long-barrelled rifle. At first glance they appeared to be alone in the bush. But in the background the silhouette of at least one more cadre was visible. Although the provenance of this image is unknown at this stage, it seems that it was meant to depict the modern guerrilla – alert, trained, disciplined, and poised for action – who traced his or her

[9] Gregory Houston and James Ngculu, *Chris Hani: Voices of Liberation*, 234.

lineage back to some of the first anti-colonial resistors depicted in MK's emblem, and was perhaps used to invoke the famous 1967 Wankie campaign.



Figure 4: excerpts from *Dawn*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1986).



Figure 5: Front cover of *Dawn*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1986).

The timing of this edition of *Dawn* was important for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the mid-1980s marked the beginning of a new, post-Kabwe era during which the ANC and its allies escalated the struggle against apartheid. As Hani explained in 'The Demand of the Time', "1985 was a year of the biggest number of operations" in South Africa.[10] To be sure, MK's operations had "increased from around 50 in 1984 to 230 in 1986".[11] According to Gregory Houston, writing for the liberation history project, South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), there were two reasons for this increase. It was firstly a response to an increasingly violent apartheid security force, which only two days before the 1985 Kabwe Conference had carried out a cross-border raid in Botswana, killing "12 people, including civilians".[12] It was also a means of expressing support for widespread uprisings in South Africa which had, according to the ANC and other observers, begun to take on a revolutionary character.[13] From this perspective, then, we might understand Kabwe as a response to apartheid's 'Total War' strategy, and as the catalyst for the ANC/SACP's transition to a new stage of struggle, and *Dawn*, the official organ of MK, as an assertion of the new party line.[14]

[10] Chris Hani, 'The Demand of Time', 6.
[11] Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Clansmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014), 124.
[12] Gregory Houston, 'The ANC's Armed Struggle in the 1980s', *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*: *Vol. 4 (1980-1990)* (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 2010), 1094.
[13] For example, see: John S. Saul and Stephen Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1981); Colin Bundy, 'History, Revolution, and South Africa', *Transformation*, Vol. 4 (1987); Colin Bundy, 'Around Which Corner? Revolutionary Theory and Contemporary South Africa', *Transformation*, Vol. 8 (1989); and more broadly, Ben Turok, *Revolutionary Thought in the Twentieth Century* (London: Zed Press, 1980), 1.
[14] The other official organs of the ANC and its allies argued the same position. See: Comrade Mzala, 'On the Threshold of Revolution', in *The African Communist: The Fighting Youth of South Africa*, No. 102, Third Quarter (1985), http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/Acn10285.

Other accounts, such Davis' doctoral study, highlight a different history that culminated in one of the most controversial events in ANC history: the Mkatashinga mutiny. The prelude to the Mkatashinga mutiny began when the ANC was asked by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) to help "defend Malanje province [in central Angola] from a series of attacks by UNITA" which was funded and supported by the apartheid regime.[15] The ANC duly obliged and put Hani, Lennox Zuma, and Timothy Mokoena in charge of operations, which although initially a success, resulted in a high casualty rate and dissatisfaction within MK's ranks. This prompted MK's rank-and-file to demand in early 1984 that the ANC announce an "immediate halt to actions in Malanje province and … [to redeploy MK] against South African troops."[16]

What followed was a series of conflicts between MK's rank-and-file and the leadership of the ANC and its allies. These took the form of three separate mutinies of increasing intensity and violence, and after the Pango and Quibaxe mutinies which resulted in casualties on both sides, several executions and the torture and detention without trial of MK's rebels.[17] As Davis summarises, after years of ill-treatment by camp commanders and what from the rank-and-files' perspective amounted to a stalled and neglected armed struggle, "[s]uspicion and indiscipline rose in tandem and reached crescendo in the Mkatashinga mutiny in late 1983 and early 1984 where nearly ninety percent of cadres in the camps rebelled, executed a few camp leaders, were suppressed by loyalists and Angolan forces, and several faced summary executions."[18]

[15] Stephen Davis, 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters', 52.
[16] Ibid. 53.
[17] Ibid. 54.
[18] Ibid. 157.

In sharp contrast to ANC-oriented accounts such as that by SADET, which tend to frame the Mkatashinga mutiny as the result of apartheid state infiltrations and 'unfortunate' acts of indiscipline within an otherwise seamless transition to liberation, this alternative account suggests that these mutinies also stemmed from a longstanding, internal struggle between different political views within the alliance. In this alternative account, there was also a struggle between the leadership and the rank and file, whose members expressed an ever-present desire to take the struggle home to South Africa. It was the events of this mutiny that prompted the ANC to call their Second Consultative Conference in Kabwe in Zambia on 16 June 1985. As we will see, this was also exactly the kind of issue that had motivated Hani and his co-authors to pen the Hani Memorandum just fifteen years earlier, an event that resulted in the ANC's Third Consultative Conference at Morogoro, Tanzania.

For me, Hani's article, 'The Demand of the Time', and this edition of *Dawn* more broadly, sits ambiguously between these two contested and conflicting narratives. On the one hand, I read it as a piece of political rhetoric designed to inspire and to motivate, to improve the morale of MK cadres who were either stationed in one of MK's camps in exile or infiltrated underground in South Africa, and to cultivate 'sterling revolutionary fighters' in the mould of Hani himself and of the Wankie generation more generally. On the other, I read it as a vanguardist document, a propaganda piece, a discursive strategy designed to discipline the supposedly undisciplined cadre, and to maintain the limits of struggle and revolution in southern Africa. In short, calling on cadres to maintain discipline would have had as much to do with disciplining supposedly undisciplined cadres in Angola, as much to do with the

internal political struggle between the ANC and its allies, as it was about preparing for military combat in South Africa. Or, put another way, during this period the ANC and its allies were not simply looking South and preparing MK for combat in South Africa. They were also looking West to Angola.

I also situate Hani in a similar ambiguous position. After ANC President Oliver Tambo's failed attempt to discipline mutineers in early 1984, Hani was sent to negotiate with the mutineers, eventually persuading them to disarm.[19] Shortly after this, however, and in what perhaps amounted to a betrayal of the mutineers and of Hani's commitment to negotiations, "[t]he Committee of Ten [the rebels' leaders] was taken into custody, some [were] imprisoned in Nova Instalação, a notorious Luanda prison, while others were sent to prison camps at Pango and Quibaxe, where, two months later, another mutiny occurred, this time followed by several casualties and seven executions."[20]

Most ANC-aligned accounts of the Mkatashinga mutiny confirm this version of events, suggesting that Hani was the only leader who could bring rebelling cadres back to order. In a 1992 interview conducted by Hein Marais, Hani also spoke against the ANC's Security Department and its excesses following the mutinies, and empathised with the mutineers' position, particularly those placed in detention without trial, and of course those who had received summary executions.[21] However, there are also isolated accounts, such as that presented in a 1990 edition of *Searchlight South Africa*, where Hani was described as an

[19] Ibid. 53-54.
[20] Ibid. 54.
[21] Hein Marais, 'Hani opens up: Interview with Chris Hani', *Work in Progress*, Vol. 82 (May-June 1992), 18-20.

uncompromising and authoritarian leader who threatened to have the mutineers executed.[22] At other times, accusations of Hani's tribalism, mobilised in order to fuel his rivalry with another leading figure of MK, Joe Modise, depicted a leader embroiled in an internal, factionalist struggle, and perhaps, as Timothy Gibbs has suggested, a leader who himself had a tendency toward cultural chauvinism, intellectual elitism, and political patronage.[23] Perhaps most telling, however, was the account of the Douglas Commission, established by the ANC in the early 1990s to investigate potential human rights violations in exile, which concluded that "Hani was a leading figure in the reign of terror unleashed by the ANC/SACP on its members."[24]

One might also argue that in 'The Demand of the Time' – published two years after the mutinies but clearly still concerned with their potential return – Hani glossed over conflicts within the movement by choosing to focus on the "unfortunate examples of indiscipline" and urging MK's rank-and-file to rid themselves of the "frivolous requirements of life", such as associating with "unknown women" and "frequenting shebeens".[25] It is not so much the silencing within 'The Demand of the Time' that concerns me here. As a leader in the ANC/SACP alliance, it would have been important for Hani to attempt to publicly allay frustrations within the camps, even if privately he was "the most vocal critic" of the ANC Security Department and its methods.[26] Instead, what interests me are the striking similarities

[22] Bandile Ketelo, Amos Maxongo, Zamxolo Tshona, Ronnie Massango and Luvo Mbengo 'A Miscarriage of democracy: The ANC Security Department in the 1984 mutiny in UmKhonto we Sizwe', *Searchlight South Africa*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (No. 5), (July 1990), 44.
[23] Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid's First Bantustan* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014), 115-116. Another telling but uncorroborated account comes from Amin Cajee, *The Fordsburg Fighter: the journey of an MK volunteer* (Cape Town: Cover2Cover Books, 2016), 115.
[24] 'The Report of the Douglas Commission, 1993', (WHP, University of the Witwatersrand: A3318f).
[25] Chris Hani, 'The Demand of Time', 5.
[26] Hein Marais, 'Hani opens up'.

between the grievances of mutineers in the early 1980s and those expressed in the Hani Memorandum of 1969. This of course raises Hani's conflicting roles during each moment.

Without dismissing the validity of the above claims, it seems that an either/or approach, which wrestles with the 'Manichean problem' of good and evil (depicting Hani as either hero or villain) fails to give nuance to the realities of struggle, and the different subject positions that Hani found himself in over time. In other words, to merely reduce Hani to an ideological caricature, as, I argue *Dawn* and *Searchlight South Africa* have both done, fails to grasp the complexities of the anti-apartheid struggle as conducted by the ANC and its allies, and fails to do justice to the political subject. Here I will try to attend to these conflicting narratives, not as a means to reconcile the subject, the two Hanis ('good' and 'evil'), nor to sacrifice either Hani to what Frederick Jameson refers to as a dialectical impasse: a "conventional opposition, in which one turns out to be more defective than the other one", and through "which only one genuine opposite exists … [therefore sharing] the sorry fate of evil … reduced to mere reflection of its other."[27] Instead I intend to place these two Hanis – these two sides of struggle – into conversation with one another, and to treat them as "equally integral component[s]"[28] of the life and legacy of Hani, and indeed his biographical makeup.

I hope that from this perspective, that admits ambiguity and unsettlement, new light might be shed on how political documents, such as Hani's 'Demand of the Time', were employed to inspire and motivate MK's rank-and-file, but also to discipline, contain and orient the Alliance's struggle against apartheid. It is also from this perspective that we might begin to

[27] Frederick Jameson, *Valences of the Dialectic*, 19.
[28] Ibid. 20.

rethink the lives and times of Martin Thembisile 'Chris' Hani, and the political subject more generally. For it seems that although Hani is predominantly remembered as a disciplined cadre, a military hero, and dedicated revolutionary within the ANC/SACP alliance, his legacy might be more generatively understood as being tied up with a different type of struggle: a pluralistic one marked by complication, contestation, indiscipline, dissidence, and indeed doubt and uncertainty. In short, his is a legacy and history that is contingent, aleatory and therefore always already up for grabs.

Mythologising Hani and the disciplined cadre

In another edition of *Dawn*, one published to commemorate the 25th anniversary of MK, the military code of MK, established in the aftermath of the Kabwe conference, was outlined and discussed. Here some of the tenets of this military code were expressed:

> To defeat the enemy in combat our soldiers must be disciplined, trained to obey commands promptly, and ready to spring into battle immediately when ordered. Vigilance, alertness and readiness to engage the enemy at a moment's notice are qualities that can develop only out of discipline, proper training and political consciousness.
>
> Bourgeois and reactionary armies like the army forces of the racists, instil a mechanical and robot-like obedience in their units. The people's army has a different conception of discipline and loyalty. Umkhonto soldiers are volunteers, willing and trained to carry out orders in the knowledge that instant obedience is the only way to safeguard life, both of the individual and his comrades-in-arms and to protect the people whom he serves […].
>
> […] A soldier who breaks discipline, disobeys commands or by improper conduct betrays the high standards of our army will be punished. Such punishment is necessary to maintain the qualities expected of our people's army. Every attempt is made to correct bad behaviour and rehabilitate members who violate the army's code. But punishment is severe in cases of serious crimes, treachery and criminal neglect endangering the safety of others and the security of the army.
>
> Inner forms of discipline, arising from political maturity and consciousness of our struggle, are far more important and enduring than a discipline enforced

> from above. But a proud bearing, alertness and quick response to commands, a smart uniform, and respect of leadership, commanders and commissars are the hallmarks of a good soldier who is proud of his platoon, detachment and army.[29]

According to the above military code, the main advantage that MK cadres had over soldiers fighting for apartheid was that they were volunteers, conscious of their responsibility in liberating their people from apartheid. Unlike the "robot-like" soldiers of "bourgeois and reactionary forces", MK cadres were free-thinking individuals, united in comradeship around a common cause, and ready to instantly obey orders. The post-Kabwe military code stressed that this type of discipline was "not enforced from above". It was a different type that seemed to rely on a greater degree of discipline; one that was self-imposed and arose out of "political maturity and consciousness". In other words, the disciplined cadre or revolutionary was not forced to obey orders. Ideally, he or she chose to for the sake of the liberation movement. As Jack Simons, quoting Engels, stated in his lectures for MK cadres: "This is the difference between the destructive forces of electricity in the lightning of a thunderstorm, and tamed electricity in the telegraph and the arc-light."[30]

Sandwiched between the first and final paragraphs, however, was a warning: "Every attempt is made to correct bad behaviour and rehabilitate members who violate the army's code. But punishment is severe in cases of serious crimes, treachery and criminal neglect endangering the safety of others and the security of the army." Considering the rebellious atmosphere that the alliance faced during the 1980s, it is unsurprising that MK chose to stress that

[29] 'The Military Code of Umkhonto we Sizwe', *Dawn: Souvenir Issue, 25th Anniversary of MK* (1986), 45-46.
[30] Marian Sparg, Jenny Schreiner and Gwen Ansell (eds), *Comrade Jack: The Political Lectures and Diary of Jack Simons, Novo Catengue* (Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2001), 186.

undisciplined cadres would be punished. After all, the realities of any army – the organisation and necessary control of violence – required that on occasion soldiers be punished. In short, the People's Army, like any other, had to discipline and punish, it had to "correct bad behaviour". Within the ANC/SACP alliance this needed preferably to happen through the "principle of political guidance" articulated in Reg September's 1988 'Report on the Commission of Cadre Policy, political and ideological work'.[31] But as emphasised in MK's post-Kabwe Military Code, and as evidenced in the ANC Security Department's treatment of dissenters after the Mkatashinga mutiny, if this did not work, more authoritarian and repressive measures could be applied as necessary. The MK cadre was, therefore, both imagined as a free-thinking individual capable of acting autonomously and expected to instantly obey the orders of their commanders, even if those commanders had betrayed the trust given to them.

Mongane Serote's short story, 'The Mosquito', published in *Dawn* alongside Hani's 'Demand of the Time', further contextualised the perceived difference between the disciplined and undisciplined cadre. 'The Mosquito' centred on a clandestine mission in Johannesburg and presents two main protagonists. The first, Thula, appeared as a disciplined cadre, focused and willing to carry out his mission at all costs. Whereas the second, Maluleke, was depicted as a drunk, a hanger-on, an undisciplined cadre who put the mission at risk because, using Hani's terminology, he had not eradicated the frivolous requirements of life. The opening scene was set as follows:

> "YOU ARE overdoing it again," Thula said.
> "Brother", Maluleke said with a sigh, "this is the last one."
> "What is the time?"

[31] Marion Sparg et al (eds), *Comrade Jack*, 59-60.

> Maluleke slowly and casually, looked at his watch, sighed again before saying:
> "Twelf."
> "Are you sure you are coming with me?"
> "What do you think?"
> "You have to tell me, I don't have to think about it."
> "You see," Maluleke leaned forward, supporting his arms on the table, looking straight into Thula's eyes, "I need not keep assuring you, or you need not keep asking, we come a long way you and I, besides, you know I love you, so…"
> "The thing is, wishes will not help any of us, nor will they do the work."
> "That sounds profound my man," Maluleke said, stood up, pulled his trousers up, almost staggered back, pushed the chair back and, without saying a word, walked towards the door. Thula followed him.

From here, Thula and Maluleke, went to meet "the timer" who provided them with a cart, a broom and street cleaners' uniforms, and chastised Maluleke for being drunk. They then made their way to a military barracks and, as instructed, left the cart which contained the parcel bomb outside the entrance. The next day, leaflets that called for people to stay at home because of the killing of people in Sekhukhuniland for refusing to leave their homes, were found on the streets. Their mission was complete despite the constant threat of Maluleke's drunkenness and indiscipline unravelling their plans.

At first reading, this is a simple story about the power of political resistance and the potential effects it had on 'the masses', ending with a young woman who we assume is potentially conscientised by the leaflet she finds on the streets of Johannesburg.

Figure 6: Image taken from 'The Mosquito', *Dawn*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1986).

However, and in light of Hani's 'Demand of the Time', Serote's short story might be better understood as a dialectical struggle between what Simons described as the "electricity in the lightning of a thunderstorm, and tamed electricity in the telegraph and the arc-light." In short, 'The Mosquito' is a moral story about the dangers of indiscipline, that charted the pitfalls of struggle and the need to remain alert, trained, disciplined, and poised for action at all times. The disciplined cadre was therefore not only envisaged as a political subject who could apply the teachings of Simons, as well as other Marxist intellectuals and activists of the 20th century, to the context of political struggle in southern Africa, but was also a moral figure that took its cue, we might say, from Hani's example. As we know, Hani rarely drank, and always remained vigilant, apart from that day (10 April 1993) in Boksburg, Johannesburg,

when he dismissed his bodyguards and allowed himself time to relax and spend Easter Sunday with his daughter Nomakhwezi.

