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Local government duality and its discontents: Rural governance and contestations for power and influence between elected officials and traditional leaders in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe.

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the Department of Political Studies, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences (EMS), University of the Western Cape.

Rodrick Fayayo

Student No. 3983596

Supervisor: Professor Bheki R. Mngomezulu

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my brother and friend, the late Manford Mbekezeli “Man Cara Cara” Hlabano. He was the future that was stolen from us. Where we were supposed to gather for our graduations, we gathered for your funeral.

Till we meet again my brother.

Abstract

This thesis deploys deliberative democracy in order to explore interactions in polity dualism in Matebeleland South and Matebeleland North, in Zimbabwe. The thesis was premised on two major problems in the way the issue of traditional leadership is generally talked about and studied. First, there is a theoretical problem in terms of how we study and talk about traditional leaders and their contribution in a democracy. Secondly, the institution of traditional leadership is assessed based on assumptions as opposed to hard facts. Methodologically, the study is based on a qualitative case study research design using focus group discussions, key informant interviews and document analysis that enabled an analysis of perceptions, opinions, experiences, and attitudes of residents regarding Zimbabwe's dual local government system. The thesis invokes the concept of deliberative democracy to argue that traditional leaders in general and Chiefs in particular are indispensable to the governance of rural spaces because they consider areas under their jurisdiction as patrimonies which have to be well-governed for the benefit of all residents regardless of their political party affiliation. One of the findings of this study is that the connections between deliberative democracy and chiefly rule are encapsulated in the Ndebele notion of "*Inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*" (a King is a King because of the people). This shows that chiefly rule is not reductively arbitrary and unilateral as viewed and advanced in Eurocentric scholarship. Rather, chiefly rule, especially in the areas under review, is premised on the foundational principles of consultation, accountability and inclusivity. Most major decisions are made at and enforced through the village discussion forums called *Indaba* in Ndebele or *Dare* in Shona. The limits of the *Indaba* platform are not premised on the deficiency of transparency and consultation but rather in their patriarchal and patrilineal biases. These agnatic platforms are dominated by men, women play very marginal roles. The study recommends that the institution of traditional leadership should coexist with the modern system of governance since there are benefits from each system. Discarding the institution of traditional leadership would be both a misnomer and an incongruity. With specific reference to Matabeleland which was used as the case study, the Dissertation recommends that there should be coexistence between traditional leaders and elected leaders so that there could be convergence between traditional leadership and modern democratic governance.

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My intention was never to do a PhD now. I had initially wanted to start by doing 5 Masters Programs which I thought were relevant in addressing a number of issues in my career. I would then do a PhD later in life after having gathered all my experience in local governance. My brothers, Dr. Gorden Moyo and Dr. Cornelias Ncube kept on insisting that I needed to start doing a PhD and forget about all these many Masters programs. Even after recruiting Prof. Philani Moyo and a number of other people who kept asking me why I had not started, I was prepared to brush aside their views, and was bent on following my path and continue with my 5 Masters Programs. Things took a different turn after the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe. Emmerson Mnangagwa had "won" the elections. My work at Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association became redundant .I also thought about how I would utilise my five years during ED's [President Mnangagwa] reign without feeling like I had lost all of them. It was then that I started tolerating the ideas of the men mentioned above. I remain grateful to these great brothers for sowing the seed and making sure that they moved with me in every step of the PhD program. Their patience as I kept on asking them to read my work has helped me get to this stage. But it was my brother Mmeli Dube who did all the donkey work. Mmeli got me a place and a supervisor at the University of Western Cape. I remain very indebted to him.

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List of Abbreviations

AC	African Councils
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BSR	Big Saturday Read
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CITE	Center for Innovation and Technology
CNC	Chief Native Commissioner
CSO	Civic Society Organization
DA	District Administrator
DC	District Council
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FTLRP	Focus Group Discussions
LHARPFMP	Land Husbandry Act
LRPFMP	Land Reform Program and the Farm Mechanisation Project
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MP	Member of Parliarment
NC	Native Commissioner
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
PA	Provincial Administrator
PM	Prime Minister
RAU	Research and Advocacy Unit
RDC	Rural District Council
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TCA	Traditional Leaders Act
UK	United Kingdom
VIDCOS	Village Development Committees
WADCOS	Ward Development Committees
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZESN	Zimbabwe Election Support Network
ZIMCODD	Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development
ZPP.	Zimbabwe Peace Project
ZWLA	Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association

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CHAPTER 1

The Problem and its Theoretical Context

1.0. Introduction

This study is an assessment of the role of traditional leaders in democratic processes in Zimbabwe. It is an audit of the democratic credentials of the institution of traditional leadership in Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North in Zimbabwe. The two Matabeleland Provinces are used as a case study in order to expound the pertinent issues concerning the theme of the study. The study explores how the coexistence of traditional leaders and elected officials in Zimbabwe has implications for the basic principles of deliberative democracy. Chigwata (2016) argues that in Zimbabwe, the structures and systems of the institution of traditional leadership in *Ndebele, Shona, Kalanga, Tonga* and *Venda* ethnic communities have some remarkable differences even though they also depict certain similarities. The institution of traditional leadership comprises of chiefs, headmen and village heads- all in order of hierarchy (Wekwete, 1991). Village heads are physically the closest to the people and thus have the most interactions with the citizens in rural areas. Prior to the colonisation of Zimbabwe by the British, the institution of traditional leadership was the sole governance structure with its legitimacy to govern derived from tradition and culture (Wekwete, 1991).

Elected officials refer to those officials who are a product of a nationally recognized election. Cities, towns and rural areas hold regular elections in order to choose officials for both their legislative and local authorities. These include the Mayor; City Council members and Members of Parliament who are in office for as long as state law dictates. This study concerns itself with councilors and Members of Parliament elected on a rural ticket.

According to Dryzek (2001), the key principles of deliberative democracy are inclusivity, equality (patriarchy and hierarchy) and accountability. As such, outcomes can be said to be democratic if they reflect the overarching dimensions of deliberative democracy which are inclusivity, equality and accountability. The study is informed by two germane theoretical categories – the traditionalist perspective and the modernist perspective. These perspectives sit on opposite sides of a spectrum that characterizes the realm of traditional authority – both normatively and empirically in terms of actual practice of traditional authority.

The traditionalist approach regards Africa's traditional chiefs and elders as the true representatives of the people. They are accessible, respected, legitimate, and therefore essential to developing democratic politics (Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014). From this perspective, the role of the chief in community-based decision-making is to reflect and discuss the opinions expressed in the village assembly and ultimately to suggest and publicly approve a decision of consensus, considering different opinions and interests of involved persons (Dusing, 2001; Mandela, 1994; Wekwete, 1990; Amosh, 2015; Bourdilon, 2005; Holomisa, 2008). The traditionalist approach mainly focuses on demanding the ability of traditional leaders to be accountable. It, however, neglects issues of inclusivity and equality. Resultantly, it says little about how traditional leaders should deal with issues of patriarchy and hierarchy.

Modernists view traditional authority as authoritarian, and an increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy and must be eradicated (Logan 2008; Ntsebeza, 2006; Mamdani, 1996; Kohn, 2014; Koeble, 2005). This characterization may be true in some instances or under certain circumstances or jurisdictions but cannot be true all the time. The argument for the abolishment of traditional leaders ignores the resilience of the system. Across Africa, after independence, nationalist leaders called for the removal of chiefs and the transfer of their power to elected politicians (Baldwin, 2015). Two major reasons dominated the quest for the removal of traditional leaders in post-colonial Africa. Firstly, the institution was seen not to be in tandem with the newly embraced liberal democracies (Baldwin, 2015). Secondly, chiefs had been willing stooges and handmaids of colonial rule under the indirect rule system (Baldwin, 2015). Most of them were also not quite supportive of the anti-colonial struggle. A number of them tried to oppose colonial subjugation but failed. The only two countries that successfully abolished the institution of traditional leadership were Tanzania and Guinea (Baldwin, 2015).

In Zimbabwe, there have been several turning points regarding the institution. These include (1) The 1980s and the weakening of the institution, (2) The 1990s and re-traditionalisation as part of political instrumentalisation, and (3) Constitutionalisation and fortification of the institution as part of governance. In the 1980s, nationalists in the post-independence government spent time trying to weaken the institution of traditional leadership. They used a raft of laws, policies and actions to do that. The post-colonial government in Zimbabwe penalised these "sell-out chiefs" by supplanting chiefly leadership and all forms of traditional authority through the democratic election of councillors and the establishment of Village Development Committees (VIDCOS)

and Ward Development Committees (WADCOS) (Makumbe, 2010). Despite these efforts, the 1990s saw a surge in re-traditionalisation of the institution as traditional leadership reasserted its dominance of rural governance structures, empowered through the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998, which restored the powers of the traditional leaders (Chigwata, 2015).

The adoption of a new Constitution (Government of Zimbawe,2013) marked another turning point for the recognition of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. The constitution devotes a section to the role of traditional leadership alongside modern state structures. Added to that, Section 18(1) of the Traditional Leaders Act requires the establishment of a ward assembly for every ward under the jurisdiction of a rural local authority (Zimbabwe Traditional Leaders Act, 1998). The assembly is composed of the councillor, all headmen and village heads in the respective ward and is chaired by a traditional leader elected from among the membership of the ward assembly. While the locally elected officials represent the ward in council, a traditional leader leads the ward. The ward councillor chairs the ward development committee, which is charged with providing technical assistance to the ward assembly.

In addition to the constitution and traditional leaders Act, the Rural District Councils (RDCs) Act also informs what happens in Zimbabwe's rural governance. The RDCs Act does not outline any roles for traditional leaders and focuses on elected rural local authorities. However, according to Chigwata (2016) for a long time dating back to pre-independent Zimbabwe, chiefs have sat in the rural local authority as ex officio members based on custom and practice. Given this background, scholars like Mngomezulu (2008), Baldwin (2015) and Hussein (2010) as well as Ndlela et al (2010) argue that the resilience of the institution of traditional leadership places a need on researchers to invest more intellectual effort to understand the dialectics of traditional leadership and elected officials and how their interactions impact deliberative democracy

Secondly, while studies have focused on traditional leaders, the same energy and scrutiny has not been put on the suggested alternative, which is the elected leadership. A lot of scholars have used the fact of democratic election under the aegis of liberal democracy as an excuse to limit analysis on issues of patriarchy and hierarchy in elected authorities. Therefore, where this study uses elected leaders, it is mainly to bring out a point about traditional leaders.

Thirdly, the focus of studies on traditional leaders has been predominantly focused on the hereditary nature of the system as the opposite of liberal democratic elections. This focus on the representative and aggregate elements of democracy has meant that little attention has been put on the equally important potentially democratic elements in the operations of traditional leaders. In focusing so intently on the absence of elections before assumption of office by traditional leaders, there is a tendency to neglect other potentially democratic features of traditional systems that may also be relevant to the democratic compatibility of the institution of traditional leadership (Logan, 2009). These divergent views necessitated a case study investigation so that the merits of each position could be subjected to scrutiny.

The consequence of these views on the role of traditional leaders in a democracy is that a lot of other aspects of traditional leaders that have nothing to do with elections end up escaping scrutiny. For instance, given the political changes in Zimbabwe as a result of the so called 'soft coup' in November 2017, the role of traditional leaders, especially in ZANU-PF has been changing. This study presents a more nuanced look at the institution and will highlight the variation in traditional leaders' approach and engagement in partisan ruling ZANU-PF party processes as well as electoral processes. Elsewhere, Fayayo (2018) argued that the 2018 changes did little to impact the role of traditional leaders 2018 Zimbabwe elections. This study takes a closer look at the implications of the changes in the long run. Departing from the standard trend in scholarship on traditional leaders which is binary (either from a modernists or traditionalists perspective), this study straddles the line between the two and shows the revolving and evolving nature of traditional leadership in Zimbabwe's democratic and electoral processes.

To address the problems flagged above, this study used deliberative democracy as a theoretical framework to investigate the implications of the coexistence between traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance. This research assesses the implications of polity dualism in deliberative democracy. Proponents of the framework assume that given the pervasive, ubiquitous and resilient nature of traditional leadership, it is essential to account for their role as part of, or alongside the democratization process (Holzinger et al, 2016). Polity dualism, also referred to as Mixed Government (Sklar, 1994), or hybrid political orders (Boege et al, 2009) describes the coexistence of two distinct political systems in the same territory, applying to the same people (Hozilnger et al, 2016). The concept of polity dualism or mixed governments is therefore a suitable way of explaining the relationship between

hereditary officials and elected officials. For the present study polity dualism is deployed in the same sense to describe and analyse the coexistence of elected officials and traditional governance (hereditary leaders) in the Zimbabwean state.

Following Sklar (1996), this study acknowledges the possibilities for traditional leadership to co-exist with elected representatives because the roles of the two authorities are clearly demarcated and defined under a unified system (Sklar, 1996). Ntsebeza (2004) concludes that the main conditions for an effective system of mixed government are that there should be clear roles for traditional and democratic systems and that traditional leaders should accept that they play a secondary and subordinate political role to elected leaders. This study acknowledges this arrangement and seeks to establish its implications towards deliberative democracy. The concept of polity dualism is also important for the present study as it potentially sheds light on how the co-existence of traditional leaders and elected officials can impinge on the normative benchmarks of deliberative democracy. According to Young (2000) these benchmarks include inclusivity in decision making, political equality (it must overstep all forms of hierachichisation) equal accountability (participants should be able to hold each other to account) and must take place within a framework of reasonableness. The quintessential question this study seeks to unravel is how the co-existence of customary authority and formalized democratic systems has impacted on the conditions for the fruition of deliberative democracy.

1.1. Research Problem

The problematique of this study is to understand the implications of the coexistence of these two types of leadership institutions on democracy in Zimbabwe. It also attempts to determine how the interaction between hereditary officials and elected officials impinges on deliberative democracy. Implicit in this research is the question of the role of traditional leaders in rural governance and particularly in relation to the various modern structures of the state of Zimbabwe where ordinarily only elected officials should sit. The study uses the interactions between the elected and hereditary officials in rural governance to contribute to the wider debate on traditional leadership and democracy.

The thesis is premised on two major problems in the way the issue of traditional leadership is generally viewed and analysed. Firstly, there is a theoretical problem in

terms of how we view and perceive traditional leaders and their contribution in a democracy. The theorising about traditional leaders and democracy across the globe reflects the influence of two germane theories - the traditionalist perspective and the modernist perspective. Traditionalists regard Africa's traditional chiefs and elders as the true representatives of the people who are accessible, respected, legitimate, and therefore essential to developing democratic politics (Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014; Dusing 2001; Mandela, 1994; Wekwete, 2015; Oomen, 2015). This perspective portrays traditional leaders as community-based decision makers as well as consensus builders.

Modernists view traditional authority as authoritarian, and an increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy (Logan 2008; Ntsebeza, 2006; Kohn, 2014; Koeble, 2005). Modernists sceptically label traditional leadership systems as 'a major setback to democracy' holding traditional values which are patriarchal, silencing the views of the youth and women in general (Kohn, 2014; Koeble, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2004).

The implication has been the predominance of a functionalist binary theorising of traditional leaders in modern societies. In other words, traditional leaders are depicted based on the aggregate elements of democracy. This focus on the representative elements of democracy has meant that little attention has been put to the equally important and potentially democratic elements of the institution. In focusing so intently on the absence of elections before assumption of office by traditional leaders, there is a tendency to neglect other features of traditional systems that may also be relevant to the democratic compatibility of the institution of traditional leadership (Logan, 2009). These divergent views necessitated a case study investigation so that the merits of each position could be subjected to scrutiny.

The second problem that underpinned this research stems from the fact that the consensus by modernists to eradicate the institution of traditional leaders seems to ignore the historically proven resilience of the institution. Some scholars (see Moyo, 2019), Bourdillon, 1993) have also argued that the resilience of the institution of traditional leadership has everything to do with its support and endorsement by the modern state. For example, in the colonial era, chiefs were reduced to bureaucrats and appendages of colonial rule. In the post-colonial dispensation, chiefs have become praise singers and a legitimating interest group for the ruling ZANU PF party. The proven resilience of the institution of traditional leaders, coupled with the failure of the

structures inherited from the colonial state to govern in line with the development aspirations of Africa's population, has led to renewed interest in indigenous institutions (Chikerema, 2013).

This resilience of the institution of traditional leadership can be traced across Africa to countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi and Mozambique. These countries once toyed with the idea of dismantling the institution of traditional leadership (Baldwin, 2015). In Zimbabwe, after attempts to emasculate the institution of traditional leaders in the 1980s, retraditionalisation was initiated in the 1990s and was consolidated with the ratification of a new Constitution in 2013 which marking another turning point in the recognition of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. The constitution devotes a specific whole section on the role of the institution of traditional leadership alongside modern state structures.

There have been debates on whether the Zimbabwean constitution can successfully link traditional leadership to the democratically elected government structures in a manner that can remove rivalry, tensions, and conflicts in the planning process (Ncube, 2011). This is especially so because of the tensions that have characterized the relationship between elected structures and traditional leaders. A number of scholars have averred that the existence of traditional and elected leaders in rural governance has resulted in a myriad of conflicts where Chiefs, on the one hand, claim that they are the legitimate representatives of the people as they are permanent and sanctioned by a higher authority (the ancestors), whilst councillors, on the other hand, claim that they have a mandate from the people because they were directly elected (Makumbe, 2010; Chigwata, 2015 ; Chatiza, 2010 ; Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014; Matyszak, 2015). The debate goes on as authors continue to hold divergent views on the matter.

1.2. Aims and objectives of the study

1.2.1. Broad Aim

The broad aim of this thesis is to employ the theory of deliberative democracy in order to explore the implications of polity dualism in the practices of deliberative democracy in Zimbabwe by understanding how the power relations between traditional leaders and elected leaders' impact on accountability, inclusiveness and equality.

1.2.2. Objectives

The objectives of this study are:

a) To investigate the stakeholders' perception of the roles of traditional leaders and elected leaders in rural governance. This objective is achieved in two ways: first, by examining how the stakeholders that include villagers, Civic Society, traditional leaders and elected officials view the roles of these two institutions in rural governance. The understanding of the roles helps in determining whether there is confusion, contestations or co-operation between these institutions. Within this context, the study aims to explore the issues surrounding either the conflicts or the co-operations between these two institutions in the polity dualism. Secondly, the objective is achieved by examining the decision-making processes of the two important institutions. Specifically, this put under scrutiny the manner in which traditional leaders make decisions in the context of the chiefs' courts. It also looks at how councilors and members of parliament make their decisions in council and Parliament. Within this context, the study further examines the currency of the argument that elected officials are by virtue of being elected, democratic.

b) To explore how traditional leaders and elected officials deal with issues of equality and inclusivity by examining their operations in rural governance in Zimbabwe. This objective is also achieved in two ways: firstly, this objective explores the interactions between the two institutions of rural governance with patriarchy. Specifically, it examines how these institutions treat women and girls. In that context the objective examines if there is a difference in terms of the way the two institutions relate with women and girls. Secondly, the objective then scrutinizes how issues of hierarchy are dealt with by these two institutions. Specifically, it examines measures that are put in place to ensure that the youths, people living with disabilities and the poor in the society contribute effectively and their contributions are taken onboard.

1.3. Research questions

The study seeks to answer two major research questions, each with its sub-questions that help in answering it. Each major question is presented concurrently with its sub-questions:

a) What are the implications of the perceived roles of traditional leaders

and elected leaders on deliberative democracy in rural governance?

To help answer this research question the following sub questions are asked:

- What are the perceived roles of traditional leaders and elected officials in the governance of rural areas.
- What is the nature of the interaction between traditional leaders and elected officials? (Power relations in formal and informal platforms). Do they aid each other? How does the coexistence (dis) enable inclusivity and political equality? (Are all affected involved in finding solutions, how do they try to sidestep or promote hierachichisation)
- How does the coexistence of these two types of leader's impact accountability? (Are they all equal in decision making?)
- What are the implications of the relationship between the two types of leadership on deliberative democracy in Zimbabwe? (Can polity dualism explain the co-existence that is there?
- Is the resultant behaviour congruent with the basic tenets of deliberative democracy?

b) How do traditional leaders and elected officials deal with inclusivity and equality in rural governance?

To help answer research this question, the following sub-questions are asked:

- What platforms are available for engagement between traditional leaders, elected officials and previously marginalized groups (Women, youths, poor).

- What measures are put in place to ensure that their voices are captured and heard?

It was critical to find answers to all these sub-questions so that the main question which is the focal point of the present study could be addressed in an appropriate and satisfactory manner.

1.4. Scope of the Study

The case study approach adopted here informs the scope of the study. The study did not concern itself with the need to generalize the findings. While its focus was on the contribution of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe it is specifically looking at two provinces in Zimbabwe, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. For this study, the analysis of the role of traditional leaders was not done at the national level. It was done at the local level, in particular in Matabeleland. This is because of the fact that Zimbabwe is a heterogeneous country with many differing cultures. The way traditional leaders handle issues of concern in Matabeleland may differ from the way traditional leaders view and do things in Mashonaland.

While it is true that a number of scholars have discussed the succession issue as the benchmark of democracy as demonstrated above, this study only concerned itself with the interaction between traditional leaders and elected officials and its implications on deliberative democracy. It used the interaction as an entry point to the bigger and broader debate on traditional leadership and democracy. The study used the two Matabeleland Provinces in Zimbabwe as a case study. Matabeleland is important because a number of traditional leaders, civic society organisations and politicians in the region have been pushing for the restoration of the Ndebele Kingdom. Secondly Matabeleland has a history of rebelling against the government, not only because of its restoration agenda that has been advocated by traditional leaders but also because of its history.

Deliberative democracy is a broad concept. According to Young (200), a well deliberated decision must include all those affected by the decision. Every participant has to be appreciated and treated as politically equal, must also take place in a framework and with the expectation of reasonableness and the process has to be public and one in which participants hold each other equally accountable. However, for the purposes of this study, only two of these will be considered. These are accountability and inclusivity. Inclusivity looks at how the institution deals with patriarchy as well as other usually side-lined groups such as the poor and people living with disabilities. As such the study will focus on investigating the implications of the coexistence of traditional leaders on accountability, equality and inclusivity.

Such incidents make the study of the institution of traditional leadership and its juxtaposition with elected leaders an interesting subject. The study focused on the

period between the retraditionalisation of Zimbabwe which is coincidentally the period around which the biggest opposition movement in Zimbabwe – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed. This is the period between the year 1999 and December in 2019. The study had 2019 as its exit point for practical reasons. While there are 200 hereditary chiefs in Matabeleland, this study only focused on four chieftaincies which were purposefully sampled to cater for important variables such as gender, politics, age and education. These were chief Maduna in Filabusi, Chief Nkalakatha in Nkayi, Chief Khayisa in Ntabazinduna and Chief Mabhena in UMzingwane.

1.5. Relevance of the Study

There is vast literature on traditional leadership and development in general. Some studies have a geographical specificity (Vaughan, 2003; Ntsebeza, 2005; 2006) while others tackle the issue from a general perspective (Sithole, 2010). In the case of Zimbabwe, the 2013 Zimbabwe constitution has a specific provision detailing and specifying the roles of traditional leaders. However, relevant Acts of Parliament to support the operations of traditional leaders are yet to be enacted. Therefore, this study feeds into the national debate on the subject of traditional leadership and will potentially provide empirical evidence to assist the parliament of Zimbabwe in enacting appropriate legislation to clarify the roles of traditional leaders. Findings of the study will therefore be useful for future policy making.

Studies by Baldwin (2015) and Logan (2008) on selected chiefs and elected councillors in Sub-Saharan Africa reveal that hereditary chiefs and elected officials can coexist without any harm to democracy. A similar study by Baldwin (2015) in Zambia shows that traditional leaders can actually be useful in democracy building as development brokers. However, a number of other scholars have also argued that the coexistence between traditional leaders and elected officials has resulted in contestations for legitimacy (Makumbe, 2010; Chigwata, 2015; Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014; Matyszak, 2012). While a number of scholars have also argued that the operations of traditional leaders are compatible with the basic principles of deliberative democracy (see Mandela, 1994; Sithole, 2010), not much scholarly work has been done beyond looking at the operations of chiefs' councils. Not much has been done also on the implications of the mixed governance system in rural governance on deliberative democracy in particular. Importantly, nothing much has been done in Zimbabwe on these issues thus leaving a big empirical gap. This study not only tests the applicability

of the findings by Logan and Baldwin but also seeks to assess the relevance of Ntsebeza's implications in *Democracy compromised* (2006) that traditional leaders and elected officials cannot co-exist. The findings of the study will be important as they will also feed into the debate on the paradox of the rising role of traditional leaders in Africa, a continent that is still finding its feet in as far as democracy is concerned. Importantly, the results will assist Zimbabwean lawmakers in their reconfiguration of the governance landscape in as far as the relationship between traditional leaders and elected representatives is concerned.

1.6. Hypothesis

The fact that traditional leaders assume offices through inheritance as well as through political capture by the ruling party puts a big dent on their contribution to democratic processes.

1.7. Research Methodology

This section briefly provides an overview of the research strategy of the thesis. According to Yin (2003), a research strategy aims to explain 'why [...decisions] were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result' in order to achieve the objectives of a research. This research was conducted using the qualitative case-study research methodology. The case study research design provided a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data, analysing information, and reporting the results. Through this approach, the researcher gained a deeper understanding of the subject under study in the selected study units in Matabeleland. Focus group discussions, key informant interviews, observation and document analysis were used as data gathering techniques. Data were analysed using the principles of content and thematic analysis. The rationale behind the triangulation of different data collection methods was to ensure that the theme of the study could be understood in full to inform the recommendations to be made by this study. A detailed methodology is discussed in chapter 5.

1.8. Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 – **Introduction and background to the study** – The introduction covers the background and context of the study. It also brings out the research problem and lays the groundwork for the rest of the study.

Chapter 2 – **History and Background** - Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion on the history of linkages between traditional leaders and democratically elected representatives in Zimbabwe. It traces this narrative from the pre-colonial era to the present. The rationale for adopting this approach was to ensure that it is clear from the outset how the process evolved over time.

Chapter 3 – **Literature Review** - This chapter reviews existing studies that are related to the theme of the study in detail by deploying the funnel approach. To that end, literature relating to the role of traditional leadership from a global perspective is discussed. This is followed by a discussion of traditional leadership in Africa. Subsequently, a discussion of literature from the Zimbabwean context from the colonial period to the post-colonial period is then entered into. The gap identified in the literature is then outlined as justification for the present study.

Chapter 4 – **Theoretical Framework** – The focus of this chapter is on the theoretical framework on which the entire research study is anchored. It begins by conceptualizing traditional leadership and democracy and concludes by critiquing a number of theoretical concepts. These include the traditionalists and modernists' narratives, integrated model and the deliberative democracy framework. This chapter discusses the theory's history and tenets as well as evaluate its relevance to the present study. The chapter concludes by justifying the use of polity dualism and deliberative democracy as a framework of understanding the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials.

Chapter 5 - Research Methodology – This chapter deals with the methodology used in carrying out the study. It draws a distinction between 'methodology' and 'methods' and then discusses the different research methods used to collect data sets. Any challenges experienced during the data collection phase are discussed in this chapter and information provided on how such challenges were addressed in order to ensure the success of the study.

Chapter 6 - Presentation of the findings and analysis for objective 1- This chapter presents and analyses findings relating to the first objective of the study. The findings are presented in line with the main research question and the four sub-questions of the study spelt out in Chapter 1.

Chapter 7 – Presentation of findings and Analysis for objective 2 - This chapter builds on the previous chapter (Chapter 6). It presents and analyses findings relating to the second broad research objective.

Chapter 8 - Conclusions and Recommendations. This last chapter presents the main conclusions of the study and provides some recommendations. The latter is divided into two types. The first type are the recommendations for policy while the second part relates to future research directions.

1.9. Conclusion

This chapter outlined the problem and theoretical context of the study. It also discussed the study's aims and objectives, the research questions and the scope of the study. The next chapter is on the history and background. It discusses the historical contributions of traditional leaders in democratic development in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 2

History and Background - Traditional Leaders and Democracy in Zimbabwe

2.0. Introduction

The previous chapter was a general introduction of the study. It introduced the research area and situated the present study within its methodological and theoretical perspectives. The previous chapter also provided a sketch of the history and background of the institution of traditional leadership. The chapter traced back the chain of events in terms of how the institution of traditional leadership has metamorphosed over time. Flowing from this background, the present chapter provides a detailed discussion on the history of linkages between traditional leaders and democratically elected representatives in Zimbabwe. It traces this narrative from the pre-colonial era to the present. The rationale for adopting this historiographical approach is to ensure that it is clear from the outset how the process evolved over time. The first section traces the role of traditional leaders in the pre-colonial era. It brings out the various contesting views with regards to the contribution of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe's pursuit of democracy. The second section discusses traditional leaders during the colonial era. In this section the study pursues the argument that while the colonial government played a big role in turning traditional leaders into despots by inventing the "traditional and the customary", it was not a one-sided affair as some traditional leaders bargained and negotiated with colonial settlers to ensure that they could not only keep their thrones but also benefitted through gifts.

In the section on post-colonial Zimbabwe, the study puts under scrutiny the estranged relationship between the post-colonial government and traditional leaders as the government pursued liberal democracy which prioritized elected officials as local agents of democracy and development. The second section on post-colonial Zimbabwe discusses the reasons for the resurgence of the institution of traditional leadership in Zimbabwe within the broader context outlined in Chapter 1. It argues that the formal retraditionalisation of Zimbabwe after Independence began when the ruling ZANU PF began to lose contact with the grassroots resulting in the fetishing of traditional leaders. This is presented as the spark, which ignited the feud between traditional leaders and democratically elected representatives.

2.1. Pre-colonial Zimbabwe – Traditional leaders and Democracy

The debate on the role of the institution of traditional leadership in democratic pursuit in pre-colonial Zimbabwe has seen two different sides representing two divergent points of view. On one hand, one side argues that the institution of traditional leadership is a legitimate institution that has always been democratic in its own right. Wekwete (1991) avers that the institution of traditional leadership operated on the principles of citizen participation, consultation, transparency, accountability and consensus through the village council or open consultative meetings. Ranger (1983) adds that traditional leaders were not dictatorial leaders who wielded the power of life and death over their subjects, nor did they use excessive force to maintain law and order. The ancestral spirits through their human agents, the spirit mediums and the subjects are said to have always removed tyrannical rulers from power (Wekwete, 1991, Bourdillon, 1993).

