Voluntary associations, democracy and citizenship in the cities of Bulawayo and Cape Town.

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DECLARATION

I declare that *Voluntary associations, democracy and citizenship in the cities of Bulawayo and Cape Town* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

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Signed: _____

Abstract

This study sits at the intersection of two promises: that of cities providing fertile ground for democratic politics and voluntary associations having positive effects on democratisation. It examines voluntary associations' contribution to citizenship and democracy in two global south cities of Bulawayo and Cape Town, drawing lessons from two case studies of voluntary associations, one from each city. The study critically engages existing theories on associations' role as "schools of democracy", their contribution to political participation, improving the representation of citizens' interests and deepening accountability in their respective contexts. One of the impediments against the generalisability of democratic theory in relation to the link between voluntary associations and democracy is the variation in political contexts. The selected cities and case studies were thus deliberately selected for their unique differences and similarities in historical and political contexts. Those are thus foregrounded in the analysis in this thesis. Data was collected through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Key Informant Interviews, documentary reviews and participant observation.

The findings show that the selected cases' contributions to citizenship and democracy are significant but uneven. The contributions are contingent on the associations' internal democracy, institutional arrangements in their contexts, associations' formal and informal relationships with political actors (state and political parties), and relationship with donors. From those findings the study then suggests a research framework for understanding the link between voluntary associations and democracy in global south cities such as the ones in this study. Firstly, researchers should get a firm grasp on the nuances of how systems of government shape the relations between and among local and national political actors. Secondly, they should tease out the internal structure of the voluntary associations, to understand, power and resource distribution among members. Thirdly, the formal and informal relationships between voluntary associations and political parties must be dissected and understood. The fourth element relates to the associations' relationship with donors and the implications for their internal democracy and their contribution to democracy.

Keywords: democracy, citizenship, voluntary associations, civil society, cities, Bulawayo, Cape Town, Zimbabwe, South Africa, global south.

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iv

List of Acronyms

AGM	Annual General Meeting
ANC	African National Congress
BOWSER	Bulawayo Water and Sanitation Response Program
BPRA	Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association
BSAC	British South Africa Company
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease
CPF	Community Policing Forums
DA	Democratic Alliance
EC	Executive Council
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
ISBS	Informal Services and Basic Services
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-Alliance	Movement for Democratic Change - Alliance
MDC-Green	Movement for Democratic Change - Green
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NDA	National Development Agency
NEDLAC	National Economic Development Labour Council

NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NP	National Party
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
PF-ZAPU	Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union
RAMG	Residents Associations Monitoring Group
RICU	Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SAP	South African Party
SAPS	South African Police Service
SJC	Social Justice Coalition
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign
TTLs	Tribal Trust Lands
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDF	United Democratic Front
UISP	Upgrading of Informal Settlement Programme
ZACC	Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

List of maps

List of figures

List of tables

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Table of Contents

ix

Map of Southern Africa. (Source: Arntzen et. al., 2004).

1.   Chapter One: Introduction

One of the persistent debates in democratic theory concerns the link between civil society groups (voluntary associations in this thesis) and democracy. To many theorists, associations build political skills and civic virtues (active citizenship) that strengthen participation in democratic processes (Gundelach & Torpe, 1996; Diamond, 1994; 1999; 2015; Warren, 2001; 1999; Wallman Lundasen, 2015; Fung, 2003). They also hold public representatives to account (Malena et. al. 2004; Lindberg, 2013; Hochstetler, 2012); and represent citizens' interests (Hochstetler & Friedman, 2008; Bevan & Rassmussen, 2020; Piper & Von Lieres, 2015; Gukelberger, 2018). Some, however, concede that the generalisability of the existing theories on the relationship between associations and democracy is still limited. This is due to the differences in political contexts and types of associations among other reasons (see Houtzager & Archaya, 2011; Fung, 2003). Furthermore, global south cities' complex process of urbanisation compounds the challenges of the generalisability of existing democratic theory (Myers, 2021). This research critically engages the existing theories on voluntary associations' contributions to democracy in two global south cities, Bulawayo in Zimbabwe and Cape Town in South Africa. Lessons are drawn from two case studies, Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA) and Social Justice Coalition (SJC) in the two cities respectively.

The selected cities and case studies operate in different political contexts, the first is in a hybrid militarised regime and the second in an emerging democracy. However, the political contexts defy any random categorization as cities of Bulawayo and Cape Town have been governed by different political parties from those that govern the national government for a long time. Such layered political contexts present further challenges for democratic theorists' understanding the role of voluntary associations in strengthening city democracy. The two cities however, share some similarities in terms of their colonial histories and current urbanisation patterns, which are characterised by poverty, inequality, poor service delivery, exclusion of the poor from democratic participation (Gukelberger, 2018; Anciano & Piper, 2019; Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015). Such conditions foreground questions on citizenship and democracy. The selected case studies share some similarities in that they are both membership-based and intentionally seek to develop active citizenship and contribute to democracy. This research critically examines voluntary associations' contribution to democracy, using the two case studies.

1.1   Background and Research Problem

Scholars observe that democracy is gradually waning in many parts of the world because of 'incumbents [who] undermine the pillars of democratic competition, such as political freedoms,

civil society, a free press, and the rule of law' (Laebens & Lührmann, 2021:1, also see Freedom House, 2018; Diamond, 2015). In cities, there are also tendencies of projecting political problems as technical ones, and thus formulating technical solutions. Such approaches weaken citizen influence on decision making or exclude them completely (von Schnitzler, 2008). Furthermore, rapid urbanisation in the global south cities has deepened challenges of poverty, inequality, among others, that negatively affect the realisation of democracy (Datta & Shaban, 2016; Anciano & Piper, 2019; Gukelberger, 2018). Related to that, is the observation by scholars that in some contexts, citizens' trust in elected public representatives, political parties and governments has decreased while it has increased for civil society groups (Kaldor, 2003).

The rapid urbanisation in the global south also comes against the backdrop of poorly resourced states (Oldfield, 2015) and relative poverty and low economic growth in the cities, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Lall et. al., 2017). Instead of urbanisation driving development, it has brought about a concentration of poverty, inequality, the strain on infrastructure and heightened competition for meagre resources. Lall et. al. (2017) also cite statistics that show the percentage of slum-dwellers in the global south as being more than 30% higher than that of the global trend. Some of these challenges have their roots in the colonial institutions and apartheid urban planning in the selected sites. Bulawayo and Cape Town are among cities that were designed for a limited number of settler inhabitants. The native Africans ("the subjects") who migrated to the cities in search of employment and other opportunities) were confined to the cities' margins and deprived of adequate services. That history is thus instructive in examining the ongoing projects of transforming Mamdani's (1996) subjects into citizens.

The population increase in the post-colonial cities, coupled with ongoing attempts to integrate the cities, has severely weakened the capacity of local authorities to deliver quality services for the rising population. In the selected sites, Bulawayo and Cape Town, the poor who settled in the townships and margins of cities are mostly in the informal economy and excluded from decision making and must resort to using mediators who link them with formal institutions (Piper & Von Lieres, 2015). Protests are among other means used to force their city governments to respond to their interests (Booysen, 2014). Initiatives aimed at deepening participatory democracy and the rise of social movements, are said to have not met the demand for democracy in the cities of the global south (Norris, 2011 as cited in Anciano & Piper, 2019). While noting such views' implications for studies such as this one, the centrality of context in understanding what voluntary associations do for democracy remains a strong factor that informs the need for more empirical and theoretical inquiry in contexts such as Bulawayo and Cape Town.

2

Cape Town is in a country that is considered an emerging democracy, albeit with challenges such as vast inequality (Bauer & Taylor, 2011; Von Holdt, 2013). The country's constitution and legislation provide for democratic participation, institutionalised relations between the state and civil society, citizenship rights and formal equality. Post-apartheid South Africa also adopted a devolved, three-tier system of government in the 1996 constitution, with provincial and local governments being fully-fledged spheres (Cameron, 2003; Stytler, 2005). This was a huge shift from the apartheid era where the government was centralised, with local government working only as an arm of the central government as its lowest rung. In cities such as Cape Town, those changes were meant to eradicate segregation and unequal provision of services between whites and non-whites (Gukelberger, 2018). However, the City of Cape Town still faces problems such as homelessness, poverty, unemployment and rapid urbanisation (Sapire & Beall, 1995) and has reproduced racial and class inequalities (Gukelberger, 2018). Democracy is disconnected from urban governance; citizens and elected officials have limited impact on decision making in the city (Anciano & Piper, 2019). This research thus focuses on what voluntary associations such as the SJC do for democracy in that context.

The post-colonial city of Bulawayo's national context on the other hand, is that of a militarised hybrid regime (Masunungure, 2011), struggling to establish a clear path to democratisation (Masunungure & Shumba, 2014). After the military coup in 2017, some scholars see the prospects for democracy as being bleak in Zimbabwe (see Beardsworth et. al., 2019; Ndawana, 2020). Civil society, media and opposition parties are restricted. Post-colonial Zimbabwe has had a tokenistic form of decentralisation and the country's 2013 constitution which provides for a devolved system of government has not been implemented (Chigwata, 2019). In municipalities run by the opposition, the national government usurps power and leaves them with limited capacities to solve urban crises (Kamete, 2006). This also happens in the context of wide socio-economic problems that have lasted since the late 1990s. Urban poverty is rife and many citizens are in the informal economy because of the country's high levels of unemployment.

Both cities are also afflicted by vertically-divided authority, a scenario where opposition parties, vying for state power, running the city while ruling parties run the national government (Resnick, 2014). This situation intensifies conflicts between the local and the national government and the potential democratic dividend of decentralisation. However, amidst all these challenges in global south cities, social scientists see cities as fertile ground for democratic politics (e.g., Heller & Evans, 2010; Parnell & Oldfield, 2014). In broader democratic theory, cities are also seen as desirable sites for inclusive forms of democratic governance (King, 2004), and as an agent and space for democratic possibility (Rodgers et.

3

al., 2014; Glaeser & Steinberg, 2017). In the 1960s, proponents of the modernisation theory saw cities as the ground for breeding some requisites for democracy (e.g., Lipset, 1959).

The introduction of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 also revived debates about the cities' role in development after some time of being overshadowed by the focus on state-/nation-building in the 1950s to 1970s (Parnell, 2016 as cited in Gukelberger, 2018) more so with the eleventh SDG that focuses on inclusive and sustainable urbanisation. Inclusion means that citizens participate in the processes of urbanisation, however, as already noted above, citizens are often excluded in the cities in question. Drawing from several pieces of research, Mcgranahan et.al. (2016, p. 25), however, see civil society groups as capable of 'negotiating for inclusion and bringing constructive pressure to bear on the state'. Such views on the link between cities and democracy also come alongside theorists' advancement of voluntary associations' role in contributing positively to democracy from the 1990s. This study is thus situated at the intersection of two promises: that of cities being the ground for democratic politics and voluntary associations having positive effects on democratisation.

1.2   Overview of the study's theoretical foundations

Democracy, citizenship and civil society are the three concepts central to this study. From the definitions of democracy, the key tenets considered in this thesis are accountability, responsiveness, popular control and political equality (Tilly, 2007; Dahl, 1989; Beetham, 1999; Goldfrank, 2007; Warren, 2014). This thesis' theoretical framework is thus immersed in these four tenets. Citizenship refers to members of a political community who have equal rights and responsibilities, including participating in politics (Turner, 2016; Isin, 2002). Strengthening of citizenship thus entails the transformation of subjects into active citizens who claim their rights and make demands on government (Goldfrank, 2007). Active citizens shape what the state delivers and how it delivers it (Lister, 2003). The concept of citizenship is implied in the concept of democracy.

Members of a political community without rights and equal membership are not citizens but 'denizens' - members with diminished rights (Turner, 2016), the populations (Chatterjee, 2004) and subjects (Mamdani, 1996). Members of political communities fight to become citizens (Isin, 2002; Baubock, 2003). The struggles for citizenship are thus also struggles for democracy as they are focused on changing the relationship between the powerful and less powerful (Hadenius, 2001). Thus, democracy and citizenship are interdependent, both conceptually and in practice. The existence of democracy depends on members of a political community making claims for citizenship rights (practising active citizenship) (Hadenius, 2001). Democratic politics require a 'vigorous civic culture that habituates citizens to perform civic duties' (Lakoff, 2018: xi). Democracy depends on a citizen who takes part in politics

4

beyond elections, keeps informed, fights injustice, supports politics, pursues individual and collective interests and is a member of voluntary associations (Shklar 1991 as cited in Hadenius 2001; Diamond, 1997).

Deepening democracy, therefore, requires both the strengthening of citizenship and democratising the state. Drawing from the selected case studies, the study focuses on how voluntary associations strengthen citizenship and democratise their cities. It draws from the literature on voluntary associations' contribution to democracy (Fung, 2003; Wallman Lundasen, 2015), and particularly (i) voluntary associations as "schools of democracy" (Putnam, 1993; 2001; Warren, 2001; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010), (ii) improving democratic participation (Susen, 2011), (iii) effective representation of citizens' interests (Warren, 2001) and (iv) deepening accountability (Malena et. al., 2004; Lindberg, 2013). However, this research recognises that associations' contribution to democracy has not been completely romanticised in literature. Some scholars have highlighted the challenges such as hegemonic civil society in authoritarian contexts (Ncube, 2010), antidemocratic groups (Habib, 2013; Portes, 2014), groups that foster narrow interests (Dahl, 1982; Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015; Monaco, 2008) among other challenges. It, therefore, does not take a simplistic view but contributes to the further problematization of the link between voluntary associations and democracy.

This thesis uses the term voluntary associations to refer to membership-based civil society groups that freely organise outside of government control to promote some special end, whether social or political. The case studies in this thesis, BPRA and SJC promote political interests. In many African cities, during the colonial era (and apartheid in South Africa), voluntary associations emerged in different forms. Some formed firstly as tribal associations among African migrant workers. The Africans who flocked into cities to find jobs in the 19th century, overcame isolation through associations, thus turning African towns into lively places (Moyo et. al., 2001; Ekwensi, 1954 as cited in Epstein et. al.,1967). Those associations subsequently grew across tribes thus deepening nationalist consciousness (Hodgkin,1956). Such groups grew amidst restrictions of the civil society among the indigenous populations and later aided liberation struggles. Some also provided leadership when nationalist political parties were banned, with leaders being jailed or exiled (Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015; Habib, 2013). However, here were other civil society groups that supported the status quo, like Broederbond, an Afrikaner nationalist group which supported apartheid in South Africa (Habib, 2005).

In the post-colonial Bulawayo and post-apartheid Cape Town, respectively, some voluntary associations were formed in response to the mounting poverty, failing infrastructure and

5

services, authoritarianism (Habib, 2013; Mapuva, 2011; Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015). The emergence of some voluntary associations has strengthened solidarity among urban dwellers, support city dwellers' voices in agitating for accountability and responsive governance (White, 1998). In both Bulawayo and Cape Town some associations also advance democraticnorm(s). However, some scholars suggest that associations' contribution to local democracy could be limited owing to their autonomy, effectiveness versus their level of resources and links with political parties. This research, therefore, contributes to the scholarship on voluntary associations and democracy in cities. It examines how voluntary associations contribute to local democracy in two contemporary global south cities, Bulawayo, and Cape Town. The following subsection is an overview of the study's theoretical framework.

1.2.1 Overview of the Theoretical Framework

In case study research design, a theory to guide the collection of data is fundamental as it sets the parameters of what data is to be collected and serves as the framework for linking the collected data back to the research questions (Yin, 2003). The theoretical framework for this thesis draws from democratic theory literature on the link between voluntary associations, citizenship and democracy. It is framed around the four operational questions outlined in the next subsection. A thematic approach is also applied in the analysis of findings, along with the four theoretical questions. The themes are as follows: a) voluntary associations as schools of democracy; b) facilitating or increasing residents' democratic participation; c) representing members and citizens' interests and d) strengthening accountability. While these four are looked at individually, there are many overlaps. The impact of the context on each association's contribution is also factored as a cross-cutting theme in the analysis.

1.3   Research questions

The thesis' main question is: do the voluntary associations, BPRA and SJC, deepen democracy in contemporary Bulawayo and Cape Town? To answer this question, the study draws from three key theories outlined in the preceding subsection. Since the study looks at whether voluntary associations build democratic citizenship (practices) on one hand and strengthen democracy on the other, the first part focuses mainly on the internal workings of the selected associations. The second part focuses on the work they do in their cities. The main question is thus broken down into four sub-questions that align with theories reviewed in this study on the link between voluntary associations and democracy, as follows:

  a) Do the selected voluntary associations develop members' and/or citizens' political skills and civic virtues that support democracy?

6

b) Do the selected associations create spheres for democratic participation and/or strengthen the existing ones in their cities?

c) Do voluntary associations represent citizens' interests? Does the representation strengthen or weaken democracy?

d) What role do the selected associations play in strengthening the accountability of their respective local government? How effective are their contributions? What factors impede them and what implications does this have for their contributions to democracy?

The effect of each political and historical context on the selected associations' contribution to democracy is a cross-cutting theme in the analysis.

1.4   Research methodology and methods

The study follows a constructivist-interpretivist paradigm. This paradigm is anchored on the idea that all reality and interpretations are socially constructed rather than there being an objective reality independent of human observation (Bhattacharya & Given, 2008). Denzin and Lincoln (2012) posit that in interpretive research emphasis is on sense-making, meaning is disclosed, discovered, and experienced. In interpretive research, the aim could be to generate theory about the social world in an inductive manner (the researcher draws 'generalisable inferences' from observations or 'findings') or test a theory. In the case of the former, those inferences are drawn from the views of the research subjects (Bryman, 2001, p. 10). This paradigm is thus relevant to studies such as this one that analyses detailed views of voluntary association members, leaders, and city officials.

The study also employs a qualitative paradigm which is 'a way to study the social interactions of humans in naturally occurring situations. The researcher plays a critical role in the process by gathering data and making sense of or interpreting the phenomena that are observed and revealed' (Litchman, 2012 as cited in Flick, 2018). The qualitative paradigm allows an inquiry into the meaning that individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (Creswell, 2007). The subsections below delve into the research design, data collection and the method of analysis.

1.4.1   Research design: Case Study

This study uses the case study approach. A case study is an in-depth examination of a particular case (e.g., individual, programme, project, work unit) or several cases. (Litchman, 2017 as cited in Flick, 2018). Kothari (2004, p. 113) defines the case study method as a form of qualitative approach which 'involves a careful and complete observation of a social unit, be that unit a person, a family, an institution, a cultural group or even the entire community'. Compared to other approaches, the case study approach allows for examination of a

contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context as it allows researchers to preserve the holistic and meaningful characteristics of events/context (Yin, 2003, p. 2). According to Yin (2003), there are two types of case study designs: single-case and multiple-case design. In designing case studies, the selection between the two is informed by the purpose of the study and available resources among other reasons.

Multiple case designs are considered more robust and their evidence more compelling. This study makes use of the multiple case design (Yin, 2003). More so, it has two cases, in two sites. The central rationale for the selection of this design is the need to understand contextual peculiarities concerning the problem (Goodrick, 2014). This study seeks to understand how associational life, citizenship practices and democracy play out in the city in the global south. The multiple-case design becomes the most relevant as this design allows analysis and synthesis of the similarities, differences, and patterns across cases.

1.4.2   Case selection

Two voluntary associations, the Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA) in Bulawayo and Social Justice Coalition (SJC), in Cape Town, South Africa, were selected as case studies. In the case study approach, it is up to the researcher to identify the case and to set limits or boundaries (Litchman, 2017 as cited in Flick, 2018). However, some logic must underpin the identification of the unit of analysis, what the case is, and the selection of the actual cases. The unit of analysis is the main entity that is being examined or analysed in the study, it could be individuals, groups, artefacts, geographical entities, or social interactions (Yin, 2003). In this study, the voluntary associations (civil society organisations) are the unit of analysis. In terms of determining the unit of analysis, the definition of the initial research questions plays a critical role (Yin, 2003). Thus, the definition of the unit of analysis in this study is straightforward.

In terms of case selection, (Flick, 2018) outlines some types of cases: the typical, the exemplary and the unusual case. In terms of the precise meaning of what these are, Litchman defers to the researcher to come up with criteria to use. This is in tandem with the views of scholars such as Ritchie and Lewis (2003) who posit that the principles for selecting samples are dependent on the research questions or the themes to be covered. The cases selected must be information-rich to answer the research question (Flick, 2018). In this study, BPRA and SJC were purposefully selected as exemplary cases in line with the literature reviewed and the research question to be answered.

There are several other reasons why the two cases were selected. Firstly, both cases conduct programmes and activities aimed at influencing politics in their cities. Their work and

8

approaches are also similar, especially concerning cities' budgeting process. Secondly, they are both memberships based thus making it possible to analyse their internal decision-making processes and the development of political skills and civic virtues among their members. Thirdly, the cases were also selected for the number of years they have been in existence in their respective contexts. Although the study does not specifically track their contributions to democracy over time there is somewhat similar timeframe from which this research draws. The fourth reason is that they are both in cities that are governed by the countries' main opposition political parties while the national government is run by different political parties. This vertically divided authority presents somewhat similar challenges in different contexts, especially the types of conflict between the national and local governments (Resnick, 2014). Lastly, the two cities, Bulawayo and Cape Town share historical similarities and post-colonial and post-apartheid challenges. There are also significant differences too, between the two contexts, such as the regime types in South Africa and Zimbabwe, forms of decentralisation, the socio-economic characteristics and many more.

The two cases thus allow for the analysis of voluntary associations' contributions to democracy in global south cities under a hybrid regime and an emerging democracy, but both inflicted by vertically divided authority. However, pragmatic considerations were also made, the two cases were selected for their accessibility to the researcher, following the view of scholars such as Gobo (2008). The two cases meet the goals of the study.

1.4.3   Data Collection

Case study research usually involves numerous ways of collecting data and it is an empirical form of research relying on 'the collection of evidence about what is going on' (Robson, 2002, p. 178). This research used five methods of data collection: (i) semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), (ii) documentary analysis, published and unpublished material and documents, such as pamphlets, newspaper articles, government reports and academic research papers (iii) focus group discussions and (iv) participant observation. These methods are discussed in full in the succeeding subsections. These methods and data sources were triangulated. Before a detailed discussion of each data collection method, the next subsection expands on why and how triangulation was done in this study.

1.4.4   Triangulation

Triangulation means that 'an issue of research is considered...from (at least) two points or perspectives' (Flick, 2018). It is the 'use of multiple methods and sources of data in the execution of a study' (Neuman, 1994, p. 141). There are different reasons why researchers triangulate their data, however, in this study triangulation was employed to enhance data validity and get 'a broader, more differentiated, and comprehensive understanding of the

9

cases' (Flick, 2018). Data collected through interviews were triangulated with that collected through document analysis, FGDs and participant observation (different methods). The use of triangulation guaranteed the validity and reliability of the study's analytic generalisations by checking consistencies of 'findings generated by different data-collection methods' (Burns, 2000, p. 419). Data sources were also triangulated: interviews targeted the selected associations' leaders (former and current), staff, leaders of other civil society organisations, city officials and ward councillors. Where several FGDs were conducted on one case study, the researcher randomly selected different participants for each meeting, thus creating an opportunity to triangulate the data collected.

1.4.5 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 11 Key Informants from BPRA, and 17 from SJC. From the former, five were Executive Council members, one board member, three current staff members and two were former staff members (see Fig. 6.1 for the outline of BPRA structures). Ten ward councillors from Bulawayo, two city officials and two leaders of civil society organisations were also interviewed for triangulation purposes. From SJC, nine KIIs were conducted with leaders and staff. Of the nine informants, three were former leaders (General Secretary, Executive Council chairperson and a branch chairperson), one former staff member and six were current staff members.[1] One ward councillor and seven officials from the city of Cape Town's Informal Settlement Basic Services (ISBS) unit were also interviewed. A semi-structured interview was chosen as it permits interviewer-interviewee interaction that has the potential to generate new data on a subject as opposed to other types (Legard et. al., 2003, p. 142). Key informant interviews mainly rely on information collected from interviews with individuals who are knowledgeable, through experience and by the nature of their positions or jobs, on issues related to the study (Kumar, 1987). The researcher deliberately chose the informants outlined above for their experience in the two case studies which made them relevant for this study.

1.4.6 Documentary analysis

Published and unpublished materials such as reports, media articles, pamphlets, booklets that outlined the structures and the work of the selected associations were reviewed. Johnson and Joslyn (1995) argue that using documentary data saves time, especially when availability and access are not a problem. The documents came in handy also considering the COVID 19 lockdown restrictions that made it impossible to have physical meetings. The method was also useful given the SJC's structural changes and the impossibility of meeting with the

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[1] There is an overlap between governance structures (leaders) and staff at SJC, see description of structure in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

organisation's members through focus group discussions during the lockdown. The documentary analysis also allowed the tracking of the work that selected case studies had conducted over time.

1.4.7 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focus groups are discussions within a small group, between six and ten participants moderated by a researcher, and oriented to obtain information on a specific topic (Blee & Taylor, 2002, p. 107). The discussion is conducted with the lead of a moderator who could be the researcher or their designate. Furthermore, the discussion is an informally organised one, involving a specially selected small number of individuals (Wilkinson & Silverman, 2004). Six focus groups were held in Bulawayo, with a total of 56 BPRA Ward Committee members and one was held in Cape Town, with seven SJC members from the now suspended Greenpoint branch.

The selection criterion was purposive, targeting the associations' members as focus groups participants able to provide special insight into the study. In terms of participant selection, Powell and Single (1996) posit that FGD participants should not know each other as this affects the validity of data to be recorded from it. However, in this research, getting participants who are not familiar with one another was not possible because the target participants were members of the selected voluntary associations, ward committee members in the case of BPRA and branch members in the case of SJC. The familiarity among participants did not affect the validity of the data collected because of the multiplicity of data collection methods and the rigorous triangulation that was done, outlined in section 1.4.4 above.

1.4.8 Participant Observation

Data was also collected through observation. It was important, especially for understanding SJC after it had embarked on the structural changes in 2019 (See chapter six for details). Observation 'involves collecting data using one's senses, especially looking and listening in a systematic and meaningful way' (McKechnie, 2008, p. 573). The researcher observed two workshops that were held by the SJC in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, to gain an understanding of the implications that the organisation's structural changes had for its areas of work and strategies. In this method, a researcher readily creates the opportunity for direct observations by making a field visit to the case study site as 'some relevant behaviours or environmental conditions will be available for observation' (Yin, 2003, p. 92). During the observation the researcher took notes about the purpose of the events, the profile of participants, the issues discussed, and the nature of participation facilitated.

1.5 Research motivation and Researcher's positionality

This thesis was partly influenced by reflections on my involvement in several civil society groups as an activist and employee. In 2007, fresh from student politics, I joined other activists in facilitating consultations that led to the formation of BPRA in Bulawayo. I later worked with the Association again in the anti-prepaid water meter campaign between 2014 to 2015. From Zimbabwe, I then briefly worked with Voices for Racial Justice in 2016 and Freedom House in 2017, both in the United States. Between 2019 and 2020, I worked for #UniteBehind in Cape Town, which is a coalition of civil society organisations that include SJC, my second case study. While at #UniteBehind, I worked with many activists and leaders from SJC. So, while I was never a member of either BPRA or SJC, I worked with and had the privilege of observing some of the leaders and staff of the two organisations who were interviewed for this research. I was also involved or keenly followed some of their work.

My reflections on cumulative experience across the countries and civil society organisations mentioned above, and many others, inevitably got me thinking about the meaning of the work that I had been involved in. One of the things that I observed across the three countries, Zimbabwe, the United States and South Africa was how the different political contexts impacted my work. My knowledge of the two case studies and their political contexts also assisted in my data collection and analysis in this study. The triangulation, however, prevented any significant bias which my closeness to the units of study may have had on the research.

1.6 Limitations

There were several challenges related to accessing the focus group participants and key informants. SJC was in the process of changing its structures and membership was suspended at the time of this research, thus there were limitations in accessing the branch members. Secondly, the restrictions related to COVID-19 in both Zimbabwe and South Africa affected data collection. The researcher could not convene many focus groups in Cape Town and had to observe only two workshops conducted by SJC. This was done out of caution, but SJC also had few activities. At least 65% of the interviews were also conducted over phone calls, WhatsApp voice calls and zoom (video and audio) calls because of the lockdown restrictions and caution. Some interviews had to be rescheduled several times because of network challenges that related to electricity outages among other reasons.

Another challenge was around getting certain councillors to be interviewed for the study. In Bulawayo, two of those who did not participate, despite being approached, wanted the interviews to be conducted in person but that was impossible during the restrictions. In Cape Town, only one ward councillor was interviewed, out of a possible seven where SJC works. Three councillors that the researcher requested to participate in the interview, were unable

12

because of their involvement in campaigning for the 2021 local government elections. However, getting many council officials who are involved in sanitation work from the city's ISBS unit, was useful in covering that gap. The challenges, therefore, did not affect the research as enough data was collected.

1.7   Structure of dissertation

This PhD thesis comprises eight chapters as follows: chapter one outlines the overview of the study, in terms of the research problem, the context in which it is located, its purpose, its central question(s), and limits or constraints. The chapter also contains a brief overview of existing literature on the topic, the study's theoretical framework, its research methodology and, lastly, outline the structure of the whole thesis as a guide to the reader. Chapter two presents an analysis of literature on citizenship and democracy. It shows the interlinkages between the two theories and how they fit in the study. The chapter also sets the background for the study's theoretical framework. Chapter Three is a detailed discussion of the concept of civil society and the contributions that voluntary associations, as a subset of civil society, make for democracy. The chapter also outlines the study's analytical framework, drawn from the literature reviewed in both chapter three and chapter two.

Chapter Four locates the case studies in their context as it presents the characteristics of the global south cities and socio-political and historical contexts of Bulawayo (and Zimbabwe) and Cape Town (and South Africa). It also highlights the key institutions that impede and/or aid democracy and citizenship in the selected sites. The chapter thus lays the ground for a clearer understanding of the roles that the selected voluntary associations play in building citizenship and strengthening democracy. Chapter five presents the collected data from the first case study BPRA. Similarly, chapter six, presents data from the second case study, SJC. Both chapters outline the formation, reason for existence for both organisations, their activities and programmes, tactics and key outcomes. They also locate each case study in its socio-political context by highlighting the political relations with other political actors and how they frame the problems they are solving. The chapters look at the internal democracy and external impact of BPRA and the SJC in their respective cities. Both are descriptive chapters.

Chapter seven presents the synthesis of the two case studies and an analysis of their contribution to democracy in their respective cities. The analysis is framed along the four dimensions of the theoretical framework with the analysis of the impact of context on the associations' contribution to democracy forming the fifth aspect. Finally, chapter eight recaps the whole study and draws implications for democratic theory and makes suggestions for further research.

2. Chapter Two: Theoretical review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a theoretical review of the two key concepts in this research, democracy, and citizenship. Both have been explored by students of politics from as far back as premodern Europe. Their meanings have been contested and adjusted over time. This chapter defines each concept, traces its development, and highlights the nuances relevant to this study. While the two concepts are often used in relation to the nation-state, the chapter also flags the concepts' application to other scales, such as the city and international political communities. Ultimately, emphasis is placed on democracy and citizenship's meaning in cities, per the study's focus. Finally, the chapter discusses the relationship between the two concepts, thus laying the ground for the study's theoretical framework in the next chapter.

In terms of structure, the chapter has four sections, including this introduction. The second section explores the concept of democracy, its contested meaning and history in different parts of the world. It also highlights the various models of democracy and their relevance to this research. The section also highlights the process of democratisation and the mixed outcomes thereof. The third section then focuses on citizenship, and highlights key linkages between democracy and citizenship, also bringing out the interdependence between the two concepts. The section also highlights how active or democratic citizens contribute to democracy. The fourth and last section is the conclusion which recaps the main ideas covered in the chapter and how they relate to the whole study.

2.2 Definitions of democracy

The term democracy derives from a combination of Greek words *demos* for 'the many' or 'the people' and *kratos*, meaning 'power' or 'rule', it, therefore, means 'rule by the demos' (Heywood, 2004; Dahl, 1989; Tilly, 2007). Beyond the literal meaning of democracy as the "rule by the people", 'it has come to represent, from earliest times and even more in the modern period, the belief in autonomy, or self-determination, for individuals and the collectivities to which they belong' (Lakoff, 2018, pp. 1-2). In his book, *Democracy and its Critics* Robert Dahl (1989, p. 1) attempts more clarity. He defines democracy as 'a political system in which members regard one another as political equals, are collectively sovereign, and possess all capacities, resources, and institutions they need in order to govern themselves'. This also resonates with Catt's (2002) democracy which is 'a set of rights or an entire way of organising the political and economic life of a state'. Catt goes on to state that democracy, in its forms as a procedure, can be used by members of a group to reach a collective decision.

14

In the same approach, of describing what a democratic system looks like, for Charles Tilly (2007, pp. 13-14), a political system is democratic if 'political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation'. By breadth, Tilly means the range of citizens' demands that the state responds to, and all groups must equally see their demands being translated into state behaviour, hence the aspect of equality. In terms of protection, Tilly means that in a democratic regime, citizens' expression of demands must be protected by the state. By mutually binding consultation Tilly means the extent to which the process of translation of citizens demands commits both the state and citizens. Goldfrank's (2007, p. 148) definition of democracy as a political system where the 'government treats citizens equally and those citizens have equal rights to participate in government' also captures some of the aspects in the two above. Warren (2014, p. 2) notes that 'normatively, democracy is defined by individuals' entitlement to proportional influence over collective decisions that affect them'. The definitions above are largely normative and have common threads in defining and describing what ought to be a democratic political system: responsiveness, popular control and political equality. This study also takes those three to be the key tenets of democracy.

Some scholars, like Joseph Schumpeter, reject the normative theory of democracy. Schumpeter chose to describe the existing form of democracy (Huntington, 1991). Schumpeter thus defines democracy narrowly, as 'that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote' (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 269). It is 'the election of the men [sic] who are to do the deciding' (Schumpeter, 1950 [1946]:296). In his theorising about democracy, Schumpeter attempted to reconcile elitism and democracy, i.e., demonstrating that despite constituting a form of elite rule, a representative form of government can be reconciled with democratic principles (Barker, 2013). His was a response to the elite theorists who had argued that democracy was just a rule by the elites and was not workable (Best & Higley, 2010). Best and Higley further note that Schumpeter's theory was insightful in describing the existing representative democracy. It was somewhat a premonition too as, in their view, political elites and leaders, particularly in Western societies have predictably wielded more power and influence than the voters. However, his approach has had some theorists arguing that the Schumpeterian definition reduces elections which are supposed to be a means to an end, not the end in themselves (for instance, Beetham, 1999).

Not only the meaning but the practice of democracy has been contested as well. George Orwell's thoughts are revealing in this regard. Particularly poignant is his remark that '[i]t is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic, we are praising it: consequently, the defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might

15

have to stop using that word if it were tied down to anyone meaning' (Orwell, 1946). For Birch (1995), the meaning and practice of democracy have been contested, partly because the Greeks 'gave us the word but did not provide us with a model' and their 'assumptions and practices' were markedly different from that of the modern (aspiring) democrats. However, for scholars like Huntington (1991), the meaning of democracy is not contested: Schumpeter won the debate about the meaning of democracy and his definition avoids fuzzy, unmeasurable concepts.

Democratic theorists like Robert Dahl (1989) have recounted that the concept and practice of democracy changed from the Greek city-state (polis), where it meant the equal right of participation by citizens in person, to the representative democracy in the nation-states where it came to mean political representation by elected few. He further observes that the changes were necessitated by the expansion of the political unit. However, some theorists, such as Carole Pateman (1970; 2012) followed in the footsteps of philosophers such as Rousseau, have continued to agitate for participatory democracy. Democracy is, as Helena Catt (2002) notes, simultaneously a set of theoretical ideas and a process that people try to implement. Thus, to master the 'subject in its wholeness and complexity', one must juxtapose history, theory, and practice (Lakoff, 2018: ix). The next three subsections, therefore, look at the transformation that democracy has gone through, from the Greek polis to the contemporary world.

2.2.1 Democracy in the ancient societies

Ancient Greek city-states such as Athens have been widely credited as the birthplaces of democracy. Historians recount that a Greek named Cleisthenes was the 'father of Athenian democracy', around 508/461 BC. He is said to have devised an elaborate system of participatory governance that lasted until Macedonian conquerors overthrew it in 322BC. In that system, all adult male citizens directly took part in assemblies (sovereign body of Athens), which convened several times a year to debate 'governmental activity – from war and peace and major public works to minor domestic disputes' (Aristotle, 1984 [332 BC]:20–2). Another feature of the Athenian system was the filling of all government offices and legal administrative posts by throwing lots. Greek democracy was, however, despised by some philosophers and historians such as Plato and Aristotle who depicted it as a rule by the poor or likely to degenerate into a rule by the mob (Birch, 1995; Heywood, 2004). Democracy was therefore thought, by these philosophers, to be the enemy of liberty and wisdom. The limitations to the political franchise which saw only the adult, propertied men participate and other groups such as women, foreign workers, and slaves being denied political rights are also widely pointed out in the literature.

The model of Athenian democracy lasted for two centuries before Athens was conquered by Alexander of Macedon (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011; Held, 1996). Alongside the Greeks, the Romans have also received a share of the credit in what Isakhan and Stockwell (2011, p. 4), reproachfully, call the 'standard history of democracy'. Cicero, however, described the Roman Republic's constitution as not only democratic but containing elements of democracy and aristocracy (Asmis, 2005). Political scientists like Robert Dahl bemoan the demise of the Athenian *polis* and the collapse of the Roman Republic as having affected the progress of democracy (Dahl, 1989). Following its criticism by the ancient philosophers, democracy was despised for thousands of years to follow (Birch, 1995). Birch also notes that its poor reputation is evident from the 17th and 18th centuries when the Americans, the British and the French described their political systems as being representative or responsible governments instead of democracies.

A common version of history about the spread of democracy advances that it travelled from Europe to the rest of the world. Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address calling for a 'government of the people, by the people, for the people' in America, for instance, is cited by some scholars as a sign of how much the concept of democracy has traversed the world (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). The ideal has also been a subject of contention and awe in Asia and Africa, especially during the third wave of democracy (Huntington, 1991). Its contemporary understanding is, for some scholars, characterised by a limited narrative 'underpinned by twin discourses which contemporaneously assert the West's alleged propensity to democratisation and the supposed non-European tendency to despotism' (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). Scholars argue that democracy is universal rather than European. Amartya Sen (2003, pp. 29-30), for instance, writes that 'the championing of pluralism, diversity and basic liberties can be found in the history of many societies'. Scholars like Muhlberger and Paine (1993 as cited in Isakhan & Stockwell 2011) have also given examples of democratic governance being exercised in contexts as diverse as the traditional Chinese villages, African tribal moots, ancient Indian republics, and Native American societies. Concerning Africa, several social scientists and historians posit that in the pre-colonial era, some ethnic groups had democratic practices governing their societies' activities. However, these have been largely left out by many in the theory and history of democracy.

Immaculate Kizza (2011, p. 135), who explored the democratic system of the Baganda people of Uganda, also concluded that in the precolonial era, they had an elaborate 'socio-political administrative systems that gave all a voice in governance, emphasised group participation, could get rid of unpopular leaders, privileged consensus over confrontation' among other aspects. Other scholars have also observed that some African systems of governance

17

resembled several aspects of democracy. Kwasi Wiredu (1997), for instance, also argues that pre-colonial Africa had consensual democracy rather than the majoritarian democracy forced on the African countries by the Western powers. He argues that majoritarian democracy has been the source of conflict in contemporary African states. Wiredu argues that certain minorities (numerically and politically) that find themselves out of power because of failure to raise enough numbers to win elections, end up engaging in disruptive behaviour. For this reason, he then argues for doing away with elections and the adoption of a consensual non-party system. In Wiredu's democracy, governments will be formed not by parties, but by consensus and thus coalitions of elected representatives. Decisions are reached through consensus and voting is only used in very rare cases of an impasse. There have been criticisms of Wiredu's model. Eze (1997), for instance, argues against the glorification of the past and the portrayal of democracy as consensus only rather than the freedom to agree or disagree. Eze's view somewhat dovetails with the views of radical democrats, discussed later in this section. The next subsection discusses the understanding of democracy in contemporary literature.

2.2.2   Democracy in the contemporary world

Contemporary democracy has different features from Athenian or classical democracy, where citizens would periodically meet to make policies and take decisions (Lakoff, 2018; Held, 2006). Its adaptability has seen 'liberals, conservatives, socialists, communists, anarchists and even fascists being eager to proclaim the virtues of democracy and to demonstrate their democratic credentials' (Heywood, 2004, p. 222). A possible reason for democracy being claimed by many is that it is still used as a stamp of approval of life in the West in terms of institutions and cultural norms (Catt, 2002).

Countries have experienced democratisation and its reversal at different times. Over the past four centuries, Samuel Huntington (1991) counts three waves of democratisation with the first two followed by reverse waves. The first occurred between the 1820s and 1926, with the widening of suffrage. The second followed the triumph of the Allies in World War II until the 1960s. The third began in 1974, lasting until the 1990s. While corroborated by many, Huntington's model has been criticised, for instance, by Kurzman (1998) who claims that it allows 'the waves and reverse waves to overlap…while implying that no wrong-way transitions occurred during any of the waves or reverse waves' (p. 47). Some scholars have also applied different sets of democratic features and come to different conclusions. One of them is Gunitsky (2018) who applied a different set of aspects of democracy and came up with thirteen waves of democracy in the same period as Huntington. Paxton (2000) also argues that the measurement of transitions to democracy and the reversals by Huntington did not factor in

18

women's participation. If that were to be done, then the model would change significantly. For other scholars, such as McFaul (2002) the fourth wave began after the fall of communism, producing both democracies and authoritarian regimes, others question its development (see Howard, 2013). Hybrid regimes, with both elements of democracy and authoritarianism, have also emerged (Levitsky & Way, 2002).

The preceding paragraphs show the differences among scholars' approaches in the characterisation of countries as democracies or otherwise. Dahl (2008) presents seven definitional characteristics of polyarchal democracy which are divided into the voting period, pre-voting period, post-voting period, and interaction stage. For Diamond and Morlino (2005) a democracy requires 1) universal adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party, and 4) alternative sources of information. They then develop eight dimensions for measuring the quality of democracy from these features as follows: (a) procedural dimensions: (i) rule of law. They adopt a thick rather than thin notion of law. Rule of law in their case is strong, diffuse, and self-sustaining; (ii) citizen participation, (iii) competition - availability of 'serious political parties' and free, regular and fair elections; (iv) vertical and (v) horizontal accountability (also see O'Donnell, 2003). (b) Substantive dimensions: (vi) respect for political freedoms - to organise outside the electoral space; (vii) progressive implementation of greater political equality. Diamond and Morlino, (2005) posit that social and economic aspects are central to this dimension. (c) Results dimension: (viii) responsiveness of government to citizens' expectations, interests, needs and demands. If applied strictly, such comprehensive approaches, arguably, risk leaving the world without any democracies. They highlight the weaknesses inherent in the model, such as the linkages and trade-offs across their dimensions, its limited applicability among other challenges. Nevertheless, for them, it provides some tools for measuring the pluralist version of democracy.

For this study, democratisation, therefore, means the attainment of the characteristics detailed in Dahl's (2008) polyarchy and Diamond and Morlino's (2005) dimensions above. However, a few more concise descriptions of the process would be useful for this study. Potter (1997) defines democratisation as 'political changes moving in a democratic direction' (p. 3). A clearer definition of democratisation and, more so, relevant for this study is the one by Grugel (2002). He defines it as 'the introduction and extension of citizenship rights and the creation of a democratic state' (p. 5).[2] For him, '[t]he litmus-test for democracy is not whether rights exist on paper but, rather, whether they have real meaning for people' (p. 5). Another elaborate definition that combines elements that are key for this study such as responsiveness, is Tilly's

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[2] Citizenship rights are discussed in detail in Section 2.3.

(2007). He advances a view that the degree of democracy can be judged by looking at a state's conformity to the 'expressed demands of its citizens' (Tilly, 2007, p. 13). Democratisation for him obtains when there is an increase in the range of citizens' demands that are translated into state policy, and equally, for different groups of society, the process of making those demands is protected by the state and draws commitment from it and the citizens. De-democratisation means a decrease in all four elements.

Grugel (2002) and Tilly's (2007) views on democratisation are useful for analysis of the selected case studies, given the social, economic and political inequality and limits on political participation among other challenges that characterise their contexts (see chapter four for a detailed discussion of these). Tilly (2007) also puts the capacity of the state at the centre of democratisation. He defines state capacity as

> '…the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities, and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions…' (p. 16, emphasis in the original).

In other words, regimes with poor capacity cannot alter the distribution of resources and citizens' activities. While this study is primarily focused on voluntary associations' contributions to democracy, the selected cities' capacity to do what Tilly sees as necessary for democratisation is also briefly highlighted in chapters four and seven.

The process of democratisation according to both Grugel (2002) and Tilly (2007) must reduce and or eliminate inequality. Grugel (2002) however, notes that the extent to which democratisation 'should include the elimination of the most extreme forms of socio-economic inequality' is unclear (p. 5). He is quick to point out that 'economic entitlements (or the lack of them) affect political entitlements' (p. 5). Furthermore, he observes that '[i]n developing countries in particular, poverty and social exclusion operate as real barriers to citizenship. Even in developed countries such as the US and Britain, poverty means reduced access and influence in the public sphere' (p. 5). Tilly (2007) argues that inequality among different groups of affects democratisation and must be eliminated.

There are different circumstances that lead to democratisation. There is the modernisation approach, the structural approach and the transition approach. Modernisation, propagated by the likes of Seymour Lipset (1959), posits that economic development and increase in higher education are conducive to democratisation as they develop the middle class. However, the assumption that the middle class supports democratisation is not always true as it is sometimes ambivalent about democracy and supports authoritarianism (Webb, 2017;

Törnquist 2000). The structural approach posits that 'a shift in the balance of class power in society towards the working classes creates structural conditions that have, historically been favourable to the development of democracy' (Harriss et. al. 2004). This approach also does not adequately cover the countries whose democratisation has happened without a strong organised working class.

The third approach is the transition theory which focuses on the agency of political elites. It posits that democratic government institutions and procedures are negotiated between political elites. According to Harris et. al. (2004), this supports the idea that democracy can be 'crafted' through the encouragement of political alliances that are conducive to democratisation. This gives impetus to the international actors to support 'good governance' and the strengthening of civil society. The third wave democracy has also had an emphasis on citizens' political agency and socio-political contextual factors as leading to democratisation rather than economic and social structures (Stokke, 2018). A view that civil society actors contribute to democracy, invoked by scholars in the 1980s and 1990s to explain the velvet revolutions has become popular (see a detailed discussion in chapter three). This is the view that this thesis examines in the two global south cities of Cape Town and Bulawayo, using the selected case studies, BPRA and SJC.

2.2.3 Models of democracy

While there are multiple theories of democracy, the different strands do not differ concerning the basic normative assumptions about democracy's essence, but in their emphasis on different elements. From Habermas' (1994) normative models of democracy, Held's (1987; 2006) models of democracy, Gabardi's (2001) contemporary models of democracy and Buhlmann and Kriesi's (2013) models of democracy, the representative (and liberal), participatory, deliberative, and radical models are the most relevant for this study. They are outlined below:

2.2.3.1 Representative democracy

The representative form of democracy is a system where the people only decide who is to take decisions on their behalf with regards to public matters. This form of democracy, unlike the direct democracy in ancient Greece, was premised on the impossibility of managing large numbers spread over expansive lands; territories of the contemporary nation-state (Urbinati & Warren 2008; Dahl 1989). Writing in 1994, Anthony Arblaster noted that, 'virtually everywhere today, democracy is taken to be synonymous with some kind of representative system…the unqualified term has been appropriated for a form of democracy which is, at best, indirect'. (Arblaster, 1994, p. 79). 'Under contemporary conditions, democracy essentially means representative government', writes Buhlmann and Kriesi (2013, p. 44). For neo-

21

Schumpeterian, representative democracy is the form in which democracy exists empirically. Besides being the only existing form to them, it is also rational. Michels and Weber, (as cited in Held 1987), who view democracy as primarily about the selection and organisation of political elites, for instance, argue for the rule by those who understand the complex decisions in a modern state; elites instead of ordinary people. Under this model, however, weak formal representation results in a democratic deficit and the need for mediation (Piper& Von Lieres, 2015).

While there is widespread acceptance that representative democracy is widely implemented in the world, 'not all theorists take it for granted that representation is democratically acceptable' (Cunningham, 2002, p. 90). The nature of representation is a contested issue, for instance, with theorists such as John Stuart Mill (as cited in Cunningham, 2002, p. 92) offering ideas on whether representatives should be empowered only to act for the voters or to also judge for them. Mill's (as cited in Cunningham, 2002) view was that the representatives must be mandated 'to act as they think is in the best interests of their constituencies' (p. 92). However, the 'representatives should honestly represent their viewpoints to voters and be ultimately accountable to them' (p. 92). There are several criticisms of the representative model of democracy. To Rousseau, for instance, the representative system usurped people's power, rights and freedom. He thus called for direct participation instead (discussed in subsection 2.2.3.2) (Held, 2006). Scholars such as Helene Landemore (2017) argue that representative democracy does not have 'any form of popular participation besides voting' (p. 5). However, some see this as a positive aspect of this form of democracy. Buhlmann and Kriesi (2013), for instance, observe that '[e]lections establish a double link between the political input (the citizens' preferences) and the political output (public policies adopted by the elected representatives) by allowing for a combination of responsiveness and accountability' (p. 44). However, they emphasise the need for accountability and responsiveness (these two concepts are discussed in detail in subsection 2.2.4).

One of the main theories that present representative democracy as a viable system is the Schumpeterian democratic elitism or pluralism, which rests on 'the axioms of formal political equality, electoral representation, interest group pluralism, elite selection and citizens rational consumer-voters' (Gabardi, 2001, p. 558). Critics like Zolo, (1992, as cited in Gabardi, 2001) have pointed out that the assumptions upon which the model rests do not exist in the real world. Resources are not distributed equally among competing groups; voters do not have the information and independence to act rationally. Corporate mass media's message is more towards consumerism than performing its civic function. Gabardi concludes that 'neither pluralistic competition nor citizens actually exist in contemporary mass democratic societies'

(p. 559). Another critic, Barker (2013) describes representative democracy (in the United States) as an oligarchy and advocates for participatory forms of democracy.

Representative democracy is closely linked to liberal or Western democracy (Heywood, 2004). Liberals believe that a representative government is a necessary evil that should protect the individual, but its power should be checked through different constraints (constitution, Bill of Rights, separation of powers among others) to prevent it from becoming a tyranny against the individual (Sartori 1987 as cited in Hadenius 2001). In addition to these constraints on the power of government, liberals respect the existence of a 'vigorous and healthy civil society, based upon respect for civil liberties and property rights' (Heywood, 2004). The other key aspect of a definition of liberal democracies is that they create the space for a plurality of civic and political associations (Dahl, 1989). The liberal tradition is reflected in the definitions of democracy as a system that emphasises rights (Beetham, 1999), which links clusters of civil and political rights and socio-economic rights to democracy.

The development of liberal democracy is credited to philosophers such as John Locke who was essentially concerned with restricting the sphere of politics to ensure freedom for citizens from pervasive political authority. According to Oldfield (2000), in Locke's time of writing the *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), there was resistance to the absolutist and arbitrary powers of monarchies. 'Civil government was to be limited in two ways: it was to be limited by being subject to, and not above, the law; and it was to be limited concerning the extent of human affairs over which its authority could legitimately be exercised' (Oldfield, 2000, p. 6). The other issue that Locke was concerned about was 'men's [sic] rights to their 'Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general name, Property' (Locke, 1988, as cited in Oldfield, 2000). Therefore,

> The function of civil government was thus solely to secure and protect these rights, and if it persistently and deliberately failed to do this, for whatever reason, or strayed beyond its bounds, then a right of resistance could be invoked, because the relationship between people and government was a contractual one, based on trust in performance of the terms of the contract. What was emphasized by employing a doctrine of natural rights was that individuals needed protection against government as much as against each other. Civil government itself was to ensure the latter, and the terms of the contract were designed to secure the former (p. 7).

Lakoff (2018) also identifies what he calls the 'unifying impulse behind modem democracy' as being 'the quest for equal liberty' (p. x). This form of democracy has probably spread morethan any other form beyond Europe, through different means that countries democratise because of economic, social, structural and ideological factors (Lakoff, 2018; Tilly, 2007). However, the early liberals seem to have been more concerned with individual freedoms than

23

with democracy and as such. They aimed to restrict the sphere of politics, roll back the state and to ensure freedom for citizens from pervasive political authority (Kurki, 2010; Habermas, 1994). Thus, for theorists like John Stuart Mill and James Mill (as cited in Held, 2006), democracy was about the protection of rights. That strand of liberal democracy is what theorists refer to as protective democracy. In addition to this, Held notes that J.S Mill argued for democracy to be about moral self-development and the development of individual capacities. Some theorists refer to this sub theory of liberal democracy as developmental.

Held (2006) also points out that the likes of Alexis de Tocqueville subscribed to the idea of curbing state intervention in individual life because not doing so would harm the freedom of individuals and progress. Tocqueville's (1838) theory about the separation between the state and civil society formations, and the latter curbing the excesses of the former, is one of the most influential in democratic theory. Since the end of cold-war, liberal democracy has been aggressively promoted throughout the world by Western donors and governments (Hearn, 2000; Hobson, 2009) and holds sway in the global south (Avritzer, 2002). Scholars like Hearn (2001) and Shivji (2006) see NGOs (actors within civil society) as being the agents for spreading liberal democracy and liberal capitalism in post-colonial societies, respectively. Attention has also turned to the local government/cities/regions to democratise following the massive decentralisation drive and contemporary rescaling of politics below and above the nation-state(Purcell, 2006).

However, the spread of liberal democracy has not been without problems as shown by the emergence of what Zakaria (1997) calls illiberal democracies. For Zakaria, 'democracy is flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not' (p. 23). Illiberal democracies are the countries that have met the Schumpeterian form of democracy, a low threshold, whereby democracy is about elections without the protection of rights. For some theorists, this was long coming as liberalism and democracy may have come together but had nothing in common between them in practice. Philippe Schmitter has put it profoundly, as follows: 'Liberalism, either as a conception of political liberty, or as a doctrine about economic policy, may have coincided with the rise of democracy. But it has never been immutably or unambiguously linked to its practice' (Schmitter, 1995, as cited in Zakaria, 1997, p. 23). The rise of illiberal regimes, therefore, as noted by Zakaria, is the evidence that 'two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world' (Zakaria, 1997, p. 23).

In recent years, some scholars have pointed out that there are efforts in liberal democratic theory, 'to make the theory more democratic, with a view to the reform and restructuring of existing liberal democracies' (Oldfield, 2000, p. 6). This has not stopped criticisms against liberal and representative democracy and the emergence of alternative versions of

24

democracy. The theory of participatory democracy, for instance, 'frames itself as an alternative theory of democracy fundamentally opposed to representative government' (Barker,2013, p. 548). This form of democracy falls within the broader communitarian views which oppose liberalism. While the citizen, in the liberal tradition, claims rights from the state, in the communitarian tradition, the citizen's rights are positive. Civil rights are not about protection by the state but the constant possibility to participate in a community of equals (Habermas, 1994).