The broader archival record demonstrates that, during the mid-1980s, at least some sections of the ANC alliance were preoccupied with what they saw as a problem of political naivety in MK's camps. The Department of Political Education (DPE) for example, which included the respected Marxist educator Jack Simons, was set up after Kabwe, and sought to create a school for political education in 'the West' (Angola). This was how this school was described as it was being planned:

> The ANC, at its Second National Consultative Conference [Kabwe], decided that a DPE be set up and charged it with the task of 'looking after the political life of the Movement'. This entails enhancing patriotism and deepening political conviction among the membership: boundless love for and devotion to the well-being of our country and people […].
>
> [A] picture of the tasks and scope of the DPE stands out clearly as:
> - systematic and consistent political and ideological work among the masses of the people.
> - production of cadres with sterling revolutionary attributes, loyalty, discipline, dedication; devotion… and "staunch in their belief of our ideological line, namely revolutionary nationalism and committed anti-imperialism". Cadres capable of exercising political leadership and be good organisers.[32]

This new line was affirmed in Muntu Khoza's *Dawn* article, 'MK Soldiers Viewpoint – Cadre of a new type'. Here Khoza attempted to resolve what he saw as an unproductive binary opposition between political and military struggle. Writing about the need to educate

[32] 'Political School – a concept: "A Very Rough Draft"', 21 June 1988 (Special Collections: University of Cape Town, Jack and Ray Simons' Papers, P19.1: ANC-Dept of Political Education (DPE), Policy, 1985-1989).

and guide 'the masses' in South Africa, and with a sense of revolutionary inevitability, Khoza argued:

> *Victory is certain* is a common slogan, but what must dominate our minds must not be the certainty of victory only, which is indisputable, but how and when this victory can be achieved. We must look for means and methods for achieving its realisation.
>
> In this regard, political superiority over the enemy is one of the decisive factors. Politics is an overall force that exerts its influence in all our activities, especially in:
>
> - cultivating the ideological maturity necessary for guiding our cadres in the intricate structures in the existing political and military relations in our country and the sub-continent;
> - developing the flexible thinking which will enable our cadres to take correct decisions independently; and
> - in inculcating our forces political conviction and devotion to the struggle. […]
>
> History will not forgive us if we underestimate the enemy's ability to mislead the masses […]. Consequently, we must draw the fundamental conclusion that our army must have fighters who are ideologically matured to understand our revolution, fighters who are able to make correct assessments and take proper decisions and actions as demanded by the situation at a given time. Are we having such fighters?[33]

The problems that the DPE faced were extensive and the political school in 'the West' never came into being.[34] However, their intent to produce 'sterling revolutionaries' through the benefits of the 'correct political training' was clear. The DPE's proposed curriculum was based largely on Simons's lectures presented in Lusaka (1969-1979) which Hani attended, as well as in Novo Catengue (1977-1979), one of MK's most important camps in Angola. This

[33] Muntu Khoza, 'MK Soldiers Viewpoint – Cadre of a New Type', *Dawn*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (1986), 24-25.
[34] The archival record of the DPE is the Simons Papers that are housed in UCT's Special Collections. This archive is dominated by proposed curricula, as well as numerous correspondence between the DPE and other departments within the ANC. These letters were written with an increasingly frustrated tone, and repeatedly asked for basic equipment (projectors and writing equipment) and suitable teachers who could take up positions in 'The West'. It seems that other departments were either uncooperative, or that cadres with the required qualifications were redirected to administrative positions in Zambia, Tanzania, or London, for example. Either way, I suggest that this archive highlights the conflicting agendas which marked the history of the ANC/SACP alliance.

curriculum privileged historical materialism as "a guide to action" and focused almost exclusively on the works of Marx, Engels, Guevara, Lenin, and Stalin.[35] Importantly, the DPE's mandate revolved around shaping the Soweto generation into cadres in Hani's image, and in the image of the Wankie Generation more generally. As alliance member, Reggie Mpongo explained:

> When you look at that group of people afterwards, those people in the June 16 and Moncada detachments, after he [Jack Simons] had left the camp there seemed to have been a failure to develop continuity of leadership. If you look, the movement more or less up to now still relies on that group of people who had worked with Jack. Afterwards there was no attempt to give those people the chance to reproduce themselves either […]. In 1982/83, just shortly before the mutiny, in our view, there was poor political education in the camp, so that some of the cadres coming into the country were failing to grasp the political process as it unfolded […]. Some of these failures which we can now trace were due to political weaknesses and when you raise the issues the response would be: Let's get the people who were once in the camps at the time of Jack go back and assist.[36]

According to the account presented in *Comrade Jack*, the most detailed biographical presentation of Simons's life and lectures, the main difference between the Wankie and Soweto generations was that the former had benefited from Simons's lectures, whereas the latter's political education was far more sporadic, far less comprehensive, and usually didactic and formal.[37] This meant that cadres were able to understand basic Marxist concepts but were unable to contextualise them, or in Hani's words, they failed, "to objectively apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to… [southern Africa's] own situation".[38]

[35] Marion Sparg et al (eds), *Comrade Jack*, 127.
[36] Ibid. 40.
[37] Ibid. 43.
[38] Ibid. 42.

This ‘failure’, coupled with the apparent indiscipline of MK cadres in Angola, contrasted sharply with the image of the modern guerrilla valorised in the exploits of Hani and those of the Luthuli Detachment during the Wankie Campaign. Davis has traced what we might call the mythologisation of Hani and of the Luthuli Detachment through an article by Hani, ‘The Wankie Campaign’, that had been published in an issue of *Dawn* in 1986. Here Hani attested to the discipline, training, and heroism of the Luthuli detachment, and gave a first-hand account of how they had acted in unity to overcome the enemy.[39] A particularly stirring moment came when Hani described the first confrontation with the Rhodesian forces carried out by his battalion:

> The first battle we fought was in the afternoon. We had done the usual: taking cover, digging ourselves in, deploying and organising all round defense of our temporary base […]. We had detected the motorized enemy earlier […]. Since it was during the day we deliberately refrained from engaging with the enemy at that particular point in time. But it was quite clear that the enemy also noticed that we were around […]. In the afternoon the enemy moved into the offensive by firing at random at the section where we had taken position. We had decided earlier on that everyone ought to be very economic with the ammunition […]. In other words, one was not to shoot until he had a clear view of the target […]. Our headquarters were far and we had to rely on what we carried on our backs, in our knapsacks […]. The enemy got impatient. They stood up and began to ask “Where are the terrorists?” This was when there was a fuselage of furious fire from us. That fuselage, the furious nature of that reply, drove away the enemy. In this first epic battle we lost three comrades: Charles Seshoba, Sparks Maloi and Baloi. [O]ne comrade, Mhlongo was wounded. On the side of the enemy we must have killed 12 or 15, including a lieutenant […]. The rest literally ran helter-skelter for their lives […]. It was a memorable victory… a virgin victory for us since we had never fought with modern weaponry against the enemy. For us that was a day of celebrations because with our own eyes we had seen the enemy run. We had seen the enemy

[39] There were three ‘sections’ or battalions during the Wankie Campaign, which before the campaign were charged with different missions. Hani was the political commissar under John Dube (ZAPU), who was the section commander of the ‘Tsholotsho group’, and overall commander of what would become known as the Luthuli Detachment. See: Thula Simpson, *Umkhonto we Sizwe: The ANC’s Armed Struggle* (Cape Town: Penguin Books, 2016), 129.

> frozen with fear. That lifted our spirits and transformed us into a fighting force. We had also seen and observed each other reacting to the enemy's attacks. A feeling of faith in one another and a recognition of the courage of the unit developed.[40]

As Davis points out, Hani's version of events and subsequent accounts that took their cue from Hani, proved to contain 'factual' inconsistencies, and produced a problematically 'neat', romanticised and theatrical narrative. In another impressive reading of official accounts and the archival record that went 'against the grain', Davis went on to demonstrate some of the realities of armed combat. This included the unpreparedness of the Luthuli Detachment, mistakes made in the field, indiscipline, and fear, and together these accounts served to question the heroic version of events rendered by Hani himself. Particularly interesting was a passage that focused on 'Training and Discipline', in which Davis gave some nuance to dominant notions of "archetypal guerrillas: masters of their environment, deftly moving in and out of view, screening themselves from detection…."[41] This brought to the fore accounts of undisciplined cadres refusing to follow orders and on occasion putting the whole detachment at risk.[42] Davis's work helps us to start unravelling claims made about the distinction between the supposedly disciplined Wankie generation and the supposedly undisciplined Soweto generation. In line with the scholarship of Luise White, his supervisor, on rumour and the circulation of statements, Davis's doctoral research showed us that the dividing line between discipline and indiscipline was far more blurred than official accounts tend to suggest.

[40] Marion Sparg et al (eds), *Comrade Jack*, 36.
[41] Stephen Davis, 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters', 117.
[42] Here Davis draws on two alternative accounts of the Wankie Campaign, which "put a greater emphasis on indiscipline". One account even claims that aggrieved cadres "threaten[ed] to shoot their commander" during a dispute over orders. Ibid. 121.

The Hani Memorandum: lives of sacrifice, comradeship and struggle

It is equally important to recognise that it was experiences of struggle itself that shaped the frames and theories about correct revolutionary positions. In an interview conducted by Padraig O'Malley in 1992, Hani contextualised his own history and role in the following way:

> I came into the movement from the ranks. I started by being an ordinary member of the organisation, participating in the general grind of things in the organisation down at the grassroots level. I have always considered myself basically an activist.… I avoided pursuing a career path at a time when there were so many scholarships offered to young South Africans. I must have been about 20-21.[43]

Instead, Hani committed himself to the armed struggle, choosing to receive military training in the Soviet Union, to take part in dangerous military operations such as the Wankie Campaign, and to make "an effort to go back to the country and challenge" the apartheid regime.[44] This position was in sharp contrast to the likes of Thabo Mbeki, who had spent much of his time in exile studying at the University of Sussex and performing increasingly important roles as a delegate and diplomat for the ANC in exile. Nevertheless, Mbeki was singled out for criticism in the 1969 Hani Memorandum, which was expressed more sharply and directly than usual, especially for Hani's generally more measured demeanour:

> 15. We consider the youth in M.K. as the most revolutionary…. The youth of South Africa is not located in London or in any European capital. We therefore take particular exception to the appointment of certain students as leaders of

[43] Padraig O'Malley interview with Chris Hani, 15 July 1992 (WHP, University of the Witwatersrand: A3268).
[44] Ibid.

the ANC Youth. Thabo Mbeki who went to London on a scholarship sponsored by NUSAS is a leader of ANC bogus Youth Organisation.

We are convinced that the ANC leadership in Exile is according better treatment and attention to the students. This attitude and practice has had a disastrous effect of diverting many would-be revolutionaries into the academic field. We feel that it is high time that the M.K. personnel which is in fact the core of our Revolution should be given the best treatment by virtue of having volunteered with their lives to give the supreme sacrifice for the Revolution. Another disturbing symptom is the glaring practice of nepotism where the leadership uses its position to promote their kith and kin and put them in positions where they will not be in any physical confrontations with the enemy. The sending of virtually all the sons of the leaders to universities in Europe is a sign that these people are being groomed for leadership positions after the M.K. cadres have overthrown the fascists. We have no doubt that these people will just wait in Europe and just come home when everything has been made secure and comfortable for them playing the typical role of the Bandas and others. As opposed to the treatment of the students, we find complete indifference and apathy to the heroes and martyrs of our Revolution who have fallen in South Africa and Zimbabwe. We have in mind the gallant sons of our country, who without doubt lay their lives in the struggle against imperialism.[45]

This was not the only grievance that the Hani Memorandum outlined. The whole document included eighteen points. Here, I want to focus on the ways it highlighted longstanding differences between the ANC/SACP's rank-and-file and leadership, and the different political tendencies that vied for control of the struggle against apartheid. It also began to reveal the distinction between what was called 'bourgeois' intellectuals and the type envisaged by Marxist theorists at the time. For it is clear that Hani saw himself not only as a soldier. From an early age, and under the tutelage of Govan Mbeki who had infiltrated the University of Fort Hare during Hani's attendance there, Hani, in his own words, had studied "very keenly" the few books on Marxism that were available in the library. In addition to the Communist

[45] Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp, *Hani: A life too short*, 313-314.

Manifesto, he read "various… works by philosophers like Hegel, Kant, Locke and Hobbes."[46]

In exile too, Hani had access to various schools of thought. He received his first official military and political training in the Soviet Union in 1963, during which he apparently excelled.[47] Later, in 1967 in Lusaka, Hani had been fortunate enough to stay at the home of fellow South African, Ben Magubane. Magubane was a lecturer at the University of Lusaka at the time and described Hani as "ever so quiet. If people came around, he would retire to the bedroom with his book."[48] Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp depicted Hani's time with the Magubanes as follows:

> Magubane recalls how he and his family – Hani being regarded as something of an older son – would meet at [… Jack and Ray] Simons's place most Sundays to discuss the evolving political situation in southern Africa. Magubane said it was on Sundays like those that he truly discovered the depths of the young man who occupied a room in his house. At first, he and other academics were taken aback by the complex young cadre's spontaneous yearning to indulge in the classics. It was just so unusual to come across anyone of Hani's age and background who responded to the political and social worlds of ancient Rome and Greece, or the English poets struggling with the chaos of industry. Hani was able to quote entire pieces of writing, exquisite passages from the Romantics, from Shelley and Keats, such was his precision and exact observation. For the intellectuals of Lusaka's bohemian African underground, Hani was a revelation.[49]

What was also striking about Hani's intellectual, theoretical and political education was his ability and willingness to engage with different political movements and positions. As Rassool

[46] Reiner Leist interview with Chris Hani, 1992 (WHP, University of the Witwatersrand: A3395f).
[47] Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp, *Hani: A life too short*, 64.
[48] Ibid. 81.
[49] Ibid. 81-82.

has pointed out, Hani was in informal contact with activists within the Unity Movement, particularly Livingstone Mqotsi who also experienced expulsion for "'undermining and damaging the movement", accused of being "consistently guilty of insubordination", of "flaunting" it and of refusing "to recognise the authority of the officials of the organisation."[50] This suggests that Hani was less politically and ideologically dogmatic than as presented in accounts such as that by Baruch Hirson. It also points toward the often fluid, open and contested debates which occurred between different liberation movements.

It was Hani's 'head start' and fortune to have received an early education at his uncle's school in the Eastern Cape that, Smith and Tromp suggest, pushed him toward a position of prominence within MK and the alliance. At just 25, Hani was named Head Political Commissar of the Wankie Detachment, and was singled out as having performed bravely during this campaign against Rhodesian and South African forces.[51] Toward the end of the campaign, which Davis has described as a "bitter defeat for the ANC, SACP and their allies,"[52] Hani and a number of other combatants were arrested on the border of Botswana and were sentenced to two years in jail. Quoting Hani himself, Houston and Ngculu explain that after his release from Botswana, Hani went home to

> a movement in a stalemate position. There was no longer any direction, there was general confusion or an unwillingness to discuss the lessons of the revolution.' In the camps there was a feeling that people had died in Rhodesia for nothing, because even if we… have achieved the independence of Zimbabwe, we were not going to gain that much really: because it was going to be the independence of Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans, not for us.[53]

[50] Ciraj Rassool, 'The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa', 177.
[51] Stephen Davis, 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters', 38.
[52] Ibid. 37.
[53] Gregory Houston and James Ngculu, *Chris Hani: Voices of Liberation*, 18.

This stalemate, coupled with a perceived lack of respect for soldiers who had fought during the Wankie and Sipolele campaigns, prompted Hani and other dissatisfied cadres to pen the Hani Memorandum. As we have already seen, this document criticised the leadership within the ANC/SACP alliance for its perceived nepotism, but also made claims about the 'correct revolutionary positions' and the best way forward in the struggle against apartheid.

The Hani Memorandum's strong and public criticism of the leadership of the alliance, had also been met with a reaction to that which the Mkatashinga mutinies met fifteen years later. The majority of accounts suggest that "some ranking leaders equated his frankness with treason."[54] According to Dubow:

> In the recriminations that followed, the ANC High Command was accused of sending cadres off on a suicide mission; it is more likely that they were allowed to go in an effort to energize the liberation movement and alleviate torpor in the squalid base camps. Seven MK fighters, including Chris Hani, were suspended by the ANC for criticizing the exile leadership and threatened with incarceration. They were eventually reprieved by Tambo. The so-called 'Hani memorandum' made allegations of 'rot' within the organization. This included lack of political focus and wide disparity in the lifestyles of ordinary cadres and officials who were accused of helping themselves and their favourites to the perks of office. The ANC was charged with having 'lost control' of MK which, run by powerful individuals like Joe Modise and Duma Nokwe, was routinely using secret trials and harsh discipline to enforce internal control on cadres.[55]

Others, such as Smith and Tromp, have gone as far to suggest that Hani and some of his co-authors were sentenced to death in the wake of the Hani Memorandum. These sentences were only withdrawn after interventions from Jack and Ray Simons and Oliver Tambo, as Dubow

[54] Stephen Davis, 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters', 39.
[55] Saul Dubow, *Apartheid: 1948-1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 146.

suggests. Just as the Mkatashinga mutinies had the consequence of the Kabwe conference being held, the Hani Memorandum had prompted the ANC to hold their Third Consultative Conference in Morogoro in late April 1969. As Davis further explains:

> By all accounts, the ANC was in a state of crisis in the late 1960s. The armed struggle ground to a halt in Rhodesia. Erstwhile African hosts proved to be less than reliable when internal and external pressures mounted. Finally, the South African government enjoyed an unparalleled era of peace and prosperity while implementing the basic structures of 'high apartheid', accelerating the forced removal of 'black spots,' installing the first Bantustans, all the while continuing to suppress domestic political dissent. Against the security of its sworn enemy, the exile community found itself largely demoralized by the Wankie Campaign and internally divided along many lines. Although it is tempting to portray these divisions as purely ideological – pitting communists against African factionalists – this internal dynamic was in fact, far more complex, encompassing the psychological effects of geography, emergent patterns of patronage, and longstanding personal relationships.[56]

Nevertheless, the outcomes of the Morogoro Conference have been seen as indicative of the growing influence of the SACP at the time, who would have benefitted more than any other organisation from the landmark resolution to allow membership of "so-called 'non-Africans' into the External Mission of the ANC."[57] Further initiatives decided on at the Conference included the establishment of a DPE, as we have seen, which was given responsibility for political education of MK cadres in exile, and the creation of a Revolutionary Council designed to centrally organise MK operations, with the intention of making regional operations more streamlined and focused.