According to Bourdillon (1993), Chirisamhuru of the Rozvi chieftaincy found himself redundant when he ignored the advice of the ancestral spirits during his rule resulting in a rebellion from his army that was assisted by a neighbouring female chief, Chief Nyamazana. Traditional chiefs would not make unilateral decisions on issues affecting communities, especially those with socio-economic and religious implications (Bourdilon, 1993). Their decisions were based on broad-based consultations with key advisors such as councillors, spirit mediums and headmen (Hammar, 2003). Traditional leaders had to seek guidance from the elders' council that served as representatives of the people without whose approval they could neither pass any legislation nor make any political decisions (Dusing, 2001). These advisors were supposed to collect and submit opinions and developments in their respective community which would assist the leadership to make decisions (Helmsing, 1994). This consultative arrangement compelled traditional leaders to operate with the consent of their people. Many traditional leaders understood and operated within the confines of that framework. Ranger (1988) adds that chiefs from Matabeleland could not make decision without consulting the people. The role of the chief in this process of community-based decision making was to 'reflect and discuss the opinions expressed in the village assembly and ultimately to suggest and publicly approve a decision of consensus, considering different opinions and interests of involved persons' (Dusing, 2001:38).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) states that governance in the Nguni practice in general was democratic in that whenever a group of people felt dissatisfied with the leadership of any powerful head, they had the option of breaking away to establish their own chieftaincies. For instance, when Chief Magugu became powerful and dictatorial as the head of the Khumalo, others from the clan broke away from him and founded new clans in Northern Natal (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). This evidence suggests that the Ndebele King did not rule by decree. State policies were subjected to serious debate and meetings were considered important in deciding the future of the state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Councils were established and their major purpose was to ensure that ordinary people were able to participate in the governance of their state. Similarly, in his study of the Shona people, Bourdillon (2016) argues that according to traditional ideals, a chief could never force his people to do what they did not want to do. He was a leader rather than a ruler. For any matter to see the light of the day, he relied on his ability to influence rather than force. Bourdillon (2016) adds that in the past, no chief could impose his own will on unwilling subjects. If he tried, they would simply move elsewhere and the chief would be left without a following. This was also reflected in Ndebele proverbs such as *inkosi yinkosi ngabantu* (a King is a King because of his people). Ranger (2004) concludes that traditional leadership represented a democratic society whose communal aspirations and values were collectively expressed. Evidence from the literature above shows that Chiefs had a sense of what can be termed as community participation and democracy. Anthropologists often describe traditional political systems as being highly consultative and traditional chiefs as having institutionalised and structural checks on their power (Ranger, 1984).

The alternate view is completely skeptical about the nature of the institution of traditional leadership, describing it as backward, unilateral, patriarchal and oppressive to women and young people (Machingaudze, 1991; Makahamadze, 2009; Kurebwa, 2015). They further look at the institution as irrelevant in a democratic era. The main argument of modernists is that they were selfish chiefs well before colonisation who distorted the institution of traditional leadership. Colonisation only served to exacerbate the situation. This group of scholars thus objects to the institution of traditional leadership being integrated into the modern democratic order (for example Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2001; 2004; Sono, 1993). Ndlovu and Dube (2012) suggest that during the pre-colonial period, only men were eligible to be chiefs. The Ndebele society was strongly patriarchal meaning that *ama*Ndebele considered men the superior gender. This is why the Ndebele terms referring to traditional leaders, *induna* (chief) and *umlisa* (headman) are masculine (Ndlovu and Dube, 2012). Ndlovu-Gatsheni

(2009) concurs that the Ndebele governance system was premised on a patriarchal ideology which viewed women as minors who were incapable of leading men. Ndlovu and Dube (2012) argue that the appointment of Sinqobile Bhebhe in 1996 as a female chief was therefore political and not customary as the appointment of a female chief was against the Ndebele custom. Chief Sinqobile Mabhena, the first Ndebele woman Chief was appointed and assumed office against the advice of chiefs from Matabeleland (Lindgren, 2004).

What can be gleaned from the above is that literature on pre-colonial rural governance portrays differing views about the institution of traditional leadership. One view portrays it as a grassroots democratic system anchored on consultation and consensus building. During this period traditional leaders enjoyed unfetted powers as there were no elected officials to contest their powers. Another view portrays it as an undemocratic and patriarchal institution. This view promotes elected leaders as genuine representatives of the locals ahead of traditional leaders. The two divergent views on the role of traditional leaders in a democracy represent purists' views on the role of traditional leaders in precolonial Zimbabwe. This study takes the view that given its resilience, the institution of traditional leadership is too important to be ignored. It therefore seeks to understand the contestations as well as to understand the costs of this dual polity.

2.2. Traditional leaders in Zimbabwe under the Colonial Rule

The democratic function of the institution of traditional leadership that existed in the pre-colonial period came to an end with the coming of colonial authorities in the country in 1890 (Makahamadze et al, 2009). In the main, especially in British territories, colonial governments changed the nature of chieftaincy by giving them specific administrative responsibilities, integrating them into the modern ruling apparatus and, hence, politicizing them (Keulder, 1998). The colonial masters introduced administrative structures and legislative laws that reduced the function of a chief to that of a government officer (Valk and Wekwete, 1990). A raft of laws were introduced to align the role of traditional leaders to the aspirations of the colonialist. These pieces of legislation included but were not limited to, the 1898 Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, the 1910 High Commissioner's Proclamation, restructuring of chieftainship in 1914 and 1951, the African Affairs Act of 1957, the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967 and the African Law and Regional Courts Act of 1969 (Weinrich, 2000). The overall

purpose of these enactments was to deliberately and strategically position traditional leaders to enhance colonial interests. The institution of traditional leadership became bureaucratized.

A number of scholars have interpreted the African Affairs Act of 1957 as an attempt to stem the tide of nationalism as chiefs had some of their powers restored in order to hoodwink them to support the colonial regime (Vincent and Chikerema, 2014). This was specifically because its enactment coincided with the growth of the African nationalist project. Through the African Affairs Act of 1927, traditional leaders got the power to chair the Tribal Land Authorities that controlled the use and occupation of tribal land (Chigwata, 2015). The Act also gave back to traditional leaders' superficial criminal jurisdiction and power to solve disputes between black Africans while strengthening their hand with regards to the collection of taxes on behalf of the colonial government (Marsh et al., 1974). The year 1937 saw the elevation of the status of the traditional leaders as they acquired ex officio membership of the newly created African Councils (local government structures) in communal areas (Palley, 1966; Chigwata, 2015). This marked the genesis of the coexistence of traditional leaders with elected officials (Chigwata, 2015).

Traditional leaders got a boost when their position was further entrenched in 1957 through the African Councils Act. This saw the elevation of chiefs to Vice- Presidents to District Commissioners who acted as presidents for all African Councils (Holleman, 1968; Weinrich, 2000). This structure had the mandate and powers to impose rates, collect taxes and enact locally binding by-laws (Chigwata, 2015). The recognition of the chiefs and African Councils seemed to go hand in glove with the attempt to thwart the rise of African nationalism in the 1970s. Traditional leaders were encouraged and rewarded for creating Native Councils in their areas as such councils were named after the chief of a given area (Weinrich, 2000). The strategy by the colonial government was to use traditional leaders as much as possible to implement its policies especially where land was concerned. Resultantly they were showered with extensive powers to exercise all that needed control. The pliability of the chiefs often led to a factitious relationship with their communities (Community Law Centre, 2010, Kurebwa, 2015). Traditional leaders also engaged in activities that sought to strengthen them or get favours from the colonial government.

Makumbe (1998) advances the view that patriarchy within the institution of traditional leadership is a product of colonial interference. Colonialists saw no reason why female

traditional leaders should continue being traditional leaders and came up with strategies to muzzle and terminate it. The colonial regime engaged in a methodical way of ensuring that chiefs were not replaced. For instance, Alexander (1997) argues that in 1934, headwoman Mupotedzi of Honde Valley died and the colonial administrators made sure that her successor was not installed. After the deaths of headwomen Shezukuru and Kanganya of Manica Reserve, there was never an attempt to install replacement (Nkomo, 2015). The colonial authorities conveniently ensured that their chieftaincy was terminated. The democracy and the rights that the female chiefs enjoyed during the pre-colonial period came to a screeching halt. DeVisser (2005) holds the view that it should be noted that while their male counterparts were losing most of their executive powers to the colonial administrators, women leaders were being phased out altogether. Notably, female traditional authorities who used to have a lot of influence in the Shona society began to sink into oblivion (Makahamadze et al., 2009).

This section traced the diminishing role of traditional leaders in a democracy in Zimbabwe. It gave the basis for the creation of decentralized despots and the rise of patriarchy within the institution of traditional leadership. It is however wrong to blame the colonial administrators totally for the acts of injustice and the descent into autocracy by some of the traditional leaders against their people. While the colonial authorities did not force anyone to become a chief, they coaxed them using gifts and salaries. It could therefore be argued that the introduction of incentives in the form of money attracted many Africans to the extent of wanting to work for the colonial government at all cost.

2.3. Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-1987 – Discontinuities

The Marxist-Leninist inspired Zimbabwe African Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government that replaced the colonial regime in 1980 discredited the institution of chieftainship right from the outset (Makumbe, 2010). ZANU PF had come to power through promises of creating a 'people's government' and it promised the masses a greater voice in the affairs of the state, an idea expressed through its description of 1980 as 'the year of people's power' (Rambanepasi and Mlambo, 2009)). The history of traditional leaders with communities, their perceived alliance with the colonial masters in their bid to emasculate nationalists' movements had a bearing on the attitude of the post-colonial government on traditional leaders. Therefore, the relationship between the new government and the chiefs was frosty, ostensibly a

response to 'the wishes of the people' (Mutizwa and Mangwizi, 2015). At independence, the government adopted socialist policies that promoted democratic representation at the local level and excluded the roles of traditional leaders (Bhebe and Ranger, 2001). The anti-chief's rhetoric was intended to create animosity between chiefs and their subjects (Mutizwa-Mangwiza, 1991). Various senior government officials when addressing communities capture this view in statements. For instance, in 1986 the Minister of Local Government said:

> They were puppets. It is not the government that is refusing these chiefs. It is the people themselves in the villages who are refusing to accept these chiefs. I do not think that the government will be able to help in the circumstances where chiefs caused ill-feeling between themselves and the people (Herald, 27 June 1986).

New policies and laws were introduced to redefine the institution as well as its roles. These laws included the District Councils Act (1980), the Communal Land Act (1981), the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act (1981) and the Prime Minister's Directive (1984) (Makumbe, 2010). These laws shifted chiefs from being an active political and administrative factor to being outsiders in the hierarchy of politics and rural governance (Orbediah, 2013). In a direct reversal of the assumed powers of traditional leaders, Chiefs were barred from allocating land, both for farming and for settlement (Makumbe, 2010). These responsibilities were shifted to Rural District councils, a body composed of elected leaders (Makumbe, 2010) Obadiah (2013) adds that chiefs could no longer dispossess villagers of their land. The roles of the chiefs, including that of allocating land, were transferred to district councils, Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) (Chakaipa, 2010). The councillors, village district committees and the village development committees believed themselves to possess exclusive authority over communal land leading to conflicts with chiefs (Chatiza, 2010). The side-lining of the chiefs and the promotion of elected leaders was willed and systematically done by the government (Makumbe, 1998).

The government subjected traditional leaders to more rigorous legislation than they had ever experienced in the past (Chigwata, 2015). The Tribal Trust Land Act (1967) was repealed and replaced with the Communal Land Act (1981). Under the new Act, land responsibilities were transferred to Rural District Councils (RDCs). The District Councils Act (1980), whose main import was to consolidate the 220 African Councils into 55 District Councils, had already minimized the role of chiefs in rural administration

(Chigwata, 2015). Chiefs were ex-officio members of the Rural District Councils, but they could not vote or make binding decisions, a factor that negatively affected their contribution to land matters (Ranger, 2001).

The import of the legal and policy reforms was that they significantly affected the authority of chiefs, taking away their most significant powers, that is, rural land allocation and judicial affairs, giving those powers to elected officials (Chigwata, 2015). They were reduced to little more than 'cultural relics', as The Financial Gazette was to describe the situation years later (Makumbe, 2010). The government raised various arguments to justify the political and administrative exclusion of chiefs (Chatiza, 2012). It harped the rhetoric of 'state-building on new terms situating the justification in the developmentalist narrative typically popular in newly independent African states (Chakaipa, 2010).

Mutizwa-Mangwiza (1991) recalls that the government offered a number of reasons towards the diminishing role of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. Firstly, they argued it was a response to the practical and bureaucratic needs which were meant to cater for the needs of a changing society from a new government. The need to modernize the state, update the judicial system and ensure that it conformed to 'international standards influenced the decision (Mutizwa-Mangwiza, 1991). Secondly, in tandem with the principles of popular governance, it was meant to make judicial processes simpler, more inclusive and more accessible to the grassroots. Thirdly, the government insisted that rural people had lost confidence in chiefs and, thus, had to be rescued from the 'tyranny of the war years and hence it was important that power be given back to the people through taking back legitimacy to the grassroots (Mutizwa- Mangwiza, 1991).

While chiefs did not appreciate this weakening of their powers, the obtaining situation forced them to accept the new terms which defined their new lowly status. For instance, a study by Bhebhe and Ranger (2001), revealed that most traditional leaders in Makoni, Zimbabwe, were victimised for their perceived role as opponents of the nationalist struggle and resultantly there was a limit as to how much they would protest the government's neglect of them.

This early post-colonial period in Zimbabwe saw the attempt at the creation of democratic structures by government as a way of trying to modernise the communities (Makumbe, 2010). The push for modernisation also witnessed the diminishing role of

traditional leaders in a democracy in preference for elected councillors. The government established democratic institutions administered by elected people to lead rural development processes (Makumbe, 2010). As chieftaincy was hereditary, it was viewed as inimical to democracy. The new government of Zimbabwe set out to totally diminish the role of traditional leaders and favoured elected officials thereby creating a fertile ground for confrontation between elected officials and traditional leaders.

2.4. Zimbabwe from 1987 – 1998: Damage Control

This period was a significant moment in the history of traditional leadership in Zimbabwe. Zhou (2012) advances the view that the year 1987 marked another shift in the relationship between traditional leaders and the government. The government initiated a new direction in order to reverse the antipathy that had characterized the first seven years of independence as it sought to ingratiate itself with chiefs (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). To accomplish this, it had to be seen to be enhancing the powers of chiefs. In that regard, the period between 1987 and 1998 was dominated by unfulfilled promises and pretentious actions that however were designed to keep traditional leaders not too far away from the post-colonial government (Ranger, 2004). There developed a new and patronising narrative designed to endear chiefs to the government (Muzondidya, 2009).

As various economic and political difficulties converged in the late 1980s to threaten ZANU PF's rule, the party addressed chiefs and chiefly issues in more conciliatory terms (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997). Confrontational language against chiefs was discouraged. Nkomo (2010) advances the view that to show that its attitudes had changed towards traditional leadership institution, in August 1987 Senator Patrick Chinamasa was rebuked by the generality of ZANU PF parliamentarians after he suggested that chiefs had no role to play in modern administration and politics (Chikerema, 2013). Chigwata (2015) postulates that there was accelerated activity in parliament as debates, bills and laws were introduced and passed in order to restore chiefs' powers.

The enacted laws included the Chiefs and Headmen Amendment Act (1989) and the Customary Law and Local Courts Act (1990) (Chigwata, 2015). The bills sought to restore the power of chiefs to preside over community courts while headmen presided over primary courts in cultural and civil matters (Makumbe, 2010). The government

presented this political intervention as a 'response to practical realities' and a 'very necessary step of bringing chiefs and headmen back to their rightful place (Ranger, 2004). The chiefs' ability to judicially express themselves was severely restricted by the nature of cases they handled (Bourdillon, 2010). The government stipulated that they had no jurisdiction over cases such as incest, *ilobolo* (bride price), child maintenance and custody of minor children among others. These were for the magistrates' courts (Bourdillon, 2010). Such actions seemed to be in tandem with the rhetoric from government with regards to the importance of traditional leaders. Chiefs were described as 'guardians of our culture', 'pillars of social cohesion and stability', 'partners in development' and 'custodians of the land' (Chikerema, 2013).

It was firm government policy that land planning, allocation and administration stayed with party councillors and planning technocrats (David, 2014). For instance, in the Makoni RDC, in which chiefs had lesser influence, local authorities continued to control land processes (Nkomo, 2015). As Alexander (2019) notes, there emerged a paradox between the enhanced status accorded chiefs and the rejection of chieftaincy-based claims to land, and between populist pronouncements of the post-colonial government. The government still preferred elected councillors to oversee important processes at the local level.

According to Chatiza (2010), technical reasoning dictated that trained and knowledgeable people would lead land planning and extension services. The rationale was that there was meticulous long-term planning involved. Looking at most of villages in Zimbabwe in the period between 1987 and 1998, they needed major infrastructural development. It involved the installation of water pipes and electricity cables, and the construction of roads, schools, clinics, dams and police stations. The technocratic demands were beyond most chiefs (Chatiza, 2010). Councillors also actively opposed chiefly involvement in land matters (Makumbe, 2010). They made various counterarguments against chiefs. Amongst them was that chiefs lacked commitment to development issues and were not equipped to technocratically make viable decisions (Ranger, 2004). Relations between chiefs and councillors were very strained. While these institutions linked on several occasions in their line of work, traditional leaders resented elected councillors as they accused them of taking over their duties (Moyo and Chambati, 2013).

From this section it can be gauged that the government did not want to relinquish its relationship with chiefs as it wanted to utilise them as a political resource. Despite their

immediate post-independence slump in popularity, chiefs were generally respected in the rural areas. They were accepted as the natural leaders of their villages with long-term attachment to their villages. The unintended consequences of these actions by the government are that they led to a conflict between the traditional leaders and elected officials.

2.5. Zimbabwe Post-1999 – Continuities

After eighteen years of independence, the years that were marked by neglect of traditional leaders in support of democratically elected structures, the ZANU PF government decided to reconfigure its relationship with traditional leaders and treat them as allies rather than foes. The first real indicator that there was a shift in the relationship was the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998, which was used to restore the legislative powers of traditional leaders (Chigwata, 2014). Ranger (2004) argues that the resurgence of chieftaincy in Zimbabwe beginning in 1998 did not signify the advent of cultural revivalism and traditionalist perspective towards the traditional leadership institution, neither did it signify re-tribalisation of political public space in Zimbabwe (Hammar, 2005). Instead, chiefs were courted to shore up sagging political fortunes of the ZANU PF government which was facing a serious political challenge from an emergent popular opposition movement - the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 (Alexander, 2018). Moyana (2000) best represents this view by observing that when faced with the real threat that the growing opposition would garner support from the communal lands, ZANU PF opportunistically moved quickly to incorporate traditional leaders as a political constituency.

The newly acquired roles given to traditional leaders by the Traditional Leaders Act (2000) were an exact re-enactment of the colonial roles of chiefs and allied traditional leaders (Chigwata, 2014). These roles included keeping and maintaining population records from the village level, promoting and upholding cultural values, overseeing the collection of taxes and levies for the rural district councils, and ensuring that land and natural resources were used in accordance with national legislation (Moyana 2000). Valorised and fetishized by these new powers, responsibilities and rewards, some traditional leaders were made to play a role in twisting voters towards ZANU PF and they became ‘vote banks’ (Moyo, 2019; Fayayo, 2018; Makumbe, 2012).

The ZANU PF government chose to invest resources in wooing chiefs who could mobilise votes on their behalf. The government of Zimbabwe raised chiefs’ social

status, placing them at a higher pedestal than most senior civil servants by giving them salaries and other incentives (Makahamadze, Grand, and Tavuyanago, 2009). For instance, as the 2000 elections approached chiefs received untaxed allowances, 15 times higher than the elected councillors (Alexander, 2018). This was soon after President Mugabe had made a public apology for neglecting the chiefs since independence (Ranger, 2001; Moyo 2019). Makumbe (2010) point out that as a result of the pampering the chiefs were getting, they began to be treated as more important than elected officials creating conflicts, an issue that is pertinent to this thesis. This was similar to the situation during the colonial period in 1967 when chiefs' salaries were raised to buy their loyalty.

Moyo (2019) observes that unsurprisingly, the fetishized traditional chiefs that sit in the Senate have always voted in support of ZANU PF regardless of the merits and demerits of the issue, most of the times giving an edge in a battle of elected parties in the Senate. Because they are appointed by the president, and they are paid monthly allowances by the state, chiefs feel obliged to politically support the president's party at all times (Makumbe, 2010). Such developments underline the serious adulteration that the institution of chieftainship has undergone in the post-colonial period, and the extent to which it has been patronised by the ruling party since 2000 (Ncube, 2011). Similarly, the marriage between traditional leaders and the state has seen the state dishing out a number of other privileges including subsidized vehicles to selected chiefs in 2004, boreholes, piped water, and electricity and in some cases houses (Moyo, 2019).

The chiefs were also mandated to distribute government food handouts in times of drought. All these favours were availed just before major elections and have made traditional leadership positions more lucrative and attractive than before (Dodo, 2013). In this way, politicians appear to be able to trade guaranteed tenure for the traditional authorities in exchange of votes (Kadt and Larreguy, 2014). Thus, in a personalised local environment like a rural village, citizens do not wish to alienate themselves from those with near absolute authority over essential public goods such as water, food and land. Doing so would be self-destructive.

Traditional leaders benefited from the Land Reform Programme and the Farm Mechanisation Programme as some of them now own vast tracks of land which they cannot even use effectively (Alexander, 2018). Through this programme, they received tractors, seeds, ploughs, carts and fertilisers (Makahamadze, Grand, and

Tavuyanago, 2009). Moreover, chiefs were given powers to spearhead development programs in their areas, including distributing land to their subjects. The post-colonial government appointed a legion of chiefs, headmen/women and village heads to preside over the newly resettled farmers across the country (Matyszak, 2018). The majority of these newly 'minted' traditional leaders were members of the ruling party and part of their mandates was to ensure that all beneficiaries of the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme under their jurisdiction remain perpetually indebted and loyal to ZANU PF which is touted as their benefactor (Kurebwa, 2014).

As already mentioned, in return for these chiefly privileges, benefits and favours, the beneficiaries were supposed to be loyal to the Party-State Alliance (Hammar et al., 2003). The role played by fetishized traditional leadership institution in delivering the rural vote for ZANU PF was clientelistic, patrimonial and coercive, with chiefs, headmen/women and village heads acting as brokers between the ruling party and rural voters (Moyo, 2019). Mapuve (2011) was correct when he observed that the political move to re-empower chiefs and allied traditional leaders in the late 1990s and early 2000s, paid huge electoral dividends for ZANU PF. The majority of the rural voters 'complied with directives of the chiefs who acted as local patrons of the ruling party.' As a result, Robert Mugabe and subsequently Emmerson Mnangagwa and their lieutenants in ZANU PF have maintained a total domination in electoral terms since the foundational elections in 1980 to date. In this way, the fetishized traditional leadership institution is part of the broader electoral manipulation mechanics in Zimbabwe. In fact, the traditional leadership institution was co-opted by the ruling party and the new party-chieftaincy alliance and has had adverse influence in the electoral politics of rural Zimbabwe (Makumbe, 2010). In a crucial way, chiefly powers were sufficiently reified and inverted by the political elite for electoral purposes. This has had the effect of promoting the conflict and contestations between traditional leaders and elected officials. For the purposes of this thesis it would then be important to determine if these contestations are party based. Importantly, are the contestations only found between chiefs and members of parties that oppose ZANU PF or are they mainly between elected officials and traditional leaders?

The 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution gave more impetus to the rise and importance of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. It recognises the role of the institution of traditional leadership alongside modern state structures (Chigwata, 2015). Section 281 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe specifically outlines some of the acceptable and unacceptable conduct of traditional leaders, stating that they must not be members of

any political party or in any way participate in partisan politics, act in a partisan manner, further the interests of any political party or violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of any person (Chikerema, 2014). The 2013 constitution also states that traditional leaders are responsible for promoting and upholding cultural values, traditions and heritage, powers to administer communal land and resolve disputes among people in their communities (Chigwata, 2015). Traditional leaders are also represented in parliament and provincial councils. In the Rural District Council (RDC), they sit as ex-officio members. While ordinarily these would be platforms that promote inclusivity and ensure that the wisdom of traditional leaders is also taken into cognizance, these platforms have been used to undermine elected officials by ZANU PF. The traditional leadership institution does not seem to be the problem, it has been caught up in a battle for survival and the political machinations of ZANU PF.

In sum, the revival of traditional authority in Zimbabwe was part of a broad political and electoral strategy aimed at sustaining the ruling party through electoral manipulation, given the support ZANU-PF has in rural areas, where these chiefs have jurisdiction. The resurgence of traditional leadership meant that they got preferential treatment ahead of their elected counterparts. This is what seems to have sustained mistrust between the two leadership structures.

2.6. Conclusion

What is clear from the literature discussed above is that the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials has always been complicated. It has always been influenced by the relationship between the government of the day and traditional leaders. From 1980 to 1998, government had frosty relations with traditional leaders. During that period the government promoted elected officials ahead of traditional leaders. After 1998, with the rise of a formidable opposition in Zimbabwe, the government reconsidered its relations with traditional leaders and considered them allies. While a number of traditional leaders willingly allowed themselves to be used as ZANU PF electoral commissars, as a way of keeping their positions, a number stuck to their guns and united their communities. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth scrutiny of the literature that was reviewed in the course of this study.

CHAPTER 3

Literature Review

3.0. Introduction

The previous chapter provided a detailed discussion of the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials in Zimbabwe from the pre-colonial era to present. This chapter provides a comprehensive literature review of the study. Chapter 1 acknowledged the extant literature on traditional leadership and also showed how the literature has been dominated by the debate relating to the relevance of traditional leaders in modern governance. As such, there is still a dearth of studies focusing on the implications of the coexistence between traditional leaders and elected officials. Amabhungane (2018) notes that the resilience of the institution of traditional leaders has meant that it cannot continue to be ignored in modern governance systems. The roles of traditional leaders have changed from merely being caretakers of the traditional system to being active agents of peace, climate change, development and critical players in the electoral system.

Further, studies on the institution of traditional leadership have frequently sought to understand how the institution of traditional leadership and individual traditional leaders have been used as vote banks across Africa in general and in Zimbabwe in particular (see Moyo, 2019; Fayayo, 2018). A lot of these studies have been devoted to understanding how the fetishizing of traditional leaders has led them to being willing tools of governing parties in furthering their electoral prospects. Such studies are also reviewed here as they undoubtedly have the potential to shed light on the relationship between the traditional leaders and elected officials after elections. Zimbabwean scholars (see Makumbe, 2010; Vincent and Chikerema, 2014; Makahamadze et al, 2009) have been embroiled in the modernists and traditionalists debate to the extent that there is a conspicuous scholarship gap on the implications of the relationship between the elected officials and traditional leaders. More importantly, not much has been done to look at how these two institutions could be utilised to enhance democracy. Many scholars working on local governance, particularly rural governance, do mention contestations, albeit in passing, without actually dwelling on the implications of these contestations. No empirical studies have been done to ascertain the impact of the relationship between elected officials and traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. This research is undoubtedly ground breaking in that sense.

Exclusive of this introduction, the chapter is divided into seven major sections. Section 3.1 conceptualizes traditional leadership and brings out the working definition adopted in this thesis. Section 3.2 is divided into three sub-sections. It brings out the theories that have been used to explain the relationship between traditional leaders and the state. Section 3.2.1 discusses the modernists' school of thought that argues that traditional leaders and democracy cannot exist and actually pushes towards the dissolution of the institution of traditional leaders. Section 3.2.2 discusses the mixed school of thought. This approach recognizes the resilience of the institution of traditional leadership despite spirited attempts to do away with it. The school proposes coexistence between traditional leaders and state structures (elected officials). Section 3.2.3 discusses the traditionalists approach, a pro-traditionalist approach that traces the consultative nature of the institution in as far as decision-making is concerned. The approach further argues that traditional leaders have a role to play in modern democracies.

Section 3.3.1 locates the institution of traditional leadership within a global perspective. The section brings out the various differing roles of traditional leaders as well as the nature of their interactions with elected officials. The section also look at specific countries and spells out the nature of the relationship between the monarchy and the elected officials. Section 3.4 looks at traditional leadership in Africa in a broader perspective. It traces how post-colonial Africa initially decided to sacrifice the institution at the altar of modernity but later reversed this decision. Within this context, the section then analyses the re-traditionalisation of Africa in the 1990s. Subsection 3.5 zeroes-in on Zimbabwe to look at how this context fits in the broader discussion covered in the other two sub-sections. The institution of traditional leadership and its relationship with state structure is assessed from the pre-colonial era to the post 1999 period which shows not only the resilience of the institution of traditional leadership, but the changing attitudes of the various regimes towards the institution. Section 3.6 ties the loose ends by looking at the history of contestation between traditional leaders and elected officials in Zimbabwe as a way of bringing out the scholarship gap. Finally, section 3.7 concludes the chapter by summarizing the major arguments revealed in the literature. The conclusion also briefly glances into the introduction of the next chapter (Chapter 4).

3.1. Conceptualising Traditional Leadership – A General Overview

In much of the literature, the definition of traditional leadership is contested for a number of reasons. Reviewed literature shows that different scholars with different intents and purposes have different conceptions of the institution of traditional leadership. A number of academics have attempted to conceptualize traditional leadership from various perspectives. Dusing (2001) view traditional leadership as the authority that is based on the belief in traditions and customs that have been effective for a long time. They emphasize shared history and geography which result in agreed views of traditions and customs as the mainstay of traditional leadership. The history and the geography result in some areas and monuments being named after the traditional leaders who are/were dominant in those areas. However, the definition assumes that these traditions are static. Certain processes, especially colonialism, did a lot to alter and interpret these traditions. What we see in the post-colonial era is the emergence of traditions that were rooted in the African past but were interpreted and negotiated by both the ruled and rulers alike.

James (2005) argues that traditional leaders (chiefs, kraal heads and headmen) are the link between communities and ancestors. The emphasis on this view is the spiritual role of traditional leaders. As communities believe that they are protected and communicate with the ancestors through their traditional leaders, the latter therefore occupy a very important place in the lives of the local communities. Against this background, Phimister (2004) concludes that traditional leaders therefore serve as an integral aspect of the cultural aspects of a community.

Oomen (2005) argues that in most African communities, traditional leaders, beliefs and customs bind communities together and provide the basis of social capital without which Africans would not have a community. Post-colonial Africa has been characterised by a mixed breed of traditional leaders. Alexander (2018) argues that they are not homogenous and they vary in their form and content. Omen's definition elevates traditional leaders to being the glue that ensures coexistence and cooperation in the communities. Ntsebeza (2005) notes that traditional leaders are those who rule and govern their societies on the basis of traditional practices and values of their respective societies. Similarly, Comaroff and Comaroff (2018) define traditional leaders as rulers whose basis of authority is by virtue of their association with the customary way of ruling a community. All these definitions seem to be different and yet they have one thing in common. They all emphasize that while customs define

most traditional leaders, these traditional practices, values and customary ways of ruling are not necessarily homogenous. Moreover, they also seem to present static traditions that are pure and untampered with yet a lot has changed over time. They are specific to communities and are a result of shared history. In a nutshell, any definition of traditional leadership is bound to reflect on the local context while not refuting the general understanding of traditional leaders in the broader context.

The definitions presented above cover a wide spectrum of leaders, their basis of occupying different levels of traditional hierarchies, their mandates as well as their spiritual roles. But, as advised by Baldwin (2015), it is prudent to conscientiously avoid reference to the mode by which traditional leaders are selected because this has historically varied across groups. The current traditional leadership system in Zimbabwe can also be questioned given the fact that the British system of indirect rule imposed some chiefs who did not exist prior to the colonial rule. This has posed some problems in postcolonial Zimbabwe where we have conflicts and contestations over certain chieftaincies. For the present study, the institution of traditional leadership can be appropriately understood as it relates to those leaders whose titles include chiefs, headmen and kraal heads. These are the hierarchies used by Ndlela (2010), among others. At the top of the ladder are chiefs who reign over tribal areas where their people live and hold the right for traditional use. Within the tribal area or district, the headman on behalf of the chief runs the local or village level. These hierarchies are respected by traditional societies in Zimbabwe.

This definition auger well into the scope of the present study that seeks to understand the implications of polity dualism on deliberative democracy. The significance of this definition is that it affords the concept of traditional leaders to be extended to include even traditional leaders who are elected. The study is then able to determine if the behaviour of elected traditional leaders and hereditary traditional leaders towards elected officials is different or the same. More so, the study will determine if elected traditional leaders and elected government officials can co-exist.

3.2 Theories of Traditional Leadership

The literature on the role of traditional leaders in post-colonial Africa can be grouped under three schools of thought. These are: the modernists school of thought, mixed government school of thought and the traditionalists' school of thought. Each of these

will be discussed in detail below. These theories are discussed to show the plurivesalty of knowledge on traditional leadership and democracy.