The next subsection outlines the basic tenets and sub-theories of participatory democracy that are relevant for this study.

2.2.3.2 **Participatory democracy**

Participatory democracy means the participation of citizens in the processes of governance with the state (Gaventa, 2006). It is a concept that has seen 'the addition of the term "direct" to what…was everywhere known simply as "democracy" (Arblaster, 1994, p. 79). This form of democracy was thought of by the likes of Rousseau and Marx who, as noted earlier, were against representative democracy. This form of democracy was later given prominence by political scientists such as Macpherson and Pateman (Held, 2006). Rousseau is regarded as 'the father' of participatory democracy owing to his strong opposition to representation (Urbinati, 2012, p. 647). He sought to revive the Athenian direct democracy because of his concerns that representative democracy did not protect people's liberty. To revive the individual's liberty, he then advocated the revival of Athenian democracy with a body politic that would be conducted and administered by the people themselves through open assembly sessions (Held, 2006). In Rousseau's philosophy about liberty, the people's sovereignty was inalienable and could not be represented thus the people were supposed to be directly involved in the affairs of the state (Urbinati, 2012; Held, 2006).

The strong critique of liberal and representative democracy in the 20th century, resulted in what is known in literature as the "participatory turn" which saw the likes of Pateman (1970), one of the leading scholars on participatory democracy, advancing 'the idea that participation could transform the inegalitarian relationships between the state and society and that it could help to emancipate and empower citizens in every sphere of their daily lives' besides just the political institutions (Bherer et. al., 2016, p. 226). Expanding participation became 'the virtual mantra of international agencies promoting both democracy and development and of development scholars' (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 148). Scholars who share that vision such as Ackerman (2004, p. 447 as cited in Gaventa, 2006), argue that participatory democracy is an effective way of harnessing society's energy by inviting social actors to participate in the core activities of the state. Cohen and Fung (2004) argue that 'citizens should have direct roles in

public choices or at least engage more deeply with substantive political issues and be assured that officials will be responsive to their concerns and judgments' (pp. 23-24). The expectation from the 20th century advocates of participation (international agencies, donors, scholars, etc.) is that it strengthens citizens and civil society, improving state responsiveness and accountability (Goldfank, 2007).

Participation has thus been promoted by various players and there has been an uptake of some of its forms by governments (Pateman, 2012). Participatory democracy has been promoted in the global south through good governance strategies (UNCHS, 2000). Scholars note that international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have also, in the past urged states to work collaboratively with civil society via institutions of participatory governance (Lemanski, 2017). In the 1990s, investment was channelled and institutional and legislative changes were made towards the creation of spaces for budgeting, planning, mini-publics and citizen juries which were mostly state-led. Civil society organisations became spaces for such participation, supported by international donors. (Cornwall, 2002). There is no agreement among scholars in terms of what state-led participatory processes have yielded. Lemanski (2017), for instance, observes that 'state-led participatory processes fail to translate their idealism – that including citizens and civil society in decision-making creates more just and inclusive cities – into practice' (p. 17) Using the example South Africa's ward committee system, Lemanski argues that the system hampers effective participation. She argues that wards are clustered in ways that serve the electoral system rather than participation.

Several other scholars have also criticised the effectiveness of state-led participation and raised the need for attention to be paid to power interplay in those spaces. Cornwall (2002), drawing from the likes of Bourdieu's and Foucault's theorisation of power for instance, emphasises the need to 'locate spaces of participation in places in which they occur, framing their possibilities with reference to actual political, social, cultural and historical particularities, rather than idealised notions of democratic practice' (p. 29). Cornwall's (2002, 2004) analysis of the state-led participatory processes as 'invited spaces' versus the 'invented spaces' which are the initiatives led by the citizens has also been useful for some scholars to interrogate participatory mechanisms. Some, like Cooke and Kothari (2001 as cited in Lemanski, 2017), for instance, argue that state-led participation serves to depoliticise citizens and legitimise the voices of those with the most power. For these scholars, the participatory methods are thoroughly flawed and beyond revision as they do not challenge socio-economic and political inequalities (Cooke & Kothari, 2001, as cited in Lemanski, 2017).

However, some scholars argue that the binary between invited and invented spaces can be simplistic at times thus giving the impression that the former is undemocratic and cannot be

contested and the latter is intrinsically democratic (le Roux, 2015). Moreover, participatory mechanisms can be effective as they offer spaces for citizens to be 'actors and agents in broader processes of governance' rather than being passive 'users and choosers of services' (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000, p. 53).

In contemporary theory, the term participatory democracy is used to refer to a wide range of models (Held, 2006). Some of the models that are part of participatory democracy are deliberative or discursive democracy and radical democracy. Fung and Wright (2003) for instance, see deliberative democracy as 'participatory democratic regeneration' (p. 40), while Goodin (2008) claims that 'deliberative democrats tend to be participatory democrats too' (p. 226). However, some scholars do not agree with this merging of the two concepts. Pateman (2012) for instance, categorically states that 'participatory democracy is different from deliberative democracy' (p. 8). For her, '[d]eliberation, discussion, and debate are central to any form of democracy, including participatory democracy, but if deliberation is necessary for democracy, it is not sufficient (p. 8).' Her issue thus is that '[s]ome of the more enthusiastic advocates of deliberative democracy tend to present deliberation as if it were synonymous with democracy itself' (p. 8). Further discussions of the deliberative model are in subsection 2.2.3.3.

Participation is not only about citizens inputting into the policy process and ensuring that the output reflects their interests and responds to their demands but that 'it contributes to 'the development of human powers of thought, feeling and action' (Kaufman, 1960 as cited in Teorell, 2006, p. 794). Pateman (1970) also argues that the 'output [of participation] includes not just policies (decisions) but also the development of the social and political capacities of each individual, so that there is "feedback" from output to input' (p. 42). This seems to be in tandem with what Goldfrank (2007) refers to as the virtuous cycle of participation, whereby participation leads to policy changes and such changes stimulate more participation. Comparisons can be drawn between this aspect of participatory democracy with liberal democracy as conceptualised by J.S Mill (as cited in Held, 2006, and as highlighted in the previous subsection) who also saw democracy's function as also developing an informed citizen with government interest. From these theorists' rationale, it does seem that participation should lead to increased, if not more effective participation.

2.2.3.3 Deliberative democracy

Deliberative democracy, sometimes referred to as discursive democracy envisions a system in which individuals actively engage with one another 'within and through a network of civil associations, groups and organisations which mobilise political action, provide political

27

information and communicate collective concerns to decision-makers' (Parvin 2018, p. 44). Another precise definition of deliberative democracy is given by its critics including Pateman (2012). She observes that 'the central claim of deliberative democratic theorists [is] that individuals should always be prepared to defend their moral and political arguments and claims with reasons and be prepared to deliberate with others about the reasons they provide'(p. 8). There are many models on how deliberations should happen among participants to ensure that the Habermasian 'force of the better argument' prevails (Habermas, 1996). They are mainly around respect, dialogue, information, well-reasoned arguments, reflexivity, among others. Gabardi (2001) notes that

> [d]eliberative democracy consists of four key features: (1) a free public sphere in which citizen discussion and debate can take place; (2) a set of procedures to ensure that this collective deliberation is fair, equal, and impartial for all participants; (3) that deliberation be conducted discursively, rationally, and dedicated to the greater public interest; and (4) that governments translate this consensus into laws and policies (p. 551).

Deliberative democrats see the public sphere as being at the centre of democracy as it is the realm that mediates between the state and civil society. Habermas defines the public sphere as 'a body of private persons assembled to discuss matters of public concern or common interest' (Habermas, 1989, p. 7). The Habermasian public sphere 'consists of civic associations, social movements, interest groups, the media, and arenas of public opinion formation. It is the space where citizens talk about their common affairs, the site where public discourses circulate' (Gabardi, 2001, pp. 550-551, mainly paraphrasing Habermas, 1994). For deliberative democrats, 'the society-wide clash of ideas characteristic of a genuinely flourishing democracy is conducted across civil society by a diversity of social and political movements, associations, and groups which act to build democratic capacity' (Parvin, 2018, p. 42). Of importance, also, for this study is that the deliberative democrats see civil society as crucial in providing citizens with 'knowledge, and attitudes, as well as the cognitive capacities, 'self-esteem' and 'political competence' necessary for active citizenship(participation) (Parvin, 2018, p. 41). Parvin also notes that deliberative democracy also relieson civil society to ensure effective representation. Civic associations are seen as crucial in creating links between the state and citizens.

The problem, for deliberative democrats, is that politics has tended to be taken away from citizens and conducted behind closed doors. This is because, 'citizens experience 'structural…deficiencies which have to do with problems of scale, complexity, lack of information and knowledge, and opportunities to speak and be heard' (Chambers, 2009, p. 330). The deliberative democrats' solution, therefore, is to

increase the opportunities open to citizens to participate…[as] a lack of participation indicates in part a failure of the system to ensure sufficient institutional means to participate in the relevant ways. [It] can be rectified by measures which re-allocate structural resources in ways which are more equitable (Parvin, 2018, p. 40).

Critics have also argued that 'the discourse ethics of the deliberative model of democracy is too demanding, too narrow, and coercive' (Charney, 1998, as cited in Gabardi, 2001, p. 556). Gabardi (2001) also explains how the rules of engagement are formal and appropriate for formal settings where discussions are highly controlled. The use of dramatic language, storytelling, figures of speech and other forms are excluded thus also potentially excluding certain people. Pateman (2012) argues that the different forms of deliberative democracy do not result in changing policies. She came to this conclusion by looking at the existing forms of deliberative democracy versus what she calls participatory democracy. She seems to negate the fact that theoretically, the deliberative democrats are about channelling civil society voices into influencing what the government does (Habermas, 1994). Besides its poor outcome, Pateman also casts doubt on the idea that the mass public sphere can be deliberative and argues for sticking to participatory forms of democracy that change policy decisions. While Pateman is not a deliberative democrat, Chambers (2009), also notes that the deliberative democrats themselves are also 'in doubt that the mass public sphere can be deliberative' (p. 324). She further notes that,

> while it is possible to enhance and promote deliberative encounters throughout civil society (i.e., Socratic dialogues), it is not at all clear that the broad informal public sphere can be deliberative. It cannot be deliberative because it cannot be dialogical. The mass public is abandoned in favor mini-publics [sic], that is, designed settings that can achieve and maintain standards of critical dialogue or that can be modeled to do so. (pp. 323-324).

One of the opposers of this thinking is Parvin (2018) who favours the strengthening of representative democracy through smaller spaces of participation in deliberation such as mini-publics. Parvin argues that 'citizens do not have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the ways that many democratic theorists require, and do not participate in anything like the numbers that they believe is necessary' (p.31). He thus rejects any attempts to increase wider participation. Instead, he advocates for the strengthening of strategies such as mini-publics that seek to strengthen representative democracy. Mini-publics however, are not prevalent in the sites of this study. However, he does not address the challenges associated with them, among which is their failure to change policies, as argued by Pateman (2012). Parvin (2018) posits that the failure of deliberative democracy also forces theorists to look at ways of infusing within the institutions of representatives, democratic deliberation. He mostly agrees with Chambers' (2008 as cited in Parvin, 2018) argument on the need to explore opportunities for

introducing more democratic deliberation into representative institutions rather than continuing to pursue deliberative democracy.

What seems clear among the assumptions made by participatory democrats is that participatory forums enhance democracy and create new forms of citizenship (Cornwall and Coelho 2007). The participatory forums and levels of participation are viewed differently however by some scholars. For instance, Warren and Gastil (2015) believe that mini-publics work best, while radical democrats believe in direct and equal participation by all citizens.

The next subsection briefly discusses the concept of radical democracy.

2.2.3.4 **Radical democracy**

Radical democracy is a broad concept which 'can refer to democratic theories that advocate the expansion of democratic processes and activities into more and more spheres of life while also pushing for more direct forms of participation in formal political institutions' (Vick, 2015, p. 206). Vick includes agonistic, participatory, deliberative democracy as part of radical democracy. However, other scholars such as Gabardi (2001) note that theorists of agonistic democracy view politics in terms of 'conflict rather than consensus'. They emphasise 'difference rather than the general interest and are radically oppositional than reformist' (p. 552). Radical democrats like Chantal Mouffe (2005), discourage passive citizenry.

The views above dovetail with those held by Pugh (2009) who starts by pointing out the meaning of the descriptor 'radical' which comes from a Latin noun 'radix' meaning a 'root'. Thus, radical politics get to the roots of a problem, 'roots [it] out' and redefines how society functions. According to Pugh (2009), this refers to all causes or issues that have caused radical changes in society. This form of democracy, argues Dahlberg (2013), draws from that 'historically constituted root meanings or conditions of democracy'; the free and equal participation of 'the people' (the demos) in power (kratos), and that democracy has no grounds, justifications or guarantees outside of the people, that is, outside of itself. One noticeable aspect is that equality is central to this kind of regime. Radical democrats 'locate the heart of politics in the existential struggle to form identities and advance different ways of life in an environment of contingency, plurality, and power' (Gabardi, 2001, p. 552). Their conception of the state and society is averse to hierarchy and they are focused on social movements activity and direct democracy rather than that of political parties (Kurki, 2010; Gabardi, 2001).

The differences in the models above are mainly around their interpretation of the role of the state, how citizens input into the public policies that are implemented and what the relationship should be like between citizens and the state. The different models can be seen through the

liberal and republican (and communitarian) views of politics. According to Habermas (1994), the liberal view is that the democratic process takes place between competing interests. These are represented by political parties that vie for political office, sell their programmes and then the citizens must choose the politicians who best represent their preferences through voting. The vote thus legitimises the political parties' access to political power. This is the school of thought that sees representative democracy as adequate. Republicans on the other hand have a different view of politics. For them 'politics is a contestation over questions of value and not simply questions of preference' (Habermas, 1994, p. 3). People's opinions about whatshould be done, their interests and values are communicated through dialogue, both in the public sphere and institutions such as parliament. Those views are then channelled into policies. Habermas is thus a theorist for deliberative democracy.

In this section, both the ideals and empirical forms of democracy were explored. These are highlighted in the analysis of the case studies, in terms of the forms of democracy that they contribute to (see chapter seven of this thesis). The next subsection focuses on the link between democracy and accountability and responsiveness.

2.2.4   Democracy, accountability and responsiveness

'Modern democracies rest on a combination of two ideas: that those who rule should do so in the public interest or in response to the public will; and that they will be more likely to do so when they are, in some way, representative of, and/or accountable to those they rule' (Philp, 2009:28).

The quote above from Philp aptly captures the concept of accountability and responsiveness. Accountability to someone for something involves 'giving account' - justifying decisions and actions in terms that are acceptable to those (potentially) affected (Borowiak, 2011, as cited in Warren, 2014, p. 3). Diamond (1997), who rejects Schumpeter's narrow view of democracy (above), describes democracy as 'also a political system in which government must be held accountable to the people, and in which mechanisms must exist for making it responsive to their passions, preferences, and interests' (p. 2). For others, democracy is 'a system of accountabilities' of not only the state being held to account but 'of representatives to the people they represent, of officials for the public trust they hold, and even of the people to themselves for past and future decisions' (Warren, 2014, p. 1). However, this study does not take a view as broad as the one presented by Warren. Its emphasis is only on local government; the cities of Bulawayo and Cape Town, being held accountable by the selected voluntary groups, BPRA and SJC respectively. The participatory models of democracy outlined above seem to ensue from theorists and practitioners' attempts to address the lack of accountability and responsiveness in the representative model.

In terms of the factors that necessitate accountability, Staffan Lindberg reminds us that 'when decision-making power is transferred from a principal (e.g., the citizens) to an agent (e.g., government), there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent accountable for their decisions and tools for sanction' (Lindberg, 2013, p. 203). In a representative democracy, problems that relate to the 'risks [of] exploitation, oppression, or other harms to the interests' make accountability a necessity (Warren, 2014, p. 2). However, if the interests of representatives and voters converge then 'relations of trust mitigate vulnerabilities. Under these circumstances, there is no need for accountability' (Warren 2014, p. 2). Accountability is a relational concept between those who owe an account and those to whom it is owed and thus goes beyond politics. However, in this thesis, the interest is in the relations between voters and elected representatives: the former may punish or reward the actions of the latter, depending on those actions (Bovens, et. al 2014).

Political scientists usually draw from other disciplines such as economics to frame the relationship between voters and their representatives as that of a principal (voters) and agents (elected or public representatives) (e.g., Warren, 2014; Bovens, et. al., 2014; Philp, 2009). While useful to some, the conceptualisation of the relationship between the government and citizens this way is fraught with problems (see Warren, 2014 and Philp, 2009 for the criticisms). Warren (2014) notes the need for empowerment of citizens to demand accountability, therefore, a democracy is 'a system of distributed empowerments', [where] 'institutional arrangements should enable those (potentially) affected by decisions to require an account' (p.3). He observes that,

> 'democracies empower individuals to demand accountability through distributions of rights and powers. But these empowerments are only effective to the extent that individuals are formed into "peoples"— formed into publics, groups, associations, or other kinds of organization that transform, say, an aggregation of voters, into a "principal" with the capacity to make demands— to ask for a justification and to hold to account. It is often the case that principals of this kind are formed as a result of distributed empowerments, such as votes' (p. 17).

While voting is seen as the main source of power for the principals to hold agents to account, most scholars see it as a weak mechanism. Przeworski (2010), for instance, argues that elections do not provide citizens with much control over government but only serve to 'constrain the most egregious abuses of power, and functioning to align policies with the preferences of the median voter' (paraphrased in Warren, 2014, p.7). Warren notes, however, that voting remains one of the most accessible, least demanding on the principals in terms of capacity to hold representatives to account, compared to other methods. Other common ways in which democratic systems give power to the represented, to hold representatives to account

32

include 'rights of speaking, pressure, petition, and association, standings to sue, and rights to information relevant to the power to question authorities' (Warren, 2014, p. 3).

Warren notes that 'democracy could not be conceived, let alone practiced, without vast and complex webs of accountabilities between peoples and those who govern on their behalf and in their name' (p. 1). Thus, some see accountability as being central to many definitions of democracy (Schmitter and Karl,1991) even though accountability precedes democracy (Philp, 2009). Related to accountability, as already shown in the preceding paragraphs, is responsiveness which is also a key characteristic for the democratic system (Dahl, 1971; Buhlmann & Kriesi, 2013). In a democracy, there must be 'continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens (Dahl, 1971, p. 1). Diamond and Morlino (2005) also count the responsiveness of government to citizens' expectations, interests, needs and demands as key characteristics of a democracy. For Buhlmann and Kriesi (2013), governments 'are legitimate because they effectively promote the common welfare of the people' (p. 44). Responsiveness can manifest in different forms. Policy makers '…may be responsive in terms of knowing what the citizens want, …agreeing with those priorities, …making an effort to deal with those priorities, or in successfully dealing with those priorities.' (Verba & Nie, 1972, pp. 301–302). The method of assessment of the responsiveness of the local government in the selected sites is outlined in chapter three of this thesis. The next subsection highlights the conditions necessary for democracy's inception and deepening.

In concluding this section, it is critical to note that the city has long been seen as both an agent and space for democratic possibility (Rodgers, Barnett, & Cochrane, 2014). The city has also long been seen as the ideal unit for the practice of democracy (Dahl, 1967), ground for breeding the requisites for democracy and, recently, a space for organising for change (Glaeser & Steinberg, 2017). While there are researchers who still see the city as a space where democratic politics play out, others like Swyngendouw (2010) observe that 'the city has undergone radical and dramatic change in terms of the modes of urban governing and treatment of dissensus. Such scholars describe the city as 'post-political' (Swyngendouw, 2010; Davidson & Iveson, 2015; Ranciere, 2006). These scholars criticise the contemporary democratic condition, not only in cities, as lacking genuine contestation and conflicting claims about the world (see Beveridge & Koch 2017).

Democratisation is a continuous process (Beetham, 1994; Rustow, 1970) and follows many different paths (Tilly, 2002). Countries are either consolidating democracy, deepening, stagnant or reversing to authoritarianism. Consolidating means that institutions and attitudes have embraced democratic norms and the country is not likely to reverse into authoritarianism (Linz & Stepan, 1996). For those countries that have attained democracy, another key step is

deepening it. Deepening democracy is 'a process through which citizens exercise ever deepening control over decisions which affect their lives' (Gaventa, 2006, p. 11). In essence, they participate more effectively, hold leaders to account and demand responsiveness from the public representatives. The late 20th century and the 21st century have, arguably, seen different trends, a mixed bag of democratisation, reversals and stagnation. Some countries have developed into what O'Donnel (1994) calls delegative democracies. These are democracies that do not seem to be on the path towards becoming representative democracies; they are not institutionalised but may be somewhat enduring. These are trapped in some stagnation where there is no movement in either further democratising or regressing. These are also referred to as hybrid regimes (Diamond, 2015; Furman, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2006). South Africa and Zimbabwe, where the sites of study are located are different types of democracies. The former is an emerging democracy while the latter is seen as a militarised hybrid regime (Ndawana, 2020).

Democracy depends on a citizen who takes part in politics beyond elections, keeps informed, fights injustice, pursues individual and collective interests and is a member of voluntary associations. This view takes after the de Tocquevellian view of citizens who participate in voluntary associations, and Montesquieu, and Rousseau who saw the French republican tradition as dependent on citizen participation. Hadenius (2001) posits that for democracy to prevail, members of a political community must, therefore, have the willingness to practice democracy while resisting dominance and the anti-democratic ideals.

The next section thus explores the concept of citizenship and its relationship with democracy.

2.3 Democracy and citizenship

This section outlines the interlinkage between the concepts of democracy and citizenship. Like democracy, citizenship has been described as an 'elusive', 'slippery', 'continually changing and disputed concept' (Pierson, 2012; Magnette, 2005; Clarke et. al, 2014). Some social scientists define citizenship as membership of a political community (Faist, 2001; Turner, 2016; Pierson, 2012; Yashar, 2005). Also related to this definition is Heater's (1990), who sees it as 'a defined legal or social status, a means of political identity, a focus of loyalty, a requirement of duties, an expectation of right and a yardstick of good social behavior'. A citizen is, thus, 'an individual who lives in a defined nation-state, has rights and privileges, as well as duties to the state, such as allegiance to the government. From these definitions, citizenship is markedly defined by a correlation between rights and duties as also observed by Turner (2016). Another element that is present in all definitions is identity with scholars like Koopmans et. al. (2005) positing that citizens are linked to the state by rights, duties and identities.

34

Drawing from Aristotle, David Held (1987) notes that in Greece, 'citizenship meant participation in public affairs' (p. 36).

Citizens are members of a political community who are 'equal with respect to the rights and duties' (Marshall 1964). Other scholars, however, do not see citizenship as membership. Isin (2009), for instance, does not see citizenship as membership but an

> 'institution of domination and empowerment that governs who citizens (insiders), subjects (strangers, outsiders) and abjects (aliens) are and how these actors are to govern themselves and each other in a given body politic. It is a relationship that governs the conduct of (subject) positions that constitute it' (p. 371).

Lister (2003) conceptualises citizenship as a status which accords to rights and obligations and an active practice (social and political participation). Therefore, to act as a citizen involves fulfilling the potential of that status.

2.3.1 Tracing the development of the concept of citizenship

The roots of the concept and practice of citizenship have often been traced to the ancient Greek and Roman notions of the city-state and *civitas* respectively. Magnette (2005) credits Greek philosophers for inventing the institution of citizenship to outline who belongs in the political community. In both Athens and Rome, there was an emphasis on citizens as being the main constitutive element of the political community rather than the territory. Citizenship was a marker of who was inside and who was outside and who had the right to participate in the affairs of the political community. In the modern state, social scientists such as Pierson (2012) also emphasize the importance of citizens as a constitutive element of the state. Heater (1990 as cited in Pierson, 2012) identifies five contexts in which citizenship has been developed in the past two and a half millennia: the Greek city-state, the Roman Republic and Empire, the Medieval and Renaissance city, the nation-state and the idea of the cosmopolis. Pierson (2012) notes that modern citizenship and attendant rights and duties have taken varying forms in different historical and national contexts.

Other regions like pre-colonial Africa are often seen as having had stateless societies and thus unorganised and without a clearly defined institution of citizenship (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2020). However, some scholars, for instance, Jan Vansina, cited by Coquery-Vidrovitch, have 'masterfully demonstrated that past societies in the Congolese basin, reputed to be 'un-organized', were on the contrary well organized and were even relatively democratic...as the presumed chief was continuously monitored by his people' (p.110). The post-colonial state, especially in Africa, was besieged by the legacies of colonialism. Mamdani (1996), argues that the legacy of divisions between citizens and subjects is part of the problems of post-colonial

35

Africa. The 'principal line of exclusion defining relations between individuals and the state, some of the value systems on which societies were structured during colonial periods remain institutionalized' (Kabeer 2000, p. 86, as cited in Gaventa & Jones, 2002). One of the major challenges facing African and other global south states is that of failure to meet the economic and social needs, (Adu, 1967, as cited in Wiener 2013), protect citizen participation and sustain democratic institutions (Tilly, 2007). Social, economic and political equality among citizens has not been achieved in most countries.

A widely cited theory of citizenship rights is the one developed by Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1964). He divided citizenship into three components, namely, civil, political and social rights. The civil feature embraced the attainment of individual freedoms and aspired to such elements as freedom of speech, the right to own property and the right to justice. The political component concerned the achievement of the right to participate in the exercise of political power, in particular the right to free elections and a secret ballot. The social aspect is the right to 'a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being' (Marshall, 1964). Writing after the Second World War, Marshall traced the evolutionary expansion of citizenship in his society (England) over three centuries; the 18th when civil citizenship or individual rights to speech, faith, and property emerged as the capitalist political systems instituted the protection of property, equality before the law, and civil liberties (Katz et. al. 2001).

Katz also notes that the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body (Marshall, 1964), developed in the 19th century, when the franchise was granted first to middle-class and later to working-class men. Social citizenship mainly arose in the 20th century and includes a broad range of rights, 'from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society' (Marshall, 1964, p. 94). As Katz (2001) notes, social citizenship took shape as the welfare state. Although it is mostly perceived and used as a universally valid model in academic literature, Katz's theory has been criticised for historicism and limitedness since it is based on the UK experience in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries (Lister 2005; Prak, 2018). Marshal (1964), however, acknowledges that there is not a universal principle of defining the rights of citizens; societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed.

The different historical epochs and contexts have influenced the evolution of the concept of citizenship in political discourse, resulting in different schools of thought (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994).

The next subsection explores the key tenets of the two broad schools of thought on citizenship: liberalism and republicanism.

2.3.2 Liberal and republican citizenship

Liberalism and (civic) republicanism are two prominent schools of thought on citizenship. The former emphasises the rights accorded to individuals while civic republicanism emphasises its conception as a practice involving responsibilities to the wider society (Heater, 1990; Oldfield 1990). Mouffe (1992) notes that the liberal view sees citizenship as focused on each person's (individual) capacity to form, revise and rationally pursue their definition of the "good". Under the same school, citizens are thus 'using their rights to promote their self-interest within certain constraints imposed by the exigency to respect the rights of others' (p. 71).

Civic republicanism 'puts a strong emphasis on the notion of a public good, prior to and independent of individual desires and interests' (Mouffe, 1992, p. 71). Civic republicans (and communitarians), in Mouffe's view, emphasise the value of political participation and object to liberalism as an 'impoverished conception that precludes the notion of the citizen as one for whom it is natural to join with others to pursue common action in view of the common good' (p. 71). While liberals argue that ideas about the "common good" have a totalitarian flair, communitarians object to the instrumentalisation of community in furtherance of individual interests. Republicans emphasise civic virtue, the 'disposition to further public over private good in action and deliberation' (Dagger, 1997, p.13). In the classical formulation, civic virtues include 'courage, public engagement, and respect for the law' (Lovelett, 2015, p. 8). Mouffe (1992) notes that the civic republican view had almost disappeared in Europe by the early 1990s as it had been (supposedly) displaced by liberalism. It was however, revived by the communitarians as noted by the likes of Dagger (1997) and Lovelett (2015).

In terms of their ideal forms of government, Gaventa and Jones (2002) note that communitarians endorse deliberative forms of democracy while liberals lean towards representative forms. What citizens (should) do in a political community, therefore, differs between the liberal and republican (communitarian) schools. For liberals, citizen participation in decision making should be episodic and mostly restricted to voting and other civic acts (Altundal & Valelly, 2011). For this school, democratic citizenship is about the state doing enough to secure the rights of citizens and the supposedly "periodically accountable" representatives (both elected and appointed officials) taking care of the business of decision

37

making. This is a view of liberal pragmatists (also elitists) like Schumpeter (2010) and Parvin (2018). This view can be said to be state-focused as it places the state at the centre and citizens on the periphery of politics.

Contrary to the liberal view is communitarianism which subscribes to continuous popular control and management of government. Delanty (2002, as cited in Waghid, 2005) identifies three strands of communitarianism: liberal communitarianism, conservative communitarianism and civic republicanism. In its conservative form, the communitarian view 'stresses participation as a civic responsibility and as necessary to social regeneration' (Waghid, 2005, p. 324). For Waghid, the liberal communitarian strand emphasises participation in the political community and the acknowledgement of minority groups by the dominant. This seems like a non-majoritarian view of democracy; however, it somewhat subdues the minority groups as they must become citizens of the dominant culture to participate in the political community.

The second, conservative communitarian's emphasis is on citizenship as a civic responsibility. For conservative communitarians, citizens should be highly participatory in all spheres of human interaction, from the family to the whole society. Some criticisms of this school have been around that it emphasises citizen responsibility to the point of excusing the state from its responsibility (Waghid, 2005). The third strand, civic republicanism, 'strongly emphasises the associational character of citizenship. Its defining features are commitment to and participation in public life, and it ignores 'social struggles in the private domain' (p. 325). This view is, arguably, generally citizen-focused as it places citizens at the centre of politics, instead of the state.

Formal vs substantive citizenship

Being a member of a political community- formal citizenship - does not, on its own, give one full access to rights - 'substantive citizenship' (Appadurai & Holston, 1996). Citizenship is political by its very nature (Isin, 2002). Bendix (1996, xii, as cited in Isin, 2002) observes that citizenship 'give[s] shape to the relations between the civil society and the state'. Theoretically, the state is supposed to use its coercive power and administrative capacity to fulfil the rights of citizens (Hadenius, 2001). However, the state does not always have a monopoly of force or the capacity. In such instances, this may lead to what Turner (2016) calls "denizenship". Turner coined the word denizenship as an antonym of citizenship but etymologically, as a combination of words deny and citizenship, thus capturing the intended meaning of denied citizenship.

Consistent with the view that citizenship is shaped by contention and constant back and forth negotiations between the state and citizens, Clarke et. al (2017) argue that,

> citizenship acts as a point of connection – indeed, a point of mobilisation – for many individuals and groups who identify themselves as citizens when they act, name themselves as people who would be citizens in demanding citizenship, or demand that citizenship be enlarged, enhanced or transformed to engage with other issues, identities and desires. Citizenship is thus a potent keyword in social, cultural and political terms, naming actual or imagined possible relationships (p. 1).

This view brings to the fore, the role of social and political players in organising the "would be citizens" to claim their rights and push for changes in the political system to undergird the transformed citizen-state relations. It is also comparable to the radical democratic concepts such as agonism put forward by Mouffe (2005) among others (discussed in subsection 2.2.3.4).

Some of the notable citizenship struggles have been recorded in the Latin Americas, for instance. Van de Ree's (2011) research on Chile where 'citizenship was re-interpreted and re-formulated' through different epochs of that country's history, gives a version of an answer to this question (p. 23). Using Giddens' (1984) notion of structuration known today as the structure-agent approach, where the state acts as a structure and civil society the agent, Van de Ree argues that state actions generate civil society interests and vice-versa, in the context of citizenship formation. In line with these observations is one made by Isin and Turner (2002), that debates and struggles of citizenship have been mostly waged via the nation-state as both the source and appeal of authority. Another view on Latin American struggles for citizenship rights is by Evelyn Dagnino (2006). The scholar observes that the common reference to citizenship, used by different political actors projects an apparent homogeneity, obscuring differences and diluting the conflict between neo-liberal and democratic participatory projects. Latin American civil society organisations have used the concept to frame their struggles and build formidable coalitions. Their version of citizenship configured it as a concept 'reaching far beyond the acquisition of legal rights: it depended on citizens being active social subjects, defining their rights, and struggling for these rights to be recognized' (Dagnino, 2006, p. 19).

Also notable are two forms of struggles for citizenship in the same continent observed by Holston (2008) and Earle (2012) as "insurgent" and "transgressive" citizenship respectively. Holston's version was a culmination of a study of homeowners' struggles in São Paulo who asserted themselves as rights-holders fighting against eviction (Earle, 2012). Holston refers to residents' groups as "insurgent" citizens for the way they have unsettled entrenched social inequalities through informal expansion of the city, conflict over land and using the law in

demanding citizenship rights. The concept of "transgressive" citizenship (Earle, 2012) came about as a description of 'the challenge the housing movement makes to the state as it uses text-based law to justify building occupations' in São Paulo (p. 97).

Another form of politics that shapes citizenship (state-citizen relations) is intermediation and or mediation. Yashar (1999) posits that "citizen regimes" (patterned combinations of choices about citizenship) not only reflect 'bundles of rights and responsibilities that citizenship can offer' but also refer to the 'accompanying modes of interest intermediation' (p. 80). In relation to state-citizen relations, scholars such as Charles Tilly (2007), have observed that there are effective mechanisms in democratic societies, which include protection and mutually binding consultation for citizens to make claims from the state and or contribute to the shaping of the political community. In absence of such mechanisms, different kinds of mediators emerge, ranging from influential individuals, organisations, speaking with, for or by the poor (Piper & Von Lieres, 2015). According to Piper & Von Lieres (2015, this form of politics is strategic in several global south contexts, to make up for the democratic deficit.

The struggle for citizenship is largely that for equality which can be achieved through equal access to citizenship rights (Dagnino, 2006). Complementing this view is an espousal by Barbalet that 'the development of citizenship rights may change how people identify themselves and it may alter their feelings about social and class inequalities' (Barbalet, 1988, p. 57). Citizenship, it seems, is thus built on much more than just basic rights thus the conception of what constitutes it is inherently unique to the context.

The concept of citizenship has indeed morphed in different ways through history and from one context to another. Lovelett (2015) points out that there are scholars who attempt to combine liberalism and republicanism, for instance, Dagger (1997). The "republican liberals", as they are called, add other virtues such as 'a disposition to respect the rights of other citizens, a generally tolerant attitude towards diverse values and beliefs, a commitment to fair play, and an appreciation of personal autonomy and individuality' (Lovelett, 2015, p. 8). Other scholars, like Gaventa and Jones (2002) have also noted the emergent view that attempts to reconcile liberalism and republicanism into a comprehensive view of citizenship. This middle of the road position cherry-picks from both the different schools and attempts a comprehensive conceptualisation of citizenship. In analysing the contributions of voluntary associations to citizenship and democracy, this study keeps an open approach, cognisant of these different schools of thought. In terms of understanding the forms of citizenship that voluntary associations construct, it is strategic to go beyond the normative nature of debates about citizenship. The importance of this stance in research is also observed by scholars such as Robins et. al. (2008) and Tilly (2000), who highlight the need for studies to pay attention to the

context in an open-minded manner rather than putting on the normative lens which has dominated scholarship about citizenship.

2.3.3   Scales of citizenship

While acknowledging that the typical and contemporary political community is the Westphalian nation-state (Pierson, 2012; Magnette, 2005; Baubock, 2003), for some, citizenship is always geographically multi-scalar (Heller & Evans, 2010: 435). Citizens are made both at the national level through constitutions and elections and in their day-to-day engagements with the local government (city government in this study). This study focuses on urban citizens (Hintjens & Kurian, 2019). In the study sites, there are glaring democratic deficits and informality is rife, thus citizenship is often mediated (von Lieres & Piper, 2014) or brokered (Gukelberger, 2018), the state circumvented (Verloo, 2017) or mimicked (Nielsen, 2011). Access to services and enjoyment of civil rights can be dependent on one's connections in some instances, (Piper & von Lieres, 2016; see also Berenschot & van Klinken, 2018). In addition to contending with the urban regimes in the struggles for citizenship, Yiftachel (2015), argues that there is also an emergence of 'defensive urban citizenship' (DUC)—citizens actively rejecting migrant populations, such as Africans in Tel Aviv. Such a phenomenon has also been going on for years in South African cities. This may create other groups who are marginalised even further, from both the democratic processes and mediation or brokerage. The study thus looks at how voluntary associations develop active citizenship in the contexts with some of the characteristics outlined above.

Some theorists also advocate the conceptualisation of citizenship beyond the state-centred versions. Laclau and Mouffe (1985, as cited in Gaventa and & Jones, 2002) also call for the location of citizenship action spaces that are separate from the state. They put forward a notion of 'radical democratic pluralism'— - alliance-building among different citizenship struggles through principles of liberty and equality (common good). This means that groups express solidarity with others' others' struggles and act to fulfil their aims without losing their struggles and aims (Gaventa and & Jones, 2002). Others call for participation against the state (Dryzek, 1996; Pahl, 1990, both cited in Gaventa and & Jones, 2002). This notion is linked with that of radical democracy, discussed in section 2.2. The approaches of case studies selected for this study, SJC and BPRA seem to bear notions of liberal and republican versions and both are focused on the local scale.

2.3.4   Interlinkages between democracy and citizenship

Democracy and citizenship are interdependent, both conceptually and in practice. Some theorists posit that the existence of democracy depends on members of a political community

making claims for citizenship rights (practising active citizenship) (Hadenius, 2001). This view seems to acknowledge the political struggles through which democracy is realised. For Baubock (2003), democratic citizenship emerges from struggles for inclusion in the polity. In the process of claiming citizenship rights, citizens simultaneously democratise the political unit in question, thus exercising democratic citizenship (Hadenius, 2001). In furtherance of the point about democracy being dependent on citizens, Charles Taylor (1997) argues that it [democracy] 'requires a certain degree of commitment on the part of its citizens' while an undemocratic society, 'could ask of people only that they remain passive and obey the laws' (p. 39). He further argues that both ancient and modern democracies require members to contribute and participate and warns that where this does not happen, 'the system is in danger' (p. 39). Democratic politics requires a 'vigorous civic culture that habituates citizens to perform civic duties' Lakoff, (2018: xi).

According to Hadenius (2001), the state may also become a tool of the powerful and a burden to the citizens. This is also echoed by Tilly (2007) in his explanation of why categorical inequality endures. The scholar advances a view that the powerful use state institutions to keep privileges to themselves. The injustices, oppression, marginalisation and other ills which may ensue thus give birth to the struggles for citizenship (Isin & Turner 2002). An active citizen engages in politics, keeps informed and speaks against unjust measures (Shklar 1991 as cited in Hadenius 2001). Other scholars, on the other hand, see citizenship as being dependent on the political system being democratic (Tilly, 1998; Altundal & Vallely, 2011). The indivisibility of and symbiosis within the trilogy, civil rights, political rights and social rights (Marshall, 1964) underlines the link between citizenship and democracy and seems to set the tone for the conflict-laden state-citizen relations.

With the emphasis on substantive and empowered citizen participation in public life (Gaventa, 2006), the citizens ought to shape what the state delivers and how it delivers it (Lister, 2003). Citing Isin (2002), Baubock notes that the polity becomes the arena through which groups 'stake their claims, wage their battles, and articulate citizenship rights and obligations' (p. 50 original emphasis). The struggles for democracy, therefore, essentially struggle about citizenship as they are about changing the relationship between the powerful and less powerful. Thus, deepening democracy requires both the strengthening of citizenship and democratising the state (Goldfrank, 2007). For Goldfrank, the former entails 'transforming residents from passive subjects in dependent relationships with particular politicians or parties into active citizens who know they have rights and can legitimately make demands on government' (p. 148). This view concerns itself with the 'quality and attitude of its citizens' (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 284), which seems to be the first point of focus for some. The scholars

who share this approach to democratisation would support deliberate approaches such as citizenship education, creation of spheres for deliberation, cultivating social capital among others. Voluntary associations are assumed to be the schools for the development of this form of citizenship (see detailed discussion in section 2.4).

Democratic citizenship and participation are anchored on a conviction that citizens are 'able and willing to involve themselves in the political process, that they desire the contact with their neighbours into which this process will bring them' (Hemmingway, 1999, p. 153). In constructing the framework of analysis for this study, elements of what democratic citizenship entails are drawn from different scholars already cited in this chapter. Some features are given prominence while others are combined as ways of arriving at the framework. Hemingway (1999) describes a democratic citizen as

> an engaged individual who makes political activity a reasonable priority, who understands the need for preparation in order to engage in informed communication with fellow citizens in order to define the situation in which they find themselves together, and who actively seeks opportunities to refine her / his abilities and knowledge to contribute to creating the community in which he/she wishes to live (p. 154).

This study looks at whether local voluntary associations democratise the global south city, characterised by poverty, inequality among other challenges that weaken democracy, as described in chapter four of this thesis.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter explored the concepts of democracy and citizenship. It also outlined the definitions, interlinkages, and some theoretical debates around both concepts. From the definitions of democracy, the key tenets are responsiveness, popular control and political equality. The concept of citizenship complements democracy in the sense that democracy depends on active citizens. And, as noted in this chapter, the strengthening of citizenship entails the transformation of subjects into active citizens who claim their rights and make demands on the government. This study emphasises democratic citizenship or active citizenship. While the usual approach is to look at democracy and citizenship with regards to the nation-state, this chapter highlighted that the two can also be analysed at the local, national, regional and/or international levels. This thesis focuses on citizenship and democracy at the city level. The chapter forms the background for the study's theoretical framework presented in the next chapter.

3.   Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

3.1   Introduction

The literature reviewed in the previous chapter shows that democracy depends on active citizenship. To democratic theorists, civil society organisations contribute to both the strengthening of citizenship and democratising the state (Goldfrank, 2007). This chapter, therefore, presents a theoretical review of the concept of civil society and traces its development, from the formulations by Enlightenment thinkers and its re-emergence in the later 1980s among Eastern European scholars. It also locates voluntary associations, which are the primary focus in this research, in the broader civil society literature. The chapter also reviews the link between voluntary associations, citizenship and democracy and highlights the critiques thereof. The chapter then culminates in the study's theoretical framework for making sense of the findings from the two case studies, BPRA and SJC.

The chapter consists of seven sections, including this introduction. The second section focuses on the key elements of the concept of civil society. It explores its development from the pre-modern to modern and contemporary eras. The third section outlines the concept of voluntary associations, defining what they are, how they form and their link with civil society theory. The fourth section pays attention to the contributions that voluntary associations make to democracy. It also highlights some of the factors that complicate what has mostly become a normative link. The fifth section presents the study's theoretical framework, drawing from the review of three concepts: democracy, citizenship and civil society, reviewed in this and the previous chapter. The framework informs the analysis in chapter seven, where it is applied to the selected case studies. The seventh section briefly highlights the importance of context in the analysis of voluntary associations' link with democracy. The last section is the conclusion which ties together the ideas explored in the chapter and shows some of their implications for the study.

3.2   Civil society: an overview of the concept

Civil society is defined as both 'a symbolic field (between the state and the family) and as a network of institutions and practices that is the locus for the formation of values, action-orienting norms, meanings, and collective identities' (Cohen, 1999, p.214). Some theorists and practitioners view civil society as a diverse aggregation of individuals, movements and associations while others seem to understand it as represented by organisations sharing certain values and goals (Fioramonti & Fiori, 2010). For John and Jean Comaroff (1999, p. 6), the concept will remain as different as are its 'protagonists, its prophets and its political theorists'. The common strand among the definitions is that civil society is not part of the state.

44

However, the 'demarcation as regards the market (or business, or the economy) and the intimate private sphere is less clear' (Dekker, 2008, p. 3).

The characteristics of civil society, cited by several scholars, are that of self-regulation and self-organising (Selznick, 2002, as cited in Dekker, 2008), and volunteering (Dekker, 2008). These characteristics thus exclude 'the family, whose members are not volunteers, and the state, which, even if its legitimacy rests on the consent of its members, wields coercive power over them' (Walzer, 2002, p. 35 as cited in Dekker, 2008). Put differently, civil society is characterised by associative relations that are based on normative and discursive influence, unlike states with power and markets with money (Warren, 2001). Voluntary associations are not part of the intimate spheres of life, not state-led or motivated by a need to achieve market-related objectives. However, they 'may be concerned and even aim to influence each of these spheres' (Maloney & Roßteutscher, 2007, p. 229).

There are different traditions for understanding civil society informed by the historical development of the concept. Scholars such as Mamdani (1996) and Khilnani and Kavaraj (2001) remind us that the concept of civil society was constructed alongside the historical changes in Western societies. Thus, it meant different things to different philosophers just like democracy and citizenship discussed in the previous chapter and like the other two, it also disappeared for some time and was only resurrected to explain historical developments. Its current popularity comes from the late twentieth mobilisations that led to democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s (Edwards, 2011). Khilnani and Kavaraj (2001) argue that it was revived in the late 1970s and 1980s, as holding promises of 'democracy, prosperity, autonomy and the means to exercise it', after the model of state-led modernization, liberalism and Marxist conceptions of social development disintegrated (p. 12).

The definitions above are informed by different historical views of the concept of civil society. If the voluntary associations are to be located clearly within the realm of civil society, the history of the latter must be clearly understood, thus the next paragraphs outline the development of the concept. Different Western philosophers conceptualised civil society in response to the questions of how to balance private interests with public interests and the need for moderation of the power of the state to prevent tyranny (Seligman, 1992). In tracing the development of the concept, some scholars painstakingly go as far back as the Greek city-states where the likes of Plato and Aristotle made a distinction between a civilised society and a barbarian one. In the barbarian society, individuals were preoccupied with private interests to the detriment of society, while in Aristotle's *koinônia politiké* ('civil society'), the private interests were

45

superseded by the community interests (Ehrenberg, 1999). In that context, civil society meant a 'civil' form of society', (Bratton, 1994, p. 53).

Besides the Greeks' conception, scholars also point to Cicero's revival of the republican ideals that had been advocated for by Plato and Aristotle in Rome, in response to the socio-political crisis that bedevilled the empire (Ehrenberg, 1999). The crisis was in the form of economic exploitations, which led to the rise of political oligarchy and subsequent rebellions (Ibid.). Cicero proposed a constitutional framework to regulate relationships and ensure social order in which disputes were settled according to a system of laws. Citizens were to participate in public life (Ehrenberg, 1999). Ehrenberg also notes that classical theologians, particularly Thomas Aquinas, also contributed to the Greco-Roman political philosophies by reconciling reason with faith.

3.2.1 Civil society in the modern era

From the modern era, scholars such as Khilnani (2001) identify three key visions of civil society by John Locke, the Scottish theorists of commercial society (Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith), and Hegel. However, conceptions of civil society by Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Antonio Gramsci will also be highlighted in this section. Firstly, Locke's civil society was one purged of the conditions of the state of nature where 'deeply held individual beliefs about how to act collided' (Ibid, p. 18). Dunn (2001, as cited in Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001) notes that Locke's civil society was characterised by the existence of laws, judges and effective enforcement. It was a condition where man disentangled himself from the idea of a life regulated by the state of nature. This disentanglement was to be achieved through the society of 'human beings who had succeeded in disciplining their conduct', not a standalone entity such as the state (Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001, p. 19).

Unlike Hobbes who conceived of the state as an impersonal authority, the Leviathan, Locke saw human interaction based on trust as the source of order (Ibid.). Hobbes' idea to bring about civility to a life that was uncivil, was for everyone to agree to appoint an individual or assembly (the *Leviathan*) to provide security for all and then forgo their quest for self-preservation. It organised and regulated a civil society (Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001). To these philosophers, civil society '…was a society where individuals come together to make a social contract and the outcome of that contract is expressed in the rule of law and the existence of the state, which is also subject to the law. Juridical equality applied both to rulers and the ruled' (Kaldor, 2003, p. 7).

In the 18th century, the theorists of commercial society advanced their views on the same problem, of achieving a civil society or a moral community. In place of the Lockean trust that

46

held the society together and a shared conviction of fulfilling divine purposes, these theorists saw a human association held together by interdependencies of need (Khilnani & Khaviraj, 2001). Critics bemoaned the destructive effects of commerce at the time as the surge of industrialism and the pursuit of individual wealth threatened republican virtues. This has a ring somewhat like that of social scientists' critique of globalisation and neoliberalism since the latter years of the 20th century, into the 21st, as destroying democracy in the cities (see discussion in Purcell, 2006). According to Ferguson (1995) for instance, private wealth accumulation had invited state intervention to the harm of individual rights. The commercial theorists were of the view that 'human association was actually enriched by the introduction of voluntariness and choice, which enabled persons to come together in an arena freed from grip of dependencies of need' (Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001, p. 20). According to Khilnani and Kaviraj, Adam Smith's (1776) view was that human relations had long been 'pervaded by exchange', 'the commercial societies had successfully instituted a distinction between the realms of market exchange and personal relations' (Smith, 1776, as cited in Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001, p. 20). For Smith, the commercial society circumscribed the realm of need to the market thus creating a sphere of non-instrumental human relations, governed by 'natural sympathy' (Ibid, p. 20). Through the unintended human interaction in the commercial societies, the human association had moved away from that which had been 'based upon exclusive and non-voluntary relations (p. 21). For the theorists, the commercial society made possible the functioning of a generalised civil society where strangers could make contracts.

Hegel is the modern philosopher who introduced the separation between civil society and the state. His ideas are described as 'both the summation and the springboard for main currents of Western thought on the subject'. He had similar concerns with his predecessors, of creating and sustaining a community in his era (Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001). In solving the problem, Hegel 'tried to integrate the individual freedoms specified by the natural law tradition (from the likes of Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant) with a rich vision of community, existing under conditions of modern exchange' (Ibid, p. 23). Hegel saw civil society as a product of the historical process of differentiation, which saw power being concentrated in the state and division of labour in the economy, giving rise to an autonomous legal sphere to govern civil life' (Mamdani, 1996, p. 14). The "bourgeois society" (*Burgerliche Gesellschaft*), Hegel's term for civil society was thus 'a modern product of a long historical transformation by which a nascent bourgeoisie established a sphere of market relations by civil law' (Keane, 1988, pp 50-51; Bratton, 1994, p. 54). For him, it was thus distinct from family, and the state (Riedel, 1984, as cited in Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001, p. 23). Some scholars, though, contest the positioning of the family in the definition of civil society and call for it to be given a more central role (Power et. al., 2018).

The contemporary understanding of civil society was thus shaped by Hegel who discontinued its use as a synonym for political society. It should be noted that he saw the potential of conflict emanating from the competing interests of individuals, classes, groups and institutions in that space. Civil society, therefore, needed the state to guide its conduct, its propensity for private interests and the attainment of ethical unity of society. The unity of society and freedom of its citizens could only be ensured by the state (Kaldor, 2003). Mamdani (1996) points out that the modern state recognised the rights of citizens, bounded by law, hence the rule of law, which meant that 'law-governed behaviour was the rule' (p. 14).

Two further conceptions of the notion of civil society were contributed by Marx and Gramsci. Inverting Hegel's dialectical idealism, Marx saw the civil society as not independent but a 'realm within which the bourgeoisie exploited the labouring class' (DeWiel, 1997, p. 30). For him, civil society was '…a set of commodity production and exchange institutions that tilted contractual relations in favour of capitalist entrepreneurs' (Bratton, 1994, p. 54). Marx saw the political society or modern state on the other hand also protecting the interests of the bourgeoisie in civil society. Regarding the civil servants whom Hegel saw as neutral and serving the interests of the citizens, Marx saw a bureaucracy whose being was influenced by the powerful bourgeoisie actors of civil society. This view was best captured by Marx & Engels (1968), who wrote that "it is not the State which conditions and regulates civil society, but it is civil society which conditions and regulates the state" (Marx & Engels 1968 as cited in Hunt, 1987, p. 269). Marx's solution to the same questions that faced his predecessors about 'the relationship between the economic, social and political orders, and the role of individuals within them', rested with 'the rise of the proletariat', which would lead to 'the dissolution of civil society and the oppressive structures it supported' (DeWiel, 1997, p. 30). Scholars such as Hunt (1987) have observed that the concept of civil society disappeared from Marx's works only to be revived by the likes of Antonio Gramsci.

Gramsci (1971) used the concept of civil society in trying to explain the challenges the workers-led revolution faced in post-World War I Italy. According to him, the state had incorporated civil society actors and combined them against the workers thus forming a strong force against the workers and affecting the chances of a successful socialist revolution (Morton, 2007). In that context, Gramsci saw civil society as no longer part of the base, but part of the superstructure. Norberto Bobbio (1977, as cited in Hunt, 1987) reminds us that in Marx's theory, civil society corresponds to an economic base, while the political society forms the superstructure, thus Gramsci's inversion of that schema was 'a radical innovation' (Hunt, 1987, p. 274). But for him (Gramsci), 'the differentiation that underlies civil society is triple and not double: between the state, the economy and society' (Mamdani, 1996, pp. 14-15). He saw

48

civil society as public opinion and culture within which intellectuals 'figure prominently in the establishment of hegemony' (Ibid, p. 15). Femia (1981, p. 24) defines hegemony as 'an order in which a common social-moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behaviour.' Hunt's (1987, p. 34) description of 'ideologies embodied in the institutions and practices of civil society' also seems to capture the meaning of hegemony.

In Gramsci's analysis, a state combines 'not only the apparatus of government but also the "private" apparatus of "hegemony" or civil society' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 261). For him, the separation between the state and civil society was theoretical (Morton, 2007). In practice, the state combined coercion and persuasion. The latter was achieved through hegemony, in and through civil society (Texier, 1979). Civil society was thus a 'site of divisive struggle for hegemony' (Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001, p. 16) and Gramsci saw the conquest of the hegemon as necessary for the conquest of power Bobbio (1988). For him, 'civil society was the ideological realm par excellence and potentially the source of either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic ideas' (Bratton, 1994, p. 55). While critics like Hunt (1987) describe Gramsci's theory as 'an incoherent web spun of liberal and Marxist concepts', also characterised by 'many ambivalences and inconsistencies' (p. 274), others have seen the changes he made to Marx's theory as being innovative. Some also claim that he was also responsible for reviving the concept of civil society as used by 'groups and intellectuals agitating against the authoritarian states and regimes' in countries like Poland in Eastern Europe and elsewhere (Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001, p. 16).

It was from the Gramscian schema that Jurgen Habermas is said to have developed his work on the public sphere (Mamdani, 1996). Habermas (1989) elaborates the concept of the (bourgeois) public sphere as, 'the sphere of private people [who] come together as a public' (p. 27). It is 'both a realm of mutually socializing individuals able to create integrative spaces of solidarity and a realm of mutually criticizing individuals able to construct discursive spaces of reflexivity' (Susen, 2011, pp. 45-46). The discourses in that sphere are said to be critical, of both the state and the actors in the sphere as well (Habermas, 1989, as cited in Susen, 2011). Drawing on Habermas and other theorists, Gabardi (2001) notes that the sphere 'consists of civic associations, social movements, interest groups, the media and arenas of public opinion formation. It is the space where citizens talk about their common affairs, the site where public discourses circulate' (pp. 550-551).