Despite the growing influence of the SACP on the ANC and MK, difficulties within its host countries, meant that the ANC spent more energy on "merely remaining on the continent of

[56] Stephen Davis, 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters', 39.
[57] Ibid. 40.

Africa, rather than fomenting revolution."[58] Furthermore, "[w]ithout a reliable path into South Africa, planning for revolution consisted much more of armchair theorising. Although the Revolutionary Council endlessly debated the proper technical conditions for fomenting revolution, the failure to establish bases in forward areas, as well as internal structures within South Africa, effectively mooted any prospective conclusion." In short, attempts by revolutionaries within alliance to take the struggle home were thwarted by a myriad of issues. These preceded and precipitated future demands by MK cadres in camps in exile, who increasingly felt isolated from their own struggle, and increasingly at odds with the leadership of the alliance.

The disciplined cadre and the new man of history

Davis's approach offers a means through which to complicate any emphasis on military discipline and heroism as a means of understanding the Wankie Campaign. It also begins to demonstrate how the image of Hani as disciplined cadre par excellence might have been deployed as a model of emulation within the ranks of the alliance. Through this lens Hani appeared much in the same mould as the revolutionary heroes of 20th century Marxist and anti-colonial struggles, and, as former SACP General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, put it in an article dedicated to Hani's legacy, he had become the "Che Guevara of Africa".[59] In other words, documents like the 'Wankie Campaign' worked to inculcate Hani into the pantheon of (largely male) revolutionary heroes who were meant to serve as models of emulation for generations of MK cadres that followed in the Wankie generation's footsteps. Documents

[58] Ibid. 43.
[59] 'Vavi: Honour Hani's Memory', *IOL*, 10 April 2003, https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/vavi-honour-hanis-memory-1498173.

about the Wankie Campaign that were circulated by journals like *Dawn*, as well as other alliance organs, marked the becoming of Hani as revolutionary, and as disciplined cadre.

However, merely to reduce Hani's 'Wankie Campaign' to the terrain of propaganda misses the reality that these types of debates were not simply aimed at creating a homogenous and obedient organisation unified behind its leaders.[60] Despite the ongoing difficulties of implementing an effective struggle against a powerful apartheid state, cadres of the Wankie and Soweto generations were embroiled in an internal ideological, political, and ethical struggle surrounding the 'correct revolutionary positions' and the different directions that the struggle could take. Furthermore, such documents emerged from longstanding and contested debates within the ANC/SACP alliance, which were inflected with various schools of thought and conflicting political positions, both Marxist and non-Marxist. In this regard, I read these documents as emerging from within a particular historical conjuncture, from a particular experience of capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid, and as a response – sometimes antagonistically sometimes sympathetically – to Marxist theory and practice, but also to other forms of disciplinary power, particularly military and 'bourgeois' discipline. In other words, our understanding of these types of documents and the discourses they produced about the disciplined cadre and the correct revolutionary positions, must be historically situated, and grounded by their relationship to different political tendencies and to experiences of other forms of disciplinary power. To understand ideas about the disciplined cadre, then, requires a historical account of the different tendencies and theories of struggle

[60] It is important to note that Davis does not necessarily do this in 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters'.

which may have influenced Hani and may have inflected the approach of the ANC and SACP to the seizure of power in South Africa.

It was perhaps from the Cuban experience of guerrilla warfare and other anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles that MK drew one of its main sources of inspiration. As Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp point out, in 1961 one of the key texts at MK's first military training camp at Mamre, South Africa, was Che Guevara's 'Guerrilla Fighters'.[61] This text emphasised the role of "the fighting vanguard of the people", supported by the masses, "armed and prepared to carry out a series of warlike actions for the one possible strategic end – the seizure of power".[62] Like Hani's 'The Demand of the Time', 'Guerrilla Fighters' had argued that this seizure of power was dependent on the "heroism of the guerilla", who, sure of the possibility of victory, and armed with revolutionary theory and the weapons of guerrilla warfare, would bring about a new society free from capitalism.[63]

The alliance's approach to the transfer of power, outlined in what Ben Turok referred to as the 'Strategy and Tactics tradition', also bear the hallmarks of the Cuban experience. The programme *Forward to Freedom: Strategy and Tactics of the ANC,* adopted in 1969 by the ANC after the Morogoro Conference, followed the Cuban line by rejecting the idea that liberation movements wait for the correct conditions to unfold.[64] Also, following Cuba's (and Maoist China's) example, it gave a privileged position to rural struggles over 'auxiliary'

[61] Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp, *Hani: A life too short*, 44.
[62] Ernesto Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare: A method* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1964), 2.
[63] Ibid. 19.
[64] Ben Turok, *Revolutionary Thought in the Twentieth Century* (London: Zed Press, 1980), 100.

urban struggles.[65] According to this model, small groups of professional cadres, who understood "the art and science – both political and military – of armed liberation struggles", would infiltrate the country in order to redirect the apparently spontaneous protest of the masses.

From his base in Lesotho, Hani and other MK cadres contributed significantly to all of these operations. After the collapse of the Portuguese colonies in Mozambique and Angola, Hani was sent to Lesotho in 1974 "to build ANC structures within South Africa" and became his organisation's Chief Representative "in Lesotho in 1976".[66] Shortly after, he became one of the youngest members of the ANC's National Executive Committee along with Thabo Mbeki.[67] Drawing from recruits both from the older generation who had worked alongside Govan Mbeki during the 1950s and 1960s, and from the younger generation "who had been involved in political unrest in the Eastern Cape's elite schools or at university," Hani proceeded to create a network of operatives whose aim was to infiltrate the Cape region primarily through what was then the Transkei.[68]

Considering the Cuban experience and its obvious influence on MK's theory and practice, it might be best to frame Hani's operations in Lesotho – often referred to as 'The Island' – through what Jameson, writing about the revolutionary *foco* of Cuba, called a process of neutralisation:

> [T]he revolutionary *foco* – the isolated mountain camp from which guerrilla warfare is waged and in which a true revolutionary party is forged – will be a

[65] Ibid. 103.
[66] Thula Simpson, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, 189.
[67] Timothy Gibbs, *Mandela's Clansmen,* 113.
[68] Ibid. 114.

> space in which both intellectuals and workers – these two essential *components* of the revolutionary party according to Lenin – lose their social determinations and become truly classless in the new revolutionary sense. Intellectuals are then physically removed from the specializations of academic work and the ideological temptations of the ivory tower and of purely intellectual labor; while the former factory workers and peasants who join the great movement in the Sierra Maestra will have abandoned factory alienation, the division of labor, and the subordinations of the workplace […].
>
> In both cases, a powerful neutralization burns away everything that Lenin has diagnosed in his program-essay ['What Is to Be Done']; the negative itself, we may say, has reduced all these individuals, not to their most elementary essence as commodity and labor power […] but precisely to their elemental power as negation and revolutionary refusal, as agency, as a pure form of revolt in which they are all equal and from which new post-revolutionary forms can be expected to emerge.[69]

Equally significant for us here, though, is Antonio Gramsci's formulation of revolutionary discipline, which although not in wide circulation at the time, clearly inflected and marked the SACP's thinking around the disciplined cadre. In 1917, Gramsci had provided one of the earliest and clearest definitions of revolutionary discipline and what, according to him, its distinctive features were. Invoking Rudyard Kipling's *The Jungle Book*, Gramsci wrote:

> In one of the stories in *The Jungle Book* Rudyard Kipling shows discipline at work in a strong Bourgeois society. Everyone obeys in the bourgeois state. The mules in the battery obey the battery sergeant, the horses obey the soldiers that ride them. The soldiers obey the lieutenant, the lieutenants obey the regimental colonels; the regiments obey a brigadier general; the brigades obey the viceroy of the Indias. The viceroy obeys Queen Victoria (still alive when Kipling was writing). The Queen gives an order: the viceroy, the brigadier generals, the colonels, the lieutenants, the soldiers, the animals, all move in unison and go off to the conquest. The protagonist of the story says to a native who is watching a parade: 'Because you cannot do likewise, you are our subjects'.
>
> Bourgeois discipline is the only force that keeps the bourgeois aggregation firmly together. Discipline must be fought with discipline. But whereas bourgeois discipline is mechanical and authoritarian, socialist

[69] Frederick Jameson, *Valences of the Dialectic*, 32.

> discipline is autonomous and spontaneous… whoever is a socialist or wants to become one does not obey: he commands himself, he imposes a rule of life on his impulses, on his disorderly aspirations […]. The discipline imposed on citizens by the bourgeois state makes them into subjects, people who delude themselves that they exert an influence on the course of events. The discipline of the Socialist Party makes the subject into a citizen: a citizen who is now rebellious, precisely because he has become conscious of his personality and feels it is shackled and cannot freely express itself in the world.[70]

Like MK's military code, Gramsci had drawn a clear distinction between 'bourgeois discipline' and 'socialist discipline'. For him, bourgeois discipline was constructed around a hierarchy of command and a machine-like system of obedience. Like the 'mule in the battery', the soldier, the lieutenant, the brigadier general, and the viceroy did not think, they first of all obeyed the commands of their superior. They were deluded, according to Gramsci, to assume that they were in complete control, that they had any real agency of their own. Socialist, or revolutionary discipline on the other hand, was the embodiment of class consciousness. It was the recognition of and subsequent struggle against bourgeois hegemony and the social relations of production. This was envisaged as a new type of discipline, tied up with the becoming of a new type of conscious man, a new historical subject and, in opposition to the protagonist of *The Jungle Book*, a man who actively undermined conventional 'bourgeois' notions of citizen and subject. In short, Gramsci's notion of the new man and revolutionary discipline was envisaged as a decisive break from capitalist modes of organisation and subjectivation and was built upon a desire to produce new forms of being in the world. In South Africa today, this might be referred to as decoloniality.

[70] Antonio Gramsci 'La Citta future [The Future City], 11 February 1917', in David Forgacs (ed) *The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935.* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 31-32.

It was from this position that Gramsci formulated one of his more important and lasting concepts: that of the organic intellectual. In his prison notes written between 1926 and 1937, Gramsci elaborated a notion of Man that situates human nature as "a 'complex of human relations'… [which] include… the idea of 'becoming' (man becomes, changes himself continually with the changing of social relations), and… denies 'man in general'."[71] This commitment to human nature as relational and Man as becoming subject, was constituted as a direct attack on idealism and the abstract, bourgeois notion of Man. For Gramsci, revolutionary praxis also required the development of a new type of intellectual whose measure could be judged by his or her "more or less close connection with a fundamental class."[72] In Gramsci's case this class was of course the proletariat, or the industrial working class of twentieth century Europe, which according to Gramsci was given "homogeneity and consciousness"[73] by the intellectual, who in turn encouraged "new modes of thought",[74] while being actively "involved in practical life, as a builder, an organiser."[75] The organic intellectual was, in principle, an intellectual of the proletariat, who married political and military struggle, and elaborated the interests of that class, thus enabling them "to exercise hegemony over the other exploited groups that were its class allies in the struggle against capitalism."[76]

Written on the eve of the Russian Revolution, Gramsci had touched on a myriad of issues that strike at the heart of twentieth century debates between various Marxisms in Europe. This

[71] Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and other writings* (New York: International Publishers, 1978): 80.
[72] Ibid. 124.
[73] Ibid. 118.
[74] Ibid. 121.
[75] Ibid. 122.
[76] Perry Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', *New Left Review*, Vol. 1/100, November and December (1976), 18.

contestation is perhaps best explained by the early twentieth century debate between Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, the latter of whom had paid the ultimate price for questioning the logic of Russian Marxism. Luxemburg's critique of Lenin and the Russian Soviet had stemmed from Lenin's celebration of "the factory as a model for revolutionary organisations".[77] In *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward* (1904), Lenin had argued that in order to organise the proletariat, the Russian Marxists should emulate the disciplinary framework of the factory, which was for him the "highest form of capitalist co-operation which ha[d] united and disciplined the proletariat."[78] Unlike Luxemburg, Lenin at this time admired the organisational capabilities of capitalism and argued that certain aspects should be replicated in order to push the proletariat toward their own emancipation. For Luxemburg on the other hand, replicating the factory as a model for party organisation was counter intuitive. In her response to Lenin, she argued:

> The "discipline" which Lenin has in mind is implanted in the proletariat not only by factory but also by the barracks, by modern bureaucratism – in short, by the whole mechanism of the centralised bourgeois state… There is nothing common to the corpeslike obedience of a dominated class and the organised rebellion of class struggling for its liberation. It is not by linking up with the discipline implanted in him by the capitalist state… but by breaking, uprooting the Slavish state of discipline that the proletariat can be educated for the new discipline, for the voluntary self-discipline of Social Democracy.[79]

One can immediately see the similarities between Luxemburg's conception of revolutionary discipline, Jameson's discussion of the revolutionary *foco* in Cuba, and Gramsci's formulation. For Luxemburg and Gramsci, the key to socialist struggle in the early twentieth

[77] Russell Jacoby, *Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 69.
[78] These words are Lenin's from *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward*. See, Ibid. 69.
[79] Ibid. 70.

century was the creation of a new consciousness that rejected models of capitalist production, rather than incorporate them. Using Jameson's formulation, the process of becoming disciplined cadres and new men was about negating and refusing the capitalist modes of production and processes of subjectivation that, in Foucauldian terminology, produced 'docile' subjects for capital and imperialism.[80] It was also, importantly, about questioning and rebelling against the order of things, and the modes through which the barracks sought to create obedient soldiers who unquestionably followed the orders of their commanders.

Although Marxist theories of the new man of history had influenced the DPE's search for 'sterling revolutionaries' in the mould of Hani, these ideas were not exclusively the terrain of Marxists and Communists. Perhaps one of the most compelling and important arguments about the 'new man' came from Frantz Fanon who argued in *Wretched of the Earth* that during the time of decolonisation a new species of man must be born:

> Decolonization never goes unnoticed, for it focuses on and fundamentally alters being, and transforms the spectator crushed to a nonessential state into a privileged actor, captured in a virtually grandiose fashion by the spotlight of History. It infuses a new rhythm, specific to a new generation of men, with a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is truly the creation of new men. But such a creation cannot be attributed to a supernatural power: The "thing" colonized becomes a man through the very process of liberation.[81]

It seems clear that although not directly drawing from Marxist theories of the new man of history, the above passage was at least in conversation with them. For Fanon, "the colonized world is a world divided into two"[82]: that of the coloniser, with its "lights and paved roads",

[80] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Random House, 1995), 139.
[81] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2017), 2.
[82] Ibid. 3.

and that of the colonised, "a world with no space" in which "you die anywhere, from anything."[83] Furthermore, the colonist was only such because of his relationship to the colonised, and vice versa. As such, according to Fanon, the only way to bring about a new world free from colonialism was through violence, the death of both coloniser and colonised, and the subsequent emergence of what he called a new species of man. In his own words, "decolonisation is quite simply the substitution of one 'species' of mankind by another."[84]

The above sketch taken from the opening pages of *Wretched of the Earth*, does not do justice to the depth of Fanon's thought and work. However, I want to point toward a distinguishing feature in Fanon's formulation of the process of decolonisation and political and military struggle against colonialism, which might shed further light on the ways in which Marxist-Leninist vanguardism always already had the potential to reproduce the logic of bourgeois discipline and the type of violence that it sought to eradicate. It is clear that Fanon reaffirmed arguments made by Luxemburg in particular, about the process through which a people rise up in the face of colonialism and state-violence. To repeat Luxemburg:

> It is not by linking up with the discipline implanted in him by the capitalist state… but by breaking, uprooting the Slavish state of discipline that the proletariat can be educated for the new discipline, for the voluntary self-discipline of Social Democracy.[85]

In other words, it seems that where Luxemburg, Fanon and Gramsci departed from more orthodox forms of Marxism-Leninism and party vanguardism, is that they each saw the new man as being birthed during the revolutionary or decolonial process itself. Put another way,

[83] Ibid. 4.
[84] Ibid. 1.
[85] Ibid. 70.

the becoming of a new man and a new world free from colonialism and apartheid, could not be predetermined and telegraphed in advance by a party programme, through 're-education', or indeed the 'science' of historical materialism. For Fanon, the experience of colonialism, apartheid, and capitalism itself, produced the ground through which a people rose-up, and it is this distinguishing feature that, I suggest, marked the theoretical and practical problem space of struggle and the blurred line between maintaining the struggle on the one hand, and the socialist, democratic vision that many within the ANC/SACP alliance claimed to adhere to, on the other.

Disciplining the undisciplined cadre.

David Scott has argued in *Omens of Adversity* that "revolutions are not only an extraordinary time of social and political upheaval. They are also a time of *exceptional human beings* who stand, momentarily, at the animating center of political affairs; whose actions are of unusual intensity and urgency".[86] Political struggles are not merely defined by the actions of 'exceptional human beings' – at least not their actions alone nor their acting alone – nor the vanguardist politics that this position often privileges. They are otherwise intimately tied up with the experiences, desires, and actions of rank-and-file cadres who do not always obediently, and rarely blindly, follow their leaders.[87] As put by Luise White when speaking about military discipline and relationships formed between cadres and commanders:

> [M]ilitary discipline is not a matter of loyal cadres, obedient to a cause and to the zeal of their commanders. Military discipline is negotiated between cadres

[86] David Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 34.