3.2.1 The Modernists' School of Thought

The modernists school of thought is attributed to a number of proponents who include Mamdani (1996); Ntsebeza (2004, 2006); and LiPuma and Koeble (2009). These scholars dismiss the institution of traditional leadership as undemocratic because of its hereditary nature and its bureaucratic commandeering attitude imposed upon it by colonial oppressors. Colonialists used chiefs as decentralized despots and ensured that they were free from restraint from peers and communities to further their vision of a bifurcated state (Mamdani, 1996). The chiefs aided the colonialists in reducing rural dwellers into subjects who had no voice. In view of this, Mamdani (1996) concept of subjects and citizens is derived from how colonialism worked to deal with what they termed the native question. It was about how a minority of whites would rule a majority of conquered black people. They developed various forms of colonial administration known as direct, indirect and even apartheid rule. In this context colonialism invented tradition including what Mamdani (1996) terms decentralised despotism. Subjectivity was elaborated through law into citizens (whites), subject races (Indians and coloureds) and then tribes (subjects) governed under tradition and custom. Mamdani's argument is that African leaders inherited this structure and assumed that chiefs were indeed authentic African rulers. Post-colonial leaders did not realise that if the chiefly institution had undergone inventions by colonialism into an authoritarian form of local governance were democratic rights and freedoms are stifled under the guise of tradition and custom.

Corroborating Mamdani's view, Ntsebeza (2004, 2006) adds that systems of traditional authorities are incompatible with democracy since they fail to pass the test of aggregative democracy, which gives the citizens the opportunity to choose a leader to represent their interests. Inherent in Ntsebeza's argument is the view that systems of traditional leaders are incompatible with the democratic system of elected officials. Ntsebeza (2004) notes that ensuring that all rural communities enjoy the right to choose their representatives should be the desirable approach by the post-colonial states rather than mixing democratically elected structures with a hereditary system of leadership. In support of the views from Mamdani and Ntsebeza, Kohn (2014) described the attempt to find a role for traditional leaders in a democracy in South

Africa as the product of short-term horse-trading aimed at appeasing traditional leaders' hunger for power. According to Kohn (2014), this approach, while purportedly remaining true to our constitutional ethos, falls horribly short of the democratic mark whose major principle are elections.

LiPuma and Koeble (2009) argue that the institution of traditional leadership is likely to entrench autocracy, patrimony and despotism. Koeble (2009) concurs with Mamdani (1996), pointing out that traditional leadership impedes the development of a prosperous, democratic and just society. She concludes that this system does not deserve a place in any progressive society. Bennett (1998) also avers that chiefs' responsiveness towards community members, which they existed prior to colonialism, was eroded by the colonial masters as chiefs became more loyal and answerable to them. According to Msindo (2012), demanding accountability and transparency from chiefs is considered a nonstarter and an affront as they think their authority cannot be questioned.

This neoliberal school of thought has provided a lens through which some scholars have analysed the role of traditional leaders and the impact that colonialism had on the institution. It however completely ignores the resilience and relevance of traditional leaders in communities. According to Mngomezulu (2009) ignoring such a resilient and pervasive institution might be short sighted. Research by Logan (2009) and Baldwin (2015) points to the fact that traditional leaders can actually contribute effectively in building democracy. Logan (2009) argues in her study that communities under study saw no challenges with the coexistence of traditional leaders and elected officials. Baldwin (2015) emphasizes the contribution of traditional leaders as development brokers. These views show that while the institution of traditional leadership might have been poisoned by the colonial system, its durability and pervasiveness has meant that it cannot be ignored. Inherent in this statement is the view that the question should no longer be about whether traditional leaders can contribute to the democratic transition of African communities but how the institution can contribute to this democratic transition.

For the purposes of the present study, the neo-liberal view has a lot of challenges. Its main focus on the colonial era blinds it to a number of roles that traditional leaders have been playing in post-colonial Africa. While its emphasis has been on the compatibility between the traditional leadership system and democracy, evidence on the ground suggests that there is co-existence in this polity dualism. The present

research proceeds from the realisation that although the institution of traditional leadership has had problems, its resilience has meant that ways have to be found to ensure that it works, especially when it has become clear that the institution cannot be eroded.

3.2.2 The Polity Dualism School of Thought

Buur and Kyed (2007) argue that polity dualism describes the coexistence of two distinct political and legal systems in the same territory, and applying to the same people: the state and traditional governance. Scholars have introduced various terms to designate this particular institutional setup; mixed government (Sklar, 1994), twilight institutions (Lund, 2007), or hybrid political orders (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009). Proponents of this school of thought believe that it is possible for the traditional leadership institution to co-exist with the democratically elected officials – as long as the roles of each are clearly defined.

For Ladley (1990), both traditional leaders and elected officials have special roles, which require their separate existence and can leverage their positions to jointly come up with decisions that enhance democracy. To this end, Kobkua (2003) foresees a situation whereby traditional authorities are given a quota of representation in council and work side by side with elected councillors leading to a new hybrid product, which taps the positives from both worlds. Ndlela (2010) also believes in the quest for a formula that would reflect on the contemporary African state where both the elected structures and traditional structures have a recognized role to play in leadership. Ndlela et al (2010) argues that the harmonization process ultimately produces a product that learns from the past and the present to create a better future.

Mngomezulu (2009) argues that given the resilience and pervasive influence of traditional leaders in African setups, ignoring them would be ill-conceived. Mngomezulu (2009) appeals for a pragmatic and localized approach to the conceptualization of democracy that is strongly rooted in history. He advocated in an international conference held in Durban (25–26 October 2007) that there must be a continental approach to the question of redefining the role of traditional leaders in a democracy. A study by Logan (2009) further consolidates this position. Rather than responding to their political environment as if selected and elected leaders opposed one another, and that they must make an either-or choice between them, the

respondents' views in that study highlighted a strong positive linkage between the two leadership institutions (Logan, 2009).

This study takes the understanding that this view is a departure from the purists' views of the neo-liberalists and neo-traditionalists whose either-or approaches imply that either there is a role or no role for traditional leaders in a democracy. The polity dualism approach is grounded on the reality that there is a need to consider the contextual differences of the African communities within a modernizing world. At a time when Africans are looking for 'African solutions to African problems' (Olukoshi, 1998; Schmidt, 1996; Mngomezulu, 2019), while also being mindful of the impact of globalization, the notion of polity dualism seems worth pursuing.

3.2.3 The Traditionalists School of Thought

This school of thought is spearheaded by scholars like Fisiy (1995) who argues that traditional authorities are leaders of their communities in their own right. In the eyes of Fisiy (1995), traditional leaders are entitled to natural leadership of their people by virtue of the experience acquired during pre-colonial times which has been passed from one generation to the other. According to Fisiy (1995), despite the impact of colonialism on the institution of traditional leaders, it is still significant and fundamental for modern-day governance. Scholars like Afigbo (1972) and Alexander (2013) argue that the traditional leadership institution is fundamentally democratic. Attempts by a number of countries to at best side-line or at worst dismantle the institution have been unsuccessful because of the resilience of the institution and its pervasive influence (Aithnard, 1976; Alexander, 2006). This lends weight to the argument that traditional leadership must be an integral part of the democratic society.

Mandela (1994) argues that traditional leaders' way of village-level deliberation and consensus-oriented decision-making is not only a superior process for the African continent as it evolves from pre-colonial tradition, but it also represents a form of democracy that is more authentic than the western version. Ndlela (2010) adds that traditional leadership without external interferences operated on the principles of community participation, consultation and consensus, through an accepted level of transparency through the village council or open tribal consultative meetings.

The neo-traditionalist school paints a rosy picture about the role of traditional leaders in a democracy. Its major challenge is that it assumes that the institution of traditional leadership is static and as such has not been influenced by a number of processes that it has gone through. These processes include colonization, slave trade as well as the adoption of the neoliberal agenda by post-colonial governments. While the approach blames most of the challenges of the traditional leadership institution on colonialism, the school of thought absolves the institution of all blemishes. It also seems to downplay the fact that some traditional leaders were willing participants in the subjugation of Africans by colonialists. Studies of traditional leaders show how overzealous traditional leaders were more than willing to sacrifice their own people as long as the system or practice personally benefitted them (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1991). In addition, there seems to be a detachment between the pre-colonial traditional practices and the current practices.

This study therefore takes the view that the institution of traditional leadership has gone through a metamorphosis as a result of its interaction with a number of global processes. Portraying the institution as the lone voice of reason unnecessarily protects it from scrutiny, which would otherwise build it and enhance its stature.

3.3 Traditional Leaders, Political Systems and Democracy

Much of the literature locates African traditional institutions of governance into two political systems, based on their pre-colonial forms: (a) Chieftaincy in the decentralized pre-colonial political systems; and (b) chieftaincy in the centralized political systems.

3.3.1 Chieftaincy in Decentralized political systems

In large parts of Africa, pre-colonial political systems were highly decentralized and decision-making was carried out through local entities such as kinship grouping (Baldwin, 2015). These systems were mostly predicated on collective decision-making arrangements and dispute resolution in this kind of system mainly involved mediations rather than through adversarial procedures that produced winners and losers (Ladley, 1997). There is collective participation by all eligible members of the community in both the creation and enforcement of rules. Its major disadvantage is that decision-making generally takes time, since consensus building is a time-consuming process.

3.3.2 Traditional leadership in centralized systems

In other parts of Africa, kings and monarchs operated in a centralized system of governance. In centralized systems, the level of concentration of power in traditional leaders differed as some rulers enjoyed absolute power while others had theirs curtailed through a number of mechanisms (Nieuwaal, 1996; Vaughan, 2003). In some cases these checks and balances, and accountability measures were weak while in others the systems were relatively better defined with constitutional provisions and customary laws authorizing a council of elders, religious leaders, and administrative staff of the chiefs to check the power of the leaders and keep them accountable (Thebe, 2013; Solomon, 2015; Sithole, 2010). However, as stated by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), various informal mechanisms also fostered accountability. One example was the ability of common people to shift their allegiance away from a despotic chief to other chiefs.

The classification of traditional institutions into centralized and decentralized systems serves to show how the character of traditional leaders before colonisation, while useful as an analytical entry point, is an inadequate conceptual framework for understanding traditional institutions. It masks significant differences among the characteristics of each type together with similarities between types, because it lumps various chieftaincy systems together with differing levels of accountability.

Moreover, in both cases issues of hierarchy and patriarchy seem to be treated the same way. While decentralized systems are potrayed as consensus based, the ability of women to participate is dependent on their ability to compete economically. In general, women who control wealth or who are engaged in the production of high-value products have greater access to decision-making power relative to women who do not have economic independence. Decision-making process is rarely inclusive of all members of the community. Women and young adults, for example, though not formally prohibited by rule, are often presumed to be represented by their husbands and fathers, respectively, and are customarily excluded from participation in the decision-making assemblies.

3.4 Stationary Bandits Versus Roving Bandits

This is a governance model, which traces how warlords ruled and were able to create chiefdoms through taxation. It owes its existence to Mancur Olson, who in his 1993 seminal work on Dictatorship, Democracy and Development characterized the various governance systems. Olson (1993) differentiates between stationary bandits and

roving bandits. Stationary bandits would impose taxes on the people and offer some public services and protection from other warlords. On the other hand, roving bandits were not worried about the future; they looted, plundered and moved to the next area where they will still do the same thing. The fundamental question this framework grapples with is; why villagers would prefer stationary bandits who continuously steal from a given group of victims to roving bandits who soon departed? The framework suggests that villagers are uncomfortable with roving bandits because their mode of operations results in occasional plunder.

The stationary bandit successfully monopolises taxation in his domain and in turn offers protection to his people. According to Olson (1993), if he steals only through regular taxation, then his subjects know that they can keep whatever proportion of their output is left after they have paid their taxes. Since all of the settled bandit's victims are for him a source of tax payments, he also has an incentive to prohibit the murder or maiming of his subjects. The framework posits that victims are comfortable with the rational monopolization of theft-in rather than occasional unplanned plunder from roving bandits. With stationery bandits they are able to retain something after paying tax and therefore also have an incentive to save and to invest, thereby increasing future.

Olson (1993) argues that in a world of roving banditry there is little or no incentive for anyone to produce or accumulate anything that may be stolen and, thus, little for bandits to steal. Bandit rationality, accordingly, induces the bandit leader to seize a given domain, to make himself the ruler of that domain, and to provide a peaceful order and other public goods for its inhabitants, thereby obtaining more in tax theft than he could have obtained from migratory plunder. The gigantic increase in output that normally arises from the provision of a peaceful order and other public goods gives the stationary bandit a far larger take than he could obtain without providing government.

Baldwin (2015) has argued that in as far as traditional leaders are socially and economically embedded leaders, they can usefully be thought of as stationary bandits. These means that in their operations they cannot completely exploit or ignore the local population because this will ultimately harm their own interests. Instead, they have incentives to facilitate local development projects within their communities over their lifetimes.

3.5 Global Context and Debates

Traditional governance is a global phenomenon. The recognition of customary forms of leadership persists in many parts of the world. According to Kadt (2014), countries as diverse as India, Indonesia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Tuvalu explicitly recognize forms of traditional governance and customary law. This holds as much for royalty in the United Kingdom as for First Nation people in Canada. In this regard it is fair to conclude that African chieftaincy is not exceptional (Kadt, 2014). In that sense, when some Africans insist that the institution of traditional leadership should continue to exist even under the democratic dispensation, this should not be seen as an incongruity. The following is a synopsis of available literature on the relationship between traditional leaders, state structures and elected officials in a number of countries outside Africa.

In a study of the monarchy in the United Kingdom, Balmer (2008) observed that in the United Kingdom, a highly symbolic and ceremonial monarchy exists under the leadership of the queen. This institution does not perform political and administrative functions. The queen appoints the Prime Minister and has the power to dissolve the legislature all of whom are elected officials. She presides over various public engagements and performs other ceremonial duties, and carries out symbolic or representative functions in national affairs. The Monarchy seems to be popular to the extent that there are attempts to ensure that it moves from just being a symbolic institution to an active one. Surprisingly attempts to elevate the monarchs in Africa are regarded as antidemocratic and a move back to the dark periods (Balmer et al , 2006). Furthermore, this study does not show contestations between the institution of traditional leadership and elected officials thereby rendering the present study very necessary.

Bonney and Morris (1987) investigated the governance systems in the Kingdom of Tonga. He noted that The Kingdom of Tonga has a constitutional monarchical system. The Government consists of three main bodies, including the executive where the king and the cabinet serve as the executive (Laurisdsen, 1993). The Constitution bestows on the Tongan monarch a great deal of power compared to the British system where the monarch acts only as a ceremonial head with limited power (Langa'oi, 2005). While Campbell's study reveals a lot of interaction between traditional leaders and elected leaders, it falls short in bringing out the contestations in this dual polity. It actually gives the impression of elected officials who are comfortable with being subordinate to traditional leaders – when this is not always the case.

Coates (2000) also did a study on traditional leaders in Canada and argues that traditional leaders in Canada are resources that can be used to improve service delivery in areas under their control. In some deep-rural areas in Canada, the local traditional leader is the only contact communities have with the outside world (Ladner, 2000). This study shows how handy the institution of traditional leadership is despite spirited attempts to have it dismantled in Africa. It came in handy in the present study as it is also a departure from the tentacles of modernists and traditionalists. The present study is also a departure from this narrative and seeks to understand the relationships between stakeholders in rural governance.

The above findings are a clear repudiation of the sweeping view that traditional leadership stands on the way of the development of a prosperous, democratic and just society (Mamdani,1996; Ntsebeza, 2006; Logan, 2009). They also debunk any insinuation that traditional leadership is solely an African practice that is irrelevant elsewhere in the world. Literature reveals that the institution is as heterogeneous as the contexts are. Furthermore, literature reveals that countries where monarchies have survived are amongst the most stable and prosperous in the world, raising questions on why neoliberal scholars who have no problem with traditional leaders in these countries frown upon traditional leaders in Africa. Moyo and Chambati (2013) adds that the success they enjoy results from the fact that the institution is not static but is continuously evolving towards parliamentary democracy. Moreover, as shown above, there are countries where highly traditional monarchies has proved perfectly compatible with democratic institutions as well as the development of an advanced and extraordinarily successful industrial society.

3.6 African contexts and debates on traditional leaders

3.6.1 The pre-colonial era controversies

There are two popular views regarding the role of traditional leaders in pre-colonial Africa. One view argues that there were undemocratic practices spearheaded by traditional leaders in pre-colonial Africa. It further argues that traditional leaders made every attempt to silence the voices of women and youths. Dusing (2001) found that in Botswana the Kgotla democracy has always been made up of male tribal elders from senior tribesmen. Furthermore, Binsbergen (1987) contends that traditional institutions were always unaccountable to no-one, and their decisions were based on a coercive demand for consensus rather than freely given consent. Luthe (2007) further states

that then and now, traditional leaders place the community ahead of the individual (such as women) needs, and traditional authorities constitute an anti-democratic, or at best a non-democratic form of governance. Additionally, this view argues that traditional authority is a gerontocratic, chauvinistic, authoritarian and increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy (Logan, 2008). Dhani et al (1976) argues that the relationship between traditional leaders in Africa and the global corporates did not start during the colonial period. He laments that some accuse traditional leaders of being involved in trading off members of their communities during slave trade. This view, however, seems to stem from scholars who do not understand the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and how much power African chiefs possessed during that era.

The other view argues that pre-colonial African leaders were responsible and responsive to their subjects and believed in consensus-based decision-making. It maintains that traditional African leaders in the pre-colonial period could hardly be said to be corrupt and undemocratic because of the communal spirit and consensus building that guided their operations. This view privileges Africa's traditional authorities such as chiefs, traditional leadership councils and other such traditional institutions and personalities as the true democratic representatives of their people because they are seen as accessible, respected, and legitimate, and hence are perceived as essential to the politics and development on the continent (Logan, 2008). Khunou (2009), for instance, observes that chieftaincy including other traditional forms of leadership have always been at the center of rural governance, political stability and rural development. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) also weighs in that the Ndebele chiefs were democratic as a result of the ability of community members to "vote with their feet". This implies that when they were not satisfied with the way they were being ruled, they would simply move to other chiefs or form their own clans. This is a purist view of traditional leadership. It glorifies traditional leaders and gives the impression that they were democrats to the core.

3.6.2 Towards the modernization agenda

This section delves into the developments of traditional leadership in post-independence Africa. It traces the place of traditional leaders as Africa moved to embrace the modernization agenda. According to Baldwin (2013) after the attainment of independence in the 1960s and 1970s, the attitude of African governments towards traditional leadership varied, although none was overly positive towards traditional

leaders. Some countries, such as Guinea, Uganda and Tanzania, set out to formally abolish the institution of traditional leadership while in some countries the strategy was to curtail chiefs' powers and influence (Baldwin, 2015).

According to Oomen (2005) upon attaining independence, newly elected African governments uncritically embraced the modernisation agenda and liberal democracy much to the detriment of the institution of traditional chieftaincy. Most of the new nationalist leaders shared the view that chiefs had no role to play in their pursuit of building democratic polities. Rather, they opted for elected councillors as state representatives at local levels. The democratic institutions resumed the roles that traditional leadership played, and in some cases with the assumption that hereditary chiefs and democratically elected councillors would co-exist (Makumbe, 2010; Mngomezulu, 2009; Sithole, 2010;). For instance, the first independent government of Ghana, headed by President Kwame Nkrumah, abolished the formal judicial function of the chiefs and tried to break their economic power base by elevating elected officials and assigning them roles previously reserved for chiefs (Logan, 2008).

Ndlela (2010) adds that in Botswana the newly independent government transferred most responsibilities of local health, education and public works, the levy of local taxes, and the impounding of stray stock from the chief to the newly created district councils resulting in tensions. According to Baldwin (2014), countries like Guinea and Tanzania permanently abolished the institution of traditional leadership. In Burundi and Uganda, traditional chiefs were overthrown (Logan, 2009). The governments of Burkina Faso and Benin took advantage of the passing on of these leaders to impose a temporary moratorium on the replacement of chiefs in the 1960s (Holzinger et al., 2016).

Traditional leaders across Africa were accused by liberation movements and post-colonial governments of colluding and collaborating with colonial governments for their own personal survival at the expense of people they often claimed to represent (Ndlela, 2010). This view explains why at independence the governments of Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia among others, attempted, of course unsuccessfully, to strip chiefs of most of their authority or even to abolish chieftaincy altogether – partly as a punishment for their role during the colonial era (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2018). Moreover, according to Ndlovu and Dube (2012), from a modernist perspective, the traditional leadership institution was thought to be incompatible with the values of representative democracy and paradigms of gender equality. Accordingly, it was also thought that this institution served the role of

reinforcing clanic, tribal and ethnic politics, hence its banishment was seen as a vital mechanism for de-tribalizing and de-traditionalizing the postcolonial state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,2009). With this hindsight, we cannot escape the conclusion that this was only a temporary era of de-fetishization of the power of traditional authorities in preference for elected officials (Moyo, 2019). This view seems to be blind to the fact that these leaders of independent nations also manipulated and further strengthened African differences which were rooted in colonialism to push their nation building strategies by silencing certain sections of society while elevating and promoting others. It was rarely about democracy.

The continued relevance and influence of the institution was viewed as a hindrance to the progress of a revolution that aimed at social and political equality. African nationalists' views on traditional leadership and their role in a modern state were encapsulated in the words of Nelson Mandela who argued that the people want democracy and political leadership based on merit not birth (Lipuma and Koeble, 2009). The removal of traditional chiefs was seen as a prerequisite for the modern democratic states that the new generation of leaders intended to build.

The onslaught against traditional leaders' post-independence also saw the introduction of a raft of laws across the continent to effect changes in the position of traditional leaders in communities. There is no consensus among different stakeholders as to whether this was good or bad.

3.6.3 Resurgence of Traditional Leadership in Africa

Despite many challenges, traditional leaders have survived. Even in cases where they were temporarily pushed to the periphery, they either reinvented themselves or were reinvented by the same powers that tried to silence them. Therefore, the resurgence of the institution of traditional leadership should be understood within this context.

According to Baldwin (2015) the quest for modernisation, which came with some perks from multilateral institutions blinded post-colonial African leaders to a number of realities about the institution of traditional leadership. This resulted in serious failures in curtailing the institution. Van Rouveroy (1996) argues that the resurgence of traditional leadership in Africa is attributable to the fact that governments often overlooked the strong relationship between contemporary states and traditional authority. The institution of traditional leadership played a significant role within the

newly democratised African states as they imparted additional legitimacy. African communities believed that traditional leaders were at the forefront of preserving the African arts and culture as they occupied a critical part of rural governance and had a bond with the rural dwellers. According to Mngomezulu (2009) the fact that the traditional system of governance is resilient and is part of the African socio-political landscape should not have been ignored. According to Logan (2009) these views are aided by the most comprehensive data on the administrative power of traditional leaders from an Afro barometer survey, which was conducted in virtually all of sub-Saharan Africa's most democratic countries and a good portion of the continent's fledgling democracies. The results were surprising for the strong influence they suggested that traditional chiefs still had at the local level in this group of relatively democratic countries (Logan, 2009).

As such, the 1990s saw a resurgence of traditional leaders against expectations, especially from a number of liberal democracy scholars (Logan, 2009). A number of countries recognized, formalized, embraced and elevated traditional leaders. This was paradoxical given the fact that a lot of these countries were following the liberal democracy path. Therefore, having hereditary leaders' side by side with elected officials seemed more like a contradiction. In Ghana, the 1992 constitution guaranteed the independence and influence of the traditional leaders (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2018). The powerful kingdom of Buganda, abolished by Uganda's 1967 Constitution after the Buganda king had been exiled in 1966, was restored in 1993 by President Museveni (Hozlinger et al., 2016). In 1995, The Ugandan constitution was redrawn to recognise the institution of traditional leaders (Ndlela, 2010; Baldwin, 2015.

Despite the negative role of traditional authorities during the apartheid period, South Africa has witnessed a surprising continuation and even strengthening of traditional leaders' formal position in post-apartheid South Africa (Ntsebeza, 2010). Having enshrined the institution of traditional leadership in the 1994 Constitution, the South African parliament passed two pieces of legislation in 2003 that would give some degree of clarity about the position of traditional authorities in South Africa's democracy. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (No. 41 of 2003) provides for the establishment and recognition of traditional councils. A majority of sixty percent of traditional council members consists of traditional authorities and their appointees while the remaining forty percent is elected by members of the public through a formal election (Classens, 2006). The Communal Land Rights Act (no. 11 of

2004) that provides for these traditional councils has unprecedented powers in the area of land allocation and administration (Classens, 2006; Ntsebeza, 2005).

The above literature points to a resurgence of the traditional leadership institution in Africa, in most cases at the expense of elected officials. It is this arrangement that set the path for a contestation between elected officials and traditional leaders as the two institutions fought for supremacy. This is the global and continental contexts against which the Zimbabwean case should be judged.

3.7 The Zimbabwean Context

3.7.1 Pre-colonial Zimbabwe

Scholarship on the role of the institution of traditional leadership in democratic dispensations in pre-colonial Zimbabwe has seen two different sides representing two points of divergence. On the one hand the institution of traditional leadership is seen as a legitimate institution that has always been democratic in its own right. A number of studies privilege the institution of traditional leadership in pre-colonial Zimbabwe as a progressive, democratic institution that was in touch with the aspirations of the communities. In one such study, Wekwete (1991) advances the view that the institution of traditional leadership operated on the principles of citizen participation, consultation, transparency, accountability and consensus through the village council or open consultative meetings. This is a view that is shared by Ranger (2004) whose study observed that traditional leaders were not dictatorial leaders who wielded the power of life and death over their subjects, nor did they use excessive force to maintain law and order. In support of the above view, in a study of the Rozvi empire by Bhebhe and Ranger (2001), Chief Chirisamhuru of the Rozvi Empire found himself redundant when he ignored the advice of the ancestral spirits during his rule resulting in a rebellion by his army which was assisted by a neighbouring female traditional leader, Chief Nyamazana.

All these studies demonstrate that traditional chiefs among the Shona people would not make unilateral decisions on issues affecting communities, especially those with socio-economic and religious implications (Bourdillon, 1993). Their decisions were based on widespread consultations of key advisors such as councillors, spirit mediums and headmen (Hammar, 2003). A traditional leader had to seek guidance from the elder council members that served as representatives of the people without whose approval they could neither pass any legislation nor any political decisions (Dusing,

2001). These advisors were supposed to collect and submit opinions and developments in their community that would assist leadership to make decisions (Helmsing, 1994). This consultative arrangement compelled traditional leaders to operate with the consent of their people. Many traditional leaders understood and operated within the confines of that framework. This characteristic of traditional leaders in pre-colonial Zimbabwe seems not to have been a preserve of traditional leaders among the Shona people alone. A number of studies have been done among the Ndebele people of Zimbabwe and the same traits seem to characterise the findings.

For example, a study by Ranger (2001), concluded that chiefs from Matabeleland could not make decisions without consulting the people. The role of the chief in the process of community-based decision making was to reflect and discuss the opinions expressed in the village assembly and ultimately to suggest and publicly approve a decision by consensus, considering different opinions and interests of involved persons (Ranger, 2001). Another study by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) advances the view that governance in the Nguni practice was democratic in that whenever a group of people felt dissatisfied with the leadership of any powerful head, they had the option of breaking away to establish other chieftaincies. For instance, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) found that when Magugu became powerful and dictatorial as a clan head of the Khumalo, others from the clan broke away from him and founded new clans in Northern Natal. The Ndebele king did not rule by decree. State policies were subjected to serious debate and meetings were considered important in deciding the future of the state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Councils were established and their major purpose was to ensure that ordinary people were able to participate in the governance of their country.

Bourdillon (1993) adds that in the past no chief could impose his own will on unwilling subjects; if he tried, they would simply move elsewhere and the chief would be left without a following. This was also reflected in Ndebele proverbs such as *inkosi yinkosi ngabantu* (a King is a King because of the people). Ranger (2004) concludes that traditional leadership represented a democratic society whose communal aspirations and values were collectively expressed. Evidence from the literature above shows that Chiefs had a sense of consensus building as a decision-making strategy. The above view portrays traditional leaders as democratic. However, during this time there were no elected leaders to challenge the authority of traditional leaders. This research hence assumes a lot of relevance as it looks at how these traditional leaders can co-exist with elected leaders under the current political dispensation in Zimbabwe.

Another view is completely skeptical about the nature of the institution of chieftaincy, describing it as backward, unilateral, patriarchal and oppressive to women and young people. A number of these studies privilege elected officials at the expense of traditional leaders. They further look at the institution as irrelevant in a democratic era. Proponents of this school of thought include Makumbe (2010), Ndlovu and Dube (2012). Findings from a study by Makumbe (1996) revealed that selfish chiefs well before colonization distorted the institution of traditional leadership when they looked after themselves instead of their subjects and the situation was made worse by colonisation. A study by Ndlovu and Dube (2012) contends that during the pre-colonial period, only men were eligible to be chiefs. They argue that the Ndebele society was strongly patriarchal, meaning that *ama*Ndebele exalted men above women thus declaring men the superior gender. This is why Ndebele terms referring to traditional leaders, *induna* for chiefs and *umlisa* for headman are masculine (Ndlovu and Dube, 2012). The above view finds traction from a study by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) who adds that the Ndebele governance system was characterized by patriarchal ideology that viewed women as minors who were incapable of leading men.

Just like the views from the traditionalists, the views of modernists on traditional leaders are very enlightening and serve as necessary background for this study. There is still a gap as these views do not show how these "patriarchal" traditional leaders relate with their elected counterparts. For example, could we assume that all democratically elected leaders operate democratically? Moreover, these views do not show the implications of the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials on democracy, which is the major pre-occupation of this research.

3.7.2 Traditional leaders in Zimbabwe under the Colonial Rule

Literature on traditional leaders and democracy in colonial Zimbabwe mainly focus on the relationship between traditional leaders and the colonial government as well as the contribution (or lack thereof) of traditional leaders in the liberation struggle. Among these is a study by Alexander (2006) which served to show how some chiefs collaborated with the colonial government as a way of keeping their positions. In her study, Alexander (2006) concludes that a number of chiefs were willing to forgo their ethics to please their colonial masters.

The above findings find traction from Sibanda (2008) whose study concludes that traditional leaders like Chief Fish Gwebu and Chief Makiwa Nyashanu supported the colonial administration and were consequently opposed by some of their subjects. According to Ranger (1984) Chief Nyashanu was also opposed by his people as a result of the confusion around his ascendancy to the throne. The prevailing belief was that his ascendancy was influenced by his proximity to the colonial administration. Villagers in his area believed that the colonial administration manipulated his ascendancy as a reward for working with them against his own people.

Extant literature, whose focus was on contrasting the role of traditional leaders during the colonial period and after it is also reviewed. One such is by Makahadze et al (2009) who conclude that the democratic nature of traditional leadership was eroded during the colonial period. In another study, Bhebhe (1999) explains how the colonial government interfered with the operations of traditional leaders. According to Bhebhe (1999), they elevated traditional leaders to government officers whose only role was to implement government policy while key duties like land allocation were taken away. Moore (2013) also analyses how the political spectrum involving traditional leaders changed from the pre-colonial period where traditional leaders had enormous powers, through to the colonial period where their powers were curtailed and only rewarded when they fulfilled the wishes of the colonial government to the post-colonial government where traditional leaders where initially rejected and then later fetished. In addition, Ndlovu and Dube (2012) discusses the changes encountered within the traditional courts during the period from colonialism to the post-colonial era with special reference to Lupane District. This study benefits immensely from these works as they provide the necessary background on the role of traditional leaders. The study however departs from these works by focusing on the implications of the contestations between traditional leaders and elected officials in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe. In a way, the present-study is forward-looking as opposed to simply tracing back how the institution of traditional leadership has evolved over time and whether it is still relevant or not in the present era.