Another influential theory of civil society is Alexis de Tocqueville's, developed from observations he made when he visited America in the 1830s. Tocqueville admired the multitude of associations spontaneously formed by Americans 'of all ages, all condition, and

49

all dispositions' in the pursuit of shared goals (DeWiel, 1997, p. 28). Coming from France and having observed other European countries like England, and seen the dominance of the state, as he puts it, 'Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the government…in the United States, you will be sure to find an association' (de Tocqueville, [1853] 2002, p 581). Firstly, the associations were public meeting places where common matters were discussed and acted upon (Gundelach & Torpe,1996). Secondly, the associations were educational and enhanced sociability which would be useful in other sectors as well. It was thus fundamental to a workable democracy as it offered individuals a possibility to get out of their private homes and be actively involved in public affairs (DeWiel,1997; Cohen & Arato,1992).

For Tocqueville, this was necessary for building and maintaining a democratic culture 'where the priority of individual freedom could be preserved' (Gundelach & Torpe, 1996, p. 1). He wrote, 'If men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great jeopardy…civilization itself would be endangered' (de Tocqueville, [1835] 2002, p. 582). His civil society was thus a collection of associations that, on one hand, protect the autonomy of the individual against the state, on the other 'they prepare private individuals for the exercise of public power' (Arrato & Cohen,1992, p. 230). For him, the associations were a protective shield against despotism 'including the tyranny by a democratic majority' and democratically constituted countries needed them the most (DeWiel,1997, p 29).

Another key observation by DeWiel's is that 'Tocqueville believed that in a democratic state, political and civil society must be mutually supporting' (p. 29). This means that on one hand, the 'associations facilitate[ed] political association; but on the other hand, political association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes' (p. 29). de Tocqueville's views on civil society belong to the liberal schools of thought that emphasise citizens' rights and a minimal state. Liberals like Tocqueville, tend to restrict the state and separate it from civil society and reject the inclusion of the family in civil society as it is a private space. Civil society, for them, protects the individual from the state (Oldfield, 2000).

3.2.2   Civil society's re-emergence in the late 20th century

After decades of wane, the concept of civil society was revived in the 1980s to describe the revolutions led by the social associations, self-help and self-management organisations that had carved a "free zone" and repopulated the public sphere in the former Soviet regimes (Chandhoke, 2007). The concept of civil society was applied to refer to the free zone that had been recovered after being 'disastrously emptied by [communist] regimes intent on monopolising the nooks and crannies of social and political life' (Ibid, p. 610). The concept has been used in Asia and Africa as well. However, its use in the global south raises questions

about its relevance, given the different historical paths that the North and the South have followed (Mamdani 1996; Khilnani & Kaviraj, 2001).

In the Eastern European cases, some scholars saw the revolutions against the communist states as resembling the Tocquevillian view of a civil society that is separate from the state opposing despotism (e.g., Chandhoke, 2007). Chandhoke posits that the Eastern Europeans' 'civil-society script' could have been written by 'John Locke, the quintessential liberal thinker' (p. 610). The scholar points to the 'demand for civil liberties, especially the right to freedom of expression and the right to associate, rule of law, limited state power, political accountability and the freeing of the market' (p. 610). However, Chandhoke (Ibid.) also argues that the revolutions validated Gramsci's views on civil society, particularly the fact that the former communist regimes lost in the fight for hegemony.

Kaldor, (2003) observes that following its revival, the concept of civil society was then adopted by theorists to refer to

> the idea of a realm outside political parties where individuals and groups aimed to democratize the state, to re-distribute power, rather than to capture power in a traditional sense. It was associated with the so-called new social movements that emerged after 1968' (p.9). concerned with peace, the environment, women, human rights, and so on. It involved an effort to create a public space where individuals can act and communicate freely, independent of both the state and capitalism (p. 9)

In the contemporary era, the concept is seen through both Gramscian and Tocquevillan lenses. The latter is the liberal view of civil society and democracy. The neo-Gramscians emphasise the blurriness of the separations between civil society, the market and the state. On the other hand, the neo-Tocquevillian or liberals see civil society as voluntary associations that are separate from the state and the market and seek to protect the individual from the state and market (Dalton, 2014). The liberals also emphasise the non-partisan nature of civil society groups. However, some argue that widespread disappointment with civil society's failures to achieve what the neo-Tocquevillian view advances as their role and to remain autonomous has led to a shift from the Toqueveillian to the Gramscian ways of analysing civil society (Walton, 2015).

3.2.3 Civil society as a concept in the contemporary global south

The contestations and controversies around the universal usefulness of concepts have not spared the concept of civil society. Its applicability in the global south continues to be critiqued just like the democracy and citizenship covered in the previous chapter. Despite its origins in the specific history of the Western societies, the concept of civil society became relevant in the global south where it became the vocabulary, which defined the struggles that had been

ongoing against the states that did not deliver 'minimum standards of life' to citizens (Chandhoke, 2007, p. 611). It also 'emphasise[s] the legitimate rights of a people in a democracy to make demands on the state, insist on state accountability; and stress[es] the importance of an autonomous site where people could engage in democratic projects for their own sake' (pp. 611-612). In Asia and Africa,

> …the concept of civil society took hold of the imaginations of both the left and the right. It promised an exit from bureaucratic inefficiency and political indifference. The state could no longer be relied upon; it had failed miserably, despite having exercised untrammelled power for decades. People looked for an alternative to state-led projects and state-inspired developments. The wave of protest movements that overtook Africa in the early 1990s, movements that were popularly hailed as the second liberation of the continent, were accordingly conceptualised as civil society versus the state (p. 611-612).

Scholars such as Mamdani (1996) have warned against the uncritical application of the concept of civil society in Africa, given the colonial history of the state and how it relates with other actors. Mamdani criticises the application of the concept of civil society in Africa by seeking analogies with Europe. He describes the uncritical application of the concept in Africa (by scholars then supposedly) as programmatic and ideological rather than analytic and historical. For him the 'claims that civil society exists as a fully formed construct in Africa as in Europe' and that 'the driving force of democratization everywhere is the contention between civil society and the state' were 'conclusions reached arrived at through analogy seeking' (pp. 13-14). If civil society is essentially a bourgeoisie society, according to the Marxist perspective, Issa Shivji (2006) observes that in Africa

> 'the transformation from colonial subject society to a bourgeois civil society is incomplete, stunted and distorted'. What we have is the continued domination of imperialism – a reproduction of the colonial mode – in different form, the current one being labeled globalization or neo-liberalism. (p. 38).

For Shivji, in that context, NGOs 'are neither a third sector nor independent of the state. Rather they are inextricably imbricated in the neoliberal offensive' (p. 38). He sees them as working in furtherance of imperialist interests rather than those of the people they claim to represent. Hearn (2001) also argues that the kind of civil society promoted by Western donors and governments in Africa is meant to weaken opposition to governments that preside over societies afflicted by poverty and inequality and promote procedural democracy. Another factor is that of NGOs' dependency on financial and political support from Western donors which reinforces their 'intermediary role linking the North and the South, ideologically and

52

materially, in a manner which perpetuates Northern domination' (Hearn, 2007, p. 1105). However, Chandhoke (2007) who sees its utility in the global south, seems to prune the concept of its normative baggage when she points out that, 'there is nothing in civil societythat automatically ensures the victory of democratic projects. All that civil society does is to provide actors with the values, the space, and the inspiration to battle for democracy' (p. 613). Both Gramscian and Toquevellian thinking are influential in the thinking about civil society in the global south, given the multiple global influences.

In conclusion of this section, it would be useful to recap some of the main ideas. In terms of the definition of civil society, there have been changes from being seen as a "civil society" in the literal sense, that is different from a barbaric one, to the Hegelian civil society. The liberal version (Tocquevillian) may be pushed by international donors and governments as noted by scholars such as Hearn (2000; 2001; 2007) and Shivji (2006), but it seems that struggles for democracy have brought the Gramscian version back. In terms of the contemporary understanding of civil society, two views stand out: Chandhoke's critical view (above) and Hunt's (1987), that 'any definition of civil society is incomplete without the understanding that it is the realm within which free people may pursuea diversity of legitimate values, ideals, and ways of life' (p. 36).

These two descriptions of civil society seem to follow what Kaldor (2003) refers to as the post-modern version of civil society. One of the comprehensive definitions, useful for this study, is that which sees civil society as an 'arena where manifold social movements […] and civic organisations from all classes […] attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interest' (Alfred Stepan, 1988 as cited in Bratton, 1989, p. 417). Indeed, there are different types of actors within civil society which include social movements, faith-based organisations, membership and non-membership organisations among many others (Kaldor, 2003).

The next subsection describes the different types of civil society formations and thus provides clarity on the different terms used in this study.

3.3   Types of actors in civil society

Civil society is 'the domain of social organization within which voluntary associative relations are dominant' (Warren, 1999, p. 14). There are different actors in that domain such as 'social movements, nongovernmental organisations, non-profit organisations, advocacy networks, civil society organizations, public policy, or epistemic networks' among others (Kaldor, 2003. p. 11). They include '...interest groups-not just advocacy NGOs but also labor unions, professional associations (such as those of doctors and lawyers), chambers of commerce, ethnic associations, and others' (Carothers & Bandt, 1999). Grugel (2002), however, argues

53

that there is 'some confusion, in an empirical sense, about who exactly is in civil society and who is not' (p.96). He notes that in different regions of the world, the term civil society means different actors. In Latin America, it refers to social movements and poor people's organisations, in East and Central Europe, it identifies with the theorists. In Asia, Grugel claims that the concept refers to 'labour and social movements, environmental groups and human rights organisations. Lastly, in Africa, the concept refers to 'local groups pressing for change and NGOs (p. 96). The other crucial observation made by Grugel is that political parties are counted as civil society in some contexts.

In this thesis, the term "voluntary associations" is used to refer to the selected cases. Scholars note that related terms such as "non-profit organisation", "non-governmental organisation" or "third sector organisation" may have characteristics that overlap with those of voluntary associations. For some, however, 'voluntary associations are membership-based while other non-profit organisations may not have a broad membership base' (Anheier, n.d.). The selected case studies in this research, BPRA and SJC fit this description of voluntary associations, thus the preference of the term in this thesis. However, "civil society actors/groups" and "civil society organisations" are still used interchangeably with the term "voluntary associations", to refer to the selected case studies. It is also important to note that voluntary associations are collective actors within civil society thus the other types of associations such as political parties, in the political society are excluded from civil society and in this study.

There are different kinds of voluntary associations such as leisure associations that are for recreational purposes, interest associations that focus on the market and activist associations that focus on the state and advocate broad societal interests (Van Der Meer et. al, 2009). Gordon and Babchuck's (1959) typology has three kinds of voluntary associations: instrumental, expressive and instrumental-expressive. In their analysis, the instrumental associations are those groups that 'serve as social organizations designed to maintain or to create some normative condition or change' (p. 25). They are not inward-looking but aim to 'attain goals that lie outside of the association themselves' (p. 25). Expressive associations are formed 'to express or satisfy the interests of their members' (p. 23). These scholars, however, note that, in practice, there may be overlaps between the associations. While an instrumental association's main aim is to achieve social influence, it may meet some expressive needs of its members. The expressive associations, according to Gordon and Babchuck, can serve instrumental purposes too.

Other scholars classify the types of voluntary associations differently. Gundelach (1995, as cited in Gundelach & Torpe, 1996), identifies a distinction between voluntary associations based on interests and values. The values can either be humanitarian or political. The ones that are not focused on values or interests are what they call leisure associations. The field of

54

voluntary associations is characterised by diversification resulting from growing social differentiation (Kim, 2004, p. 78). The plurality of forms of associations is also captured in Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. He saw Americans, 'of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, form[ing] different kinds of associations,

> 'of a thousand kinds, --religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive…' The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found establishments for education, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; and in this manner, they found hospitals, prisons, and schools.' (de Toqueville, 2002[1835], p. 581).

From their different angles, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and radical democratic theorists see civil society organisations as having positive effects on democracy.

The next section focuses on democratic theorists' views on what civil society does for democracy.

3.4 Civil society and democracy: towards a theoretical framework

Democratic theorists see voluntary associations as 'the prime means by which the functions of mediating between the individual and the state is performed. Through them, the individual is able to relate himself effectively and meaningfully to the political system' (Almond & Verba, 1965. p. 245). Democratic theorists from different schools of thought see civil society's contribution to democracy differently. Liberals, also neo-Tocquevillians, see civil society formations' role as being to support democracy but in a limited way, i.e., through 'shaping parliamentary deliberation by providing a voice to public opinion, educating citizens in democratic values, and generally acting as a "watchdog" over those in power, but otherwise leaving the "real" business of democracy to representatives (Baker, 2003, p. 1). Neo-Gramscians, on the other hand, are radical as they are concerned with the attainment and use of state power. Grugel (2002) also notes the difference between the liberal and radical perspectives of democracy. He writes as follows:

> The liberal perspective sees civil society essentially as an aid to the state, especially in terms of reducing the load the state carries, and as a check on state excesses. It envisages the democratic state as a minimal state. The radical perspective, in contrast, takes the view that the role of civil society is to transform the state. Community activism is a way to challenge unequal power relations and engage with the state, so as to require it to use its capacities for the benefit of all citizens. Civil society thus becomes an instrument to correct the imbalances of the capitalist state, and struggle between civil society and the state is a means to achieve democracy (p.95).

Both views are useful for the analysis of the selected case studies' contribution to democracy.

Applying both in the frame of the analytical framework enables the study to examine the selected cases in a much broader way, especially given the broad and political nature of their work.

Some democratic theorists like Warren (2001) posit that 'the virtues and viability of a democracy depend on the robustness of its associational life' (Warren, 2001, p. 3). Fung (2003) also notes that 'conceptually and empirically, theorists agree that associations render important contributions to democracy, including the intrinsic pleasures of association, civic socialization, political education, resistance, representation, deliberation, and direct governance' (p. 516). Another democratic theorist, Larry Diamond (1994) highlights ten ways in which civil society contributes to democracy. Four of those are included in this study's theoretical framework, i.e., creating alternative avenues for political participation; building citizens' political skills, promoting a better understanding of the rights and obligations which make up democratic life (part of political education), acting as channels for articulation, aggregation and representation of interest, and non-biased monitoring of political activity and government.

While there may be consensus, as Warren (2001) observes, that voluntary associations contribute to democracy, studies that do not agree with this view are also reviewed in this section. The popularity of the view that voluntary associations contribute positively to democracy seems so strong in democratic literature such that Gundelach and Torpe (1996) describe those who do not agree as holding unpopular views in academia. They cite the views by the likes of Madison and Rousseau that associations are 'expressions of the private and the particular' and therefore 'obstacles to reach common good', as an example of unpopular views (Gundelach and Torpe,1996, p. 2). Critically examining the contradictions and nuances in the views espousing the link between civil society and democracy allows the study to maintain a critical view on those theories (highlighted below) and their relevance in the selected contexts.

There are multiple ways in which voluntary organisations (referred elsewhere as civil society organisations) contribute to democracy. These are highlighted in the next six subsections. However, the study analyses only four types of contributions: schools of democracy that equip citizens with political skills, facilitators of public deliberation and participation, improving the representation of citizens' interests, and enhancing government responsiveness and accountability. Other contributions, such as building social capital and achieving the social integration that is necessary for democratic institutions; challenging authoritarianism and others are only discussed briefly.

3.4.1   Associations as "schools of democracy"

56

Alexis de Tocqueville's (1835) view of voluntary associations as "schools of democracy", has had a huge influence on democratic theorists (Fung, 2003). The neo-Tocquevillian view holds that voluntary associations enhance members' political effectiveness by developing their 'political skills such as oral presentation, negotiation, bargaining, compromise' and 'civic virtues' such as 'tolerance, mutual respect, trust, reciprocity', and critical skills' (Warren, 2001, p. 71-76). Associations also 'promote a better understanding of the rights and obligations which make up democratic life' (Diamond, 1994, p. 8). Association members are also socialised to participate in politics. The cooperation among members induces civic consciousness and displaces narrow self-interest with 'self-interest properly understood', i.e., 'a self-interest defined in the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is alive to the interests of others' (Putnam, 1993, p. 88). This view holds that 'the civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks' (Walzer, 1992, p. 104). In essence, 'associations that teach civic skills improve democracy by enhancing political participation' (Fung, 2003, p. 520). Gundelach and Torpe (1996) refer to this as the democratic socialization role of associations.

However, critics argue that the causality of the social role is not clear. Van de Meer and Van Ingen (2009; 2016), for instance, argue that voluntary associations are "pools of democracy" rather than being the schools of democracy described by Tocqueville. They argue that it is people who are already politically active that join associations. Those people 'join interest and/or activist (and not leisure) organisations for the same reasons that they become politically active – namely to reach specific political goals or get involved in political discourse' (p. 286). Their findings dispute the socialisation and social capital generation role of voluntary associations. For them, voluntary associations 'do not contribute to their members' levels of political action; instead, their members were already more likely to participate politically...so rather than schools of democracy, this makes voluntary associations *pools of democracy*' (italics in original) (p. 286). This observation of member self-selection raises questions on the Tocquevillian schools of democracy concept.

Somewhat related to the phenomenon of self-selection is the recruitment or what Bryson et. al. (2013) call 'the "usual suspects", people who are easily recruited, vocal, and reasonably comfortable in public arenas' (p. 29). Commenting on the reasons why some voluntary associations have low membership in Zimbabwe, Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015) argue that it is because they are composed of those usual suspects and cannot recruit or attract members who are not politically active. Drawing on Fung (2003), Binder (2021), notes that other challenges that complicate the Tocquevillian hypothesis are what he refers to as 'reverse causality (i.e., democracy likely breeds more lively voluntary associations) as well as the

57

dependence of this relationship on the concrete political context' (p. 48).

Gundelach and Torpe (1996) also note that associations must be autonomous or semi-autonomous from the state. Kover (2021) argues that autonomy 'depends on its [civil society organisation's] ability to protect itself against both subsystems (state and market)' (p. 7). Lack of autonomy leads to associations serving particular interests (Gundelach & Torpe, 1996). Maloney et. al. (2008) are also quick to point out, however, that there should be opportunities for meaningful involvement and groups should not be in pursuit of anti-democratic or un-civic ends (p. 262). Thus, the important element is the associations 'internal democratic structures and practices' (p.6). This point seems to be in line with their socialising role, through which they are believed to support procedures and values that entrench democracy (Linz & Stepan,1996; Wallman Lundasen, 2015).

The leadership of voluntary associations is key in determining whether there is internal democracy or not. The procedures and values that the members are exposed to will thus, supposedly, have a bearing on how they engage in public processes. Regarding leadership, Markham et. al. (2001) emphasise the importance of leaders in maintaining members' interest and participation in an association. They further point out that some associations may have undemocratic leaders resulting in undemocratic selection procedures thus affecting the effectiveness and viability of the association. While internal democracy is portrayed as important for associations' contribution to democracy, Gundelach and Torpe (1996) note that many associations face challenges with meeting demands of efficiency and that of democracy. They see their challenge as being 'split structurally based in two parts of the organization: a professional part and a membership part' (p.1). Drawing from several scholars, including those on the applicability of Michels' (1962) iron law of oligarchy, Markham et. al (2001) also note that where democracy is practised, efficiency suffers. Michels' law 'holds that, despite democratic ideologies and forms, organizations almost always evolve toward rule by an entrenched elite' (as cited in Markham et. al., 2001, p. 106).

According to Cunningham (2002), the internal democracy thesis is advanced by both participatory democrats and liberal democrats. The fear, among democratic theorists like Skocpol (2003) is that lack of democracy within associations would negatively affect the broader society. Because, while associations focus on the individual, 'the mechanisms of schools of democracy may create widespread norms of how to behave politically and thus potentially influence others who are not active in civil society organizations' (Wollebaek & Selle 2007, paraphrased in Wallman Lundasen, 2015, p. 142). Some scholars, however, argue that voluntary associations' internal democracy does not matter since '[they are not representative and do not claim to be representative' (Kaldor, 2003, p. 6). Lakoff (2018) argues that members of voluntary associations should have the liberty to decide the power relations in their

58

organisations, otherwise, they have the liberty to be undemocratic if they so wish. He claims that 'institutional democracy is a more rigorous requirement in the political sphere than in civil society' (p. 31). Also rejecting the need for internal democracy in associations, Rosenblum (1998) argues that associations' benefits for members are usually unintended. For Kaldor, such a view is untenable, especially when organisations have a responsibility to external actors.

Fung (2003) however, notes that associations can be undemocratic in some contexts, depending on their contributions to democracy. He writes as follows:

> Organizations capable of offering resistance, especially in climates of severe repression, frequently do not follow democratic principles in their internal operations. Exigencies of survival and effectiveness press many of them to adopt forms that are neither open, transparent, horizontal, nor clearly accountable (p. 523).

From the outline of the context (chapter four), the militarised hybrid regime in Zimbabwe may come close to resembling the context described above. However, the city-level (Bulawayo) context has its unique attributes that do not fit the above description. In this research, internal democracy is scrutinised to understand the skills and civic virtues that members may gain in their participation in the selected associations' internal decision-making processes. In line with Wollbaek and Selle's (2007, as cited in Wallman Lundasen, 2015) views above, that associations do not only socialise their members but may also affect the behaviours in the broader society, the study also examines the implications that internal democracy has for the selected associations' contribution to democracy in their cities. The study also examines the associations in relation to the conditions highlighted earlier in this subsection, particularly the need for associations to maintain autonomy from the state (Gundelach & Torpe, 1996) and political parties (Carothers & Bandt, 1999).

Lastly, theorists also do not agree about the kinds of associations that can fulfil the role of being schools of democracy. The debate is on whether associations with the 'public as opposed to private purposes, those with inclusive and heterogeneous versus homogeneous memberships, and those with social and civic versus explicitly political missions are more congenial to conferring civic virtues and skills to their members.' (Fung, 2003, p. 521). Fung also notes that there is another debate among theorists on whether associations with memberships that provide physical interaction among members or those civil society organisations without members develop the political skills and virtues that support democracy. The debates cited above make it far from clear whether the selected associations, by their virtue of being membership-based or being civil society formations, contribute to citizenship and democracy. This study, therefore, examines whether the selected associations fulfil the

role of being schools of democracy.

3.4.2 Associations build social capital

Related to the values, virtues and skills, associations are seen as generators of social capital, i.e., 'features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam,1994, p. 7). For Putnam, 'virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful, and trustful towards one another, even when they differ on matters of substance' (p. 89). Putnam further notes that leaders in these civic communities are relatively honest and committed to equality. The key ingredient to social capital is generalised trust beyond family members (Warren, 1999). Social capital can create robust associations that 'reduce the ability of the state to directly oppress citizens and provide a space for growth in organized opposition to a nondemocratic regime' thus facilitating the creation of democracy where it does not exist (Paxton, 2002, p. 257, as cited in Maloney et. al., 2008).

From the previous subsection and the concept of social capital above, it is important to note that Putnam (1993) distinguishes between internal and external democratic effects of voluntary associations. Internally, their effects are related to the members of associations while externally, associations enhance the articulation of collective interests. For Putnam, associations, therefore, 'both embody and contribute to effective social collaboration' (p. 90). They form a 'civic community of like-minded equals that contribute to effective democratic governance' (p. 90). In line with Putnam's view, Stolle & Hooghe (2005, as cited in Maloney et. al. 2008), also note that the high number of diverse associations is a proxy indicator for the health of a democracy. Paxton (2002) argues that robust associations can also help sustain the smooth functioning of existing democracies through 'teach[ing] tolerance, promot[ing] compromise, stimulat[ing] political participation, and train[ing] leaders – all of which contribute to a healthy democracy' (p. 257). Other scholars also note that the social integration facilitated by associations is necessary for democratic institutions.

There have been several criticisms of social capital's link to voluntary associations and political participation. Basically, as Newton (2001) puts it,

> social trust is a puzzle; its relationship to society and voluntary associations, as well as its relationship to political trust and government, is not at all clear. To this extent some of the basic assumptions underlying the theoretical relationship of trust, social capital and civil society, on the one hand, and the classic issues of social integration and democratic stability, on the other, are questionable (pp. 204-205).

One of the lingering questions in literature is whether associations generate trust and social

trust. While some studies like that by Uslaner (1999) support the view that associations infuse trust, the basis for social capital, in people who were not trusting before, others argue that associations do not generate social capital but 'facilitate high levels of social capital' (Wollebaek & Selle 2007 as cited in Van der Meer & Van Ingen 2009, p. 286). Thus, for Van de Meer and Van Ingen (2016), 'although voluntary associations are associated with greater political participation, the causal mechanisms are thus still unclear' (p. 84).

The other debate is around the types of associations that generate trust and social capital. Uslaner (1999), in line with the other neo-Tocquevillian literature, finds that sports associations, given their level of social interaction supposedly, are the most ideal for building trust and which then generate co-operation among members. Warren (1999) then, justifiably, raises questions around the translation of such social capital to co-operation in political activity. A study by Van de Meer and Van Ingen (2009) indicates that interest and activist associations have more correlations with political action than leisure associations. They conclude, therefore, that 'the goals of associations are more important than their structure' (p. 286).

While the theories about associations' contribution to social capital have been explored in this section, this study does not examine this theme individually. Doing so would take a different approach in data collection and framing of analysis. However, where aspects of social capital are observed, they will be flagged to nuance the analysis.

The next subsection focuses on the voluntary associations' contribution to public participation.

3.4.3   Public deliberation and participation

One of the key contributions of civil society (voluntary associations included) is the intrinsic value of promoting freedom of association. Related to this is the creation of a space for opinion formation and criticism of public officials by citizens (Fung, 2003). Other scholars also emphasise the associations' function of creating spaces for equal and free discussion of public issues- 'the public of *private* individuals who join in debate of issues bearing on state authority' (Calhoun, 1992, p. 7) (emphasis in original). Associations create and support public spheres (venues for participating in public conversations and opinions) and this limits citizens' exclusion from decision making on public matters (Warren, 2001). According to Fung (2003), drawing from Beck (1999) and Habermas (1996), the public spheres are inclusive and open thus creating a space for 'social problems and priorities' to be 'initially articulated and transmitted to political and economic spheres' (p. 525).

Public decisions are often influenced by those with money, political power and other forms of influence, thus consigning the poor or marginalised to being followers, resulting in their interests, not being translated into policies (Beck,1999; Habermas,1996 both cited in Fung,

2003). Also, in the presence of authoritarianism or depoliticized local governance, democracy and citizenship will not exist (Harriss et. al., 2004 as cited in Stokke, 2015). In such instances, residents become clients, populations, subjects and not participants in the governance of the cities (Anciano & Piper, 2019; Chatterjee, 2004; Mamdani, 1996). The public sphere thus fosters equality as it negates aspects such as force, money, numbers, or status which usually influence political decisions. Instead, participation and deliberation in the public sphere privileges only 'the force of the better argument' (Habermas, 1984, p. 25, as cited in Fung, 2003). Acting as public spheres, therefore, associations facilitate equal participation among citizens. But more importantly, it deepens the dispositions of democratic citizenship and enables those without power and money to also exercise political influence (Kim, 2014).

Some scholars have demonstrated how state-led participatory initiatives can be exclusive. For instance, Lemanski (2017) discusses how delimitation of wards in Cape Town weakens participation of poor people in ward forums and later ward committees. She observes that the sizes of wards, in some instances, make it impossible for some residents to participate in meetings (see discussion in chapter 4). While such instances may need voluntary associations to create spheres for participation, it should be noted that those who are socio-economically vulnerable often find it 'difficult to engage because their main priorities are to provide for their families, not spend time in meetings' (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004, p. 59). This is important to note, in both BPRA and SJC case studies, as their members are mostly poor residents

Wallman Lundasen (2015), credits the pioneering work of Verba and Almond (1963), who first observed the positive correlation between individual participation in voluntary associations and political participation. While participatory democrats see the potential of participating in voluntary associations, they do not agree on how it can contribute to democracy. Some see member participation in associations 'regarding its purposes, strategies, and actions as itself valuable as a social, collective and potentially political act' (Fung, 2003, p. 531). Fung also notes that participatory democrats believe that 'the benefits of participatory democracy can be captured without altering the formal, institutional arrangements of representative government and hierarchical bureaucracy' (p. 531). Others, however, 'argue that harnessing that potential requires deeper transformations in formal institutions, for example, by inviting associations to share in the exercise of state authority or by devolving decision making or administrative power to venues that are directly accessible to citizens' (p. 532). Another important observation of the role of associations in creating opportunities for participation is the one by Wallman Lundasen (2015) that they are 'more likely to mobilise their members for direct contact with politicians than to provide general incentives for broader forms of participation' (p. 151).

Other scholars like Goldfrank (2007), however, note that while voluntary associations are key in creating opportunities for democratic participation, they do not act alone. According to both

scholars, the initiatives that saw the introduction of Participatory Budgeting in parts of Latin America were a result of interventions by voluntary associations and leftist political parties. Furthermore, where participation succeeds, it can produce 'a virtuous cycle that [can] strengthen citizenship and democrati[ze] the state' (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 164). Goldfrank cites Participatory Budgeting in Porto Allegre which achieved what he calls a virtuous cycle. That cycle is when participation yields responsiveness and then spurs more participation. Goldfrank further argues that the will of other political actors and the capacity of the state (or city in this case), to respond to citizens' demands is key. In this thesis, this aspect is considered in the analysis of contextual effects on the selected case studies contribution to democracy.

Democratic theorists distinguish between the types and intensities of participation. The ones reviewed for this study seem to follow in the footsteps of founding theorists like Arnstein ([1969] 2020) and Pateman (1970). Arnstein's (Ibid.) ladder of participation distinguishes threeforms of participation: non-participation (manipulation); tokenism (informing, consultation andplacation) and citizen power which is joint decision making. Pateman (1970) distinguishes between full and partial participation. The first entails a 'process where each individual member of a decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions' (p. 71). In the case of partial participation, there is an interaction between parties regarding decisions to be made 'but the final power to decide rests with one party only' (p. 70). The question that this study seeks to answer using the theories of participation therefore, is whether the selected associations create and/or strengthen avenues for democratic participation in their cities? Their equalising role is also interrogated, especially in unequal cities where many factors constrain some individuals and groups from participation in democratic processes. The study also focuses on who participates and does not participate in the created or expanded platforms, and to what end? The analysis also focuses on how theselected associations expand participation to include residents who would not ordinarily participate in politics without their intervention.

3.4.4   Associations improve representation

Democratic theorists submit that voluntary associations represent citizens' interests and facilitate their translation into policy. Besides being represented by elected public office holders, individuals can channel their public concerns through voluntary associations (Fung 2003). Drawing on scholars such as Warren (2001), some theorists posit that associations communicate issues in ways that are 'more detailed, nuanced, and information-rich than thinner channels of representation such as voting' (Fung, 2003, p. 523). Associations can also aggregate interests in ways that negate territorial boundaries, political differences and are thus better in 'transmit[ing] intensities of interest to officials than formal channels of representation' (Ibid., p. 523). Hochstetler and Friedman (2008) found that when political parties failed, civil

63

society groups replaced partisan representation for some time.

Some of the recent research findings concur that associations can indeed 'function and act as crucial transmission belts between the public and the policymakers increasing the likelihood that the views of the public are aggregated and translated into policy' (Bevan & Rasmussen 2020, p. 112). From these scholars' research, there must be many associations focusing on an issue to make it visible enough and therefore hard for public representatives to ignore it. Bevan & Rassmussen further posit that voluntary associations may 'strengthen agenda representation by increasing the level and credibility of the information decision-makers possess regarding public priorities' (p. 112). However, voluntary associations only impact policy at the agenda-setting stage and none at other stages as 'institutional friction and transaction costs' increase along the policymaking process (Ibid. p. 113). Once their role, as the 'linkage between the public and the decision makers', becomes ineffective at the other stages, it becomes 'less likely for public priorities to be translated into the agenda for laws' (Ibid, p. 127). Representation can be in different forms such as mediation, which is of citizens by third parties to the state and the state to citizens (Piper & Von Lieres, 2015). Protests can also be a method of forcing the state to be responsive (Booysen, 2014).

In representing citizens' interests, associations supposedly contribute to responsiveness which scholars like Dahl (1971) and Tilly (2007) regard as central to any democratic system. This study, therefore, examines what or whose interests the selected associations represent and whether that increases or improves the issues' translation into public policy or strengthens the responsiveness of government in their cities? The analysis also focuses on the strategies that the associations adopt and the outcomes thereof.

3.4.5   Improving accountability and responsiveness

In socialising and mobilising members to participate in public spheres or public decision-making processes, associations also enable members to hold the state to account (see Gaventa & Barrett, 2010). As noted in chapter two, accountability is one of the features that define democracies (Warren, 2014; Dahl 1989; Diamond, 1997). Like participation and representation, discussed in the preceding subsections, accountability is meant to increase responsiveness. One of the approaches that theorists advance for holding representatives to account is the concept of social accountability. According to Malena et. al. (2004, p. 3), it is 'an approach toward building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations that participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability'. Lindberg (2013), who refers to it as societal accountability, also highlights 'actions taken by civil society and media aimed at forcing political, bureaucratic, business and legal decision-makers community-based to give information on, andjustifications for, their actions' (p. 215).

64

However, for Lindberg, social accountability can be weak, considering that civil society organisations are "self-appointed" actors who are not the individual voters, thus, they must first convince the public representatives that they are indeed supposed to account for them. He sees this as limiting the power of the voluntary actors. But 'members of civil society are [also] voters and constituents of democratic state leaders' (Hochstetler, 2012, p. 363). Furthermore, in some contexts, civil society formations are gaining the trust of citizens while political parties and elected representatives are losing it (Kaldor, 2003). Another limitation that may affect social accountability's impact is citizens' lack of resources and/or capacity to abstain and process the information needed to do so (Warren, 2014). However, there are success stories. Scholars note that actions led by civil society actors, such as public expenditure tracking, monitoring of public service delivery and others, have been successful in holding the public representatives to account and improving responsiveness (Malena et. al., 2004, pp. 215-216).

Scholars distinguish between accountability within state institutions (internal) and that which is applied by actors outside the state (external). This study focuses on external or social accountability, which involves civil society acting to hold public representatives to account (Malena et. al., 2004). However, it also notes the observations by some scholars that accountability measures are most effective when they are formally implemented by state actors or partially formalised, leaving non-state actors with some role to play too. And for Fox (2000, p. 1), 'civil society demands for state accountability matter most when they empower the state's own checks and balances'. Democratic theorists see voluntary associations as key contributors in holding the state to account. However, organisations such as Affiliated Network for Social Accountability (ANSA) (2012) posit that for social accountability to have an impact, civil society groups must be organised and capable. This study examines the selected associations' role in holding their city governments to account, in particular, the issues that they focus on, the decisions and actions they demand accountability for, the strategies that they have used to strengthen citizens' capacity to hold the cities to account and the responses thereof.

3.4.6 Challenging authoritarianism

Democratic theorists posit that civil society groups also contribute to democracy by challenging authoritarianism. There are many ways in which voluntary associations contribute to democracy such as facilitation of the enjoyment of the right to associate, usually restrained by autocratic regimes (Fung, 3003). Bernhard et. al. (2017) also observe that actions by pro-democracy civil society actors have the potential of shaping a democratic regime during historical moments. In their words, 'well timed bouts of contentious civil society mobilization have important positive ramifications for the type of democracy that emerges, particularly with

65

regard to social, political, and economic equality' (p. 299). However, some scholars caution against overstating the civil society groups' capacity to democratise regimes (see Carothers & Barndt, 1999; Ali, 2003).

Seeing civil society as a space for actors who struggle against tyranny is also inherently Gramscian, as already discussed in the preceding section. For instance, Chandhoke (2007), describes the revolutions led by civil society actors in Eastern Europe as being in line with Gramsci's views (see section 3.3.1 for a detailed discussion). However, while Gramsci recognises the civil society's potential of being counter-hegemonic, the flip side is that of hegemonic voluntary associations that strengthen authoritarian rule. Scholars such as Portes (2014) cite associations that supported Nazis in Germany, while Habib (2013) cites the likes of Broederbond, as associations that supported the South African apartheid regime. In Zimbabwe, Ncube (2010) notes that there are hegemonic civil society groups aligned to the ruling ZANU-PF and counter-hegemonic ones working with the opposition and funded by pro-democracy donors.

From the themes covered above, one sees that civil society is not an 'unmitigated blessing for democracy' (Schmitter, 1993, pp. 14-15), there are many aspects that still need further problematisation. As Chandhoke (2007, p. 613) observes, there is nothing about civil society that 'automatically ensures the victory of democratic projects'. The limitations of existing theories about the link between voluntary associations and democracy open up avenues for studies like this one to adopt a sceptical view on their universal applicability. Thus, applying some of the key theories in the selected contexts and case studies brings forth different ways of understanding the link between voluntary associations and democracy, particularly in the global south cities of Bulawayo and Cape Town. This study looks at four types of voluntary associations' contribution to democracy, from the ones outlined and discussed above: schools of democracy, participation, representation and accountability.

3.5 Voluntary associations and context

Regarding the context, Fung (2003, p. 517) notes that '...the most important contributions that associations can make to any particular society also depend on distinctive features of that society's political context'. Furthermore, the context determines what would be considered as a contribution by voluntary associations and the form of democracy that they contribute to. However, in literature, 'the question of whether the context in which one lives is important in determining political participation [for instance] is both longstanding and disputed' (Lundasen, 2014, p. 140). The analysis in this thesis, therefore, examines the impact of the political context on the selected associations' contributions to democracy. It focuses particularly on the relationships between the selected associations and key political actors and their effect thereof

66

on their contribution to democracy. It also teases out the forms of democracy that selected associations contribute to in their respective contexts. Finally, the analysis then draws out the implications that the political context has for democratic theory.

The next section presents a summary of the study's theoretical framework.

3.6   Theoretical Framework in summary

From the preceding subsections, the theoretical framework focuses on four types of voluntary associations' contributions to democracy that are in tandem with the study's four operational questions. The first contribution pertains to associations' role as schools of democracy. In the analysis, the study seeks to establish what political skills and civic virtues the selected associations develop in their members and through what strategies? How effective are those strategies? Who do they target and why? Are the selected associations democratic internally? What virtues do the members learn? Do they also impact non-members? How?

Secondly, the study looks at whether the selected associations strengthen members and/or citizen participation in decision-making in their local government. In this regard, further questions include the following: what avenues for political participation have the selected associations created? How do they democratise existing platforms? What are their strategies and outcomes in their respective contexts? Thirdly, do the selected associations represent interests and enhance the responsiveness of the local government? The analysis will look at what issues the selected associations represent, on behalf of whom and to whom? The strategies that they use and outcomes of their interest representation will also be examined. The fourth question is about the associations' contribution to accountability in the local government. Questions will include: On what issues and areas of decision making do the selected associations hold the city government to account? What strategies do they use and what are the outcomes? Do they strengthen or weaken citizenship and democracy? The answers to these questions lead to the answer to the main question, i.e., whether the selected voluntary associations contribute to citizenship and democracy in their cities.

The analysis in this thesis thus focuses on, firstly the members' participation within selected associations' internal structures and procedures. Secondly, it examines what they do externally, in terms of interventions (programmes and activities) in their cities and their impact on democracy. The other key element in the analysis, relates to how the political contexts in Bulawayo and Cape Town shape BPRA and SJC's contribution to democracy, respectively.

3.7   Conclusion

This chapter presented a theoretical review of civil society and voluntary associations. In terms of the concept of civil society, the chapter reviewed its development from the premodern to the contemporary era. This was useful in showing how the voluntary associations that give the

67

civil society its form, relate to the state and the market. The contemporary use of the concept of civil society spans both the neo-Tocquevillian and neo-Gramscian traditions. The concept was revived in the 1980s to explain the civilian uprisings against former communist regimes in Eastern Europe and demands for citizenship rights and democracy. This chapter also discussed the contributions that voluntary associations make to democracy as schools of democracy, through building social capital, challenging authoritarian rule, fostering public participation, improving representation and deepening accountability. It then culminated in outlining the study's theoretical framework with four specific themes (first and last three from above) to inform analysis of findings in chapters five and six.

68

4. Chapter Four: The political context of the study

4.1 Introduction

The state, politics and society are intertwined and shape each other; thus, many scholars stress the importance of understanding the context within which voluntary associations contribute to democracy (Fung, 2003; Kriesi & Baglioni, 2003; Gaventa & Barret, 2010). This chapter highlights current and past political configurations, citizen-state relations, key political actors and socio-economic factors shaping the two sites, Bulawayo and Cape Town. It thus lays the contextual backdrop for the selected case studies. Before delving into the specific study sites, the chapter focuses on the broader characteristics of cities in the global south and Sub-Saharan Africa. It foregrounds the political history, governance structures and the role of civil society, in the contexts where the selected voluntary associations seek to turn subjects into citizens and democratise the local government. The two cities have their unique characteristics inextricably tied to those of their countries, thus the relevant country-level characteristics are also highlighted.

The chapter has five sections: the introduction which gives an overview of the chapter, the second section is an overview of key issues in the global south cities, two broad sections, three and four focus on the study sites, Bulawayo and Cape Town and the conclusion. The two broad sections cover the political history of the cities, including the formation of the post-colonial and post-apartheid local and national states, the system of government in each country, key political actors in each city and the development and role of civil society. It also highlights the state-civil society relations and factors that promote or impede citizenship and democracy. The last section is a conclusion of the chapter, which pulls together the main points raised and how they relate with the rest of the study.

4.2 Global south cities

This section highlights some of the characteristics of cities in the global south in the 21st century[3]. Most cities in the global south with a history characterised by rapid urbanisation, 'rife with pains from histories of injustices and inequalities, racism and state incapacities, grand dreams and colossal failings' (Holston 2008, as cited in Myers, 2021, p. 29). In recent decades, cities have experienced rapid urbanisation, driven by various factors. However, in the global

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[3] 'Global south cities' in this study refers to the cities in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America from which the trends that comprise urbanisation in the twenty-first century emerge, 'compared to the minority trends of slow growth or even shrinkage for cities across the Global North' (Myers, 2021:29). The researcher is also cognisant of the contested meanings of the term global south, however, those are not discussed in this thesis.

south, Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) urbanisation is happening at an even faster rate. The urban population is growing at twice the rate of Southeast Asia, and four times the rate of South America (United Nations, 2018). In broader comparative terms, the United Nations noted that populations in SSA urban areas grew by 3.98% annually from 2015 to 2020, while in the same period, populations in urban Europe, for instance, grew by 0.32%. In SSA, scholars such as Tostensen et. al., (2001) see urbanisation being driven by both rural to urban migration, starting with that which happened in the colonial and early post-independence periods in both countries, and then by natural increase (births and deaths). Owing to those trends, 80% of Africa's population growth will occur in cities and it is expected to double by 2050 (Muggah & Kilcullen, 2016).

However, rapid urbanisation has presented challenges for the 'processes of democracy, citizenship, sustainability and belonging in the making of cities' (Datta & Shaban, 2016, p. 208). The cities are 'full of vitality and vibrancy, shock and disorder, spontaneity and fluidity' (Holston, 2008, as cited in Myers, 2020, p. 29). In most contexts, the rapid urbanisation, also comes against the backdrop of poorly resourced states (Oldfield, 2015) and relative poverty and low economic growth in the cities (Lall et. al., 2017). Some cities, particularly in Africa, are thus afflicted by squalor and failure to deliver services such as water and health (Resnick, 2014; Muggah, 2016). Some scholars also point out that this rapid urbanisation is not coupled with industrialisation (Turok & McGranahan, 2013; Gollin et. al., 2016). Therefore, the spread of precarious work across sectors is also high (Morange & Spire, 2019; Simone, 2020). Instead of urbanisation driving development, it has brought about a concentration of poverty, inequality, the strain on infrastructure and heightened competition for meagre resources. Lall et. al (2017) also remind us that the percentage of slum-dwellers in the global south is higher than the global trend. Residential insecurity is very strong in these cities, resulting in the poor being relegated to the urban periphery (Morange & Spire, 2019).

Residents in these rapidly growing urban centres must negotiate multiplicity and difference (Amin, 2007) and transform from being depoliticised subjects or populations into citizens, full members of a political community with rights (Mamdani, 1996; Chatterjee, 2004). The genesis of some of the challenges that these cities face is etched in their colonial history characterised by the exclusion of indigenous populations in the urban areas among other things. Bulawayo and Cape Town are among cities that share a history of having been designed for a limited number of settler inhabitants - the citizens (Mamdani, 1996). The Africans who migrated to the cities in search of employment and other opportunities ("the subjects") initially settled on the margins and were deprived of adequate services. It is thus important to highlight some of the key historical developments in both research sites, Bulawayo and Cape Town.

While there are concerns with the nature and process of urbanisation in the global south, some still see it as holding the promise for democratisation. Heller and Evans (2010), for instance, note that political transformation is being forged in the southern city and those cities are actually 'homes to the most promising forms of democratic contestation and sites for construction of citizenship' (p. 433). A somewhat precise description of the blend of those challenges and opportunities is advanced by Oldfield (2014, p. 256) who observes that

> ...cities of the global south are fertile ground for politics. Protests and movements, the overturning of authoritarian regimes, the building and substantiating of democracy are shaped in and by cities. At the intersections of formal systems of governance and the practice of city institutions, and in the everyday actions of nongovernmental organizations, social movements, and citizens, 'the political' proves critical terrain for shaping subjectivities, neighbourhood mobilizing and citywide, even national, reform and revolution. From visible urban contestation to a politics of the every day, from state-driven projects for democratization to individuals 'getting on', southern cities are spaces of transformation and its political contentions.

Some of the democratic experiments have been conducted in cities in the global south such as participatory budgeting in Porto Allegre (Brazil) and Kerala (India). However, while they have been a success in some instances, they obtain 'more as the exception than the rule' (Anciano &Piper, 2019, p. 4). The rise of social movements such as the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia which led to the ouster of the long-time president, Ben Ali and the 25 January Revolution in Egypt which ousted the long-time president, Mubarak are supposedly some of the recent examples of social movements agitating for reform described by Parnell and Oldfield (2014) above. Some scholars remain pessimistic as they do not see the social movements and participatory models deepening democracy (see Anciano & Piper, 2019).

Despite the portrayal of the southern city as the site of democratic transformation, this study maintains an inquisitive stance because of the persistent poverty and inequality, depoliticisation of citizens, the impact of hybrid regimes among other challenges. While decentralisation has also been part of the attempts to democratise cities, global south cities often 'lack sufficient capacity for effective governance and the delivery of urban services' (Myers, 2021, p. 39). Furthermore, 'there are always varying limits on the capacity or autonomy of urban governments to affect their own solutions, whether due to the dominance of national governments or the power of the domestic private sector or international capital' (Ibid., p. 40). In SSA scholars such as Resnick (2011) also observe that 'urban development challenges are exacerbated by the combination of political party competition with circumscribed decentralization' (p. 142). Some cities, including Bulawayo and Cape Town, are thus afflicted by vertically divided authority, i.e., being governed by the countries' main opposition political parties while the national government is run by different political parties. In

71

those contexts, the conflict between the national and local governments further constrains cities' capacity to solve urban challenges (Resnick, 2014). Given these and other challenges in the global south, '[t]he sharpness of meaning and clarity of triumphal vision around the Global North's intertwined ideas of urban democracy and urban neoliberalism are, if not gone entirely, surely lost in the wilderness…' (Myers 2021, p. 40). Myers further notes that in global south cities, the hopes for national and local democracy have been dashed by authoritarian tendencies.

While there are broad similarities across cities in the global south and SSA, the case studies in this thesis are from two different contexts, a hybrid regime (Zimbabwe) and an emerging democracy (South Africa). The next section turns to the context in the first site, which is the home of BPRA, one of the study's two case studies.

4.3   Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

The City of Bulawayo is Zimbabwe's second-largest urban area with a population of between six hundred thousand and two million inhabitants[4]. Located in the southwestern part of the country, it is one of its ten administrative provinces. In terms of local governance, it is divided into 29 electoral wards, represented by councillors elected in the City's policy-making body. Formerly the royal kraal of the last King of the Ndebele, Lobengula, in the 1870s and 1890s, Bulawayo was established as a town in 1894, after the settlement was captured by Cecil John Rhodes's British South African Company (BSAC) soldiers during the First Matabele War (Ranger, 2010). The Ndebele people were driven away to the surrounding areas by the colonists.

The town was thus established on the backdrop of conquest and exclusion. The city was under colonial rule for a century, until Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. During the colonial years, the indigenous blacks[5] were not afforded full urban citizenship rights like the white settler population. The mechanisms that were employed in their exclusion and the resistance they mounted by the excluded groups thereof are discussed in the sections below. The forms of citizenship and systems of government and types of civil society organisations that emerged throughout the colonial and postcolonial eras are also highlighted.

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[4] The 2012 census pegged the population at 653,337, while the Bulawayo City Council claimed it to be about 1.5 million (See: http://www.citybyo.co.zw/About/Bulawayo).

[5] The terms 'blacks' or 'indigenous blacks' or 'indigenous populations' are used in this study to refer to the Africans who inhabited the land before colonialism. They are also used in the racial sense in the case of Zimbabwe.

4.3.1   Democracy and citizenship in colonial Bulawayo[6]

As a town, Bulawayo was built for the white settlers and they 'were determined that Africans should have no chance to prove themselves to be enterprising townsmen' (Ranger 2007, pp. 35-36). Laws were enacted to keep the black Africans in the city and country's peripheries, they could only be in the city as pass-bearing migrant labourers. When in the city, the blacks were restricted to areas with poor services. Many historians outline the dispossessions of land and subsequent discriminatory land tenure system which was enacted by the colonial settlers in Rhodesia. Laws such as the Land Apportionment Act and Native Land Husbandry Act barred the indigenous blacks from owning land while helping the whites to tighten their control of the politics and the economy. The creation of reserves or Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) such as Gwayi and Shangani and the imposition of taxes in areas without economic activity were employed to force Africans to migrate to the cities in search of employment and income (Palmer, 1977).

In the years preceding and following Southern Rhodesia's establishment as a self-governing British colony in the 1920s, political participation was limited to Cecil John Rhodes' civilised men. He had earlier proclaimed that the equal rights were for 'civilized man south of the Zambesi …. [who] can write their names, place of residence and occupation, and... are workers or possessed of some property, quite irrespective of colour' (Depew et. al., 1902 as cited in Frenkel, 2015, pp. 1168). Voting in particular (franchise) was limited and technically racialised as it was reserved for those who met certain qualifications: males who were at least 21 years of age, owned immovable property worth at least £75, had an annual income of at least £50 and were able to read and write in English (West, 2002). According to West, women, who were initially discriminated against, were only given the same qualified voting rights in 1919 while the men had been allowed the same since 1898. This meant that all women, initially, and most blacks who owned less than the requirements or no property at all, were excluded from participating in elections and having any meaningful role in the governance of the city and country.

Later, the 'townships, set aside for housing blacks in urban areas, were run not by the respective urban local authorities but directly by the Department of Native Affairs situated in central government' (Kamete, 2003, p. 197). Legislation such as the 1973 Urban Councils Act gave powers to control the cities and African Townships to 'ratepaying Whites, 'Coloureds' and Asians', through consultative Advisory Boards (Jordan, 1984 as cited in de Visser et. al., 2010, p. 4). Meanwhile, in non-African areas, elected Area or Town Management Boards were

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[6] While Zimbabwe was named after Cecil Rhodes who founded and led the British South African Company (BSAC) that colonized present day Zimbabwe, the town of Bulawayo and subsequently the city, was named after the royal throne of the Ndebele.

established. Most reforms in terms of the laws and institutions that governed the running of the cities were aimed at consolidating European settlers' stranglehold on the economy, political control and exclusive citizenship rights (Jordan, 1996).

The following section focuses on the struggles waged against the colonial state-led discrimination for the realisation of citizenship rights and equality.

4.3.2   Resistance and struggles for rights and equality

The discriminatory mechanisms and decisions taken by the colonial government resulted in blacks mobilising through various forms, including voluntary associations and ultimately armed liberation movements to fight the colonial forces. The conflict culminated in the political settlement in 1979, and the ultimate transition of power from the colonial to the liberation government in 1980. According to West (2002), the political consciousness of the black middle class developed in the period between 1914 and 1933, thus protest movements emerged afterwards. The historian records the Union Native Vigilance as the first protest movement formed by South Africans who went to Rhodesia as part of the Pioneer Column in the 1890s. Their demand was to be exempted from pass laws and equality with the whites. The group that was formed next was against the pass laws and related policing by the Southern Rhodesian state. It was formed by the indigenous Ndebele and was called Ilihlo Lomuzi Society and it gave birth to another association, the Patriotic Society, with the same cause.

In the 1920s, the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association, an organisation concerned with securing voting and other rights for the African elite was formed. This came after Southern Rhodesia had been conferred the responsible government status in 1923 (Hooker,1966). Several scholars have also noted the same about the African National Congress, formed in 1912 in South Africa. They posit that, initially, the ANC was not a mass movement (Deegan, 2001; Mufson, 1991) but predominantly composed of middle-class blacks whose 'goal was neither to resist colonisation nor to transform colonialism, but rather to achieve full political and economic assimilation into colonial society' (Seekings, 2000, p. 4). This seems to have been the character of these initial civic formations.

According to Hooker (1966), besides the issue-based movements such as the ones highlighted above, there was also a proliferation of mutual aid societies and voluntary associations of a hometown nature that helped migrants settle in urban life. This is consistent with Hodgkin's (1956) observations elsewhere that voluntary associations emerged firstly as tribal associations among African migrant workers, slowly forming across tribes and deepening nationalist consciousness. The Africans who flocked into cities to find jobs in the

74

19th century, overcame isolation through associations, thus turning African towns into lively places (Moyo et. al., 2000; Ekwensi, 1954, as cited in Epstein et. al., 1967).

Civil society was largely restricted among the indigenous populations but emerged and participated in the liberation struggles at a time most nationalist political parties were 'banned organisations' and/or leaders exiled (Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015, p. 125). The same phenomenon happened in South Africa, as will be seen in the next section. Musekiwa and Chatiza note that in Bulawayo, for instance, the first Residents Association, the Bulawayo Residents' Association (BURA), was established in the 1960s to fight for an inclusive society and recognition of the rights of Africans. As already pointed out above, voluntary associations became strategic in waging the fight for the right to vote and better living conditions. BURA's alignment with the liberation movements, particularly the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) after the 1987 Unity Accord, was viewed, by some, as polarising and not beneficial to most Bulawayo residents, thus necessitating the formation of BPRA as the alternative (see the discussion in chapter five and Dube & Schramm, 2021 for more details). However, the alternative also turned out to be somewhat associated with the opposition, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as shown in chapter five.

Alongside the voluntary associations, labour unions also played a key role in the fight for workers and citizens' rights from the 1920s to the 1960s, culminating in most of the leaders being absorbed into the liberation movements which went on to wage an armed struggle (Phimister & van Onselen, 1997). For instance, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) was among the first black trade unions to be formed in colonial Zimbabwe around 1920. Its purpose was to fight the stagnation in wages and to raise black workers' political consciousness on power and class structure in a colonial economy (Ibid). Its successor, the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICU), formed in 1946 was instrumental in fighting against state controls on Africans in urban areas. Through its rural connections, it also fought against colonial laws such as the Native Land Husbandry Act (Raftopolous, 1997, as cited in Magure, 2009).