[87] Contrary to official struggle historiography, it seems reasonable to argue that throughout the ANC/SACP's anti-apartheid struggle – for example the 'turn to armed struggle' in the early 1960s, the 'Hani Memorandum' in 1969, and the arrival of the 'Soweto Generation' after 1976 – the leadership were in fact responding to the desires and actions of the 'rank-and-file', rather than guiding and controlling the direction and movement of the anti-apartheid struggle.

> and commanders in their everyday practices and frictions, and in how they address extraordinary situations… .[88]

Scott's analysis of the Grenadian revolution and its aftermaths points toward a contradiction between the necessity of maintaining the struggle on the one hand, and the socialist, democratic vision that many within the alliance claimed to adhere to, on the other. When speaking about the global 'rise of Leninism', Scott argued that the vanguard party offered a pragmatic solution for liberation movements across the colonised world who "were increasingly seeking to position themselves to take state power…."[89] Unlike other, more inclusive and open approaches to political organisation, this, according to Scott, allowed for "a more tightly knit, more disciplined, and more doctrinally focused party form".[90] This, in theory, would not only have streamlined political organisation, but would have also provided a defence against counter-revolutionary forces and against the states they sought to defeat or take over. As others have noted, the adoption of this position also secured much needed support from the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

According to Ben Turok, Lenin maintained that the vanguard party was essential in Russia, for organising and guiding the working class, which "lack[ed] the cohesiveness and singleness of purpose to perform its historical role spontaneously".[91] Thus, for Lenin and those that adopted this position, revolutionary struggle was inextricably linked to the Party, and could not succeed without "highly conscious revolutionaries maintaining strong

[88] Luise White, *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo*, 36.
[89] David Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 41.
[90] Ibid. 40.
[91] Ben Turok, *Revolutionary Thought in the Twentieth Century* (London: Zed Press, 1980), 8.

discipline, centralisation of leadership and coherence and unity in action".[92] But as Scott's analysis and the archive of the anti-apartheid struggle tend to suggest, the ANC/SACP's desire to streamline political organisation, as they attempted to do in the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s,[93] and to maintain a cohesive and disciplined anti-apartheid struggle, seemed to have other consequences. Although the alliance's vanguardism was not solely derived from Leninist conceptions of political struggle, Scott – following Brian Meeks, a Caribbean historian of the Grenadian Revolution – offers a useful means through which to think through the effects of vanguardist organisations:

> 'Each Leninist measure which made the party more capable of taking power, also increased its tendency toward hierarchical decision-making and enhanced the autonomy of the leadership both from ordinary party members and the people.' Thus, for example, the creation of a military wing in 1975 at once improved the party's readiness for insurrection *and* 'increased the tendency toward secrecy.' […] [W]ith the conversion to Leninism only the leadership was now privy to knowledge about decisions regarding direction, policy, and comrades […]. As Meeks neatly summarizes it, 'This both eroded the popular connection and increased the sense of sectarianism in those few privileged to possess the knowledge of 'science'. It also had the potential to generate distrust and betrayal […].[94]

Another way of approaching this issue, might be to follow Jameson by highlighting the process through which theory "becomes philosophy and an ideology in its own terms and congeals into the very type of system it sought to undermine…"?[95] In other words, what

[92] Ibid. 8.
[93] The problem of political vs military work for example was one that Tripartite Alliance constantly struggled with. As Houston explains, the ANC/SACP attempted to resolve this problem in the early 1980s by amalgamating political and military branches of the ANC/SACP under one roof, when the Politico-Military Council (PMC) replaced the Revolutionary Council (RC) in 1983. See: Gregory Houston, 'The ANC's Armed Struggle in the 1980s', 1071-1073.
[94] David Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 41-42.
[95] Frederick Jameson, *Valences of the Dialectic*, 9.

happens when the thought of the intellectual or of the Party becomes 'common sense', and how are these limits maintained? Jameson attends to this problem in 'The Three Names of the Dialectic' by unravelling what he refers to as the "[t]raditional presentations" of the dialectic: either as a system and ultimately as an ideology on the one hand, or as an instrumentalised method on the other."[96] For Jameson, the emergence of theory offered an opportunity for undermining the totalising systems of philosophy, but also, as for example in the case of deconstruction, runs the risk of becoming Deconstructivism, constrained within its own universalising system. Clearly, Jameson's argument was also applicable to, and was necessarily directed toward "the predominant form taken by Marxism as a philosophical system…, orthodox Marxism…, vulgar Marxism or Stalinism."[97]

For Jameson, the implications of this totalisation and incorporation were significant, especially the closing of thought and its implications for praxis: "the rearrangement of… themes into a system or philosophy", into universal laws, into dogma, constituted by Jameson as a political act that enables "the exclusionary moves, the anathemata and excommunications."[98] And this brings us back to the alliance's internal political and ideological struggle. It is well documented that one of the greatest achievements of the alliance since its inception, has been its ability to manage political and ideological differences through the principle of democratic centralism, which was supposed to provide a space for rival factions to air their grievances, whilst allowing the broad church to maintain a cohesive struggle in the face of extreme difficulty, particularly during the exile years. Indeed, one

[96] Ibid. 3.
[97] Ibid. 6.
[98] Ibid. 15.

might argue that the Morogoro Conference of 1969 and the Kabwe Conference of 1984, were constitutive of the alliance's ability to close ranks, to right the ship, and to respond to grievances without directly addressing the concerns of Hani and his co-authors in 1969, or of the Mkatashinga mutineers in 1984.

It is clearly one thing to manage ideological and political differences within party structures, and another to manage dissent within MK's rank-and-file, particularly when those dissenting cadres of the 'Soweto generation' who were generally more familiar with Black Consciousness ideas, had not 'benefitted' from the 'correct political training' and were greeted in exile by party lines and security police. In short, as we have seen, when cadres *en masse* start to question the logic of struggle, and if that questioning becomes an insurrection against the party, other increasingly violent measures have been deployed and justified.

When asked about the mutinies in 1992, Hani spoke passionately against the ANC Security Department:

> It is an open secret that the most vocal critic of detention without trial was Chris Hani. I was a member of the politbureau – people who challenged the detention of Thami Zulu and others [who] were leading members of the SACP….
>
> Up to the time people were released from Quatro [MK's notorious detention camp] I led a campaign at every meeting of the NEC of the ANC, saying that we cannot call upon the regime to release our political prisoners and continue detaining people for long periods of time without trial. I accept that there was a time when our security actually dealt with detainees in a way I never accepted. I tried to understand how they behaved like that. …
>
> That was a period – I'm not condoning it – when our people were targets of assassination in Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, when the security branch in our country was sending dozens of agents to poison people, to destabilize our camps, to create a situation where our struggle would be neutralised. There was

> a need for us – and I will never dispute this – to set up an efficient security system.
>
> But it is important in any movement, in any government that security forces be given clear guidelines and they should be accountable to the leadership. They should never use methods that are not acceptable in any democratic country. Communist leaders tried to change a situation where harmful and negative methods were used against those who were suspected of working for the South African regime.[99]

Hani's words speak to a number of issues already highlighted within this chapter, including the contradiction between the necessity of maintaining the struggle on the one hand, and the socialist, democratic vision that the ANC/SACP alliance claimed to adhere to, on the other. But how might we come to terms with the ways in which the desire to maintain a cohesive anti-apartheid struggle and to guard against Askari infiltrations became the nodes through which torture, imprisonment, and execution were acted out and justified, or, when the necessities of struggle come into conflict with cadres' vision of a different world free from the system of oppression? How might we think with and against Foucault when he argues that systematic change and revolutionary practices have the potential to "leave essentially untouched the power relations which form the basis for the functioning of the State"?[100] Does MK's military code not imply that the soldier's signs – "a proud bearing, alertness and quick response to commands, a smart uniform, and respect of leadership, commanders and commissars" – are the actual indicators of the disciplined cadre?[101] And if so, are these not some of the same signs, the "constraints and privations, obligations and prohibitions", that

[99] Gregory Houston and James Ngculu, *Chris Hani: Voices of Liberation*, 272.
[100] Colin Gordon (ed), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other writings, 1972-1977, by Michel Foucault* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 123
[101] From MK's post-Kabwe Military Code.

Foucault recognised in the 'docile' bourgeois armies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?[102]

With this in mind, I want to return to the Douglas Commission, which interviewed Hani about his activities during the 1980s in Angola. According to Hani:

> I was summoned to come and try to solve a mutinous situation. And you must bear in mind that when the Angolan camps were established I was not in Angola. I was in Lesotho doing internal work. I only proceeded there in 1982-3. So, I never had a role in terms of establishing a foundation for our camps. In other words, I got into a situation where there was already a Quatro. I didn't have the benefit of the background in terms of even the detainees. I began to meet people who were already in detention, and I had to try and update myself about each and every one of them.[103]

On the mutinies themselves:

> The loyalists (if I may use that term) overran the camps. Lives were lost on both sides. Very sad, because these were all members of the ANC, fellow South Africans. And that was the end of my role. I was never a member of the tribunal which tried them. A tribunal was set up by the ANC to try them, and some of them were sentenced to death. And executed – it was a big number, about eighteen or nineteen, I can't remember. I rushed back to Lusaka and said to the leadership: stop the executions.[104]

Tellingly, after this interview with Hani, the Douglas Commission claimed that he was complicit in the torture, detention, and execution without trial of MK mutineers and concluded:

> On the evidence and the possibilities, I have no hesitation in concluding that Hani was a leading figure in the reign of terror unleashed by the ANC/SACP on its members in exile.
>
> The broad 'excuse' or 'justification' enunciated by the apologists for the ANC/SACP for this murderous reign of terror was the fact that enemy agents

[102] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 11.
[103] 'The Report of the Douglas Commission, 1993'.
[104] Ibid.

> did infiltrate MK with serious consequences for its cadres. The movement, so they say, needed protection for such infiltration and destabilisation.
>
> I have no hesitation whatsoever that the South African Security Police did infiltrate the ANC/SACP and MK.
>
> But such infiltration could never justify the atrocities perpetrated in the camps. In any event no-one can seriously contend that all 900 mutineers were 'enemy agents'. Even a genuine enemy agent was entitled to better treatment than this. The ANC's own Freedom Charter states that imprisonment shall only be for serious crimes against the people, and shall aim at re-education, not vengeance. Manifestly these ANC members were in total breach of their own Charter.[105]

It is clear that the Douglas Commission and other evidence presented shrouds this period in uncertainty and troubles the idea of Hani as revolutionary and disciplined cadre par excellence. It also, ironically, places Hani between the young cadre who co-authored the Hani Memorandum and who was briefly expelled from the party in 1969, and the leader who was to some extent involved in the imprisonment and execution of young cadres just fifteen years later. It is not my intention or place to judge or defend the actions of Hani during this period. Rather, my intention has been to hold these two Hanis and positionalities together in order to demonstrate that the line between the violence of revolutionary struggle and of the state and capital is tenuous and blurred.

Didi-Huberman has suggested that uprisings and political struggle represent both "the best and worst of things."[106] On the one hand, these are corporeal manifestations of a people's desire for freedom, and on the other, to quote Michel Foucault, these "will always risk falling back into the rut" and betraying the revolutionary potential of a people.[107] This is what Didi-

[105] Ibid.
[106] Georges Didi-Huberman, *Uprisings* (Paris: Gallimard, 2016), 56.
[107] Ibid. 331.

Huberman, following Walter Benjamin, referred to as the "unavoidable tragedy of human culture,"[108] a formulation that I suggested in the previous chapter, might provide a generative narrative mode through which to understand the transitional period and the assassination of Chris Hani.

For now, though, I want to end with Foucault's notion of disciplinary power, and more importantly, Deleuze's reading of Foucault on the subject. For Foucault, the emergence of disciplinary power coincided with the development of capitalist and industrial societies, which required a greater degree of organisation and control. Foucault put this very clearly in a particularly memorable passage in *Discipline and Punish,* when speaking about the factory as a model of organisation. In relation to disciplinary power, he wrote:

> Each individual has his own place, and each place its individual. Avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions; analyse confused, massive or transient pluralities… One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulations… Its aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at mastering and using.[109]

As many scholars have pointed out before me, Foucault's reading of disciplinary power in *Discipline and Punish*, had a tendency to produce an idea of a totalising system which inhibited the agency and autonomy of people living with and within the effects of disciplinary power. It is important to recognise that *Discipline and Punish* was not his only

[108] Ibid. 307.
[109] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*: 143.

engagement with disciplinary power. Indeed, Foucault's work traversed a number of interrelated concepts that always included, touched upon, traversed, and even undermined his own arguments about disciplinary power. Here I want to dwell on the question of the subject which Foucault claimed was the "general theme of his research",[110] and the ways in which, as he saw it, individuals and groups resist disciplinary power.

Perhaps the most efficient way to approach this question is to turn to Gilles Deleuze who provided a thorough examination of Foucault on the subject, in his book, *Foucault.* Here, Deleuze was at pains to clarify that Foucault was primarily interested in the ways in which power is resisted. Quoting Foucault, he argues that "'the most intense point of lives, the one where their energy is concentrated, is precisely where they clash with power, struggle with it, endeavour to utilise its forces or escape its traps.'"[111] For Foucault and Deleuze then, the question of the 'outside' of power is paramount:

> the diffuse centres of power do not exist without points of resistance that are in some way primary; and that power does not take life as its objective without revealing or giving rise to a life that resists power; and finally that the force of the outside continues to disrupt the diagrams and turn them upside down….
>
> But what happens when the transversal [a line that intersects two or more lines at different points] relations of resistance continue to become restratified, and to encounter or even to construct knots of power?[112]

My reasons for turning to Deleuze and Foucault should be clear. For what they point toward is the complex ways in which subjects are made through the procedures of disciplinary power (such as in the barracks and in the revolutionary camp); how these subjects refuse power's

[110] Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer, 1982), 777-795: 778.
[111] Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2006), 78.
[112] Ibid. 78.

effects and, we might say, strive to become subjects and cadres of a new type; and most importantly, how they are always already potentially incorporated and folded, violently, back into power's effects. In other words, the 'outside' of power is not outside as such, but always potentially refolded into its effects.

Fundamentally, it seems that this formulation is key to thinking through the ways in which the disciplined cadre was made and remade during and after the anti-apartheid struggle. It might also, provide a lens through which people might continue to resist power's effects:

> If it is true that power increasingly informs our daily lives, our interiority and our individuality; if it has becoming individualizing; if it is true that knowledge itself has become increasingly individuated, forming the hermeneutics [interpretation] and codification of the desiring subject, what remains for our subjectivity?
>
> There never 'remains' anything of the subject, since he is to be created on each occasion, like a focal point of resistance, on the basis of the folds which subjectivize knowledge and bend each power"
>
> The struggle for a modern subjectivity passes through a resistance to the two present forms of subjection, the one consisting of individualising ourselves on the basis of constraints of power, the other of attracting each individual to a known and recognised identity, fixed once and for all. The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the right to difference, variation and metamorphosis.[113]

Conclusion

It should be clear that this chapter is not only concerned with the historical implications of the disciplining the undisciplined cadre. It is also concerned with the ways in which these historical understandings have been inflected and mediated in after apartheid. Indeed, as we have already seen, Hani as disciplined cadre continues to be employed as a means through

[113] Ibid. 87.

which to discipline the alliance, and the nation. In this sense, Hani himself has been disciplined in death, serving as a martyr of the ANC, and as a sign through which different politicians legitimise their own political projects and the policies of the ANC government. As I have suggested, it has also been deployed as a means through which the SACP and successive ANC governments have symbolically deferred further systematic change until a later date (until the arrival of a new man), and as a result affirmed the stalled time of the postapartheid.

There are, however, other ways in which Hani's legacy continues to be understood. In a 2014 *Africa is a Country* article, Sean Jacobs remembered a different figure: an independent and committed soldier against apartheid, and someone who did not shy away from criticising the movement and its leaders. To demonstrate this claim, Jacobs referred to the 1969 Hani Memorandum, and the reality that during the latter years of apartheid, Hani was an outspoken critic of negotiations and the suspension of armed struggle and was clearly mindful of the routes and destinations that a negotiated settlement might lead to. For Jacobs, despite being lionised and "invoked in speeches and songs, the principles [Hani] stood for no longer animate the political project of the liberation movement he laid down his life for". And it seems that these principles for Jacobs are anathema to the idea of Hani as "loyal, disciplined and responsible cadre", and therefore, we might argue, work to challenge the order of things.[114]

[114] Sean Jacobs, 'Chris Hani's Political Legacy', *Africa is a Country*, 4 October 2014, https://africasacountry.com/2014/04/the-late-chris-hanis-political-legacy

Chapter Five

Desiring justice: Archives of dissensus and the ghosts of apartheid

Despite the 'truth' claims made in films like 'The Bloody Miracle', the news report in *The Citizen* about Mandela having been booed at a rally, points toward ambiguities within the historical record and a more contested and uncertain time. It also highlights histories which restore other political organisations such as the PAC and the people of South Africa more generally as agents of a heterogeneous and contested struggle. Furthermore, the report enables the contradictory character of political struggle itself to be marked. As with 'The Bloody Miracle' Mandela's booing might be seen as troubling problematic binaries between 'good' and 'evil' by highlighting how attendees expressed a xenophobia that Hani himself would have publicly criticised. But unlike 'The Bloody Miracle' it also highlights a far more contested, and unresolved struggle, one that among other things troubles the image of Mandela as 'great man' of history. In short, rather than exerting "a debilitating power over… doubt", the newspaper report highlighted above demonstrates that the media, history, and the archive (or our accounting of it) cannot always be adequately trusted.[1]

It should by now be clear that it is not my intention to undermine Mandela's contribution to the struggle against apartheid, nor his role in the transition from apartheid to democracy. Clearly, as *Newsnight* correspondent Alan Little suggested, Mandela was a "brilliant political

[1] Achille Mbembe, 'The Power of the Archive and its Limits', in Carolyn Hamilton (et al), *Refiguring the Archive* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 2002), 21.

operator", and his establishment as a "moral authority" during this period helped to ensure the defeat of the National Party in the elections, and to stave off the threat of civil war.[2]

In Achille Mbembe's words, one of the conventional functions of the archive is to order the inevitable disorderliness of history:

> There will always remain traces of the deceased, and struggles engaged in or evaded. Archives are born from a desire to reassemble these traces rather than destroy them. The function of the archive is to thwart the dispersion of these traces and the possibility, always there, that left to themselves, they might eventually acquire a life of their own. Fundamentally, the dead should be formally prohibited from stirring up disorder in the present…. Assigning them to this place makes it possible to establish an unquestionable authority over them and to tame the violence and cruelty of which the 'remains' are capable, especially when these are abandoned to their own devices.