In another study Hammar et al (2003) explains the institution of traditional leaders responded to the trauma exerted by attacks from both the Rhodesian forces and ZANLA forces. The same study also exposes the violent methods adopted by both parties as they sought to mobilize villagers and their traditional leaders to their side. The study found that the strategies and tactics that contending forces used had devastating effects on the civilians and their traditional leadership.

Some scholars have also looked at how some chiefs deviated from supporting the colonial forces to supporting the nationalists' movements. A study by Maxwell (1999) found that besides being subjected to terror by the ZANLA guerrillas, some traditional leaders and some of their subordinates in Buhera willingly supported the liberation cause because of their experiences of the repressive colonial system. The study found that Chiefs who participated strongly in the liberation struggle had grievances over the introduction of Native Commissioners whose influence was extended by the African Native department in 1894.

In their study of the role of traditional leaders in the fight against colonization, in Buhera district, Kriger (2005) conclude that, traditional authorities such as Chiefs, headmen and village heads contributed immensely in mobilization and organization of peasants' support for the war effort. They also discovered that, during the war, traditional leaders also explained to their people the intricacies of ZANU's case during all night political gatherings or night vigils (Pungwes). From such interactions the guerrillas gained a better perception of the traditional leaders and their subordinates' grievances while the traditional leaders and their followers also understood the guerrillas' mission. Ndawana and Hove (2018) argue that during *pungwes* Chief Chitsunge emphasized the importance of teamwork in the struggle designed to set free the country from colonial bondage.

Similarly, a study by Musekiwa (2012) revealed how the interference by the colonial administration muzzled the rise of women traditional leaders. Nkomo (2015) argues that in 1934, headwoman Mupotedzi of Honde Valley died and the colonial administrators made sure that her replacement was not installed. After the deaths of headwomen Shezukuru and Kanganya of Manica Reserve, there was never any attempt to install replacements. Gradually, women leaders were phased out of the institution of traditional leadership. The colonial authorities conveniently ensured that their chieftaincy was terminated. The democracy and the rights that the female chiefs enjoyed during the pre-colonial period came to a screeching halt.

There is also scholarship on the introduction of alternative or parallel systems of administration or elected officials. For example, Dube and Ndlovu (2012) looked at the parallel system that was run during precolonial Zimbabwe Chiefs of the provinces were under a Chief Native Commissioner (CNC). Below him was a Native Commissioner (NC) stationed in each district. African functionaries including chiefs, kraal heads and

messengers assisted the Native Commissioner in his administrative duties. The Native Commissioner took upon himself all the administrative duties for the district, thereby robbing the traditional rulers of all the powers they wielded before the colonial era (Holleman, 1969). As a result, the power of the chiefs to allocate land was usurped.

3.7.3 Traditional leadership and democracy in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe

Scholarship on the role of traditional leaders in building democracy during this period is vast. This literature is important for this study as it not only shows the resilience of the institution of traditional leadership but also provides a basis for the current relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials.

Scholars looking at the early days of post-colonial Zimbabwe largely focus on the relationship between the postcolonial government and traditional leaders. In one such study, Kurebwa (2015) posits that the government that replaced the colonial administration frowned on the institution of traditional leadership. Given the popularity of ZANU PF at that particular time, they preferred elected leaders at the expense of traditional leaders to be their link with the communities. In his study Kurebwa (2015) found that the side-lining of traditional leaders was made easy by the fact that they (traditional leaders) had an unhealthy relationship with the communities.

In line with this view, another study by Makumbe (1998), which focused on the legal terrain that guided traditional leaders between the colonial period and the post-colonial period concluded that a raft of laws were introduced to curtail the institution of traditional leadership. Among these laws were the District Councils Act (1980), the Communal Land Act (1981), the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act (1981) and the Prime Minister's Directive (1984) (Makumbe, 1998). The effect of these laws was to emasculate traditional leaders and deprive them of their source of legitimacy which was the allocation of land. The fact that these duties were given to rural district councils, a body made up of elected officials made the ground fertile for contestations. The importance of these studies is that they show how the relationship between traditional leaders and elected leaders is shaped by the way the government of the day views the institution of traditional leadership. Since the post-colonial government showed indignation towards the institution, in support of the elected officials, traditional leaders also saw competitors in elected leaders. By so doing the government was sowing seeds of distrust which it would take advantage of when it suited them.

There is also literature that shows that during this period there was a thrust towards the building of democratic structures. In his study, Nkomo (2010) contends that the roles of traditional leaders were being transferred to democratic structures that had been created. These structures included district councils, Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs). Makumbe however argues that these structures were not democratic structures, they were ZANU PF structures that were just being given other names. These studies are illuminating in the sense that they expose the pretence of the post-colonial government in their dealing with traditional leaders. While they argued that they were pushing the doctrine of liberal democracy whose main issues are democratic elections, they were actually replacing traditional leaders with their non-elected structures. Their major concern seems not to have been democracy but dominance. More so the pre-occupation seems to have been to make sure that their structures are given official paying jobs for their roles. The energy with which these new leaders pushed and fought with traditional leaders also depicts people with a party agenda, pushed by the government to dominate all structures of the society.

This view finds support from a number of scholars who study the relationship between the post-colonial governments between the periods of 1987 to 1998. In a study by Sithole and Makumbe (1997) they conclude that the convergence of a number of challenges towards the late 1980s pushed the government to address the concerns by traditional leaders. What is clear from this study is that it was not the pressure from the traditional leaders but a "convergence of push factors", many of which had nothing to do with the concerns of traditional leaders. The fundamental question then is: why would the government respond by dealing with the concerns of the traditional leaders when the questions of the time were not about traditional leaders? This research takes the view that in the early 1980s the government tried to use its popularity to do away with chiefs. It pursued coercive politics as it knew that the people were behind them. However, that period also had a lot of expectations. People thought the government would deliver. Towards the end of the 1980s to the 1990s, people began to lose patience with the government. Noticeably, government structures that had replaced traditional leaders were seemingly failing to either deal with the expectations or were losing their influence over the people. The government then thought of turning people into subjects using traditional leaders who were also desperate to be recognised by the government.

This view is supported by findings from a study by Chigwata (2015) who contends that the period between 1988 and 1998 saw the passing of a number of bills that sought to restore the powers of the chiefs. These bills included the Chiefs and Headmen Act of 1989 and the Customary Law and Local Courts Act of 1990. Nkomo (2015) argues that even after a number of laws were put in place, the government made sure that district councils dealt with land issues. This research takes the view that the government was wedging its bets by making sure that traditional leaders got the impression that their issues were being dealt with while at the same time leaving important judiciary and land planning functions to district councils. Inadvertently, the government was setting up traditional leaders against elected officials. Traditional leaders saw elected officials as impediments to them regaining their full powers and authority while elected officials saw traditional leaders as democratic impediments. This is a view shared by Ranger (2004) who argues that elected officials thought traditional leaders lacked the technical capacity to make modern decisions.

The scholarship reviewed looking at the period after 1998 shows that the government invested a lot in getting the traditional leaders to their political side rather than dealing with the socio-economic challenges of the day. Some scholars (for example, Ranger, 2004, Makumbe, 2010) argue that the retraditionalisation of Zimbabwe was never about culture or tradition. The revival of traditional authority in Zimbabwe was part of a broad political and electoral strategy aimed at sustaining the ruling party through electoral manipulation. The resurgence of traditional leaders meant that they got preferential treatment ahead of their elected counterparts.

Scholars like Makumbe (2010) and Alexander (2018) argue that the retraditionalisation of Zimbabwe was a direct response to the worsening socio-economic situation in the country as well as the rise of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This research takes the logic that the rise of traditional leadership institution against an impatient population and a popular opposition party was meant to assist the ruling ZANU PF in its waning electoral fortunes. Traditional leaders were therefore expected to use their influence or power of coercion to mobilise support for ZANU PF. The strategy seems to have been to turn villagers into subjects and give traditional leaders overwhelming power over their “subjects”. Instead of dealing with the socio-economic problems, the ruling party opted to fetish traditional leaders with gifts such as cars, houses, electricity and monthly salaries.

3.8 Traditional leaders and elected officials - Defining the Research Gap

A number of reviewed scholars (Ntsebeza, 2005; Kadt, 2014; LiPuma and Koeble, 2009) have looked at the institution of traditional leadership and democracy in Africa. Firstly, Ntsebeza (2005) did a study on the relationship between traditional leadership and democracy. He used in-depth interviews, life histories and participant observation to gather primary data for the case study area. Ntsebeza (2005) concludes that democracy and the institution of traditional leadership are incompatible. He argues that the institution of traditional leaders cannot survive side by side with modern state institutions. This is a view that is taken by a number of other scholars like Kadt (2014), Kohn (2014), LiPuma and Koble (2009).

While Ntsebeza's work remains important in the broader framework of the relationship between traditional leaders and democracy, it fails to explain how traditional leaders should then be utilised given their resilience, especially taking into consideration the fact that they cannot be ignored. His suggestion that the institution be done away with seems to be oblivious to the many failed attempts to do away with the institution in the past. Further his focus on the incompatibility of traditional leaders and democracy as a result of the hereditary nature of the institution has meant that a number of potentially useful characteristics of traditional leaders have escaped scrutiny. In fact, either wittingly or unwittingly kept silent about many democratic countries globally that use the dual system. The present study goes beyond the traditionalists and modernists debate to put under scrutiny the operations of traditional leaders in rural governance.

Secondly, LiPuma and Koeble (2009) assessed whether traditional leadership in South Africa constitute a potentially indigenous form of participatory deliberative democracy as encapsulated by Nelson Mandela and several chiefs in Southern Africa (Mandela, 1994), or as Mamdani (1996) argues, it represents a lingering species of despotic domination. LiPuma and Koeble (2009) conducted research in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. They interviewed a number of chiefs and members of the traditional leaders' association in Cape Town. The aim was to observe the behaviour of chiefs and their headmen or indunas in village-level decision-making and record their relations to the newly elected local municipal councillors. The study found that the relative degree of subjects' inclusiveness was a prerogative of the traditional leader. So, even where local council meetings are more or less inclusive, this does not seem to be an established principle, let alone one that is universally recognized across the variegated forms of traditional leadership. The study also found that access to the

decision-making process is organised along lines of gender and generation, as well as the social ranking embodied in the notion of traditional leaders who command their citizen-subjects' respect, not only in terms of their accomplishment but their heredity.

This study is an important movement away from the modernists and traditionalists' narrative in that it puts into scrutiny an important aspect of chieftainship. However, the biggest challenge of that specific study relates to its inability to subject elected officials to the same test traditional leaders are subjected to. It seems to work from the assumption that elected leaders are good for democracy simply because they are elected. The present study fills that gap by putting under scrutiny one of the most important relationships in rural governance. Furthermore, while the study by LiPuma and Koeble focuses on whether there is a relationship between the key principles of deliberative democracy, the present study goes further to examine the implications as well as look into ways of making the relationship work.

Thirdly, Comaroff and Comaroff (2018) explain the resurgence of customary chieftaincy in Africa. They used case studies from South Africa, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique. The case studies show that rather than being obfuscated by the tide of liberal democracy, the institution of traditional leadership has been resilient across Africa. Comaroff and Comaroff (2018) explain that chiefs come in different fashions from businesspeople to farmers to ordinary villagers. The volume shows that chiefs remain an integral part of rural governance in Africa. In line with the assertions by Mngomezulu, wishing them away would be a non-starter. The present study addresses that gap by assessing how such a resilient institution can be utilised to further democracy.

Fourthly, Baldwin's (2015) study offers a new theory of the role of traditional chiefs in democratic Africa. In contrast to the common claim that chiefs undermine accountability by disconnecting citizens from their elected representatives pushed by modernists (Ntsebeza, 2005; Kadt, 2014), this theory claims that unelected traditional chiefs can facilitate the responsiveness of politicians to their constituents. Baldwin (2015) argues that the primary role of traditional chiefs in democratic Africa is brokering development projects, not votes, with any political influence they maintain derived from this function. By recognizing chiefs' potentially constructive role in facilitating local development projects, this model also forces a reappraisal of their political influence. If the delivery of resources to a voter's community depends on elected representatives working with local traditional chiefs, it makes good sense that voters may consider their

chiefs' opinion of each candidate when deciding who to support. Thus, the development-broker model differs starkly from the vote-broker model in its implications for how we think about the position of chiefs and other nonelected local elites in democracies.

Baldwin (2015) develops a new model of chiefs as development brokers. The model is built from three critical claims about African politics, which I explain and justify next. Firstly, Baldwin (2015) maintains that voters care first and foremost about their political representative's performance in providing local development projects. The second claim by Baldwin (2015) is that the weak presence of the state in rural Africa has resulted in the coproduction of public goods through the joint efforts of politicians and local communities. Finally, Baldwin (2015) argues that unelected traditional leaders are uniquely positioned to mobilize community contributions to produce local public goods. Together these three premises provide the foundation for Baldwin's (2015) assertion that traditional leaders can facilitate the responsiveness of democratic governments in rural Africa.

This view by Baldwin (2015) is important, as it is a marked departure from the usual modernists and traditionalists purity debates that start and end with the hereditary nature of traditional leaders. It goes beyond the way traditional leaders assume offices to look at their operations after assumption of office. In the same vein, the present study is not constrained by the assumption of office by traditional leaders. The present study moves from the assumption that the resilience of traditional leaders shows that they cannot be wished away and hence the need to see how best they can be useful in consolidating democracy. To be specific the present study looks at how traditional leaders can work better with elected leaders.

Logan (2009) has also done a study that focused on the compatibility of traditional authority and democratic governance. She assesses whether the two systems can be blended into a viable effective hybrid system. The survey data collected revealed that Africans who live under these dual systems do not see much difference between chiefs and elected leaders. They view them as complimentary. The study also found that there is no evident conflict between supporting traditional leadership and being a democrat. Africans appear to have seamlessly adapted to the hybridization of these political institutions. These findings by Logan (2009) fly in the face of the assertions by Ntsebeza that traditional leaders and elected leaders cannot co-exist. The present study goes further to look at the contestations between traditional leaders and elected

officials with a view of seeing how the two institutions can be made to work better together for communities.

In Zimbabwe a number of scholars have also studied the relevance of the institution of traditional leadership in the post-colonial state. Makumbe (2010) and Chakaipa (2010) examined the relationship between traditional leaders and local government structures. Makumbe (2010) concludes that traditional leaders should not be represented in Rural District Councils (RDC) but should only attend council meetings on special invitation by the chairman of the RDC. He further argues that chiefs should not have any role to play in democratic governance of Zimbabwe except the role of advising the democratic structures on issues of tradition and customary law. However, Chakaipa (2010) quips that traditional leaders are an effective communication and development tool given their hierarchical nature and spread. They are present in all parts of the country where they interface with elected officials. According to Chakaipa, though the law prohibits them from seeking elective office, they remain major players in rural governance. The two scholars however agree that rural governance has been a battleground as elected officials and traditional leaders fight for space.

This view is shared by Matyszak (2015) whose research describes parallels and overlaps in the responsibilities and power of the local authorities that govern rural Zimbabwean communities, where the majority of Zimbabweans live. The study revealed that the existence of parallel authority structures, traditional and elected leadership has resulted in a myriad of conflicts that have stunted development in rural Zimbabwe. Chiefs on one hand claim that they are the legitimate representatives of people as they are undeviating and sanctioned by a higher authority (the ancestors), whilst councillors claim that they have a mandate from the people because they were directly elected. Resultantly, this has had an effect on land allocation, livelihoods, development, development projects and party politics.

The reviewed literature above demonstrates that the institution of traditional leadership has been a subject of research for a long time. Themes such as the resilience of the institution (Amabhungane, 2018), traditional leadership and development (Baldwin, 2015), laws on traditional leadership in Zimbabwe (Makumbe, 2010, Chigwata, 2015 have been explored. There is a lacuna that makes this present study very relevant. The present study views the implications of the contestations between traditional leaders and elected officials as some of the overlooked aspects that are central to understanding the role of traditional leadership in a democracy.

This is in consonance with the view shared by Logan (2019). Logan argues that the focus on the representative and aggregate elements of democracy has meant that little attention has been put on the equally important potential democratic elements within the institution of traditional leadership. In focusing so intently on the lack of elections, there is a tendency to neglect other features of traditional systems that may also be relevant to the democratic compatibility of the institution of traditional leadership (Logan, 2009). As such, the preoccupation should be with looking at the various aspects of traditional leadership and putting them up for scrutiny. The thrust of this study is anchored on moving beyond the modernists and traditionalists' narrative to determine the implications of a very important relationship in rural governance.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a comprehensive review of available literature relating to the topic. It set off by acknowledging the dearth of studies that particularly focus on the impact of the contestations between traditional leaders and elected officials in general and Zimbabwe in particular. Definitions, conceptions and the different schools of thought approaches to traditional leaders and democracy were given attention. In an attempt to locate the lacuna that validates the present study, the chapter proceeded by deploying the funnel approach to review related literature. To that end, world literature on the operations of traditional leaders was reviewed first, followed by a review of literature from Africa in general and lastly literature specific to Zimbabwe, the context in which the present research is situated.

The review of literature demonstrated the lacuna regarding studies on the institution of traditional leadership especially within the African and the Zimbabwean stage. As is apparent in the review, most studies on traditional leadership have generally tended to focus on the hereditary nature of the institution. A few studies from Logan (2019), LiPuma and Koeble (2009) and Baldwin (2015) have ignored this narrative to look at the operations of traditional leaders but still fall far short of scrutinising the implications of the contestations between traditional leaders and elected officials. This sets the present study apart from many that have been carried out as demonstrated by literature. As a result, it is prudent to conclude that available literature relating to traditional leaders and democracy points to a field that is still in its nascent stages of development. As one of the ground breaking studies on the impact of the contestations

between traditional leaders and elected officials, the present study curves a niche for itself. The next chapter presents the theoretical framework, which guided the study.

CHAPTER 4

Theoretical Framework – Deliberative Democracy in Polity Dualism

4 Introduction

The previous chapter (Chapter 3) reviewed the literature on the theme of the present study. This chapter sets out the theoretical framework that undergirds the study. The central objective of the thesis, also set out in chapter 1, is to examine the implications of polity dualism on deliberative democracy in Zimbabwe, with particular reference to Matabeleland. The theoretical starting point for this thesis is the theory of deliberative democracy, which is a departure from the usual aggregate democracy whose emphasis is on elections. The chapter therefore aims at assisting with the objective of thinking and looking at polity dualism or the coexistence of traditional leaders and elected officials in Zimbabwe within the prism of deliberative democracy.

The chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section conceptualizes and contextualizes polity dualism within the Zimbabwean context. The discussion then flags and discusses the various manifestations of polity dualism in Zimbabwe's rural governance system. The second section provides an in-depth look at deliberative democracy. It further looks at various interpretations and critiques of the theory. The third section discusses the analytical framework of the thesis and grapples with the challenge of how to use deliberative democracy as a theoretical framework in understanding the implications of contestations in rural governance in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The last section concludes the chapter.

4.2 Conceptualization of Polity Dualism

Polity dualism describes the co-existence of two distinct political and legal systems in the same territory, and applying to the same people (Buur and Kyed, 2007). A number of scholars have used different terms to denote this set-up. Sklar (2005) refers to it as mixed government, Lund (2007) terms it twilight institutions whereas Boege, Brown and Clements (2009) refer to it as hybrid political orders. Usually, this involves the construction of a government that combines traditional leadership (hereditary officials) and the state (elected officials) at the same time (Holzinger et al., 2016). In Africa, polity dualism has each aspect of the polity existing in its own right and occasionally

each aspect encroaches upon the others' domain resulting in contestations (Makumbe, 2010). While in the ancient form dual polity involved a mixture of institutions designed to safeguard the rich with other institutions devised to promote the interests of the poor, currently dual polity involves co-existence between modernity and the traditional (Sklar, 1994). Lund (2007) adds that there is usually contestation between the state and the second dimension of traditional states over issues of sovereignty.

Boerge et al (2009) explain that dual authority implies an arms-length relationship between "parallel governments", which may, or may not, function harmoniously regardless of the fact that their operations are inter-related. The nature of the coexistence seems to be varying according to states. The coexistence of these institutions ranges from federal arrangements with sizable autonomy of the traditional polity (in North America) to indigenous rights (in South America) and parliamentary Houses of Chiefs (in Ghana or Namibia) (Krol , 2015). Krol (2015) identifies seven state policies, which are used as a basis for categorizing polity dualism. These include exclusion, adaptation and reorientation, integration, subordination, association, harmonization and laissez-faire. These typologies reflect the attitude of the state institutions towards the institution of traditional leadership. In reality, it is always a mix of these, given the context and issues at stake, as well as the manoeuvres by traditional leaders as they seek to claim and assert their authority. As such, polity dualism should not be seen as only the government represented by its elected officials imposing its will on traditional leaders but this being a negotiated and highly contentious relationship and interactions.

Sklar (2005) argues that the level of coexistence can be determined by the degree of autonomy of traditional authorities from the state and the degree of decentralization pursued by the state. As such, Lund (2007) concludes that traditional governance today complements, substitutes, and challenges state authority in various contexts—be it with regard to public goods provision, conflict resolution, elections, land tenure, human rights, or the role of women in society. In anthropological thought, polity dualism is represented as an adversarial relationship (Sklar, 2005). Sklar's depiction of polity dualism cannot fully explain the role of state in shaping their logics, diction and practices of authority. Sklar does not pay adequate attention to the fact that state institutions can in the long run decide the fate of twilight institutions, to the extent that state recognition is central to the sustenance of the authority of twilight institutions (Chamunogwa, 2019). But also it is possible that the character of the twilight institutions can determine the behaviour of the state institutions?

The variance in terms of the forms of mixed governments is more apparent in Southern Africa. The constitutions of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland represent a gradation from marginal to maximal constitutional authority for traditional rulers respectively (Holzinger, 2016). Botswana has built a political structure in which the Westminster-type of government and the institution of traditional leadership coexist for the preservation and development of the country's unique form of democracy. In Namibia the constitution establishes a national council of traditional leaders which is consulted by the President on matters related to the control and use of communal land (Bell and Ngonyama, 2009). In South Africa the constitution establishes a council of traditional leaders elected by the members of the provincial house of traditional leaders (Ntsebeza, 2006). In Zimbabwe traditional leaders are ex-officio members in various local government bodies, are represented in the senate and have their own councils that sometimes feed into government processes (Chigwata, 2015).

In Lesotho the incorporation of traditional institutions into the state is at a higher scale (Peterson, 2014). The King of Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy and the constitution provides that paramount chiefs occupy two thirds of the seats in the senate (Peterson, 2014). ESwatini has an absolute monarch as its governor (Lund, 2007). The Swazi King retains executive powers shared with a Prime Minister who is appointed by the King (Sklar, 2005). All these cases confirm that traditional leaders have a place in the African governance system, albeit operating in different contexts.

4.2.1 Polity Dualism in Zimbabwe's Rural Governance

Polity dualism manifests itself in various ways in Zimbabwe's rural governance system. Firstly, polity dualism manifests itself in the relationship between elected officials and the bureaucrats in local authorities. This relationship is characterized by contestations in ways that affect service delivery (Muchadenyika, 2014). Issues of roles and responsibilities especially of newly elected councillors often constituted a major source of conflict between councillors and appointed officials. Scholars have observed this especially in urban local authorities where the opposition MDC has been dominant since 2000. When new MDC councillors came into power, they found in place senior council staff already appointed and aligned to Zanu- PF (Jonga, 2014). Over the years, urban local authorities have depended on these staff members, which has grown beyond requirements. A study by Muchadenyika (2014) revealed the existence of a

'serving bureaucracy' intent on misleading council, and in the process creating immense challenges to the management and administration of city affairs. This is a relationship that is characterized by contestations and conflicts.

Secondly, the local government system has also nurtured tension in the coexistence between the elected (councillors) and appointed (Resident Ministers/Governor's office) officials in rural governance. According to the Zimbabwe Institute (2005) the introduction of the post of Governor or Resident Minister in Bulawayo and Harare was possibly designed to neutralize the "unwanted presence" of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party, which controlled the two cities of Harare and Bulawayo. The downside of this institution is that the Governors are appointed rather than elected. The legislation can actually pave way for a "return of the jettisoned" as the President can legally appoint individuals who have been rejected by the electorate in parliamentary elections (Makumbe, 2010).

This study however concerns itself with the coexistence of traditional leaders and elected leaders in rural governance. Polity dualism is useful in explaining the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials in Zimbabwe. It is useful in terms of thinking of the "elected officials" and the "traditional leaders" as a dual polity. The concept of polity dualism helps us make sense of this relationship by allowing us to explain the uneasy and complicated co-existence.

The history of contestations between traditional leaders and elected leaders in Zimbabwe dates back to 1944 (Alexander, 2018). This view finds support from Nkomo, 2015) and Kriger, 2018). According to Nkomo (2015), under pressure from the proto-nationalists a few councils were formed and were composed of chiefs and elected officials. Contestations became the order of the day as chiefs feared the younger and better educated elected representatives while the latter resented their illiterate elders (Kriger, 2018: 66). According to Matyszak (2012) the overlapping of responsibilities between elected (councillors) and hereditary (traditional leaders) officials of local government resulted in conflicts. A research by CCMT (2019) views this coexistence as responsible for a myriad of conflicts that have stunted development in rural Zimbabwe. CCMT (2019) found that Chiefs on the one hand claim that they are the legitimate representatives of the people as they are permanent and sanctioned by a higher authority (the ancestors), whilst councillors claim that they have a mandate from the people because they were directly elected. A number of legislations recognize

traditional leadership as an important institution of rural governance by restoring powers allocated previously during the colonial era to allocate rural land and to try civil and criminal cases in rural areas, among other local governance obligations (Makumbe, 2010; Alexander, 1990). The Rural District Councils Act further continues to permit chiefs to be ex-officio members of councils (Chigwata, 2015).

The 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution gives more impetus to the rise of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. It recognises the role of the institution of traditional leadership alongside modern state structures (Chakunda, 2015). Section 281 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe specifically outlines some of the acceptable and unacceptable conduct of traditional leaders, stating that they must not be members of any political party or in any way participate in partisan politics, act in a partisan manner, further the interests of any political party or violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of any person (Chikerema, 2013). The 2013 constitution also provides that traditional leaders are responsible for promoting and upholding cultural values, traditions and heritage and also have powers to administer communal land and resolve disputes among people in their communities (Chigwata, 2016). Traditional leaders are also represented in Parliament and Provincial councils. In the Rural District Council, they sit as ex-officio members. They share all these platforms with elected officials. Chigwata (2016) argues that the relationship between traditional leaders and these elected leaders has been characterized by contestations and complications as councillors and traditional leaders' fight from the colonial era.

The structure of rural local governance in Zimbabwe reflects an uneasy coexistence between custom and democratic decentralization ideas and practices. Resultantly, rural Zimbabwean communities are governed by a dual polity system that places traditional leaders and the state structures side by side. These structures interpret each other in complex and uneasy ways. The present study seeks to interrogate, unpack and explain the implications of these interpretations on deliberative democracy. The existence of a dual polity has had mixed results in Zimbabwe. On the one hand, it has resulted in a myriad of conflicts that have stunted development in rural Zimbabwe. On the other hand, there have been positive developments such as the role of traditional leaders in development, land governance, preservation of environment, mediating between the state and rural communities, as well as extending the authority of the state institutions. While chiefs claim that they are the legitimate representatives of the people as they are permanent and sanctioned by a higher

authority (the ancestors), councillors on the other hand claim that they have a mandate from the people as a result of their direct election (Tutui, 2014).

Land allocation in rural Zimbabwe provides glaring instances of the tensions that result in overlapping roles. The Rural District Council has the authority to allocate land, particularly with respect to developmental projects such as schools and clinics. However, traditional leadership retains semblance of power through a combination of legislative grants, historical and customary function and proximity to rural communities (Jonga, 2014). Village heads work in greatest proximity to the day-to-day use of rural land, and hence they cannot be overlooked in the allocation and sustainable utilisation of land in the communal and resettlement areas (Chigwata, 2015). This thesis traces the implications of the interpenetrations between traditional institutions and state institutions to deliberative democracy.

4.3 Deliberative Democracy as a political theory

Deliberative democracy is also referred to as communicative democracy (Young, 2000), politics of presence (Philips, 2000), dialogical democracy (Talisse, 1996), discursive democracy (Dryzek, 2001), epistemic conception of deliberative democracy (Martin, 2000), proceduralist-deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1990), and substantial deliberative democracy (Cohen, 2000). Deliberative democracy is a departure from the classical liberal models of democracy that emphasize voting and representation. It is a model that promotes the ability of all citizens affected by a collective decision to engage in a process of deliberation concerning that decision (Cohen, 2000). In contemporary political theory, deliberative democracy stands in contrast to aggregative democracy as both theories focus on different decision making processes (Young, 2000).

Bohman (1998) affirms that deliberative democracy moves away from competitive pluralism by encouraging the distinctive rationality of “the forum” as opposed to the rationality of “market”. The forum refers to the public space accessed and utilised by anyone despite their material conditions while the market refers to decisions made at a platform created by the privileged, usually based on resources. These complimentary views of deliberative democracy show that the theory is more concerned about how political practice is done (LiPuma and Koeble, 2009). Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to the infusing of public space and participation in decision making

(Cohen, 1997). This notion indicates that all persons affected by a decision will be involved in collective decision making. These decisions are made not on the basis of numerical advantage but arguments for and against (Fishkin et al, 2005). Deliberative democracy is explained as an attempt to combine political equality with deliberation by the people themselves, but is agnostic in relation with mass participation and non-tyranny (Gastil and Levine, 2005). It promotes political judgment through the consideration of different perspectives in unconstrained dialogue. In this way, deliberative democracy provides a basis for reciprocal questioning and criticism that is more than a mere aggregation of individual interests (Young, 2000). This seems to be privileged blissful view of the reality on the ground. It would be interesting to see how women, youth and children have the same power and influence to inform decisions or dialogue on contested issues. In reality, dialogue and decision making are shaped by power dynamics.

While definitions of deliberative democracy are as varied as its proponents, there seems to be some common ground on its major elements. These elements are: equality, inclusivity, binding decisions and reason giving.

4.3.1 The Case for Deliberative Democracy

Different reasons and arguments have been given by various scholars for the movement from aggregative democracy towards deliberative democracy. Tutui (2015) argues that deliberation on laws leads to more rational and informed decisions, because free discussion and open debate allow relevant information to be distributed and mistaken reasoning to be exposed while all the reasons for and against laws, policies and decisions are to be debated and considered. Marti (2006) adds that because deliberative democracy combines equal participation with free and open debate and criticism, all sides have an opportunity to pitch their views resulting in a situation where everyone's interests are considered. This ensures that the basic rights of minorities or individuals are not infringed upon or their fundamental interests ignored, particularly when citizens are called upon to reflect on the common good. Bohman (1997) asserts that deliberative democracy also contributes to the legitimacy of decisions, because there are no losers as everyone is likely to accept the decision when it is adopted after careful consideration of the relevant merits of competing arguments. This is a flowery portrayal of decision-making processes as in reality decisions always result in losers and winners. Given the prevailing 'winner takes all'

political attitude prevailing globally, deliberative democracy tempers with self-interest and broadens people's interests and concerns, because it requires them to consider interests other than their own and make principled arguments for their positions (Tutui, 2015). According to Marti (2006) having to deliberate with others and give reasons acceptable to them inclines citizens to consider others' points of view and thereby extends people's imaginations and empathy or engages their moral sentiments.