The working-class movement gained traction and mounted protest actions 'during the period 1945 to 1963 when the nationalist movement took over' (Jordan, 1996 as cited in Maguire, 2009, p. 47). For Jordan, three events had far-reaching implications on the struggle for political inclusion: the 1945 strike organised by all railway workers in Rhodesia, the1948 general strike, (a colony-wide phenomenon that was precipitated by the high cost of living and poor housing among other grievances) and a bus boycott in 1956. The scholar further points out that, 'the Rhodesia industrial revolution had created a huge working class that was united by similar grievances relating to poor wages, housing, and lack of basic human dignity' (p. 48) These

75

were the issues that informed the actions. According to Raftopolous (1995 as cited in Magure, 2009), trade unionists and nationalists had a close working relationship thus exposing both to threats of incarceration and elimination by the colonial government. Towards the launch of the armed struggle, the nationalist movement absorbed some unionists into its structures. The anti-colonial struggle then shifted from the cities to the countryside, with the nationalist movement leading the armed struggle.

The armed struggle was fought between the late 1960s to 1979 when negotiations and subsequently a settlement took place between the guerilla movements PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF and the Rhodesian government. Zimbabwe got its independence in 1980 and ZANU-PF won the inaugural elections by 63% and formed a government led by Robert Mugabe as the Prime Minister. The other liberation movement, PF-ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, got 20% of the vote while the rest was shared among other parties.

4.3.3 Local democratisation in the post-colonial state

The country's independence came with a promise of transforming society through the expansion of access to social services such as water, health and education by all citizens (Mate, 2018) and to usher in political institutions that would facilitate political participation for the previously marginalised groups (Moyo et. al., 2000). As part of legislative reforms, the new ZANU-PF government brought all types of local government institutions (for urban, commercial farming and former Tribal Trust Lands) and all legislation (Acts and Statutory Instruments) under one Local Government Ministry. The other new laws that were also enacted captured the objectives of the post-colonial state at the local level, such as making provisions for universal adult suffrage and the one-city concept (de Visser et. al., 2010). Therewere many reforms to follow, such as the Urban Councils Act (1982) which introduced the election of city councillors and mayors, albeit with a limited franchise (more on this later in thissubsection).

However, for Bulawayo, the fulfilment of some of the promises of independence was seemingly curtailed by *Gukurahundi*, between 1983 and 1987.[7] When ZANU-PF came into

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[7] Gukurahundi denotes the state-orchestrated massacre of at least 20 000 Ndebele speaking civilians in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces between 1983 and 1987. The Mugabe-led ZANU-PF regime accused PF-ZAPU of plotting against the government. The government then deployed a North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade militia, which consisted of Shona-speaking ex-combatants of the military wing of ZANU-PF, to the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces to subdue the alleged 'dissidents'. The Fifth Brigade committed killings, mass detentions, disappearances, torture and rape against PF-ZAPU officials, members of that party's former military combatants and Ndebele-speaking civilians who were accused of aiding 'dissidents'. The Brigade also claimed to be avenging the pre-colonial Ndebele raids on Shona communities. The overt violence ended in 1987 after a truce between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU. However, the perpetrators have not been held to account. For more details, see Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace in Zimbabwe and Legal Resources Foundation (Zimbabwe) (1997).

power, it saw PF-ZAPU (the other liberation movement) as a threat to its stay in power and sought to decimate it. The government, led by Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), launched a programme aimed at rooting out what was said to be dissidents associated with Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU). The *Gukurahundi* initiative, which in Shona translates to 'the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains' (Mpofu, 2019, p. 111), resulted in thousands being killed and others fleeing from the rural Matabeleland and Midlands regions, and into urban areas such as Bulawayo (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997). It is logical, therefore, to conclude that such rural to urban migration may have increased the need for services in the City of Bulawayo.

The other challenge was the one-party-state politics pursued by ZANU-PF throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Legislative reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were inadequate and designed to centralise power (Mapuva, 2019). In 1985, the then Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, even warned the people in Bulawayo and Matabeleland against voting for PF-ZAPU. Despite the limited suffrage in the 1980s (more on this below), the residents of Bulawayo have a well-documented history of voting for the opposition since the country's independence in 1980. In those years, civic participation came through the establishment of ward committees. However, these were a replica of ZANU-PF structures thus hierarchical and non-democratic (Wikwete, 1988, as cited in Makumbe, 1996). Participation was undemocratic, governance structures were hierarchical and accounting upwardly. Outside the party, citizens virtually had no power to influence policy.

In terms of citizen participation in local elections, some limitations put in place by the colonial government remained in place after independence, until the late 1980s. This was unexpected as one of the main objectives of the liberation struggle was to gain the right to vote at both the local and national levels (Kamete, 2003). Many leaders of the liberation movements had experienced exclusion in the urban areas and were thus expected to ensure local democracy (Meredith, 2002). Universal suffrage was granted in national elections, according to residency, age, and citizenship rather than race and property as previously required by Ian Smith's (Prime Minister of Rhodesia, 1964-1979) laws. This extended the right to vote to most indigenous blacks. However, in the cities (local government elections), adult suffrage was still based 'not only on residency but also on property ownership' (Kamete, 2003, p. 198). Most of the property owners were still the whites in the affluent areas of the cities. Most indigenous blacks were tenants and lodgers without the right to vote or to be voted for. The legislation finally changed in the late 1980s, thus finally taking a step towards democratising urban local government elections (Kamete, 2003).

4.3.4 Institutions supporting democratic participation

In terms of local government institutions, Zimbabwe has had a tokenistic and contentious form of decentralisation marred by a mixture of democratic progress and reversals. Mapuva (2019) notes that in the first decade after independence, between 1980 and 1990, political participation in local decision making happened through ward committees. Other legislative changes, in the 1990s, for instance, the Urban Councils Act (1996), provide for more ways to facilitate citizen participation in decision making, including budgeting. The Act also empowers ratepayers to form interests-based associations that would represent them. The Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA) is one such entity that seeks to represent the residents (see subsection 4.1.7 for discussion on the residents' associations and other civil society formations). The other provision that should strengthen local electoral democracy is the one concerning the direct election of councillors and mayors to formulate policies of a local authority. The Act provides for the elected councillors to form ward development committees that formulate community needs for inclusion in the policy agenda. The councillors should also hold feedback meetings and consult residents (Mapuva, 2019). However, Mapuva notes that the Act subsequently underwent countless amendments that mostly undid the democratic gains it had initially provided for. One such example is the direct election of mayors which was amended in 2008 with the introduction of ceremonial mayors who are elected indirectly through an electoral college comprising the councillors.

In terms of reversals, firstly, the national government was hesitant to devolve power to the local authorities. Besides the delays in expanding electoral franchise in the urban areas (discussed above), post-independence policy and institutional frameworks have maintained the undermining of local governance by the centre (de Visser et. al., 2010; Chigwata, 2019). The post-colonial local government in Zimbabwe has operated with delegated capacity, performing functions conferred upon it by the central government. Those remain open to central government variation and re-assignment to other state agencies, for instance, the national government's attempt to assign local authorities' water reticulation functions to the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) in 2005.

The City of Bulawayo rejected the implementation of that national policy and the political mobilisation around that issue partly led to the formation of BPRA (Dube & Schramm, 2021) (see discussion in chapter five). The prevailing form of decentralisation has made it easy for ZANU-PF to use the national government powers to subvert the authority of MDC-led local authorities. The actions taken by the ZANU-PF-led national government between 2000 and 2008 were aimed at centralising power and tactics for 're-urbanization regaining lost political ground in the urban areas' (Kamete, 2006, p271). Those actions include changing the Cities

of Bulawayo and Harare into metropolitan provinces thus appointing Provincial Governors who report directly to the National President, stripping mayors of their executive powers and tweaking the electoral laws to make it harder for urban voters to register and vote. Resnick (2014) has observed such 'strategies of subversion' across different sub-Saharan African cities with vertically divided authority (p. 4).

From 2009 to 2013, during the Inclusive Government, Zimbabwe's local government saw some respite and ultimately the new constitution (2013) that 'envisages local authorities exercising devolved powers and not only delegated powers' (Chigwata & de Visser 2018)[8]. The provisions are meant to 'ensure the democratic participation in government by all citizens and communities, equitable allocation of national resources and the participation of local communities in the determination of development priorities within their areas' (Zimbabwe Constitution 2013). However, the constitutional provisions have not been implemented thus local governments such as the City of Bulawayo, even though run by the social-democrat-leaning opposition, the MDC, remain constrained by the current legislative framework. ZANU-PF, which did not favour the devolution provisions, won the 2013 election and became the government responsible for the implementation of the same. Needless to point out that conflict between the national and lower tiers of government, limited fiscal and other resources among other challenges, have continued. The 2017 coup and subsequent political developments have made prospects for democratisation bleak (Beardsworth et. al., 2019).

4.3.5 Local government in the City of Bulawayo

Bulawayo and other major cities in Zimbabwe have had what Resnick (2014) calls vertically-divided authority -, opposition parties vying for state power, running the city while ruling parties run the national government -, since the year 2000. In Bulawayo, the MDC-Alliance (different formations since 2000) has strong support across the city while the (national) ruling ZANU-PF is nearly absent in the city in terms of representatives in the council.[9] Since independence, in 1980, Bulawayo has only been run by ZANU-PF for twelve years, from 1988 to 2000. Before 1988 it was run by PF-ZAPU and after 2000 by the MDC. However, the country's largely centralised system which ZANU-PF inherited and consolidated complicates matters. The 2013 constitution which provides for 'a foundation upon which an effective multi-level system of government can be built...fails to entrench adequately enough (sic) the necessary political,

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[8] Between 2008 and 2013 Zimbabwe had an Inclusive Government formed by MDC (formations) and ZANU-PF. It was responsible for overseeing the crafting of the country's constitution. The period also, arguably, saw fewer conflicts between the MDC-run local authorities and the national government.

[9] The MDC Alliance rebranded and registered as a new political party named Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) in 2022. That development is unlikely to change BPRA's internal democracy (described in Chapter Five) or its broader socio-political context.

administrative, and fiscal instruments of decentralisation (Chigwata, 2019, p. 303). The new constitution, which was only enacted 33 years after independence and is yet to be implemented.

As noted earlier, local government is still provided for in statutes that give the central government powers to control local authorities. The Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29:15), for instance, gives the Minister of Local Government the powers to approve cities' budgets and appointments of senior technocrats. The senior technocrats thus have dual allegiances to the local authority and the national Minister of Local Government. What complicates matters even further for Zimbabwe is the dual local government system of elected local governments alongside appointed provincial governments. Bulawayo and Harare, which are also provinces, have a provincial government led by a Resident Minister, formerly known as a Governor, appointed by the National President. Such an arrangement further compromises the city government's power to govern. The same applies to other major urban centres where the main opposition governs municipalities (Kamete, 2006).

In terms of the socio-economic characteristics, the City of Bulawayo is not different from its national context. Zimbabwe's Gini coefficient pegged at 50.4% in 2019 and has high unemployment and poverty levels (World Bank, 2019). In terms of its spatial outlook, the City of Bulawayo still resembles the colonial planning: the residents with low income live in the townships (also referred to as locations or high-density suburbs) and those with high income live in the relatively rich areas (also referred to as yards or low-density suburbs).

Figure 1. Map of the city of Bulawayo. Source: Semantic Scholar.

4.3.6 Post-colonial civil society and democracy in Zimbabwe

In the 1980s, civil society in Zimbabwe was weak for several reasons. Among these reasons was that the gap left by formations and leaders who had joined the liberation movements remained unoccupied, some civic leaders were co-opted into the new government and the post-colonial state closed the civic space, co-opted, and substituted civil society groups. Some civil society groups also sought to complement rather than oppose or agitate for democracy early on (Dorman, 2001; Saki & Katema, 2011). The same years saw *Gukurahundi,* state-sponsored violence against PF-ZAPU and its supporters in Matabeleland and other parts of the country. However, the 1990s were characterised by a heightened push for democratisation, firstly by labour, then by students, (part of civil society) against the forceful pursuit of the one-party state by the ZANU-PF government. Civil society was also given impetus by the end of the cold war and the advent of Economic Structural Adjustment (ESAP)

81

reforms caused citizens' increased disaffection with the economic austerity and public mismanagement that had intensified (Sachikonye, 2017).

Zimbabwe adopted the austerity measures against the backdrop of known failures of the programme elsewhere. But, in the late 1980s, the country's economy had started to stagnate, owing to large state spending and poor policies, thus leaving the country with no other option but to go the route of austerity. In the same period, the country suffered severe droughts as well (Mlambo, 1997). Mlambo notes that in the first ten years, the socialist-leaning ZANU-PF government had managed to expand education facilities, provided free primary education, free health services and subsidised basic consumer goods. The austerity measures that came with the liberal policies under ESAP affected the government's ability to provide services thus brewing frustration among citizens. Labour, students and civil society opposed to both ESAP, and one-party-state started calling for an end to corruption, better services and democratisation. Their agitation manifested through demonstrations and open confrontations with the state, never seen before in the post-colonial era (Sachikonye, 2017).

Towards the end of the 1990s, some civil society groupings started to call for constitutional reforms, culminating in the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) by labour unions, mostly led by the Zimbabwe Congress for Trade Unions (ZCTU), academics, student movements and women's groups. Within the broader call for constitutional reforms, the NCA called for electoral reforms, respect for human rights, reconfiguration of provisions such as the presidential powers (Ncube, 2010; Sachikonye, 2017). The work by the NCA and the labour movement would form major constitutive elements of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The emergence of the pro-democracy movement which was constituted by civil society groups and the MDC led to the reinvigoration of ZANU-PF aligned civil society (Ncube, 2010). Using the Gramscian language, Ncube refers to the pro-democracy civil society as counter-hegemonic and the latter as hegemonic. For some, the polarisation is not only in the form of these actors but ideological as well, between nationalism and democracy (Cameron & Dorman, 2009). Besides the ideological conflict, the state has also continuously deployed physical violence against both the MDC and pro-democracy civil society (see Sachikonye, 2017).

The post-2000 hybrid regime is not easy to comprehend, and the same goes for the crisis in Zimbabwe. There have been different interpretations by scholars, with some describing the ZANU-PF regime as a violent one that seeks to remain in power through coercion (e.g., Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Ndlovu-Gatsheni writes as follows: 'The democratic train has been blocked by the intransigence of ZANU-PF and this has worsened the crisis in Zimbabwe. For instance, ZANU-PF stepped up its nationalist authoritarianism, violence and intimidation' (p.

128). Some have also described the state as being portrayed as coercive for carrying out a justifiable yet violent land redistribution (See discussion in Lewanika, 2019). Lewanika posits that the hybrid regime deploys a mixture of coercion and consent-seeking methods thus difficult to classify as hegemonic. He also argues that the state has not become hegemonic owing to the work of the counter-hegemonic bloc.

The relationship between the MDC formations and the pro-democracy civil society has thus been either outrightly disputed or largely unacknowledged. Some scholars, like Ncube (2010, p. 244) argue that this is caused by

> ...the uneasiness and difficulties faced by civil society to toe the line of an 'apolitical civil society' within both the dictates of the neo-liberal framework that promotes civil society in the country and the realities of the conflictual and polarised nature of how politics came to be articulated and practiced since 2000.

BPRA, the first case study in this thesis, faces this dilemma as discussed in chapter five. The Association's relationship with political parties is also revisited in the analysis chapter of this thesis.

In the cities, Residents Associations, which had similarly formed in the colonial era and some cases agitated against the colonial state, were revived in the late 1990s to the early 2000s. This time it was in response to the collapsed service delivery and to agitate for local democracy (Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015; Mapuva, 2011). In Bulawayo, however, the citizens' sense of grievance with the ZANU-PF government goes beyond the party's failures and/or intransigence regarding democratisation but goes far back to the years of *Gukurahundi* and perceived neglect by the state in the provision of services such as water (see Dube & Schramm, 2021). The city is, however, home to civil society actors with both a local and national outlook, in terms of their issues. In 1999, civil society groups (labour, students, constitutional reform movement and others) formed the MDC as which came to be the most formidable opposition after the ZANU-PF's failure to forcefully institute a one-party state[10]. The opposition went on to win local government elections in all major urban areas, rural Matabeleland region and parts of Midlands provinces. Between 2009 and 2013, it formed an inclusive government with ZANU-PF, culminating in a new constitution for the country in 2013. However, ZANU-PF regained power in 2013 and, for transitologists, reversed or at least stagnated the country's transition to democracy (Sachikonye, 2017).

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[10] The forceful annihilation of perceived enemies through Gukurahundi and widespread persecution of PF-ZAPU leaders, arguably coercing PF-ZAPU into a pact, known as the Unity Accord, with ZANU-PF in 1987, was one way to institute a one-party state. ZANU-PF also dealt ruthlessly with both opposition from within its party and emergent opposition parties like Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), formed by their own member, Edgar Tekere (see Saki and Katema 2011).

Throughout the 2000s, the operational space for civil society and the opposition in Zimbabwe was heavily constricted by the state. Politically, the ZANU-PF and some government officials portrayed the civil society and opposition as jointly pursuing the interests of the Western governments and donors. In 2004, for instance, the national legislature passed legislation, the NGO Bill, which meant to limit funding sources for civil society groups, and increase their control by the state (Kagoro, 2005; Musila, 2019). While the Bill was eventually aborted, other laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) were applied arbitrarily to curb civil society groups' activities. Public gatherings were to be permitted by the police. That law has changed over the years, but the central tenets remain the same from the colonial to post-colonial governments. Besides the law, activists were intimidated, abducted and disappeared. The media was also targeted by the state through legislation, arrests and other actions which curtailed its freedom.

Another constraining factor has been the economic downturn in Zimbabwe. While the economy somewhat recovered from the ESAP in the mid-1990s (Mlambo, 1997), decisions taken by the ZANU-PF government in the late 1990s, particularly the unbudgeted payout for war veterans in 1997, to boost its political support, decimated the economy (Sachikonye, 2017). This caused huge inflation as the money used for payouts was printed by the central bank. Subsequently, there was the fast-track land reform in the early 2000s which was largely characterised by lack of planning and chaos in the form of invasion of farms, thus dealing a huge blow in the country's agricultural sector and destabilising the economy. This also affected property rights, scared away investors and attracted economic sanctions from the United States and Europe (Sachikonye, 2017). The economy has been in free fall since those years, culminating in over 90% of the country's citizens being employed in the informal economy and cities facing deindustrialisation amidst rapid urbanisation. This has left local authorities such as Bulawayo City Council with depleted revenue sources and therefore unable to provide services (Chigwata, 2019).

This section has covered the political history of the City of Bulawayo and Zimbabwe. The development of civil society, both in the pre- and post-independence periods was highlighted. The local democratisation process, with regards to elections, participation and accountability were also highlighted. The section has also shown that civil society groups, including Residents Associations existing in a polarised political context, are either incidentally aligned to political parties or labelled as being aligned to political parties. The next section focuses on the history and context of Cape Town and by extension, of South Africa.

4.3 Cape Town, South Africa

Cape Town, a city of more than four million inhabitants (StatsSA) was established in a race-based conflict in the mid-seventeenth century (Wilkinson, 2000). The Khoikhoi cattle herders and other indigenous groups from the area were driven away by force by the white European settlers (Brown & Magoba, 2009). The growth of Cape Town, throughout the colonial and later on apartheid years, was also achieved against the backdrop of slavery and colonial policies that served the whites and marginalised all the other groups (Wilkinson, 2000). In South Africa, at the time of independence from Britain in 1910, the white settlers' population had grown to 20 per cent of the total, but they dominated the country in terms of politics and the economy (Feinberg & Horn 2009). To keep their influence, they had to design a system that would marginalise blacks, the majority, both politically and economically. Segregation was thus incrementally instituted and affected Cape Town as well as the whole country.

4.3.1   Democracy and citizenship in the colonial and apartheid years

South Africa had limited democracy and citizenship in the colonial and apartheid eras. Citizenship rights and political participation was a preserve of the whites while the blacks, Indians and coloureds were excluded.[11] At the beginning of the 20th century, racial discrimination had already been institutionalised. The colonial state instituted and enforced pieces of legislation that regulated the areas in which the black and coloured populations could settle and the movement of blacks from the rural areas, into and out of the urban areas (Wilkinson, 2000; Feinberg & Horn, 2009). In Cape Town, settlements were segregated with the blacks and coloureds being removed from the centre of the city to the outskirts such as the Cape Flats and other areas. One of the reasons for such segregation was to avoid the expansion of the expenditure for the provision of municipal services such as sanitation.

Historians note that in the early years of the 20th century when the British took control of the Cape Colony, the colonial administration sought to avoid expensive investment in its commercial frontiers. This, among other reasons, led to black Africans (and later coloured residents) being pushed out of the city, to reduce the sanitation expenditure (Jackson & Robins, 2018). Jackson and Robins (2018) argue that the 'boundaries of Cape Town's exclusive sanitation grid laid the literal groundwork for subsequent forms of segregation or rigid separation of centre from periphery' (p.78). From Lemanski's (2017) conceptualisation of infrastructural citizenship, one may conclude that the colonial state was determining who was

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[11] I use the term 'white' to refer to the descendants of English and Dutch settlers, 'black' or 'African' refer to the indigenous people from groups such as the Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa, Tswana, and Venda, while the term 'coloured(s)' is used to refer to a mixed-race group mainly in the Cape. Lastly, I use the term 'Indian' to refer to the Asians who were brought to South Africa in the late 1800s as indentured labourers.

a citizen and who was not through (non) provision of infrastructure. The other reason for the removals was to protect the white population from diseases such as the bubonic plague of 1901 (Wilkinson, 2000).

Subsequently, in 1927, Langa, for instance, was established as a "model Native village" for black Africans who were displaced away from the city centre (Ibid; Brown and Magoba, 2009). Under the rule of the South African Party (SAP), natives were allowed in the urban areas, only if their presence was in service to the white population. This was articulated, unequivocally, in the Stallad Commission of 1922 (Davenport, 1969). Davenport notes that The Natives Land Act of 1913, 'marked the beginning of territorial segregation by forcing black Africans to live in reserves and making it illegal for them to work as sharecroppers' (p. 95). It was 'part of a broader pattern of legislation designed to implement segregation within South African society, encompassing the workplace, cities and even inter-racial sex outside of marriage' (Feinberg and Horn, 2009, p. 42).

Spatial and economic segregation gained much more traction during the apartheid rule of the National Party (NP) in 1948–1994. Under its policy of apartheid, literally, "apartness" in Afrikaans, now universally defined as segregation on grounds of race (Hughes 2010), more discriminatory laws were enacted and their implementation became cruder. According to Wilkinson (2000), at least 150,000 people were displaced by the end of the 1960s into "coloured" and "black" townships in the Cape Flats. Mixed-race citizens were forced out of central urban areas designated for whites only into 'inferior housing in low-lying areas prone to flooding and with limited access to water, sanitation, and other services' (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019, p. 1). Under the policy of apartheid, the population was classified into four races: white or "European" (decedents of English and Dutch settlers), black or "Bantu" and "African" (consisting of indigenous tribes such as the Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa, Tswana and Venda speaking people), coloured (a mixed-race group descendent from slave groups, indigenous populations and immigrants in the Cape) and Indians or "Asian" (imported in the late 1800s as indentured labourers). The objective was to minimise inter-racial contact (Ballard 2002). Drawing on Western (1981), Charlotte Lemanski (2020, pp. 593-594) argues that

> Apartheid's restrictive framing of citizenship was inherently infrastructural in terms of differentiated access to services, and the quality of those services. Resources were channelled to ensure that superior social infrastructure (e.g., education, health, and policing) was concentrated in white spaces, while inclusion in the urban network of service provision (e.g., electricity, water, sanitation) was differentiated according to racially determined residential zones.

However, for Lemanski, the infrastructure represents the state in physical form to the citizens thus the physical representation of apartheid's citizenship model through infrastructure served as its downfall. The apartheid city's reliance on cheap labour required high levels of black

urbanisation that by the 1980s threatened the political system's precarious balance of power and highlighted the myth of urban apartheid (Smith, 1992). The colonial system described above, before 1948, influenced Southern Rhodesia's, which 'modelled most of its own legislation and social practice on South African precedents...segregation in urban areas and the partition of rural land into "European" and "native" areas was the rule' (Ranger, 2007). The same historian also notes that the African opposition was also influenced by the South African one.

The next subsection looks at the resistance against colonialism and apartheid.

4.3.2   Resistance against apartheid

The system of racial segregation led to resistance by the blacks, coloureds and Indians (non-whites). They organised through voluntary organisations, political parties such as the South African Native National Congress, later renamed the African National Congress (ANC) and labour unions, to fight for civil and political rights and subsequently oppose the apartheid system (Deegan, 2001). Gukelberger (2018) notes that in Cape Town, the racialised townships became hot spots for protests. Elsewhere, excluded people who had been denied their citizenship rights mobilised, formed political organisations and movements and fought against apartheid (White, 2008; 2010). In the 1960s political organisations such as the ANC were subsequently outlawed by the apartheid government, thus further radicalising the activists who started calling for a revolution rather than reform (Fine, 1992). The resistance took the form of protests, boycotts, stay-aways, strikes against the Nationalist government and its laws. In the 1950s, the African National Congress (ANC) led mass mobilisation against the apartheid government's discriminatory laws (White, 2008).

One of the key developments during the years of resistance against apartheid in South Africa, was the formulation of the Freedom Charter in 1955 by different movements under the umbrella of the National Congress of the People. The Charter did not only call for the end of apartheid laws and practices but also called for citizenship rights such as voting and access to health for all South Africans. It also expressed the people's desire for the establishment of a democratic form of government (Karis & Carter, 1977). Some scholars note that the Charter continues to inform the ideology of the ruling ANC, the 1996 Constitution of the republic and some movements' demands in the post-apartheid era (White, 2008). The charter is said to reflect only the will and not the actions of the post-apartheid ANC and some movements (Gukelberger, 2018). From the 1940s through to the 1980s, trade unions, churches and civil society organisations played a key role in the fight against apartheid (Fine, 1992). They were 'community organisations, sectorally mobilised movements of youth, students and women, as well as business, lawyers, and religious associations' (Hearn, 2000, p. 817). When the

liberation movements were banned, some leaders were jailed, others exiled, unions and civil society organisations worked even harder to represent broader societal interests (Piper & von Lieres, 2016).

In the early 1980s unions joined hands in organising campaigns against the state. The largest of the unions was the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), launched in 1985 (Ibid). Civil society organisations also joined forces, forming the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, mainly to campaign against the tricameral parliament which gave coloureds and Indians some voting rights. The apartheid government had made a raft of reforms in the 1980s which included the tricameral parliament. The UDF became the largest resistance coalition with a membership of over two million people with 700 affiliates based in every major centre of population in the country (White, 2008). The apartheid state also eased pass controls thus triggering an unprecedented move of Africans into the cities. This was in line with the 'adapt' rather than 'die' strategy which Louis Botha advised his party and followers in the 1980s (Worden, 1994, pp. 142-144). Botha's successor, Frederik de Klerk forged ahead with the easing of apartheid legislation, releasing political prisoners like Nelson Mandela, unbanning the ANC and entering negotiations with the liberation movements, leading to a transition from apartheid to democracy (Steytler, 2005).

However, it should be noted that civil society formations were not only against apartheid and colonialism. Some organisations and churches supported or were uncritical of the repressive state. Scholars refer to this as Afrikaner civil society (Kuperus, 1999). Kuperus explores the Dutch Reformed Church which was formed at the same time as the South African state in 1910 and went on to advance the Afrikaner interests, subsequently formulating apartheid theology which justified segregation. Afrikaner Brotherhood (Broederbond) is another organisation referred to by many scholars as having actively supported apartheid (Habib, 2013). This is instructive for studies such as this one to be critical in examining the contributions of voluntary associations or civil society organisations to democracy. The two which are highlighted above supported an undemocratic state thus contributing negatively to democratisation.

4.3.3   Post-apartheid changes and implications for democracy and citizenship

South Africa held its first non-racial elections in 1994 thus supposedly laying the ground for the work of dismantling the 'authoritarian state institutions and the establishment of a liberal democratic order, including a substantial rights framework' (Piper & von Lieres, 2016, p. 314). The South African Constitution of 1996 provides for citizenship rights and equality. The legislation was changed and enacted to reconfigure the system of government, public institutions and citizen-state relations. In terms of the system of government, South Africa

adopted a devolved, three-tier system of government in the 1996 Constitution, with provincial and local governments being complete spheres (Steytler, 2005). This was a huge shift from the apartheid era where the government was centralised, with local government working only as an arm of the central government, as its lowest rung (Gukelberger, 2018; Steytler, 2005). The country's 1996 Constitution provided for the institutionalisation of participatory democracy. Section 195 (e) states that 'in terms of the basic values and principles governing public administration – people's needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making' (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Drawing on the Constitution and supposedly influenced by the circulating discourses on participatory democracy, local government legislation emphasises 'both participation and accountability' (Pieterse, 2002, p. 7).

The Municipal Systems Act of 2000 provides for the establishment of local government, with the intention 'to develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance' (Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000). The Act also reads as follows: 'A municipality must develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance and must for this purpose encourage and create conditions for the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality…' (Sections:30-34). In reconfiguring local government in the post-apartheid era, the ward system was introduced and 'saw the entire country divided into wards and having a wall-to-wall local government. This meant that every South African would have direct access to democratically elected representatives involved in the management of their local area…' (Breakfast et. al, 2015).

Local government is recognised in the constitution as a sphere of government with 'an entrenched though limited degree of autonomy' (Steytler, 2005, p. 183). The Constitution provides that 'in the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated' (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, S 40(1)) Stetler's interpretation is that 'the word "sphere" was a deliberate deviation from the term "tier" used in the 1993 Constitution, in an attempt to move away from the notion of hierarchy (p. 184). Each municipality in South Africa, 'has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, as provided for in the Constitution' (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, S 151(3)) and '[t]he national and provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its duties' (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, S 151(4)).

According to Cameron (1999), the establishment of the institution of ward councillor was meant to achieve two things: decentralise power and include the townships in politics. In 1998,'the state created institutions for the participation of poor people in the form of sub-councils, ward committees, and *imbizos'* (Gukelberger, 2018, p. 125). This was meant to fostercitizenship and strengthen "community-state" relations (Ibid). The participatory framework defines the residents as one of three components of the municipality, establishes ward committees of around ten members to assist the ward councillor in engaging the local community and requires public consultation around key decision-making processes including the annual budget and development planning (Barichievy, 2006). These changes were seen by some, like Hearn (2000) as being in line with the globally circulating liberal democratic tenets around (state-led) participation, at the time. However, as noted in chapter two, these state-led changes have not resulted in full citizen participation in decision making (Lemanski,2017).

The municipal structures that ought to facilitate the participation of the citizens, in practice, only allow for marginal input into policy. This is because the structures choose what to implement to achieve minimal adherence to the law, such as the presentation of the draft budgets and plans (Barichievy, 2006). The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (2000) outlaws interference and gives each municipal council the right to govern and to exercise the executive and legislative authority over their jurisdiction. It is for this reason that Piper and von Lieres (2016) conclude that, 'direct popular participation in decision-making over the key issues that affect people's lives is thus, by design, not possible' (p. 318). According to them, that is because 'the law located the ultimate right to rule with elected representatives and not the public' (p. 318).

The post-apartheid governments have also used infrastructure to redress the past inequalities. They have '...pursued an infrastructure-centric vision of citizenship, prioritising the physical extension of networks of infrastructure (e.g., housing, water, sanitation, electricity) as part of the political extension of citizenship rights' (Lemanski, 2020, p. 593). Other scholars like von Schnitzler have, however, pointed out the weaknesses of the post-apartheid democracy related to service provision. For von Schnitzler, the state's failure to deliver services has led to the depoliticisation of citizens, political matters being attended to through techno-managerial and procedural solutions such as prepaid water meters meant to encourage payment for water (von Schnitzler, 2008). The scholar uses the case of Soweto where the residents resisted the system through protest and litigation but still lost. Such approaches are also seen in the other site, Bulawayo, where the ESAP kick-started an era where subsidies by the post-colonial state dwindled and some services were privatised while citizens became poorer (see the previous section). Faced with water crises and a citizenry that was too poor to

pay, the City of Bulawayo attempted to introduce prepaid water meters in 2013, thus prompting massive protests which successfully stopped the local government from offering techno-managerial solutions and depoliticising residents (this is discussed in detail in chapter five concerning the emergence of BPRA, one of the case studies in this study). The following section turns to some of the specific post-apartheid institutional changes and challenges that have affected the City of Cape Town.

There are several explanations as to why there are service delivery failures. Some scholars argue that the constitutional provisions under South Africa's devolved system overburden local authorities thus resulting in service delivery failures (Koelble & Siddle, 2014). Others cite undue political party influence on the municipality officials thus interfering with decision making such as appointments and others (Zarenda, 2013, as cited in Masuku & Jili, 2019). Masuku and Jili also identify political factionalism as also having a negative impact on the stability and effectiveness of local government. Corruption also affects the effectiveness of service provision by local authorities. Despite the challenges discussed above regarding local democracy, the post-apartheid South African governments have been relatively committed to the process of introducing democratic decentralisation. Some comparativists also argue that South Africa's decentralisation or devolution allows for more competition than that of other countries in the Southern African region (Muriaas, 2011). Considering the discussion in the preceding section on Bulawayo and Zimbabwe, in this chapter, one can cite Zimbabwe as one of those countries with a decentralised system that does not fully allow for political competition among parties. The central government retains decision making power and constantly interferes with local government.

4.3.4 Local democracy and the City of Cape Town

In post-apartheid South Africa, Cape Town's 25 separate municipalities were merged into one single City of Cape Town metropolitan municipality in 1997 (Beck et. al., 2016). This was done to enable redistribution of tax revenue from the entire metropolitan area across the city centre, suburbs, and townships (Mills et. al., 2019). Other scholars note that the changes in the system of governance in Cape Town were meant to eradicate segregation and unequal provision of services between whites and non-whites (Gukelberger, 2018). Broadly, this was in line with South Africa's post-apartheid emphasis on decentralisation to fulfil the basic needs of the previously excluded groups (Lemanski, 2017; Steytler, 2005). Stetler (2005) describes the apartheid local government as follows:

> When the first democratic elections were held in April 1994, local government was a racist institution, giving effect to the spatial separation of blacks and whites. The black community was further divided between African, coloured and Indian, each with their own local authority.

These racial divisions meant massive inequality in services – white communities were well serviced, while black communities received inferior or no services at all (pp. 183-184).

Together with the changes in legislation detailed above, those changes were thus meant to establish a state that would grant citizenship rights to the previously excluded groups. However, the legislation could only go to a certain extent. The implementation of the legislation and actual changes were to be implemented by various political actors in Cape Town.

Cape Town is the capital of the Western Cape, the only province where the (national) ruling ANC has not been in power for the longest period in the post-apartheid era. Between 1994 and the time of writing this thesis, the ANC only governed the City of Cape Town between 2001 and 2006 before ceding power to South Africa's main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) (Guekelberger, 2018). During the other years, the City government was shifting from one coalition to another including the one between the ANC and the National Party. Lemanski (2020) sees Cape Town as having demonstrated political plurality unlike the rest of South Africa, 'with leadership shifting between the ruling ANC party and the DA (Democratic Alliance) opposition party since democracy. However, from 2006 the DA led the city in a multiparty coalition and has ruled the city outright since 2011' (pp. 21-22). The DA also governed in two other metropolitan municipalities, Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane after the 2016 local government elections.

The DA-led local government has had its interpretation and implementation of legislation. In terms of public participation, for instance, instead of the ward committees, the City has experimented with a system of ward forums in the past, which were deemed more inclusive. It only settled for the ward committee system in 2011 once it had absolute control of the city. According to Lemanski (2017), the changes were necessitated by a low take-up of the ward forum concept across the city. However, Lemanski argues that the ward committee system has also not improved public participation. The challenges put forth by Lemanski are that the past inequalities interfere with equal participation in those forums as the wards cut across previously unequal communities. Secondly, the distances across each of the wards, that were divided to serve electoral rather than participatory purposes make it hard for some residents to participate. Alongside the ward forums and subsequently the ward committees, the City of Cape Town has twenty-four sub-councils, clusters of between three and six wards. This platform is unique to Cape Town and is meant to provide a space for citizens to demonstrate their voice beyond the scale of the ward (Buire, 2011).

Regarding the effectiveness of the participatory democracy that the post-1994 local government reforms sought to achieve, in the City of Cape Town and the rest of South Africa, Pieterse (2002, p. 7) also poses a hard question and proffers his opinion:

> …is a participatory democratic local government system a sufficient condition to overcome the legacy of apartheid social engineering and especially the severe inequalities that characterise all settlements? In my opinion it is not, unless metropolitan governance can foster the conditions for citizens and communities to reclaim the city and mould its identity and functionality to their needs. The core of the city governance and management challenge faced by South African cities is to bridge the chasm that separates citizens in order to achieve greater economic efficiencies, political tolerance, social inclusion and sustainability.

His opinion, while seemingly speculative at the time, now resonates with some of the challenges seen in the City of Cape Town and other municipalities across the country.

Inequality is one of the main challenges in the City of Cape Town. While inequality is South Africa's bane, for Gukelberger (2018), in Cape Town, the vast disparities between the wealthiest and poorest suburbs are striking and reproduced along the lines of race and class. The City of Cape Town is 'a starkly polarised city [where] affluent suburbs and prosperous economic centres offering rich opportunities of all kinds contrast with overcrowded, impoverished dormitory settlements on the periphery' (Turok, 2001, p. 2349). Some describe Cape Town as an 'extremely unequal' city (Lemanski, 2017, p. 15). The legacy of apartheid still lingers on, there has been inadequate 'systematic responses to the material forces, demographic, economic, environmental and institutional, that shaped the inherited apartheid city form' (Boraine et. al., 2006, p. 259).

Many blacks and coloureds who were physically moved to the peripheries and or barred from being of the city, 'still live in Cape Town's outskirts, while the majority of inhabitants in the better-off suburbs are white' (Boraine et. al., 2006, p. 3). Boraine et. al. (2006, p. 97) posits that 'integrating previously-excluded townships into the municipal system of Cape Town has proved to be a complex task for both local government and society' as shown by the 'informal settlements, which remain unincorporated into the system and whose size and population are unknown'. Other scholars also add urban homelessness, poverty, unemployment in the face of rapid urbanisation (Sapire & Beall, 1995). The high levels of inequality in such cities then leave the poor, migrants, women and other vulnerable groups without a voice and excluded from democratic citizenship.

In terms of participatory democracy, the implementation of the structures detailed in section 4.4.1 above, has been described as an 'ineffective and not especially democratic system' (Piper & von Lieres, 2016, p. 318). The ward committees, intended as participatory structures are seen as susceptible to being dominated by ward councillors and other political party actors (Piper & Deacon, 2008). Democratic institutions across all spheres of government in the country are 'seen as weak, unresponsive and corrupt' and citizens have lost trust in the political system (Booysen, 2014, p. 1). According to Gukelberger (2018), a common critique

of South African democracy is that the government tends to limit citizen participation to voting, leaving the actual governance to politicians. Participatory governance is weak. In Cape Town, Anciano and Piper (2019) posit that there are multiple forms of governance at play that the democratic institutions cannot hold to account. Citizens are largely treated like consumers as democratic citizenship exists around elections and instances such as participation in public platforms. Citizens and elected officials have limited impact on decision making in the city. These forms of governance are thus beyond the capacity of democratic institutions to hold them to account. These scholars further observe that the initiatives aimed at deepening participatory democracy have not been effective. Citizenship exists around election time when residents vote and beyond that, they are treated as consumers.

With the ineffective formal participatory institutions which cannot deliver services and other aspirations for the citizens, protests become a way of forcing the state to deliver (Booysen, 2014). The failures of the liberal democratic legal order to facilitate democratic participation through the 'invited spaces' of participation created 'from above' by the state results in the 'organic' or 'invented spaces' created by citizens 'from below' (Cornwall, 2002, p. 17). These include what Piper and von Lieres (2015) refer to as 'mediated citizenship' (p. 700). Citizens' relations with the state are mediated by third-party actors such as civil society organisations, community-based organisations and informal networks of local leaders who engage with then state on their behalf. Such instances may be for various ends, democratic, clientelist or other. In Cape Town, democracy is disconnected; citizens and elected officials (councillors) have limited impact on decision making in the city (Anciano & Piper, 2019).

Figure 2. Map of Cape Town. Source: municipalities.co.za [Accessed 11 November, 2021].

4.3.5   Post-apartheid civil society and democratisation in Southern Africa

This section highlights the post-apartheid state-civil society relations and the interventions that different formations have made versus the country's democratisation. It lays the context within which one of the selected case studies, the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) exists. While 'a robust civil society is seen as a way to ensure responsive democracy in the post-apartheid era' (Shubane, 1992, p. 33), in the apartheid era, scholars were not in agreement about the existence of civil society in South Africa. Some theorised that the groups that fought against the apartheid state, highlighted in subsection 4.3.2 above, were part of civil society which needed to be protected, while others argued that there was no civil society to talk about, the organisations were a part of the broad liberation movement (Shubane, 1992). Shubane summarises the debate as follows:

95

...the many radical organisations which arose to oppose apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s are identified as constituting a civil society. The trade union movement, civic associations, youth groups, women's organisations and professional groups, many of which were affiliates of the United Democratic Front, are seen as crucial formations in civil society. An opposing view holds that these formations should not be viewed as part of civil society. They are rather part of the opposition, seeking to transform the current apartheid state. Once transformed, many of these groups may become the new functionaries of that transformed state, thus forming part of the state rather than of civil society. In this sense these formations must be understood as part of the liberation movement (p. 35).

Such were some of the views from the time when 'South African anti-apartheid intellectuals and activists [had] discovered civil society' (Glaser, 1997, p. 5). Besides the contested meanings of the concept of civil society in literature (See chapter three), South Africa's transition to democracy seems to have brought a mixture of optimism and worries about the potential co-optation of civil society and thus leading to a totalitarian state (Fine, 1992,).

The post-apartheid era initially saw civil society organisations weakening but the challenges such as poor service delivery, persistent inequality, poverty and others eventually led to the emergence of vibrant social movements (Ballard et. al, 2006). Ballad et. al note that, among other reasons, the weakening of civil society in the early years of the post-apartheid era was caused by the UDF's disbanding, following the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. The other reason noted by Piper and von Lieres (2016) was the 'absorption of civil society leadership into the reconstituted party' affected civil society (p. 322). Civil society organisations were funded by international donors and when donors shifted and directly funded the ANC government, it made some shift and aligned with the state (Habib, 2005). There was also a brief honeymoon after the fall of apartheid, where the government of the day was 'seen to be "working on the problem" of poverty and deprivation…[p]atience was exercised and although social conditions remained difficult for the poor, communities were not inclined to mobilise' (Desai, 2002, as cited in Ballard et. al., 2006, p. 15). The civic organisations that sought to continue with their activities struggled to reposition themselves in the democratic era thus resulting in their reduced impact (White, 2008). However, before long, in the late 1990s, civil society formations emerged and challenged 'various government policies', 'focused on government's failures in meeting basic services and addressing socio-economic rights and resisted attempts at repression' (Ballard et. al., 2006, p. 2).

The operational space for civil society organisations improved in the post-apartheid era. The ANC government adopted a corporatist approach which saw the establishment of forums such as the National Economic Development Labour Council (NEDLAC), the National Development Agency (NDA), in which civil society formations were given representation (Habib, 2005; Ballard et. al., 2006). More positively, pieces of legislation that constricted civil society, such

as the Fundraising Act of 1978 were repealed while some which enabled it, such as the Non-Profit Act were enacted (Habib, 2003). This supposedly delayed but subsequently aided the emergence of post-apartheid civil society organisations. However, some scholars observe that the corporatist hold of the state has weakened and combined with pluralism, thus strengthening, and expanding civil society (Lehman, 2008).

The post-apartheid state's failure to translate *de jure* socio-economic rights into de facto socio-economic empowerment has given rise to civil society organisations around issues such as the provision of houses and against the evictions and privatisation of services (Stokke & Oldfield, 2005). Seekings (2000) points out that the same issues that were contentious in the apartheid era, such as housing and service delivery have been at the centre of the rise of post-apartheid civil society organisations. The movements that fight for the fulfilment of socioeconomic rights, in the post-apartheid era are seen as 'mirroring the dual focus on democracy and social justice in the anti-apartheid movement and the continued problems of social injustices after the democratic transition' (Stokke, 2018, p. 9). Some scholars also see the post-apartheid civil society organisations as drawing experience, values, ideologies and inspiration from the organising done during the apartheid era (White, 2008).

In that context of both collaboration and conflict with the state, different types of organisations have emerged, with 'a massive diversity of concerns' (Ballard et. al., 2006, p. 17) and with different relations with the state. White (2008), for instance, identifies four non-static types of organisations: 'established, normally membership-based, 'a-political' organisations; informal survivalist organisations; formal service-oriented NGOs and lastly adversarial or oppositional groups mobilising against the state or its policies' (p. 159). Gukelberger (2018) also points out that activists who were part of the former underground liberation movement are engaged in 'newly-emerged political spaces within and outside the urban governance system' (p. 4). One of the case studies, the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), discussed in detail in chapter six, fits this description.

In the post-apartheid era, the City of Cape Town has seen the emergence of movements such as the Treatment Action Campaign, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and others campaigning around socio-economic rights. In the post-apartheid political context, some scholars, see civil society as 'able, perhaps better than it ever was, to strengthen democracy by creating multiple channels for the articulation of interests, fostering accountability, constraining executive power and potentially reducing socio-economic inequality' (White, 2008, p. 158). However, there are challenges noted by others. Sara Monaco (2008), for instance, who focused on civil society organisations' perception of the changing political context from apartheid to the post-apartheid era raised concerns about their lack of autonomy,

effectiveness versus their level of resources and links with political party representatives. Thus, the emergence and relative success of social movements has been described as an exception rather than a rule in the context where civil society has limitations (Gukelberger, 2018). The other factor that may constrain civil society organisations is the restrictions of protest activities, albeit supposedly less often and severe than in authoritarian countries such as Zimbabwe (see the instances discussed in chapters five and six).

The next section is the conclusion which brings together the main ideas from discussions in the preceding sections.

4.4   Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the characteristics of cities in the global south, particularly rapid urbanisation, urban poverty and relatively poor states with limited capacity to provide services. The two cities, Bulawayo and Cape Town share a history of indigenous Africans' exclusion in the urban territory by settler colonisers, resulting in resistance and struggles for liberation. The colonial legislation and social practice in Southern Rhodesia mimicked the South African precedents. There was segregation in urban areas and the partition of rural land into "European" and "native" areas in both countries. The anti-colonial struggles also shared some similarities but differences were huge too. The pre- and post-independence, post-apartheid rural to urban migration caused challenges for the cities' infrastructure, service delivery and cohesion. The struggles for citizenship and democracy date back to colonial and apartheid times and continue in the 21st century. In the post-colonial and post-apartheid years, the institutional changes that seek to democratise the countries and cities have also had to contend with local, national and global challenges. The multiple layers from the historical, social and political contexts present rich sites for understanding how context shapes the selected cases' contributions to democracy and citizenship.

98

5.   Chapter Five: Case Study One - Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association

5.1.   Introduction

This chapter presents data collected from the first case study, Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association. It outlines the organisation's objectives, structure and internal decision-making procedures and the interventions that it makes in the City of Bulawayo. BPRA's relations with key political actors, its tactics alongside some key changes it has influenced are also highlighted. Data was collected through six focus groups, with a total of 56BPRA Ward Committee members, documentary analysis (constitution, (un)published reportsand papers) was done and key informant interviews were held with five BPRA leaders, four staff members and three civil society leaders in Bulawayo.[12] The key informants were five Executive Council members (See Fig. 1), one board member, three current and two former staff members. Ten ward councillors, two city officials and two leaders of different civil societyorganisations were also interviewed, mostly for triangulation purposes.

Following this introduction, which provides an outline of the chapter, are four sections. The second section focuses on BPRA's formation, membership, size and structures and decision-making procedures. It demonstrates how the Association navigates its socio-political context. The section thus dissects BPRA's relations with other actors such as political parties, the state, civil society groups and the city officials. These aspects also get more focus in the third section which outlines BPRA's programmes, activities, tactics and key outcomes. In that same section, some key outcomes of the Association's work and challenges are highlighted. The last section is the conclusion which summarises the chapter and links it with others in this thesis.

5.2.   An overview of BPRA

> In the same way that we have the media as the fourth estate, I can characterise BPRA as the second estate that always intervenes in decision-making. It ensures that the laws are pro-poor. For instance, in budget making, BPRA follows closely on behalf of residents to ensure that it is pro-poor' (Focus Group Participant, Mpopoma, Ward 9, Bulawayo)[13].

The quote above, from a focus group participant's description of what BPRA is, somewhat captures the organisation's *raison d'etre* as will be seen in the paragraphs below. The Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA) was established in 2007 by civic activists, former student leaders, labour unionists, leaders of women's groups, water activists,

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[12] BPRA Ward Committees are members' community-level structures, different from the Ward Committees appointed by the councillor.
[13] Focus group participant, Mpopoma, Ward 9, 4 January 2020, Bulawayo.

99

educationists and others.[14] The process of institutionalisation, i.e., its registration, resource mobilisation and launching of a full-fledged organisation were facilitated by Bulawayo Agenda, one of the leading civil society organisations at the time. The overarching aspiration of the Association's founders was to have 'an organisation that is relevant and accessible to proactive residents who agitate to live in a pleasant city of first choice' (BPRA Constitution, 2007:5). According to the organisation's constitution, its mission is to 'empower the residents' on local governance and collective decision-making issues through research, resulting in improved service delivery (p. 5). However, some members of BPRA have a different view of its mission. In one of the focus group meetings, for instance, one member said, 'We are the supervisors of the council. They respect that and retreat on matters that are not favourable to the residents. The council is scared that some people are looking, unlike in the past where they would just implement policies as they wish'.[15]

Another focus group participant, in a different meeting, however, affirmed what the constitution of the Association states as its raison d'etre when they said, 'We don't exactly mean that we are the bosses of the City Council, no, we simply protect the residents' interests, that's all'.[16] This may be a revelation of the different views that members have of the role of the organisation and how the Association or its members interact with the city. It may also be telling of how BPRA articulates the residents' demands for services from the City and other public authorities that they target. With the diversity of the Association's membership, many factors may account for the differences in understanding what the Association's mission, objectives and attitude towards public authority are. Those may include political party membership, individual members' understanding of the organisation's mission, among other factors, as will be seen in the next subsection on BPRA and its socio-political context.

The formation of BPRA was necessitated by several concerns, with the first being the residents' concerns with their local authority's failure to provide services. The second was a realisation that 'sustaining local democracy requires committed vigilance by the residents, to ensure the growth of the city, institutions of community involvement and participation, especially those that support accountability and transparency' (BPRA Constitution, 2007:5). BPRA was also formed at the tail-end of the residents' successful repulsion of an attempted takeover of the City's water management by a national government-controlled agency, the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA).[17] Thus for some, like the Association's

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[14] This researcher participated in the initial consultative meetings to establish BPRA.

[15] Ward 26 focus group, 5 January 2020, Bulawayo

[16] Ward 13 focus group discussion, 4 January 2020, Bulawayo

[17] The attempts that the national government made to weaken local authorities are discussed in detail in the context chapter.

chairperson, Ambrose Sibindi, there is a direct link between the mooted takeover of water by ZINWA and the ultimate formation of BPRA. In his view, 'BPRA was born during the [fight against] ZINWA takeover.'[18] Dube and Schramm (2021) state that in previous research with colleagues, they have also noted the possible link between the formation of BPRA as a vehicle for residents to make claims to broader democratic political participation following a successful campaign against the ZINWA takeover between 2005 and 2007.

The residents who formed BPRA were also dissatisfied with the Residents Association (RA) existing at that time. They also viewed it as doing the bidding for the ruling party and national government.[19] For Rodrick Fayayo, a founding member and former Coordinator of BPRA (2009-2018), there were concerns that the existing RA at the time (Bulawayo United Residents Association) could not represent the residents who are members of different political parties since it had become 'irretrievably conflated with ZANU [PF]'. Fayayo also highlighted that the other challenge was that it 'only represented rate payers thus leaving out lodgers and it also had not had elections, it had had the same leaders since the 1980s'.[20] To the founders of BPRA, these observations meant that an alternative RA was needed, thus setting the scene for BPRA's emergence. This view was echoed by many key informants and focus group participants. One focus group participant did not mince his words, he said, 'The challenge was that BURA had been taken over by ZANU-PF'.[21]

Some scholars have also noted that most postcolonial Ras in Zimbabwe were formed in the 2000s, in response to the decline in the quantity and quality of services as the country had seen years of economic problems (Mapuva, 2011; Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015). For Musekiwa and Chatiza, these RAs 'are guided by the notion that councils have some capacity but are unwilling to deliver services and will only perform with some nudging and guidance from ratepayers' (p. 2). The reasons cited for BPRA's formation, however, reveal that while there were overarching challenges that affected the delivery of services by local authorities across the country, each was faced with a different set of contextual peculiarities. Those peculiarities underscore the need for the mapping of how BPRA relates with its immediate and broader socio-political contexts, as those have supposedly contributed to its form, the members it

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[18] Interview with Ambrose Sibindi, BPRA Chairperson, 6 January 2021, Bulawayo. This view has also been expressed by other leaders of the Association such as the former BPRA Coordinator, Rodrick Fayayo (See voanews.com 27 October 2009).

[19] Interview with former BPRA Coordinator, Rodrick Fayayo, 19 June 2021, WhatsApp call.

[20] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo.

[21] Focus group meeting, Ward 9, 4 January 2020, Bulawayo.

recruits its tactics and strategies, the issues it deals with and some of its successes and failures.

5.2.1.   BPRA's quest for non-partisanship

For BPRA members and leaders, who had been in Bulawayo from the early years of independence, BPRA's formation was a culmination of a long struggle by the residents to reclaim the civic space that had been constricted by the state. BPRA, therefore, had to be different in many ways from its predecessors to avoid the risk of being co-opted or suppressed by the state, for instance, and to be open to all the residents of the city. Ben Moyo, BPRA's Secretary for Education offered a brief overview of the post-colonial context that had culminated in the ineffectiveness of the existing RA and what BPRA had to avoid. His thoughts were as follows:

> …there was BURA [Bulawayo United Residents Association] before which was formed at a time when political parties had been banned [during the colonial period] and there was no democratic space to express the aspirations of the African people. They continued after independence but it had problems because there was a conflict between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF. Sydney Malunga, the Chairperson of the RA was also the National Organising Secretary for PF-ZAPU, so when the government mounted a crackdown on political leadership, it meant therefore that the RA remained without a leader. For me that was the most salutary lesson from that experience, that there was a need therefore to create a non-partisan RA so that when there is a crackdown on the political leadership, as they are wont to, at least we will have a RA that is still led and maintain some democratic space. It is with that background that we formed this association.**[22]**

For leaders and members who share Moyo's views, the possibility of its leadership being attacked by the state was one of the reasons why the BPRA has attempted to remain non-aligned to political parties. However, this has not been an easy process in a city that has a well-known history of supporting opposition parties, firstly the liberation movement PF-ZAPU in the 1980s and 1990s and the MDC since the 2000s. At the time of BPRA's formation, the MDC, initially as one political party and subsequently its factions, MDC-T and MDC-Green had dominated local politics for close to a decade and the population had become polarised between the ruling ZANU-PF and the MDC formations.[23] Polarisation or negative partisanship in Zimbabwe has been noted by some scholars cited in the previous chapter (see also Moyo,

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[22] Interview with Ben Moyo, an educationist and founding member of BPRA, 6 January,2020, Bulawayo. Moyo has also been a member of BPRA's Executive Council in different roles since its formation.
[23] The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), formed in 1999, split in 2005 into MDC-T and MDC-N (also known as MDC-Green) factions or formations. It then reunited in 2018 as MDC-Alliance. However, in 2020 another splinter emerged again named MDC-T.