As mentioned before, Tom Lundborg has referred to these traces as lost events and has suggested that fragments such as these have the potential to challenge the limits of the historical record. These also point to a different politics of historical production.[3] However, as Mbembe further argues:

> Through archived documents, we are presented with pieces of time to be assembled, fragments of life to be placed in order, one after the other, in an attempt to formulate a story that acquires its coherence through the ability to craft links between the beginning and the end. A montage of fragments thus creates an illusion of totality and continuity.[4]

This type of selection, ordering, and classification speaks to processes through which the past has been memorialised into strict, regimented forms. It speaks to arguments made earlier in

[2] Alan Little, 'NEWSNIGHT: How Mandela responded to the assassination of Chris Hani', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOn24d9xwYQ
[3] Tom Lundborg, *The Politics of the Event*, 98.
[4] Achille Mbembe, 'The Power of the Archive and its Limits', 21.

this dissertation, about the tendency of different nationalisms and their archives to produce monumental, 'concrete truths', while marginalising or silencing others. It also points to arguments about the agency of the dead and the processes through which the dead and the living are policed and disciplined through certain modes of remembering and forgetting. And it speaks to subsequent processes through which the historian and 'the expert or 'rational man' attempts to craft links between fragments, and by doing so, creates an "illusion of totality and continuity".[5] In short, the type of archival and historical production Mbembe spoke of in *Refiguring the Archive*, is one that embodies a colonial or Eurocentric mode of seeing, knowing, and organising the world.

Working against this type of violence means further unravelling the ways in which archives of the anti-apartheid struggle, and its subsequent histories, produce knowledge, power, and 'truth' about the apartheid past and the postapartheid present. How do postanti-apartheid archivists and historians avoid reproducing the logics and discourses of colonial archives? And how do they evade the same traps when selecting and organising archival fragments, as I have tried to do throughout this study? If, as Jacques Derrida suggests, the archive is as much about the future as it is the past, then what is our responsibility to those who come after, and to those who continue to face the violence of imperialism, colonialism, and of apartheid?[6] Finally, what is our debt as historians and archivists to those who came before? If, as Didi-Huberman argues, it is the historian and poet's responsibility not to shy away from the truth and horrors of the holocaust, colonialism, and apartheid, then how could archives of the anti-

[5] Ibid.
[6] Anne Laura Stoler, 'On Archiving as Dissensus', in *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 43, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2018), 50.

apartheid struggle be used as a means through which to hold history and institutions of power to account?[7]

Following *Remains of the Social*, I will try to attend to the problem of how we might learn to live on in the wake of colonialism and apartheid and the type of violence that these interconnected systems produced and normalised globally.[8] I will begin by further tracing a genealogy of political and philosophical thought that attends to a contested, contingent, and tragic reading of historical change and human action. Then, I will offer a series of disconnected but interrelated archival fragments that I see as troubling the historical record and ideas about time and historical change as progress and as succession. After this, I will return to the work of Didi-Huberman and Jacques Derrida as a means through which to speak with the ghosts of apartheid and of the anti-apartheid struggle and attend to what remains in their wake. One of the many ways through which to come to terms with this violence, is to reckon with histories of struggle and transition that have often failed to come to terms with the question of justice after apartheid. At the same time, I hope to start a reckoning with my own debt and obligation as a historian invested in a future free from global apartheid and exploitative capitalism.

Encountering histories and archives of dissensus

One way of beginning to address these concerns is to follow Ann-Laura Stoler's call for the production or creation of 'archives of dissensus', which are "accountable to a visceral, living

[7] Georges Didi-Huberman, *Images in spite of all: our photographs from Auschwitz* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3.
[8] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social*.

space of contestation"[9] and attentive to different "ways of knowing and living."[10] Following Foucault, she suggests that new objects be made "available to thought", objects that, in spite of convention, are "dense, impacted, charged sites of contest and contradiction."[11] Critically for Stoler, the archive is not, as Derrida claims, an "impenetrable center… of authority", nor is it "hermetically sealed from the tactical intrusions of those who intend to countervail their command."[12] Colonial and nationalist "archives are [instead] constantly transgressed and upturned, their premises of order called into question from both within and outside of the corridors of power". In short, if colonial archives have been used to discipline the dead and history itself, they can, as Kirsten Weld has argued when writing about archival activism in Guatemala today, also be understood as crucial sites for the "defence of democracy" and for "building bottom-up movements for accountability, representation, and justice."[13]

This critical observation by Stoler, as well as by Weld, points to two broad threads through which to think archival practices and historical production. Riffing of Jacques Rancière's distinction between police and the polis or politics, Stoler suggests that there are archives that police and control the "distribution of what our senses can process", and there are also archives of dissensus that "recuperate… sensibilities and sensory regimes", "make… visible that which had no reason to be seen" and trouble the normative ways in which 'rational man' produces 'truth' and historical certainty.[14]

[9] Anne Laura Stoler, 'On Archiving as Dissensus', 44.
[10] Ibid. 45.
[11] Ibid. 46.
[12] Ibid. 49.
[13] Kirsten Weld, 'No Democracy Without Archives', *Boston Review: A political and literary forum*, 9 July 2020 https://bostonreview.net/global-justice/kirsten-weld-no-democracy-without-archives
[14] Anne Laura Stoler, 'On Archiving as Dissensus', 46.

I see Stoler's 'archives of dissensus', Lundborg's 'lost event', Jenny Edkins's 'trauma time', and Patricia Hayes's 'reject photographs' as abiding by an approach to historical production and concepts of time and temporality that can be traced back to Walter Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History'. Here I want to begin by turning to Didi-Huberman's work on uprisings, montage and the gesture, as well as John Akomfrah's seminal art film, 'The Last Angel of History', which riffs of Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', and further elaborates my thinking around these questions.[15]

Afro-futurist, anti-imperialist, and for want of a better word, decolonial in character, 'The Last Angel of History', does the work of subverting colonial ways of knowing and seeing, and through the process of assembling a montage of fragments of Black culture and critique, produces histories that are not only attentive to legacies and systems of oppression and violence, but also potentially liberatory futures. In this sense, 'The Last Angel of History' can be understood as a practice of historical and archival dissensus, one that, to repeat Stoler, "recuperate[s]… sensibilities and sensory regimes" and "make[s]… visible that which had no reason to be seen". The main protagonist in 'The Last Angel of History' is the Data Thief, who "two-hundred years into the future… is told a story:

> If you can find the crossroads, a crossroads, this crossroads, if you can make an archaeological dig into this crossroads, you'll find fragments, techno-fossils. And if you can put those elements, those fragments together, you'll find the code. Crack that code and you'll have the keys to your future.

[15] John Akomfrah, 'The Last Angel of History', https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=akomrah+last+angel+of+history

“Surfing across the internet of Black culture, breaking into the vaults, breaking into the rooms, stealing fragments, fragments from cyber-culture, techno-culture, and narrative culture”, the Data Thief goes back and forth through time and space and encounters Robert Johnson, the Blues, Jazz, and Hip-hop; George Clinton and P-Funk; Derrick May, Juan Atkins and Detroit Techno; Goldie, A Guy Called Gerald, Break-Beat and Jungle music; Ismael Reed, Greg Tate, Samuel R. Delany, Octavia Butler and Black science fiction; Sun-Ra’s Arkestra and Lee Scratch Perry’s Black-Ark. As such, the Data Thief begins to reconstruct histories (and futures) of the Black radical tradition, splicing together cultural and political fragments to produce a kaleidoscopic image of different, but interlinked traditions of the Black diaspora.

The Data Thief’s exploration in effect, produces a sense of solidarity, synergy, and sometimes friction across time and space: between British Jungle and Detroit Techno; between US Funk and Jazz and Caribbean Reggae and Dub; between Black Science Fiction and the trans-Atlantic Slave trade; and between what film critic Kodwo Eshun calls an “Africa as a lost continent in the past and… Africa as an alien future”. This connection between the future and the past is expressed by Black astronaut, Dr Bernard A. Harris Jnr, who in the opening scenes of the film informs the Data Thief about his hope to visit the African continent and to “acknowledge that Black people were the first astronomers and mathematicians in this world… [I]t seems only natural that one of their sons would come back from space and say, hey, look what we have accomplished.”

This brief reading of 'The Last Angel of History' does not do justice to the complex and complicated questions, debates, and histories that Akomfrah puts into play, particularly what he, and his interlocutors draw out about the use of technology by African American musicians and young Black British musicians to create sonic visions of the end of the industrial era. What particularly interests me is Akomfrah's clear gesture toward Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', and how this gesture produces certain claims about historical and archival production and intervenes in debates about our concept of time and temporality. For Akomfrah's 'Last Angel of History' is not merely concerned with recuperating histories of radical Black thought. As with Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', 'The Last Angel of History' is also constituted through a powerful critique of historicist notions of history and time, and from a shared anti-racist and anti-fascist position, albeit at different points.

In the 1930s, Benjamin wrote in response to the rise of fascism and European nationalism, but also to what he saw as the ineptitude of the European left in dealing with it. As David Scott explains:

> For Benjamin, as we know, as the European 1930s grew more perilous, a central, urgent intellectual-political task was to subvert the prevailing historicist philosophy of time and the conformist assumptions about change drawn from it (by social democrats and Marxists alike) and to provoke – indeed, to will – an untimely temporal sensibility for the future in the present. This is the role played in his thought by the theological idea of the "messianic" and "messianism," especially in that memorable work, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," where its function is to help disabuse the present of the illusion of a future that is waiting elsewhere than the possible, graspable, now. The Benjaminian intuition was of the out-of-jointness of time in history, or of time with history.[16]

[16] David Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 6-7.

This "historicist philosophy of time" refers to the idea of history as progress, and what Scott has described as a romanticised conception of time that places man (and the nation) in control of his destiny and understands history as though it "were heading somewhere; from bondage to freedom, from despair to triumph".[17] On the other hand, messianic time is, in Benjamin's memorable phrase "time filled by the presence of the now".[18] In other words, as I see it, the future, and the past, for Benjamin, were located in and defined by our actions and ideas in the present. Unlike historicism, which is driven by the inevitable progress of humankind and eschatological predictions about the end of capitalism, messianic time is embodied by potentiality and for that reason cannot be prescribed in advance by nationalist mythmaking, the 'logic' of global economic markets, or 'historicist dogma'.

Jacques Derrida perfectly illustrated this relationship or friction between historicism and the messianic in the beginning of his autobiographical film, 'Derrida':

> In general, I try to distinguish between what one calls the future and "l'avenir". The future is that which – tomorrow, later, next century – will be. There's a future which is predictable, programmed, scheduled, foreseeable. But there is a future, l'avenir (to come), which refers to someone who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future. That which is totally unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So if there is a real future beyond this other known future, it's l'avenir in that it's the coming of the Other when I am completely unable to foresee their arrival.[19]

[17] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 166.
[18] Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', 261.
[19] Kirby Dick and Amy Zeiring, 'Derrida', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J5HOJISEXvA

In another text, Benjamin employed the idea of the destructive character, which for me thickens his ideas about messianic time, and adds to what Didi-Huberman has called an attentiveness to the "unavoidable tragedy of human culture":[20]

> The destructive character has the consciousness of historical man, whose deepest emotion is an insuperable mistrust of the course of things and a readiness at all times to recognize that everything can go wrong… The destructive character sees nothing permanent… But for this reason he sees ways everywhere… Because he sees ways everywhere, he always stands at the crossroads.[21]

Scott's reading of the tragic as described in the previous chapter, also drew from this 'Benjaminian intuition', one that "oblige[s] us to adopt a certain scepticism to what has gone before and a certain caution in how we judge the remainder of the story to come".[22] In the wake of fascism and Nazism as well as Soviet Communism (Benjamin), the end of socialist revolutionary expectation (Scott), histories of slavery, colonialism and violence across the Black diaspora (Akomfrah), and with the recurrence of fascism in Europe and the US today, it seems that this scepticism about the course of history was and still is necessary. However, as Benjamin's notion of the destructive character demonstrates, this political and philosophical position is not one of acquiescence. Indeed, it seems that for Benjamin, the impermanence of historical change fills the future with potentiality, and it is this potential that Akomfrah conjures in his conversations across time and space. In short, rather than creating a sense of time as progress and sequential, 'The Last Angel of History' opens historical and archival production to the possibility of futures that, although not free from

[20] Georges Did-Huberman, *Uprisings* (Gallimard: Jeu de Paume, 2016), 307.
[21] Ibid. 309.
[22] David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 166.

histories and experiences of violence and systemic oppression, are potentially unmoored from this destination.

One of the ways in which Akomfrah does this is by making the cultural, technological, and social tools of the Black diaspora available in the present, and by creating temporal and spatial solidarities between past, present, and future struggles. It seems that another is his use of montage as an aesthetic and technological tool that splices archival fragments and interviews across time and space. According to Didi-Huberman, montage is one of the principal modes through which to transmit a sense of history and futurity as open, aleatory, and potentially liberatory. Much like Stoler's arguments raised earlier, in *Uprising*s Didi-Huberman called for a fusing together of "new images, new thoughts, or new possibilities of action" so that the world might continue to rise up in the face of what he, following Bertolt Brecht, Frederick Nietzsche and Benjamin, called these "dark times."[23] In other words, *Uprisings*, like 'The Last Angel of History' as I see it, is meant as an aesthetic and political gesture which works against "nihilistic submission" and hopes to offer a means through which to keep open our "horizon of expectation", to imagine alternatives to the violent worlds in which we live, and to put the gestures and desires of past struggles to work today.[24]

As already intimated, Didi-Huberman did this by employing montage himself throughout *Uprisings*, which includes what he called "a visual atlas of conflicts".[25] This is a catalogue of over one hundred images comprised of photographs of uprisings and protest, as well as

[23] Georges Did-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 345.
[24] Ibid. 15.
[25] Ibid. 292.

revolutionary posters, journals, artworks, and other materials. Alone, each image (or gesture) could be read as a particular example of revolutionary art, or of specific political movements and revolutionary events. However, together they produced a vision of an endless, collective scream, a gesture toward freedom, which was meant to both trace the histories, gestures, and often tragic character of uprisings, and to put the world as we know it into motion. In short, this was a kaleidoscopic vision of the whole world rising-up and in motion. Furthermore, in the text itself Didi-Huberman traced the struggle of refugees for minimum hospitality in Europe today, to the struggles of Cuban students in 1956 against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, the Black Panthers in the US (1960s), the Odessa Uprising (1905), and the allegorical struggles of Atlas, Prometheus, and Eve. By so doing he suggested that the whole world was and always has been rising up, and that this rising, interpreted by the author as an expression of our desire for freedom, was intrinsic to human behavior. As he put it, following Albert Camus, "I rebel – therefore we exist."[26]

For Didi-Huberman, Chris Marker's 'Le fond de l'air est rouge', perfectly illustrated this commitment to montage as aesthetic practice.[27] In this film, Marker created a timeless global uprising through the juxtaposition of footage from different times and space. By splicing scenes from Eisenstein's Battleship Potempkin (a 1925 film about the 1905 uprising in Odessa) with footage of twentieth century uprisings in the US, Europe and elsewhere, the opening scenes of 'Le fond de l'air est rouge' worked to scatter "struggles to every point of the globe, and to every moment of history, as though to give the multiple image of a *whole*

[26] Ibid. 319.
[27] Chris Marker, 'Le Fond De L'air Est Rouge' (Tr. 'The Essence of the Air is Red' 1977). The English name of the film is 'A Grin without a Cat', https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zP1AoocnoXM&list=PLEIYHjTrk-Z_bOoo2bBUJuJy6qgMC2PcP

world rising up."[28] According to Didi-Huberman, this montage effect produced "a profound solidarity that links the subjects with their mourning and their desires; but which also joins the times themselves with their interposed images." [29]

Didi-Huberman's concern with images and photographs is to work against the idea of them as static representations of a frozen moment in time, to reinvigorate them with a sense of dynamic historicity, to see them, like a film, as 'movement-images' in Deleuzian terms, and to trace what Hayes (writing about Didi-Huberman's gesture) has called our "fundamental pathos", through the history of our collective gestures toward freedom and justice.[30] The importance of montage as aesthetic and technological practice is, then, found in its ability to illuminate the dynamic and historical aspect of our desires. In short, the acts of splicing archival fragments across time and space on the part of Didi-Huberman, Marker and Akomfrah has the effect of enlivening the archive and therefore has the potential to put the past, present, and future into motion. As Didi-Huberman puts it, following Georgio Agamben in 'Notes on Gesture': "Cinema leads images back to the homeland of gesture…. The duty of the director is to introduce into this dream the element of awakening."[31]

It is important to stress that *Uprisings* was not a utopian text. It was as much a pragmatic warning about the processes through which a people's potency becomes a struggle for power, as it was a political thesis that called forth the uprising and the great refusal. To quote

[28] Georges Didi-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 292.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Patricia Hayes, 'Photographic Publics and Photographic Desires in 1980s South Africa', *Photographies*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2017), 319.
[31] Georges Did-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 55.