Deliberative democracy encourages people to reflect on their preferences and provides them with information that can lead them to alter their values and positions (Cohen, 1997). This ability and time to reflect ensures that people are not simply governed by given preferences and/or pre-conceived ideas formed as a result of their subconscious adaptation to existing circumstances. Their decisions and values are then more rational and citizens as a result are made more freely (Gutman and Thompson, 2004). Fishkin et al (2005) argues that "the central idea of deliberative democracy" is founded on autonomy, or the free and reflective process of preference formation. Political autonomy "can be found in collective self-determination, as citizens decide, not what they 'want,' but instead who they are, what their values are and what those values require." Cohen (1997) also add that deliberation helps participants cultivate skills such as eloquence, rhetorical ability, empathy, courtesy, imagination, and reasoning capacity. Through the active exchange of ideas, and the voicing of and listening to preferences expressed in an ideal speech situation (Habermas, 1984, 1990), deliberation can help people clarify, understand, and refine their own preferences and positions on issues (Marti, 2006). Even if preferences are not transformed, collective discussions may create greater understanding among persons with divergent preferences, as well as more tolerance for opposing views because people may begin to think beyond their own self-interest, to include greater concern for others and their community (Gutman and Thompson, 2004).

Deliberative democracy is "talk-centric," whereas aggregative democracy is "vote centric" (Bohman, 1997). The aggregative model, which forms the basis of representative government, relies on the aggregation of individual preferences to arrive at public policy decisions and uses voting and bargaining to determine how those individual preferences are cumulated (Young, 2000). Because voting and bargaining encourage strategic behaviour based on individualist and economic incentives (Marti, 2006), the aggregative model is also an adversarial model of democracy (Gastil and Levine, 2005). In this adversarial model, policy and other governmental decisions are seen as a zero-sum game where the majority rules

(Cohen, 1997). In contrast, deliberative democracy promotes inclusive participation rather than privileged participation. In that sense, a number of scholars (see Mandela, 1994) have argued that deliberative democracy resonates with the African way of life. Their ways of village level deliberation and consensus-oriented decision making (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010, Ndlovu and Dube, 2012) resembles the principles of deliberative democracy.

This is what makes this theory relevant to the present study. It goes beyond being fixated in the prescripts of liberal democracy which is grounded on the Western notion of democracy but does not completely dismiss liberal democracy as useless.

4.3.2 Key components of deliberative democracy.

While definitions of deliberative democracy are as varied as its proponents, there is some agreement on its core elements. Proponents of deliberative democracy submit that a decision is made in a genuinely deliberatively democratic manner only if the decision-making practice satisfies a critical band of normative benchmarks or thresholds (Lipuma and Koeble, 2014).

Firstly, a well-deliberated decision must include all those affected by such a decision (Bohman, 1997). All members should be equally entitled to have a voice on how to resolve relevant collective issues (Young, 2000). This means that deliberative democracy is to be differentiated from elitist or authoritarian schemes, including the ones in which deliberation and dialogue play an important role (Bowman, 2009). Direct participation by all members affected will be preferred as compared to indirect representation. Through this deliberation, affected individuals sincerely weigh the merits of competing arguments in their discussions (LiPuma and Koeble, 2005).

Secondly, every participant has to be appreciated and treated as politically equal to every other. At least for the purposes of conversation, the process must overstep existing forms of hierarchisation based on economic status or gender (Bowman, 1997). All citizens with deliberative capacities have equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process and they can put issues on the agenda, suggest solutions, and provide reasons in support or in criticism of proposals (Marti, 2006). In addition to that, each has an equal voice in the decision (Gutman and Thomson, 2004). The substantial aspect of equality refers to the fact that the existing distribution of power and resources

does not affect their chances to contribute to deliberation or their authority in the deliberation (Cohen, 1997). This study seeks to establish what happens in reality as opposed to dwelling much on the theory part of an ideal world. To be sure, given the importance of power dynamics and the influence of resources, it would be important to see how class differences, race, ethnicity shape decisions. Most importantly, how does deliberative democracy take all those factors into cognisance? This remains a pertinent question.

Thirdly, deliberative democracy must take place in a framework and with the expectation of reasonableness where participants have to keep an open mind on the outcome rather than clinging to preconceived notions of what should happen (Marti, 2006). The dialogical constraint is understood in terms of the need for an open and unforced dialogue between the members of a democratic society in centralized or decentralized contexts. The assumption here is that people do not act on their interests either as individuals or sub-groups. In reality, however, they act based on their interests and are more than willing to use their power and resources to ensure that decisions go their way.

Finally, in deliberative democracy a decision is binding for some period of time (Tutui, 2015). This implies that the possibility of a future debate on that same subject must be kept open. The participants must present their reasons for supporting or criticizing the proposals with the hope of convincing others to adopt their perspective (Parkinson, 2003). The accepted proposal should be conceived as the one supported by the best reasons and not as the one which corresponds to the preferences and interests of most citizens (Cohen 1997). The process has to be public and one in which participants hold each other equally accountable (Young 2000). This appears to ignore the importance of power relations in a society. The best reasons by the less powerful rarely prevail over the interests of the most powerful in a society. Importantly, the assumption that the less powerful will hold the most powerful accountable without any means is weird. From the above, it can be surmised that deliberated decision must respect equality, inclusivity, reasonableness and accountability.

4.3.3 Limitations of Deliberative Democracy

A number of scholars are very critical about the appropriateness of deliberative democracy. They argue that deliberative democracy faces a scale problem as

deliberative decisions appear to be illegitimate for those left outside the forum, while bringing more than a few people in would quickly turn the event into speech-making, not deliberation (Cohen, 1997; Young, 2000). It also has a legitimacy problem to do with motivations. Fishkin et al. (2005) further adds that in order for genuine deliberation to take place, those participants who do make it into the forum must meet the minimal procedural conditions set out above, including the demands of reciprocity and willingness to set aside strategic concerns. This is despite the fact that people's pre-formed preferences, interests and goals are an essential part of what motivates them to enter political arenas in the first place (Gastil and Levine, 2005). If deliberative democracy rules those interests out [of court], it may seem to people that deliberative democracy is procedurally unfair, and thus illegitimate.

Another problem with deliberative democracy emanates from the need to take into cognisance the needs of various competing groups. Gutman and Thomson (2004) argue that the struggle to balance the voices of lay citizens with the voices of experts and elites has always been a feature of deliberative democracy. In classical Athens, professional rectors with greater education and knowledge of politics took the most active role in addressing the citizen assembly (Marti, 2006). As such, deliberative democracy in political theory has been widely criticized for perpetuating rather than resolving the problem of inequality (Bohman, 1997). Scholars contend that the demands for reason, consensus, and the common good may marginalize or exclude members of disadvantaged groups (Cohen, 1997). A vision of rational discourse in which speakers must give logical reasons and evidence for their positions favours "the talk of an identifiable and privileged sector" trained to engage in this kind of discourse (Fishkine et al, 2005). Gastil and Levine (2005) adds that insistence on consensus can suppress discussion of difficult differences in ways that narrow the possible agenda for deliberation and thereby effectively silence some points of view, especially the values and interests of the marginalized. Exclusive consideration of the common good can also be a subtle means of domination because "definitions of the common good are likely to express the interests and perspectives of the dominant groups in generalized terms (Cohen, 1997). In response to these criticisms, many deliberative scholars have incorporated concerns about inequality into the theory of deliberative democracy. Following Young (2000), some have adopted a broader notion of rationality that includes greater appreciation of the roles of emotion, storytelling, and rhetoric as valuable elements of civic reasoning (Lipuma and Koeble, 2015). Others have leavened the desire for consensus with an appreciation for productive disagreement that encourages participants to explore their differences (Cohen, 1997).

Still, some theorists have argued that boosting equality depends not simply on including disempowered groups in cross-cutting discussion with more privileged citizens and powerful institutions but also on the ability of the marginalized to confer among themselves in their own social movement organizations, interest groups, or parties (Tutui, 2015). In this view, the disempowered need to be able to "oscillate between protected enclaves, in which they can explore their ideas in an environment of mutual encouragement, and more hostile but also broader surroundings in which they can test those ideas against the reigning reality." (Cohen, 2008: 276). Yet most of the innovative civic forums we have mentioned follow a process of inclusion of the marginalized within a random sample or quasi-representative microcosm of the public as a whole (Marti, 2006).

Cohen (1997) argues that there is a striking absence in major accounts of deliberative democracy and from much writing on participatory governance of politics with party politics. Yet political party affiliation and the cultural practices learned in party spaces can have a significant effect on the dynamics within deliberative democratic set-ups (Young, 2000). Party politics becomes, in some respects, the elephant in the room in accounts of deliberative democracy and participatory governance. According to Martil (2006), every space has its "generative past" which shapes expectations, relationships, and conduct within any newly created political space. No institutional design can insulate these spaces from the play of party politics, nor from practices associated with prevailing cultures of politics in other political spaces (Cohen, 1997). Those who enter these institutions bring with them expectations and experiences, relationships, and agendas, that span other spaces—party meetings, sites of bureaucratic encounters, and informal social networks (Marti, 2006).

Gastil and Levine (2005) cite the unequal positions of the power of participants in these institutions as the most serious potential weakness of deliberative democracy. They suggest that:

> These inequalities can stem from material differences and the class backgrounds of participants, from the knowledge and information gulfs that separate experts from laypersons, or from personal capacities for deliberation and persuasion associated with educational and occupational advantages (Fishkin et al, 2005).

They go on to consider the factors that might turn deliberation into domination: the more frequent and effective participation of those with greater social and material advantage; the extent to which the more advantaged are able to "use tools at their disposal .to advance collective decisions that unreasonably favour their interests, deliberate restriction of what can be debated or decided on by the powerful to protect the status quo, and the discouragement of radicalism and militancy" (Marti, 2006: 48).

In conclusion, some scholars question how those participants who do make it into the forum must meet the minimal procedural conditions set out above, including the demands of reciprocity and willingness to set aside strategic concerns, how to balance the voices of lay citizens with the voices of experts, how to deal with effects of party politics within deliberative democratic set-ups as well as to ensure inequalities stemming from material differences and the class backgrounds of participants, from the knowledge and information gulfs that separate experts from laypersons, or from personal capacities for deliberation and persuasion associated with educational and occupational advantages and do not disturb the capacity of others to deliberate meaningfully.

4.3.4 Deliberative Democracy as a Theoretical Framework for this study

While the above form a critical ensemble of normative benchmarks or thresholds for genuine deliberative democracy, in this thesis two aspects of the process are accorded special weighting and will be used as the criteria for deliberative democracy. These are inclusivity and equality. To be sure, the thesis will assess the implications of polity dualism on equality and inclusion.

The first criterion to be used is inclusivity. According to deliberative democracy theorists, a well-deliberated decision must include all those affected by the decision. Through this deliberation, affected individuals sincerely weigh the merits of competing arguments in their discussions. Against this background, the thesis assesses the operations of traditional leaders and elected leaders given the polarized, power dynamics, resource dynamics, gender dynamics and the class dynamics in communities. The thesis also looks at how during the interactions between traditional leaders and elected officials, the voices of ordinary citizens are balanced with the voices of the elites.

In the second criterion, the thesis empirically tests the implications of polity dualism on equality. How do marginalised groups negotiate and push for their interests in the various spaces provided by traditional leaders and elected officials? What tactics do they use? How do the two institutions mediate the interests of the marginalised? More importantly how do the traditional leaders and elected officials interact with the marginalised. Is there a difference between the way marginalized groups are treated, for example, when it is a female chief? What are the gender relations during the engagements? These are some of the critical questions that this thesis grapples with.

The analytical framework of this thesis flows in two stages: Firstly, it systematically identifies the nature of the relationship between elected leaders and traditional leaders. This helps to appreciate the power relations between traditional leaders and elected officials as well as the perceptions of the community on these power dynamics. The thesis then analyses the implications of the power relations on inclusivity and equality.

Secondly, the analytical narrative identifies conflicts and unity of interests (of political and economic nature) inherent in polity dualism and explores how this might influence the continuous configurations and disfigurations of equality and inclusivity in rural governance. In this case, identifying the conflicts and unity of interests helps in determining the sustainability of conflicts and unity. Given that the study is also concerned about the future role of traditional leaders, the sustainability of unity can be used as building blocks. The appreciation of the conflict and unity of interests therefore became crucial to the reconstitution and re-strengthening of the role of traditional leaders.

To be considered in this study is whether the interaction between traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance is compatible or inimical with the key elements of deliberative democracy. Put differently, does polity dualism in Zimbabwe bear a clear family resemblance to the principles of deliberative democracy as articulated by theorists? The question that this thesis contends with therefore is what are the implications of the coexistence between traditional leaders and elected officials in Zimbabwe, Matabeleland on the model set out by theorists of deliberative democracy. This process of approximation is doubly constituted: at the level of performative criteria, such as those of inclusion and equality, and more deeply, at the level of social presuppositions about, for example, the relationship between the elected officials and traditional leaders which is the basis for actualising a genuinely deliberative democracy. Would the relationship as well as the power asymmetries between the

elected officials and traditional leaders satisfy the conditions for the attainment of deliberative democracy as envisaged by its theorists? More importantly, how does that relationship impede or enhance equality and inclusivity in decision-making in rural governance? These are critical questions this thesis wrestles with.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the theoretical framework on which the thesis is grounded. The major aim of the chapter was to contextualise polity dualism and deliberative democracy. In order to appreciate the analytical utility of deliberative democracy in polity dualism for this thesis, the chapter began by exploring and contextualising polity dualism in Zimbabwe. It then reviewed the theory of deliberative democracy. It was argued that the theory marks a departure from the liberal democratic theories whose point of departure tends to be regular elections. It was argued that the key elements of deliberative democracy include inclusivity, equality, consensus building as well as the ability to change decisions overtime. While a number of theorists try to poke holes into the theory, deliberative theorists see the theory as a genuine inclusive policy making platform that protects the needs of affected groups. For the purposes of this thesis emphasis is however put on only two of the principles, namely inclusivity and equality. This study assesses the implications of polity dualism on equality and inclusivity in rural governance. In a nutshell, the present chapter has introduced the theory on which the study is predicated and argued for the theory's relevance to the study despite criticism levelled against it. Having achieved this goal, the next chapter (Chapter 5) will focus on the methodology employed to collect and analyse data.

CHAPTER 5

Research Methodology

5 Introduction

The previous chapter dealt in detail with the theoretical framework that guided this study. In particular, it situated the present study within the broader theoretical perspectives of deliberative democracy. While Chapter 1 briefly discussed the research strategy for this study, this chapter explains it in detail including key methodological approaches that guided the data collection process, analysis and interpretation. The research strategy provides a rationale and significance of a case study approach in understanding the phenomenon under study. It also involves a discussion of the choice and rationale of the specific data collection methods and how they individually and collectively contribute to a broader/deeper understanding of the study phenomenon. The chapter begins by providing a brief summary of the research design. Thereafter, the chapter explains in detail the rationale behind using a case study in looking at the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials. The chapter then discusses purposive sampling as a technique adopted in determining which chieftaincies would be suitable for the study as well as deciding which key respondents would add value in the study chapter. This is done primarily as a way of developing a research approach to answer the key research questions.

This research adopted a purely qualitative research methodology. Key informant interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), participatory observation and document analysis were the data collection techniques that allowed the study to link the context under which traditional leaders and elected officials operated to their relationship. This qualitative approach was informed by the need to understand the link between and among these aspects: the environment, history and geography as well as the way traditional leaders view their role in a democracy. Furthermore, the chapter explains how the researcher endeavoured to maintain high ethical standards, methods used to preserve data integrity and how the study handled field research.

5.2 Research Design

Leedy (1997) defines research design as a plan for a study, providing the overall framework for collecting data. MacMillan and Schumacher (2001) view it as a plan for selecting subjects, research sites, and data collection procedures to answer the

research question(s). They further indicate that the goal of a sound research design is to provide results that are judged to be credible. For Durkheim (2004), research design is a strategic framework for action that serves as a bridge between research questions and the execution, or implementation of the research strategy. Based on these definitions, the research design therefore should stipulate the nature of the data that is required, the methods used to collect and analyse the data, and more importantly how all this will assist in answering the research question(s).

This study was conducted using qualitative research methods, specifically a case study approach as a mode of enquiry. According to McMillan and Schumacher (1993) qualitative research is an inductive process of organizing data into categories and identifying patterns (relationships) among categories. This definition raises the importance of context in the emergence of data and meaning. For instance, in determining the use of qualitative data, the study had to contend with questions such as: Would the proximity of the Khayisa Chieftaincy to the city of Bulawayo, a predominantly pro-opposition city influence his relationship with elected leaders? Would Age and the historical roots of Chief Maduna's influence his relationship with elected officials? Importantly, would Chief Mabhena's gender influence her contribution in a democracy?

Through observation of the behaviour of elected leaders and traditional leaders during their party meetings and traditional courts, interviews with various stakeholders who engage these leaders on a day to day basis, and analysing documents from different stakeholders, the research was able to utilize the importance of looking at variables in the natural setting in which they are found. In the process of qualitative research interaction between variables is important and the interviewer is an integral part of the investigation. Shank (2002:123) defines qualitative research as "a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning". This implies that qualitative research is grounded in the world of experience, taking into consideration the context, and trying to make sense of the phenomenon in its natural settings. Silverman (2005) asserts that qualitative research is based on research methods that are flexible and sensitive to the social context. This is why the research goes for a purely qualitative focus. For example, given the high sensitivity of leadership to context, quantitative researchers incorporate contextual variables in their models but conceptualize them abstractly, thus obscuring the impact of context-specific forces. Qualitative researchers on the other hand are well positioned to use a number of variables such as the context, age, politics to gain a deeper understanding of the society.

This study is compatible with the above literature on qualitative research. The research methods applied allowed the researcher to explore the context of the study with a view of ascertaining how it affects the behaviours of elected leaders and traditional leaders. While interviews allowed for perspectives from different stakeholders, observation complimented that by monitoring the actions of traditional leaders and elected leaders. This allowed the researcher to be able to get a glimpse into the historical and the current while at the same time appreciating the value of the geography and exposure of the traditional and elected leaders within a specific context.

This study used research methods that are also flexible and allowed the researcher to be an integral part of the process. For instance, after interviewing a traditional leader or elected official, the researcher then observed some of the claims to verify if indeed they were true. Similarly, issues observed were verified during interviews. The interviews allowed for back and forth discussions while observations ensured proper understanding of the contextual issues as well as exposed gaps from other methods. This allowed the researcher to play an integral role in the interpretation of words and actions guided by the context and experiences.

The qualitative research design also allowed the researcher to understand how the context affects the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials. By taking into cognisance the history of traditional leaders, their politics, proximity to Bulawayo, which is the second capital city and dominated by opposition politics, academic backgrounds and exposure given that some of the respondents have spent decades in the United Kingdom and Botswana, the researcher was able to understand the philosophy behind the complications and dynamics in the relationships.

While qualitative research is an umbrella term for a broad range of different approaches and methods, which vary considerably in terms of focus, assumptions about the nature of knowledge and the role of the researcher, the approach utilized here was the case study.

5.3 The Case Study Approach

As mentioned earlier, this study adopted a qualitative case study approach. The present study sought to explore the institution of traditional leadership in different geographical settings and historical periods. A number of variables were examined.

These variables included: gender, educational qualifications, political affiliation and age to determine if they have any influence on the behaviour of traditional leaders towards elected leaders. This is in line with the thinking from Smith (2003) who conceptualizes qualitative case study as an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This definition assisted in ensuring that the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials is not explored through one lens, but rather a multiplicity of lenses, which allowed for multiple variables to be examined and facets of the phenomenon to be laid bare.

According to Yin (2003), a case study design should be considered when the focus of the study is to answer "how" and "why" questions, when one cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study, when one wants to cover contextual conditions because they believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study, and, when the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context. Against this background, the present study sought to understand the implications of a dual polity on deliberative democracy. The study sought to explore the roles and relationships of traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance and how these roles impact on key principles of deliberative democracy, i.e. equality and inclusivity. The understanding of the context in which these traditional leaders operate helped in ensuring that the explanation of the relationship is understood within a specific context and not abstractly. It was important to understand the culture, politics and religious context of these areas to determine their level of influence in the way traditional leaders and elected leaders relate.

Cylwik (2001) cautions that one of the common pitfalls associated with the case study approach is that there is a tendency for researchers to attempt to answer a question that is too broad or a topic that has too many objectives for one study. In order to avoid this problem, several scholars, including Yin (2003) and Stake (1995), have suggested that placing boundaries on a case can prevent this explosion from occurring. Case studies can be bound by time, place, activity, definition and context (Creswell, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1994). While the temptation to study the whole institution of traditional leadership is overwhelming, given that not many similar studies have been done, this study only concerns itself with how the contestations between traditional leaders and elected officials impact on key principles of deliberative democracy. To be specific the study preoccupies itself not just with the question of whether traditional

leaders and elected officials can co-exist but also with the specific impact of such co-existence on key processes of democracy namely; inclusivity and equality.

The present study has all the hallmarks of a multiple case study research. The study examined four cases, namely, Chief Khayisa Ndiweni, Chief Sinqobile Mabhena, Chief Vezi Maduna and Chief Nkalakatha. Focusing on these cases, the study explored the influence of different contexts, geographies, history, ages and political background to the behaviour of traditional leaders. Where the study looks at elected officials it is with a view of exploring a certain phenomenon or assumptions about traditional leaders.

This conforms to the view by Finlay (2002). Finlay (2002) advises that if a study contains more than a single case, then a multiple-case study is required. This is because the context is different for each of the cases. A multiple or collective case study approach allowed the researcher to analyse findings within each setting and, across settings. In a multiple case study, we are examining several cases to understand the similarities and differences between the cases. Yin (2003) urges that multiple case studies can be used to predict similar results (a literal replication), predict contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication).

According to Neumann (2014), a hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources, a strategy that also enhances data credibility (Patton, 1990; Yin, 2003). Potential data sources included, documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artefacts and direct observations. In a case study, data from these multiple sources are then converged in the analysis process rather than handled individually. Data sources compliment and verify each other. For instance, some of the data from interviews and document reviews was verified using observations. This convergence added strength to the findings as the various strands of data were braided together to promote a greater understanding of the case. In line with this suggestion, this study also used a number of qualitative methods to enhance data credibility. The study initially analysed a number of documents that relate to the relationship between leaders in rural governance. From these documents the study identified key gaps and strands that needed to be scrutinized and clarified using other methods. This further scrutiny was done either through key informant interviews or observation. Similarly, questions arising from observations were clarified through interviews. The use of interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis as well as observation were all intended to ensure complementarity, convergence as well as credibility and validity of findings.

This study employed purposive sampling, targeting chieftaincies with certain attributes, councillors from specific political parties as well as district administrators and Rural District Council (RDC) Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) based on their work and specific experience in local government. While the District Administrators, RDC CEOs are not the subject of the study, they interact a lot with the subjects of the study and hence have very valuable information about how these institutions under scrutiny co-exist. Given the fact that the study also wanted to establish if age, gender, proximity to the urban centres had an effect on how traditional leaders relate with the elected officials, the study purposively sampled Chief Sinqobile Mabhena (Woman) Chief Nkalakatha and Chief Maduna as the youngest and oldest chiefs respectively and Chief Khayisa as a chief whose area of jurisdiction is 25 kilometres from Bulawayo, the second largest city in Zimbabwe. The tools used to gather data were deliberately focused at ensuring that all this experience is captured to determine its influence on the phenomena under study. The use of triangulation was also to ensure complementarity and credibility.

5.3.1 Limitations of a Case Study Approach

Scholars have warned researchers on the limitations of a case study approach. While a number of criticisms have been levelled, this section will discuss a few. Scholars have raised red flags with regards to the ability of cases to be scientifically generalizable beyond producing a microscopic study (Giddens cited in Yin, 1993). The present study however was not concerned about generalizing; its main thrust was to get as much data as possible about the context and its effects on the behaviour of elected and hereditary leaders within a particular area namely, The Khayisa, Maduna, Nkalakatha and Mabhena chieftaincies.

One of the common pitfalls associated with the case study approach is a tendency for researchers to attempt to answer a question that is too broad or a topic that has too many objectives for one study. In order to avoid this problem, several authors, including Yin (2003) and Stake (1995), have suggested that placing boundaries on a case can prevent this explosion from occurring. This research took the view that while there were so many issues to study in rural governance, it was best to confine the study only to the implications of the interactions between traditional leaders and elected officials. While there are more than 50 traditional leaders in Matabeleland, the

study focused on four chieftaincies to achieve its objectives. This was deemed a workable sample.

5.4 Sampling in Qualitative Studies

This study employed the purposive sampling model to choose both the chieftaincies and the respondents within the chieftaincies. Purposive sampling is discussed in some literature as criterion-based sampling (Ritchie et al., 2003) or strategic sampling (Mason, 2002). This model does not aim to achieve any statistical representation of cases. Instead, the selection of a case is not guaranteed. As Ritchie et al. (2003) argue, sample units are chosen because they have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration. The understanding of the central themes and puzzles which the researcher wishes to highlight and study are best realised by the sampling approach. It uses the judgment of an expert in selecting cases, or it selects cases with a specific purpose in mind. It is inappropriate if the goal is to have a representative sample or to pick the "average" or the "typical" case. In purposive sampling, cases selected rarely represent the entire population. Purposive sampling is appropriate to select unique cases that are especially informative. Purposive sampling is also used to identify particular types of cases for in-depth investigation to gain a deeper understanding of types (Mason, 2002). The approach of the study took its cue from this line of thinking.

The broad aim of this study was to investigate the implications of the co-existence between traditional leaders and elected officials on deliberative democracy. The selection of the study's sample (respondents) was influenced, first, by the principles of purposive sampling as discussed above and secondly, by the reality in the study's population site (i.e., Zimbabwe) at the time of data collection. The chieftaincies were purposively sampled so as to meet specific criteria. This study focuses on four chieftaincies. The controversy around the installation of Chief Sinqobile Mabhena makes her an interesting case study as she is a female chief in a largely male dominated institution and society. Many chiefs in Matabeleland were against her installation as they argued that her installation was political and not customary. According to Ndlovu (2017), Chief Sinqobile Mabhena is a teacher who resides in Botswana. While this information is being used to portray her as someone who is out of place and has little regard for her subjects, what is important is her qualifications as a teacher as well as her exposure through working in Botswana, one of Africa's

consistent democracies. It was therefore important to asses if the woman chief dealt with patriarchy differently from the male chiefs. More so, it assisted the researcher to determine if her education and exposure makes her appreciation of her relationship with elected officials different.

Chief Vezi Maduna is the oldest chief in Matabeleland. As a product of ZAPU, Chief Maduna always had a complicated relationship with the government. For this study, the chief provides an insight into how the elderly view the complex relationship between customary institutions and state institutions. His views are juxtaposed with those of the youngest chief in Matabeleland, Chief Nkalakatha Ndiweni. Specifically, the two chiefs, Chief Maduna and Nkalakatha, provide two sides of the spectrum on the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials. Put differently, they respond to the question of whether age influences the relationship between traditional leaders and elected leaders. Meanwhile, the Khayisa chieftaincy has always had a complicated relationship with the government. The late Chief Khayisa was a politician in his own right, and was part of the team that went to Lancaster to discuss the peace process in Zimbabwe. On several occasions he stated that traditional leaders were more powerful than elected officials, including the President. Given his educational background, his three decades stay in the United Kingdom, Chief Khayisa's successor, Chief Nhlanhla Khayisa provided interesting insights into the relationship and how the institution of chieftaincy can be improved for effective rural governance.

Other key informants were also purposively drawn from actors representing the state, civil society, social and political commentators who all engage with both traditional leaders and elected officials in their line of work. Most of the civil society respondents deal with traditional leaders and elected officials on a day-to-day basis. These included Habakkuk Trust, Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), residents associations and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). These organizations monitor and engage both traditional leadership institutions and elected officials in their day to day work. Other key informants included the offices of the District Administrator (DA) and the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the Rural District Councils (RDCs) within the study areas. The District Administrators are the heads of the districts and as such are meant to ensure harmony between state institutions and customary institutions even though many a times they seem to be the ones sponsoring disharmony. As the heads of Councils, CEOs also have a duty to ensure that RDCs work in harmony with other state and non-state actors. The DAs and the CEOs inputs added value to the study.

Moyo (2019) implicates the institution of traditional leadership in the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. He argues that the Zimbabwe political terrain is dominated by an incestuous relationship of fetishized traditional leaders and the hegemonic ruling party – the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). Fayayo (2018) argues that the removal of President Robert Mugabe meant that traditional leaders continued to play a prominent role in sprucing up ZANU PFs electoral fortunes, but now behind the scenes. This view is shared by a number of election observers who intimated that traditional leaders were playing a significant role in aiding ZANU PF to win elections (see reports from ZESN, 2018, Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2018, African Union, 2018, European Union, 2018). Against that background it was important that the voice of political parties be heard. Respondents from political parties helped the researcher to explore the second objective of the thesis, specifically, exploring the interactions between traditional leaders and elected officials. After participating as electoral agents of one party, how do they relate with the victors? In this context, it was crucial to unpack the political parties' views concerning the interactions between elected officials and traditional leaders. The initial plan was to interview all political parties. But, on the ground, I discovered that they were too many officials from different political parties. In the end, because of the volatile political situation at the time of the fieldwork, the study sought only an audience with officials from those political parties that are represented in council and Parliament.

5.4.1 Challenges of the Sampling Process

Given the focus of this study, it was almost given that one of the chieftaincies to be studied would be the Khayisa Chieftaincy. Given the fact that the study wanted to explore contestations and cooperation between traditional leaders and elected leaders, The Khayisa Chieftaincy has a history of clashes with elected officials. In 2010, Chief Khayisa refused to attend a meeting between traditional leaders and President Mugabe because he had argued that the President had disrespected him by calling for a meeting in his area without consulting him. President Mugabe issued a public apology. After the death of Chief Khayisa, his heir, Nhlanhla Khayisa has also had an unstable relationship with the government. Against that background the intention to conduct a research in the Khayisa chieftancy came with a lot of challenges. The political antagonism between the government and the Khayisa family had a negative impact on the study in two ways. Firstly, officials from the DAs office were reluctant to be interviewed over the Khayisa chieftainship. Even the letters requesting

permission to study were initially sent to the DAs office and after 2 weeks the DA's office called the researcher and indicated that the letters should be sent to the Provincial Administrator (PA) for approval. There were even suggestions from the Provincial Administrator's office to change the chieftaincy and deal with a less controversial one.

The second effect of the above relationship between Chief Khayisa and the government was that it even polarized the community. The interviews became either an anti-Khayisa or pro-Khayisa campaign. This meant that many a times respondents would take much of their time either praising or castigating the Chief. While the study still ensured that all were given an ear, notes were only taken on those points that assisted in responding to the questions of the study.

The study also sought to balance views from political parties. This was important because elected officials belong to political parties. It was therefore important to understand what political parties as the sanctuaries of elected officials think about the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials. The initial plan was to interview all political parties present in the research area. However, time constraints resulted in interviews being conducted only with those political parties that were either represented in parliament or residing in rural district councils being interviewed.

The research also sought to benefit from the only female Chief in the Matabeleland region in Zimbabwe Chief Sinqobile Mabhena. However as the study progressed, it was discovered that Chief Mabhena is not even resident in her chieftaincy. She is based in Botswana as a teacher. While that was important in terms of exposing her to different cultures, it also meant that she was superintending over a chieftaincy in name only. The men who constituted her court assessors were in actual fact running the chieftaincy for her.