2020). Inevitably, some if not most residents who became its members were also, predominantly members of the MDC formations.

Some founding members too such as labour unionists and some civic activists were also members of some MDC formations or perceived as being sympathetic to them. Those formations were MDC-T and MDC-N at the time. To some, this was subsequently "confirmed" by the political choices made by some of the Association's leaders and founders. A prominent case was that of BPRA's patron, Gorden Moyo, who became a Minister, firstly in the Prime Minister's Office and then for Parastatals and State Enterprises in the Inclusive Government between 2009 and 2013.[24] He did so under the banner of the MDC-T. At the time of his appointment, he was also the Director for Bulawayo Agenda, an organisation that facilitated BPRA's institutionalisation. His appointment by the MDC-T happened just two years after BPRA's formation. While the role of a patron, an advisor of the Association is a ceremonial one, his political choices may have reinforced the perceptions that BPRA was aligned to the MDC-T. Ambrose Sibindi, BPRA's Chairperson during this research thus notes that 'when BPRA started, it was linked to the MDC and the public could tell. The factionalism happening in that party also affected our structures. Our ability to raise issues against the city also suffered'.[25]

When the MDC-T split in 2014 and leaders that included Gorden Moyo left, some residents leaders expected the perception of BPRA as being linked with the opposition MDC-T to shift as well. This was reflected by Ben Moyo, in our interview, who noted: 'When Gorden [Moyo, BPRA's patron] left the MDC we waited to see what the reaction would be.'.[26] The informant seemed to perceive that that event had the potential to shift perceptions and assist the association's quest to firm its non-partisan posture. However, this was going to be just another shift but with much more complex implications for the Association's depoliticisation project. While those aligned to the ruling ZANU-PF portrayed or perceived BPRA as being aligned to the MDC, the MDC itself was also circumspect of BPRA. Moyo (Ben) noted that 'The position of the MDC[-T] now is that we are anti-MDC[-T] because our patron left and we continue to demonstrate against an MDC-Alliance council'.[27] The opposition seemed to see the Association as being against their party. Any protest of a decision made by the City was seen as an affront to the political party itself. 'Some campaigns, like the one against prepaid water

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[24] A patron, in the BPRA constitution, is an advisor appointed by the Board.

[25] Interview with Ambrose Sibindi, 6 January, 2020, Bulawayo. Sibindi is a labour unionist and one of the founding members of BPRA

[26] Interview with Ben Moyo, 6 Jan 2020, Bulawayo

[27] Ibid.

meters, against corruption of the campaigns that fuelled the view by some in the MDC-T that we are against their party or that we work with a certain faction'.[28]

The perceived and somewhat real alignment of the Association to the opposition, the MDC, could also be seen from different angles. Firstly, the opposition emerged from the civil society formations such as labour, constitutional reform movement, students and women's movements.[29] The second angle is that the ZANU-PF government, 'which was failing to provide citizens with services, took a defensive approach, including seeing civil society organisations as aligned with the opposition [MDC formations].[30] The strategy of labelling the civil society organisations as agents of foreign western governments, rather than representatives of citizens was the same way that ZANU-PF characterised the MDC formations (Muneri, 2016). Drawing from the context chapter, this has also served to justify their treatment by the ZANU-PF government, i.e., in the same way as the opposition whom they dissuade their supporters from joining the Association, arrest their leaders, surveil and intimidate. Indeed, state security agents surveilled some of BPRA's activities, and some leaders reckoned that there were also attempts to infiltrate its structures.[31] Thirdly, 'in politics and passion, perception is reality', says John Kramer Blythe, fictional literature author. This could be true and worse in Zimbabwe, a country with a documented history of negative partisanship and suppression of the opposition parties.

Other factors that may have pushed the narrative for some leaders like Fayayo, was that BPRA grew exponentially and thus threatened other civil society organisations as it assumed a leading role on matters. Fayayo shared the following thoughts:

> The growth of BPRA was a problem for other organisations because it meant that it was taking a leading role. It had the numbers and its show of force threatens others who had previously occupied that space. That on its own came with its own problems, especially in civil society and especially in Matabeleland. Coming up with the anti-prepaid water meter campaign was one of the most difficult things to do because some organisations were saying that BPRA is a front for the MDC. I remember in one meeting where [unnamed organisation] said, "no we cannot meet at BPRA offices because those are MDC offices.

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[28] Ibid. The campaigns are discussed in the sections below.

[29] Scholars like Chatiza and Musekiwa also claim that 'in Bulawayo and Harare, the three main post-independence RAs (CHRA, BPRA and HRT) align with the opposition MDC-T'. However, their paper does not show how they reached that conclusion.

[30] Interview with Thabani Nyoni, former Coordinator of BPRA, 19 October 2021, WhatsApp call.

[31] Interview with Ntombizodwa Khumalo a founding member and former Vice Chairperson of BPRA, 17 June 2021, WhatsApp call.

Besides being accused by the ruling party and some civil society organisations, potential donors and those who were already funding BPRA were also concerned about the Association's political association. Leaders like Fayayo who engaged with donors felt that,

> Some problems came from donors. I don't remember how many meetings I sat with one of the organisations, trying to explain that one we are not a political party, and two, personally, I had no political ambitions. Because people were saying "Fayayo has political ambitions, Fayayo wants to control Bulawayo using BPRA ''. Some donors never gave us money; they perpetually accused us of being aligned to the MDC. But it's not the same with other organisations…well, it's always about the people who control the purse, where their loyalties lie.[32]

Ironically, the MDC-T also tried from its end to disassociate with BPRA. For some leaders, BPRA was not acting in the best interests of the party, thus MDC-T members had to cease their membership in the Association. This meant that they had to choose between being BPRA members or MDC-T members. While that may have created an impasse within the MDC it seemingly affirmed BPRA's importance to members, especially those who saw opportunities to use it to be elected to public office.[33] Rodrick Fayayo's put it in this way:

> As BPRA, we had people that were belonging to the MDC. At one point the MDC Province sat down and said everyone who belonged to the BPRA should get out of BPRA. It became a very big thing and people were called to the office. People fought hard, they actually said "we will actually leave the MDC". These were people that had not been mobilised, these were people that had belief in the organisation and on that aspect, they knew they had the support of the organisation. People believed that much in the organisation and they believed that the organisation was going to help them win and after winning, the organisation was going to continue training them. So, they knew that the organisation was theirs. But because we were afraid of being labelled [MDC], as soon as those people expressed their interest, we disassociated with them. It then became difficult to associate with them after they had won.[34]

All interviewees and focus group participants, however, repeatedly emphasised that the Association's official position was that of being non-aligned to political parties. Amid the fear of being labelled MDC, Fayayo believes that BPRA may have lost an opportunity but also potentially, learnt a lesson to support members who are running for public office and make sure that they become exemplary leaders when in office.[35] Such an approach may work for

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[32] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo, 19 June, 2021, WhatsApp call.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

BPRA since its constitution does not (and seemingly cannot) bar members from being members of political parties or contesting elections.

In some instances, what seems to frustrate politicians is the failure to control the Association. Some focus group participants shared their first-hand experience of being repeatedly snubbed by MDC councillors in their wards. One of the participants said that their ward councillors had not assisted BPRA members with securing the community halls for free, which should be the case for non-profit making organisations from the City thus leading BPRA to pay to use them.[36] A focus group participant thus said, 'Our [ward] councillor has openly declared that he hates BPRA, he said that in a public meeting'.[37] Another weighed in with their view on why the councillor may have expressed hatred for BPRA, saying, 'He sees that the Association is strong and cannot be brought under his influence'.[38]

BPRA leaders give different reasons for the need to depoliticise the Association. For Ambrose Sibindi, the Association always emphasises non-partisanship because 'the issues that we deal with are bigger than political parties'. Sibindi notes that there was a need to 'depoliticise the Association to appeal to all residents, across the political divide'. He went on to say, 'We also had to ensure that its agenda was not perceived as being the same as that of the opposition and that we were interested only in quality service delivery and will demand that from the opposition as well.'[39] Moyo (Ben), sees being non-partisan as likely to assist with the quest to grow membership and remain true to BPRA's mandate. The Association has made various attempts to rid itself of the partisan tag, such as barring the members of the Executive Council from holding any positions in political parties and suspending those who were running for public offices during elections. However, the perceptions that the Association was aligned to the MDC were not only external. Some BPRA members also assumed that the organisation supports a certain political party or factions within those parties. Besides such assumptions, some saw their positions in the organisation as good opportunities to champion the cause of their political parties thus further entrenching the views that the Association was politically aligned.[40]

Other informants like Thabani Nyoni, the former Coordinator of BPRA (January-July 2009), shared a different view about BPRA's non-partisanship. For him, during the formative years of BPRA, there was a need for changes in areas such as service provision and the ruling political party (ZANU-PF) stood in the way of realising that change. Thus, an Association that

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[36] Ward 12 focus group, 5 January 2020.

[37] A participant in the Ward 12 focus group meeting, 5 January, 2020.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Interview with Ambrose Sibindi, 6 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[40] Interviews with Ntombizodwa Khumalo, 17 June, 2021 and Rodrick Fayayo, 19 June, 2021.

advocates for change like BPRA could not be neutral. He argues that 'it happens in any context that if you are pro-change and you want accountability, those who do not want to account will be your enemy'. While Thabani acknowledges that 'some felt the need to be always non-partisan', to him, BPRA was 'part of the broader opposition politics'.[41] He characterises opposition politics as involving both the opposition political parties and civil society organisations advocating for democratic change. From this view, BPRA then should not have been apologetic about its relationship with the MDC formations. The MDC formations represented the face of the democratic change that civil society and citizens were 'yearning for'.[42] Indeed, from the researcher's recollection, its early years coincided with a critical time in Zimbabwe, where the opposition and civil society were seemingly poised to succeed in forcing a democratic transition through.

BPRA's perceived alignment might have affected its appeal to some residents who in turn did not participate in the Association's activities.[43] Scholars such as Musekiwa and Chatiza (2015) argue that partisanship negatively affects residents' associations' wider appeal in Zimbabwean cities. However, for some, like Nyoni, this was predictable and maybe unavoidable as membership recruitment

> In any given platform, it's not only the function of whether the organisation is recruiting or not recruiting...it's also a function of the context... You find that people will always assess the situation to see whether that platform is likely to push their agenda or not and the extent to which they can control this space. They may also find ways of participating in that, especially if it is a movement. Movements by their very nature do not regulate too much in terms of membership, they recruit on a broad-based approach and that recruitment means you could get anyone. That means that those people that see themselves as most likely to benefit from the platform will make use of it. There is individual agency and stakeholder agency in this process because while we are talking about a voluntary organisation, we are also talking about a movement. It's a contested space, some contest it by participating in it and others contest it by staying away from it.[44]

Over the years, the Association managed to attract members from different political parties, religions and ethnic groups found in the City.[45] And 'in our meetings and actions we do not

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[41] Interview with Thabani Nyoni, 19 October 2021, WhatsApp call.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Interview with Ntombizodwa Khumalo, 17 June 2021, WhatsApp call.

[44] Interview with Thabani Nyoni, 19 October 2021, WhatsApp call.

[45] Views shared by focus group participants in all discussions. The ethnic identities were also observed by the researcher in all the meetings.

allow political party regalia or slogans or anyone to speak about their party'.[46] However, there are still challenges related to partisanship. 'Some of our residents still complain when ZANU-PF members are elected to positions...we are trying to find the middle ground but it is not easy', observed Moyo.[47] The partisanship of some members has affected BPRA in its decision making and threatened its effectiveness. During the campaign against the installation of prepaid water meters in Bulawayo, some BPRA Ward Committee leaders, who were also members of the MDC or had positions in that party, found themselves conflicted. Fayayo recalls that, 'They also did not mobilise residents in their areas for our Right to Water march and rally, we had to send leaders from other areas to go in and mobilise'.[48]

While BPRA's reputation as a non-partisan RA may have improved over the years, as some leaders reckon, it continues to be affected by the conflicts of MDC factions. Leaders who belong to different factions or who have disputes in the party tend not to work well together within the Association as well while some who perceive the leadership as aligned to a certain faction become uncomfortable to the extent of self-excluding.[49] In the runup to Zimbabwe's 2018 elections, BPRA had to request its members who were running for public office to suspend their work for the Association. This was done to minimise the effects of the conflicts between competing candidates spilling over into BPRA structures and the perception that the Association was supporting candidates from a particular political party. However, some of those who did not win did not return to their positions after the elections. This was important to some leaders as it avoided yet another 'confirmation' of the perceived conflation of BPRA and MDC.[50]

Lastly, on this issue, some informants felt that BPRA's rejection by MDC formations, on one hand, and accusations of being aligned to it, on the other, has assisted in projecting the Association as a representative of residents' interests regardless of political affiliation.[51] A view that captures the contestations within BPRA and outside it, about its role in the city and its relations with political parties, citizens and other key actors in Bulawayo is the one shared by Rodrick Fayayo when he said:

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[46] Focus group participant, Pumula, Ward 17, 3 January 2020, Bulawayo. All other focus groups and leaders who were interviewed also emphasised this.

[47] Interview with Ben Moyo

[48] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo, 8 January 2021, via whatsapp call. The researcher was also a co-organiser of the campaign and thus recalls the same incident.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Interview with Ottilia Sibanda, BPRA's Gender Secretary (2019-curent), 18 June 2021, WhatsApp.
[51] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo. Other informants, such as Emmanuel Ndlovu and Ntombizodwa Khumalo also expressed the same views.

One thing that I have always liked about BPRA is that when people see it, they always see a lot of things and sometimes the things that they see are not the things that we see. For instance, we, as an organisation, were putting mechanisms to try and stop people from campaigning [for public office] using BPRA. When we would ask all those that were campaigning to step aside, for instance, we were trying to protect the Association. When we sat down in one of our meetings, we agreed that no one from the Executive Council was going to contest for elections so that it wouldn't compromise the Association. But, you see, that was a gentlemen's agreement. Soon after we agreed [one of our Executive Council members] contested elections, as an independent candidate. When we asked why he was doing that, he said, "It's not there in the constitution. I agreed with it then but I don't agree with it now. And no one can say that they have chased me from Progressive". He was right, no one could chase him.

The next subsection will focus on the organisation's membership and growth, post its early years.

5.2.2. Membership and growth

According to the interviews with BPRA leaders, the Association has between 14 and 20 000 members across the 29 wards of the city.[52] Some researchers have previously estimated that in 2013 BPRA had about 8000 members (Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015). This may show a doubling of membership numbers in the past seven to eight years. However, scholars such as Musekiwa and Chatiza (Ibid) reckon that the membership of RAs is notably low across the country (as of 2013). While the scholars do not say what a high level of membership would be, they go on to argue that the low numbers are 'either an indictment of RAs' mobilisation capacity or reflective of low civic engagement – if not both' (p. 3). Though BPRA has grown from the poorer areas to all the wards across the city, more than 62% of its membership is still from the Western suburbs (medium and high density) of the city.[53] The Association seems to have more of its members drawn from among the poorer residents. One of the leaders, Thembelani Dube, the Secretary for Administration, attributes this to the poor's absolute dependence on the City for services while 'those with relatively higher incomes can afford to have their private boreholes for water and solar for power.'[54] In his view, the residents with

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[52] Interviews with Emmanuel Ndlovu, Ntombizodwa Khumalo, Thembelani Dube, Claude Phuthi and Ottilia Sibanda. All ten Councillors who were interviewed also confirmed BPRA's presence and vibrancy in their wards.

[53] Interview with Claude Phuthi

[54] Interview Thembelani Dube. In Zimbabwe, urban areas are still segregated into high density (former African) and low-density (former European) areas. According to some researchers, middle- and low-

relatively higher income, therefore, do not see the need to participate in initiatives aimed at pushing the City to provide services.

However, there are variations again in terms of the concentration of the Association's membership across the high-density areas. Some areas have more members than others while some have recorded a somewhat selective, issue-specific, participation of residents. Explaining this phenomenon, Ntombizodwa Khumalo, the former Chairperson of the Association pointed out that the issues that specific areas have with service delivery or property rights, for instance, made the residents of those areas join in high numbers. There are areas such as Iminyela and other surrounding areas where residents have long sought ways to strengthen their advocacy for property rights. Most residents in Iminyela live in houses that are owned by the City to which they pay property tax, in addition to rentals and rates. The houses were initially built as cottages rented out to migrant African bachelors under the colonial era. In the post-colonial era, the population increased and the cottages ended up accommodating families. The City of Bulawayo has taken long to decongest the area and transfer title deeds to the occupants. The residents have reported to BPRA that service delivery is also poor in that area.[55]

BPRA has deliberately sought to attract a diverse membership across the city. Sibindi noted that 'our members are very diverse, we have professionals like doctors in our midst, old, retired people who have vast experience in budgeting and other areas. They are assets that assist the organisation in its work, especially in budgeting and training other members'.[56] Members are made to formally commit to the Association through payment of a subscription fee and carrying membership cards. Sibindi explained that 'We have refined our approach, we now have membership cards. We do not speculate that people are members. When one joins, we ask them to complete a membership form and pay a joining fee that shows their commitment'[57]. Focus group participants who commented on the subscription fees felt that it was nominal and would not stop new members from joining and felt that this gives members a sense of responsibility and ownership of the Association. The subscription fees are said to

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income earners reside in high-density areas, mostly characterised by large family units and high levels of poverty, hence the poor service delivery which spurs protests (See context chapter).

[55] These issues were also raised in the focus group held in Ward 13, Bulawayo on 4 January 2020.

[56] Interview with Ambrose Sibindi,6 Jan 2020, Bulawayo

[57] Ibid.

be allocated to cover the costs of printing membership cards.[58] Both ratepayers (owners of properties) and non-owners can be members of the Association. Besides the registered members, BPRA officials also claim that the Association has unregistered members who support the Association's work. Those are also estimated to be in tens of thousands and spread across the city.[59]

In their membership recruitment, the BPRA ward structure leaders revealed that they particularly target vulnerable groups such as the poor, women and youth to join the Association as, according to them, they are the ones most affected by poor services. However,'One group that is difficult [to recruit] is the youth. They generally do not participate in public processes and we have had a hard time getting them to join our association…but we keep working hard'.[60] In some wards, the Association has partnered with youth organisations and/or facilitated sponsorship for youth-focused recreational activities. This deliberate targeting of the youth seems to be informed by their limited participation in the Association's activities. Some leaders of BPRA who were interviewed also expressed concerns with what they described as low participation of women both inside BPRA and in public processes. Within the association, while there have been attempts to encourage women participation, women who are office bearers are fewer than men and some also describe their contributions in the decision-making arenas as limited compared to that of men.[61]

5.2.3. Organisational structure and decision making

BPRA has six decision making bodies, a People's Convention, General Council, Executive Council, Ward Committees, a Board of Trustees and the Secretariat (See Fig.1). The Ward Committee is the lowest body, responsible for recruiting members and mobilising for BPRA activities in each of the 29 wards of the city. These committees are elected by registered and paid-up BPRA members. Only registered members are eligible to run for office. Two of these bodies have elected leaders while the Board of Trustees is appointed by the Executive Council. A ward can only elect a committee if there are at least 30 members of the Association. Each Committee has 19 office bearers responsible for educating and mobilising residents on

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[58] Zimbabwe uses a multi-currency regime whereby the South African rand (ZAR), Botswana Pula (BWP), United States Dollar (USD) and the Zimbabwean Dollar (ZWD) are all in circulation as legal tenders.

[59] Interviews with Ben Moyo, Ambrose Sibindi, Thembelani Dube and Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[60] Focus group participant in Ward 28, Cowdray Park, 4 Jan 2020.

[61] Interviews with Ottilia Sibanda, BPRA's Gender Secretary (2019-curent), 18 June 2021, WhatsApp. Ntombizodwa Khumalo, also expressen similar views.

issues such as social service provision, healthcare provision, education, transport, water, gender development, sports, arts and culture and the environment.

According to Emmanuel Ndlovu, BPRA's Coordinator, between 100 and 150 members usually participate in each Ward Committee election.[62] Once elected at the ward level, all members of BPRA's Ward Committees and the Board of Trustees sit as an electoral college to elect the Executive Council at the People's Convention every four years. The Convention has an average of 560 members consisting of 29 Ward Committees of 19 members each and six to 10 Trustees.

|	
People's Convention	• Meets once every four years, to elect the members of the Executive Council, to receive financial statements, to conduct any other business. It is also be responsible for reviewing the progress of the Association and constitutional amendments. It consists of all the members of the Board of Trustees, all the members of the Executive Council, and all the office bearers of the Ward Committees
General Council	• Meets twice a year, as the supreme decision governing body of the Association in between the People's Conventions. It consists of all the members of the Board of Trustees, Executive Council, Ward chairpersons and Ward secretaries for administration.
Executive Council	• Holds meetings once every month and where deemed necessary Extraordinary meetings may be convened more than once a month. It operates by delegating its authority to the secretariat.
Ward Committees	• Consists of a minimum of thirty registered members in any ward. Ward committees are responsible for advancing the aims and conducting the business of the Association at ward level.
Board of Trustees	• The Board monitors the operations, management and development of the organisation. The board also assists to source funding for the programmes and activities in furtherance of the aims and objectives of the organization.
Secretariat	• Consists of all salaried employees of Association as headed by the Executive Director, all of them duly appointed by virtue of and renewable fixed term contracts by the Board. They implement the Association's programs, report to donors and membership, etc.

Figure 5.1. Outline of BPRA Structures. Source: Created by the researcher.

All the elections are done through a secret ballot and by a simple majority. They are run by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a civil society organisation that advocates for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe. At the ward level, the elections are run by BPRA Executive Council members while other community-based voluntary associations such as Ozibuthe (Burial Societies) observe the elections. Civil society organisations and the media

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[62] Interview with Emmanueld Ndlovu, BPRA Coordinator, 18 May 2021, WhatsApp call.

112

also attend as observers of the internal electoral process. 'This gives legitimacy to our leaders even to the councillors of every ward. They are respected and listened to by all residents', observed one focus group participant.[63] How the elections are run within BPRA has left an impression among some members as one focus group participant said, 'By participating in BPRA [elections], we learn how to elect our leaders properly'.[64] While the elections of leaders in BPRA are said to be generally competitive and fair, there have been complaints in the past of senior members of political parties or elected public representatives such as national legislators and ward councillors buying membership cards to influence the elections. In such instances, if undetected or undeterred by the leaders, a ward structure of a political party may be wholly or partially transplanted into BPRA. Internally, while there may be conflicts over positions among the members, one informant thought that they were usually 'manageable and part of healthy competition'.[65]

In terms of responsibilities and decision making, the People's Convention is the highest decision-making body that approves the Association's policies, plans and programmes. It also reviews and approves financial and other reports from the Association's Executive Council and Secretariat. Membership subscription fees are also set by this body (BPRA Constitution, 2007). The Convention is held once every four years and is led by the Board of Trustees. In the years when the Convention does not sit, the General Council, held annually, assumes the decision-making role regarding the issues highlighted above. There are, however, additional mandates such as the appointment of annual auditors. The General Council is not an elected body, in terms of composition, the only difference between it and the People's Convention is that only two members of each Ward Committees participate in the former, while in the latter all members participate. The rest of the membership composition is the same between the two bodies.

Below the General Council is the Executive Council with its 19 office bearers (elected at the People's Convention) responsible for overseeing the implementation of programmes that BPRA runs. The EC also appoints the Association's patron who advises and assists with resource mobilisation. It delegates its powers to both the Secretariat (staff) and Ward Committees. An Executive Council member responsible for health-related programmes, for instance, holds regular meetings and coordinates the work of the Ward Committee members that have similar responsibilities at the ward level. Related to the geographic spread has also been the Association's ability to maintain strong Ward Committees that keep it connected to

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[63] Focus group meeting, Cowdray Park, Ward 28, 5 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[64] Focus group meeting, Pumula, Ward 17, 3 Jan 2020, Bulawayo.

[65] Interview with Ottilia Sibanda. Other informants, particularly Emmanuel Ndlovu, Ntombizodwa Khumalo also shared similar views.

113

the residents and inform localised responses to service delivery and governance problems.[66] The lowest structure of BPRA, the Ward Committee, forms the primary interface between the members or residents and BPRA. They meet monthly to discuss the problems observed in the ward and devise strategies to solve them.

The Board of Trustees monitors operations and the development of the Association. It also assists in fundraising for the association. For some leaders who were interviewed, the Board was necessitated by the registration requirements for a Trust, but the Association is primarily run by the elected leaders. However, the Board offers some checks and balances as it is the one that convenes the Convention where all structures account.[67] Association also has issue-based committees. For instance, in membership recruitment, BPRA deliberately targets experts, both active and retired from different professional backgrounds such as public finance, environment and women empowerment. 'Unlike the ward structures [committees] that are elected on the basis of popularity, we choose the members of the [Technical] Committee based on their expertise', explained Emmanuel Ndlovu, the Coordinator of BPRA[68]. However, such committees do not make decisions but recommend different courses of action to the Association's Executive Council and Secretariat. A Budget Backstopping Technical Committee, for instance, composed of such experts was formed to train fellow members on technical subjects such as budgeting. The Committee also formulates some of the Association's input into the City's budget. Other committees focus on issues such as climate change, gender equity and women empowerment.[69]

The Association's decision making is mostly representational as noted by Khethiwe Tshuma, a BPRA Ward Committee member in ward 10, '...the board and the executive council make decisions on behalf of the residents [members] but if it is a pressing issue that needs approval from residents, a General Council is called'. At the ward level, members and residents are represented by elected Ward Committee office-bearers. The wards are then represented in the General Council by the Ward Committee Chairpersons and Secretaries for Administration. In the case of the People's Convention, all Ward Committee members attend, as already explained above. The members and residents who are not elected or appointed into any of the decision-making bodies input into decisions through consultations held by the Ward Committees. Several focus group participants pointed out that the Committees hold public

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[66] From interviews and focus groups.

[67] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo.

[68] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[69] Ibid.

114

meetings monthly to discuss service delivery problems and possible actions to address them.[70]

'The Ward Committee then communicates with the Executive Council to find ways of improving service delivery'.[71] However, in some instances, there are localised decisions and actions to tackle ward-specific problems. Tshuma noted that 'Ward Committee members have led localised protests against the drug traffickers and the police. We also decided to invite the media to publicise the demonstration'. General Council meetings and public consultations are held for city-wide campaigns. The Right to Water Campaign in 2013-2015 is one of the examples where there were prolonged consultations among General Council members, BPRA's ordinary members, civil society organisations and the generality of residents across the City. The organisation sought to mobilise wide support for its issue. The campaign received broad support, beyond BPRA members, thus leaving BPRA with coordination responsibilities. This campaign is discussed in detail in the next section which focuses on the Association's programmes and activities.

In practice, however, the structures do not work as well as it is explained above. There may be overlaps and some overstepping by some leaders, for instance, some members of the Executive Council would feel entitled to work from the office and supervise staff. This, however, is the position of the co-ordinator and there is a clear separation of duties between the duties of the Secretariat and the governance bodies.[72]

The following section focuses on the programmes and activities that BPRA implements to further its objectives. It is worth noting that BPRA gets financial support from international donors who support work related to democracy and governance, needless to point out that this may affect the association's work. However, 'we do not allow donors to dictate to us what we should do'.[73] The only challenge noted by the Association's Chairperson, Ambrose Sibindi, is that the interaction between BPRA and donors is, from the latter's side, done through the Secretariat/staff. Sibindi sees that as problematic as it leaves the Executive Council without a full view of the organisation's finances.

In terms of its work, BPRA supposedly draws from its objectives. The first objective is to represent and support residents through advocating for the impartial provision of affordable,

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[70] Interviews with Emmanuel Ndlovu, Khethiwe Tshuma and Ntombizodwa Khumalo.

[71] Interview with Khethiwe Tshuma, Ward Committee member, Entumbane, Ward 10, 29 March 2021, WhatsApp voice call.

[72] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo.

[73] Interview with Sibindi

115

quality municipal services. Secondly, BPRA seeks to 'promote effective participation of women, youths and other vulnerable groups in residents' activities and local governance. The third one is to facilitate research and dissemination of information to the residents. This informs the association's interventions as will be seen in the next section. Fourthly, BPRA seeks to support increased dialogue between residents and public officials, while the fifth objective is to build synergies with other organisations to advance the interests of residents. The Association thus campaigns on issues such as 'poverty and corruption, and local government elections' (BPRA, 2016, ii; BPRA Constitution, 2007). The next section thus focuses on the programmes, activities, tactics and outcomes from the Association's work.

5.3. BPRA's programmes and activities

> BPRA encourages the residents to come together and share their vision of their city and also [sic] participate in pushing for service delivery. Residents come together as a collective and then in one voice say what they want the city to resolve.[74]

This section looks at the Association's core programmes and activities. These are informed by input from members, research and analysis conducted by the staff, Ward Committee members and consultants in some instances.[75] The outcomes of the Association's activities and programmes, its tactics and challenges are also covered in this section.

5.3.1. Training for residents' leaders and public officials

BPRA conducts training for its elected office holders (all members of Ward Committees and the Executive Council), firstly as part of their broad induction and subsequently on specific areas.[76] Leadership skills, conflict resolution skills, knowledge on gender equality and women development, human rights (as provided for in national legislations, regional and international covenants), public institutions and local governance form part of the materials imparted through workshops (2020 Annual Report, "Building Residents' Power Project", unpublished). According to its chairperson, Sibindi, BPRA does the training '…so that the leaders know how to solve residents' problems and to understand politics and how the systems [of government] work'.[77] In addition to the areas of training mentioned above, for the Ward Committee leaders,

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[74] Focus group participant, Mpopoma, Ward 9, 4 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[75] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[76] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[77] Interview with Ambrose Sibindi.

116

there are practical skills around their duties, such as 'how to convene and run a meeting, personal grooming and public speaking'.[78]

Some members have seen changes regarding their leadership qualities and roles in their communities. One of the Committee members thus commented, 'I had no confidence to stand in front of people, but I can now. Even when someone approaches me with their problems, I am now able to assist…where I am not able, I can refer them to someone to help them'.[79] Another BPRA Ward committee leader in Njube observed that 'We have learnt to work collaboratively with other organisations and public officials. Being members of BPRA improves our standing in the community. We gain a lot'.[80] In the same focus group, another participant credited the training and leadership grooming for producing public office bearers, Members of Parliament and Councillors, from among Ward Committee leaders. He said, 'Some members [of BPRA] have become councillors [in the past], one becomes hopeful that they can also make it into public office. While it is not the motivation for us to do work, that is an exciting possibility.'

Councillors who were interviewed for this research indicated that BPRA members were involved in their (Councillors') Ward Committees which assist with planning development projects, monitoring service delivery, solving conflicts, and convening meetings to facilitate interactions between the councillor and residents.[81] The Association has also had several residents' leaders from both the Ward Committees becoming Councillors and national MPs. At the time of this study, there were nine ward councillors and four national MPs who had been BPRA members before being elected to public offices. Six of the ten ward councillors who were interviewed confirmed that they were former BPRA members. As BPRA members, they had participated in various training programmes. Those who said that they had benefitted from the training, said that being BPRA members had given them a head start as they had a better understanding of what the residents' expectations were and knew the key roles of a councillor.[82]

 The BPRA members and the city's residents are said to have benefitted from the accessibility of the councillors who used to be BPRA members. They are said to be easier to approach by residents and more willing to account. Some have also become proactive in the fight against

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[78] Interviews with Khethiwe Tshuma, Thembelani Dube and Claude Phuti.

[79] Ward 12 focus group, 5 Jan 2020, Bulawayo.

[80] The term 'community' has a slightly flexible meaning for the members of BPRA to refer to different collectivities such as the whole ward, a whole suburb or a section of either.

[81] Interview with ward Cllr.   Shadreck Sibanda, Ward 7, Bulawayo.

[82] Interviews with Councillors Sikhululekile Moyo, Frank Javangwe, Febbie Msipha, Rodney Jele.

corruption in the city as they share information that civic groups like BPRA would not have accessed.

Regarding the MPs, the Association has also found it relatively easy to influence the legislative agenda. In 2017, one of the MPs raised the issue of drug trafficking and a phenomenon known as *vuzu* parties (sex parties for school going youths, sponsored by drug traffickers) in parliament. This was done following a request by BPRA in its efforts to raise awareness and to put pressure on the law enforcement agencies to act.[83] While this demonstrates success on the part of BPRA, it comes with its challenges: firstly, all former members who were councillors and MPs were members of MDC formations that are deemed to be aligned to BPRA (see preceding discussion, in section 5.2). To some therefore, that (BPRA's working relations with elected officials) somewhat gives credence to the views that the Association is aligned to that political party. Secondly, some members who become ward councillors immediately cut ties with, or are in a power tussle with, the BPRA Ward Committees.[84]

The informants who commented on this conflict with some ex-BPRA members attributed this occurrence to several things. Among the explanations is that, in some cases, such ward councillors have sought to influence or control the BPRA Ward Committees. Some informants also highlighted the possibility that BPRA may have been identified as a vehicle to get into public office by some who either have little or no political clout in their political parties. This is said to be one of the possible sources of conflict between BPRA leaders in the wards and ward councillors.[85] Some of the councillors interviewed as part of this study confirmed that. A view that represents most of what they shared was the one shared by ward 7 councillor, Sibanda, when he said,

> The biggest challenge we have with some residents associations is that they are compromised because some of the people in there are political people and some of them have hidden agendas in the sense that they also want to be councillors. So, most of the time they don't represent what the people would have said. They represent some of their personal interests. So, most of the time they will be trying all means to discredit a sitting councillor so that he will have a challenge when it comes to 2023 (the next elections). So, you will find that those same people, come 2023, they will be the candidates to be councillors. So, some of their information,

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[83] Interview with Claude Phuthi. In the case of fighting drug trafficking and Vuzu parties, media reports also show BPRA's prominent involvement.

[84] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo. Ottilia Sibanda, Claude Phuthi and Ntombizodwa Khumalo also shared similar views.

[85] Interview with Anonymous 2, Bulawayo City Council official.

yes, it may be from residents, some of it will be compromised. So, we end up not having a not so good relationship.[86]

Other councillors also felt that some people who lost the competition to be ward councillor candidates in their political parties, see BPRA as a platform to work against those who won.[87] The distrust between some BPRA leaders and ward councillors, especially those who were former BPRA members, was because of their suspicion that BPRA was grooming leaders to become future councillors. Rodrick Fayayo's views quite clearly advanced this view about such councillors when he said,

> In their minds, BPRA had groomed them but rejected them. So, after winning elections, they became suspicious that the organisation would groom others to take over from them. In their minds, they thought they had been groomed by BPRA to become ward councillors.[88]

In such instances, a BPRA member who assumes public office may have no intentions to improve service delivery or advance any of BPRA's interests.[89] Another explanation was that in some instances, such leaders get involved in corruption or some decisions that the residents do not view as being in their interests. When confronted by BPRA, then the relationship collapses.[90] Lastly, some felt that councillors' co-operation with BPRA is on an issue and interest basis and thus will likely remain unstable.[91]

In addition to the residents' leaders, BPRA also trains elected and appointed officials from the City of Bulawayo and other local governments. From the same report, cited above, in 2020 BPRA 'conducted a capacity development for Bulawayo councillors on Budgeting and Participatory Budgeting, Revenue collection and Gender Responsive Budgeting' (BPRA, 2020 Annual Project Report, unpublished). The objective of the training, according to the report, was to 'capacitate local leaders to be equipped to foster policies for improved service delivery through engaging appointed council officials on service delivery through a rights-based approach'. Four ward councillors and one of the city officials interviewed in this study confirmed being part of the training. A council official who was interviewed as part of this study, Anonymous 2, confirmed that 'I remember that they once trained [ward] councillors and council staff on gender budgeting and that the training had been useful for council workers'.[92] The

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[86] Interview with ward Councillor Sibanda, ward 7.

[87] Interview with Febbie Msipa, ward councillor, ward 15.

[88] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo.

[89] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo. Councilor Sikhululekile Moyo (Ward 17) also made a similar point. Anonymous, who is an official in the Bulawayo City Council also made a similar observation.

[90] Ntombizodwa Khumalo, Rodrick Fayayo and Ottilia Sibanda shared similar views.

[91] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu

[92] Interview with Anonymous 2, Bulawayo City Council official.

Association reported that there was increased co-operation between the Association and some trained councillors. BPRA's Annual project report (cited above) cites the support rendered by some to BPRA in its quest to access information that was previously inaccessible from the city (BPRA, 2020 Annual Project Report, unpublished).

The Association also runs campaigns, i.e., distributes informational materials and holds meetings to raise the residents' awareness around political and social issues. BPRA simplifies and translates into local languages, key legislation and sections of the country's constitution such as the Bill of Rights and the section on devolved governance for distribution as pamphlets. A focus group participant noted that it 'educates citizens about their rights to water, health, shelter, freedom of speech and food, and ensures that they are not oppressed'.[93] BPRA also sends members and residents 'alerts to always follow what is happening in the city'.[94] The Association also distributes newsletters covering current affairs, minutes for council meetings, and summaries of new policies. Another focus group participant commentedthat the information shared by the Association was making some difference in their community.'Now most residents can speak for themselves, for instance, ward structures [BPRA Committees] draw their own agenda in preparation for service delivery campaigns'[95].

5.3.2. Community leadership and localised campaigns

BPRA's Ward Committees hold monthly meetings with residents, 'to find out what service delivery issues are in the community. The organisation then advocates on behalf of residents...we come in when there is no movement in solving problems'.[96] A Secretary for Education in Ward 9 said the following,

> When I came into office, I went around the schools to understand what problems were being faced. One of the issues that affected children's education was obtaining birth certificates for women who delivered their children in areas outside the city, grandmothers who are taking care of their grandchildren without parents, in some cases. The registry office was demanding 'impossible things' and that was depriving a lot of children of identity documents and thus affecting their education and violating their constitutional rights. We then invited lawyers for human rights to listen to the issues and advise residents on how best to get identity documents for their children.**[97]**

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[93] Ward 26 focus group, 5 Jan 2020, Bulawayo.

[94] Claude Phuthi, Programme Manager, BPRA, Interview 15 February 2021.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Focus group participant, Ward 13 focus group, 5 Jan 2020, Bulawayo.

[97] Ward 9 focus group, 4 January 2020

120

BPRA eventually ran a city-wide campaign, in schools, to relax their demands and ensure that children's right to education was not affected while the parents were working on getting identity documents for their children. This came after research was done across the city, only to discover that the problem was widespread. In some areas, the local BPRA leaders have taken the proactive approach to 'encourage and assist parents to ensure that newborn babies have identity documents'.[98]

The Association also follows the same process for other services such as health, housing, water and others, whereby the different office bearers at the ward level conduct research in their communities which then informs interventions. Participants in the focus group in Mabuthweni, ward 13, noted that in their community they had conducted environmental programmes and 'eliminated refuse dumps in the area, we dug holes and made compost from refuse…turning some dumping sites into gardens'.[99] In Mpopoma, BPRA residents leaders had 'recently engaged the office of the resident Minister [Provincial Governor] to ensure that bus fares for Mpopoma residents were lower than in other areas because of our proximity to the city centre'.[100] Other examples include the Association's calls for residents to have clear schedules for water rationing and electricity load shedding. This initiative forced the concerned service providers to provide the schedules.

5.3.3.   Engaging with the City's budgeting process

BPRA trains and mobilises members to participate in the city's budgeting process while also calling for the process to be more accessible and open to the city's residents. Underpinning BPRA's interventions in the City's budgeting process is a view that residents are not adequately involved thus raising questions around transparency in public resource management and democratic decision making in the city (BPRA, 2016). BPRA's Co-ordinator, Emanuel Ndlovu opined that 'the city [representatives] think that the budget is too technical for the residents'.[101] In response to this challenge, the Association formed what it calls a Technical Backstopping Committee consisting of experts and members. It then reached an agreement with the city for this Committee to provide input directly to the city's Finance Department when it starts formulating the budget. In that way, the organisation influences what goes into the budget.[102] In Ben Moyo's words, 'we have developed the intellectual abilities that match the council at all levels. This has helped us to also be able to get through to the

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[98] Focus group participant, Pumula, Ward 17, 3 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[99] Ward 13 focus group participant, Byo 4 Jan 2020.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[102] Ibid.

technocrats in council'.[103] However, the Committee does not replace the members and residents. Its submissions are informed by the structures of BPRA. The Committee also trains the Association's members and residents on various aspects of the budget such as revenue, capital expenditure among others. The council employees interviewed during this study confirmed that the City shares the budget with stakeholders such as BPRA to input, as part of its consultations.[104]

In its research, the Association also identifies other challenges such as a general lack of political will to involve citizens in the budgeting process, residents' perceptions that budgets do not address their developmental needs and that budget processes are only tokenistic.[105] Thus in addition to the training for leaders and members, BPRA mobilises the residents to participate in the budgeting process. BPRA's Ward Committees distribute flyers in residents' homes and mobilises them to participate in the budget consultative meetings. They also hold public meetings to disseminate information and prepare communities for effectiveengagement with the process. The Association publicises the budget formulation process, especially the consultative meetings held annually by the city in community halls. Residents are also assisted with drafting letters to voice their views on the budget. Those are used in raising objections to the budget.[106] A Focus Group Discussion participant noted that: 'In the past, we just heard, within a day or two that there will be budget meetings [public consultationmeetings] in our community hall and we would go because it sounded important but we did not know what was going on really'.**[107]** However, in terms of the city's failure to involve residents, one of the council officials interviewed said, 'The challenge with BPRA is that if youdo not consult them then you have not consulted residents', thus implying that it is not true that the Council has ever failed to consult residents.[108]

According to members, leaders, and staff, who participated in this research, BPRA has increased the number of residents who effectively participate in the city's budget formulation process. The mobilisation of residents to attend the meetings began in earnest in 2011 after discussions between the Association's leaders and city officials to address the challenges of low levels of participation in the City's budget.[109] One of the focus group participants observed that, 'Over the years, the city had been accustomed to waylaying the residents…announcing

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[103] Interview 6 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[104] Interview with Anonymous 1 and Anonymous 2.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Interview with Claude Phuthi.

[107] Ward 12 focus group, 5 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[108] Interview with Anonymous 2.

[109] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo.

a few days before the budget consultative meetings thus giving the residents no time to prepare their input or attend the meetings'.[110] After the interventions by BPRA, there were increases in the number of residents who participated in the budget. This was confirmed by a Bulawayo council employee who was interviewed during this study. At least half of all attendants of focus groups had only started participating in the budget process after interventions by BPRA and more so after they had become active in the Association. A focus group participant in ward 12, for instance, said, 'I never used to attend the budget consultative meetings, even if I attended, I did not know what to say in those meetings. BPRA has empowered me to know how to effectively participate in that process'.

The increase in the number of residents participating in the public consultation phase of budget formulation and the quality of input was also confirmed by a ward councillor interviewed for this study. Rodney Jele, the councillor of Ward 24, noted that in his ward, 'not only the number of participants had increased in his ward but also the quality of the residents' input had made him think that residents seemed more informed'.[111] Jele is a member of the MDC Alliance and a former member of BPRA in the same ward that he represents. Furthermore, in the 2019 budget presentation before the City's Council, the chairperson of the Finance and Development Committee also said the following:

> ...the report that we received from the Budget Team leaders is that the attendance to these Budget meetings were encouraging, for example, the Iminyela hall was full to the extent that some of the residents opted to contribute while standing outside. I want to thank all Councillors, Management and Resident Associations for your efforts in mobilising the residents to attend the consultative meetings… (City of Bulawayo, 2019 Budget Speech, 2019).

Since its formation, the Association has had an active membership and the most vibrant Ward Committees in the same area, Iminyela, mentioned above in the excerpt from the budget speech.[112] BPRA's Ward Committee also actively mobilised residents in the area for budget consultation meetings in 2019.

BPRA's work on mobilising and assisting residents to participate in the budgeting process seems to have limitations in impacting residents who are non-members of the Association. Councillor Jele claims to have observed that BPRA leaders that he knows are the ones who constantly contribute in meetings. In his own words, '…in most cases, only the known BPRA leaders and members in my area [ward] show signs of being informed while other residents

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[110] Ward 26 focus group, 5 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[111] Interview on 4 February 2021, Bulawayo.

[112] Interview with Ntombizodwa Khumalo.

still remain less informed on matters of the budget'.[113]Despite the successes enumerated by some BPRA members, others still feel that the City does not (fully) consider the residents' views. For instance, one female participant in the focus group in Pumula, Ward 17 said the following: 'The budget proposal that the Council presents to us as residents seems to count as a final budget for them. No matter how much we voice our concerns, it counts for nothing, nothing changes.' She even cited an example of recent consultations where the residents were not successful in influencing the changes they sought as the City officials said that water treatment chemicals are bought in foreign currency and other service providers also charge the City in foreign currency necessitating the budget supplements that were tabled.[114]

BPRA also mobilises and prepares residents to participate in other public meetings convened by the ward councillors. These are often referred to as feedback meetings, where councillors report on issues such as council resolutions that may affect the residents, policy proposals or community projects.

5.3.4. Facilitating interface between residents and service providers

> The Council generally has no consultation beyond the budget. For instance, recently the council wanted to raise fees in their schools and they thought they can just go ahead [without consultation] when the Education Act is clear… [that they should not do that].[115] ...on other issues, their representatives only come when we, as residents, convene a meeting and invite them to come and address certain issues.[116]

What BPRA regards as limited opportunities for public participation provided by the Bulawayo City Council (BCC), have spurred the Association to undertake a mediation role between residents and public authorities. This is done through regular meetings convened by the Association's members for interactions between public officials and residents. Public officials such as councillors, city technocrats, service providers such as the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) among others, are invited to attend and address questions that residents may have. The meetings are usually around specific issues affecting the residents:

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[113] Interview with ward councillor Jele.

[114] The country's economic problems, discussed in the Context chapter, have seen the introduction of a multi-currency regime that has the US dollar, South African Rand, Botswana Pula and some forms of local currency in circulation. That situation has affected the delivery of services as also noted by other researchers cited in the previous chapter.

[115] Interview with Ben Moyo.

[116] Focus group participant, Pumula, Ward 17, 3 January 2020, Bulawayo.

> We recently were experiencing unexplained power cuts from ZESA, a high crime rate and unattended burst sewers. BPRA called all the relevant stakeholders which were ZESA, ZRP and BCC to come and explain themselves to the residents and the residents got an opportunity to ask questions.[117]

Through such meetings, BPRA has managed to facilitate increased sharing of information between residents and public officials. However, not all public officials honour such invitations. In some instances, like in Ward 12, councillors do not always attend these meetings; a focus group participant noted that 'the councillor of the area only comes when he has answers for the issues being discussed'.[118]

During one of the focus groups, a member of a BPRA Ward Committee noted that there are residents who are unable to approach the councillors directly when they have problems but can approach the residents' leaders. In such instances, the residents' leaders either assist the residents or advise them on the options available to solve the problem or which authority to approach.

5.3.5.   Voter education and election observation

Working with other organisations BPRA also conducts voter education, through the distribution of educational materials and public meetings, to encourage residents' participation in elections. BPRA also participates in the monitoring of elections. In 2018, the Association was part of a group of RAs that formed the Residents Associations Monitoring Group (RAMG). It partnered with the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) to conduct voter education and observe Zimbabwe's national elections.[119] Over the years, BPRA has had an ongoing voter education and registration programme where members of the BPRA Ward Committee explain the process of registering for elections to the members and residents. They also encourage them to register to vote and determine the calibre of leaders to lead service delivery and governance of their city.[120]

During the elections, BPRA hosts public debates for candidates competing for public office. The purpose of those meetings, according to the interviewees and focus group participants, is to build the residents' interest in elections, eliminating polarisation and making the election about the problems that elected officials would have to attend to. For the residents' leaders who were interviewed, those meetings also set a tone for the nature of relations that would

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[117] Khethiwe, Ward 11 Committee chairperson, Interview, 3 Feb 2021.

[118] Ward 12 focus group, 5 Jan 2020.

[119] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[120] Focus group participants, Wards 17 and 26, Bulawayo.

exist between the residents and the elected public officials. Their campaign promises are used to hold them to account.[121]

5.3.6. Tracking the performance of public officials

BPRA has also implemented several ways of tracking the performance of elected officials. Firstly, its members observe monthly Full Council Meetings (FCMs) from the public gallery. Ward Committee leaders and ordinary members funded by BPRA commute to and from the City Hall to observe meetings when the Council convenes. This enables residents to follow policy debates and monitor implementation. They also monitor their representatives and can engage with them effectively on different issues and their [representatives'] performance in council.[122] BPRA also uses methods such as scorecards to rate the performance of the local elected representatives. In the Association's 2020 Annual Report for "Building Residents' Power Project" (unpublished), it was stated that,

> A mobile online tool was developed to track the performance of local councillors as well as council management. The tool was developed online where residents could be able to go online and rate their local leaderships in scorecards This tool enables residents to keep the actions of duty bearers in check without physically meeting them which is ideal as the country is dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic which discourages the conducting of meetings. It has been used to feedback council on residents' experiences with service delivery under the COVID-19 context.

The scorecards are then shared with the Council and the public through the media. While the tracking of elected officials' performance is based on their constitutional mandate, it is also done against the backdrop of their commitments made during the election campaigns. The Association holds annual social accountability conferences with local and national government public officials, members of parliament, cabinet ministers and heads of government departments, where they are requested to give an overview of the annual outputs for the departments they lead.[123]

Regarding this form of work, some councillors complained about being overly monitored to the point of being unable to do their work in their wards. 'The problem is that some leaders cannot accept that as a councillor I have many responsibilities. If I fail to attend a meeting convened by the residents, that is considered a failure on my part', explains Sikhululekile Moyo. She attributes the approach to some residents who may harbour ambitions of being councillors in the future and thus see the organisation as their platform to campaign, to the point of being

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[121] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu and Claude Phuthi.
[122] Interviews with Emmanuel Ndlovu (22 february 2021), Claude Phuthi (15 February 2021) and focus group participants in Wards 9, 26 and 17.
[123] Interview with Claude Phuthi

impossible to the incumbent ward councillor. During her early days as a councillor, Moyo would forgo some 'important meetings in council' to spend more time in the ward because '...if you slacken, they [BPRA leaders] will leave you behind'. She described the relationship as generally smooth but with some undercurrents of mistrust and somewhat negative competition.[124]

5.3.6.1. Campaigns for transparency

Related to tracking public officials' performance, BPRA campaigns for transparent governance and prioritisation of service delivery in resource allocation. As indicated in chapter four of this thesis, corruption is deemed endemic in Zimbabwe and contributes to poor service delivery in municipalities such as Bulawayo. BPRA has conducted research and made recommendations to strengthen public accountability. In one of their research papers, the association cites corruption cases relating to the allocation of stands, employment of community members under the City's Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), among other cases (BPRA, 2017). BPRA has spoken against corruption and in some instances, invited the national government ministries and agencies, to investigate cases of corruption in the City.

BPRA leaders with positions within the MDC or invited to MDC-Alliance events, as they often are, also directly appeal to the leaders and members, commit to supporting the party, or even threaten withdrawal of electoral support. An example is when the Chairman of BPRA, Ambrose Sibindi, spoke against corruption and promised more support from residents of Bulawayo if the party deals with it, during the 22nd Anniversary Celebrations of the MDC-Alliance. The then president of the MDC Alliance, Nelson Chamisa responded immediately and committed to deal with corruption.[125] Some councillors who were interviewed for this study, however, dismissed BPRA's fight against corruption. For instance, despite BPRA's efforts and reports by the Ministry of Local Government, that confirmed City officials and Councillors' involvement in corruption, those (councillors and a city official) interviewed for this study describe BPRA's work on corruption as 'alamist', 'without merit' and 'probably done to please their donors'.[126] BPRA has also campaigned for the adoption of an asset declaration policy by the City, which the association reckons will enhance transparency.[127]

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[124] Interview with Sikhululekile Moyo, Ward councillor for Ward 17, Bulawayo. 16 July 2021, Via WhatsApp call. Similar views were also shared by four other councillors.

[125] NewZimbabwe.com https://www.newzimbabwe.com/byo-residents-call-on-mdc-alliance-to-reign-in-corrupt-councillors/ [Accessed 13 November, 2021]. Chamisa became the leader of a new party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) formed in 2022.

[126] Councillor Jele, Sibanda, Chigora, Mlandu and Anonymous 2, a City Official, shared similar views.

[127] Interviews with Emmanuel Ndlovu and Claude Phuthi.

5.3.7.   Strengthening solidarity among residents

In different localities across the city, the Association's Ward Committee leaders are involved in conflict resolution, both at the community level and domestic level, crime prevention, providing psycho-social support and promoting social justice. Tshuma, the chairperson for one of the Ward Committees puts it as follows: 'We help solve disputes among residents themselves, we also help make sure there are no disputes between landlords and tenants and we also help families as well that are challenged financially or those that need moral support'.[128] The Association also works with other organisations, such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers For Human Rights (ZLHR), Msasa Project, Christian Legal Aid Society (CLS), with resources to tackle these and other issues such as gender-based violence and upholding the rights of vulnerable groups such as women and children and the elderly. About rights education, one focus group participant had this to say:

> We educate residents on their rights such as 'equal rights' between men and women. However, we encourage residents to balance this modernity with their culture so as to preserve peace in their homes. The 50/50 principle does not mean that the man has to cook, he can cook on a day he feels like but should not be forced[129]

This may be indicative of the diversity within BPRA and probably that some members see the organisation as a viable platform for preserving cultural practices.

In all the focus groups conflict resolution was mentioned as one of the key roles that BPRA's Ward Committee leaders fulfil in their communities. There was also an emphasis on 'oneness', 'unity', 'peace', and the need for 'solidarity' among residents. In terms of citizens' responsibilities, most focus group participants' views were that besides paying bills, the city's residents should identify problems affecting fellow residents, especially the vulnerable people like the disabled and elderly. Claiming residents' rights, maintaining cleanliness in the city and ensuring that the communities live in solidarity and peace were also counted as part of residents' responsibilities. Given these views, it is therefore not surprising that the BPRA ward leaders are involved in conflict resolution, humanitarian responses and crime prevention.