Mondzain, uprisings for Didi-Huberman represent both "the best and worst of things"[32], on the one hand, because they are corporeal manifestations of a people's desire for freedom, and, on the other, following Foucault, because they "will always risk falling back into the rut"[33] and betraying the revolutionary potential of a people. This attentiveness to the "unavoidable tragedy of human culture"[34] is what animates Didi-Huberman's work, and is what makes *Uprisings* both a burdensome and uplifting text: burdensome because Didi-Huberman actively inherits and passes on a debt, an ethics and a (non-utopian) politics of struggle, and uplifting because he offers gestures of resistance so that an 'I', a 'we', a people might continue to struggle in the face of these dark times.[35]

The assassination of Martin Thembisile 'Chris' Hani: Conspiracy, rumour and myth

I now want to return to Evelyn Groenink's investigation into the assassination of Hani, and the proliferation of speculation, rumour and conspiracy surrounding this event. For it seems that Groenink's testimony and investigation might shed further light on the ways in which the archive might run up against and trouble normative modes of historical production and ideas about historical progress. As argued before, and in terms of narrative form, I see Groenink's account as expressing a certain tragic scepticism about the transitional period from apartheid to democracy and the postapartheid. However, I also see it as a vital piece of journalistic investigation driven by a deep commitment to justice, and one that both touches on the truth

[32] Ibid. 56.
[33] Ibid. 331.
[34] Ibid. 307.
[35] As Frederick Jameson explains, Derrida following Benjamin, refers to this type of politics as a 'weak messianic power', one that holds onto the idea of a future free from capitalism and violence without succumbing to utopian thinking. See, Frederick Jameson, 'Marx's Purloined Letter', 33.

of Hani's assassination and blurs the boundaries between truth, rumour, and conspiracy in important ways.

First, I want to briefly provide an official account of Hani's assassination so as to further contextualise narratives about this event. The TRC's official report offered perhaps the most conclusive and thorough account of Hani's assassination, concluding that Waluś and Derby-Lewis worked alone, while at the same time acknowledging that others may have been involved:

> Chris Hani was gunned down on Easter weekend 1993 at his home in Dawn Park. Polish immigrant Januzs Waluś [AM0270/96] and CP MP Mr Clive Derby Lewis [AM0271/96] applied for amnesty for the killing. Hani's death led to fears of widespread reprisals and counter-reprisals that could derail the negotiations and an international team was set up to probe his assassination. Both Walus and Derby-Lewis were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Allegations still abound that a wider conspiracy was involved in the assassination. Some of those alleged to have been involved (names withheld at this stage) have also been implicated in intelligence documents as part of the so-called 'Inner Circle' or 'Binnekring' of 67 members of special forces (mainly CCB) and MI allegedly set up in July 1990. According to the former Transkei Intelligence Service they were tasked to carry out special operations by top generals in former MI structures.[36]

It is no secret that Hani's assassination has always been shrouded in conspiracy and rumour, both at official and unofficial levels. At the Hani Memorial, different political parties such as the SACP, the ANC and COSATU, as well as SACP General Secretary, Blade Nzimande and Limpho Hani, have made persistent calls for the truth about Hani's assassination and for the reopening of the investigation. Within the mainstream media, as well as on social media, such narratives have also been common, and have often been linked to critiques of the ruling party

[36] *Volume Two: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 29 October 1998), https://justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm, 653.

that focus on Hani's incorruptible character and his unwavering commitment to socialism and/or the South African people. However, before Groenink mounted her accusations, which included the involvement of ANC leaders (particularly Joe Modise), the National Party, British and apartheid Military Intelligence, and military contractor, British Aerospace, very few have been able to construct an alternative albeit inconclusive account of his assassination.

Largely aided by evidence from the police docket that Groenink was fortunate enough to obtain, and interviews with eyewitnesses, Groenink was able to assemble a series of fragments that, she claimed, revealed several inconsistencies in the police investigation, contradictory evidence, and the possibility of a police cover up. Several eyewitness accounts suggested the existence of at least one more car that had tailed Hani on his way home from the shops, and the presence of another potential assassin, 'Alex the Greek', who was supposedly linked to Waluś and who was interviewed by police during the initial investigation.[37] According to Groenink, cigarette butts and a soda can that were found at the next-door neighbour's house, also indicated the presence of someone monitoring the Hani residence at the time of his assassination.[38] And eyewitness accounts undermined the state's 'star witness', Retha Harmse, who Groenink claimed, provided contradictory evidence during her police interview. This, for Groenink, suggested that rather than 'coming to the rescue' with vital information as Mandela suggested in his live television address to the nation, Harmse had been involved in the assassination and perhaps worked for one of the many

[37] Evelyn Groenink, *Incorruptible: The story of the murders of Dulcie September, Anton Lubowski and Chris Hani* (Self Published by Evelyn Groenink, 2018), 272.
[38] Ibid. 266.

secret service agencies active in the country at the time.[39] Perhaps the most important aspect of Groenink's account, however, was her accusation that apartheid's Military Intelligence had intervened in the investigation and made sure that certain important aspects of the case would not be investigated by local police, who were themselves accused of intimidating witnesses who offered contradictory evidence.[40]

Although Groenink herself could not find conclusive proof, her investigations and accusations were informed by and corroborated by eyewitness accounts, by allies within the police force, by the TRC and by the anti-apartheid movement itself, as well as by Hani family members and friends. According to Groenink,

> Limpho Hani had said all along that she didn't believe Janusz Waluś was a lone killer. 'I even told the policemen who came to my house about that can and the cigarette butts. Someone had clearly waited there, in cahoots with the shooter. But they didn't listen to me. In the end I chased them away.
>
> Noxolo Grootboom [one of Groenink's eyewitnesses] nods, she knows about the mysterious cool drink and cigarette butts. She also feels that there could have been two killers. After all, Nomakwezi Hani, the 14-year-old-daughter, had heard two cars drive away after the shots rang out. And a local police representative, a Captain Meyer of the Boksburg police, who had first addressed the press on that very day had spoken of two killers as well. But all that had been buried.[41]

I would suggest that Groenink's accounts of the assassinations of Hani, of ANC activist, Dulcie September, and of South-west African People's Organisation (SWAPO) activist and lawyer, Anton Lubowski are compelling enough for each investigation to be reopened.[42] That they have not, perpetuates rumours about their deaths, as well as doubt and uncertainty about

[39] Ibid. 278-280.
[40] Ibid. 293.
[41] Ibid. 266.
[42] In the years since its publication, Groenink's investigation into September's death in particular has rightly drawn much support and developed into a campaign to reopen the case.

the transitional period from apartheid to democracy. I am not primarily interested in Groenink's account because of the claims she makes about the circumstances of Hani's death. Although her investigations into the September, Lubowski and Hani assassinations are extremely important, particularly because of what they reveal about the social, political, and economic landscapes of southern Africa during the anti-apartheid struggle and the time of transition, I am specifically interested in what Groenink's investigation tells us about historical production, 'truth telling', and the postapartheid condition. Put another way, I am interested in the conversations that occur on the edges of the evidentiary frame, conversations that, although punctuated by speculation, rumour and myth, are nevertheless important narratives that inflect people's understanding of the history of the anti-apartheid struggle and of transition. Groenink herself offers many commentaries. Particularly important are those that link Hani's assassination to the South African Arms Deal:

> **Johannesburg, 2001**
> The DCC [an elite unit for Military Intelligence named, the Directorate of Covert Collection] had written, in 1992, that Chris Hani should be neutralised. And the 'Murder Inc' military and mercenary network of which the DCC was a crucial part, had, I have come to believe, done just that. Joe Modise, the one who was more 'reasonable', less 'radical', who could be 'talked to', had become Minister of Defence in 1994.
>
> Views differ on whether Chris Hani would have accepted a cabinet post in the first post-apartheid government under Nelson Mandela. 'He wanted to remain an activist,' says one. 'He would have rejected even the *appearance* that he was out to get a posh position.' 'But he would go where the ANC called him,' says another. 'If the ANC would want him to be in charge of the military, he would do it.' But all I speak to agree on the following four things. One, plenty of ANC members, including the vast majority of Umkhonto we Sizwe veterans, would want him to be in leadership. Two, many would strongly advocate for Chris Hani as Minister of Defence or even Deputy President. Three, South Africans would vote for him *en masse*. And four, he would have opposed the arms deal.
>
> That the structures of Murder Inc, which had gained its nickname from South African journalist for a reason, had carried out the assassination of Chris Hani is to me, at this stage, beyond doubt. But between the arms dealers, the establishment, and Joe Modise, erstwhile commander of the guerrilla army and

> later Minister of Defence, who had given the greenlight? And what had the motive been exactly? That a US$6 billion arms deal, which he would have opposed, had to go through? Had there perhaps been *another* mafia-type deal going on that I wasn't aware of? Or had an even broader goal been served: to remove someone who was honest, and a communist, and immensely popular from the entire South African political scene?[43]

This claim was corroborated in *Incorruptible* by unnamed Umkhonto we Sizwe combatants who had been close to Hani, suggesting that Modise and other leaders within MK were "selling them out":[44]

> 'Modise and his coterie had so many parties with foreign visitors. There were gifts, trips, dinners, cars. Everybody wanted to be the best friend of South Africa's future military bosses. But us ordinary soldiers felt abandoned. We had no houses, no jobs. Chris would fight for us.'
>
> 'It wasn't that we were jealous, that we also wanted things. It was really about the ideals we fought for. We were supposed to be the backbone of a better country, ready to support a better government. It was so hurtful to see what was going on. Even already in 1991. Our people were being killed in the streets by Inkhatha and the police, but our High Command couldn't care less.
>
> [Ex-MK combatant 'Nomsa'] then tells me about the first MK conference on South African soil, held in August 1991 in Thohoyandau, capital of the former black homeland of Venda. 'There were Western arms dealers there. We were shocked to see how close they were to our leadership. Modise and his friends told us their presence was very secret and that we should not ask questions, since they were there to 'help us start new lives'. They told us we were going to get help with businesses and careers. We would have to keep quiet about it, 'because these people didn't want to be seen to be helping us.'[45]

Although the first concerns about the South African Arms Deal were officially raised by Patricia de Lille in parliament in September 1999, "some components of the Strategic Arms Procurement Package were first discussed in modernization programs dating back to the last

[43] Ibid. 295-296.
[44] Ibid. 308.
[45] Ibid. 308-309.

days of apartheid."[46] As The World Peace Forum and Corruption Tracker have explained, one of the most significant allegations that led to the prosecution of an admittedly limited number of people close to then Defence Minister Joe Modise and former President Jacob Zuma, focused upon BAE System's fighter jet tender:

> The alleged corruption associated with the package was meant to give each bidder an advantage in the requirements-setting and tender processes. BAE's offerings for the fighter trainer aircraft tender, the Hawk and Saab Gripen, were originally eliminated in March 1997 on cost grounds, but became viable after a controversial revision of requirements later that summer. In particular, then-defence minister Joe Modise (who died in 2001) unilaterally decided to remove cost as a consideration for the package of fighter and trainer aircraft, which was ultimately awarded to BAE Systems and Saab for the Gripen fighter aircraft (Saab/BAE) and the Hawk trainer (BAE). The bribes were allegedly offered in cash, in gifts, and in preferential selection of industrial partners.[47]

Importantly, one of Groenink's interlocutors suggested that "If Chris had lived there wouldn't have been an arms deal. He wanted to spend on houses, schools, hospitals", and this, for Groenink, pointed toward 'inside' involvement in his assassination.[48] Similarly, September who was assassinated in Paris on 29 March 1988, and Lubowski who was killed in Windhoek on 12 September 1989, were, Groenink claimed, assassinated because the former had been investigating a corrupt nuclear arms deal between the apartheid state and the French government,[49] and because the latter had refused a series of demands for bribes related to casino rights, oil and diamonds in Namibia.[50]

[46] World Peace Foundation, 'The South African Arms Deal', *Corruption Tracker*, 28 November 2020, https://corruption-tracker.org/case/the-south-african-arms-deal
[47] Ibid.
[48] Evelyn Groenink, *Incorruptible*, 312.
[49] Ibid. 327-328.
[50] Ibid. 234-235.

Whether backed by conclusive proof or not, these accusations remain tied up with the legacy and politics of the transition from apartheid to democracy and continue to haunt the history of the ANC's struggle against apartheid. In October 2014, it was reported that

> the arms deal activist Terry Crawford-Browne went before the Arms Deal Commission and dropped a bombshell. He claimed that the person really responsible for the assassination of Chris Hani in 1993 may have been former Defence Minister Joe Modise. … Crawford-Brown's main claim is that Modise had been involved in corruption for some time. He also says that Hani knew about this, and was about to expose him. He points out that the genesis of the Arms Deal itself lies in the days before the ANC became the government, and while it was in fact preparing to govern. He suggests Modise was being wined and dined by arms manufacturers from the late 1980s, when it was realised that South Africa under an ANC government would have to re-arm. [51]

I have already argued that the survival of Hani would probably not have ensured a future free from the type of violence that colonialism and apartheid normalised. However, what I find important about these types of claims is what they do to our ideas about the postapartheid and the transitional period, rather than their relative 'truth'. In other words, I do not want to speculate about Hani as incorruptible character who would have ensured a more just and fair future in South Arica. For it is clear that although Hani was an outspoken critic of negotiations and did not trust the interests of big-business and the apartheid state, it is also clear that Groenink's claims about his incorruptible character are much easier to make because Hani did not live longer than 1993.

Put another way, although Hani stated that if necessary he would remove the SACP from the alliance in order to act as "watchdogs for democracy", and to advance the socialist and

[51] Stephen Grootes, 'Chris Hani and the Arms Deal Bombshell: A Death that Still Hangs Over Us', *Daily Maverick*, 8 October 2014, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-10-08-chris-hani-and-the-arms-deal-bombshell-a-death-that-still-hangs-over-us/

democratic ideals that he dedicated his life to,[52] it is impossible to know what the future of Hani and South Africa would have been, had he survived that day in 1993. What is important for me is how Hani as martyr, as pure incorruptible character, has been made available for certain critiques of postanti-apartheid corruption and the ways in which the ideals of struggle have been mobilised and weaponised for capital and for the continued oppression and exploitation of South Africa and its people.

Following Luise White, I do not see these assessments as mere speculation, but as powerful critiques that reveal contradictions within the historical record, such as the contradiction between the ideals of struggle and the reality of what happened when political organisations and liberation movements took power after colonial rule.[53] The relative truth of rumours and conspiracies that circulate around the assassination of Chris Hani are, therefore, sometimes less important than the question of how and why they are told. To paraphrase White, what makes a rumour powerful is not it's 'truth', but that people believe it.[54]

I see these types of allegations as being constitutive of an exchange of information and knowledge, which can create intimacy as well as opposition between different people. As White, quoting Max Gluckman, put it, "a most important part of gaining membership in any group is to learn its scandals."[55] As such, narratives about the fate of postapartheid South

[52] Chris Hani, 'The Tasks of the Party in a Democratic South Africa', interview with Padraig O'Malley, 1992, in Gregory Houston and James Ngculu, *Chris Hani: Voices of Liberation*: (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2014), 227.
[53] For history itself, these types of claims about factionalism, political infighting and the possible involvement of Modise and other leaders of the Tripartite Alliance in Hani's assassination, reaffirm the contested and fractious character of political struggle in southern Africa.
[54] Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 54.
[55] Ibid. 56.

Africa and the assassination of Hani which trouble the 'monumental truths' of the nation-state, have as much importance for the nation as the types of monuments found at the Hani Memorial and at Freedom Park. Unlike the concrete monuments of the nation-state however, such narratives circulate throughout society and produce histories of struggle that trouble our notions of the past and what it means to be an active, critical citizen today. In the same breath, they potentially articulate ideas about a future free from apartheid and the violence and corruption that it produced, normalised, and maintained. As argued before, these types of accounts can be seen as haunting the nation-state in ways that cannot be contained or governed by the discursive frames, monumental projects, and temporality of the state, which as I see it, ultimately seek closure and the end of a politics that has the state as its target.

It follows that rumour, myth, conjecture, and speculation should not be seen as "events misinterpreted and deformed, but rather events analyzed and commented upon"[56] that allow people to speak about and "participate in the civil societies that manage them".[57] Again, as White following Foucault argues, the "very act of talking about oneself, or others, disciplines; the very practices of sorting out the epistemologies that shock and scandalize creates and catalogues ideas about deviance and virtue, which are enforced with each telling. Modern subjects are not only studied, counted, and classified; they speak about these things for themselves. It is how they are managed."[58] In short, if histories of the anti-apartheid struggle have been deployed as "didactic lesson books for dutiful students of the struggle

[56] Ibid. 55.
[57] Luise White, *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo*, 61.
[58] Luise White, *Speaking with Vampires*, 57.

that the state hopes to discipline",[59] they have also become important sites through which the state and the ruling party are in turn disciplined, critiqued and held accountable.