5.5 The Pilot Study

The pilot study was a small-scale replication of the actual study, targeting one chieftaincy with characters similar to those of the target group of respondents, namely traditional leaders, councillors, representatives from the Provincial Administrator's office, Civic Society Organizations and political parties.

The pilot sample consisted of 10 respondents who were purposively sampled from one chieftaincy in Matobo district, Matabeleland, Zimbabwe. The purpose of the pilot study was to determine the feasibility of the study; to test the reliability and validity of the instruments, clarity of the questions, and to determine if there were salient issues that might not have been covered in the interview guide. This would then ensure that any problems were addressed or pre-emptied before the actual study. The pilot study demonstrated that the questionnaire did not contain any confusing items and the respondents found it easy to engage based on the guides. Moreover, the pilot study revealed the need to be politically neutral and objective in order to ensure that all stakeholders were heard.

5.6 Ethical Considerations

In planning, the research had to take into consideration the need to protect the privacy, feelings, and rights of the key informants and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) participants as enunciated in the ethical clearance certificate issued by the University of Western Cape. All those who were not comfortable with being part of the research were excused with the full assurance that no harm would happen to them. In Umguza district, following the public fights between Chief Khayisa and the Government, one participant expressed discomfort with participating in the research. As a member of the ruling party (ZANU PF) in Zimbabwe the participant felt that participating in anything that involved Chief Khayisa would result in sanctions from his political party. In Umzingwane, one participant who was involved in the dispute that ensured leading to the inauguration of Chief Sinqobile Mabhena also excused himself as he thought any comments about the chief would be interpreted as a fight with the chief.

In compliance with the rules and regulations of the university with regard to conducting research using human subjects, all the ethical considerations, stipulated were taken into account during the course of the research. These considerations applied to both the focus group conversations and the key informant interviews.

5.6.1 Permission to Conduct Research

In accordance with the laws and practices in Zimbabwe, I wrote letters, obtained written permission from both the District Administrators' offices and the rural district councils covering the four chieftaincies. Given the sensitivity of the institution of traditional

leaders coupled with my previous work as the director of a Civic Society Organization, authorities were initially skeptical about giving me permission to conduct research. However, upon discussing the scope of the study, authorities opened up and gave me permission to proceed. This enabled these offices to open up not only their offices but to also spare time and take me through any documents they deemed relevant.

5.6.2 Confidentiality and Privacy

Confidentiality refers to handling the information concerning the respondents in a confidential manner. While the nature of the research was never a sensitive one, it was important that participants in the Focus Group conversations and key informants were assured that their names and the information they supplied would be dealt with in the strictest confidence. Given the influence of both traditional leaders and elected leaders in the community it was important that I emphasized that the issues discussed were only to be used for academic purposes. Some of the respondents were direct beneficiaries of projects either run by traditional leaders or elected officials. It was therefore important that confidentiality of their contributions was assured. Failure to do that would have resulted in either them not participating effectively or just pulling out. I therefore assured the participants that their trust would not be exploited for personal gain or benefit, by deceiving or betraying them in the research route or its published outcomes. With these assurances, potential informants felt comfortable to participate in the study.

5.6.3 Voluntary Participation and Informed Consent

The principle of voluntary participation was explained to the respondents and they were also informed that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any time. The principle of informed consent was attached to the questionnaires and verbally explained to the interviewees. Both principles entailed explaining the research process and its purposes to the participants. All participants felt comfortable to participate in the study and filed the consent form confirming that they understood what the study was about and what its purpose was.

5.7 Data Collection: Methods and Processes

This section discusses the precise mechanics of the data collecting procedures as well as the opportunities and challenges encountered during fieldwork. Data was collected within the periods covering September 2019 and May 2020. The data building blocks

of the thesis came from secondary and primary sources. Firstly, secondary data (e.g. published books and journal articles) informed the conceptual and analytic framework discussed in chapter 2 Secondly, primary data from interviews, documentary analysis, focus group discussions and observation were used to empirically explore the major research questions of the study. In the first three sub-sections, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the data collection methods in general. In the fourth sub-section, I then discuss the application of these methods during fieldwork. The fifth sub-section is dedicated to the discussion of the framework for analysing fieldwork data.

5.7.1 Key Informant Interviews

This study also utilized key informant interviews to collect data. Traditional leaders and elected officials were purposively sampled based on the positions they occupy and the focus of the study. Given the thrust of the study, it was prudent that the researcher got insights from the actors themselves on what they perceived to be key determinants of their interactions. The above view justified the inclusion of district administrators and council Chief Executive Officers. Through their work, they not only interacted with traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance but they were also in a position to observe the behaviours of these actors.

Ospina (2004) adds that some key informants have a keen interest in the behaviour of those around them and key actors in the society. They also observe the development of their culture and often speculate, or make inferences about both. In this regard, key stakeholders like civic society organizations and community leaders who have a keen interest in ensuring accountability in the operations of traditional leaders and elected officials were included as key informants. These included representatives from groups such as Habakkuk trust, Masakhaneni Trust, Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association, Youth in Action among others. These key informants were able to juxtapose the expected relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials and the reality on the ground. Moreover, from a neutral perspective these informants were able to propose how these two institutions could work together to build accountability in rural governance.

The interviews were conducted face-to-face and a total of 70 key informants were interviewed. An interview guide was generated to guide key informant interviews. The

interviewees comprised the chiefs, elected councillors, community leaders, District Administrators, Council CEOs, Civil Society Organizations, Provincial Administrators, headmen, Members of Parliament and representatives of political parties. Most of these respondents were available for the interviews, and participated willingly in the project save for a few who had to be followed over and over. Getting District Administrators to sit down for the interviews was cumbersome. They seemed to be busy every time even though one suspected that they were not so sure of the questions that they had to deal with. Once their interviews took off and their fears were allayed they cooperated. The other challenge was that given the high number of interviewees, it took a long time to transcribe the interviews.

To ensure that the research stayed within the confines of its scope, the study made use of the key informant guide during the interviewing process. Arthur and Nazroo (2003) define the key informant interview guide as a framework that identifies broad topics or themes to be explored. It 'helps to ensure that relevant issues are covered systematically and with some uniformity, while still allowing flexibility to pursue the detail that is salient to each individual participant' (Arthur and Nazroo, 2003:115). For this study and in broad terms, the guiding topics and questions focused on the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials as well as perceptions of stakeholders on the relationship and its impact on rural governance.

Key informants were actually useful in that they gave the study personal perceptions of various stakeholders on the relationship between the elected officials and traditional leaders. During the interviews the researcher was also able to get the context and history that shapes these perceptions. Some of the information from the interviews was used to shape the questions of the focus group discussions. For instance, some questions were thrown into the focus group discussion to try and see if the views shared by individuals are indeed shared by the generality of the people.

Astalin (2013) warns that key informants might only divulge information that is politically acceptable. To avoid this scenario the researcher made sure that views by different key informants was cross-checked either through other key informants or through other data collection methods.

Table 1 . Key Informant Interview Statistics

Stakeholder Category	Number of Interviewees	Total
Chiefs	1 per area x 4 areas	4
Headmen	2 per area x 4 areas	8
Civic Society Organisations	3 per area x 4 areas	12
Provincial Administrators	2 x 2 provinces	4
District Administrators	1 per area x 4 areas	4
Community leaders	5 per area x 4 areas	20
Members of Parliament	1 per area x 4 areas	4
Councillors	2 per area x 4 areas	8
Political Party Representatives	4 per area x 4 areas	16
Total number of respondents		70

5.6.2. Document Review

The study also made use of published and unpublished documents. Such documents included brochures, pamphlets from Habakkuk Trust and Masakhaneni, manuscripts and other published academic literature. Some of the documents were accessed during fieldwork while others such as election observation reports from regional and International organizations as well as the participating parties locally were accessed during the initial preparatory phases of the study through the Internet. Documents such as policy papers from the Public Policy Research Institute of Zimbabwe, speeches (by politicians and civil society actors), and interviews from news outlets such as the Centre for Innovation and Technology (CITE). The study made use of more than 300 newspaper articles and other mass media material. These documents were analysed to ascertain patterns and emerging themes.

Documents can provide data on the context within which research participants operate (Bowen, 2009). Documents like Civil Society Organisations reports, Constitution of Zimbabwe, Newspapers, Election reports, as well as policy papers provided background information as well as historical insight. Such information helped in grounding the study within its historical and socio-political context which influenced the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials. Data drawn from these

documents were used to contextualize data collected during interviews and Focus Group Discussions.

Apart from providing contextual richness, documents provided useful insights in pre and post interview settings. In that regard, I used data collected from secondary sources to validate interviews and FGDs data. Documents supplied leads for asking additional, probing questions. Information contained in newspapers and reports from civil society was also instrumental in purposively sampling places that needed keen observation.

Documents were also analysed to verify findings or corroborate evidence from interviews and Focus Group Discussions. If the documentary evidence was contradictory rather than corroboratory, the researcher investigated further. Some documents from the electoral commission stated that all councillors in one district belonged to one political party. However, on the ground, it was revealed that one of the councillors belonged to the opposition. The researcher had to go back and ascertain the correct position. It was discovered that the DA's office had not updated its information. Indeed, after elections all councillors were from ZANU PF but one died and the by-election was won by the opposition MDC.

The other advantage of secondary sources of data for this study was that they allowed access to subjects in the past and present that are usually impossible to reach through one-on-one interviews. This was particularly important in preparation for interviews. Through documents, the researcher was able to understand the context through which traditional leaders and elected officials operate and what exactly influences their actions. It was through documents such as newspapers that the researcher accessed information on the various chieftaincies.

However, using written documents as sources of evidence has its own disadvantages. Corbin and Strauss (2008) note that documents contain text and images that have been recorded without the researcher's intervention. To be sure, the objectivity of these documents can never be guaranteed given that they are written for specific purposes other than what the researcher uses them for. Furthermore, organisations and institutions select which documents to give as a way of promoting their own narratives. This means that issues of incompleteness and/or bias of the contents of documents cannot be ruled out (Creswell, 2003:187; Hay, 2002). But this weakness was addressed by cross-referencing various source types. This research drew upon

multiple sources of evidence to seek convergence and corroboration while also noting any points of divergence. Other methods such as Focus Group Discussions, Key Informant Interviews as well as observation were triangulated to cover the gaps of document analysis. By triangulating different data sources, the researcher attempted to provide a confluence of evidence that would breed credibility. This was in line with the advice from Patton (1990) who noted that triangulation helps the researcher guard against accusations that a study's findings are simply an artefact of a single method, single source or a single investigator's bias. The specific documents used for this research were as follows:

Newspapers – These carried various articles on traditional leaders and governance. Specifically, the study followed the coverage of the contestations between Chief Khayisa and the government.

Reports from the 2018 Observer missions – A number of reports from various missions were used during the study. These include the reports from the European Union, AU, SADC, and NDA. The majority of these reports indicated that traditional leaders in Zimbabwe were at the forefront of violating the democratic rights of their subjects as they marshalled them to vote for their preferred candidates.

Court judgments – The study benefited from court judgments where villagers appealed certain decisions from traditional leaders. Specifically, the study had access to a court judgment that overturned Chief Khayisa's ruling banishing a villager from his area. Another court judgment relayed how a woman was able to overturn a decision to overlook her for a chieftaincy on the basis of her gender.

Big Saturday Read (BSR) – The BSR blog looked at a number of issues concerning traditional leaders including the legislative framework guiding the operations of traditional leaders. The BSR blog also carried a special feature detailing how the traditional leaders, among a lot of other enhancers, corruptly benefitted from a farm mechanization program initiated by the government.

5.7 Observation

The research also utilized observation as a data collection method. Observation was useful in this research for a number of reasons. For example, where these leaders were interacting in-group settings, it was critical to observe the context and how they

made decisions. During the process of collecting data in Zimbabwe, the researcher was able to 'observe' operations and interactions between traditional leaders and elected officials and document phenomena which were cross-checked or further interrogated during interviews and Focus Group Conversations. In particular, the researcher participated in various meetings organised by elected officials, namely the councillor and the Member of Parliament. Mostly these were rallies and feedback meetings. Furthermore, the researcher attended public discussion meetings, which brought together representatives from different political parties, civil society and traditional leaders. The researcher also had the privilege to attend full Rural District Council meetings as well as *Kings' Court*. These opportunities offered the researcher an opportunity to witness events as they happened. It gave the researcher a feel of the environments and the roles of various actors that cannot be achieved through an interview situation or a Focus Group Discussion only. Observing these processes afforded the researcher the opportunity to collect data from the context in which it occurred and to also observe decision making by these leaders.

As part of a multi-method research, observation was used to support data from interviews, documents and Focus Group Discussions. For example, from the interviews and FGDs, the researcher was able to note areas worth observing. Equally from observations, the researcher was able to note some issues that needed to be clarified through interviews and FGDs. Observation used with other methods ensured that the researcher built up a picture of the traditional leaders' and elected officials' working day.

The data gathered during observation sheded a lot of light on the behaviour and decision-making processes of the traditional leaders and elected officials. For example, during the key informant interviews, traditional leaders and elected officials portrayed a certain picture about decision making. Moreover, observations ensured that the researcher could ascertain the veracity of the claims. While other methods brought out the views of the respondents, observations provided an opportunity to witness some of the interactions personally. Observation allowed the researcher to understand the interactions in several dimensions. It was an opportunity to witness the behaviour of traditional leaders and councillors, in both formal and informal settings as well as to follow processes involving traditional leaders and elected leaders. For example, the researcher was able to observe the behaviour of the traditional leaders and elected officials during full council meetings, get the views of traditional leaders

during *Inkundla* and at the same time hear what elected officials thought during their rallies and feedback meetings.

Gaining access is the biggest obstacle to observation in research as there are many situations where access would not be granted (Dargie, 1998). However, the researcher was able to avoid this challenge. Firstly, letters were sent out to all District Administrators and Chief Executives of the rural district councils concerned. Enclosed in those letters was the clearance letter from the University of Western Cape clearly confirming that I was a student and spelling out the parameters of my study. Secondly, the researcher has more than 10-years-experience working in the local governance sphere; a lot of contacts were made during those years. The relationships came in handy, as officials from the District and RDCs were more than willing to help. So, even as senior officials in the offices were cagey, junior officials were able to ensure that other aspects of the research continued.

Observation is criticised for its failure to address the 'cognitive processes' of actors in organisations (Snyder and Glueck, 1980). This view, however, works on the assumption that observation is the only method used during this research. This study used observation as part of many other research methods as indicated earlier. It allowed the researcher to observe actions and behaviour of actors. Where observation was done prior to the interviews or Focus group Discussions, clarifications were sought during the interviews. Where questions from observations arose after the interview, the researcher was able to request for follow-up interviews.

5.7.1 Focus Group Discussions

This research also employed Focus Group Discussions as a data collection tool. To be sure, FGD served to shed light on how the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials, their decision-making processes impacted on equality and inclusiveness. During the period between September 2019 and May 2020, a total of 8 FGDs were carried out. These comprised of individuals with certain characteristics who normally focus their discussions on a given issue or topic as advised by Wilkinson (2004). The focus groups consisted of a small group of people, usually between six and nine in number, brought together to explore attitudes and perceptions, feelings and ideas about the implications of dual polity on democracy. The focus group interview provided a setting for a group to assist each other to reflect on the salient questions of the study.

As mentioned earlier, this study adopted purposive sampling as a procedure for selecting participants for the FGDs. Leaders of women clubs and youth groups, were all chosen to extend their knowledge on key questions on the subject. The Focus Group Discussions were specifically designed to cater for disadvantaged groups. Women, youths and people living with disabilities are groups that were specifically invited to give their views on the interactions between traditional leaders and elected officials.

Based on recommendations from Krueger and Casey (2000) who asserts that Focus Group Discussions require a team consisting of a skilled facilitator and an assistant, in this study the researcher was primarily responsible for facilitation. The subject of traditional leaders and elected leaders is sensitive primarily because these are people who play an important role in a community. They mobilize resources that benefit a number of people in most of the sampled chieftaincies. It was important that participants in the focus group discussions had their privacy assured while at the same time ensuring that they contributed effectively in the discussions. This ensured that while taking brief notes, the researcher was also able to observe non-verbal ques and the impact of group dynamics. It was also important that the researcher focused on ensuring that not only everyone participated but also that all participants were comfortable. This left the researcher's assistants with the responsibility of ensuring that the discussions were tapped using a recorder while hand-written notes were also taken.

Initial FGDs were very valuable as the researcher lacked information about the elected officials and traditional leaders in some areas. The focus group discussions filed in that gap. They were important as they not only gave the researcher an appreciation of the context and history of the area but also assisted in shaping the questions for the interviews. Focus Group Discussions also provided data about perceptions, thoughts, feelings and impressions of people with regards to the interactions between traditional leaders and elected officials. Focus groups were also beneficial when the researcher needed to find out people's understanding and experiences about the issue and reasons behind their particular pattern of thinking about the actors in rural governance. Gorman and Clayton (2005) advise that there are a number of limitations associated with the focus group interview. It is considerably difficult to get the people together on time for the group session (Gibbs, 1997). This research was able to counter that by calling all participants an hour before the meeting to ensure that they came on time

and for those who had changed their mind there was time to look for replacements. While ordinarily a few vocal participants may dominate other members in the course of group discussion, for this research all participants were given an opportunity to say their views on all aspects of the research. The facilitator identified those who were vocal and made them speak last so that they did not influence the narrative.

Table 2 showing List of focus group discussions held

Group	**Frequency**	**Total**
Women	One per area x 4 areas	4
Youths	One per area x 4 areas	4
Total		8

5.7 Notes from the field – Dealing with the unexpected.

The collection of data for this thesis was carried out in Zimbabwe between the months of September 2019 and May 2020. To meet the University of the Western Cape's ethical code of conduct by its research community, consent of all would-be interviewees was obtained by giving as much information about the study and the researcher as befitting. For the avoidance of doubt, participants were able to fill in forms for focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. Full consent for the interviews to be recorded was also sought and interviewees were given guarantees that anonymity and confidentiality in the use of information will be professionally observed. This procedure was important – given the volatility of the political environment at the time – in order to protect both the interviewees and the researcher from harm or ill- effects. Thus, an official letter from the University of Western Cape identified me as a registered student and also explained the purpose of the study **.** 2 letters from the Provincial Administrators in Matabeleland North and South further supported the university letter. Consequently, care has been taken not to explicitly attribute statements or direct quotations to particular individuals.

The data collection period was largely affected by 2 events that were largely unforeseen, namely the arrest and removal of Chief Khayisa Ndiweni as a chief and the novel Covid 19 pandemic. The scheduled work plan was to start interviews in September 2019, notwithstanding any huddles and be done by February 2020. A total of **70** in-depth interviews were carried out, **8** focus group discussions held, **10** public

meetings organized by elected officials, **12** Rural District Council Meetings as well as **12** meetings organized by the chiefs were all observed. The guides approved by the University of Western Cape were used as a guide. On each physical visit to an interviewee, I gave my interviewees hard copies of the interview guide plus university and Provincial Administrator's letters of identification.

5.7.1 Arrest and Conviction of Chief Khayisa Ndiweni

Felix Nhlanhlayamangwe Ndiweni, the outspoken Ntabazinduna traditional chief was jailed after he was convicted of malicious damage to property. Chief Ndiweni and 23 villagers were accused of destroying a kraal and garden fence of a fellow villager, Fetti Mbele. Mbele had been banished by a traditional court from Ndiweni's area involving a case of adultery. Zanu PF's Secretary for Administration Obert Mpofu was one of the witnesses to testify during the trial after Chief Ndiweni accused him of instigating his arrest. The chief alleged Mpofu had sought ways to "fix" him after he filed a police report, accusing the then Home Affairs Minister in charge of the police of having stolen 200 cattle from his late father, Chief Khayisa Ndiweni.

5.7.2 Dethroning of Chief Khayisa

In an unprecedented move, on the 18th of May 2019, President Emmerson Mnangagwa decided to dethrone Chief Nhlanhlayamangwe Ndiweni. President Mnangagwa claimed that he removed the outspoken Ntabazinduna chief from his position after the traditional leader's chieftaincy was challenged by his brother. This move heightened tensions between the Ndiweni elders and the government. According to The Standard (2019), the Ndiweni elders and *Inkosi* Advisory Council, Ntabazinduna village headmen, faith groups and the Ntabazinduna community insisted that Nhlanhlayamangwe Ndiweni remained their substantive chief.

"It is only the Ndiweni clan that can enter that kraal and select the bull for their herd and they have done that," they said in a joint statement. According to the standard, the Family argued that,

"To make it abundantly clear, the president of the Republic of Zimbabwe cannot enter any chieftaincy clan's kraal and select the bull for that clan," they said.

The government has been accused of fighting in Ndiweni's brother Jorum's corner. Jorum claimed he was the rightful heir to Chief Khayisa Ndiweni's throne because he

was the first born son in the family. The Ndiweni elders accused Zanu PF Secretary for Administration Obert Mpofu, the ruling party, the chief's brothers Jorum and Douglas of working with the Matabeleland North Provincial Chiefs Council to cause disturbances in the family. Mnangagwa's government was accused of trying to silence Ndiweni because he is critical of its policies. The Chief is also vocal about the Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland and the Midlands.

These two events were very important in determining the pace of the study for a number of reasons. Firstly, Chief Nhlanhlayamangwe Ndiweni was my key informant. His incarceration meant that I had to follow him to Khami prison to interview him. Because of the delicacy of his matter his visitors were restricted. He was only allowed to have one visitor at once. This meant that I had to compete with his relatives. A week after his release on bail he was then dethroned from his chiefship. This meant that I either had to change my case study or wait for the dust to settle. I opted to wait because initially the thrust of my study was to understand the relationship between the Khayisa Ndiweni chieftaincy and the government. Moreover, my study was not focused on the future but wanted to understand the interactions that Chief Khayisa Ndiweni had had with the elected officials.

Secondly, Chief Khayisa occupied a leadership role among traditional leaders in Matabeleland. His actions were likely to influence the actions of a number of traditional leaders. His role was also visible in mobilising chiefs in Matabeleland to install Bulelani Lobengula as the King of the Ndebele. A lot of traditional leaders became focused on offering solidarity to the chief to the extent that it became very difficult to have time for interviews. It was only after some time that the dust settled and traditional leaders were available for interviews.

Thirdly the arrest and subsequent dethronement of Chief Khayisa changed the relations between traditional leaders and the government. Where initially activities involving traditional leaders were not much under the microscope, they became of significant interest to the government. For instance, where one did not require permission to go and interview traditional leaders, the mention of Khayisa Ndiweni as a key informant pushed the local government officials to require that you have a letter of approval to access their localities. One could only be able to interview councillors, and other stakeholders on issues relating to the chief after getting permission from the District or Provincial Administrator. Even after seeking permission, the letters really took a lot of time to come because of the bureaucracy in the government operations.

For the purposes of my study, the friction between Chief Ndiweni and the government was very instructive. It was a miniature of the friction that exists between Roman Dutch Law and our traditional way of life. It showed that the attempt to mix the traditional and the modern had not been properly done or deliberately so. The government was willing to use the traditional system where it suited them and operationalise the Roman Dutch law when it worked to their advantage. The invoking of the Roman Dutch Law in the Chief Khayisa's case was an attempt to silence and intimidate him.

5.7.3 Covid-19 Restrictions and its implications on the Study

On the 21st of April 2020, Zimbabwe recorded its first case of Covid-19. The government of Zimbabwe responded by introducing restrictions that had an immense bearing on my data collection process. As part of measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus, the government declared a state of national disaster and banned all public gatherings for 60 days. Some of the banned gatherings include church services, weddings and all international sporting fixtures. The government also ordered the closure of schools and designated three hospitals as quarantine facilities. Moreover, the government also ordered that all movements seize, people were all required to stay at home. The only people that were allowed to travel were only the first responders in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic.

These restrictions negatively affected my data collection process as it meant that travel to the chieftaincies was no longer possible. I was stuck at home. Moreover, the restrictions meant that I could not even organise focus group discussions. The first reaction to the pandemic was that of fear. So, outside the restrictions people were afraid of gathering, especially when it was about non-essential services. The restrictions reaffirmed that position. The spread of the Covid-19 pandemic also forced traditional leaders to stop the meetings of the traditional leaders' councils, public meetings by elected officials as well as Rural District Council meetings. Against that background it was no longer possible to observe those events that were of interest to the study. The lockdown also came with other challenges that included increase in prizes of a number of essential services. For instance transport costs went up along with the cost of communication. This meant that as the data collection process delayed, the budget for the process was also ballooning.

Given that movement was restricted, people needed to have letters of approval from the police dictating that they were essential services, I opted to use WhatsApp as a means of communication with my respondents. This method proved to be very

effective with some respondents. For example, with Chief Mabhena it was very effective as I was able to send her my questions and she would send back responses quickly. Moreover, there was also room to send follow-up questions. While that method could not replace face to face in depth interviews, under the circumstances it served me well. It however also had its own difficulties. For instance, not all respondents were using social media as a communication tool. So, the method could only work for some respondents and not work for others. The method also presented other challenges. For instance, in my communication with Chief Nkalakatha, he was only sending one-word answers to the extent that follow up was even difficult. In worst case scenarios respondents would just read your questions after agreeing to participate, and just ignore the researcher Resultantly, this method of communication was used just as a preliminary data collection method which had to be followed up by face to face in-depth interviews when the situation returned to normal.

During the course of my data collection I got attached as a researcher at the Public Policy Research Institute of Zimbabwe (PPRIZ). This position ensured easier access to several civil society meetings and workshops where I became a participant observer. I also researched and wrote policy paper briefs on behalf of PPRIZ for immediate use in their advocacy activities. These policy briefs were posted on their website and also summarised for press release in the print media. I also contributed articles in a number of their publications. PPRIZ claimed the authorship of all policy briefs. These documents were also used as sources of data. Attending civil society's meetings and workshops was helpful because I was able to not only meet a number of people who worked with traditional leaders but was also able to get broad perspectives around pertinent issues. Those issues would help in framing my questions on the field. The meetings also presented me with an opportunity to meet and network with some of my would-be respondents. Although the meetings and workshops focused on a number of different issues they were also informative in terms of how the different actors rationalised the challenges in shaping democracy in Zimbabwe.

The field work experiences discussed here has possible lessons for future and budding researchers planning to conduct research where there is a combination of unnatural events as well as politically volatile environments such as the one that ensued in Zimbabwe between September 2019 and July 2020. I highlight two lessons in particular. Firstly, it is important to avoid, where possible, taking anything for granted especially on research that involves governance issues and key Institutions of the

community. In terms of my planning, this was one of the most harmless topics where no one would be concerned. As long as it was not about elections in Zimbabwe the assumption was that it was a safe topic where no tensions would rise. However as shown by the case of Chief Khayisa in politics there are always unexpected circumstances that will always come into the fore. The arrest and suspension of Chief Khayisa was one such event. It changed the relationship between traditional leaders in Matabeleland as well as the way researchers conduct themselves in the affected provinces when it came to issues regarding traditional leaders.

Secondly, it was also important, especially when discussing politically sensitive topics that may invariably conjure up a sense of criticism towards the ruling elites, to know the political leanings of my respondents and therefore to continuously re-structure my interview guides as dictated by such circumstances. In this regard, I found out during fieldwork that I could easily get labelled depending on how I frame my questions especially by political party representatives. For instance, when talking to councillors and people sympathetic to them it was important to assure them that the information relayed would not be relayed to traditional leaders as this would affect not only their relationship but also their prospects for the next election. Simply put, there was need to be aware of the existing centres of conflict and the key social actors involved. Once the 'gatekeepers' are known and are given their due respect and trustworthiness between the researcher and respondents has been established, it is possible and easy to conduct field work in Africa.

The next section is a discussion of how the data that was collected from the field, transcribed and analysed.

5.8 After data collection: Notes on transcription and data analysis

The initial plan was to collect all the data that I needed and then transcribe it when I got back to the University of Western Cape in South Africa. There were a number of challenges in achieving that plan. Firstly, as has been extensively alluded to in the section above, the unexpected arrest and dethronement of chief Khayisa militated against the smooth collection of data. By the time the government introduced the restrictions I was three quarters into my data collection. I then had to utilize my time during the lockdown to transcribe the data. As such, much of the transcription was done at home during the lockdown while the rest was done when I went back to the University of Western Cape in South Africa. Initially, the transcriptions were written in an exercise book, with the intention to encode them to enable computational aided

qualitative analysis using the NVIVO software, which I had undertaken to pursue the training prior to going to the field. I however did not manage to get the training because of a number of reasons. Transcribed interviews were labelled into the folders “A” to “D”. A, B, C and D represented the four chieftaincies that were under scrutiny. For instance, A1 would represent all the interviews done under the Khayisa chieftancy. Inside the folder would be transcribed interviews of A2 up to 20. This order of labelling was determined by the completion of each transcription and not necessarily the order in which the interviews were carried out back in Zimbabwe. This labelling has been used throughout the thesis for the purposes of referencing within the explanatory accounts or text and for maintaining respondents’ anonymity.

The process of transcribing the interviews took longer than initially planned because I engaged an assistant to help me with transcribing some of the interviews. Resultantly at the back of my mind I was worried about balancing the need to move with speed in as far as transcription is concerned and the need to ensure that the process was not hurried to the extent of undermining the quality of the whole work. I needed my transcription to be as accurate as possible and also reflect contextual clarification. So instead of me focusing on my part of the work and letting my research assistant to also focus on his work, I went over the transcripts and the recordings that he had done. And that consumed a lot of time.

The audio versions of interviews were stored in the computer. I used the traditional method of treating qualitative interview data. The task entailed a three-pronged analytic hierarchy process (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) involving, first, the immersion stage where I re- read all the transcribed interviews in order to identify emergent and/or generate themes and concepts. Logically, some of the themes and concepts were derived from the study research questions and the sub questions. Secondly, I indexed or flagged out relevant or interesting parts of the interviews and coloured them for easier locating during the writing up stage. Thirdly, I used the themes generated at stage one to design the chapter outlines and then assign the indexed data under the different sections of the chapters. Once I had completed stage three, I found developing explanatory accounts to the research questions of the thesis easier and quicker.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter has extensively dealt with the methodology applied in this study. Specifically, it has justified the use of a case study and the purposive sampling used

to select the four chieftaincies for this study. The chapter has also extensively dealt with data collection for the study. More importantly, it has shown how the selected data collection techniques were triangulated to ensure validity. The last part of the chapter dealt with how the challenges in the field were navigated to ensure that the study was completed. The next chapter deals data presentation as well as the analysis.

CHAPTER 6

Roles of Traditional Leaders and Elected Officials in Rural Governance: The dynamics of Inclusivity and Accountability

6.0 Introduction

In chapter 5, I discussed methodological issues relating to this study. Apart from spelling out how the study was carried out, I also highlighted some of the challenges there were experienced and indicated how some adaptations were made in order to ensure that the research was a success. This is one of the two empirical chapters. Specifically, the Chapter discusses villagers' perceptions of the roles and relationships between traditional and elected leaders as well as the decision-making processes involved in rural governance regarding the two leadership institutions. The chapter assesses how the tensions, similarities and differences in roles, the subsequent contestations and cooperation impact on inclusivity and accountability. Inclusivity and accountability are applied here as they are key principles of deliberative democracy. As defined in the Theoretical Framework Chapter, a democratic decision must include all those affected or to be affected by such a decision. Through this deliberation, communities have an opportunity to evaluate competing arguments. More importantly, there should be checks and balances in the operations of officials.

Against this background, the thesis assesses the operations of traditional leaders and elected leaders given the polarized power dynamics, resource dynamics, gender dynamics and the class dynamics in communities. The thesis also looks at how, during the interactions between traditional leaders and elected officials, the voices of ordinary citizens are balanced with the voices of the elites.