Pumula, Ward 17, participants narrated how the residents' leaders had facilitated a humanitarian response to assist two residents whose houses had burnt down. One participant commented as follows,

> In instances of need such as disaster befalling a family, as residents, we sometimes collect money and make donations. For example, two residents had houses burnt, we collected money

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[128] Interview 3 Feb 2021
[129] Focus group participant, Pumula, Ward 17, Bulawayo.

across the community and bought materials to rebuild the house.   however, we do not only assist the needy but also encourage service providers such as the BCC and ZESA to attend to the problems.[130]

In the same meeting, the participants emphasised the importance of their leaders attending funerals and empathising with the bereaved. In one of the wards, 'BPRA also identifies opportunities for vulnerable children in the community…one way is to identify businesspeople and request them to create opportunities for them as a way of ploughing back into the community that supports their business'.[131] The members who participated in the research see the interventions detailed above as important for strengthening community solidarity. Asked why it was important that BPRA members engage in such community activities, Ambrose Sibindi pointed out 'it was necessary to overcome the polarisation brought by political parties and ensure that the association builds co-operation among residents'.[132] Emmanuel Ndlovu added that 'Our thrust is to promote social cohesion, to build a strong base for social capital where residents can rely on each other during times of difficulties'.[133]

BPRA leaders are also involved in monitoring and intervening in instances of discriminatory distribution of public resources. Moyo, one of the BPRA Ward Committee Chairpersons details the resistance that their ward leadership and members put against the partisan distribution of resources:

> 'When food aid is donated by NGOs the ruling party [ZANU-PF] leaders try to bypass the local leadership and distribute it to their members only. We have put up a huge fight against discrimination of residents by political party affiliation in the distribution of food aid. Some residents get frightened when titles such as the DA [District Administrator] are invoked, thinking that they will be arrested for calling for fair distribution of food aid. We recently went as far as the DA's office to ensure that there is no partisan distribution of food aid in our area'.[134]

In terms of fighting crime, BPRA leaders work with local police and victims to identify hotspots and perpetrators of crime. One of the focus group participants summed up the multiplicity of roles of the Association's members and leaders this way: 'Being a member of BPRA helps you where you live, even when some children want to engage in mischief, they end up censoring themselves because there is a resident leader within the vicinity, they will take action against

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[130] Ibid.

[131] Ward 9 focus group, 4 Jan 2020 Bulawayo.

[132] Interview with Ambrose Sibindi.

[133] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[134] Ward 17 focus group, 3 Jan 2020 Bulawayo. Partisan distribution of aid is one of ZANU-PF's common strategies to punish supporters of opposition parties.

them.' **(**Ward 12 focus group, 5 Jan 2020)**.** Other interventions that BPRA members do in the communities are around life-skills training and prevention of community ills such as crime and drug use among children and youths. Initiatives such as training of youths in soap making and marketing have been done in some areas such as Ward 10.[135]

The Association also uses short- and long-term campaigns to increase awareness, influence certain shifts in attitudes and behaviours of the residents, maintain pressure on service delivery providers or influence policy. Some of the campaigns are discussed in the subsections below.

5.3.8.   Initiatives to improve the City's revenue

BPRA runs two campaigns, We Pay You Deliver and Pay Your Bills, aimed at improving the revenue collection by the city of Bulawayo. In the first campaign, BPRA, together with nine other organisations, sought to encourage the city and other local authorities to pursue effective ways to get residents to clear their debt. This was informed by research findings which revealed that around 50% of debt in the major cities was owed by the residents. At the same time, the revenue from rates and the provision of water constituted significant amounts of revenue for the cities. In Bulawayo, for instance, the average contribution of water and rates was 26% in 2014 and 53.4% in 2017. The We Pay You Deliver campaign then sought to push the local authority to engage with the residents and find effective ways to realise revenue (We Pay You Deliver Consortium, 2018).[136]

The voluntary associations who were part of the We Pay You Deliver consortium, including BPRA then also noted that the RAs and civil society organisations had a duty 'to inculcate a sense of responsibility in citizens so that they honour their obligations to local authorities' (Ibid. p. 14). This resulted in the formation of BPRA's Pay Your Bills campaign, through which it sought to encourage Bulawayo residents to pay their rates.[137] Several focus group participants noted that BPRA has also assisted residents who cannot afford to pay their rates to approach the Council and other service providers and negotiate payment plans. In some instances, the Ward Committee leaders also advise residents regarding the options for settling their bills and negotiate on their behalf, with council employees to avoid water cuts.

As part of encouraging the residents to pay their bills, BPRA also advocated for the adoption of a policy that would see each ward retaining 3% of its revenue contribution. The policy was adopted by the City and the Association, in turn, monitors its implementation. BPRA leaders

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[135] Interview with Khethiwe Tshuma.

[136] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu

[137] Claude Phuti, BPRA, Interview 15 Feb 2021

noted that where the fund has been used well, there have been changes such as the refurbishment of community facilities thus probably encouraging more residents to pay. However, there have been instances where the fund has been affected by corruption.[138]

5.3.9.   Influencing decision making

BPRA has also conducted campaigns to influence policy. One of the main campaigns was done under the broad banner of the Right to Water campaign which aimed to improve water billing and cost-effectiveness. BPRA mobilised residents to protest the introduction of prepaid water meters by the Bulawayo City Council between 2013 and 2015. One of the reasons for opposing the decision was that it had been taken by the Council without consulting residents. BPRA then drove a campaign against the decision, citing three major reasons: the lack of consultation, water meters' potential to the notion of water as a human right and the meters likely dire social, economic and environmental implications as seen elsewhere. Some of the social and economic reasons that were cited for opposing the prepaid water meters included the fears that they were likely to destroy community solidarity. They were also going to punish the poor and force them to use unsafe water sources. Women and girls were also in danger of spending more time fetching water for their families thus depriving them of life opportunities (BPRA, 2015).

The City of Bulawayo backed down on the decision to install prepaid water meters owing to widespread protests and public outcry. One of the City officials interviewed for this study, Anonymous 2, reiterated the technical reasons that the meters were only meant as a pilot and for a small portion of Cowdray Park, a suburb in Bulawayo. According to the informant, BPRA, therefore, had gotten the issue wrong and 'perhaps doing it because of their donors'.[139] The resistance of the prepaid water meter installation was singled out by residents and BPRA leaders as a watershed moment for the Association. Asked what their achievements were, a focus group participant cited the 'stopping [of] the installation of prepaid water meters, the residents were heard, and we remain inspired by that feat'.[140] Others cited the successful campaign as a sign that the Association represents residents' interests as 'we realise that councillors sometimes get distracted because of party politics.'[141]

In terms of tactics, protests are rarely among BPRA's strategies. While the ones against prepaid water meters were successful, they seem rare among the Association's strategies. A

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[138] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu. T

[139] Interview with Anonymous II,

[140] Ward 12 focus group, 5 January 2020.

[141] Ward 26 focus group, 5 January 2020, Bulawayo.

participant in one of the focus groups pointed out that, 'the Association is not confrontational, we fix things discreetly and we rarely *toyi toyi* (protest). But there are instances where we have demonstrated like when we demonstrated against the installation of prepaid water metres and ZESA'.**[142]** Some participants could hardly recall being part of any protests. This was also confirmed by the leaders who were interviewed in this study. However, also equally instructive was an observation by other BPRA members pointing out that 'people are not free to protest. We wish we could protest more for many things that do not work like the high prices of food…most of the problems concern the national government'.[143]

> …we fear that we will be targeted for organising actions such as demonstrations. It is because most problems stem from national problems, for instance, load shedding [electricity shortages], shortage of fuel that affects the refuse collection, local corruption is also linked to national corruption. There is no way of fighting the local authority without indirectly fighting the national government on those issues. We have seen student demonstrations being suppressed, which generally instills fear among residents.[144]

Such fears are not in vain as there are countless cases of activists and journalists who were and continue to be beaten, arrested and jailed for being critical of the Zimbabwean government. Elsewhere, researchers like Wallman Lundasen (2015) have also noted that 'contact with politicians may be considered a more efficient means of influencing policy than demonstrations and petitions' (p. 152). In some contexts the relations between civil society actors and state actors may shape the 'political norms...to avoid direct conflicts through political actions such as demonstrations' (Wallman Lundasen, 2015, p. 152). This case, however, is different as the same participant indicated that, had it not been for the risks involved, they would demonstrate.

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter has presented the context that informed the emergence of the BPRA, its leadership structure, its mission, and its objectives. The Association was formed by activists to uphold democratic values and hold public authorities to account regarding the delivery of municipal services. BPRA has recorded a huge growth of membership and maintained strong ward-level structures that keep it connected to the residents. Those structures also inform localised responses to service delivery and governance problems. The chapter also unpacked the elaborate internal BPRA structures and decision-making levels and processes. The key highlight is that BPRA's decision-making processes are mostly representational. At the ward

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[142] Ward 26 focus group, 5 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[143] Focus group participant, Mabuthweni, ward 13, Bulawayo, 4 Jan 2020.

[144] Focus group participant, Mpopoma, Ward 9, Bulawayo, 4 January 2020.

level, members and residents are represented by elected office bearers in the organisation's Ward Committee. Some Committee members then go on to represent the wards in the General Council. It is only at the People's Convention that all Ward Committee members, not the ordinary card-carrying members, participate. The only direct participation of ordinary members in the Association's decision-making process is in the election of Ward Committees.

Also covered in this chapter are the interventions that the organisations make, such as training of their members, public officials and residents' leaders of other towns close to Bulawayo. The training is in two parts. The first one is for BPRA's elected officials there is induction training that equips leaders with practical skills of how to convene and run meetings and how to speak in public. The other forms of training are in response to capacity needs and include leadership, conflict resolution skills, knowledge on gender equality and women development, human rights (as provided for in national legislation, regional and international covenants), public institutions and local governance. Internally, as some participants attested, the training has improved leaders' ability to fulfil their roles. While the primary objective of training was not stated as that of building rapport with public officials, in 2020, BPRA shared that some of the trained ward councillors had developed good working relations with the Association. Most ward councillors who were interviewed also confirmed attending BPRA training and working with the Association. However, some expressed concerns that BPRA activists tended to be quick to share inaccurate information and were seemingly bent on subtly competing with the serving councillor.

The Association also runs various campaigns that were highlighted in the chapter. The members who participated in the focus groups had seen changes over the years in terms of service delivery, particularly the timely repairs of sewer and water bursts, regular refuse collection and involvement of residents in decision-making. The Association has maintained pressure on the council to deliver clean potable water, regularly collect refuse, protect the environment, provide public lighting, be more responsive to faults such as burst sewer and involve residents in decision making. For the residents, the delivery of such services has been somewhat satisfactory given the country's economic downturn, the city's perennial water shortages, the negative interference by the national government and deindustrialisation that has seen residents becoming poorer. The socio-political and economic context in which BPRA works seems to have a bearing on the choices of strategies and outcomes thereof. BPRA employs various tactics in pursuit of the changes it seeks in society. These include both engagement and confrontation with the local and national governments. The choice of strategy depends on several factors which include the importance and urgency of an issue, response by the city or any other responsible public official.

133

6. Chapter Six: Case Study Two-Social Justice Coalition (SJC).

6.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the Social Justice Coalition's (SJC) formation, its mission, membership profile, structures and internal decision making and its activities and programmes in Cape Town. Key outcomes from the organisation's interventions are also highlighted. The chapter also brings out SJC members' involvement in politics in their communities and the city. The description of the organisation's programmes and activities also brings out the tactics and strategies that it uses. Data was collected through several methods. A focus group meeting was held with members of two suspended SJC branches in the BM Section and Greenpoint. Ten Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted with the Coalition's leaders and staff. Two informants were former SJC leaders and six were current leaders and staff members.[145] The Coalition suspended its branches and individual members in 2019; the focus group meetings targeted the members of the suspended branches. The fourth method was the analysis of documents like reports. Fifthly, observations of two workshops held by SJC for community leaders (street committee leaders and others) of informal settlements in Khayelitsha and other parts of Cape Town also formed part of data collection.[146] For further triangulation, in addition to the five methods listed above, government reports, media articles and previous research was reviewed.

This research was conducted while the SJC was in the process of transitioning from having members and supporters to working with communities through the existing street committees and other forms of community leadership. The implications of those changes on the organisation may warrant a different study, however, they had some impact on the collection of data for this study. The implications are explained in detail in the first chapter of the thesis, under the section on data collection methods. This chapter is divided into four sections. There is an introduction, followed by an overview of the SJC, the third focuses on the programmes and activities and the last section is the conclusion of the chapter. The conclusion draws out the key issues covered in the chapter and briefly links them to the study, thus providing a transition to the analysis chapter.

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[145] There is an overlap between governance structures (leaders) and staff at SJC, see description of structure in subsections below.

[146] One was an introductory workshop where the SJC was introduced and in turn the community leaders introduced themselves and highlighted the main challenges in their communities. The second workshop focused on identifying priorities which would possibly become the areas of collaboration between SJC and the communities.

6.2. SJC's formation, mission and objectives

The SJC was founded in 2008 in response to the xenophobic attacks at the time. This action continues to inform what the Social Justice Coalition does to this very day, which is, safety, justice, and equality for all.[147]

In 2008, individual activists and different civil society organisations came together to form a loose coalition to respond to the humanitarian crisis resulting from the xenophobic violence in Khayelitsha and other parts of Cape Town at the time. Their initial aim was to alleviate the humanitarian crises that had resulted in some foreigners being displaced from their homes and left without social support systems.[148] According to Zukiswa, a founding member of the SJC, after the violence subsided, the activists saw a need to address deep-seated problems such as vigilantism that had left traumatised families and communities.[149] She further noted that 'there was also poor service delivery in the informal settlements, residents had no access to services like water and toilets. Using the few communal facilities posed safety concerns especially for women. Some were raped and men were robbed and/or stabbed while using the toilets or relieving themselves in the open spaces.[150] Related to the issues of safety werealso the inefficiencies of the police and the judiciary system in dealing with crime.[151] Those conditions are what activists like Zukiswa see as having prompted the establishment of the SJC.[152] The Coalition was set to become 'a democratic, mass-based social movement that campaigns for the advancement of the constitutional rights to life, dignity, equality, freedom and safety for all people, but especially those living in informal settlements' (SJC, 2017, p. 2; SJC Constitution, 2012).

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[147] A tweet from the SJC on Africa Day, 25 of May 2021.

[148] The activists aided victims of xenophobic violence (see Robins, 2009).

[149] Records by the Department of Community Safety Provincial Government of the Western Cape also show that acts of vigilantism had increased in Khayelitsha since 2001 (Baefele 2006).

[150] Regarding safety for toilet users, research by Gonsalves et.al (2015) found that between 2003 and 2012, there were 635 sexual assaults on women travelling to and from toilets in Khayelitsha. In relation to poor services, a 2009 survey conducted in informal settlements in Cape Town found that 61 percent of residents were unhappy with water and sanitation services. See, "Water Services Development Plan for the City of Cape Town 2011/12 – 2015/16, Final Report March 2011," City of Cape Town, p. 97, http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/Water/WaterservicesDevPlan/Documents/WSDP_2011_2012/WSDP_%2018_ %20April_%202011_12.pdf.

[151] This was also mentioned by Gavin Silber SJC's former coordinator (cited in Overy 2012).

[152] Interview with Zukiswa Qezo, 26 March 2021, via Whatsapp call.

For Phumeza Mlungwana, a former leader of SJC, the organisation is also 'building solidarity among all poor and working classes...trying to bridge the divide, the gap across ethnic groups, across class, religion, gender and race, to improve the lives of all people.'[153] The attempts to organise across the diverse groups, however, were largely unsuccessful because of the logistical challenges in reaching some areas owing to the apartheid-inspired layout of the city. For instance, Phumeza, noted the separation that still exists between the coloured and the blacks (also Kramer's argument on how the city of Cape Town is 'a series of islands', as cited in Mlungwana and Kramer, 2020).

A brief review of the organisation shows that it seeks to achieve its mission through mobilising members through branches, training and conducting actions to force public authorities to fulfil the members' and residents' rights.

> The coalition uses basic services like sanitation and the criminal justice system [as entry points] to advance rights enshrined in the country's constitution. …using advocacy and the law to push for their realisation. And at the same time SJC is trying to make sure that the people are organised and realise their power and that's about exploring different spaces for that. That could be branch meetings, workshops, conversations, or protests.[154]

The next two subsections, therefore, highlights the SJC's membership recruitment and growth. In terms of engaging with public authority, there are programmes and activities that it executed. Those are explored after the outline of the internal decision-making processes and a brief outline of how the organisation is positioned in relation to other key actors in its socio-political context.

6.2.1. Membership and size

> *The SJC has a broad-based membership from which policy and advocacy objectives are garnered. The SJC argues that the sustainable upgrading of communities can only be achieved with the full and active participation of community members (Overy, 2012).*

While the founding activists were diverse, including middle class, white and coloured leaders, the organisation mobilised poorer, black African members from Cape Town's informal settlements and townships.[155] The founding members of SJC were mainly drawn from organisations such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) to the extent that in some

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[153] Interview with Axolile, former DGS, Interview 27 January 2021, Whatsapp call.

[154] Interview with Phumeza Mlungwana.

[155] Interview with Gavin Silber.

instances 'a TAC branch was also an SJC branch'.[156] Building on that, the SJC grew and spread to different parts of Khayelitsha and beyond. Initially, all its members were from Khayelitsha's informal settlements with the organisation only expanding to the formal areas after some time.[157] It then further expanded into areas outside Khayelitsha such as Kraaifontein, Langa and Philippi in 2016[158] Before suspending individual membership, in 2019, the SJC had branches and thousands of members across several suburbs in Cape Town (SJC, 2018).[159] The expansion outside Khayelitsha's informal settlements, however, remained thin and erratic.[160]

The Coalition had two categories of membership, the members and supporters. Members were those who subscribed to the organisation's values, vision and objectives and paid membership fees. They participated in the branch meetings and the Annual General Meeting (AGM) and other decision-making bodies, through representatives. Supporters on the other hand consisted of any person who actively supported the SJC's work and shared its vision and objective. However, unlike the members, supporters resided in areas where there were no branches to join and did not have the same rights as members. They were not members of branches and did not have voting rights within the organisation. They only participated in activities that are also attended by any member of the public (SJC Constitution, 2012). The recruitment of membership was done through different ways such as home visits by the SJC volunteers and organisers who told the residents about the organisation and its campaigns. In some instances, the organisers would approach community leaders to be members.[161] 'Some residents would approach the organisation after seeing or hearing about its campaigns and then join. Nkosikhona Swaartbooi, for instance, one of the members and subsequently a member of staff, joined the SJC in 2011. Explaining his reasons for becoming a member, he said,

> What motivated me [to join the SJC] were the issues that were discussed in branch meetings which reminded me of my childhood, in terms of the injustices that I had lived in...there were no basic services in the area where I was born, crime had been normalised, I had seen people die...and there was no justice served for them. And seeing my grandmother who raised

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[156] Interview with Gavin Silber. Thandokazi Njamela, a former TAC member who became SJC's Community Organiser and subsequently Community Advocate in RR Section, also confirmed this.

[157] Focus group with members and Greenpoint Branch leaders, Greenpoint, Khayelitsha, Cape Town

[158] Interview with Axolile.

[159] Interview with Ntuthuzelo Vika, SJC's Community Support Officer

[160] Interviews with Phumeza Mlungwana and Axolile Notywala.

[161] Ibid.

me...and my sisters, having to use the bush to relieve themselves and together with other boys, playing in the bush and having to see some of our parents relieving themselves. As I grew older, I knew that something was wrong and that something must have been enabling those wrong things to continue happening...but I had no political consciousness...When I was invited to a meeting [then] I saw the value of being part of the SJC...[162]

According to Ntuthuzelo Vika, Members would form a branch that first sat as a house meeting for three months. At some point members paid a R10 (ten rands) membership fee. Non-payment of this subscription did not exclude one from participating in elections and other processes.[163]

SJC's members and supporters ranged between as young as 14-year-olds to as old as 70-year-olds. This meant that there was a wide spectrum of political views and ideas on effective ways of engaging with public authority. The organisation's ability to attract young members who later became leaders within SJC and in other civil society organisations may be the reason why some would describe the SJC as having produced some of the 'most incredible young activists' who have been 'central to the struggle against spatial apartheid and inequality.'[164] However, the age difference was also a source of conflict as the younger members and older members often disagreed on the best strategies to implement the organisation's campaigns. The older generation, especially those who had participated in the struggles against apartheid thought they knew better while the youths thought that the organisation needed to implement new strategies.[165]

As already stated, this research was conducted while the SJC was in the process of moving away from having members and supporters to working with communities through the existing street committees and other forms of community leaders. The reasons for the changes in SJC's organisational structure are discussed in the sections that follow, although an outline of the structure is presented first.

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[162] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi, SJC's Head of Advocacy and Organising and previously the organisation's Chairperson. Interview was held on 22 June 2021, Whatsapp call.

[163] Interview with Ntuthuzelo Vika, 8 March 2021, Whatsapp call.

[164] Dustin Kramer's reflections on SJC's tenth anniversary, in SJC 2018 Annual Report. At the time of the research, some of the leaders of the organisation were also members who had joined at a young age (See Nkosikhona's testimony above).

[165] Interview with Zukiswa Qezo. Thandokazi Njamela also made similar observations.

6.2.2. Organisational structure and internal decision making

The SJC has somewhat elaborate decision-making processes (see the organogram, fig. 6.1) as outlined in the organisation's constitution (SJC, 2012).[166] This subsection looks at how the members were involved in those processes before the suspension of branches in 2019. The SJC's highest decision-making body is its Annual General Meeting (AGM), comprising all the organisation's members, from the branches.[167] Its core responsibilities are to set the organisational priorities for each year. On average, the AGMs are attended by 500 members who formally adopt the priorities through branch commissions, discussions and resolutions (SJC, 2019).[168] Elective AGMs, held every two years, facilitate the election of members of the Secretariat. All members have the rights to vote on issues whenever there is a need. A level lower than the AGM is an Executive Council (EC) consisting of the elected Chairpersons and Deputy Chairpersons from each branch and the Secretariat (described below). Among other roles, the EC has powers to take major decisions in between the annual meetings of the AGM, approving the formation of branches and overseeing budgetary and fundraising strategies. The EC meets quarterly and in the previous years before branches were suspended, once it had made decisions, they were not final before being considered by the branches. That process ensured the centrality of the branches in decision-making.[169]

Alongside the EC was a Chairperson's Forum (CF) for branch chairpersons and secretaries. It was conceptualised as a non-decision-making body but 'a space for branches to coordinate and receive updates on campaign progress from the SJC Community Advocates and other staff'.[170] According to Swaartbooi, that Forum emphasised the need for branches to be supported in getting SJC members into the councillor-led Ward Committees and to attend sub-council meetings to influence development and service provision. Some SJC branch members applied and were appointed to Ward Committees.[171]

Below the EC and CF was the Secretariat, elected at the AGM every two years. It consisted of five members among whom were the General Secretary (GS) and the Deputy General Secretary (DGS). Through the GS and DGS, the Secretariat oversaw the day-to-day running of the organisation as the two were (full-time and paid) leaders of the employees. The Secretariat was elected, in a bi-annual elective AGM, by branch chairpersons only. However,

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[166] The SJC suspended its membership branches and other decision-making bodies in 2019.

[167] Ntuthuzelo Vika estimated that SJC had between 2000 and 3000 members.

[168] The number of delegates for the AGM was shared by Nkosikhona Swaartbooi.

[169] Phumeza Mlungwana, as cited by Neil Overy (2012).

[170] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi.

[171] Ibid.

140

they were mandated by their branches after consensus was reached in a nominations process. Elections were run by a reputable organisation nominated by the EC and overseen by monitors from a separate organisation also nominated by the EC. In this representational form, the leaders were elected by members.[172]

Branches were SJC's community-level structure, with a minimum of 10 members. They only became a branch after conducting house meetings for at least three months. By the time the SJC suspended its membership, it had 17 branches in different parts of Cape Town, as already noted in the preceding subsections. The role of the branches was to mobilise members, supporters and residents to participate in SJC activities. They were the space 'where SJC members meet, educate and mobilise' (SJC, 2015, p. 5). A focus group participant also noted that

> The role of a branch member was to identify the problems that people encounter in the community. They were also supposed to educate people about their rights. For instance, the standards and norms around sanitation provision, how many people must share one toilet. The branch members were expected to develop the residents' capacity… [to demand service delivery and hold leaders to account][173]

Leaders of the branch (the Branch Secretariat) are elected to office every two years by active members. According to Ntuthuzelo Vika, the Branch Support Officer, 'Members who are inactive do not participate in elections...yes, they are free to participate in the organisation's actions and represent us, but they cannot vote'[174]. The organisation used records such as attendance registers of past branch meetings to check this and the members who would have participated in less than half of the branch activities were considered inactive.

According to the SJC constitution, each branch was supposed to be led by a Branch Secretariat consisting of a Chairperson, a Deputy-Chairperson, a secretary and a Deputy-Secretary. Branches could also co-opt up to two additional members to the Branch Secretariat (SJC Constitution, 2012). The branches participated in the organisation's Annual General Meeting, however, in the election of SJC's Secretariat, they are represented by their chairpersons. In the Executive Council, the branches are represented by the Branch

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[172] From the SJC Constitution (2012).

[173] Focus group participant in Greenpoint, Khayelitsha, Cape Town, 20 April 2021. Regarding norms and standards mentioned by the participant, reference was being made to those that are set by the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) for different authorities to follow (Department of Water and Sanitation 2016).

[174] Interview with Ntuthuzelo Vika, 8 March 2021, Whatsapp call.

Chairperson and Secretary. The members' direct participation in decision-making was limited to elections of leaders into a branch and discussions in non-elective AGMs. The rest of the decision-making was representational. As already noted, however, the SJC suspended its branches and members in 2019 and resolved to work with the existing community leaders such as street committees, community development committees and others.

Figure 6.1. SJC Organigram, 2018, taken from SJC Annual Report, 2018.

6.2.2.1.   Structural changes: From branches to community leaders

In 2019 the SJC began a process of reviewing its Constitution that would lead to changes in its structure. That process saw the SJC suspending its membership branches, the EC and Secretariat and replacing them with a Board to facilitate the organisational review process. In place of branches, in the interim and during the time of this research, the organisation worked with existing community structures such as street committees.[175] These changes were necessitated by challenges around internal governance. SJC leaders and members

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[175] Interview with Mandisa Dyantyi, Deputy General Secretary of SJC and the Director in the interim period, April 2021, via Whatsapp.

interviewed as part of this thesis cited several of them. There are two broad versions on why the changes happened, what the problems were and the solutions needed.

The first view was that some of the branches had become ineffective in their work but more focused on mobilising for elections into positions within the organisation. This resulted in an unending conflict that distracted members from the objectives of SJC. Those who expressed this view argued that there was a need, therefore, to review the organisational constitution, and indeed its internal democracy. Describing the structural change, Axolile Notywala, the former General Secretary wrote as follows:

> 'Reflecting on our Constitution included interrogating our relationships with the communities we support and how best to structure our political education and engagements. An important outcome of this process is the realisation that to build democratic power and real solidarity amongst communities we work with, we must focus on meaningful and sustained organising.'

This process was necessitated by challenges that had affected the organisation's work. According to Notywala, the branches were no longer effective. 'A branch had become an autonomous entity removed from the community and [therefore] the broader things that we wanted to do with the communities were not realised', he noted. Furthermore, as the organisation approached its 2019 elective AGM, they had become sites for mobilisation for elections into positions within the organisation at the expense of the organisation's interests. There were noticeably 'high levels of participation of people towards elections but no branches at other times.'[176] To some leaders and staff, this meant that the branch leaders became more concerned about their positions within the organisation rather than the position of their organisation in the communities.

Vika, the Branch Support Officer, also cited several challenges at the branch level. According to him, the branch members had stopped doing the work they had been elected to do in communities, such as attending public meetings to voice the organisation's position on the issues discussed. The 'branch leaders were using their power within the SJC, to gain employment or financial resources, rather than outside the organisation, growing the organisation's influence in their communities'. He also observes that members had become unaccountable as some, 'were using SJC to enrich themselves, for instance applying for funding from the sub-council or other donors in the name of SJC...fundraising should be led by the organisation's treasurer'. Vika also observed that the branches had become gatekeepers who could, in some instances, block the SJC from reaching communities and the

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[176] Interview with Axolile Notywala, 27 January 2021, via Whatsapp call.

other way round. An evaluation of the organisation's impact revealed that 'many people did not know about SJC in their areas and were not attending its meetings'.[177] The organisation's actions became poorly attended and executed thus negatively affecting the execution of work.

Another view from several informants was that the organisation had structural problems that had made internal elections disruptive. For instance, the SJC constitution provided for the General Secretary to be a full-time and paid position. The timeframe provided meant that the decision was to be effective starting from 2013, five years after SJC's formation. To the holders of this view, the main problem was having the General Secretary and Deputy General Secretary, being full-time and paid yet they were attained through elections and that they would be the only ones paid out of a Secretariat of five members (see organisational structure in the previous section). Whenever there was to be a change of leadership at the Secretariat level, the campaigns became acrimonious thus affecting decision-making for the organisation. Between 2013 and 2019 (the year when the changes were made), there were two elections, in 2015 and 2017. The organisation's leaders would belong in factions and the members also remained in perpetual alliances and maneuvering to get elected or the candidates they supported elected into office.[178]

Alongside the structural challenges, the membership of SJC grew and decision making, according to Axolile Notywala (GS, 2017-2019), became more cumbersome and conflict-ridden. It was not only the growth in size that made decision making difficult but,

> [i]t became difficult to make decisions in the organisation because of factions. The EC is made up of members of branch representatives, when SJC had two branches, there were nine people in the EC. The more the organisation grew, the more it became unable to make decisions. With 17 branches, the EC plus secretariat had grown to about 40 people who were supposed to sit and take decisions.[179]

Notywala also highlighted uncertainties about which structures were supposed to make decisions. He notes that the Chairperson's Forum wanted to make decisions even though it was not part of the decision-making structure. He mentions that he had also noticed such structural problems in other organisations. He noted, 'SJC and other organisations in Cape Town have structures that mimic the unions and political parties. And for that reason, the problems that we see in political parties such as factionalism also manifest in these

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[177] Interview with Ntuthuzelo Vika.

[178] These views were echoed by several informants like Zukiswa Qezo, Thandokazi Njamela, Nkosikhona Swaartbooi, and Mandisa Dyantyi, SJC's General Secretary and Interim Director.

[179] Interview with Axolile Notywala.

organisations'.[180] The informants who shared the view above also noted that while the leadership arrangements had not been a problem in the formative years of the organisation, they became more pronounced when it grew bigger in terms of membership. Those positions supposedly became more powerful and thus more attractive.

The contrary view is that the power and resources that came with being in the GS and DGS offices made leaders become overprotective of their positions and stifled internal democracy. In the words of Philani Gebu, former chairperson of one of SJC's branches, 'the payslip would speak louder than the politics of the organisation'.[181] The protection of the positions happened mainly through the manipulation of the internal electoral process because the growth of SJC membership meant that its elections became competitive and the outcome uncertain. The chronology of events given by Wiseman Mpepho, the former EC Chairperson (2017-2019), teases out some of the problems that those who share his views saw. According to him, the problems started in 2016 when there were cases of fraud, '...some leaders wanted to protect people who were involved then the tension started, and it continued during elections for 2017 elections.' The 2017 election 'was divisive as different factions got their people in, the EC was divided'. Furthermore, '…the GS who came into office started doing things differently, branches were no longer included in the planning, programmes were now top-down, many changes were made and branches developed an attitude'.[182] In 2019, some leaders and branches called for the GS to be recalled, and 'as the EC, we had to implement that, but he responded by suspending the branches. Programmes were suspended too but the EC remained'.[183]

Wiseman felt that while the branches were supposedly suspended, '…others were still involved, for example, Greenpoint'.[184] He further shared that the elective AGM that was due to be held in 2019 'meant more uncertain outcomes for the incumbents and staff and they did not want that'. According to the former leaders who shared this view, the powers in the GS and DGS made incumbents dictatorial. As Gebu notes, 'there is no democracy, decisions are imposed'.[185] Incumbents are said to have, out of fear of losing elections, resorted to manipulating the process to keep the 'candidates who were not in their camps' out.[186] One of

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[180] Interview with Axolile Notywala.

[181] Interview with Philani Gebu, former BT Branch Chairperson (2012-2019), 28 July 2021, Cape Town.

[182] Interview with Wiseman Mpepho.

[183] Ibid.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Interview with Philani Gebu.

[186] Interview with Wiseman Phepho. Philani Gebu also expressed similar views.

the issues cited as intentions to manipulate the internal electoral process was a requirement that was proposed by some leaders towards the 2019 Elective AGM, for the candidates running for the GS and DGS positions to have certain qualifications. However, some leaders noted that such discussions were conducted as part of reviewing what had worked in the decade of SJC's existence and seeking to strengthen the organisation, rather than exclude members.[187] Such differences of interpretation by the leaders, seem inevitable, given the lack of trust that prevailed at the time.

Speaking on the same issue, however, Gebu curiously raised a suspicion that 'maybe donors also wanted them to remain in the leadership positions, I am not sure but I think people are being used'.[188] He went on to share his observations that donors 'are so powerful, they choose who to fund and what ideology to support.[189] Philani was not the only member who spoke about funding. A focus group participant had shared that the branch leaders agreeing to the process of change had saved the organisation from losing donors.[190]

SJC is funded by donors, such as foundations among other types of organisations that support civil society in South Africa. Asked about the demands that donors make on the groups they support, a former SJC staff member who had also worked for some donor institutions said the following:

> I think when you put money into an organisation, you do want there to be some sort of accountability. Right? I think some organisations are...a lot less stringent than some of the other bigger foundations, but I think most foundations want to know that there's a level of financial accountability. I think good foundations are mindful of what putting money into an organisation can do as well like how it can also cause damage.[191]

Despite this rational and somewhat reassuring view, the view that donors were responsible for the form that organisations take was also repeated by Madoda Cuphe, an experienced civil society leader who was interviewed for this research. Part of his observations was that some movements lose their identities, and, in some instances, members lose control once donors start supporting them. The pressure 'from donors for organisations to professionalise has killed movements' [sic].[192]

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[187] Interview with Mandisa Dyantyi.
[188] Interview with Philani Gebu.
[189] Interview with Philani Gebu.
[190] Focus group, Greenpoint, Khayelitsha, Cape Town.
[191] Interview with Gavin Silber.
[192] Interview with Madoda Cuphe, 2 July 2021, WhatsApp call.

In 2019, the SJC suspended its membership branches, AGM, EC and CF. An interim Board was appointed to oversee the work of a director who would be in turn, responsible for the recruitment of staff and day-to-day running of the organisation.[193] During this research, that arrangement was still considered temporary and meant to facilitate the review of the organisational structures. In Swaartbooi's view, 'the Coalition has accepted that it is not the social movement but an organisation supporting the movement of informal settlement dwellers...the function and the form of the organisation have to align'.[194] The SJC then began a process of exploring common themes to work on with the communities leaders mainly drawn from street committees around Khayelitsha and other informal settlements such as Imizamo Yethu in Hout Bay.[195] Some former leaders interviewed expressed doubts over the interim or new approach.[196]This process of change, however, as Notywala notes, may have had some challenges but it was 'necessary to ensure our organisation is strong, sustainable and that we continue to organise for bigger impact' as provided for by the Constitution (SJC, 2019, p. 1).

The implications of the changes remained unclear when this research was conducted. From the focus groups with branch members, it became clear that there were different views about the changes that the organisation had adopted. While some were circumspect about the solution, they all agreed that there were challenges that had affected the effectiveness of the organisation. One of those that were optimistic justified the changes as an expansion to work with more community members than just the SJC members. The participant sounded positive but also pointed out that the changes had affected him as he was no longer involved in decision-making and had no access to information on what the organisation was doing. He said, 'what affected me was the changes in the lines of communication. …there is a huge difference because now we just hear that something is happening somewhere without having taken part in that decision'.[197]

The impact of the changes outlined above, on SJC's work is likely to be noticeable after some time and will not be speculated in this study. The next subsection covers the organisation's position in the socio-political context as that shapes its interventions, strategies and outcomes.

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[193] Interviews with Mandisa Dyantyi, Axolile Notywala and Nkosikhona Swaartbooi.

[194] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi.

[195] Observation notes from SJC workshop with community leaders, 8 April 2021, Greenpoint Hall, Khayelitsha, Cape Town.

[196] Interviews with Philani Gebu and Wiseman Mphepo. Some focus group participants in Greenpoint also expressed concerns and doubts that SJC would become as strong as it had.

[197] Focus group discussion with suspended branch members. It should be noted however that at the time that the focus group was held, there was no clarity as to what the role of the members was going to be other than   , supposedly, attending events open to the public.

6.2.3.   SJC and the socio-political context

The SJC is non-partisan and restricts its leaders from holding positions in political parties. According to several informants, the decision to be non-aligned was taken from a position of fear of being perceived as partisan and thus dismissed for advancing the interests of political parties rather than those of their members and communities. This was important given the competition among political parties in Cape Town.[198] SJC members and community leaders were discouraged from wearing political party regalia to meetings and expressing political party views in SJC events and activities.[199] The SJC is based in a city largely polarised between the DA, which has governed it since 2006 (it also runs the province since 2009), and the ANC, which is the official opposition there, despite running the national government since 1994. While there are often several parties represented in the legislature and City Council, competition is mostly between the two parties, and it is acrimonious sometimes and affects policy implementation (see chapter four). Furthermore, the city is racially and economically divided and that intertwines with politics. For instance, Khayelitsha, with predominantly black and poorer residents of the city and most of its informal settlements, is the stronghold for the ANC while the DA's support is mostly from the middle income and affluent residents elsewhere. Some SJC activists, such as Gavin Siber and Axolile Notywala, argue that the DA does not seem to care about Khayelitsha because their votes do not come from there. One of the councillors interviewed for this research also shared the same view.[200]

For SJC, the strategy was to work with the city rather than confront it for improved sanitation in informal settlements in Khayelitsha. It also sought to mobilise middle-class support for some of its campaigns (Overy 2012). It is thus, not surprising that the leaders emphasised non-partisanship. According to Notywala, the SJC has also thrived on collaborations with other civil society organisations thus making it even more important to avoid any affiliation with political parties or their [prominent] individual members. He also added that the organisation had '...some reluctance in engaging with them [political parties] especially in Cape Town and in the Western Cape [where] the government always sees civil society as linked to one political party or another.'[201] The organisation's non-partisan stance of SJC may have shielded the organisation from being intentionally aligned to political parties but that did not stop the DA from accusing them of advancing a pro-ANC agenda. Notywala recalled that,

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[198] Interview with Axolile Notywala. Nkosikhona Swaartbooi, Mandisa Dyantyi and Zukiswa Qezo also shared similar views   .

[199] Notes from observation of two SJC workshops.

[200] Interview with Cnlr. Thando Pimpi.

[201] Interview with Axolile Notywala.

148

> The DA would always brand us ANC. Anything coming out of Khayelitsha was seen as ANC. Things got worse when Ses'Khona was established, which was linked to the ANC and they started working on the same issues of sanitation. It was difficult to differentiate who was doing what and so we were all labelled ANC. That also worsened the [SJC's] reluctance to work with councillors.[202,]

The organisation's sanitation campaign that drew national attention to the problems in Cape Town in the runup to the 2011 local government elections made the relations between the City and SJC worse. Notywala notes that 'the relationship ended up being antagonistic because...a lot of issues for us were [contentious]…. [for instance] before the 2011 local government elections most people were talking about sanitation in the country…because that started in Cape Town it made things look ugly for the City and the DA so their response was sort of a defensive one'.[203] The other issue that worsened the relations between the SJC and DA-led City and Province was the organisation's calls for reforms in the distribution of policeresources. Because 'policing is a national function and because we are in Cape Town, we were seen as working with the ANC'[204].

The SJC's attempts to engage with the City through the technocrats was equally unsuccessful as the response would always come from the politicians. The organisation subsequently engaged sub-councils 'when we started doing the budget work…[and] they would take some suggestions'.[205] Changes in the city's leadership have affected the relations that the SJC has with the city government. This has resulted in the SJC recording intermittent changes, for instance, 'when Dan Plato became a Mayor [2009-2011] we had challenges, when he left the new Mayor [Patricia de Lille 2011-2018] leadership that came in engaged with us more constructively…we made a lot of ground but we had problems later on'.[206] It is when de Lille was the Mayor of Cape Town that the SJC successfully campaigned for the janitorial services in Khayelitsha as part of its campaign for improved sanitation (also see Overy, 2012).

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[202] Ibid. Ses'Khona People's Rights Movement, like the SJC, campaigned for improved sanitation in the informal settlements. In 2014, Councillor Ernest Sonnenberg, a Mayoral Committee Member for Utility Services at the time, accused them of being 'an ANC organisation that is encouraged in its lawlessness by top leaders' this came after what the councillor described as violent protests led by them.

[203] Interview with Axolile Notywala.

[204] Ibid.

[205] Ibid.

[206] Ibid.

However, while not aligned to the ANC, the SJC almost consistently managed to engage with some ANC ward councillors. While they took the issues up, they were not effective since they were the minority in the Council. It made some residents feel like their areas were being deliberately marginalised by the DA-led City Council. In Notywala's words,

> There was a feeling from us as SJC [members] and some people in Khayelitsha that because of party politics, sometimes the lack of development is deliberate in cases such as Khayelitsha. Even when councilors take up issues to Council they do not get responded to. That looks like trying to make them look bad [because they were ANC in a DA-led Council]. It is not like councilors did not take up issues, some of them did. Some of their issues were not responded to.[207]

The political dynamics of Cape Town did not only affect SJC's engagement with public authorities but internally, there were also instances where the organisation's members who belonged to different political parties would clash over the organisation's campaign strategies, for instance, around which public authorities to target and the messaging. However, those conflicts did not affect the work of the organisation.

Swaartbooi, who made these observations, recalls two instances that illustrate this. The first one was around the campaign strategies to push for the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry into Policing in Khayelitsha. The call was primarily directed at the provincial government headed by DA's Hellen Zille at the time yet the policing function for the South African Police Service (SAPS) is within the purview of the ANC-led national government.[208] This meant that the SJC had to target both levels of government in some respect. Swaartbooi observed that, 'there were many disputes around that with some feeling like the organisation was being too hard on their party but those were just debates that did not stop the work of the organisation', observed Swaartbooi.[209] The second instance was when the SJC members who also belonged to the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the ANC clashed over the content of educational materials relating to calls for the upgrading of informal settlements. To Swaartbooi, the ANC members seemed to support the calls for the implementation of the existing

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207   Interview with Axolile Notwyala.

208 There was conflict between the ANC-led national government and the Western Cape Government. The police minister at the time, Nhleko lodged a court challenge in 2012 to stop the Western Cape Premier from including powers of subpoena for the Commission as the South African Police Service reported to the national government.

209 In 2013 the ANC complained about the Commission as having wasted money. The Western Cape leader was quoted saying, 'It is a shame that we've spent R13m plus on only a commission. We've made it clear from the start that a commission will not resolve crime in Khayelitsha.'

Upgrading of Informal Settlements Policy (UISP) while those aligned to PAC wanted the organisation to take a more radical stance and call for urgent redistribution of land.[210]

Over the years, the SJC has implemented many programmes and activities, most of which are well-documented in the organisation's annual reports. Some have been covered in the media, while others have also attracted researchers' interests. Data collection on these programmes and activities was therefore not new but emphasised themes relevant to this study.

6.2.4.   Programmes and activities

The SJC's work falls into two areas, Safety and Justice Programme, and Local Government Programme, under which various overlapping campaigns and activities have been implemented. Under the first theme, the Coalition conducts work on improving the safety of residents through calls for changes in policing and distribution of police resources (human and other) in Khayelitsha. Under the second, the SJC has focused on making calls for the provision and improvement of sanitation in informal settlements. Related to the sanitation campaign was the training and mobilisation of members, supporters and residents to participate in the City's budget process. The description of programmes and activities in this section also brings out SJC's tactics, strategies and campaign outcomes.

6.2.5.   Training for members

SJC members participate in leadership training and political education programmes and the organisation's campaign activities. The organisation has run a structured programme for branch education and support aimed at 'building sustainability and developing politically engaged and active members' (SJC, 2018, p. 8). Through the programme, the SJC facilitated 'museum visits, documentary screenings and ran courses on politics, history and society, as well as on building confidence for public speaking' (SJC, 2017, p. 4). Regarding political education, the SJC runs courses on issues such as history, urban land, radical Black feminism and politics (SJC, 2018, p. 8). In Phumeza's words, the organisation 'exists to make the working class and poor communities realise that they have some power and they could use the law for their benefit…to realise the right enshrined in the constitution.[211] Zukiswa Qezo's reflections seem to reveal this logic when she says,

> I arrived in the RR section, Khayelitsha, in 1999, and have been an SJC member since its beginning, in 2008. There were no lights or toilets. I relieved myself next to the freeway. The SJC opened our eyes to our rights and how to practice them. As residents and SJC members,

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[210] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi, 22 June 2021, via Whatsapp call.

[211] Interview with Phumeza Mlungwana, 10 December 2020, Cape Town.

we've received some of the things we've waited so long for. I'm so proud of this organisation, working with stakeholders around the Western Cape. This organisation empowered me in termsof knowing the South African Constitution.[212]

The suspended branch members who participated in this study also shared several forms of knowledge and skills that they received through the training. The knowledge of rights and the constitution was mentioned by all the seven participants and some added that before joining the SJC they did not know anything about the city's budgeting process. That was also something that they had learned and participated in. Regarding skills, the members had learned skills such as public speaking, writing, and speaking the English language with confidence. One of the participants mentioned that he had been trained in photography, a skill he could use in documentation.[213] The suspended branch members who participated in the focus group generally shared the view of the training as having been useful. One of them said, 'we learned a lot...when I joined, I didn't have an idea that we could make the City of Cape Town do something about the sanitation in our community'.[214]

Other researchers have noted that the 'critical element of the SJC's theory of change is the effort that it takes to empower citizens through advocacy, training and workshops to enable them to become actively involved in their communities' (Overy, 2012). This seems to be the point made by Phumeza Mlungwana that the SJC seeks to make communities realise that they have some power.[215] Indeed, over the years, the branch members became increasingly involved in community structures such as the ward committees (already mentioned in the preceding section), street committees and community development committees.

In terms of activities, the branches held regular meetings for members to work out campaign strategies. They also organised activities in their communities such as public debates, sports tournaments, and documentary screenings. These served to distribute information to the members and their communities but to also get views from the communities themselves. In some instances, public officials were requested to attend some of those meetings thus facilitating a direct interface between the communities and public officials but also giving legitimacy to the organisation's campaigns.[216] The branches also hosted mass meetings,

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[212] Zukiswa Qezo's reflections on SJC's 10th anniversary, in SJC Annual Report 2018.

[213] Focus group discussion, with suspended branch members.

[214] Ibid.

[215] Interview with Phumeza Mlungwana, see note 47 above.

[216] Neil Overy (2012) also makes a somewhat similar point on legitimacy and cites Councillor Sims who she has observed the SJC's engagement with the community and claimed that that has validated the SJC's demands on the City.

152

Umrhabulo sessions to discuss politics.[217] Notywala noted, 'the training and actions [were meant to] empower communities to engage with the City'.[218]

The campaigns that are described in the subsections below are examples of such campaigns and activities that the members and communities held to engage with the city.

6.2.6.   Campaigning for improved sanitation

> I am proud to be part of the movement that brought social change in many communities around Khayelitsha, a movement that gave the people of RR their dignity by advocating for clean and safe toilets…'[219]

Over the years, the SJC has campaigned for improved service delivery in informal settlements. Their main campaign has been around improving sanitation, given the challenges that the residents in informal settlements and townships face. These challenges include open defecation, safety concerns especially for women while using toilets or open spaces that are far from their homes (these are discussed in the context chapter). Zukiswa Qezo, highlighted some of the service delivery challenges in her community that made SJC's contributions important. The organiser highlighted the case of an old man who was inside a standalone chemical toilet in one of the informal settlements when it tipped over and fell because the company employed by the City did not level the ground or secure the toilets. The toilet rolled down the slope, soiling the old man in the process. These were some of the stories that were told over and over in her community and forced activists to call for the proper installation of the chemical toilets.[220]

For SJC, the 'rights to human dignity, freedom and security of the person are among the most basic rights and freedoms violated when using toilets in informal settlements in Cape Town' (SJC, 2015, p. 14)**.** Furthermore, Mandisa Dyantyi, the SJC Director, points out that the city of Cape Town:

> ...discriminates on the basis of poverty and race…depending on where you are and the colour of your skin, in Cape Town in particular, we are able to tell what your experience of government

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[217] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi. Umrhabulo is an isiXhosa concept that literally means taking a sip. In South African politics it is evoked to inspire or refer to a political discussion about a concept or cause. It was popularised by Robben Island prisoners who termed their political discussions as such.

[218] Interview, with Axolile Notywala.

[219] Thandokazi Njamela's reflections on the SJC's 10th anniversary, in SJC Annual Report 2018.

[220] Interview with Zukiswa Qezo.

and service delivery will be. If you are white, and you are in Sea Point of course, you get treated the way a citizen should be treated but if you are black and in Bishop Lavis or Khayelitsha or Delft, we know that you are likely struggling with access to basic services, you are likely to have a very hostile relationship with the police…not only because you are poor but because you are black or coloured too. We keep making the argument that we cannot keep giving life to this legacy of apartheid. It is not a secret that we haven't done away with racial prejudice.[221]

In this campaign, SJC seems to have persistently exposed the inadequacies of the City of Cape Town thus forcing them into action. However, the organisation also engaged robustly and put proposals on the table for improving sanitation in informal settlements. One of those practical suggestions for cleaning and maintenance of the existing communal toilets was for the city to employ janitors.

One of the actions done to expose the indignity that the informal settlement residents were enduring was when thousands of SJC activists queued for toilets in the city centre and middle-class areas. This also served to mobilise the support of the middle-class residents who probably had not appreciated the severity of the inequalities in the city. The organisation blended its tactics from toilet queues to marches among others. The residents from informal settlements also wrote letters to the mayor, emails to City officials, made telephone calls, held meetings and had social audits (SJC, 2015, p. 15). According to Steven Robins (2014), in the RR Section, one of the informal settlements in Khayelitsha, SJC activists set up a register to record residents' unsatisfactory encounters with court officials, police and sanitation service staff.' They also collected testimonials of residents who were attacked while walking to communal toilets at night'. The organisation would disseminate these as part of raising awareness on sanitation problems in the informal settlements.

Another effective method that the SJC used was the Social Audit. These are described as an accountability tool that provides members with the skills to obtain and analyse budgets and other official documents. The residents then audit if services are delivered as per theresources allocated and contractual agreements. According to the activists interviewed for thisstudy, the social audits were a tool that compelled the City to engage the communities and the SJC regarding the provision of services. 'With social audits…even before we conducted one, the City would rush to make improvements ahead of it. The City would tell the companiesthat we are doing this [social audit]'.[222] In the end, the City acceded to the calls for Janitors

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221 Interview with Mandisa Dyantyi, 7 April 2021, Cape Town

222 Interview with Axolile Notywala.

and employed community members under the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) in 2013.

The City of Cape Town's controversies in the provision of free basic sanitation in the informal settlements and the resultant chain of events in 2009 also gave some impetus to the campaigns by organisations such as the SJC. The City built unenclosed toilets for Makhaza informal settlement in Khayelitsha. The toilets stoked protests and litigation against the City and Western Cape Province by the community. The City lost the case and during its hearing in court it turned out that the City of Cape Town had consulted only 10% of the population of Makhaza. The matter also resulted in the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) getting involved following the community's complaints that the City and Western Cape Province had provided undignified toilets. The Commission ruled that the City of Cape Town had violated the residents' right to dignity, privacy and a clean environment and that it had to immediately enclose them in a way that upheld the users' human rights (SAHRC, 2014). Researchers like Taing (2019) make the connection between these events and the launching of the janitorial service.

The implementation was, however, ineffective thus prompting the SJC to do a social audit which 'included comprehensive inspections of 528 flush toilets and nearly 200 interviews with residents who use the facilities and janitors who clean the toilets' (SJC, 2015, p. 17). According to the SJC, the audit led the communities they worked in at the time to use the results to hold councillors to account for poor service delivery. Researchers like Overy (2012) concur with the SJC reports by attributing the City of Cape Town's engagement of janitors to clean the communal toilets and ensuring of regular maintenance of flush toilets and standpipes to the pressure from the organisation.

In terms of tactics, the SJC 'has managed to tactically combine the politics of the spectacle with the more mundane technical and bureaucratic work of making the state responsive to the needs of the urban poor' (Robins, 2014). The next subsection describes how some of the tactics resulted in the curtailment of the activists' right to protest by the City. This prompted the organisation to mount a campaign that influenced far-reaching changes in the law that impinged on the right to protest.

6.2.7. Fighting for the right to protest

At the height of the calls for the provision and improvement of sanitation in 2013, fifteen SJC activists 'chained themselves to the railings outside the Cape Town Civic Centre and refused to leave until the City's Mayor upholds her commitment to develop a plan [sic] for the janitorial service' (SJC, 2014, p. 15). This form of protest led to an arrest of the leaders of the

organisation against whom charges were laid leading to a subsequent conviction for contravening the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA). According to that law, it was a criminal offence to convene a public gathering of more than 15 people without giving notice to public authorities that it specifies. The conviction was possible because the SJC activists did not deny that the gathering took place but challenged the constitutionality of a law that was used to convict them.

SJC's litigation on the case led to the Western Cape High Court and subsequently the Constitutional Court overturning the convictions of SJC activists and declaring a section of the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) unconstitutional in 2018. 'The right to protest judgement was a huge victory for the SJC...this is something that we use to challenge the police [when they try to stop protests] to say [that] we have the right to protest'.[223] This campaign shows how the organisation has successfully used litigation as a strategy. While it was successful in this case, it took a long time and may have cost SJC a lot of time and money. One informant noted that the organisation uses litigation as a last resort strategy 'because it is expensive, time-consuming and offers no guarantees of success'.[224] However, SJC approaches the courts because they 'see the judiciary as one of the arms of the state that we can rely on because the failure is with the implementation of existing policies and rights'.[225]

6.2.8.   Demanding the improvement of informal settlements

In line with the organisation's work on service delivery, the SJC has also campaigned for the holistic improvement of informal settlements in Cape Town. Their main contention has been around the effective implementation of the national government's Upgrading of Informal Settlement Programme (UISP). The simplified guide to the National Housing Code describes the programme as concerning 'the provision of grants to a municipality to carry out the upgrading of informal settlements within its jurisdiction in a structured manner' (p. 9). According to the guide, upgrading informal settlements entails 'the provision of security of tenure, basic municipal services, social and economic amenities to residents in informal settlements' (p. 9). The programme also provides for the relocation and resettlement of people in exceptional circumstances. It also stipulates that 'where interim municipal engineering services are to be provided, they should as far as possible be undertaken on the basis that such interim servicesconstitute the first phase of permanent services' (National Department of Housing, 2009, p. 37).

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[223] Interview with Mandisa Dyandtyi 7 April 2021

[224] Interview with Axolile Notywala

[225] Ibid.