Other than his struggle and revolutionary credentials, it is the things that Hani said about corruption and the type of South African society that he envisaged after apartheid, that are invoked in order to speak back to power and corruption today. One of his many comments that circulates on social media is the following:

> What I fear is that the liberators emerge as elitists who drive around in Mercedes Benz's and use the resources of this country to live in palaces and to gather riches. The perks of a new government are not really appealing to me. Everybody would like to have a good job, a good salary, but for me that is not the all of struggle. What is important is the continuation of struggle. The real problems of the country are not whether one is in Cabinet but what we so for social upliftment of the working masses of our country. We need to create the pathways to give hope to our youth [so] that they can have the opportunity through education and hard work to escape the trap of poverty.[60]

The above words are important for a number of reasons, not least because of what they say about postapartheid South Africa, particularly in relation to 'State Capture' and in the wake of the 2021 imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma for refusing to face charges of corruption. Hani's words seem to return to us as a premonition of the anti-apartheid past that, importantly, speaks to an ethics of struggle which, according to Sean Jacobs, "no longer animate the political project of the liberation movement… [Hani] laid down his life for".[61] As we saw earlier, this legacy has been invoked by Lindiwe Hani at the annual Hani Memorial,

[59] Stephen Davis, 'Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters: Everyday life in the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe (1961-present).' (PhD Thesis: University of Florida, 2010), 11.
[60] Lizeka Tandwa, 'Chris Hani in his own words', 10 April 2018 https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-10-chris-hani-in-his-own-words/
[61] Sean Jacobs, 'Chris Hani's Political Legacy', *Africa is a Country*, 4 October 2014, https://africasacountry.com/2014/04/the-late-chris-hanis-political-legacy

as a means through which to speak truth to power and to hold those in positions of power to account.

These types of speeches and the critiques that emerge with them, should not merely be seen as archival documents to be mined by the historian in order to tell us about the biographical makeup (the desires, politics, ethics, ideals and aspirations) of an individual, nor as a means through which to retroactively inform us how history unfolded. Instead, using Foucault's terminology, they should be seen as discursive tools through which to police and discipline the boundaries between deviance and virtue, the ethical and the unethical, state-violence and justice, truth and lies. As such, they provide important tools through which to trace the desires and aspirations of South Africans today. Through Didi-Huberman's lens, they might also help us to trace the gestures and desires of past, present, and future uprisings, which as he argues, "can go from the tiniest gestures of retreat, to the most gigantic gesture of protest."[62]

Sketching the spectral: Justice and the violence that remains in apartheid's wake

Groenink's investigation might be described as a practice of archival dissensus, one that attempts to piece together fragments and lost events, in order to produce an alternative accounting of southern Africa's histories of struggle and the postcolonial world, and to hold those in positions of power to account. By making claims on truth and justice in the postapartheid, we might also understand *Incorruptible* as gesturing toward alternative futures and as inheriting the type of politics that someone like Didi-Huberman advocates for in

[62] Georges Did-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 16.

Uprisings. In the latter stages of *Incorruptible*, Groenink offers an account of the 'new nightmare' of criminal violence in South Africa. Although this 'nightmare' is more productively understood as a continuation of the type of corruption and violence that apartheid normalised, her account is nevertheless important:

> **Johannesburg, 1994**
> *The new nightmare*
> Apartheid terror has been replaced by criminal terror. The Johannesburg and East Rand townships are wracked by car-theft and arms-smuggling syndicates. Tsotsi comrades operate next to the 'old' gangs and Inkhata. A most terrifying new sport has emerged: jackrolling, whereby groups of armed male youth march into schools and take out girls to rape. 'If only Chris Hani was still here,' is a sigh heard very, very often. I ask a township comrade, formerly from Umkhonto we Sizwe, if he really thinks it would have made a difference. The answer is an emphatic yes. 'Chris knew how to control them, He could even control Inkhata.'
>
> No other township leader, including Tokyo Sexwale, had the charisma and the reputation of Chris Hani; none of them could stand up and stare the young traumatised masses down like he did. 'He was able to quote Shakespeare, talk of the struggle and spell out the ANC's Freedom Charter to shut you up and make you aware that you, youngster, have a role to play to build this country, instead of destroying it,' the same comrade remembers. 'And they knew Chris, they knew Chris was honest and brave. They looked up to him. Without Chris, it became difficult to control the spiral into violence and crime'.[63]

Clearly, Groenink's investigation and account of the assassinations of September, Lubowski and Hani, hinge on the question of justice, something that was briefly posed earlier through the contestation between the individual and the collective. Now, it is important to return to the question of justice which has been narrowly framed within legal frameworks that have often failed to attend to wider, systemic issues.[64] Justice for Hani was always tied up with his socialist ideals:

[63] Evelyn Groenink, *Incorruptible*, 197.
[64] Pablo de Grieff, 'Justice and Reparations', 457.

> Socialism is not about big concepts and heavy theory. Socialism is about decent shelter for those who are homeless, it is about water for those who have no safe drinking water. It is about healthcare. It is about a life of dignity for the old. It is about overcoming the huge divide between urban and rural areas. It is about a decent education for all our people. Socialism is about rolling back the tyranny of the market. As long as the economy is dominated by an unelected, privileged few the case for socialism will exist.[65]

It is this question of socialism and justice that haunts these pages and one that Derrida also took up at the beginning of his book, *Spectres of Marx*, which I turn to, in part, because his book is dedicated to Hani. According to Derrida,

> [O]ne should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure, not even an exemplary figure in the logic of an emblem, a rhetoric of a flag or of martyrdom. A man's life, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol. And this is precisely what a proper name should always name.
>
> As yet… . I recall that it is a communist as such, a communist as communist, whom a Polish emigrant and his accomplices, all the assassins of Chris Hani, put to death a few days ago, April 10th. The assassins themselves proclaimed that they were out to get a communist. They were trying to interrupt negotiations and sabotage and ongoing democratization. This popular hero of the resistance against Apartheid became dangerous and suddenly intolerable, it seems, at the moment which, having decided to devote himself to a minority Communist Party riddled with contradictions, he gave up important responsibilities in the ANC and perhaps any official political or even governmental role he might have held in a country freed of Apartheid.
>
> Allow me to salute the memory of Chris Hani and to dedicate this lecture to him.[66]

Written in the wake of what editors, Bernd Magnus and Stephen Cullenberg, called "the orgy of self-congratulations which followed the 1989 crumbling of the Berlin Wall",[67] and Francis

[65] Lindiwe Hani, 'Chris Hani's daughter remembers her late father'.
[66] Jacques Derrida, 'Dedication', *Specters of Marx*, xiv-xv. *Spectres of Marx* was originally presented as a two-part lecture (22 April and 23 April 1993) at a conference held by the Center for Ideas and Society, University of California.
[67] Bernd Magnus and Stephen Cullenberg, 'Editors Introduction', in Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, vii.

Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis which claimed that "the future… was to become the global triumph of free market economies", Derrida's *Spectres of Marx,* can be situated alongside Scott's concerns in *Omens of Adversity*, about the end of "revolutionary socialist expectation" and the rise of neoliberal politics toward the end of the twentieth century. Like Scott, Derrida began with the "politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations", but also the question of how one might learn to live, finally, in the face of an unjust world and in the name of "victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism."[68] As Derrida put it in his exordium:

> To live, by definition, is not something one learns. Not from oneself, it is not learned from life, taught by life. Only from the other and by death. In any case from other at the edge of life. … If it – learning to live – remains to be done, it can happen only between life and death. Neither in life nor in death *alone*. What happens between two… such as between life and death, can only *maintain itself* with some ghost, can only *talk with or about* some ghost. … So it would be necessary to learn spirits.[69]

For Derrida, the problem of learning to live is firstly a question of justice: "[o]f justice where it is not yet, not yet *there*, where it is no longer", and for "those others who are not yet *there*, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born."[70] It is striking that the above dedication to Hani was immediately followed by an exordium which called for justice for the other, for those who were already dead or not yet born. But what does it mean to attend to this question of justice in a world where processes of re/humanisation, reparation, and restitution, are always already preceded by further human rights violations? Put another way,

[68] Jacques Derrida, 'Exordium', *Spectres of Marx,* xviii.
[69] Ibid. xvii.
[70] Ibid. xviii.

how is one to attend to the question of justice in South Africa, or to the case of the genocide of Namibians during German rule,[71] or to British colonial rule or South African colonial control over Namibia, when ongoing human rights violations are being carried out in Palestine and the Middle East, and in the Mediterranean Sea? And how is one to attend to this question when people across the 'third world' are routinely and systemically stripped of their human rights?

I ask these questions because it seems that this is where Derrida situates the question of justice: between a justice which is 'not yet', 'not yet there', which 'is no longer', and importantly, a justice which is to come. The question of justice requires, for Derrida, something other than knowledge, something other than a legal framework which names injustice but by doing so establishes the parameters and limits of who qualifies for reparations and restitution. In short, justice requires something that goes beyond the legal paradigm, something that genuinely recognises the ongoing violations inherent in capitalism and one that recognises the other as worthy of a just life, a life worth living, no longer reduced to bare life.

Elsewhere, in *Spectres of Marx,* these questions were elaborated on through a notion of spectrality or hauntology. Although a complex debate, one that I do not have the capacity to deal with in its entirety here, it seems that, for Derrida, the spectre is at least in part tied up

[71] I refer to Namibia because of the ongoing case between the German and Namibian governments about the Herero and Himba genocides during German colonialism. See: Franziska Boehme, 'Germany acknowledged colonial atrocities in Namibia as genocide. Victims' groups want more', *The Washington Post*, 9 June 2021 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/09/germany-acknowledged-colonial-atrocities-namibia-genocide-victims-groups-want-more/; Allan D. Cooper, 'Reparations for the Herero Genocide: Defining the Limits of International Litigation', *African Affairs*, Vol. 106, No. 422 (Jan 2007), 113-126.

with the ways in which history, objectivity, truth, and justice are understood, deconstructed, and potentially unravelled:

> There has never been a scholar who, as such, does not believe in the sharp distinction between the real and the unreal, the actual and the inactual, the living and the non-living, being and non-being, … in the opposition between what is present and what is not, for example in the form of objectivity. Beyond this opposition, there is, for the scholar, only the hypothesis of a school of thought, theatrical fiction, literature, and speculation.[72]

Spectrality, then, refers to the interstices between the real and the unreal, rationality and irrationality, the material and the immaterial. In Derridian terms, it refers to the coming of the other, the unknown, that which cannot be anticipated, those uncontrollable repetitions and premonitions, the return of a revenant or of spectres. In short, the immaterial and uncontainable aspects of history and of politics, which are difficult to name within the evidentiary frame, but which we nevertheless inherit and are responsible for. Frederick Jameson has usefully described spectrality in *Ghostly Demarcations*, which is composed of a series of responses to *Spectres of Marx*, as that which makes the present, the objective and materiality waver:

> Spectrality is not difficult to circumscribe, as what makes the present waver: like the vibrations of a heat wave through which the massiveness of the object world – indeed of matter itself – now shimmers like a mirage. We tend to think that these moments correspond to mere personal or physical weakness – a dizzy spell, for example… .[73]

In short, spectrality according to Jameson's reading of Derrida, is constitutive of the "'barely perceptible', wanting to mean by that 'perceptible' and 'imperceptible' all at once."[74]

[72] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 12.
[73] Frederick Jameson, 'Marx's Purloined Letter', 38.
[74] Ibid. 39.

Spectrality as a concept is meant to attend to the liminal, the interstices, the in-between of the material and the immaterial. Importantly, according to Jameson, spectrality

> promises nothing tangible in return; on which you cannot build; which cannot be counted on to materialize when you want it to. Spectrality does not involve the conviction that ghosts exist or that the past (and maybe even the future they offer to prophesy) is still very much alive and at work, within the living present: all it says, if it can be thought to speak, is that the living present is scarcely as self-sufficient as it claims to be; that we would do well not to count on its density and solidity, which might under exceptional circumstances betray us.
>
> Derrida's ghosts are these moments in which the present – and above all our current present, the wealthy, sunny gleaming world of postmodernism and the end of history, of the new world system of late capitalism – unexpectedly betrays us.[75]

The above is clearly a complex debate, one that touches on many of the foundational concepts of Western philosophy, such as the question of being, time, history, and man. However, for me, one of the most important things that Jameson and Derrida attempt to think with are those aspects of being that cannot be contained within philosophical systems and political dogma nor framed by hierarchical knowledge systems or legal frameworks. These are historical and contemporary atrocities that the legal framework and the nation have been unable to come to terms with. In other words, the spectral is something that haunts the history of capital, colonialism and the Holocaust by holding a mirror up to the world and declaring it unjust and inherently violent. For it is this, it seems, that provides the potential for new concepts, and new futures unburdened by the West's universalising gaze.

Although in *Uprisings*, Didi-Huberman does not directly engage with Derrida's notion of spectrality, it seems that his gesture toward past, present, and future uprisings also attempts to

[75] Ibid. 39.

come to terms with the spectral remnants of past struggles, albeit through a different and, I would suggest, more productive register. As I have already argued, Didi-Huberman's *Uprisings* is motivated by an ethics and politics of struggle that obliges the historian to continue to work, to imagine, to think, and to act in spite of all. As he puts it, "[o]ur cries come in thousands of different forms. One form is the book".[76] Another is the artist Didi Michaux's "clamors of India ink, uprisings of forms, riots of graphic signs, public demonstrations of beings that we would hitherto not have noticed…".[77] Yet more examples are provided, such as Georges Bataille's meditation on "the most profound revolution" being "an experience in which time itself becomes 'unhinged'",[78] or Maurice Blanchot's joy in observing that the May 1968 uprising in France "allowed everyone, without distinction of class, age, gender, or culture, to befriend the first person that they saw, as though with a loved one, precisely because he was an unknown familiar."[79] The point, for Didi-Huberman, it seems, is that the duty of the historian or poet is something similar to Antonio Gramsci's notion of the organic intellectual: to be with 'the people', to give expression to or mediate their desires, and to articulate their gestures toward freedom.

This call is repeated by Didi-Huberman in *Images in spite of all* which focuses on a series of photographs that were smuggled out of Auschwitz by members of the Sonderkommando, Jewish prisoners who had been responsible for operating Auschwitz's machinery of mass destruction. In this book, Didi-Huberman forcefully argues that the historian is indebted to those who died during the Holocaust, and "to the words and images that certain prisoners

[76] Georges Did-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 345.
[77] Ibid. 310-311.
[78] Ibid. 318.
[79] Ibid. 357.

snatched, for us, from the harrowing Real of their experience."[80] And this indebtedness means that "[w]e are obliged to that oppressive imaginable." Didi-Huberman, in other words, urges the historian to not shy away from the real of Auschwitz, both, so that the Holocaust and all victims of mass violence are not forgotten, but also so that we are attentive to the reality that the Holocaust (and, I would add, apartheid) was and still is possible.

Didi-Huberman goes on to argue that these particular photographs, taken in haste and thus only showing a hint or a blur of what was happening at Auschwitz, nevertheless have the ability "to curb the fiercest will to obliterate."[81] They work against the Final Solution's attempt to eradicate all Jews, Romani, homosexuals and political opponents, and to eradicate our memory of the Holocaust itself. In *Uprisings*, Didi-Huberman suggests that such images, like memory, and somewhat like Jameson's reading of spectrality, glow or burn in spite of all. They survive and transmit our gestures, which in turn have the "capacity to make tangible the very dynamics of real or imagined uprisings", such as those carried out by the Sonderkommando in the face of certain death.[82]

Yet photography, the author demonstrates, also functions as a medium through which to blur as well as to reveal. Didi-Huberman, then, is attentive to the ways in which photography (and the event) can have both an illuminating effect and an obscuring one. For him, photography is a medium of overexposure and underexposure. As he puts it in *Images in Spite of All*:

> [W]e often ask too much or too little of the image. Ask too much of it – 'the whole truth' for example – and we will quickly be disappointed…Or else we

[80] Georges Didi-Huberman, *Images in spite of all*, 3.
[81] Ibid., 23.
[82] Georges Did-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 307.

> ask too little of the images: by immediately relegating them to the sphere of simulacrum…we exclude them from the historical field as such.[83]

This tension between the overexposure and underexposure of images is central to the author's dialectical method and is perhaps best highlighted by his discussion in *Uprisings* of Aby Warburg's *Pathosformeln*. According to Didi-Huberman, "Warburg forged the notion of *Pathosformeln* – or pathos formula – to account for the survival of gestures throughout the duration of human culture." Gestures, he continues, "are inscribed in history" and in images: "they make up the traces…of the unconscious at work in the infinite dance of our expressive movements."[84] Furthermore, "[t]o make the world rise up we need gestures, desires, and depths",[85] and Warburg's cartographies of human experience point toward the ways in which "gestures have a remarkable ability to reverse or overturn."[86] Put another way, like photography's remarkable ability to reveal the unseen, to question established truths, and to invert meaning through the blur and the cut, gestures and archival fragments have the ability to move the world and 'a people' in new, potentially liberatory ways, to forge new modes of thought which had previously been 'lost' to history, and as such, "transmit desires by means of gestures."[87] And this it seems is the importance of the types of claims made by Groenink and countless other activists and commentators: that despite not always having conclusive proof of a conspiracy, of a cover-up, or a sell-out, there remains unfinished work, an ethics of struggle that is recuperated and channeled through the words of activists like Hani.

[83] Georges Didi-Huberman, *Images in spite of all*, 3.
[84] Georges Did-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 302.
[85] Ibid. 299.
[86] Ibid. 305.
[87] Stijn de Cauwer, 'Searching for Fireflies: Pathos and Imagination in the Theories of Georges Didi-Huberman', *Angelaki*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2018), 134.