The present chapter looks at the differences and similarities in as far as villagers' perceptions of the role of traditional leaders and elected officials is concerned. Given the widely held views on this relationship (see Chapter 1) (Makumbe, 2010; Chigwata, 2015; Chatiza, 2010; Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014; Matyszak, 2015), it was important to determine if the same views were held by villagers in the areas of the study. The chapter also looks at the tensions and contestations in the dual local governance system. This is to try and locate the root cause of the problems that bedevil rural governance. It is also to determine if the tensions are a result of power struggles between the two institutions of traditional leaders and elected officials in rural

governance. Specifically, the chapter answers the question of how the power relations and interactions impact on the key aspect of inclusivity and accountability. Finally, the chapter investigates the levels of cooperation between traditional and elected leaders. The chapter also seeks to evaluate the drivers of cooperation between these two institutions.

Structurally, the first part of the chapter looks at the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials in governance. Determining the roles is important in as far as determining where tensions, contestations or even cooperation are sourced from. Given that the institution of traditional leadership is one of the most durable institutions, understanding these issues assists in determining how they can actually be used to promote inclusivity and accountability. More importantly, it is critical to understand if these perceptions of the roles in rural governance have an impact on rural governance. The second section of the chapter closely scrutinises the decision-making process employed by these critical institutions. To be sure, this section establishes whether decision-making can pass the principles of deliberative democracy as envisioned in the theoretical framework presented earlier in this Dissertation.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: It first deals with evidence on the clarity of roles between traditional leaders and elected officials. It shows that the superiority of traditional leaders in rural governance is uncontested. It also shows that across the spectrum, there is consensus over the superiority of traditional leaders in rural governance among traditional leaders, government officials (these include appointed and elected) as well as Civic Society Organisations (CSOs) operational in the four studied areas. The chapter then engages the literature that attempts to explain the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials while presenting an alternate argument based on the evidence gathered. After clarifying the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials, the chapter then engages on collaborations and contestations in the mixed polity. The study uses the evidence to decipher circumstances that necessitate engagements in the mixed polity. This study also looks at how the two institutions manage their decision-making processes. More so, it also looks at decisions made and collaboration between the two institutions. The chapter concludes by arguing that rural governance is dominated by cooperation more than contestations as the critics of the institution of traditional leadership claim.

6.1 Villagers' views on the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance

This section examines at how villagers perceive the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance. Its thrust is to locate the implications of these roles on inclusivity and accountability in rural governance. Specifically, this section seeks to determine if there are contestations around the roles and if they are there, how do they either impede or increase inclusivity and accountability?

While the general impression in the literature and popular discussions is that there is confusion and contestation over the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials, evidence obtained from the study in the four chieftaincies shows that most respondents were clear on the roles of the traditional leaders in their communities. Their perception of the roles of traditional leaders range from being the representatives of the ancestors, owners of the land as well as critical leaders in the community who should be consulted when there are problems. Respondents in the form of traditional leaders, elected officials, civic society organizations operational in the areas under study, as well as ordinary villagers, all seemed to be knowledgeable about the roles of the traditional leaders. One respondent indicated that:

> Traditional leaders represent our customs. They are linked to the ancestors via the land. That is why ownership of the land by the traditional leaders is important.

Another view added that:

> …when we look at traditional leaders we see our moral compass. These are the custodians of our culture and from time to time they are around to give us guidance. Linking the past and the present. Failure to listen to their guidance will result in bad luck.

Another view from a villager captured below indicated that:

> "…their roles are very clear in the village. When there is drought, which is more often, we don't go to councillors, we appeal to traditional leaders to apologise on our behalf for our transgressions but also to do a number of traditional

ceremonies so that rains might come. Even elected officials go to traditional leaders because they know that their positions are just temporary".

The views of stakeholders, however, differed when it came to the elected leaders. Some respondents thought that elected leaders were part of the traditional leaders' team, implying that they worked as assistants to the headmen and chiefs. This view came out clearly as one villager observed that:

> In my view elected leaders such as councillors are messengers of traditional leaders who are sent to deliver messages to the communities. If a traditional leader doesn't want one to be a councillor they can easily make sure that they are not elected.

The differences in terms of their roles are laid bare as the case cited below indicates;

> …elected officials operate with the blessings of traditional leaders. They all understand that their positions are temporary and are meant to ensure that they support the operations of traditional leaders. If they try to go against traditional leaders they lose all the respect they have from the community. Elected leadership is temporary while traditional leadership is permanent.

Another view also added that:

> In the ladder of rural governance, traditional leadership and elected officials are not competing. Traditional leaders own the areas and elected leaders are sent to councils and parliament by people owned by traditional leaders. Many times, they come back to the villages to report back to the traditional leaders.

In some extreme cases, the villagers expressed ignorance not only about the role of the elected officials but also the persons occupying those positions in their wards. As the experiences of one villager showed,

> …because we have never had a need for help from a councillor, we have never attended any of the feedback meetings from councillors. We have never bothered about the councillor, their roles and the persons occupying those offices.

In support of that narrative, these are the views shared by one villager in one of the chieftaincies:

> It is easy to get things done when we appeal to traditional leaders than when we appeal to elected officials. Elected officials are not honest, are sometimes controlled by their political parties to the extent that the whipping system makes it difficult to get commitment from them. With traditional leaders if you agree with them then you know all the energy is directed towards achieving that.

Another view from another villager supported this assertion as follows:

> …traditional leaders have a genuine interest in the development of communities as they are not looking for votes. They deal with you in an honest manner unlike elected officials who want to first see the electoral value of any development projects hence the preference for the traditional leadership system.

This dependence on traditional leaders seems to complicate the suggestions by Ntsebeza (1996) that the institution should be abolished. In fact, evidence from the study shows that villagers are heavily reliant on the institution of traditional leadership for their day-to-day activities.

Also, going against "common sense" perceptions of traditional leaders in modern societies, evidence from the study also shows that there is consensus among the communities, stakeholders and villagers that traditional leaders are superior to elected leaders.

An elected leader who is a councillor indicated that,

> …there has never been a time when we as elected leaders have doubted the superiority of traditional leaders. In all cases where elected leaders have tried to compare themselves with traditional leaders they have not lasted.

Another view from the CSOs was very instructive:

> …when you put side by side traditional institutions and modern institutions people prefer traditional institutions. Maybe it's because people occupying the spaces in modern institutions have been unreliable.

This finding is compatible with the finding from Logan (2015) who concluded that popular perceptions of traditional leaders are more positive than those of elected leaders. This implies that in as far as communities are concerned, they owe much respect and loyalty to traditional leaders more than the elected leaders. This view is in line with the views expressed by Chief Khayisa Ndiweni at the funeral of liberation hero, Dumiso Dabengwa where he stated that:

> A chief by authority and definition is higher than a Councillor or MP, Minister, Vice President, President. If you go to the highest office in the land and ask him to produce an identity card, it will have a chief on it. That chief can summon him and fine him anytime. (Chief Nhlanhlayamangwe Khayisa Ndiweni, August, 2019)

According to evidence from the study, these particular views from Chief Ndiweni are compatible with the views from his father the late Chief Khayisa Ndiweni who argued that a chief was more important than the President because chiefs had no terms of office. According to Nehanda Radio:

> At one time Chief Khayisa Ndiweni refused to meet the President at a hotel in Bulawayo and instead summoned him to his Ntabazinduna home. Mugabe was forced to drive to the late traditional leader's homestead where the two held a one on one meeting behind closed doors (Nehanda Radio, August 5, 2010).

The view that traditional leaders are superior to elected leaders was shared across all the villages that were part of this study. One councillor indicated that:

> All of us are under chiefs and we give them the respect that they deserve. Our take is that from the time we started operating in this area, there has been no doubt to most villagers on the superiority of chiefs. If the chiefs can summon the President of the country and he obliges, what more with mere councillors. Chiefs are the glue that bring the communities together quipped one respondent.

Another villager argued that:

> …while traditional leaders and elected leaders work together, the fact that traditional leaders can summon elected officials to their kraal simply shows who is more powerful. If elected officials are powerful why are they not having the power to summon traditional leaders? It is simply because the elected officials do not superintend over any court. So a traditional leader is able to question an elected leader over an array of issues that include service delivery and family issues and yet the elected leader can neither refuse nor summon. Even when villagers have issues against traditional leaders they cannot report them to elected leaders because elected leaders do not have any powers to subpoena traditional leaders. In Nkayi for instance, the chief has on a number of occasions summoned the elected leaders especially councillors because they have held meetings without informing him.

The fact that chiefs cover a larger jurisdiction as compared to elected officials like councillors was used to argue that chiefs are more important than councillors. One CSO representative argued that, "a number of councillors fall under a chieftaincy and yet there are no chieftaincies that fall under one councillor".

The table below (Table 3) obtained from Zimbabwe Electoral Commission as part of the documents analysed shows the wards that are under the four chieftaincies. This factor has also shown how chiefs can be a uniting factor in polarized environments. For instance, observations during the study revealed that Chief Nkalakatha is in charge of wards that have councillors from different political parties. As one ward has a ZANU councillor, they are getting more attention from the government compared to the other ward where the councillor is from the opposition MDC. The role of the chief has been to make sure that all his villagers in all the wards are taken care of and benefit from service delivery. A CSO representative argued that, "where political parties attempt to ensure that only their members benefit from state resources, it is the chief that has brought sanity and ensured that all villagers benefit". This view is in contrast with the views by Moyo (2019) that traditional leaders are fetished to act as political party commissars for the ruling party. Evidence from this study shows that they are not only advocates for fair distribution of resources but they also help in ensuring accountability as they monitor the use of government resources in their areas of jurisdiction.

Added to that, the study also revealed some tensions between elected officials and civic society organizations operating in those areas. The councillors accuse Civic Society Organisations of undermining them and of mobilizing people against them. They believe that people coming in to do work in their wards should come through them, dovetail their programs to fit the needs of the councillors and also ensure that their programs support their cause. Civic society organizations however believe that they have rights to operate wherever and whenever as long as they are legally registered in Zimbabwe. Traditional leaders have come in to deal with those challenges and ensuring that there is peace and harmony in the communities. The view below, captures the thinking from a member of civic society operational in the area captures this issue elegantly:

> We usually have a challenge with these elected officials, a number of them came from civic society and they expect us to treat them with kids' gloves. When we raise accountability issues with them they always try to mobilise their supporters to stop us from operating in their wards. Traditional leaders have been pivotal in ensuring that CSOs operate in the villagers. In so doing they assume the role of peace builders as well as stationary bandits who are more worried about the long-term benefits to their communities given that they are permanent features of the communities.

A CSO activist indicated that:

> We usually have problems in our operations with elected officials. For them democracy starts and ends when they are elected. After their election they assume that anyone wanting to do an activity in their wards should seek authority from them.

Another villager added that:

> It's so shocking that elected officials tell us that they are our employees when they are campaigning. After they are elected they assume positions of kings. They start to behave as bosses.

A councillor responded that,

> These are just misunderstandings, we never want the CSOs to seek permission to operate from us, we as a council just want to know who is operating where and with what agenda.

While these views show the struggles between elected officials and civic society organisations, they further show the role of traditional leaders as democratic enablers. They ensure cooperation between elected leaders and civic society to promote transparency and accountability, which benefits the villagers across party lines.

Table 3 Showing the distribution of councillors in each Chieftaincy

CHIEFTANCY	NUMBER OF WARDS COVERED
Chief Khayisa	6
Chief Nkalakatha	8
Chief Mabhena	3
Chief Maduna	6
TOTAL	**23**

Evidence from the study revealed that councillors, cognisant of the popularity of traditional leaders in their areas, have tried to use traditional leaders as vote banks. One traditional leader confirmed that,

> We always try as much as possible to be apolitical even though sometimes we know elected officials invite us to their meetings as a way of endorsing them. So to avoid all that as a chief I attend meetings of all candidates and preach the same message of tolerance in all platforms.

During the research, the researcher was able to observe Chief Khayisa attending meetings called by political parties in his area. True to his word, his message was the same in all the platforms. However, the meetings were covered differently by the media in Zimbabwe. This is in line with the views shared by Baldwin (2010) who (after studying the relationship between traditional leaders and elected leaders) concluded that unelected traditional chiefs can facilitate development and the responsiveness of politicians to their constituents.

Evidence from this study also shows that polarisation between the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and ZANU PF has permeated across the communities. Villagers look at themselves from a political perspective. As a result, chiefs have had to play a pivotal role of facilitating accountability in the operations of elected officials.

For instance, according to one respondent:

> …when a meeting is called by a councillor people first check which political party the councillor belongs to. Resultantly, in most meetings called by elected officials, party stalwarts dominate and the gathering easily degenerates into a party affair. Villagers therefore prefer to attend meetings called by chiefs as they are nonpartisan and developmental, not political.

Traditional leaders have been used to ensure that people attend and contribute in service delivery meetings. A councillor indicated that,

> The election challenges always follow us. For instance, during elections, there are flights between competing political parties. In addition to that there are also intra party fights. After the election it is not easy to bring all those people together. In a consultative meeting you will find that the only people attending are from your faction. So, if you want to pass a resolution that will not be contested, it's safer to call the chief. When people know that the chief will be there they come in their numbers.

One traditional leader also acknowledged that:

> Our role as an institution is to bring all people together despite their political differences. We try as much as possible to ensure that people participate in issues that affect them as a community.

The study evidenced that "once villagers are told that the headman or the chief will be there they all go to the meeting across the political divide". One villager indicated that,

> …in service delivery meetings attended by the chief and the headman, even those villagers who do not belong to any political party, are active in contributing because villagers believe that where there is a chief, its serious business and there is no politicking.

Another respondent indicated that,

> …it is easy to follow processes where the chief is involved because they are sustainable. Unlike elected leaders who have a term of office, traditional leaders look at sustainable projects that outlive the term of office of elected officials. Traditional leaders are not looking at short term projects that will score political points.

Given the suggestions by Ntsebeza (2006), these observations trigger a lot of questions. Due to their popularity and the fact that they do not derive their popularity from the government, how does the government do away with them as suggested by some scholars? The study suggests in line with the assertions of Mngomezulu (2008) that a way should be found to tap from the rich history of traditional leaders as a way of shaping their future role. Focus on their hereditary nature has short-changed scholarship.

The study found that rural villagers also elect their councillors and MPs but still prefer to have their issues dealt with by traditional leaders. One villager added that,

> …we have become so used to being dependent on traditional leaders. If we have problems with any services and you approach the chief, you get almost immediate redress

Another view added that the challenges with councillors who ordinarily are supposed to be in charge of service provision is that they are either too political to be trusted or to put the issues of villagers ahead of them. Usually it's about them benefitting. Approaching them is just a waste of time.

A CSO representative explained that,

> What you see is a culmination of a certain behaviour attributed to elected officials. It's a rejection of modern systems of government by the villagers. While the modem systems are pre occupied with elections, villagers are preoccupied with service delivery and they get it through their *interactions with traditional leaders.

The study found that elected officials were able to evade accountability because of the polarisation that engulfs the nation. They are aware that given the polarisation of the politics in Zimbabwe, getting elected leaders to account is difficult. As roving bandits, elected leaders are interested in maximising gains during their term of office, unlike chiefs who are stationary bandits and would be concerned about the bigger picture and long-term development for the areas.

Evidence gathered from one CSO member and corroborated by a number of villagers indicates that elected councillors have also tried to ride on the popularity of traditional leaders to win votes during elections. According to this respondent,

> Towards elections, elected officials, as prospective candidates try to make sure that they are in good books with traditional leaders so that at the very least traditional leaders do not say bad things about them.

One respondent indicated that,

> …candidates always want to pass by the chief almost on a daily basis, advising them of their daily programs and also trying to establish if they can get the support of the chief towards their electoral path.

This behaviour seems to cut across political lines. Even those contesting as independents also behave in the same way. A member of the chief's council also affirmed this and added that,

> …during election times elected officials frequent the chief's kraal on a daily basis. Candidates come to the chiefs' homestead because many a times there will be many people at any given point and times, most of them influential. So, candidates will be wanting approval not only from chiefs, members of the Chiefs' Council but also from influencers that will be with the chiefs.

This view was affirmed by councillors who indicated that, "traditional leaders are important during elections because if you do not get their support it's easy to lose".

The perception that traditional leaders are more important or superior to elected officials is also supported by evidence that sometimes when villagers have service delivery problems they approach traditional leaders to try and rectify the situation.

While this might not be a vote of no confidence on elected leaders, it is definitely a vote of confidence on the institution of traditional leadership. Villagers see traditional leaders as people who can get service providers to account, and ensure that they provide services. Traditional leaders in this instance are put across as service delivery champions on behalf of the villagers.

A Civic Society representative argued that,

> …if you look at the people that stay in a ward and the proportion of people who vote you can see that it is very negligent. For instance, Insiza ward has a population of 15 000 and yet only 3 000 people cast their votes and 1200 cast their votes from the winning candidates. In a focus group meeting, participants expressed a number of reasons why they are not participating in elections especially for positions like councillors.

One participant indicated that,

> "We participated in elections in anticipation of improvements in our way if life but that has not happened. Instead of depending on these elected leaders most of whom cannot be trusted we are better if just dealing with people that we are used to, traditional leaders.

One councillor indicated that,

> ….while it is true that some people get help from traditional leaders, a good number still has faith in elected officials. The challenge is that other elected officials have given us a bad name. When they do wrong it's as if it's all elected officials.

These views were echoed by another villager who highlighted that,

> When I wanted a stand to build I approached a councillor and he wanted me to pay a bribe. However, I was able to get a stand through the chief without paying anything. So naturally when I want something done I approach the chief."

The analysis of the CSO representative is that a lot of people have lost hope in politics and politicians because of their failure to deliver both on their mandate and their own

promises. These views show that villagers would rather go to traditional leaders even to deal with service delivery issues which are the domain of the elected leaders. The weakness of State structures has actually given traditional leaders more roles to play in the communities. As the relationship between state structures and communities fail, the value of traditional leaders increases.

The study also revealed that there is a general perception among various stakeholders that the government has a soft ear to traditional leaders than elected leaders. According to one respondent,

> It is probably because elected officials are from political parties, sometimes those that do not belong to the government. The government therefore uses traditional leaders to actually emasculate the elected officials. In addition to that it's about terms of offices. Elected officials are temporary while traditional leaders are permanent.

Another informant pointed out that, "in a government meeting with villagers, a chief always gets time to address the villagers and yet elected officials rarely get that opportunity".

This researcher observed one meeting called by the Provincial administrative to raise awareness on COVID 19 to the villagers. The chief got recognition ahead of elected officials and was given time to address "his" people, which included elected officials. Elected officials were not even given platform.

While this view shows how the government prefers chiefs over elected officials, it also shows how the government tries to pit traditional leaders against elected officials. The government uses traditional leaders to emasculate elected leaders where it deems it fit. In the case of Chief Khayisa, there is an attempt to use elected officials to undermine the role of traditional leaders. It is in such dealings where the true inclination of the government towards traditional leaders is exposed.

One CSO leader cited the example of what he called the Maleme debacle. According to this respondent,

> …in 2017, the government of Zimbabwe through the Governor repossessed a farm from a white man and gave it to a CIO operative based in Matopo. Traditional leaders in the area teamed up with the communities and resisted

the move. Their argument was that the farm was not only productive but it had set up many projects that were beneficial to the community. More so, the intended beneficiary was not from the area. He had only come as a government employee if the takeover was successful a lot of people in the community would have their livelihoods affected. Traditional leaders led by Chiefs Masuku, Mathema and Nyangazonke organised villagers, lobbied President Robert Mugabe through the Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko and the move was reversed. There is no way the Vice President would have entertained mere councillors or Members of Parliament. The way the President intervened and even affirmed the superiority of the chiefs showed how the government highly regarded traditional leaders.

According to another respondent, the President even restructured the land committee. He argued that all land committees should have chiefs as the owners of the land. Villagers also added that the way government agencies and departments deal with traditional leaders also shows that the government is trying to placate them; it is trying to buy their support. For instance, one respondent argued that,

> …council Chief Executive Officers, who work on a day to day basis with elected officials like councillors have argued that councillors are uneducated and cannot comprehend simple council procedures. However, the same officials are able to work with traditional leaders and get what they call "wise counsel" from some who are worse off in comprehending issues as compared to councillors.

Another informant argued that the unprecedented arrest and firing of Chief Nhlanhlayamangwe Khayisa Ndiweni was a big statement from the government to traditional leaders. While the government could stand a rebel elected official like a Member of Parliament or Councillor, it could not withstand a powerful chief who could not conform to its dictates. The government was aware of the harm that a free rebellious chief would cause, not only to the community that he led but also to the office of chieftaincy in Zimbabwe. According to the respondents, the government responded by concocting frivolous charges against the Chief as a way of promoting the view that Chief Khayisa was a constitutional delinquent. For the first in Zimbabwe a chief was arrested for barring a villager who had disobeyed his ruling and was sent to prison. As if that was not enough, in an unprecedented move, the President [Emmerson Mnangagwa)] personally wrote to Chief Khayisa dethroning him. What was even more

suspicious was the fact that the President did not even consult the Ndiweni family in accordance with customary practice. As a result, the Ndiweni family stood firm and argued that Nhlanhlayamangwe Ndiweni was their chosen chief and nothing would change their view. This is interesting as it signifies a departure from the normally cosy relationship between the Presidency and chiefs. It signals that either not all chiefs are fetishized by the regime for electoral gains of the ruling party or more importantly a new breed of traditional leaders whose livelihood does not depend on favours from the ruling party is on the rise. The President erred in his action. According to one respondent,

> It is probably because elected officials are from political parties, sometimes those that do not belong to the government. The government therefore uses traditional leaders to actually emasculate the elected officials. In addition to that it's about terms of offices. Elected officials are temporary while traditional leaders are permanent.

Another view pointed that, "in a government meeting with villagers, a chief always gets time to address the villagers and yet elected officials rarely get that opportunity."

This section has shown that in the areas that have been studied there is no confusion around the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials. More so, the section has shown how villagers and elected officials agree on the superiority of traditional leaders in the ladder of rural governance. In the next section, the study looks at the various collaborations that have marked the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials.

6.1.1 Collaboration between traditional leaders and elected officials

This section addresses issues of collaboration between traditional leaders and elected leaders. Specifically, it looks at the circumstances and conditions these collaborations take place.

From the study, there is evidence of collaboration between traditional leaders and elected officials. This view seems to be in tandem with the view from Logan (2009). According to data collected by Logan (2009) evidence illustrated that far from being in

competition for the public's regard, traditional leaders and elected leaders are seen by the public as two sides of the same coin. One of the villagers indicated that,

> There are so many collaborative efforts that have taken place between traditional leaders and elected officials. Actually, in most development programs in the area they all have a role to play. It is rare to see a developmental program that has one and exclude the other.

This seemed to be the view across all the chieftaincies. This view was corroborated by one councillor who explained that,

> If programs are to be well received by both the people and the government it is important that we work together as community leaders. And that's exactly what we do. Of coz traditional leaders take a lead coz they own the area.

Traditional leaders also emphasized the same point as evidenced in the comment below from one of the respondents,

> In almost a development programs, we work together as a team. Usually we allocate roles for each other and then we have meetings to continuously evaluate progress.

According to evidence from CSOs,

> "We hardly see any fighting between these institutions. Probably when they fight they do it behind scenes. What we always see is a situation where the chief leads and all others follow".

The study also observed that during the fight against COVID 19, traditional leaders collaborated with elected officials to raise awareness on the restrictions that had been put by the government as well as the hygiene practices that villagers had to adhere to. According to one respondent,

> …while elected officials were responsible for the rural district councils and councillors were responsible in making fliers and distributing them to villagers. At the same time, traditional leaders were using their ability to mobilise people

to bring them in small groups; they relayed information on the restrictions and hygiene issues.

Moreover, according to one respondent,

> …both the traditional leaders and elected officials mobilised civic society which was helpful in disseminating information through radio programs and road shows. These collaborative efforts assisted in ensuring that the community is up to date in terms of information on the COVID 19 pandemic.

Another respondent also indicated that,

> …the traditional leaders and elected officials' collaboration proved fruitful in as far as raising resources for development projects in the communities was concerned. These resources were mobilised from private companies, donors, international agencies, local community as well as the civic society.

According to yet another respondent,

> "…elected and unelected officials have collaborated in ensuring food security for the community in Nkayi through engaging with World Vision and Plan International. These international organisations were able to mobilise food handouts as well as garden projects. In the garden projects, villagers were able to plant vegetables, for consumption as well as for sale."

During the course of this study, the researcher observed some collaborative work in Filabusi. The chief and the councillor have been able to mobilise a cash transfer program for the villagers. As a result, 150 families are benefitting from a cash transfer program run by Danish Church Aid.

The study also observed evidence of collaboration between traditional leaders and elected leaders in construction projects. In Nkayi, villagers working with the councillor, headman and the chief, have built a clinic. The councillor was responsible for mobilising resources through Non-Governmental Organisations while the traditional leaders were responsible for mobilising labour through villagers.

Another respondent indicated that, “in Filabusi villagers have built a classroom block, working with their elected officials and traditional leaders”. Similar construction work was witnessed in Ntabazinduna where collaboration between traditional leaders and elected officials have enabled the community to pave roads, construct a school as well as a clinic. In Ntabazinduna, the chief and the councillors have gone around schools, churches and villages addressing villagers on the importance of sending the girl child to school. Moreover, during the national tree planting day, Councillors have continuously provided trees where traditional leaders have mobilised villagers in a restocking program.

Traditional leaders and elected officials have also collaborated in preparing for disasters as well as responding to them. In Ntabazinduna, traditional leaders and elected officials have been pivotal in mobilising people towards “isiphala senkosi” (Chiefs granary). According to another respondent,

> ..During a drought, the elected officials were also responsible for identifying some of the most vulnerable people who needed assistance from the chief. These are the people who would then benefit from “Isiphala senkosi ….

In Filabusi, the researcher observed that the councillor has been responsible for mobilising non-governmental organisations to carry out a hazard assessment and the production of a risk map for the area. The chief has taken the map, held meetings with the villagers as a way of raising awareness as well as building their resilience.

The Umzingwane Disaster Management Plan states that traditional leaders deal with complications around the evacuation of villagers in the event of a disaster. These complications revolve around the refusal by villagers to move to safe areas based on the fact that their current dwellings have some value for them. Many of the villagers argue that they can’t leave because their ancestors are buried in those lands. It is the traditional leaders who have come in to explain to villagers why the argument on the graves of the ancestors cannot be used to risk the lives of the people. Given that they are trusted by the people, traditional leaders have also been given the task of ensuring that the resources of those who have been evacuated are safe and can be accounted for. Elected officials have also played a complimentary role as they provide transport through the Umzingwane Rural District Council. According to one respondent, both the elected officials and traditional leaders were able to assist first responders in a time of floods. From this we can see that the relationship between traditional leaders and

elected leaders is not always about contestations. Polity dualism explains this relationship as there are clear demarcations on the roles, obligations and functions.

This section has shown that contrary to what a lot of scholars say, there is a lot of collaboration between traditional leaders and elected officials. While the impression given (see literature review) is that the relationship is a hostile one, characterised by constant infighting for political power, in the areas that were studied, cooperation seems to be the order of the day. The next session tackles the causes of contestations between traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance where this exists.

6.1.2 Contestations between traditional leaders and elected officials

While evidence from the areas studied has shown that there is cooperation between traditional leaders and elected leaders, there was also evidence that occasionally there is bad blood between the two institutions. This section examines the causes of the conflict as well as its implications on inclusivity in rural governance.

The study revealed that there are moments when traditional leaders and elected officials clash. In Nkayi, one respondent indicated that, "the chief and the councillors have clashed because the councillors sometimes do not report to the chief when they are having meetings". This was affirmed by the chief who indicated that, "our expectation is that every time when there is a meeting the chief is supposed to be alerted". The councillors also confirmed that they had indeed had meetings without informing the traditional leaders but indicated that, "the meetings where they do not tell the chief are usually political party rallies". Their thinking was that chiefs do not need to know about their political activities. Villagers indicated that,

> …the contestation between traditional leaders and elected officials are usually over political meetings. This usually happens when elected officials have a feeling that traditional leaders will antagonise them during those meetings. They then do their meetings clandestinely. And resultantly the chief will push back and treat it as disrespect.

A councillor acknowledged that,

> Our understanding is that there are some meetings that do not need the chief to BC there, we can't call the chief for all meetings. So, in meetings where we think it's not necessary we don't even call the chief. We just do our meetings.

The chief in return argued that,

> What they do not understand is that it's not about whether we attend or not, it's about us knowing that there is something happening in our area so that if anything bad happens we are in the know how. Imagine when fights break out and we don't know there was a meeting.

A CSO representative indicated that, “sometimes the clashes are just about misunderstanding and nothing big. People work with a lot of assumptions”.

There were also clashes in Ntabazinduna as the study found out. There was evidence that the Member of Parliament for the area and the chief do not see eye to eye. In Ntabazinduna the contestations are purely political. One councillor argued that,

> The chief has been vocal against our party and president. So sometimes it becomes very difficult to call him for our meetings. How do you invite someone to come and castigate your leadership in your presence? While I have nothing against the chief, if I call him it looks like I am in agreement with what he says. I just have to toe the party line.

A villager reiterated that,

> The clashes between the chief and the MP is political. The MP understands that the chief is superior but he has to be seen to be fighting in his party corner. But when there are development issues most of these things are forgotten.

The Chief also acknowledged that,

> The clashes are about the role of the centre and the periphery. The centre wants to control everything including its members in the periphery. That's why when the MPs and the councillors talk they say the President has said this and this.

One villager indicated that the source of their fight was political. It was because the chief was refusing to tow the political line. Unlike other chiefs who were benefitting from the regime, the chief had refused to be given gifts to buy his support. A civic society representative also indicated that, "the ruling party is used to chiefs who are afraid and will always bend once threatened with economic sanctions, however the chief in the area is wealthy and does not need favours".

The chief confirmed that,

> …there was a problem between him and the Member of Parliament but it emanates from the fact that the MP is a front for some politician who the chief accuses of stealing cattle belonging to the chieftaincy. The undermining is meant me as the chief into not demanding the cows back. Beside the issue of being vocal about Gukurahundi which made the government unsettled, the issue of the stolen cattle is the reason for my incarceration and subsequent dethronement."

Villagers interviewed also indicated that, "the feud between the chief and the Member of Parliament had nothing to do with their roles, it was about politics".

The evidence above shows that while there is mutual respect between traditional leaders and elected officials, it is usually disturbed by political discourses of the day. So, it is not about the coexistence of traditional leaders as explained by a number of scholars (See Makumbe, 2010; Chigwata, 2015; Chatiza, 2010; Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014; Matyszak, 2015). On the contrary, it is about differing political views in rural governance resulting in the clashes. These political clashes manifest themselves in suspicion in the two offices.

The analysis of the roles and power relations in the coexistence between traditional leaders and elected officials shows that there are many opportunities that have been lost that could have been harnessed had the focus on traditional leaders moved beyond their hereditary nature. To be sure, this study has revealed that traditional leaders can play a big role in enhancing democracy.

The above material illustrates the interaction between a Western view as to what is supposed to be the role of traditional leaders and elected officials and the reality on the ground. Where the expectation is that elected officials are at the thick of things, the

reality is that it is traditional leaders who are at the forefront of rural governance. To be sure, there is no doubt in the minds of the villagers that traditional leaders are superior in rural governance. In fact, there is not even contestation between these offices. The contestation is a creation of the Western expectation that is designed to show traditional leaders as people fighting for survival.