The SJC contends that the City of Cape Town 'does not prioritise the lives and safety of poor, black residents of informal settlements, but also it is unwilling to be transparent and accountable to them on decisions that impact their lives' (SJC, 2019, p. 22). The irony that lends credence to that contention is that, amidst such problems faced by the City's poorer citizens, for several years, the City of Cape Town underspent on grants meant for upgrading of informal settlements. In 2019 South Africa's Auditor General reported that, 'The situation has become serious as reports in black and white show that since 2011, the urban settlement development grant received from National Treasury had been returned by the City to the tune of more than R2 billion' (Adriaanse, 2019). An anonymous informant (SJC staff member) reckoned that the other reason for underspending on the budget was that 'to the City of Cape Town, residents in informal settlements are invisible' and in the few instances that the City makes commitments to improve service delivery in their areas, it is only lip-service as those are usually not reflected in the budget.[226] The availability of financial resources, however, is not all that is needed for policy implementation. Scholars such as Taing (2017; 2019) have demonstrated the complexity of policymaking in the City of Cape Town, including the political considerations, which may affect what the City can do.

The observation by the informant invokes two aspects that are also explored by social scientists studying informal settlements in South Africa and elsewhere: the invisibilisation and silencing of the poor. Poorer residents, often lack the means to participate in public processes as discussed in chapter four of this thesis. That is where organisations like the SJC seem to come in to make their realities politically legible (see Robins, 2014).

6.2.9. Participation in the budgeting process

The work of SJC outlined above led the organisation to focus on the City's budgetary allocation, particularly for services in the informal settlements. Mandisa Dyantyi, explained that 'it was important to know how much resources the City allocated to the container-based, temporary sanitation compared to the full-flush toilets that people wanted at the time'.[227] In Cape Town, before the budget is approved at the end of May each year and implemented in July, the City places copies of the draft budget at all City public libraries and is open to comment after it is tabled at Council in March each year. Once the deadline for comments has been met, amendments are considered and the final budget is approved by Council at the end of May each year (City of Cape Town, 2020). However, reports and opinion pieces by activists from the SJC reveal how the residents in informal settlements are excluded from the budget

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[226] Interview with Anonymous who is an SJC staff member, 9 April, 2021, Cape Town.

[227] Interview with Mandisa Dyantyi.

process. Such observations are also consistent with those made by some scholars such as Gukelberger (2018), already cited in the context analysis in chapter four of this thesis. Notywala (2016) argues that 'the City of Cape Town treats the budget process as more of an inspection and comment than a forum for public deliberation'.[228] He further illustrates the factors that constrain participation such as the limited time that the City gives for submissions and flighting of the budget on the internet thus disadvantageous to those without the means to access it. With regards to the copies placed in libraries, he observes that they are often voluminous stacks 'full of figures, tables, annexures and lists, which is very difficult to understand and engage with'.[229] Furthermore, his observations were that there was 'no organised forum in place to actively encourage and support real participation'.[230]

A telling description of the budgeting process in the City of Cape Town was offered by Notywala's (2016) opinion piece. It partly reads as follows:

> The City is currently holding what it has termed "Mayoral public meetings" on the budget. The Khayelitsha leg was held last night attended by about 300 residents. The meeting was comprised of a 40-minute PowerPoint presentation focusing on what the City has done since 2011 city-wide. Very little was said about the 2016-17 draft budget for Khayelitsha specifically. One resident asked, "What is [in] the budget for Khayelitsha that we can comment on, why are we being told about city wide allocations?"
>
> About 20 comments and questions were raised by residents but time ran out and the meeting ended before a single one could be responded to. How is this public participation?
>
> Last year, with assistance from the SJC, 502 residents from Khayelitsha, mostly from informal settlements, participated and made submissions on the 2015-16 draft budget. The City had never had so many budget submissions. The previous year there were 38, and 23 of them were from the (mostly white) public. In fact, since 2007 there hadn't been more than 57 submissions. That is incomprehensible for a budget of R35 - 40 billion that affects the lives of over 3,5 million people.[231]

When SJC raised concerns about the budgeting process, the City's responses were dismissive. The then Mayor Patricia de Lille, for instance, in 2015 said that the organisation was 'trying to impress its donors' and dared the 'puppet masters of the SJC to step back from

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[228] Opinion piece by Axolile Notywala (2016, included in references).

[229] Ibid.

[230] Ibid.

[231] Ibid.

their MacBooks for a second and answer a few questions themselves'.[232] Another DA Councillor, Sonnenberg once accused the SJC of being obsessed with budgets. The organisation later printed t-shirts and banners with the satirical message: 'SJC is obsessed with budgets' and used it in its campaigns.[233]

The organisation's 2015 annual report points to the problems described above as being part of what led the organisation to conduct its budget justice work. It then had the campaign to encourage the residents to participate in the budgeting process and then facilitated the training for activists and community members on making budget submissions. In subsequent years, particularly in 2015 and 2016, 'the SJC assisted informal settlement residents to make submissions on the budget. Over 500 submissions were made during the first year and 3000 during the second year' (SJC, 2017, p. 1). The organisation claims that in the preceding years, the City of Cape Town had only a few hundred submissions from affluent citizens. According to the organisation's reports and interviews conducted for this study, when the SJC-assisted residents made their submissions in 2015, the City was dismissive and defensive. The City, for instance, counted the initial 500 submissions as a single submission of a focus group facilitated by a civil society organisation seeking to please its funders (Notywala, 2016).

For all the informants, the participation has not yielded substantial changes in terms of resource allocation for service provision in informal settlements. The SJC, however, observed that in 2016 the submissions informed budget debates in Council. The African National Congress (ANC) councillors also protested the exclusion of submissions made by informal settlements in the finalisation of the budget. Councillor Thando Pimpi (Ward 93) recalls an incident where protesters led by the SJC forced their way into a meeting to demand 'fair distribution of financial resources in the City and they were removed forcefully. That did not sit well with most ANC councillors who also wanted to leave the meeting after that'.[234] Pimpi went on to share that such actions by the SJC were helpful to their cause as a minority in the City and had led to the DA leaders accusing the SJC of being aligned with the ANC.

Furthermore, 'the City adopted a new format for budget submissions in response to our campaign, making it easier for more residents from across the City to make submissions' (SJC, 2017, p. 1). In terms of the impact of its budget justice work, Mandisa had this to say:

> The change that I can point to is not with regards to how the City engages the people but the other way round, that is how people engage the City. When we started doing budgeting work, the level of

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[232] Ibid.

[233] Interview with Axolile Notywala.

[234] Interview with Councillor Thando Pimpi, 14 September 2021, Whatsapp Call.

participation, especially among people on this side of the City (Khayelitsha), was very low. I think the City would get like 300 submissions for all of Cape Town and that would always be largely your well-off suburbs.

In describing the work that SJC has done on budgeting, some activists used Cornwall's (2004; 2009) conceptualisation of public participation in "invited spaces" facilitated by the political system and "invented spaces" that are created by civil society. Notywala, for instance, says about the budget-making process and public participation in Cape Town, 'there are few spaces that exist [however], most of those end up being co-opted into political party platforms. For instance, ward committees are co-opted by political parties…even if people engage it is very difficult'. He concludes that his organisation's intervention was 'inventing spaces' instead of depending on the 'invited spaces'.[235] The invented spaces included public meetings in the communities, focus group discussions to analyse and formulate input, protests and marches among others.

6.2.10.   Community Safety and Policing

In the informal areas where the SJC works, the other main concern raised by most residents consulted by the SJC in its formative years was the lack of safety for the residents. Khayelitsha, a township with more than 50% of households being in informal settlements, relatively low incomes and high numbers of social grant recipients, is one of the areas with a high level of crime in Cape Town (SJC, 2018). The report also notes that 'residents, in informal settlements get robbed, raped, stabbed and killed sometimes while walking to use a community toilet or open fields at night'.[236] In that context, the conviction rate of crimes reported to the police stations is lower than 1%. Researchers such as Jean-Claude (2014) and Super (2015) have written about crime in Khayelitsha and they cite the same crime patterns as the ones detailed in the SJC report. The lack of safety, for the SJC and other social movements working in Khayelitsha at the time, was caused by police inefficiency, among other things. In 2011, the SJC and other organisations including Ndifuna Ukwazi, Equal Education and the Treatment Action Campaign called for the Western Cape government to set up a Commission of Inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha.

The Commission was finally established in 2014 after being opposed by the police and subsequently the Minister of Police's attempts to have its powers reduced. In both instances, the SJC and its partners responded with a plethora of tactics such as 'legal advocacy, mass action, research, education and mobilisation' (SJC, 2016, p. 8). The Commission conducted

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[235] Interview with Mandisa Dyantyi, 27 January 2021, via Whatsapp call.

[236] Interview with Zukiswa Qezo.

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public hearings and reviewed the operations of police in Khayelitsha leading to the unearthing of several systemic problems. The SJC (2015, p. 9) notes one of the key findings that is

> ...related to the irrational and unfair allocation of human and material resources. The ten safest suburbs in the City of Cape Town, all established largely white middle- and upper-class suburbs, with an average murder rate of 6 per 100 000 people have one police officer for every 232 residents. The ten most dangerous suburbs [Khayelitsha], all black and coloured working-class areas, with an average murder rate of 84 per 100 000 people have only one police officer for every 1153 people.

The Commission made recommendations to improve police and community relations, improve the distribution of police resources in Cape Town among others to enhance community safety. For civil society campaigns to lead to the establishment of the Commission was a huge achievement and getting the SAPS to publicly answer on their deployment, account for the poor services was even bigger. The residents also publicly shared how the SAPS had failed to investigate serious cases like rape, murder and the trauma and fear that they lived under. In Van de Spuy's (2021) view, the Commission, was indeed a space 'for (re-)engaging some pressing issues relating to the structure, function and governance of the police' (p. 331).

SJC members and leaders who were interviewed for this study acknowledged that the recommendations may take time to be implemented but SJC has kept the pressure on.[237] One of the success stories they identified was that the Community Policing Forums (CPFs) have become more open for participation by residents unlike in the past. One of the SJC Organisers has also assisted communities to form their CPFS.[238]

The Commission's significance is precisely captured by Van de Spuy (2021, p. 340) when she writes the following:

> That dialogue – overseen by the Commission – took as its point of departure the promise embedded in the constitution of democratic South Africa. The demand for humane, human rights compliant, accountable and effective policing was not negotiable. The twenty recommendations articulated by the Commission, provided opportunities for interventions that could make a difference to the police's ability to deliver a better service. The actualisation of those interventions, however, as always, is dependent on organisational capacity and political will.

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[237] Interviews with Mandisa Dyantyi and Nkosikhona Swaartbooi.

[238] Interviews with Nontando Mhlabeni, 15 July 2021, WhatsApp call. Councillor Thando Pimpi also shared his observations about SJC involvement in community safety.

While also aware of the challenges in getting the recommendations implemented, as shown in the preceding paragraph, SJC also shares the view that the Commission of Inquiry 'radically altered the nature of participatory government in the sphere of safety, policing, and justice as its recommendations require participation in areas such as school safety, provision of adequate street lighting and gang prevention' (SJC, 2017, p. 8). A Cluster Commander for Khayelitsha, whose appointment in 2015 was a result of the Commission, convened a joint forum between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and civil society organisations, including SJC. 'The joint forum contains sub-forums dealing with vigilantism, alcohol and drug abuse, road safety, youth gangs, business crime and violence against women and children'. The SJC has continued to campaign for the implementation of the 'twenty clear recommendations, which have the potential to change the face of policing and justice in South Africa, particularly in poor and working-class communities' (SJC, 2016, p. 8).

6.2.11. Humanitarian response to COVID 19

During the first COVID-19 lockdown in South Africa, individual activists affiliated with the SJC and other organisations (both in the past and at the time) got involved in the community-led response to the pandemic known as Cape Town Together. The initiative contributed to a movement of self-organised community action networks (CANs) which mobilised humanitarian responses to COVID-19 in Cape Town. Research into Cape Town residents' experiences under lockdown revealed that those whose income was disrupted by the lockdown struggled to earn a living and were pushed deeper into poverty (see Anciano et. al., 2020). Amongst many Communities Action Networks (CANs) that emerged across the City, there was one in Khayelitsha which was initially led by a group of young activists. The SJC and other civil society organisations based in Khayelitsha subsequently supported it. It educated the residents in Khayelitsha, about COVID-19, distributed personal protective necessities such as masks, sanitisers and food to poorer households who could not fend for themselves under the restrictive lockdown. In some instances, it worked with ward councillors in the distribution of food parcels from the government. The activists also supported communities who had occupied land in resisting eviction by the City of Cape Town.[239]

6.3. Conclusion

This chapter has described SJC's formation, from the contexts to the actors who were involved. The organisation started incrementally from a humanitarian response to the xenophobic violence at the time to identifying deeper problems in one of Cape Town's poorest areas, Khayelitsha. One of the main issues discovered was poor service delivery in the

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[239] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi.

informal settlements where residents had no sanitation and were thus exposed to crime while using the few communal toilets and open spaces for relieving themselves. This was coupled with safety concerns as robberies and cases of women being raped were rife and without justice for the victims because of inefficiencies of the justice system. The organisation then emerged to empower the communities and called for improved living conditions.

A robust organisational structure was developed with a view of having the residents drive the agenda of SJC. By 2019, between two and three thousand members had been recruited into 17 branches across the City. The branches were the lowest structure but had two representatives each in the Executive Council body that makes decisions constantly unlike the AGM that meets yearly. However, all members of SJC participate in the AGM directly. Many SJC members were trained in different areas such as public speaking, writing, photography and budget analysis. Besides being equipped with such skills, the members also received political education which focused on South African history, the Constitution, and various laws that were relevant to their campaigns. The members would put this knowledge and skills into actions such as budget submissions and participating in sub-council meetings.

In 2019, however, the SJC started changing its structure owing to internal challenges. By the time data for this research was collected, it had suspended its branches, Executive Council and Secretariat and started working with existing community structures such as street committees from informal settlements across the City. The SJC seems to have thrived on mobilising public pressure, starting with their trained membership. The impact of the structural changes may be discernible after some time.

Also covered in this chapter are the programmes and activities that the SJC has done in advancing safety for communities and improving sanitation services. The two major campaigns were the one for improved sanitation and the other for improved policing in Khayelitsha. The former had a high impact as it resulted in the roll-out of the janitorial services to clean and maintain toilets in the informal settlements. It also kickstarted residents' participation in the City's budget process and the right to protest campaign that resulted in a far-reaching ruling by the constitutional court on the right to protest in South Africa. The latter also saw the establishment of the Khayelitsha Commission which unearthed several systemic problems and made far-reaching recommendations. The major ones are still to be implemented, but the SJC has not given up as it has continued the fight.

In its campaigns, the SJC employs various tactics which include marches, occupations, litigation, social audits, research, opinion pieces in the media and mass mobilisation. The organisation has combined contentious tactics with engagement and advancement of research-based solutions to the problems faced by the city's poorer residents in Khayelitsha

and other areas. It has also built alliances with other organisations with different kinds of expertise. It has also litigated on some matters, however, as a last-ditch strategy given the time and resources that litigation takes.

The contexts in which it works have also had a bearing on the choices of strategies. The SJC does not have formal working relations with political parties and maintains a strictly non-partisan stance. While it has been labelled as being aligned with the ANC by the DA-led council because of the sanitation campaign which was also being used as campaign fodder for elections, that has changed each time issues change. Internally, the organisation has members who also belong to different political parties, but from the data collected for this study, that has only resulted in animated debates on issues and strategies, rather than political party-affiliated policies. This case study's similarities and differences with the first provide wide ground for analysis of what roles each plays in democratising their respective cities.

The next chapter analyses the findings and is underpinned by the study's theoretical framework.

7. Chapter Seven: Analysis—Applying theory to the findings

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis of the findings from the two case studies. It answers the study's four operational questions in line with the four themes in the theoretical framework: a) "schools of democracy"; b) increasing democratic participation; c) representing citizens' interests; and d) enhancing accountability. The impact of the political context on each association is applied as a cross-cutting theme in the analysis and is also consolidated towards the end of the chapter. There are four sections in this chapter. The first is this introduction which gives a chapter overview. The second section presents the analysis of the findings, presented in chapters five and six. Under each theme, outlined above, the section discusses whether the selected associations contribute to democracy or not, how they do so, outlining reasons for success and challenges. It then highlights the consistency between the case studies' contributions to democracy and the democratic theories reviewed for this research. The third section consolidates how the respective contexts shape the selected associations' contributions to democracy. The last section is the conclusion which summarises the key aspects covered in the chapter.

7.2 Analysis of BPRA and SJC's contributions to democracy

This section is a discussion of the findings through the four theoretical lenses that constitute the thesis' analytical framework. Per the outline of the framework in the introduction, the section has four themes. First, political skills and civic virtues, which covers the discussion on the selected associations' role as schools of democracy, examining the case studies' internal decision making, training for members, and members' motives for joining the voluntary associations. The second theme looks at the case studies' roles in improving democratic participation. It highlights both the alternative platforms they create and strategies they employ to democratise existing ones. The third theme discusses their role in representing citizens' interests. It pays attention to whether the associations broaden interest representation. The last theme is on the selected cases' role in enhancing accountability. These themes, however, overlap in the analysis of the selected voluntary associations' work. The political context of the selected sites is factored in throughout the analysis but fully discussed in section three of this chapter.

7.2.1 Political skills and civic virtues (Schools of democracy)

One of the prominent theories about voluntary associations' contribution to democracy, in the literature reviewed for this research, is that of their role as schools of democracy. Scholars

see voluntary associations as key in developing their members' political skills and civic virtues (interest in public affairs) and thus improving their participation in politics. Members learn from the interactions with each other and through involvement in decision making activities (Gundelach & Torpe, 1996; Warren, 2001; Wallman Lundasen, 2015; Fung 2003). Consistent with this theory, the findings show that both BPRA and SJC facilitate interactions among members. Furthermore, the two associations train their members in budget analysis, human rights, functions of councillors and other local government officials, among other things. SJC's branch leaders and BPRA's Ward Committee members (ward leaders) also receive customised training focused on their roles within their organisations.

Such training focuses on leadership skills, convening and chairing meetings, public speaking, stakeholder mapping and engagement and campaign planning and implementation.[240] BPRA also focuses on conflict resolution, gender equality and women development and trains non-members as well.[241] SJC members also received training in public speaking, writing and "speaking the English language with confidence".[242] In terms of the purpose of training, BPRA wants residents' leaders to be able to 'solve residents' problems and to understand politics and how the systems [of government] work'.[243] For SJC, Notywala noted that 'the training and actions [were meant to] empower communities to engage with the City'.[244] Before suspending its branches in 2019, the SJC used to conduct 'branch education and support', aimed at 'building sustainability and developing politically engaged and active members' (SJC, 2018, p. 8).

The training conducted by BPRA and SJC has contributed to members' political skills. Some members interviewed for this research shared some of those positive outcomes. A BPRA member said, 'I had no confidence to stand in front of people, but I am now able. Even when someone approaches me with their problems, I am now able to assist, where I am not able, I can refer them to someone to help them'.[245] Some have also seen changes regarding their leadership roles in their communities. A BPRA Ward Committee leader commented as follows, 'We have learned to work collaboratively with other organisations and public officials'. They

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[240] Interviews with BPRA's Emmanuel Ndlovu, Khethiwe Tshuma, Thembelani Dube and Claude Phuti. Interviews with SJC's Bonga Zamisa, Sibusiso Mdlakomo. Branch members of the suspended Greenpoint branch who participate in a focus group also confirmed these.

[241] Ibid.

[242] Members of the suspended Greenpoint Branch who participated in a focus group meeting for this study also indicated that they had attended such training.

[243] Interview with Ambrose Sibindi

[244] Interview, with Axolile Notywala.

[245] Ward 12 focus group, 5 Jan 2020, Bulawayo.

also 'hold monthly meetings with residents to find out what service delivery issues are in the community'.[246]

Another focus group participant had this to say: 'Being BPRA members improves our social standing in the community. We have gained a lot'.[247] The suspended SJC branch members who participated in a focus group also shared the view that the training had been useful. One of them shared that, 'We learned a lot...when I joined [SJC], I didn't have an idea that we could make the City of Cape Town do something about the sanitation in our community'.[248] Lastly, some also added that before joining the SJC they did not know anything about the City's budgeting process (see further discussion in subsections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3.) Besides the political skills, the comments from members also show that they have developed civic virtues, noted by democratic theorists, such as collaboration and taking up leadership roles, being concerned about the interests of their communities (see Dagger, 2009; Lovett, 2015; Putnam; 2001).

From the examples cited above, BPRA and SJC fulfil the role of developing members' skills and civic virtues that seem to deepen democracy. However, the associations' practical considerations in the selection of members to be trained, deserve closer attention. BPRA mainly targets the leaders in the Ward Committees and the Executive Council members. Ordinary members and non-members are then trained by the leaders in their wards. Before suspending membership, SJC's approach was slightly different. 'For leadership training, all branch leaders would be trained. For other things, the branches themselves [used to] decide who to send'.[249] Thus some ordinary members are also trained, alongside the leaders. Admittedly, resources may not be enough for the selected associations to train all their members directly, but the emphasis on leaders risks the reproduction of political inequalities. More so, since members who get elected in positions of leadership in both BPRA and SJC, are usually experienced, male activists.[250]

The selection of trainees from the ordinary members and non-members is also facilitated by the branch/ward committee leaders. It is a form of dispensing patronage and winning people over. With their biases, potentially informed by things such as internal factions, thus leaders may tilt the selection processes in their favour and frustrate the losing faction. In its extremity,

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[246] Focus group participant, Ward 13 focus group, 5 Jan 2020, Bulawayo.

[247] The term 'community' has a slightly flexible meaning for the members of BPRA to refer to different collectivities such as the whole ward, a whole suburb, or a section of either.

[248] Ibid.

[249] Interviews with Mandisa Dyantyi. Bonga Zamisa also confirmed that this was the appcoach.

[250] Interviews with Phumeza Mlungwana, Wiseman Mpepho (SJC) Ntombizodwa Khumalo and Otilia Sibanda (BPRA).

such a scenario may negatively impact both associations' contribution to citizenship and democracy because they would fail to eliminate categorical inequality (Tilly, 2007). However, the continuous reconfiguration of factions and the existence of internal elites is inevitable, by many political theorists like the school of elitism.

One of the enduring challenges for democratic theorists is to draw the link between members' participation in associations and subsequently in politics (see Van de Meer & Van Ingen, 2016; Quintelier, 2013). The discussion above shows that BPRA and SJC do not develop their members' skills and virtues through interactions and participation in internal processes. They only facilitate interactions among members and hope for a supposedly organic process of the development of skills but they train members and facilitate the usage of those skills in their respective cities. SJC branch and BPRA Ward Committee leaders organise communities and lead the engagement with the public representatives and participation in democratic processes (see detailed discussion in subsection 7.2.2 below). The link between the learningprocess and members' participation in politics thus seems clear.

This subsection focused on the training that the selected associations conduct and thus gives a partial picture from the findings. The next subsection focuses more on the procedures and processes that members participate in BPRA and SJC (internal democracy) and their implications for the associations' roles as schools of democracy.

7.2.1.1 Internal democracy in BPRA and SJC

Besides direct training noted above, democratic theorists posit that it is members' participation in associations that result in their democratic socialisation (see Diamond, 2004). Thus, associations must have opportunities for meaningful involvement or internal democracy (Markham et. al., 2001; Gundelach & Torpe, 1996), and commitment to democratic ideals (Maloney et. al., 2008, Portes, 2014). Both SJC and BPRA aim to achieve democratic and civic ends and they supposedly conduct their internal business democratically. Their constitutions, for instance, provide for elections and for them to be 'undertaken with care to promote gender representivity' [sic] (SJC Constitution, 2012). In both BPRA and SJC the terms of office are also clearly outlined in the organisations' Constitutions. In practice, both associations' members participate in internal elections and meetings such as campaign planning meetings where members decide on the issues to tackle, the strategies to be implemented and the target audience.

Both also have platforms that allow members to participate in decision making, such as the Annual General Meeting, Chairperson's Forum and branch meetings in the case of SJC. The People's Convention, General Council meetings and the Ward Committee meetings are some

of the spaces in which BPRA members participate. In terms of elections, both SJC and BPRA have direct and indirect elections for leaders. At the branch or ward level SJC's Branch Secretariat and BPRA's Ward Committee, are elected directly by paid-up members, through a secret ballot. For higher decision-making structures, particularly both associations' Executive Council, elections are indirect. All the internal elections, for both associations, are done through a secret ballot and by a simple majority and are monitored by other civil society organisations to ensure transparency. Realities in both associations, however, show that where these processes detailed above worked, the members got involved in processes that supposedly socialised them democratically, and where they failed, the associations' contributions to the building of democratic citizenship were affected negatively.

Members of both associations have sometimes seen elections as being manipulated by leaders to ensure the success of "preferred candidates".[251] The SJC's internal democratic challenges are worth recounting at length here: Some key informants from SJC shared that the selection of candidates was "guided" by powerful staff who were possibly worried about the uncertainty which elections of leaders can bring for job security and survival of the organisation.[252] In both SJC and BPRA, the elected leaders oversee staff and have the powers to hire and fire them. In the former, however, the General Secretary and Deputy General Secretary were also the organisation's full-time, remunerated director and a deputy director (before the suspension of structures). According to some leaders, the powers in those two offices made incumbents dictatorial owing to fears of losing elections and the positions that come with power and financial gain. That led them to resort to manipulating the electoral process to keep the 'candidates who were not in their camps' out.[253] An example cited by Gebu, one of the informants, was the mooted introduction of additional qualification requirements for candidates by some leaders towards the 2019 Elective AGM. To such informants, SJC always had 'guided [internal] democracy', meaning a restricted form of internal democracy where elections and discussions were staged to just retain a modicum of legitimacy, while the outcome was already predetermined. But as the organisation gained

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[251] Interview with Philani Gebu. Wiseman Mpepho also expressed similar views. See details in chapter 6. Ottilia Sibanda, from BPRA also pointed out that some Executive Council leaders had complained in the past that they had not been allocated Ward Committee elections to oversee as often as others, thus jeopardizing their chances of campaigning to retain their leadership positions.

[252] Interviews with Wiseman Mpepho. Philani Gebu also expressed similar views.

[253] Interview with Philani Gebu.

more members, fixing the elections and other internal decision-making processes became impossible, thus producing uncertainty that some leaders and staff could not tolerate.[254]

The contrary view from other SJC members was that the organisation's challenges with maintaining internal democracy emanated from members and branch leaders who had, for a long time, been preoccupied with elections into positions at the expense of fulfilling their roles.[255] Such members were seen to be vigorously mobilising to be elected into the paid positions, that of General Secretary and Deputy General Secretary. The discussion spaces like branches where members would participate ceased to serve their purpose as leaders excluded members who did not support certain candidates for election into office.[256] Another factor was that some staff members who were disgruntled also campaigned for certain candidates, who would, in turn, implement favourable decisions once they were in office.[257] The 2019 elective AGM, which for some, would have destabilised the organisation was thus initially delayed for leaders to find ways of preventing reviewing the rules to ensure that the uncertainties of internal democracy were bound by rules (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). It seems that when the bounds of uncertainty were not agreed upon, the SJC suspended its membership and simultaneously started working with communities while revising its constitution and hoping to solve the failures of internal democracy.[258]

The views of Markham et. al. (2001), regarding leadership, were confirmed in the case of SJC, regarding the importance of leaders' role in maintaining internal democracy and the negative effects of the internal democratic deficit on the effectiveness and viability of associations. The SJC seems to suffer the challenge of being an oasis of opportunity for income in a relatively resource-scarce context, thus turning into a site of conflict. Ironically, the financial resources from donors that should enable the organisation to conduct its work, also become a source of conflict. The seemingly skewed distribution of power and resources among its leaders also seems to add a negative dynamic. This is because, in its formalisation process, the loose coalition adopted the structure of labour unions that had some elected officials being

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[254] Ibid. Wiseman Mpepho also described it the same way.

[255] This view was shared by several key informants such as Axolile Notywala, Nkosikhona Swaartbooi, Zukiswa Qezo, Thandokazi Njamela, and focus group participants from Greenpoint.

[256] Ibid.

[257] Interview with Axolile Notywala.

[258] Interviews with Axolile Notywala, Nkosikhona Swaartbooi, Wiseman Mphepho and Philani Gebu.

responsible for both political and professional work.[259] While it may have worked for the associations, it only worked for some time before it failed at SJC.

Among other things, internal elections seem to have become a chance for staff to influence who their bosses would be or leaders positioning themselves for the paid positions. The changes that were ongoing during the writing of this thesis had suspended internal democracy. A focus group participant pointed out that the suspension of branches had affected him as he was no longer involved in decision-making and had no access to information on what the organisation was doing. He said, 'what affected me was the changes in the lines of communication. ...there is a huge difference because now we just hear that something is happening somewhere without having taken part in that decision'.[260] Some informants and focus group participants expressed pessimistic views about the future of the organisation and feared that the changes would negatively affect contributions to local democracy in future.

In the case of BPRA, one of the informants noted there had been some tension in the past, between leaders and staff, regarding what the former saw as deprivation of opportunities to campaign among members and retain leadership positions.[261] The deprivation was related to the allocation of duties to the Executive Council members to oversee BPRA's Ward Committee elections or activities. Those who felt like they had had fewer opportunities to do so, though they were being deliberately deprived of opportunities to campaign, thus fixing the future elections against them. Other challenges in BPRA's internal elections related to senior members of political parties and elected public representatives who sought to influence the Association's internal elections.[262] Internal conflicts over positions were said to be 'usually manageable'[263]. Thus, broadly, the way elections are run within BPRA has left a positive impression among some members. As one focus group participant said, 'by participating in BPRA [elections], we learn how to elect our leaders properly'.[264] This is arguably a critical attribute for citizens in a context where electoral democracy has been elusive. Secondly,

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[259] Interviews with Gavin Silber, Axolile Notywala, Nkosikhona Swaartbooi, Philani Gebu, Wiseman Mphepo.

[260] Focus group discussion with suspended branch members. It should be noted however that at the time that the focus group was held, there was no clarity as to what the role of the members was going to be other than, supposedly, attending events open to the public.

[261] Interview with Ottilia Sibanda, 18 June 2021, WhatsApp.

[262] Interview with Ottilia Sibanda. Other informants, particularly Emmanuel Ndlovu, Ntombizodwa Khumalo also shared similar views.

[263] Ibid.

[264] Focus group participant, Pumula, Bulawayo.

members saw the internal elections as giving 'legitimacy to our leaders even to the councillors of every ward, they are respected and listened to by all residents'.[265] This seems to assist BPRA's role in expanding democratic participation and representing citizens' interests, as shown in the subsections below.

Another challenge for both associations was that while, in principle, balancing gender was desirable in the elections of leadership, the process repeatedly saw the election of male activists, while women got less influential positions.[266] Thus, while internal democracy is important, it may also perpetuate political inequality. In such instances, there may be a need for the members to agree on corrective measures, whether democratic or not. Overall, the challenges detailed above may decrease trust among members and negatively affect the associations' role as schools of democracy. Both cases seem to confirm theorists' emphasis on the need for voluntary associations to be internally democratic. The selected case studies' role as schools of democracy seems to be relatively positive when internal democracy works and negative when it fails.

The next subsection teases out the characteristics of the associations' membership in relation to their role in developing political skills and civic virtues.

7.2.1.2 Schools or pools of democracy?

Are the selected associations schools of democracy or pools of democracy that mobilise the 'usual suspects'? There is ongoing scholarly debate on whether associations mobilise members who already possess political skills and virtues thus becoming pools rather than schools of democracy (Van de Meer & Van Ingen, 2009; 2016 Quintelier, 2013). The concept of 'usual suspects', from Bryson et. al. (2013) also describes 'people who are easily recruited, vocal and reasonably comfortable in public arenas', and are likely to be the only ones included in participatory processes (p. 29). From the findings in this thesis, BPRA and the SJC seem to be both pools and schools of democracy, and that attribute seems to have both positive and negative effects on their contributions to democracy and citizenship.

To illustrate the point above, both case studies have membership overlaps with political parties and other voluntary associations in their contexts. Some of those may have similar effects on members as BPRA and SJC. In the case of BPRA, the activists (unionists, former student activists, women groups, water activists, etc), who founded the association, initially recruited

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[265] Focus group participant, Cowdray Park, Bulawayo.

[266] Interviews with Wiseman (SJC) and Ntombizodwa and Ottilia (BPRA).

their contacts, some if not most of whom were already activists .[267] SJC was established through the membership of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).[268] As both associations grew, they attracted members from outside political parties and existing associations, i.e., inexperienced activists rather than the usual suspects.

While this already shows a mixture of usual suspects and probably inexperienced members, a few factors still need to be considered. One of them is that of desocialisation, i.e., the erosion of socialisation effects after members cease participation in voluntary associations (Van de Meer & Van Ingen, 2016). So, some members who may have been members of previous associations may have lost the skills and civic virtues by the time they joined BPRA or SJC. Another factor is that of the graduality of socialisation as noted by Stolle (1998). It is thus also possible that members of the selected cases may not have participated long enough in their previous or concurrent associations to learn pro-democratic political skills and civic virtues. Even worse, they may have been members of associations that either have poor internal or may not be autonomous from either the state or political parties and not ideal to be schools of democracy. These three could not be established from the data, however, what is becoming clear is that the selected case studies may be both schools and pools for democracy.

Furthermore, the data showed that most, if not all members of BPRA and SJC, join because of some objectives of their own, which include wanting to participate in political discourse as observed by Van de Meer and Van Ingen (2009; 2016). There are four types of joiners for the selected associations, who can be looked at from at least two dimensions: prior involvement with other civic groups, or campaigns outside any structured movement or organisations, and motive for joining the current one. Of the four, the first type is that of members who were activists before joining SJC or BPRA and they joined because they saw them as spaces for fulfilling their citizenship role. While some of these members joined proactively and thus, may be considered usual suspects, even though their personality traits were not established from the data collected. An example of such a member is Philani Gebu, who was a student leader and 'did not want to participate in party politics after university' and then 'I identified SJC as an organisation where I could be active in politics but not partisan politics'.[269]

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[267] Interviews with Rodrick Fayayo and Ambrose Sibindi. The researcher was also part of the founding members and thus reflections from that experience were consistent with the observations by the two informants.

[268] Interviews with Gavin Silber and Thandokazi Njamela.

[269] Interview with Philani Gebu.

The second type is that of members who were activists on issues that were similar or related to those of the selected case studies, and seemingly sought to either strengthen their activism or shift to a more formal organisation. Ntombizodwa Khumalo, from BPRA, joined the Association because, 'I wanted to participate as a resident but to also gain skills to assist women back in my community, in Nketa, to assert themselves in community meetings'.[270] A slightly different case is that of SJC members like Wiseman Mpepho who was already 'involved in different struggles' for the provision of housing and services for Khayelitsha residents in the informal settlement, as an individual. He said, 'I joined because I was [already] active'.[271] Thirdly, some joined as youths and had no prior involvement but saw the association as representing their concerns. Nkosikhona Swaartboi, who joined SJC as a young man without any activist experience, belongs to this group.[272] The fourth type is of those that were involved and/or already had positions in political party structures. Some may have joined for the opportunity to "use" BPRA to fulfil political ambitions in the future while others may have been initially driven only by their usual suspect status (see discussion in chapter 6).[273]

As noted in chapter five, some BPRA members have become ward councillors and national members of parliament. Ten ward councillors were interviewed for this study. Out of those, five shared that they had been part of BPRA before being elected to public office. However, all who became councillors had also been MDC members before joining BPRA.[274] Only two councillors, who were elected while being members of BPRA, indicated that their membership in the association had played a part in their decision to run for political office and aided the campaigns thereafter. One of them shared that, 'When I joined [BPRA], I already had a position in my party [MDC-T]… I decided to run [for elections] towards the end of my term of office as Treasurer [for BPRA's Ward 13 Committee]'. He also shared that 'When I campaigned it became easier because residents already knew me as they had seen me working in the community as part of BPRA leadership'.[275] This is possibly the reason why some BPRA leaders conclude that some members, who eventually run for political office join the association to horn their skills and gather support for their political interests.

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[270] Interview with Ntombizodwa Khumalo.

[271] Interview with Wiseman Mpepo.

[272] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi. Refer to subsection 6.2.1 in the previous chapter.

[273] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo.

[274] The MDC has split into various formations or factions over the past two decades, as pointed out in the previous chapters.

[275] Interview with Councillor Frank Javangwe, ward 13.

Another councillor shared that she was not only a BPRA member (for nearly ten years) but was also involved in two School Development Committees (SDCs). She joined BPRA because, '…of its programmes; it was campaigning for the things that we wanted to see as residents and the way it puts pressure on the council to respond to residents' demands'.[276] She also shared that the skills she learned and the leadership role she had fulfilled, as a member of the BPRA ward committee, 'is part of what made me decide to be a candidate [for council elections]'.[277] Other members who also see the opportunities to run for public office, however, pointed out that 'While it is an exciting possibility, it is not the reason for joining the association or motivation for us to do work'.[278] While BPRA does 'not have a programme for training councillors [to-be], we only concentrate on training and producing leaders, we don't mind what they become'[279], it produces political leaders and contributes to democracy (Diamond, 1994). SJC on the other hand produces civil society leaders 'who have been central to the struggle against spatial apartheid and inequality.'[280]

Back to the question of whether the two associations are schools or pools of democracy, there is one more important angle to look through. While some members may have been active in some associations before joining BPRA or SJC, most of those who participated in the focus groups for this research shared that they had either not been leaders before in their communities, did not know their rights, or were not politically active beforehand. The usual suspects may gain different skills or find a space to either grow those they already have or better still, put them into use, thus "learning more by doing". So, how does that profile of membership affect the selected associations' contributions to citizenship and democracy? The identification of SJC and BPRA, by some would-be members, confirms the selected associations' reputation as spaces for developing civic virtues and political skills. This is also combined with the testimonials from members, already highlighted in the preceding paragraphs. Despite the challenges outlined above, the selected associations play a significant role in building active citizens in their respective cities.

While Van de Meer and Van Ingen's (2009; 2016) theory about pools of democracy is partially confirmed in this study, it does not seem to negatively affect the selected associations' role as schools of democracy and their overall contribution to democracy. BPRA and SJC build democratic citizenship, and in the former's context, several members have become local and

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[276] Interview with Councillor Skhululekile Moyo, ward 17.

[277] Interview with Minyela councillor

[278] Focus group participants in Njube and Mpopoma focus groups.

[279] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[280] Dustin Kramer's reflections on SJC's tenth anniversary, in SJC 2018 Annual Report.

national political leaders. Producing political leaders is a form of contribution to democracy (see Diamond, 1994). Both associations recruit members, train them and facilitate their participation in politics and thus undoubtedly fulfil the role as schools of democracy. The next subsection focuses on the case studies' role in improving democratic participation.

7.2.2 Improving democratic participation

Voluntary associations create and support public and inclusive spheres for citizen participation in the discussion of social problems and formulation of opinions and preferences. The views from those spaces then inform public policy (Warren, 2001; Fung, 2003; Stokke, 2015). They also disrupt existing inequalities and facilitate equal participation among citizens (Kim, 2014). However, some scholars have highlighted that voluntary associations may replicate the inequalities in society as they attract certain groups, for instance, those with high levels of income, resources such as time, thus excluding others (Compion, 2017). This subsection looks at whether BPRA and SJC broaden citizen participation in democratic processes. It also examines the case studies' role in line with the definition of participation as 'the equalisation of power relations between privileged and non-privileged actors in formal or informal decision-making processes' (Carpentier, 2016, p. 72). Thus, the focus is on whether BPRA and SJC's role in improving democratic participation increase citizens' influence in decision making.

The findings show that both BPRA and SJC, organise their members and non-members to participate in existing public platforms and processes and that both create alternative spheres for citizen participation. The main democratic process led by both cities is the budgeting process. Both associations train members and organise residents to participate in various stages of their cities' budgeting processes. During consultations, they publicise the process among members and their communities and prepare them for effective engagement. BPRA and SJC leaders have noted similar challenges of inadequate citizen involvement in the cities budgeting process, thus prompting the associations' responses. Explaining the logic for SJC's intervention, Notywala (2016) notes that the City of Cape Town treats the budgeting process '…as more of an inspection and comment than a forum for public deliberation'.[281] In Bulawayo, Emmanuel Ndlovu, from BPRA, also argued that 'The City [representatives] think that the budget is too technical for the residents hence their exclusion.[282] The budget analysis and

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[281] Opinion piece by Axolile Notywala (2016, included in references).

[282] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu. See chapter five.

(objection letter) writing skills, highlighted in the previous subsection, enable residents to voice their views on the city budget.[283]

Already cited in the findings are some members' admissions from both associations, that they had not participated in budgets before and had no skills or other means to influence it before being trained and/or becoming members (see discussion in chapters five and six of this thesis). A BPRA member participating in a focus group for this research said the following: 'Inthe past, we just heard, within a day or two that there will be budget meetings [public consultation meetings] in our community hall and we would go because it sounded importantbut we did not know what was going on really'.[284] SJC's branch members who participated ina focus group for this research said that they did not know anything about the city's budgetingprocess before joining the SJC. It was something that they had learned and participated in asmembers of the association.

The organising work done by SJC and BPRA has increased the number of residents who participate in their respective cities' budget formulation processes. In Cape Town, for instance, in 2015 and 2016, 'the SJC assisted informal settlement residents to make submissions on the budget. Over 500 submissions were made during the first year and 3000 during the second year' (SJC, 2017, p. 1). Besides increasing the number of citizens participating in the process, SJC also influenced the City of Cape Town to change its approach and make it more open for participation (SJC, 2017). SJC claims that in the preceding years, the City of Cape Town only had a few hundred submissions from affluent citizens. Explaining the interventions noted above, one informant added that, 'when we started doing budgeting work the level of participation, especially among people on this side of the City [Khayelitsha], was very low. I think the City [of Cape Town] would get like 300 submissions for all of Cape Town and that would always be largely your well-off suburbs.[285] BPRA has also observed that, over the years, the numbers of residents who attended budget consultative meetings increased owing to their organising work. This seems like a relatively huge contribution to the development of citizenship and strengthening democracy.

Apart from organising their members to participate in the city-led budget consultations, which both associations see as not giving enough opportunity for effective citizen involvement in the budgeting process, BPRA and SJC create alternative spaces. They convene workshops,

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[283] Interview with Claude Phuthi (BPRA) and SJC's Axolile Notywala, Mandisa Dyantyi. Focus group participants from SJC's suspended membership also shared the same experiences.

[284] Ward 12 focus group, 5 January 2020, Bulawayo.

[285] Interview with Mandisa Dyantyi.

meetings and other platforms for members and non-members to formulate their views and devise ways to submit them to the elected public representatives or city officials. The submissions are then made through letters, petitions and other strategies. One of the key informants from the SJC, Notywala noted that,

> there are few spaces that exist [however], most of those end up being co-opted into political party platforms. For instance, ward committees are co-opted by political parties…even if people engage it is very difficult...we ended up inventing spaces instead of depending on the invited spaces.[286]

Such problems have also been noted by scholars such as Piper and Deacon (2009). Both BPRA and SJC create alternative spheres to the formal ones, as noted in the paragraphs above. This seems to confirm theorists like Cornwall's (2002; 2004) view that the failures of the state, city governments in this case, to effectively facilitate democratic participation through the 'invited spaces' results in the 'organic' or 'invented spaces' created by citizens 'from below' (Cornwall, 2002, p. 17). Thus, the view from one of the informants from SJC seems profound. When asked about the changes that her organisations had noted she said the following: 'The change that I can point to is not with regards to how the City engages the people but the other way round, that is how people engage the City'.[287]

The two associations also seem to disrupt the existing inequalities in their cities as they organise poorer residents who would probably not have participated in some of the city-led democratic processes on their own. Thus, given how the spaces created by both BPRA and SJC seem to rupture the existing marginalisation, one could see them as what Fraser (1990) called subaltern counterpublics. Fraser defined them as 'parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs' (p. 67). The subaltern counterpublics created by the case studies seem to attract the excluded citizens and enable them to generate alternative views about what the budget must look like. In the informal settlements, where SJC organises, the City of Cape Town seems to make limited efforts to ensure participation. For instance, as part of public consultations, it provides copies of the draft budget for review by the City's residents in community halls and libraries. That approach potentially minimises opportunities for participation by residents in some informal settlements without such amenities.

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[286] Interview with Axolile Notywala. On the political parties dominating the supposedly democratic structures also see Piper and Deacon (2009).

[287] Interview with Mandisa Dyantyi.

One could argue that informal settlement residents are not seen as citizens by the City of Cape Town. Instead, they are often seen as "illegal occupants" or "land invaders", who are either not taking enough responsibilities or expect too much from the City. While this is somewhat shown by the example in the preceding paragraph, some comments attributed to Mayor Dan Plato in a meeting with SJC are also telling. When told that '…there were over a hundred people sharing [sic] a single toilet in Khayelitsha,' he responded, 'Should I wipe people's bums as well?'[288] The mayor seems to be of the view that the City is providing enoughsanitation even though he is told about the appalling conditions. Such differences in expectations in terms of what the citizens think the local government should be providing andthe state's expectations from the recipients, seem to invoke Lemanski's (2019) views on the infrastructure-centric vision of citizenship. For Lemanski, service provision is part of the state'sextension of citizenship rights (see chapter four of this thesis). The City defines who the citizens are by the kind of infrastructure it avails to them. SJC members' demands for participation in the budgeting process and the city to respond to their demands are thus a formof struggle for citizenship rights and democracy.

In the case of BPRA, some Bulawayo residents who had not (effectively) participated in processes such as budget-making only started doing so after the association's intervention. A member who participated in a focus group, for instance, said, 'I never used to attend the budget consultative meetings, even if I attended, I did not know what to say in those meetings. BPRA has empowered me to know how to effectively participate in that process'.[289] This illustrates BPRA's role in empowering citizens with information and skills that enable effective participation in the decision-making process. The testimony from the BPRA member suggests some movement from being merely informed about the budget to actual interaction with the public representatives. Furthermore, in the 2016 budget consultations, BPRA took advantage of its mobilisation capacity to have its members lead calls for the adoption of a policy that would see each ward retaining 3% of its revenue contribution. The policy was adopted by the City and the Association in turn monitors its implementation.[290] One of the councillors interviewed for this study shared that he had seen increased participation after using the funds to build a 'footbridge that connected two suburbs, across a sewer laden stream which residents used to struggle to cross'.[291]

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288 Interview with Gavin Silber.
289 Ward 12 focus group, 5 Jan 2020, Bulawayo.

290 Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

291 Interview with Cllr. Arnold Batirray, Ward 24.

Such developments suggest that, beyond organising members and citizens to participate in the budgeting process, BPRA may have kickstarted a virtuous cycle of participation (Goldfrank, 2007). Goldfrank describes a virtuous cycle of participation as a situation whereby participation leads to policy changes and those changes stimulate more participation in turn, thus deepening democracy and simultaneously strengthening citizenship. However, while both associations democratise the budgeting process, there seem to be limitations in their contributions. On the part of SJC, the organisation is narrowly focused on members and residents in informal settlements. While BPRA seems to focus on the budget holistically, it has limitations in impacting non-members. Councillor Jele, for instance, claims to have observed that, '…in most cases, only the known BPRA leaders and members in my area [ward] show signs of being informed while other residents remain less informed on matters of the budget'.[292] Despite such challenges, the changes noted have been profound, as shown above.

Lastly, BPRA and SJC also facilitate their members' and residents' participation in other council-led processes such as IDP meetings in the case of Cape Town and Strategic Planning consultations in Bulawayo. BPRA and SJC members also participate as committee members appointed by the ward councillors.[293] Besides the spaces and processes led by the respective cities, both associations convene public meetings to facilitate a direct interface between the City officials and residents regarding service delivery. And, as already pointed out in the previous subsection, SJC branches and BPRA ward committees also convene community meetings where the residents discuss politics, share their service delivery problems and deliberate strategies for influencing changes. They also run regular activities such as public debates, sports tournaments and documentary screenings in their communities. BPRA also encourages its members and non-members (it runs campaigns across the City) to register as voters and participate in elections. It also participates in election monitoring, thus probably increasing voters' confidence in the process. The data shows how BPRA holds elected representatives to account through its work on elections, as discussed in subsection 7.2.4. These serve to facilitate political discussion and information distribution.

Table 7.1 below clearly outlines the platforms that BPRA and SJC expand and the ones they create.

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[292] Interview with Cllr. Rodney Jele, Ward 22, Bulawayo.

[293] Interviews with Sibusiso Mdlankomo, Bonga Zamisa from SJC and Emmanuel Ndlovu from BPRA.

	Associations' internal decision-making processes	Participation in existing platforms (invited)	Participation in created platforms (invented)
BPRA	Election of Ward Committee and EC Ward committee meetings Convention (indirect/reps)	Budget consultation meetings Other city-led consultations	Monthly ward meetings Service provider-residents interface meetings Protests
SJC	Elections of branch and EC Branch Meetings AGM (direct)	Budget consultation meetings Other city-led consultations	Regular branch meetings Protests Public Meetings Community meetings

Figure 7.1. Invited and created spaces for citizen participation.

7.2.2.1 Participation without democracy?

The last issue that this subsection seeks to dissect further, is the persistent question in democratic theory on whether voluntary associations like BPRA and SJC only increase participation without strengthening democracy (see Anciano & Piper, 2019; Parvin, 2018; Myers; 2021). As already noted in the preceding subsection, the case studies have increased the numbers of citizens effectively in democratic processes such as the budget, but informants from both associations pointed out that there are still some limitations in terms of changing the actual budget from what the cities would have proposed. Participation only or even deliberating, and the number of participants is not enough for participatory democrats (see Arnstein, 2020; Pateman, 2012). Scholars such as Carperntier (2016) and Arstein (2020) also look at participation in terms of degrees, intensities, or levels, from minimal to maximal forms. On the minimal end, citizens have less power to influence decisions and on the maximal end, they have significant power to inform policy and decisions. Some participatory democrats would still question whether the participation by citizens influences the cities' decisions. From the data, the citizens' influence seems marginal. Data on BPRA, for instance, shows members recalled a few incidents where the City of Bulawayo officials rejected changes and cited the poor economic situation as the cause for the hiking of rates.

Furthermore, in Bulawayo, the City government also does not have the power to finalise the budget. It produces a proposal that is subject to review and approval by the national government. This means that citizens direct their demands to a local government with inadequate authority to respond to them. An official from the Bulawayo City Council noted that while the City had no reservations about accepting the residents' demands, it also had to

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balance a lot of things, including whether the national government would approve them. [294] In Cape Town, SJC members noted that the substantial changes in the budget allocations they were calling for had not been realised. Some informants also argued that while the City had slightly expanded the consultative process, it was still largely that of 'an inspection and comment than a forum for public deliberation' and there was no active encouragement and support of 'real participation'. [295] These and other challenges highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, in this subsection, seem to invoke the notion of "participation without democracy". [296] A stricter analysis of BPRA and SJC's work through the participatory democracy lens, therefore, may raise doubts on the significance of their contributions to democracy. However, the fact that they steer the city-led participatory initiatives from excluding the poor and act as alternative public spheres in the context of relatively 'ineffective democratic system[s]' (Piper & von Lieres, 2016, p. 318), show a positive contribution to democracy. BPRA and SJC also improve their cities' responsiveness to the demands of citizens.

The next subsection examines the selected associations' role in directly representing citizens' interest and delves deeper into the question of associations' role in improving responsiveness.

7.2.3 Expanding the representation of citizens' interests

One of the democratic theorists, Robert Dahl (1971) posits that 'the key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens' (p. 1). Citizens' interests are presented through different channels and in representative democracies, the main channel is the elected representatives. Besides elected representatives, democratic theorists posit that voluntary associations also articulate and transmit citizens' interests into policy formulation (Fung 2003; Bevan & Rassmussen, 2020). Some scholars even suggest that associations may, at times, replace partisan representation when parties fail (Hochstetler & Friedman, 2008). Lastly, voluntary associations may represent those groups that elected representatives may not and present preferences in 'more detailed, nuanced, and information-rich than thinner channels of representation such as voting' (Fung, 2003, p. 523). In this regard, the associations thus contribute to responsiveness which scholars like Dahl (1971), Tilly (2007) regard as central to any democratic system. In this subsection, the term representation means the conveying of citizens' interests into the political system.

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[294] Interview with Anonymous 2. City of Bulawayo official.

[295] Interview with Avolile Notwala. Also see Notywala (2016).

[296] This notion is deployed by various scholars to describe participation that does not result in the preferences of those who participate not being reflected in public decisions.

Firstly, both BPRA and SJC conduct advocacy work. They gather citizens' preferences through consultations with their members and broader communities, research, receiving complaints, service delivery tracking and other methods. After seeing the gaps in the representation of citizens' interests in their cities, '…the organisation[s] then advocate on behalf of residents...We come in when there is no movement in solving problems'.[297] This quote from a BPRA member is also reflective of SJC's approach. Two examples from the findings illustrate this approach. The first one concerns BPRA's campaign against prepaid water meters and the second is SJC's campaign for the implementation of the janitorial programme for cleaning and maintenance of toilets in informal settlements.

BPRA's 2013-2015 successful campaign against the introduction of prepaid water meters was done after the Association consulted with its members and some residents across the City. BPRA then led protests against the undemocratic approach by the City and the meters' perceived potential harm of the policy to the wellbeing of residents (see Dube &Schramm, 2021). To some BPRA members, the City's reaction meant that 'the residents were heard'.[298] But some city officials still felt that BPRA represented only their members but had acted as if they represented all residents.[299] This case seems to illustrate BPRA's contribution to democracy by pushing back against what some scholars describe as the tendency to frame decisions in technical terms rather than political ones, thus sidestepping the need for democratic processes (von Schnitzler, 2008). In that regard, the campaign exposes the limitations of representative democracy in that city and, at the same time illustrates BPRA's contribution to citizenship and participatory democracy. However, one may still argue that such instances are reminiscent of the observation by scholars that strong associations may interrupt representative democracy and tilt policy in the favour of their members (see Carothers and Barndt, 1999).

SJC's successful campaign for the implementation of janitorial services in informal settlements, also illustrate the voluntary association's representation of marginalised residents' preferences to the City government. The SJC successfully put pressure on the City of Cape Town to respond to demands that had not been tangibly responded to by the City despite the representation by elected public officials from the ANC. City officials interviewed for this research and researchers also attribute the implementation of the janitorial programme to the pressure by the SJC (e.g. Overy, 2012; Robins, 2009).[300] The elected officials' failure

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[297] Focus group participant, Ward 13, Bulawayo.

[298] Ward 12 focus group, 5 January 2020.

[299] Interview with Anonymous 2. Bulawayo City Council official.

[300] Refer to interviews with Anonymous 4.

was pointed out by the ANC ward councillor interviewed for this study, when he said, 'SJC takes action to show residents' anger about poor service delivery, that assists us as [a] minority…'.[301] The SJC seems to have succeeded by resorting to repertoires of contention and effective engagement to force the City to respond to citizens' demands. The organisation also achieved this feat in a city which has '…engaged with NGOs, previously...but the city is a very rigid structure, in the sense that you're very much governed by supply chain principles and processes'.[302] The case illustrates SJC's role in representing interests of the poorer residents of Cape Town's informal settlements, whose interests are often excluded as highlighted in the context chapter of this thesis. The association thus seems to have contributed to democracy by complimenting the relatively weak representative democracy in the City. Both BPRA and SJC arguably show that strong associations may arguably counter partisan representation and/or expand representation to include the interests of excluded groups.