The road to Sabalele

There is, finally, another contest over Hani's dead body which rubs up against the nation-state's desires to control the limits and possibilities of mourning and remembrance, and one that returns us to Hani's place of birth in the Eastern Cape. In the most definitive biography about Hani's life, Smith and Tromp begin with Sabalela and the funeral of Chris's brother Mbuyiselo Victor, a much more intimate affair than the funeral we began this thesis with:

> The *impepho* smoulders, the scent roughly serene as it disperses high above the gathering, inviting the ancestors to the sacred reunion. The fragrance is unmistakable, dancing down into the valley below with the swing of the sand from the homestead pitched high on the hill. If there's enough strength in it, it might even reach the graves on the other side of the rise where Mary, a peasant, and Gilbert, a worker, lie together for eternity.
>
> Up on that hill, the scent of the traditional herb, the spirit contact, is pure and intoxicating. It's at its most intense inside the heavy stone walls of Nolusapho Hani's kraal. For the duration of the ceremony, the goats that usually occupy the kraal have been moved to the adjoining harvested vegetable garden, and the tilled soil is littered with lambs. …
>
> The Hani family spear – symbolising sorrow and joy, life and death, the pulsing contradictions of blood – has been used a lot of late. The children admire it even as they keep their distance. Two brothers – the eldest Mbuyiselo Victor, and the youngest, Christopher Nkosana – have died. Their parents, Mary and Gilbert, died six years of each other, sfter the murder of their middle son, Martin Tembisile [Chris]. Mary – who had spent her life working for her family – couldn't survive an ailment of the heart. …
>
> 'Today we eat only meat. All day, meat,' says one young man serving. Those sharing in the peace after the slaughter, the time to celebrate, would have thought a lot about Dushe, the name by which they knew Victor Hani, brother of Sabalele's greatest son Martin Tembisile, later know as Chris Hani. Now both were gone. Victor had died almost a year before, on 29 September 2007. Their younger brother Christopher Nkosana had died in Covimvaba hospital in February 2004 after a short illness. Chris Hani had been shot dead, many hours away, on 10 April 1993.
>
> Today the family will guide the older brother home in the company of their ancestors. But they are saddened that there was never such a farewell for Chris in the village of Sabalele. For his family there, his death was an ending

> without proper farewells. His remains are not in the soil, though they belong there, they say.[88]

As we have seen throughout this thesis, state-led memorial occasions and histories of struggle are not homogenous and uncontested. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that this intimate scene described by Smith and Tromp, contrasts sharply with the theatricality and performance often exhibited at state-directed or party-led events like the Hani Memorial, or at the very least, that this type of event is performed through a different register, one tied up with the ancestors and Xhosa funerary practices. In other words, unlike the Hani Memorial which situates the Eastern Cape as origin story, as native, and as peripheral to South Africa's and Hani's story of struggle, the funerary practices that Smith and Tromp describe, ground Hani's biography in the Eastern Cape and in relation to the ancestors who, we might say, according to this tradition remain present in their pastness.

As such, it centres a different temporality, one that does not differ chronologically, but one that coincides with but also rubs up against the time of the state, of capital, and of revolution. This final fragment, in other words, brings us back to the work of mourning and the different modes through which the dead body of the anti-apartheid struggle inflects our understanding of historical change, time, and temporality. For although this thesis has largely focused on the two concepts of time – the time of capital and of the state on the one hand (state time), and the time of Marxist revolution (trauma time) on the other – what Smith and Tromp's encounter with Hani's place of birth reveals is another temporality which rubs up against and troubles the time of capital and the time of revolution.

[88] Janet Smith and Beauregard Tromp, *Hani: A life too short*, 1-4.

This time, I tentatively suggest, could be referred to as the time of the ancestors which can be seen like a mirage on the landscape of postapartheid South Africa, troubling the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle and making the present waver. For Hani's family still living in and around Sabalela, until Hani's body is interned in his place of birth, until he is given 'proper burial' alongside his mother, father, and brothers, and with the ancestors, the ghosts of the anti-apartheid struggle cannot rest, and will continue to stir up disorder in the present. As a result, it also has the potential to reveal further contests between the personal, the political, and what it means to be considered human in postapartheid South Africa:

> In 1993, the people of Sabalele would have been content knowing there would be a next time, and a time after that, to see Hani again, to talk through what mattered. Their only desire was that he would be among them again. When he died, the necessity to complete his journey was immense. There had been no Washing of the Spades for Hani. Nothing could happen without the consent of his widow, Limpho Hani, and she decided to lay him to rest in South Park Cemetery, Boksburg, a short drive from where they lived and where he died.[89]

In 2019 I went on my own trip to Sabalele. Roughly following directions laid out by Smith and Tromp, we found a church which I assumed was where Hani had received his first education, but instead of finding the dirt road Smith and Tromp had followed in the early 2000s, we were led down a newly finished tarred road that wound its way up the hill to Sabalele. At the end was a football pitch and a gathering of people settling down for the night, surrounded by rolling hills and the Amatohle mountains where legend of Hintsa, Maqoma, and Hani seemed to still whisper on the wind.

[89] Ibid. 7.

Surprisingly, there was also a Cultural Centre named after Hani, within it a larger-than-life, but cheaply rendered statue, a centre for women's health, and a library. At first glance, this investment in Sabalele, the birthplace of Hani, seemed to attest to his stature and importance, and the transformative potential of postapartheid South Africa. In reality though, these were only token gestures. What the postapartheid government of South Africa had 'bequeathed' to Sabalele was a polished road, and a cultural centre which by 2019 had become neglected, with weeds protruding from the concrete and around Hani's statue.

I have since been reckoning with this encounter, one that left me with a profound sense of irony and tragedy. For me, it works as an analogy for the postapartheid condition and the ways in which the ideals of struggle have, in Derrida's words, been appropriated as nothing more than an "emblem, a rhetoric of a flag or of martyrdom". As he puts it, a "man's life, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol." It is this struggle over the past, and over the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle and the official end of apartheid that is channelled through the dead body of Hani and other activists, and brought to bear on the postapartheid.

I want to end with a poem, a fragment, that I came across when searching in papers of Ronnie Kasrils in Historical Papers at the University of the Witwatersrand. At the time, I was looking for political documents and information about Hani's assassination, but in the midst of newspaper clippings and party-political documents, I came across a small brochure called 'Unveiling of Tombstone'. Inside was a short poem by a thirteen year-old Lindiwe Hani. Then, as now, it reminded me of the ways in which the personal and the political collide in

uncertain, sometimes disruptive ways, that more often than not, unsettle our modes of seeing and of knowing, and make the present and our understanding of history and historical change waver.

> Father
> do you ever hear my prayer
> that you come back home
> where you belong
> in the arms of Mama
> and the shoulders of your people
> Father
> you told me to be patient
> our day will come
> what's our day without you
> to share the joy
> which you created
> Father
> all the years I have waited
> for you to come home
> so that I can play with you
> but I never had the chance
> for me to tell you that I love you
> and never will get the chance
> now that you are gone
> Father
> do you hear my prayer
> that you come back home
> where you belong.[90]

[90] 'Unveiling of Tombstone', 9 April 1995 (Ronald Kasrils Papers, WHP, University of the Witwatersrand, RKA3345).

Conclusion

Apartheid as particular and general

As Ciraj Rassool has argued, every biographical study is at the same time autobiographical,[1] and this dissertation has been partly constituted by my own relationship with and ideas about socialism, communism, and revolutionary politics more generally. It is also representative of an attempt to come to terms with my place in a world still marked by apartheid and colonialism and the violent, racialised, and segregated systems that they inaugurated. In this regard, I do not see South African apartheid as being an anathema to the ideals of Europe, as popular histories in the global North tend to suggest. Rather, I see South African history as a mirror through which to interrogate the continued segregation, violence, and exploitation summarily enacted upon those whom George Didi-Huberman quoting Herbert Marcuse described as the "substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and the persecuted of other races and colors, the unemployed and the unemployable."[2]

It follows that although the experience of apartheid was particular to southern Africa, it can also be understood as a metonymy for global histories and systems of exploitation, racism, and state violence. This dissertation and my time spent in South Africa more generally has therefore informed and inflected my own memories and experiences of growing up in Nottingham, England, which although particular in itself, are nevertheless marked by colonialism and apartheid and what Hardt and Negri have referred to as global

[1] Ciraj Rassool, 'Rethinking Documentary History and South African Political Biography'.
[2] George Didi-Huberman, *Uprisings*, 342.

apartheid.[3] In this sense, apartheid is both particular and general. As Derrida put it in the beginning of *Spectres of Marx*:

> One name for another, a part for the whole: the historic violence of Apartheid can always be treated as a metonymy. In its past as well as its present. By diverse paths (condensation, displacement, expression, or representation), one can always decipher through its singularity so many other kinds of violence going on in the world. At once part, cause, effect, example, what is happening there translates what takes place here, always here, wherever one is and wherever one looks, closest to home. Infinite responsibility, therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good conscience.[4]

It is this problem of apartheid, its remains, and its lodging within capitalism and the modern world system which informed much of my thinking throughout this dissertation. In the first part, I attempted to trace the contested ways in which Hani has been remembered, memorialised and mythologised during the anti-apartheid struggle, the time of transition and in the postapartheid. Following Leslie Witz, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool's 'postanti-apartheid heritage complex', I foregrounded the contested processes of historical and heritage production in order to challenge the truth claims and monumental projects of nationalism, capitalism and the modern nation-state.

More specifically, in Chapter One, I traced a genealogy of political funerals in South Africa and the ways in which the potency and power of Hani's dead body was brought to bear on the time of transition and made available for the refiguring of the meaningful universe of the state to come.[5] In this chapter I also began to trace the relationship and tension between the individual and the collective and how these contests were intertwined with dead body politics and the contested modes through which the nation did or did not

[3] Maurits van Bever Donker, Ross Truscott, Gary Minkley and Premesh Lalu (eds), *Remains of the Social*, 15.
[4] Jacques Derrida, 'Dedication', *Specters of Marx*, xiv.
[5] Nicky Rousseau, 'Identification, Politics, Disciplines', 182.

mourn the individual and the end of a politics that had capitalism and apartheid as its target.

Chapter Two turned its focus to the annual Hani Memorial and extended debates and arguments made in Chapter One. However, in this chapter I also undermined prior assumptions and argued that despite attempts by the ruling ANC to determine the ways in which Hani, armed struggle and transition in South Africa are remembered, Hani's revolutionary politics always already troubles ideas about the modern nation-state, as well as the end of apartheid. Following Jenny Edkins' notion of trauma time, I also began to trace how Hani's life, legacy, and assassination returns to us as "a collective scream, a protest against the way people have been treated, a demand to hold open the temporality of trauma and a demand for a different politics."[6]

In Chapter Three, I elaborated Tom Lundborg's use of the Deleuzian notion of the pure event in order to trace how the 'truth' of Hani's assassination was produced over time, and what this narrativisation made available for different ideas about transition. Here, I foregrounded David Scott's meditation on the romantic and tragic modes of historical emplotment to further unravel the ways in which our ideas about the historical event determine our ideas about transition, as well as the 'end' of apartheid, the supposed victory of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, and the longing for total revolution.

Although couched in heritage production and processes of memorialisation, these first three chapters were also grounded by the question of how we think moments of transition,

[6] Jenny Edkins, 'Temporality, Politics and Performance', in Shirin M. Rai and Janelle Reinelt (eds), *The Grammar of Politics and Performance* (London: Routledge, 2014), 131.

the historical event, and historical change. For it seems clear that the ways in which people remember and memorialise Hani, are intimately tied up with their ideas about historical change, and, in this instance, the supposed end of colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa. These memories and experiences, more importantly, shape the ways in which people have and continue to come to terms with the violence of apartheid and the systems of segregation, racism, and capitalist exploitation that remain in colonialism and apartheid's wake. In short, the modes through which we remember activists like Hani are intimately tied up with our differing ideas about and critiques of this time 'after' apartheid (post-apartheid) and colonialism (the post-colonial).

The above passage from Derrida therefore also informs my thinking about history and historiography, and what I see as the political and ethical role of the historian, and his or her responsibility, paraphrasing Didi-Huberman, to not shy away from the real of Auschwitz, colonialism, apartheid, and slavery.[7] Put another way, this research has also been informed by an attempt to think through and work with the role of the historian during these 'dark times' and with what I see as a process through which history has often been depoliticised or emptied of its politics.

It is this point that Didi-Huberman works with in *Images in spite of all*, which begins with the following:

> In order to know, we must imagine for ourselves. We must attempt to imagine the hell that Auschwitz was in the summer of 1944. Let us not invoke the unimaginable. Let us not shelter ourselves by saying that we cannot, that we could not by any means, imagine it to the very end. We are obliged to that oppressive imaginable. It is a response that we must offer, as

[7] George Didi-Huberman, *Images in spite of all: Four Photographs from Auschwitz* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3.

> a debt to the words and images that certain prisoners snatched, for us, from the harrowing Real of their experience.[8]

We have seen that the images that Didi-Huberman refers to are four photographs smuggled out of Auschwitz by the Sonderkommando in spite of the "fiercest will to obliterate."[9] For Didi-Huberman, these images work against the idea that the violence of Auschwitz is unthinkable and call on the historian to attend to the debt passed down to us through history. In other words, despite the fragmentary character of the archive and of memory, the historian is indebted to the words (and images) of the Sonderkommando, of Hani and of all victims of violence, so that historical, state violence is not forgotten, and that we remain attentive to the reality that the Holocaust, colonialism, apartheid, and slavery was and still is possible. As Didi-Huberman following Georges Bataille puts it:

> Auschwitz is inseparable from us …. There is no question, of course, of confusing the victims with their executioners. But this evidence must be considered with the anthropological fact-the fact about the human race, as Robert Antelme wrote in the same year that it is a human being who inflicts torture, disfiguration, and death upon his fellow human being: 'We are not only potential victims of the executioners: the executioners are our fellows.' Bataille, the thinker par excellence of the impossible, well understood that we must speak of the camps as of the possible itself, the 'possible of Auschwitz,' as he specified.[10]

It is this tension between the fragmentary character of the archive and of memory, and the ethical responsibility of the historian to name the truth of history which haunt and trouble the latter stages of this dissertation. Chapter Four turned its focus to the exile period and the mythologisation of Hani as disciplined cadre par excellence. In this chapter I also attempted to problematise the ways in which revolutionary and socialist ideas of the disciplined cadre and the new man of history have been tied up with the 'Enlightenment

[8] Ibid. 3.
[9] Ibid. 23.
[10] Ibid. 28.

values' and the type of politics that the anti-apartheid struggle mobilised against. Here, the contradiction between the ideals of revolution and the practicality of organising an armed struggle in exile, were examined in order to demonstrate the contradictory character of struggle and to trace a more nuanced idea about biographical production and the political subject more generally. Importantly, this chapter also engaged with the violence enacted on rank-and-file members within ANC/SACP structures, particularly during the Mkatashinga mutiny, and attempted to bring this history to bear on the question of violence and historical truth today.

Chapter Five turned its attention to the archive, the fragment, and the spectral. Here, much of my thinking was foregrounded by Derrida's *Spectres of Marx*, and his meditation on the legacy of Marx and Marxism in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the supposed triumph of neoliberal economics and politics. Although not explicit, in this chapter the question of apartheid as globalised and globalising guided my thinking. It also foregrounds much of my thinking going forward. In other words, the question that I posed in this final chapter regarding the work of mourning and what it means to live on in the wake of apartheid, is as much concerned with global politics as it is the particularity of South African apartheid and the assassination of Chris Hani. For me, the following November 2021 statement from Abahlali baseMjondolo, an activist organisation based in KwaZulu Natal, perfectly illustrates this problem at this historical conjuncture:

> **The majority have rejected the ANC**
>
> Only around a quarter of people eligible to vote chose to cast their votes for the ANC in the recent election. The mass stay away from the polls is a mass rejection of the ANC, along with the DA and the EFF which could not attract the support of significant numbers of former ANC voters. When you do not respect the dignity of the people and you undermine their power you always pay the price.

We have always said that the day is coming where South Africans will no longer have the loyalty to the ANC and will vote them out of power. This election shows that that day is coming.

We must never forget that this country was liberated from apartheid by ordinary people, by the long history of popular organisation at a mass scale running from the ICU to the UDF. We must not forget the Durban strikes of 1973, the Soweto Uprising of 1976 and the uprising in cities and towns across the country that began in 1984. We must always remember the price that ordinary people paid for our liberation from apartheid.

However, we do also remember the great men and women who led the ANC, people like OR Tambo, Chris Hani, Dorothy Nyembe and many others who gave their lives to the fight against the evils of apartheid. We must also acknowledge that when the mass struggles on the factory floors and in communities brought apartheid to the brink of collapse the majority of the people accepted the ANC as their leaders.

But now, twenty-seven years after the end of apartheid, we are ruled by political gangsters in some parts of the country. When we organise and march against corruption we are organising against the day to day theft of our own futures. When houses are actually built they are sold by corrupt councillors. […]

When there is development it is imposed on the people.

Grassroots planning is taken as criminal, as a political threat to be crushed. We have seen this in in Tembisa outside Johannesburg where the ANC undermined people's democracy. […]

Evictions take place with impunity and at gunpoint through private security companies or the Anti Land Invasion Unit. They are carried out in brazen violation of the law, and sometimes court orders too. The politicians continue to assume that they are above the law and that we are beneath the law.

As a result of austerity and corruption we are left in the mud without water, electricity and sanitation and violently attacked when we organise land reform, urban planning, service provision and food sovereignty from below. We cannot continue to live without land and work, to have our dignity vandalised and to live in the mud like pigs year after year while a few political elites live in luxury at the expense of the poor. Many families continue to go to sleep without any bread on the table. The same system that makes the rich to be rich makes the poor to be poor.

We are beaten, arrested, tortured, jailed and murdered when we stand up for our dignity. 'Land or death' has become a common saying because people know that to struggle for land is to risk death. 'Phansinge ANC!' has become a common slogan in rallies and big meetings.

> The ANC has become the enemy of the people. It is just as Frantz Fanon warned us.[11]

This reflection by Abahlali baseMjondolo on the results of the November 2021 municipal elections in South Africa, intervene incisively in debates that are particular to South Africa, but also, broader debates about global capitalism and the violence routinely enacted on political activists and 'the poor'. It also speaks through a register that many would associate with Hani and invokes a politics 'from below' that Hani and many other murdered political activists dedicated their life to, both during the apartheid period and in its wake. These challenges continue to haunt the postapartheid project of the ANC, and once again the spectre of Hani returns to us. For it is clear that apartheid and the type of politics mobilised against it are not entirely finished with us.

[11] 'Abahlali baseMjondolo press statement', *Facebook*, 6 November 2021, https://www.facebook.com/abahlalibasemjondolo.

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