Another area where SJC and BPRA have represented residents is in the budgeting process as highlighted in the previous subsection. BPRA has a Technical Backstopping Committee made up of academics and professionals analysing and drafting input into the City's budget. A critical aspect is that 'the Committee does not replace the Association's members and residents. Its submissions are still informed by the structures of BPRA'.[303] For some BPRA leaders, the development of 'the intellectual capacity that match[es] the council at all levels...has helped us to also be able to get through to the technocrats in council'.[304] The SJC on the other hand works with experts such as the International Budget Partnership (IBP) to analyse budgets and recommend changes to the City. Through the analysis, SJC has identified the shortcomings in the allocation of financial resources towards sanitation and safety in the informal settlements and made recommendations in the past. Internally, SJC also follows a participatory approach where members (branch members), staff and experts participate in workshops and collectively formulate the submissions made to the city.[305]

The selected associations broaden the representation of citizens' interests thus contributing to democracy in their cities. Besides its attempts to directly represent citizens' interests, BPRA also trains elected representatives and officials from the City of Bulawayo on issues such as

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[301] Interview with Councillor Thando Pimpi

[302] Interview with Moegamat Mallick. Acting Manager for the Informal Settlements Basic Services (ISBS) Branch.

[303] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

[304] Interview with Ben Moyo.

[305] Interview with Bonga Zamisa.

revenue collection and gender-responsive budgeting' (BPRA, 2020). This has the potential to improve the capacities of representatives to ensure the representation of preferences of groups such as women whose interests may be overlooked. A city official who was interviewed for this research admitted that the City of Bulawayo has found such to be 'useful'.[306] BPRA also indirectly improves representation by having trained members, with a deeper understanding of residents' interests before becoming ward councillors. Those councillors are also said to be easier to approach by BPRA members and residents to make their demands or report problems. However, some councillors expressed concerns that BPRA leaders were sidestepping them and directly approaching council technocrats only to portray them in bad light.[307] One of the ward councillors interviewed for this study shared that he had '…told council staff to not entertain them...if they do, they will be in trouble'.[308] Such reactions seem to emanate from the competitive rather than cooperative relations between some councillors and BPRA ward committee leaders. As already noted, some councillors perceive the association's leaders as political competitors. Such views may be accurate in some instances, considering that some BPRA leaders have become councillors in the past. In such instances of lack of trust and conflict between the elected public representatives and mediators (BPRA leaders), citizens' interests may be overlooked.

While the DA also attempts to delegitimise SJC by describing it as an ANC front, it does not seem to stick as it does in the case of BPRA. SJC does not currently have the kind of linkages with any political party like BPRA. This could be the reason the DA ward councillors who accused the organisation of being aligned with the ANC kept changing, especially when the SJC targeted both their party and the ANC.[309] It thus seems ironic that the former SJC General Secretary, Phumeza Mlungwana, in her reflections in Mlungwana and Kramer (2020) seems to suggest that the civic groups should attempt to influence political parties from within. While she does not offer precise methods of how this would work, it would be crucial to draw lessons from associations like BPRA, albeit from a different context. Section 7.3.2 of this thesis discusses the implications of voluntary associations relationships with political parties.

Finally, the selected associations are dismissed as representing donor interests rather than citizens' interests by city officials and/or elected public representatives, thus further denting the legitimacy of the issues they represent. The membership overlaps with political parties and

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[306] Interview with Anonymous 2, Bulawayo City Council official.

[307] Interviews with Councillor Sibanda, Msipha, Batirai.

[308] Interview with Cnlr Arnold Batirai, ward 24, Bulawayo.

[309] An example of this is when the SJC called for the Commission of Inquiry which was seen as a huge slap in the face by the ANC.

presents dilemmas for some members who are forced to choose between towing the party line or supporting their associations' positions on issues. This seems to affect BPRA more than SJC because of the differences in their relationships with political parties (see section 7.3 for a detailed discussion). Such challenges may negatively affect the selected associations' role in representing citizens' interests and contribution to citizenship and democracy. This subsection has demonstrated the selected associations' role in representing some citizens' interests in both cities. They broaden the representation of citizens' interests to include the groups and issues that political parties exclude or fail to adequately represent.

The next subsection looks at the case studies' roles in improving accountability in the two cities.

7.2.4 Improving accountability

In democracies, accountability entails public representatives justifying their decisions and actions to those they represent (Philp, 2009; Warren, 2014). Voluntary associations are identified as key actors in holding governments to account (Malena et. al., 2004; Lindberg, 2013; Hochstetler, 2012). Civil society's demand for accountability is what Malena et. al. (2004) call external or social accountability. Gaventa (2006), among many scholars and practitioners, refers to it as the watchdog role. Against that theoretical backdrop, this subsection pays attention to BPRA and SJC's capacities to hold their respective city governments to account, particularly their strategies and outcomes thereof.[310] It also focuses on the type of actions and decisions they demand accountability for and ultimately, their contribution to local democracy.

The findings revealed that both BPRA and SJC have several actions and programmes aimed at holding city governments to account. The data on BPRA's work reveals that BPRA holds service delivery annual social accountability conferences where the mayor of the City and national ministers of government present and answer questions, conducts research and produces periodic policy papers, convenes public debates for candidates competing for public office, encourages members attendance of council meetings, tracks the implementation of the city budget quarterly and campaigns against corruption. BPRA leaders also directly approach technocrats and public representatives to demand justification for actions or inaction.

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[310] These aspects are drawn from Affiliated Network for Social Accountability's (ANSA) (2012) framework for social accountability: 1) organized and capable public groups, 2) responsive government, 3) access to information, 4) sensitivity to culture and context. Source: http://samcop.co.zw/news/four-pillars-social-accountability-detail [Accessed on 3 October 2021].

SJC on the other hand facilitates social audits[311], uses legislation and litigation (works through existing legislative provisions to invoke formal accountability, for example, Khayelitsha commission(s) of inquiry), facilitates meetings between leaders and communities and is part of Asivikelane project - a crowdsourcing platform where residents of informal settlements share service delivery challenges and (in)actions by their municipalities. Both associations use traditional and social media (media articles, interviews, and opinion pieces) to hold the cities to account. However, the freedom and plurality of the media are not the same in the two contexts as noted in the context chapter. The associations' main targets are the city governments and both mainly focus on municipal service delivery. The SJC almost entirely focuses on informal settlements. Their primary target thus is the city governments.

The actions taken by both associations are interlinked with most of the work already discussed in the preceding subsections, for instance, participation in the budgeting processes requires the public representatives and officials to justify decisions. This is especially the case with BPRA where the city holds two rounds of consultations:, a review of the previous budget and a presentation of the proposed budget. The two associations' demands have forced public representatives to answer for their decisions and actions. They have also improved responsiveness.

First is SJC's social audits that the organisation seems to have used effectively, to force the City of Cape Town to engage with the communities and the SJC regarding the provision of services. The city also employed janitors to clean and maintain toilets regularly in the informal settlements. One key informant shared that the audits were so effective that whenever the City suspected that SJC would do one, it '…would rush to make improvements ahead of it. The City would tell the companies that we are doing this [social audit]'.[312] For BPRA, one example that stands out in their work is the campaign against corruption, concerning the allocation of land to councillors and senior technocrats. The Association successfully prompted national government institutions such as the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission(ZACC) and the Ministry of Local Government to investigate the allegations land being sold atundervalued prices to some technocrats and politicians. Furthermore, the Association

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[311] A social audit is defined as 'a community-led process of reviewing crucial [sic] documents to determine whether the public expenditure and service delivery outcomes reported by the government really reflect the public money spent and the services received by the community'. See https://socialaudits.org.za/ [accessed 13 October 2021].

[312] Interview with Axolile Notywala. The City of Cape Town hires private companies to provide and service toilets in informal settlements.

successfully campaigned for the adoption of a local policy to force elected representatives and senior council officials to declare assets when required.

One of the city officials interviewed for this study described BPRA's work on corruption as alarmist and 'probably done to please their donors' while others praised it.[313] Similarly, the SJC was once described by Cape Town's then-Mayor Patricia de Lille as trying to impress donors.[314] Such views seem to permeate through the two cities' structures. Cape Town city officials interviewed for this research also shared that while the SJC was seen as "too confrontational" and thus unlikely to work collaboratively with the city. In Bulawayo, City officials interviewed for this research also described BPRA as being '…too negative and entitled, ...councillors also complain that it mobilises against them'.[315] Such views affect the prospect for the institutionalisation of social accountability, identified as key by the likes of Malena et. al. (2004). Despite such challenges, BPRA and SJC seem to play a significant role in holding the city governments to account thus contributing to democracy. Their roles confirm the literature that advances civil society organisations' role in demanding accountability.

The next section consolidates the key effects of context on the selected associations' contribution to democracy.

7.3   Political contexts and the case studies

The differences of political contexts in which voluntary associations exist tend to affect their contribution to democracy (Fung, 2003; Houtzager & Acharya, 2011; Wallman Lundasen, 2015; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010). As already noted in chapter four, BPRA and the SJC are in different political contexts; Zimbabwe is a hybrid regime while South Africa is an emerging democracy. The data from the two case studies and the preceding analysis highlight some aspects of the political context which impact the selected associations' contributions to citizenship and democracy. The key ones are as follows: the existence and role of institutions supporting democracy in each regime (including the forms of decentralisation and city governments' capacity to respond to citizens' demands), associations' relationship with key political actors such as political parties and their relationship with donors.

The next three subsections serve to consolidate the analysis of the political contexts' impact on BPRA and SJC under these three themes.

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[313] Councillor Jele, Sibanda, Chigora, Mlandu and Anonymous 2, a City Official, shared similar views.

[314] Refer to Chapter six.

[315] Interview with Anonymous 2, Bulawayo City Council employee.

7.3.1 Regime type, local democracy and voluntary associations

Democratic theorists posit that in hybrid regimes voluntary associations 'can often act as a countervailing force to democratic erosion by promoting popular mobilisation' (Fioramonti & Fiori, 2010, p. 86). In Zimbabwe, BPRA faces a militarised hybrid regime overseeing high levels of poverty (Masunungure, 2011; Ndawana, 2020). In that context, civil society is largely constricted. Cities also have limited power to decide on local government matters because of the weak form of decentralisation and years of intrusion and usurpation by the national government (see Kamete, 2006). This seems to be at the core of undermining the participation of citizens in democratic processes such as budget making in the city of Bulawayo. While BPRA has increased citizen participation, demands are directed towards a local government with limited authority. This potentially leads to participation without democracy, as noted in the preceding section.

Furthermore, the process of democratisation in Zimbabwe has seen all major urban centres being run by the main opposition, the MDC formations (currently MDC-Alliance), since the dawn of the 21st century. As noted elsewhere in this thesis, the retention of power by the ruling ZANU-PF while the main opposition runs the major cities like Bulawayo has produced Resnick's (2014) vertically divided authority. For Bulawayo, that scenario has prevailed for longer than all major cities as ZANU-PF has only been in power for less than 10 years since independence in 1980. Thus, while Bulawayo is partially reflective of national politics, it has its own unique local political context. The tension between the national and local political contexts seems to impact BPRA's contributions to democracy. In terms of navigating the vertically divided authority, BPRA seems to move between engagement and confrontation with the national and local governments, depending on the issues. It mainly confronts the ZANU- PF-led national government, broadly about the lethargy in the implementation of devolved governance. There are also specific instances where the national government usurps the power of the local government. Such instances include a decision that was taken by the national government to rename some streets in the city of Bulawayo. BPRA approached the courts and successfully stopped the illegal exercise of power.[316] When BPRA stands up for the city, sometimes it incidentally supports the opposition running local government.

At the city level, however, BPRA also contends with the MDC-Alliance-led city government. This is illustrated by several examples, covered in section 7.2. One of them is the Association's campaign against the introduction of prepaid water meters. From the preceding paragraph, it seems that the MDC-Alliance-led city needs the support of Associations such as BPRA, for

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[316] Interview with Emmanuel Ndlovu.

support in case of some conflicts between itself and the national government. However, that relationship is not consistent as BPRA also confronts the city on some issues. Lastly, in some instances, and possibly out of sheer political brinkmanship, BPRA seems to capitalise on the inherent conflict between the national and local governments to achieve its ends. For instance, the Association actively invited national agencies' intervention to investigate corruption cases against the elected representatives and officials in the city government (see subsection 7.2.4).

Theoretically, one would expect voluntary associations such as the SJC to contribute to the deepening of democracy as it is in an emerging democracy (see Fung, 2003). And, as already noted in chapter four of this thesis, the South African constitution and various pieces of legislation provide for citizenship rights, equality and democratic decentralisation. Civil society formations also operate freely. The SJC emerged as part of the civil society actors that sought to improve the realisation of socio-economic rights. From the data presented in chapter six, the SJC uses the constitution to call for the provision of services such as water, toilets and equitable resource distribution. In its context, it utilises institutions that support democracy such as the courts. It also effectively uses the constitutional provisions like when it successfully called for the establishment of the Khayelitsha Commission. The Commission subsequently exposed the unequal distribution of police resources and in turn forced the South African Police Service (SAPS) to account to the citizens. That arguably stands as one of the association's profound contributions to democracy.

SJC also confronts the city government through actions like marches, sit-ins among other forms of protest. Freedom to protest is provided by the country's constitution. Thus, in the instance where the city of Cape Town's Law Enforcement arrested SJC activists, the organisation approached the courts and won a case that led to the repealing of sections of the Regulations of Gatherings Act (see chapter six of this thesis for details). This seems to confirm Diamond's (1994) argument that civil society groups contribute to democracy by both restraining democratic governments and opposing non-democratic ones. SJC also uses litigation to hold the city or national government to account or to get certain policies implemented. However, it uses this strategy as a last resort, as it takes longer and is expensive.[317] The implementation of court judgements or recommendations from institutions such as the Khayelitsha Commission needs political will and may take longer as well in terms of time (also see Van de Spuy, 2021). An informant from SJC also shared that it may be hard for leaders to keep members focused and interested in an issue for a long time.[318]

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[317] Interview with Axolile Notywala.

[318] Interviews with Axolile Notywala and Gavin Silber.

In addition to the institutions that support democracy that SJC approaches, the city of Cape Town has the jurisdiction and resources to respond to citizens' demands. This seems to aid SJC's contribution to citizenship and democracy. The city's decision and subsequent implementation of the janitorial programme is a case in point. This is a contrast to the case of BPRA where members' and citizens' demands are directed at a city with limited authority thus potentially resulting in participation which does not lead to democracy. However, the City of Cape Town deploys its powers in coercive ways sometimes, for instance, in the removals of residents who set up informal settlements, colloquially the "land invaders", and mooted arrests of the homeless (see Dayimani, 2021). Some scholars also argue that the DA which runs the city gerrymanders ward delimitation to exclude the poor from democratic participation (Lemanski, 2017).[319] Thus, while the national context is deemed to be democratic, the City of Cape Town has such seemingly undemocratic traits. Such a context may see associations like SJC having to resist undemocratic actions. For instance, when SJC members supported residents of informal settlements to resist forceful eviction by the City of Cape Town.[320]

Another difficulty that SJC faces is unlocking the DA-run city or province's political will, especially when it is seen as being aligned to the ANC. This is where the vertically divided authority seems to limit SJC's contribution to democracy, or at least force it to work harder and longer to realise changes. A case in point is SJC's calls for the establishment of the Khayelitsha Commission, initially targeting the DA-led provincial government. The calls were initially dismissed but, according to some informants' guesses, acceded to when it became clear that it would expose the ANC-led national government which is responsible for SAPS. The provincial government went as far as the Constitutional Court to secure the right to appoint the Khayelitsha Commission. The friction between the ANC-led national government and the DA-led provincial government also stoked tensions among some SJC members. Those who were also ANC members felt that their organisation had 'exposed their party'.[321] The next subsection focuses on the selected associations' relationship with political actors.

7.3.2 Associations' relationships with political parties

In liberal conceptions of civil society, the actors in that space are non-partisan. This is also emphasised by donors supporting democracy who do not want to be seen as meddling in

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[319] There are media reports on this, for instance about the city suspending law enforcement officers for wrestling a naked man out of a shack in an informal settlement. The SAHC condemned the incident as inhuman and degrading.

[320] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi.

[321] Interview with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi.

other countries' politics (see Carothers & Barndt, 1999). However, some scholars like Chandhoke (2001) and Diamond (2004) argue against studious non-partisanship. They advance a view that voluntary associations should be able to work with political parties if it helps their contribution to democracy. Diamond, however, also makes it clear that they must retain their autonomy and not seek political power for themselves. Thus, the selected associations' relationship with political parties, as shown in the findings and preceding analysis, needs some teasing out. Both SJC and BPRA are formally nonpartisan, however, the latter seems to be somewhat entangled with the MDC-Alliance and other MDC formations. BPRA's problem is not unique in its context, it affects most if not all pro-democracy civil society groups in Zimbabwe, as already noted in chapters four and five of this thesis. The question then is about how that relationship affects its contribution to democracy. Some observations are discussed in the paragraphs below.

Firstly, the researcher looked at their membership overlaps with political parties and the implications thereof, which needed closer examination. In Bulawayo, BPRA's membership overlaps extensively with that of the MDC formations which have run the city, with almost all the council seats, since 2000. The MDC-Alliance is also the main national opposition. It has strong support across the City of Bulawayo, and 28 of the 29 council seats in the 2018-2023 council, while the (national) ruling ZANU-PF had one representative. In Cape Town, SJC's membership mostly overlaps with that of the ANC which is the main local opposition in the city council but runs the national government. In Cape Town, the DA which runs the city, with over fifty percent majority since 2011, draws most of its support from the middle class and wealthier suburbs. The ANC's support is predominantly from the poorer black residents in townships and informal settlements. The paragraphs below explore some of the implications for these arrangements, starting with BPRA and then SJC.

BPRA has a relatively large membership across the city and some of its members are also members and have leadership positions in the MDC-Alliance and other MDC formations. While there are some from other political parties, most of them are from the parties mentioned above. To the national ruling party (ZANU-PF), and some civic actors, 'BPRA is MDC' while to the MDC-Alliance, it is a threat.[322] The SJC, on the other hand, has taken up the task of

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[322] Some informants dismissed the views by ZANU-PF as only designed to justify repression by the national government which it controls. Others described it as a perception possibly peddled by disgruntled people. The third group argued that there was some truth in such observations, given the membership overlaps and relationship of civil society and the main opposition party. However, the overwhelmingly clear message was that the Association had worked hard to be non-partisan (See Chapter 5 for the full discussion).

representing the interests of residents who reside in informal settlements that form part of ANC's stronghold, in a DA-run municipality. Unsurprisingly, the organisation is often dismissed as 'an ANC front' by DA leaders. Ironically, in some matters, the SJC has been accused by ANC leaders of acting in favour of the DA.[323]

The membership overlaps outlined above and the perceived or real relationship between the selected associations and the political parties raises two problems for democratic theorists. One of the problems is that the membership of both BPRA and SJC would seem too homogeneous for some. Foley and Edwards (1996, p. 2), for instance, note that 'the networks that associations create should '… "cut across social cleavages" in order to nourish wider cooperation'. If associations' networks are segregated, they may not contribute to democracy but, at worst, they may 'become the basis for civil strife' (Foley & Edwards, p. 2). Dahl (1983) sees a dilemma in contexts where the independence of associations risks the promotion of narrow individual demands. Both BPRA and SJC are independent and predominantly organise along the existing cleavages in Bulawayo and Cape Town. In the former, the main cleavages are ideological and manifest as the counter-hegemonic and hegemonic civil society (see Cameron & Dorman, 2009; Ncube, 2010). In the latter's context, cleavages are along racial and socio-economic lines and voluntary associations generally organise along those (see Monaco, 2008). Judging by the distribution of the DA and ANC's electoral support over the years in that city, they also mobilise along similar cleavages.

In their political contexts, the case studies seem to target deliberately and circumstantially those who are excluded as groups with either a common identity or similar socio-economic characteristics. In Cape Town, it is the exclusion of poorer residents from informal settlements from democratic processes that necessitated the emergence of the likes of SJC (see Lemanski, 2017; Gukelberger, 2018). BPRA also largely organises residents who are excluded and have limited bargaining power to influence local and national politics. Looking back at the theories in the previous paragraph, associations like BPRA and SJC should not be contributing to democracy. But, as already noted in the earlier parts of this thesis, they both do. Most of the types of contributions they make also reflect the interests of those that they recruit, as also seen in the previous section.

The second problem in the two contexts is related to non-partisanship. Voluntary associations are self-regulating, self-organising (Warren 2001; Selnick, 2002 as cited in Dekker 2008) and civil society as space does not include political parties (Kaldor, 2001). Those that are partisan may be serving particular interests (Gundelach & Torpe, 1996). Some scholars also argue that

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[323] Interviews with Nkosikhona Swaartbooi and Axolile Notywala.

voluntary associations affiliation to political parties affects their effectiveness as it divides communities (Musekiwa & Chatiza, 2015). So, from the discussion in the preceding paragraph, what exactly is the relationship between BPRA and MDC and between SJC and the ANC and how does it affect their contributions to citizenship and democracy?

In a different context, maybe BPRA's relationship with the MDC-Alliance should be improving its contribution to democracy, probably in the mould of the leftist parties that worked with civil society in Latin America to introduce Participatory Budgeting (Goldfrank, 2007). But, again, the thesis emphasises that differences in contexts as one of the main factors for the challenges of generalising observations such as the one by Goldfrank. Thus, the two case studies' uniqueness must be highlighted. About BPRA, the MDC sees the Association as a threat and would avoid any co-operation with it. Perhaps this is caused by the absence of strong local opposition in the Bulawayo council and, by default, BPRA might be filling that void. On the other hand, the association works hard to be seen as non-partisan. This seems to produce some kind of a logjam as BPRA and MDC-Alliance mutually reject one another. From the discussion in the previous section, that logjam seems to negatively affect democratisation in the city of Bulawayo. The opportunities presented by the vertically divided authority and the solidarity between civil society and the opposition parties, forced upon them by the undemocratic state are lost. However, from the analysis in the preceding section, BPRA still makes relatively significant contributions to democracy. And where it benefits from its sizeable membership and the overlap with MDC-Alliance's support base, it is largely coincidental. Thus, by default, BPRA's complicated relationship with the MDC formations seems to partially assist its contribution to local democracy.

While there are exceptions, BPRA develops leaders who become responsive councillors, riding on the strength of its huge membership, it effectively uses voting (threat of denting electoral support) as an accountability tool. It also has committees that work with the city on budgeting (some degree of institutionalisation of participation). The SJC on the other hand, with a strong non-partisan approach uses protests and other means against the DA-run city and mostly acts from the outside of that party. The ANC, which shares membership with the SJC is not in power in the province and City, thus has limited power to influence decisions that affect democracy in the city. As noted in the previous section, some former SJC leaders suggest a more flexible stance to allow the exploration of ways to influence political parties from within.

The preceding discussion does not seek to romanticise the relations between the selected associations and political actors in their contexts. There are huge problems that were noted in the findings in section 7.2., such as the associations' members being divided seeking to shield

their political parties from being held to account. For SJC an example is that of members who sought to shield the ANC by stopping the calls for the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry. For BPRA, it is the members who withdrew from the campaign against prepaid water meters. In the context where the national ruling party has power legislatively and otherwise but does not have to account directly for municipal services and local government decisions, democracy becomes a tick box exercise. Participation, for instance, does not result in changing most policies. This is more so in Bulawayo where the MDC seems to acknowledge citizens' demands, but instead of acting, shifts the blame to the national government. Apparently, in democratic theory, the mere acknowledging of demands counts as a form of responsiveness (Verba & Nie, 1977). It then, in its logic, turns around and accuses groups like BPRA of making unreasonable demands in the context, thus impairing their contribution to democracy.[324] While it is true that there are issues that the local authorities cannot act upon in that context, ward councillors and city officials seemed to suggest that some of BPRA's demands were unreasonable sometimes, given the national context.

This seems to expose a weakness in the support for democracy by donors and insistence on non-partisanship which negates the exploration of areas of possible co-operation between the MDC-Alliance which runs the city and BPRA. But whatever form of co-operation would not be easy, given polarisation and likely conflict or even one party submitting to the other. The main point here is that the context makes it hard for voluntary associations to contribute to democracy. In the case of Cape Town, where the DA, which runs the local city does not depend on residents in informal settlements for electoral support, it seems possible to entrench the marginalisation of the voices of the poor who cannot use the vote to sanction the party. It does also seem that some participatory processes remain largely tokenistic thus affording weak forms of participation. Both SJC and BPRA members shared that their contributions to the budgeting process, for instance, have not changed budget allocations.

7.3.3 Associations and democracy in resource-scarce contexts

BPRA and SJC are funded by donors and that has implications for their contribution to democracy. Firstly, the financial support that the associations receive enables them to conduct all the work detailed in the findings and contribute to democracy as argued in section 7.2 above. The membership of both associations does not contribute enough to fund the work

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[324] While it is true that there are issues that the local authorities cannot act upon in that context, ward councillors and city officials seemed to suggest that some of BPRA's demands were unreasonable sometimes, given the national context. This may well be true, but the point here is that the context makes it hard for voluntary associations to contribute to democracy.

done. Thus, both BPRA and SJC must fundraise and account to their donors. The associations, therefore, need skilled fundraisers, accountants, programme managers and other relevant staff. That process seems to force both associations to formalise, i.e., acquire a structure that promotes the integration of professional practices of skilled personnel with the processes of internal democracy. This also means adhering to laws regulating labour, for instance.

In attempting to balance between internal democracy and efficiency, BPRA and SJC's organisational structures seem to still retain the split between membership and the professional part (Gundelach & Torpe, 1996). And the demands from members may not be in tandem with either the law or institutional stability that is needed for maintaining funding. One of the informants from SJC observed that 'sometimes demands from members may clash with labour laws for example'.[325] Both the tension between members' preferences and the need for adherence to the law or accounting to donors afflicted SJC (see subsection 6.2.21, chapter six).

The ensuing collapse of internal democracy then led to the suspension of membership and an organisational structural review process. The 'exigencies of survival' noted by Fung (2003, p. 523) seem to have necessitated the adoption of a seemingly undemocratic path. 'We took decisions [suspending membership] to save the organisation. I am sure, if we had not taken that decision, we would not be having that organisation by now', said one informant.[326] He also shared that 'the challenge is that *amaqabane* (comrades) do not understand or forget that as a movement we do not have our own money...we have to fundraise and we have to account. That is a lot of work'.[327] This reference to the need to act in ways that fulfil donor demands for accountability seems to validate the observations about their power over African civil society by scholars such as Shivji (2006) and Hearn (2007). SJC's internal organisational review process was ongoing at the time of writing this thesis, but the preceding section noted how the lack of internal democracy had already affected SJC's contribution to citizenship and democracy.

Another challenge related to donor funding is that funders do not only choose who to fund but also what to fund. Campaigns, which articulate policy positions that go against what funders believe may not be funded. BPRA's campaign against prepaid water meters was not funded by some donors who supported the installation of prepaid water meters.[328] The irony in both instances is that donors who assist democracy, supported the installation of prepaid water

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[325] Interview with Axolile Notywala.
[326] Ibid.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Interview with Rodrick Fayayo.

meters and did not seem perturbed by the undemocratic decision-making process. Some donors also put pressure on BPRA to be non-partisan and its leaders to assure donors that they were not aligned to any political party.[329] Secondly, instead of seeking ways of strengthening what BPRA gained from its relationship with the MDC formations (already noted above), they maintain the default position of emphasising non-partisanship. In the process, they also gave the impression that it was not in the interest of the same democracy that they support, for civil society leaders to become political party leaders. Their stance thusbegs the question that Foley and Edwards (1996) ask, in the manner: 'If, as some hold, civil society's chief virtue is its ability to act as an organized counterweight to the state, to what extent can this happen without the help of political parties and expressly political movements?(p. 1). However, those seem to be the challenges that donors' promotion of liberal democracypresent (Hearn, 2000; Hobson, 2009).

Some democratic theorists raise warnings about the relationship between donors and civil society groups. They point out risks of the organisations being controlled, leading to the perpetuation of the liberal notions of democracy whose shortcomings were discussed in chapter two of this thesis (see Carothers, 1999; Hearn, 2000; Shivji, 2006). Both BPRA and SJC are funded or partner with donors such as the Danish Church Aid, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Open Society Foundations who support democracy work in their countries (see We Pay You Deliver Consortium, 2018 and SJC Annual Report, 2018/2019). In some instances, BPRA and SJC's dependency on donors also seems to have led to them being dismissed as driven by donor interests rather than those of citizens. The deployment of the language of "partnership", like in the case of BPRA and Danish Church Aid (see We Pay You Deliver Consortium, 2018) between civil society organisations and donors itself seem to euphemistically cover the unequal power between the so-called partners. However, donors are different and their relations with recipients of funding is determined by many factors.

Both associations also, arguably, pursue liberal democratic ideals, seeking accountability and participation within procedural democracy. However, in some instances they radically challenge the status quo and perpetuation of liberal capitalist logics. The SJC for instance challenged the legal restrictions on the right to protest which arguably sought to weaken opposition to the state and help maintain the status quo. SJC challenged the status quo instead of pacifying their members and supposedly helping the state preside over inequality and poverty with ease. Doing the latter would have validated Hearn's (2007) view that civil society in South Africa and other post-colonial African societies seeks to legitimize the state and maintain status quo. BPRA's rejection of prepaid water meters on the other hand, even against some of their donors, seems to go against Shivji's (2006) view that NGOs are the

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[329] Ibid.

agents of neo-liberalism.

In some instances, BPRA and SJC's dependency on donors also seems to have led to them being dismissed as driven by donor interests rather than those of citizens. In resource-scarce contexts, donor support may be all that associations have to conduct activities and programmes that contribute to democracy. The conditionalities that donor funding comes with and how the financial support changes power dynamics within the associations and their communities can have negative outcomes. This seems to confirm the pessimism of scholars such as Hearn (2000), Abrahamsen (2000; 2013) about the potentially negative role of donors supporting democracy. However, in resource-scarce contexts, the financial support by donors seems to contribute rather than impede BPRA and SJC's contribution to citizenship and democracy.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter highlighted key findings and analysed them in response to the study's sub-questions and along the themes set out in the theoretical framework. Both associations build political skills and civic virtues for their members and some non-members. What is important is that BPRA and SJC do not teach the skills to their members but create opportunities for them to be experienced. Another key issue related to political skills was that BPRA and SJC are not only schools of democracy but pools as well as they attract many members whose intention is to participate in political discourse. Some members seem to join the associations to sharpen their skills and gain support for elections into public office. Being both a school and a pool of democracy seems to increase BPRA's contribution to democracy as it also produces political leaders. While both case studies seem to contribute to the development of members' political skills and civic virtues, where internal democracy fails, the contribution is potentially impaired.

Another theme covered in this chapter relates to the associations' role in improving democratic participation. The analysis showed that BPRA and SJC organise their members and non-members to participate in city-led democratic processes such as budget consultation, ward committee meetings convened by councillors. Both associations have contributed to increases in the numbers of citizens participating in the cities' budget-making processes. They also organise the marginalised citizens who are unlikely to have participated on their own. Therefore, they seem to disrupt the existing inequalities. Both associations also seem to make contributions towards ensuring that citizen participation becomes a virtuous cycle. The associations also convene alternative platforms for members and non-members to discuss politics and formulate preferences and demands to influence the city governments' decisions. The main challenge is that in most instances, participation does not seem to lead to policy changes which is the main aspect of participatory democracy. The alternative platforms such

198

as protests seem to effectively influence policy in most cases. However, they seem to increase the risk of the associations' legitimacy being questioned.

From the analysis, representation of citizens' (members and some non-members) issues is an area where both BPRA and SJC seem to make the most contributions. The former's successful campaign against prepaid water meters and the latter's campaign for the improvement of sanitation in informal settlements are key examples of their representation of interest and contributions to democracy. The analysis in this chapter also demonstrates that both BPRA and SJC have achieved significant milestones, especially around building internal capacity to effectively hold the cities' government to account. However, the functionality of institutions supporting democracy and the cities' vertically divided authority, political will, jurisdiction and capacity seem to present both challenges and opportunities for each case study. In explaining the navigation of those, the study raises many questions about assumptions made in some of the existing literature.

The chapter largely demonstrated that BPRA and SJC contribute to democracy and raised some questions that further the scholarly debates on some existing theories. Some of the contributions that the case studies make to citizenship and democracy do not confirm existing theories. For instance, both associations do not mobilise members across existing political cleavages, and for some theorists, that should harm their contributions to democracy. In both cases, this did not seem to be the case: for SJC it seems impossible to not mobilise along the existing cleavages given the association's members who are predominantly black, poor, residing in informal settlements and the ANC's electoral stronghold. While there are challenges, SJC's membership enables it to expose the city's failure to provide services thus, raising questions of citizenship. That seems to jolt the city into defensive action. BPRA's mobilisation also, along the political cleavages in Bulawayo leaves the association with almost a similar membership with opposition parties, including the MDC-Alliance which runs the city. While that presents challenges, the positives seem to outweigh those, thus hardly impairing the association's contributions to democracy.

The next chapter is the conclusion of the thesis.

8. Chapter Eight: Implications for theory and suggestions for further research

8.1 Introduction

This thesis interrogates the link between voluntary associations, citizenship and democracy in two global south cities, Bulawayo and Cape Town. It examines two case studies, BPRA and SJC respectively. In terms of democracy, the thesis focused on citizen influence on decision making and state responsiveness to citizens' preferences. The case studies' contribution to the study of democracy was examined by firstly focusing on the internal democracy, training and the role of members in their communities (building citizenship). Regarding their roles in democratising the local government, the study examined if they expanded democratic participation, represented citizens' interests, and held the city government to account. The concept of citizenship has been used to tease out what active citizenship entails. This has enabled clearer analysis of how the case studies transform subjects into active citizens, with political skills, civic virtues and claim their rights and/or make demands on government.

The two case studies, BPRA and SJC were purposefully selected as voluntary associations, i.e., membership-based civil society groups of citizens who freely organise outside of government control to promote political ends. The consideration of the differences in their contexts, an emerging democracy and a hybrid regime, was also strategic as it provided important implications for theory as highlighted below (section 8.3). This chapter comprises of five sections including this introduction. Section 8.2 is a summary of the findings of this thesis, section 8.3 focuses on the study's implications for democratic theory, while section 8.4 proposes a framework for researching voluntary associations' link with democracy in global south cities. The final section suggests areas for further research and concludes the thesis.

8.2 Summary of findings

The research examined whether the selected cases contribute to citizenship and democracy in their respective cities. From the findings, both BPRA and SJC make considerable contributions to citizenship and democracy in Bulawayo and Cape Town respectively. However, their contributions are constrained by internal structural weaknesses and their immediate (city-level) to broader (national) political contexts. Those constraints seem to make their contributions somewhat erratic. Firstly, both associations predominantly recruit members from the often politically marginalised residents in their respective cities. Among their members are both experienced, politically engaged activists and inexperienced residents who are unlikely to participate in voluntary associations and politics. Both BPRA and SJC provide

200

internal spaces for their members to interact, participate in decision-making, regarding campaigns, the election of leaders among other things. Such spaces seem to give members opportunities to learn political skills and civic virtues when internal democracy works too. When it fails, either because of structural failure or human shortcomings, they also seem to cease being spaces for members to learn. The conflict among SJC leaders which led to the suspension of all membership illustrates this point. BPRA's internal elections, on the other hand, seemed to have positive effects on members interviewed for this research.

BPRA and SJC also conduct extensive training in areas such as budget analysis, for their members and some non-members thus improving their capacity to engage in democratic processes and hold leaders to account. The important point is that they do not only train, but also create opportunities for members to learn through experience like organising communities and engaging with elected public representatives among others. However, the training seems to predominantly target the experienced male activists thus potentially reproducing the existing inequalities in the two contexts. Another positive outcome from the training is that some associations' members have gone on to occupy public offices or leadership positions in other civil society organisations that contribute to democracy. However, in the case of BPRA, the association does not seem to fully embrace its role in producing wardcouncillors and MPs. This failure to explore the possibilities of framing a relationship that mayfurther strengthen the association's contribution to democracy seems to be underpinned by the inflexible fixation on the ideal of non-partisanship. It seems to be informed by the liberal notion of an ideal civil society group and reinforced by donors.

Secondly, regarding the case studies' contribution to democratic participation, both associations expand the existing democratic spaces such as budgeting and create alternative ones. Regarding the budgeting processes, BPRA and SJC publicise the city-led consultations, prepare their members through training in budget analysis, objection letter writing and mobilise them and communities they work in to effectively participate in the city-led public consultations. They create public spheres for citizens to participate in and formulate their preferences to influence public policies. They both frame participation and citizens' demand for services in the language of rights. These approaches have seen increases in citizens who participate in democratic processes. Broadly, the participants in some of the processes seem to be citizens who would not have participated, had it not been for BPRA and SJC's intervention. SJC's exclusive targeting of poorer informal settlement residents in a city that seldom makes the effort to engage them or even fully recognise their citizenship is telling. In that regard, BPRA and SJC do not only expand participation but disrupt the existing political inequalities.

201

However, the major challenge is that citizen participation in both cities seldom results in policy changes. In Bulawayo, for example, the budget is approved by the national government thus neither the citizens nor the city has the power to affect some preferences. The city is generally constrained in many areas, as its jurisdiction is contested and often usurped by the national government. In Cape Town, while policymaking is highly contested, the City has some power to shape policies but seems to lack the political will in some instances. A City official interviewed for this study, attributes the City's failure to respond to some demands to the rigidity of its decision-making procedures, while informants from SJC argue that the DA, which runs the City, does not easily feel the pressure from outside its electoral support base. In instances of cities' non-responsiveness, both associations seem to engage robustly and/or confront their city governments through strategies like protests and litigation.

Thirdly, the thesis showed that BPRA and SJC transmit poorer citizens' interests to the political sphere for translation into policy. The former's advocacy against the installation of prepaid water meters and the latter's campaign for the janitorial programme highlight that both associations represent the poor residents in their cities. It is through contention and robust engagement strategies that the associations either complement or oppose the representation by elected public officials. SJC and BPRA also represent citizens' interest in the cities' budgeting processes through direct input into the existing representation institutions, from their rigorous analysis. The leaders and staff in the two associations also use the media to highlight citizens' interests which then attract the attention of city officials.

The two organisations also seem to strengthen the representation of citizens' interests by either complementing the local opposition, the ANC in the case of SJC, in a DA-run city or representing the groups excluded by elected leaders. BPRA, for instance, seems to inadvertently play the role of strong opposition in the absence of one in Bulawayo. Both organisations also use litigation, protests and sustained advocacy to pressure the cities to make policy changes. Lastly, BPRA seems to indirectly improve representation through the training of elected representatives and city officials in areas such as gender budgeting to ensure effective integration of women's interests.

However, both BPRA and SJC face problems such as overlapping membership with political parties which leave some members conflicted between towing party lines and supporting the associations' positions on different policies. The other challenge relates to the associations being described as serving donors or certain political interests. Despite such odds, representing marginalised citizens' interests seems to be one of the areas in which the selected associations are effective. Their strong membership, more trust in civil society rather than public officials in their contexts, seem to be part of the reasons for that success.

Regarding (social) accountability, the fourth theme that the study examined, BPRA and SJC use various tactics and have achieved some success in holding their respective cities' governments to account. Both associations track service delivery, facilitate participation in democratic processes, such as the budgeting process and where possible, they incite action by public institutions responsible for strengthening accountability. The Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, which forced the police to account for failures that resulted in poor safety in informal settlements, remains one of the major accomplishments of SJC. In a context where institutions supporting democracy are partisan, it seems that BPRA must choose its targets and battles strategically. For instance, it seems to capitalise on the inherent conflict between the national and local government by inviting the latter to reign in the former on some issues. The invitation of interventions from national entities such as ZACC to investigate corruption is an example. This seems to show that vertically divided cities may, on one hand, constrain the local government's (or city government's) capacity to respond to citizens, demands, while opening opportunities for citizens' voice on the other.

The thesis also highlighted four context-related factors that affect the selected associations' contribution to citizenship and democracy. The first one was the regime type: BPRA is in a militarised hybrid regime while SJC is in an emerging democracy. In the former's context, public institutions supporting democracy are captured and partisan while in the latter's case, the same is largely independent. Related to that is the hybrid regime's tendency to limit decentralisation in Zimbabwe while the democratic regime devolves power in South Africa. That leaves Bulawayo with limited powers and jurisdiction to solve urban crises while Cape Town has a relatively wider jurisdiction. Thus, while BPRA seems to target a city with inadequate authority and capacity on some issues, SJC's main challenge seems to be unlocking the city government's political will. BPRA is also somewhat limited in terms of the forms of action it can institute to force either the local or national government to be accountable or responsive because of restrictive legislation.

Also related to the effects of regime types and systems of government on voluntary associations' contribution to citizenship and democracy is the vertically divided authority. In both cities, the main opposition political parties run the city governments while the national government is run by the national ruling parties. Such a situation is characterised by conflicts between the national and local governments that interrupt government responsiveness in some instances. For BPRA and SJC to effectively contribute to democracy, they need to navigate the challenges that such contexts present.

This thesis also flagged the effects that voluntary associations' relationships with political parties have on their contribution to democracy. The findings showed that while both case

studies maintain non-partisanship, they are described as being aligned with one party or the other. However, BPRA's case is more complicated than just being described as partisan. The association's extensive membership overlaps with the MDC-Alliance and other MDC formations, and the historical links between civil society groups and that country's main opposition compromise non-partisanship. The effects thereof are both positive and negative as already pointed out in this thesis. In the case of SJC, some activists seem to see a weakness with the maintenance of a strict nonpartisan stance. Instead, they suggest a more flexible relationship with political parties which may allow the organisation to gain more influence on policymaking. The experiences of BPRA seem to provide lessons for such considerations, albeit from a different context.

Lastly, a relationship that stood out in the analysis was the one between associations and donors. Activities and programmes for both BPRA and SJC are funded by donors, thus making it possible for them to contribute to democracy in their cities. However, this relationship with donors presents challenges too. One of them relates to the internal structures that the associations seem to have adopted to balance their internal democracy and the need to account to donors. Those seem to have resulted in skewed distributions of power and resources. In the case of SJC, for example, the imbalance, characterised by some elected leaders occupying paid positions, seems to have led to the collapse of trust and subsequently, internal democracy and stability. The power of donors seems to partially shape the internal structure of the organisations. In the case of BPRA, donors also seem to shape the association's position on policies. While it was unsuccessful in the case of prepaid water meters, cited in this thesis, it is always implied that donors fund that which contributes to their ideal form of democracy. This seems to parallel the concerns by scholars such as Abrahamsen's (2000) views about liberal democracy being imposed by donors and western countries in Africa.

8.3 Implications for theory

BPRA and SJC's contributions to citizenship and democracy in their cities seem to confirm the four theories in the study's theoretical framework, however, some nuances must be teased out. Firstly, the case studies seem to fulfil the role of being schools of democracy. They develop members' political skills and civic virtues, leading to participation in politics (Putnam, 1993; 2001; Verba et. al., 1995). The link between members' participation in the two associations (civic engagement) and politics in their cities seems inherent in BPRA and SJC's approaches. They recruit, train members and create opportunities for them to participate in internal processes and democratic politics. This conclusion, however, seems simplistic given the argument by Van de Meer and Van Ingen (2009; 2016) that voluntary associations attract

active citizens, making them pools rather than schools of democracy. Van de Meer and Van Ingen posit that the people who are likely to participate in politics are similar, in terms of skills, personal traits and resources, to those who are also likely to participate in voluntary associations.

As noted in this thesis, BPRA and SJC attract both members with and without prior involvement in politics. The findings illustrate some of the characteristics of BPRA and SJC members. While some were activists before joining, others joined as youth without prior engagement in politics. Unlike citizens with resources necessary for participating in public affairs, often self-selecting and participating in associations, as Van de Meer and Van Ingen argue, BPRA and SJC recruit poorer residents of their cities, who seem to participate because they must, not only because they can. Of note also, is that some members who supposedly had political skills and interest in participating in politics, still shared that they had learnt more after joining BPRA or SJC. This seems to suggest that voluntary associations do not need to recruit members without any political skills and civic virtues to be schools of democracy.

Furthermore, the findings confirmed some of the conditions that theorists posit as necessary for voluntary associations to be schools of democracy. However, some were not confirmed. One of the notions which theorists advance is that associations which contribute positively to democracy must be internally democratic (e.g., Skocpol, 2003). Some, however, reject the importance of internal democracy (e.g., Rosenblum, 1999; Lakoff, 2018). The third contribution to the debate is an empirical one by the likes of Markham et. al. (2001) and Lakoff (2018) which notes the problems that associations encounter because of their varied structural forms and internal agreements about role and power distribution (see chapter three). This thesis confirmed that internal democracy is integral for voluntary associations' contribution to citizenship and democracy. However, it also showed that the achievement of internal democracy is very difficult where voluntary associations are sources of employment for elected leaders. Secondly, it is unlikely where the organisational structure produces tension between internal and external accountability. Donor demands for accountability, for instance, seem to put a premium on a certain calibre of leadership that may not be produced through democratic processes, thus presenting challenges with balancing the two. The difficulties of achieving internal democracy do not negate its importance as already pointed out above. Where the case studies' internal democracy was weak, their contributions to democracy also suffered, and the opposite is true.

Another finding with implications for theory relates to voluntary associations' non-partisanship. Some theorists argue that voluntary associations can contribute to democracy if they are non-partisan. Donors who support pro-democratic civil society organisations also insist on non-

partisanship (see Rosenblum, 2000; Carothers & Barndt, 1999). Others, however, advance a need for civil society organisations to be flexible enough to work with political parties to achieve democracy but still retain their autonomy. (See Chandhoke, 2001; Diamond, 2004). In chapter seven, this thesis demonstrated that there is value in organisations maintaining strict non-partisanship, as seen in the case of SJC. Its strict non-partisanship enabled it to effectively represent the interests of its members and residents of informal settlements. This seems to confirm the theory that voluntary associations must indeed be non-partisan. However, the case of BPRA holds different implications for theory. Maintaining non-partisanship seems impossible for the association, because, among other reasons, the political context is polarised between pro-democratic actors and non-democratic actors. That context leads to the extensive membership overlap between BPRA and the MDC-Alliance and other MDC formations.

Thus, while BPRA actively strives for non-partisanship and has no formal relationship with political parties, the political context seems to entangle it with the MDC formations. And that entanglement seems to aid some of BPRA's contributions to democracy, for instance, producing political leaders. On the other hand, and to a lesser extent, that relationship presents challenges for the association's internal democracy as noted in chapters five and seven. The positives seem to outweigh the negatives. This thesis, therefore, confirms that therelationship between voluntary associations and political parties should be flexible and shouldbe analysed contextually rather than being normatively viewed as being inherently bad. That forecloses opportunities that may be realised in strategic collaborations among democratic actors.

Theorists also posit that for voluntary associations to contribute to democracy, they should organise across existing political divisions, lest they promote narrow demands (Dahl, 1983) or even contribute to conflict rather than promoting democracy (Foley & Edwards, 1996). These views were not confirmed in this thesis. BPRA and SJC organise along political divides or racial ones, in the latter's context. The membership of SJC and residents of informal settlements are in a city that is divided along racial and economic lines thus seemingly necessitating the complementary representation by civil society actors, through extra-institutional means. BPRA's membership overlap with the opposition also seemed to show that the association predominantly attracts members aligned to certain political parties. Both associations' membership seemed like strength in fulfilment of roles such as representing the marginalised citizens' interests.

Lastly, while both associations played a role as public spheres, the thesis showed that participation was effective where there is political will and city government capacity to respond

to citizens' demands (cf. Carothers & Barndt, 1999; Tilly, 2007). Where that did not happen, participation did not seem to contribute to democracy as already noted by some scholars (see Parvin, 2018).

The next subsection proposes a research framework for understanding the link between voluntary associations and democratic governance in cities.

8.4 Framework for researching voluntary associations and democracy

This subsection discusses ideas for a research framework for understanding voluntary associations' contributions to democracy in cities such as Cape Town and Bulawayo. These suggestions are drawn from this thesis' findings and may be used in tandem with some existing theories. Firstly, it is key for researchers to focus on associations' internal structures to see if the associations are set up to be schools of democracy. In this regard, it is important to note that the aspirations may differ with practice, thus the need for scrutiny. As noted in the preceding sections, the study found some of the conditions advanced by democratic theorists to be true, for instance, the importance of internal democracy. Key questions on the organisational structure of a voluntary association should be around the balance between internal and external accountability, for instance. The form and functionality of the organisational structure to retain internal democracy and account to external actors such as donors or adhere to the law are key to associations' role as schools of democracy. In the case of SJC, the need for survival, seems to have interrupted the maintenance of internal democracy.

From the two case studies, the structure of the voluntary association is reflective of the distribution of power and resources among members. Furthermore, the internal arrangements and practices also determine whether an association reproduces inequalities existing in society such as marginalisation of certain groups. Despite the aspirations for equality expressed in the organisations' internal electoral procedure for instance, in both BPRA and SJC, experienced male activists were said to be dominant. In BPRA, the elected leaders also influence the selection of ordinary members and non-members who may attend training. And as noted in this thesis, negative factional interests may deprive some members of the opportunities to fully participate in the associations, thus, negatively affecting associations' role as schools of democracy.

Secondly, understanding the role of associations in strengthening democracy in cities such as the ones in this study also require a nuanced appreciation of the political context. What are the institutions and norms (formal and informal) that shape the associations' relationships with both the national and local government? What opportunities exist for the associations to

organise freely, work with institutions that support democracy, for instance, the judiciary? These may differ from one regime type to another, as seen in the two case studies. The institutional arrangements (systems of government) also determine the cities' capacity to respond to citizens' demands. This is also noted by scholars like Goldfrank (2007). Researchers should examine the forms of decentralisation and resource distribution, to determine if the cities can respond to citizens' demands. In instances where cities do not have that capacity, democratic processes may become futile, for example, participation may not deepen democracy where it does not affect decision making.

Related to the importance of institutional arrangements are the political actors, at different levels of government, local (city), provincial or regional and national levels. For instance, is the political party running the local and national government the same? If they are different, what are the formal and informal relations between or among them? How do their relations impact the governance of cities? What political opportunities exist for the voluntary association in question? The two cities in this study have what Resnick (2014) terms vertically divided authority, which fuels conflicts between the national and local governments. Researchers thus should examine how voluntary associations relate with the actors and or navigate the conflicts to contribute to local democracy. Particularly important is unlocking the political actors' will to respond to citizens' interests or institutionalise democratic norms. This thesis showed how both case studies in this research were affected by both the lack of capacity and political will by either local or national political actors. This thesis also found that voluntary associations' formal and informal relationship with individual political parties may also affect their contributions to democracy. Therefore, it is key for researchers to examine those relations and their effects on the associations' contribution to democracy.

Lastly, understanding the relationship between voluntary associations and donors is also important. Donors' demands for accountability may have implications for the internal structures that the associations adopt. Researchers thus should ask themselves, what conditions donors have for voluntary associations, in terms of reporting and implementation of programmes. The programmes and policy positions that associations take may also be informed by the interests of donors. In that regard, donors attempt to shape what contribution to democracy is and what it is not. The example from BPRA of donors who rejected funding the campaign against prepaid water meters, illustrates that donors still seek to discipline democracy, in the words of Abrahamsen (2000; 2013).

8.5 Conclusion and suggestions for further research

This study has shown that associations like BPRA and SJC have the potential to effectively contribute to democracy. However, there is a need to be more flexible on what alliances they may need in fulfilling their roles of being schools of democracy, expanding citizen participation, representing citizens interests and holding the city government to account. If cities like Cape Town and Bulawayo are to be indeed the ground for democratic politics and if voluntary associations are to play a key role in that, then there is still need for more research on those two promises. This study thus suggests future research to focus on voluntary associations' contributions to local elections. In this study, BPRA's work on elections was highlighted but not fully explored. Future research could look at that in detail, given the association's relationship with the political parties in Bulawayo. It would be key to establish how the association conducts that kind of work and the implications for local democracy thereof. Broadly, this research also raised the intricacies that characterise voluntary associations' relationships with political parties. There also seems to be limited cogent literature on this. Academic activists seem ideally placed to take on the challenge of furthering research on how voluntary associations work with political parties that support democracy.

This study also highlights that associations resist authoritarianism. While authoritarianism seems to be studied vis the national actors, some scholars have looked at coercion in cities (see Davies, 2014). The suggestion in this thesis is for future research to focus on voluntary associations' role in resisting coercion in cities. This study highlights how the City of Cape Town arrests activists and forcefully removes land invaders, for instance, but does not fully explore that. It is not clear whether the City legitimately enforces the law or suppresses criticism, especially in light of activists being arrested during protests.

Another theory that is central in explaining voluntary associations' contribution to democracy relates to their capacity to facilitate the development of social capital. Research focusing on social capital and trust could be key in cities that are polarised and have unequal citizenship. In the study sites for this research, inequality, polarisation and the current lack of trust in public officials and institutions as indicated in chapter one of this thesis seem to also point to the relevance of such research.

Future research could also focus on immigrants and democratic citizenship in cities such as Cape Town. If poorer nationals are excluded from democratic processes, then it could be worse for foreign nationals. Questions for research could start with establishing what rights immigrants claim and how they do it? What forms of bargaining powers do they have to make the city to respond to their demands? Given South Africa and the City of Cape Town's history

and the constant threat of xenophobic violence, such a focus could be key. In instances where immigrants successfully negotiate their inclusion in politics or have their demands responded to, what political skills do they show? Are they different from that of nationals? Why do they succeed or fail? Do immigrants "import" skills and civic virtues or develop those in the destination city? How do contextual differences affect their participation in politics? What implications could that have for voluntary associations and democracy?

Lastly, future research could also look at the impact of COVID-19 on voluntary associations' roles and approaches. Are there innovations that voluntary associations have gained from the long periods of lockdowns? How did voluntary associations maintain contact among members and how did the transition impact democratic socialisation? For instance, how did the shift from physical interaction to virtual interactions affect different groups like the elderly or the poor who could be without data or Wi-Fi? It would be useful to know whether COVID-19 has shifted the ways of organising, members' socialisation, and other purposes of voluntary associations. Some theorists argued that associations with memberships and that facilitate physical interactions among members could be more ideal as schools of democracy than those without members. This could be something worth exploring.

Finally, this thesis critically engaged existing theories on the link between voluntary associations and democracy in the global south cities. If cities (especially in the global south) are to be the ground for democratic politics and voluntary associations are to have positive effects on democratisation, theorists, donors, activists and practitioners should appreciate the contextual nuances. This thesis proves that the link between voluntary associations and democracy is contextual. While there are some factors that may play out in similar ways across contexts, a clearer understanding of voluntary associations contribution to democracy seems only possible when firmly grounded on specific contexts. Furthermore, the complexities of the global south cities and the constant changes they are going through, provide opportunities for further theorisation.

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