The second analytical point of the argument in this section is that traditional leaders can play a significant role in enhancing democracy. Because traditional leaders are stationary bandits who are more concerned about the development of their communities and the polarization that engulf the rural communities, they bring together everybody across political parties, are able to attract Non-Governmental Organisations that bring help to the communities as well as facilitate the entry of CSOs who ensure transparency and accountability in the operations of elected leaders. As stationary bandits, traditional leaders assume the role of development agents. As illustrated above, NGOs are able to make long-term development plans with traditional leaders than with elected leaders whose term of office would expire after some time.

The above material also shows that villagers are hybrid citizens. The same villagers who pay allegiance to traditional leaders in the rural areas get to elect their representatives in towns and cities. The same villagers that are called subjects when in the rural areas are citizens when in town. A number of citizens in Zimbabwe are both rural and urban dwellers due to cyclical and ongoing rural to urban migration and vice versa. Therefore, the line between "rural" and "urban" communities is very thin.

In contrast to the common claim that chiefs undermine accountability by disconnecting villagers from their elected representatives, the evidence above shows that traditional leaders can actually facilitate accountability, transparency and responsiveness of not only elected officials but service providers in general. The evidence above illustrates that villagers are more comfortable in attending meetings that have been called by traditional leaders than those convened by elected leaders. In this regard, traditional leaders are portrayed as a uniting factor in rural governance. On the other hand, elected officials come across as divisive officials who are more worried about those that belong to their political parties, not all members of society.

There is a clear appreciation by elected officials that traditional leaders are handy and could enhance their performance. This is unlike in the study by Ayee (2007) who

argued that in Vhembe district, elected leaders blamed traditional leaders who they believed were discrediting them.

More so, this section also illustrates that where there are conflicts between elected officials and traditional leaders, its primarily because of politics, it is never about confusion over roles and responsibilities of each leadership institution.

This section has shown that the conflicts between traditional leaders and elected officials in the areas studied is political and is usually inherited from the central government. The study has proved that political parties seem to think that while the chief is overall in charge, he cannot superintend over their political party processes. In addition to that, the relationship between central government and the chief mostly determines the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials, especially those that swear allegiance to a party controlling central government. In tandem with the findings from the question on the roles of each leadership institution, the study shows that the conflicts have nothing to do with who is superior. In the next session, the chapter details how decision-making by both traditional leaders and elected officials impacts on inclusivity.

6.2 Dual Rural Governance System, Decision-Making and Accountability

6.2.1 Traditional leaders and decision making

This section examines a major component of rural governance, namely decision-making. It seeks to understand how decision-making by the two systems of government in rural governance impact on accountability. The first part looks at traditional leaders and the second part assesses decision-making by elected officials.

This study affirms the findings from other studies by a number of scholars (see Gatsheni (2017), Amabhungane (2019) and Mandela (1994)). Evidence from the study suggests that decision-making among traditional leaders is highly consultative and consensus-based. The study found that traditional leaders have to make a lot of decisions, most of which are either developmental or judicial. The study found that when it comes to decisions regarding developmental programs the routine is almost the same in the chieftaincies that were studied.

One respondent indicated that,

> "Decision making concerning development issues is made in a public meeting. Residents are mobilised and come together as a village. In the meeting the issues are presented and discussed. The role of the chief is to do a summation of all perspectives, bring them together and find a compromise."

In the focus group meetings, respondents agreed that, decision-making on developmental issues is very consultative. According to one respondent,

> "The consultative meeting are usually thorough and they don't take a day. It's a long process as people agree and disagree. After lengthy discussions then a day for resolutions is proposed. By then attempts to convince people would have been made."

A traditional leader also highlighted that,

> "It's important that as traditional leaders we get a buy in from the villagers because most of the times it is the villagers who will do the work. So if you say you want to build a school and the villagers think it's not a priority then they will either not volunteer to do work or they will simply not bring their kids to the school."

CSO activists in the area added that,

> "In most cases our view as CSOs is also taken into consideration. For instance in one instance the chief made a start resolution and asked us to do an analysis. Bring out the pros and cons. Sometimes we are asked to assess the constitutionality of a decision."

The researcher observed some of the meetings in these chieftaincies. What was probably interesting was how the traditional leaders chairing these meetings attempted to ensure that everyone was given an opportunity to air their views. There were suspicious cases where some people were denied the opportunity either on the argument that they had already aired their views or their families had already had a chance and therefore it was important to give others a chance. Another meeting observed was a follow-up meeting where the chief was giving feedback on the work that had already been done. The traditional leader wanted input from villagers on how

to move forward. What was interesting was how the villagers urged the traditional leader to organise a separate meeting with the youths to try and get their inputs, especially on issues that concern them. One of the respondents reinforced these observations by asserting that,

> "…what I saw was normal like any other community public meeting where an issue is put up, people debate and consensus is used to make final decision."

A different view argues that on development,

> "The Chief is not part of initiators or implementers, he is in between. Villagers sit and agree on their own and then take the issues to the traditional leaders, especially the chief. In the follow up meetings it is the chief who then accounts to the villagers on the progress he has made. Usually in these meetings it's about how can we as a village try to make sure that we succeed. So for instance, those who think they can push the issue so that it can be a success are also given space to try and push."

The Chief also indicated that,

> "There is a belief that as traditional leaders we attempt to influence people to do what we want. That we sometimes impose our development projects on unwilling villagers. The culture in this area is that I am a messenger. Against that background, villagers discuss on their own and bring a project to me. Where there are disagreements I seek consensus."

A humanitarian organisation person working on drilling boreholes for communities agreed with these sentiments,

> "When we go to the area, our belief was that if we convince the chief we would have dealt with the hardest hurdle. The Chief however redirected us back to villagers and left us there. He just said whatever you guys agree on I will just follow. We were left with the task of convincing the villagers."

Villagers also agreed that,

> "In all these developmental projects, the chief has had two roles. Firstly, where we can't agree as villagers, he has come in to build consensus. Secondly when we have agreed on a specific project, his role is to spearhead it."

When it comes to conflict resolution however, the evidence suggests that the chief takes full charge with his committee of elders. The study found that traditional leaders have committees, starting at kraal head level. According to one Kraal head,

> "Our job is to represent the chief at this lower level. We have committees that to deal with cases and as kraal heads we are constantly in touch with the chief for guidance and update."

This version was corroborated by another respondent who highlighted that,

> "…the chief works with the committee and the process is the same as the court proceedings. For instance, the issue is brought to the elders who summarise it for the chief. The complainant is given an opportunity to lay out their case before the elders and questions are asked. The accused is also given a chief to defend herself and similarly questions are asked. The Chief's Council then makes the decision."

One villager indicated that,

> "I have gone there a number of times to witness the processes. My assessment of that the chief's role is to listen to the allegations levelled, listen to the defence as well as the discussions by his team. Here and there where he thinks he can give input, he does. Ultimately, he is the one who summarises the facts and the ruling.

Evidence from the study also indicates that the institution of traditional leadership has always had checks and balances. One source indicated that,

> "…where villagers are not happy with the decision of the kraal head at a local level they usually take up the issue with the chief. The chief then starts the whole process of understanding the issues."

During the Focus group meetings, one respondent also indicated that,

> "I remember a number of cases from the kraal heads whose decisions were over tuned. It's not like their decisions are cast in stone. If you appeal you can win "

A CSO operating in one of the areas added that,

> "We have helped a number of villagers who thought that their issues had not been dealt with properly by kraal heads and their committees. And some of their appeals were very successful"

This view was corroborated by another CSO representative who argued that,

> "…the decisions of the chief's council can be taken for review in courts. They gave an example of the decision by Mr Mbele to seek a review of the decision by the elders at Ntabazinduna to banish him from the area which led to the arrest of the chief."

A traditional leader also added that,

> "It's not like our systems are cast in stone. We allow people to test some of the decisions we make. Also, when a decision is overturned we don't take it personal because the idea is not to fight with a villager but to correct their actions."

This section has shown that decision-making within the institution of traditional leadership is consensus-based and accountable. Where there are challenges, or where any stakeholder feels excluded, there are mechanisms in place to deal with that. There also seems to be a blend between the traditional system and the modern system. The next section puts elected leaders under the same microscope.

6.2.2 Elected Officials and Decision-making

This section explores inclusivity and accountability within the institution of elected leaders. Specifically, it assesses how elected officials are inclusive after their election.

Evidence suggests that there are mixed thoughts about the processes surrounding the decision-making by councillors. Evidence suggests that once officials are elected, they

believe that they have been given the powers not only to act on behalf of the people but to also think for the people. One villager indicated that, “After the elections we don't see them as frequently as during the campaigns. They always say they are busy with this and that meeting”. Another CSO leader argued that,

> “At one time in the middle of a meeting, before even making a presentation, an MP asked to be excused. He indicated that if we don't excuse him he will miss a plane and would therefore not be able to go to Parliament. This was despite the fact that he had not held a meeting since being elected”.

There is also evidence that occasionally, elected representatives call for public meetings to engage with villagers on issues of concern. Moreover, a number of minutes showing constant meetings being held was availed for the purposes of the study. The study observed a number of meetings that had been called by elected officials. One CSO representative indicated that, “There are some elected officials who make an effort to consult their voters. “

The study found overwhelming evidence that elected officials use their political party machinery to mobilise and consult, thereby excluding the majority of the villagers in as far as decision-making is concerned. According to one villager, “For some as soon as they consult their party members, in their informal meetings they don't bother consulting the generality of the residents.” Another resident indicated that, on many occasions you see resolutions from villagers that are actually resolutions from the party.

This study also observed a party meeting that was discussing service delivery. Initially, it was as if this was preparation for a public meeting but then during a full council meeting the issues discussed in the party meeting were now being presented as resolutions from the whole ward. This was cause for concern.

A source who is a councillor indicated that,

> “…before going to meet other councillors in council chambers they hold monthly council meetings, feedback meetings organised by Councillors, engagement meetings organised by CSOs and sporadic meetings organised by the local authority such as budget consultations. All these are platforms which help in terms of inputting into the decision-making of elected officials.”

Another villager confirmed that,

> "With us a number of meetings are held. While the meetings might not be held every month, when there is a meting the area councillor usually updates calls us and updates us."

A member of CSO also highlighted that,

> "We try to organise a lot of meetings to ensure accountability and transparency. Some of the meetings are successfully attended by elected officials while others are ignored."

However, there were counter-arguments that while the council sits every month to make decisions, councillors are only called for meetings rarely, more than 3 times a year, and many a times it is just a formality. One villager accounted that,

> "Some of these elected officials rarely organise a meeting. In our area it is possible for the whole to pass without any of the elected officials calling for a meeting. Without even any of the residents knowing what their representatives are up to."

A CSO representative also highlighted that,

> "Every year we do a compilation of the meetings held by elected officials to try and hold them to account for all their promises. It is normal to find some officials without any meeting for the whole year."

During the study, in one of the areas, the researcher observed that one of the elected people had been promising to meet with villagers over a number of pertinent issues affecting the community. However, the meeting did not materialise till the COVID 19 pandemic hit the country. As such, it is possible that the particular community went for the whole year without having a feedback meeting with their elected official. Some of the involved councillors retorted that,

"You only call a meeting when there are issues to report back or consult on. If there is nothing there is no reason to waste people's times calling for a meeting."

Because of the challenges in convening meetings, some CSOs try to input into the decisions made by elected officials in a variety of ways. For instance, the study observed that CITE tries to push to a limited extent to have accountability through media reporting (give a range of what other organisations do). Organisations like CITE are doing online programmes holding councillors to account. They even broadcast the council meetings live. However, these only allow those with internet connectivity to participate. A CSO representative also indicated that many a times their voices are not taken into consideration when elected officials are making decisions. He evidenced that,

"We have written letters to councillors to ask them to either scrutinise or provide information on a number of tender processes but in all the times, elected officials disregard the views of residents as they move in search of opportunities to enrich themselves."

Another activist argued that they had been disregarded by elected leaders for too long as they seek to hide from accountability. In one instance, an elected leader indicated that he could not meet residents as he was on his way to Parliament and would therefore be late. If residents wanted him they had to book him early. The challenge is that elected leaders decide which things to consult on instead of leaving villagers to determine for themselves.

Evidence from the study also points to the fact that there are gaps in as far as decision-making by elected officials is concerned. The notable gaps are lack of participation of youths and women in accountability processes, yet youths and women constitute the largest component of the population and indeed of voters. During the FDGs, one of the respondents argued that,

"Many a times meetings to discuss service delivery, which affects women more, are done in the morning or in the evening. During those times women will be busy making sure that families have had their meals."

Another view from the youths argued that, “youths do not understand issues of meetings. There has been no effort to introduce mechanisms that will ensure youths input into service delivery issues”.

This was corroborated by another source who indicated that,

> “…the biggest gap is that when electoral accountability is weak, due to partisan voting, then all the other mechanisms lose power since councillors do not care and simply will not be voted out. That's why despite declining service delivery we have a record number of councillors who’ve served councils for more than ten years. These are also referred to as Alderman”.

Another informant highlighted access to information as another key defining gap. A CSO activist argued that,

> “It's partly fuelled by the fact there isn't a substantive right to information law in the country. So, people don't have access to full budgets, plans, strategies, and thus cannot engage in meaningful accountability work. Consultations are sometimes done not to get the input of stakeholders but just to tick the box”.

Another resident indicated that,

> “On a number of occasions, I have gone to my councillor to ask for a budget or council resolution but it has been difficult to get these documents. Councillors tell you that those are confidential documents.”

A CSO representative argued that, “in most cases we have had to resort to court action just to have access to documents that show how key decisions were arrived at” Another source highlighted that the challenge is that there is no provision for elected officials to consult stakeholders in decision-making. They said that, unlike with issues of information, there is no mechanism in the constitution to ensure that elected officials consult. As a result, the only stakeholder that is taken seriously are political parties.”

One organisation gave evidence on how they mobilised villagers against a decision to award a tender to a company based in Harare at the expense of local companies. According to this organisation,

"…we wrote letters, did marches but because elected officials had been given a directive from their party they disregarded their voices and gave out the tender. Once an elected leader ensures that his or her party is taken care of then they are assured of another term of office. Maybe there is a need to constitutionalize consultation of the public in decision making .There is a need for legislation that makes the councillors accountable to the electorate. The principle of recall should not be left to the party".

This view found support from a number of respondents who indicated that,

"…maybe another mechanism of ensuring that elected officials consult their electorate before making a decision could be to incorporate recognition of residents/villagers associations into the urban councils act as important state holders who can recall the elected councillors by passing a vote of no confidence."

This section has demonstrated that in a number of times elected leaders assume that elections are the beginning and the end in a democracy. After elections, elected officials make unilateral decisions that usually cater for their political party needs, excluding others from other parties. Resultantly, a number of villagers prefer to engage traditional leaders at the expense of elected leaders. This leads to exclusion.

6.2.3 Dual governance and Decision-Making

This study observed that there are instances where traditional leaders and elected leaders have to make decision together. This section explores how accountable those platforms are.

Evidence from the study also shows that there are times when traditional leaders and elected officials have to make joint decisions. In such instances, one respondent argued that, "

…the challenge has always been that there are no procedures for decision making and hence most of the times the process is determined by individuals. For instance in the fight against COVID19 the Chief and councillors went

around villages addressing residents and consulting them on the best way of ensuring that villages are safe.

Another source indicated that:

> "The decision-making process is not consistent. On some cases people are consulted but in others instances you are just given instructions. It might actually depend on the urgency of the issue that needs a decision."

Another source indicated that,

> "There is no decision-making structure that brings them together. So usually when they act in common interest they need to decide who to consult. In some cases they have decided not to consult. Given the powers of the chiefs and councillors, when they act in unison it is difficult to go against them."

There have been challenges where these two leadership institutions do not agree. Ntabazinduna provides a typical example. The councillors in Ntabazinduna council wanted to allocate land from Ntabazinduna as a political favour to a Zanu PF functionary. The land was owned by a family that had coexisted well with the villagers in Ntabazinduna. Resultantly, in making the decision, the council, made up of elected councillors did not bother to consult the villagers. In response, the chief called an iMbizo, and together with villagers they agreed to defy the government directives. They launched a Save Ntabazinduna campaign whose main aim was to resist the government move. This move pitted the chief with the backing of the people versus the MP and some councillors with the backing of the government. One respondent concluded that,

> "Where the two systems disagree and it's usually based on interference from the central government, people adopt political decisions. The elected officials then get directions from their political parties while the traditional leaders usually stick with the people. In some cases, the traditional leader can benefit from the opposing political party. For instance, if it's Zanu elected councillors, the MDC supporters side with the traditional leaders."

The study also sought to find the input of other organised groups on decision-making in dual rural governance. Evidence suggests that depending on specific issues,

stakeholders like CSOs are able to lobby both elected leaders and traditional leaders. According to a CSO representative,

> "CSOs have been able to engage the councillors to implement a number of strategies. We have successfully lobbied the councillors to implement gender focused budgets. Council had since adopted a gender strategy which was meant to ensure that women and girls are specifically catered for in service delivery projects."

In the same vein, another respondent from the CSOs stated that:

> We have been able to successfully influence traditional leaders to stop a female genital mutilation practice in their area. After constant engagement between traditional leaders and civic society organisations, a training was organised. This training was meant to build the capacity of traditional leaders on gender issues. Part of the highlights of the success of the program was when traditional leaders mobilised villagers to enable interactions between CSOs and villagers on issues of Genital mutilation.

However, some organisations revealed that,

> "…both traditional leaders and elected leaders only welcomed input into decisions that either suit them or are in line with their thoughts. In the absence of that there are attempts to exclude people from decision making theatres."

This evidence was corroborated by one respondent who indicated that,

> "Our organisation wanted to push councillors to push forward by-laws that supported indigenous people to benefit from tenders. However, councillors rejected this and decided against legislating tender processes". In response councillors indicated, "that they only co-operate when they think the recommendations help entrench their authority, where they think the recommendations are meant to emasculate them they were largely bound to resist". Chiefs also argued that," where we resist it is specifically because they would not have been accorded the respect that they deserve."

This section shows that where both traditional leaders and elected leaders have to make decisions there is no consistency. There are times when they work together and provide checks and balances for each other. There are also times when they work together and make unilateral and exclusive decisions. The study argues that because there are no laid down decision-making procedures, it is always up to the decision-makers to decide how they go around it. The next section discusses some reflections on the findings.

6.3 Discussions and Reflections of the Findings

The evidence from this chapter gives an interesting view of the interaction between the institution of traditional leadership and elected officials, as well as implications for accountability in rural governance. What is clear from the discussion above is that there is no confusion over the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials. While there are different perceptions emanating from the way stakeholders view the roles, there is no evidence of instances where these roles overlap. Contrary to what a lot of studies (see Makumbe, 2010; Chigwata, 2015; Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014; Matyszak, 2015), have concluded, this study has established that there are no contestations over roles between traditional leaders and elected leaders in the areas studied.

The study also found that, against popularly held modernists' views, villagers perceive the institution of traditional leadership as the most effective vehicle for service delivery. Evidence from the study suggests that most villagers perceive traditional leaders as more equipped to deal with issues of service delivery. This is despite the fact that service delivery is the domain of elected councillors. This might also be a result of the polarisation that engulfs these communities. Members of political parties that do not belong to the same party that the councillor or elected official belongs to either find it easy to approach the traditional leaders to push for service delivery processes, or they just approach the traditional leaders as a way of trying to delegitimise the elected officials. This shows that traditional leaders are viewed as politically neutral. As such, traditional leaders are then perceived as the middle ground. The study shows that issues of reliability and politics seem to be pushing people towards the traditional leaders.

The study found that where modernists like Ntsebeza (2006), Sithole (2010), and Vaughan (2003) attempt to put elected officials as the real voice of the villagers in rural governance, the evidence from the study shows otherwise. Villagers argued that the fact that elected officials have term limits implies that their priorities are focused towards ensuring that they are re-elected. Elected officials are a product of a first-past-the-post electoral system where someone can win by a few votes and also be voted by less than half the voting population. This makes it difficult for them to get the recognition that they want. The study shows elected leaders as people who spend most of their time politicking instead of focusing on issues of service delivery. On the other hand, while traditional leaders are un-elected, they are portrayed as the neutral leaders close to the people. The fact that residents view them as stationery bandits implies that villagers appreciate their shortcomings and yet still think that they are better than elected officials.

These findings fly in the face of widely held views by Moyo (2018) and Makumbe (2010) who argued that traditional leaders use material resources or normative pressure and are fetishized by the government to direct voters to support their preferred candidates. However, evidence from the study supports Baldwin (2015), who illustrated that the strength of traditional leaders does not only lie in material resources, but pure respect and confidence of citizens in the institution. This study argues that traditional leaders have a lot of roles that endear them to the local population. These roles range from cultural to social.

Evidence from this study also points towards a scenario where traditional leaders are seen as key contributors in as far as accountability is concerned. The fact that villagers are only interested in coming to consultative meetings to hold service providers accountable not only show the faith that villagers have on traditional leaders but also show how traditional leaders can play an influential role in holding elected officials to account. They can be involved in mobilising villagers to hold service providers to account and at the same time follow-up with elected officials on issues that would have been raised by villagers.

The findings from the study further reveal that, in the eyes of the locals/people, traditional leaders are more popular and superior to elected officials. This is evidenced by the fact that they alluded to numerous situations where elected officials, regardless of their political party affiliation, have on one time or the other tried and still try, to benefit electorally by being close to traditional leaders. This then explains why villagers

viewed elected officials as appendages of traditional leaders as they, in many cases, use the name of traditional leaders to get villagers to support their points.

As a result of this relationship between tradition leaders and elected officials, the evidence suggests that there is more collaboration than contestations between the two types of leaders. The unwritten hierarchy in rural governance as shown in these studied areas show that traditional leaders lead and elected leaders follow. This, however, does not mean that there are no instances where they clash. The study showed clearly that the roots of their clashes emanate from the politics of the day. While fully acknowledging the superiority of traditional leaders, if the traditional leader is viewed as opposed to the central government like Chief Khayisa, attempts are made by the central government to delegitimise them using locally elected officials.

The study also makes interesting observations with regards to decision-making and accountability in rural governance. In line with a number of scholars like Ndlovu – Gatsheni (2014), Amabhungane (2019) and many others, evidence from the study shows that decision making within the institution of traditional leadership is consensus based. It is not a preserve of the traditional leaders. There are systems put in place to ensure that there are checks and balances. The linkages from the kraal head, the chiefs' council and the modern courts have all ensured that there are checks and balances. All these structures are accountable for their decisions. However, the same cannot be said about the elected leaders. Contrary to what a lot of scholars think, elected officials in the studied areas are not as accountable as many scholars say. The only useful accountability measure available for the villagers seems to be the election.

The study shows that putting much focus on elections ends up neglecting the other key elements of democracy. The end-result is a situation whereby people are elected as representatives of the people, come out as bosses of the people and never bother to consult and think on behalf of the citizens. While they are elected democratically, their deliberative democracy aspect is either weak or absent. Evidence from the studied areas shows that while elections are important in democracy, they are not sufficient to instil the democratic ethos.

A good illustration of poor or absent deliberative democracy mechanisms pertains to how elected officials carry out their mandate. After elections, citizens have no input into the council decision-making process. Citizens are unable to influence public action through the long route of accountability where they are expected to work through

councillors who in turn work through committees that then put pressure on management. There is no mandatory requirement or threshold for citizens who must be consulted prior to decisions being made. There is no permanent space in the bargaining table for residents to influence indoor processes. The accountability gap between residents and policy makers is too wide. This creates pathways for policy makers to act without consultation. This exclusion is also caused by the lack of knowledge about public participation and low levels of knowledge on council decision-making processes amongst the residents. This study therefore concludes that while elections are important, they cannot be put as the determining feature of democracy and accountability. Elected leaders are only held to account for their work once in five years and yet traditional leaders, despite their hereditary nature are held to account more often and more frequently by the villagers who have agency.

This study also builds on Mamdani's thesis of a bifurcated state, and his notion of citizens and subjects. Mamdani's concept of citizens and subjects is derived from how colonialism worked to deal with what they termed the 'native question' by removing things about accountability. Evidence from the study suggests that looking at rural governance in a binary provides serious challenges. While in colonial Zimbabwe villagers under a chief had no agency primarily because the colonial system had put up a system where villagers live under different laws from their urban counterparts, the current dual system is home to hybrid citizens who are under a hereditary chief but also live in areas where they elect their councillors.

Moreover, those villagers who permanently reside in rural areas also have an opportunity to vote for their elected officials. Those in towns are citizens because they can vote for their leaders and are not under a chief. This study contends that what Mamdani overlooked was that these are hybrid citizens who have been exposed to both modernity and customary way of life. Ntsebeza (2006) also privileges elections as the most important activity in a democracy. But this study has shown that after elections, elected officials rarely consult, they think for their constituencies whereas traditional leaders are engaged in a constant process of consultation and consensus building. This then makes it interesting to analyse someone like Chief Khayisa, who was extensively exposed to western modernity through his education and working life but is a hereditary leader. While being a hereditary leader, he is also a leader who has given his people agency and is at the forefront of demanding that democratic principles be respected.

So, whatever the demerits of the institution of traditional leadership, however much they may seem to be unable to meet the key essentials of aggregate democracy, they seem to be suitable to today's rural socio-economic and political situations. In fact, rather than push an unsustainable elbowing out of the institution, which many African governments tried to do and failed, this study follows the logic by Mngomezulu (2016) which pushes for leveraging on critical and beneficial elements of the system that can improve accountability in rural governance. Rural governance would benefit from the inclusive conversations conducted in a rational manner designed to inform and transform people's views in a march toward consensus during the village meetings of many chiefs and kraal heads. In several cases during the study, traditional leaders exhibited traits of uniting the people across political lines and immense ability to mobilise the villages to resolve developmental problems. The study also pulls the veil on a number of assumptions held in relation to the elected officials. Given that they satisfy the most important component of aggregate democracy, it has been assumed that their operations are democratic hence the need to either ensure that traditional leaders are democratically elected or totally removed. The challenges associated with their decision-making processes unmask all the pretences. It shows that elections are merely used as a routine just like in authoritarian or electoral dictatorship.

The evidence in the study also privileges traditional leaders as people who have a big role to play in enhancing democracy in these four areas that constituted the subject of this study. The evidence in the study seems to directly contradict the views held by a number of scholars (see chapter 3) who argue that traditional leaders are unnecessary in a democracy. The study also goes on to show the dependence of elected leaders on traditional leaders as they seek re-election. In agreement with the views from Baldwin (2010) that traditional leaders are stationary bandits, the study signals that on a number of occasions, villagers believe that their issues are better addressed and resolved when they approach traditional leaders than elected leaders. This is because they find it easy to make long-term plans with traditional leaders than with elected officials. The fact that traditional leaders are hereditary and do not have a term of office and do not need to seek re-election makes them more attractive to villagers.

The study also put under scrutiny decision-making processes by both traditional leaders and elected officials. The study contends that in focusing so intently on the absence of elections before assumption of office by traditional leaders, there is a tendency to neglect other features of traditional systems that may also be relevant to the democratic compatibility of the institution of traditional leadership. This is a view

shared by a number of scholars. More importantly, this study reasons that contrary to assertions by a number of scholars (see Ntsebeza, 2001), Mamdani (1996) there are checks and balances within the institution of traditional leadership. While the colonial process removed checks and balances to achieve their goals, the current rural governance arrangements ensures that modern systems are also involved in monitoring the operation of traditional leaders. The mixed polity arrangement that brings together the customary and modern institutions has placed checks and balances on the institution of traditional leadership.

The overturning of the ruling by Chief Khayisa (see methodology chapter) provides a classic example of how these checks and balances have been used to curtail the excesses by traditional leaders. The focus on elections as an indicator of democracy has also meant that a number of dictatorial practices by elected officials have escaped scrutiny. Evidence from this study shows that beyond an election, decision-making by elected officials in Zimbabwe is highly undemocratic. Unlike in the instance of traditional leaders where checks and balances can result in the nullification of a decision, a number of undemocratic decisions by elected officials are always implemented. Elected leaders make decisions in Parliament and Council that affect villagers without even consulting them.

6.4 Conclusion

This Chapter has put under scrutiny decision-making procedures from two critical players in rural governance, i.e. elected officials and traditional leaders. The above material illustrates that decision-making within the institution of traditional leadership has some checks and balances which ensure accountability. The chapter has also illustrated that outside the elections, which give elected officials their democratic credentials, there are a lot of assumptions about elected officials. There is a general assumption that after elections, elected officials hardly consult their constituencies. Where they consult, they only consult their supporters, not the general public as traditional leaders do.

Flowing from the above, it is inaccurate to juxtapose traditional leaders and elected officials and assume that traditional leaders are unaccountable and the elected leaders signify the birth of a modern democratic era. This study proves that the traditional leadership system is participatory and inclusive while the accountability of elected

officials is dependent on individuals. As there are no mechanisms to ensure the participation of villagers after the election, many a times elected officials only consult to tick the boxes. This is compatible with conclusions drawn by Classens (2001) who asserts that many rural people have had bad experiences with new 'democratic' structures. These structures have shown that they are not immune to problems of corruption and abuse of power.

The argument that there is no oversight or recourse on decisions made by traditional leaders is misplaced and unfounded. In the main, it is based on ignorance or deliberate political machination. The fact that chiefs oversee the work of the kraal heads and the courts are also there to review not only show that there are clear accountability measures but also the fact that there is actually a common ground between the operations of traditional leaders and modern governance structures.

This chapter also went a long way to illustrate that in most instances traditional leaders engage communities resulting in input from villagers being included. To be sure, traditional leaders involve every villager in public meetings unlike elected officials whose meetings are largely attended by people from the same political parties. Resultantly, elected leaders are more accountable to people from their political parties. Many times, questioning the operations of traditional leaders results in people being characterized as enemies. Sometimes when elected leaders attend the meetings, the meetings are characterized by clashes from opposing political parties. The chief then plays a crucial role in moderating the discussions.

As illustrated in this chapter, there is evidence to the effect that Civic society organizations and development organisations have relied heavily on the ability of traditional leaders to not only organize people to attend meetings but to also ensure that there is robust debate during the meetings. The conclusion confirms the observations of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014), Logan (2009), Baldwin (2010) and Bourdillon (2010) who argued that within the institution of traditional leadership, people are actively involved in their governance structures through participating in meetings at village and broader community levels. Based on this evidence, the claims made by the critics of the institution of traditional leadership need to be revisited. The empirical evidence presented in this study clearly challenges these claims and assumptions.

Having presented these findings, the next and penultimate chapter focuses on the two main concepts discussed in this study, i.e. inclusivity and equality. These are discussed in the context of rural governance which this study is about.

CHAPTER 7

Inclusivity and Equality in Rural Governance

7.0 Introduction

Building on the previous chapter (Chapter 6), this chapter traces two key issues in the operations of both traditional leaders and elected leaders. Specifically, it answers the question of how these two governance structures in rural governance deal with issues of equality. In particular, this chapter assess if in the operations of traditional leaders and elected officials, issues of hierarchy and patriarchy are taken into consideration.

Hierarchy and patriarchy are applied here as they constitute key principles of equality. The chapter looks at how traditional leaders and elected officials deal with issues of patriarchy and hierarchy in their line of work. Given the widely-held views on this relationship (see Chapter 1) (Makumbe, 2010; Chigwata, 2015; Chatiza, 2010; Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014; Matyszak, 2015), it was important to determine if the same scenarios prevailed in the areas of the study. The chapter also looks at how these two institutions deal with issues of hierarchy. Hierarchy here depicts how these two institutions deal with people ordinarily regarded as inferior in the society. These groups include youths, people living with disabilities, the poor and the elderly. Specifically, the chapter seeks to understand the nature of interactions between previously marginalised groups and the players in the mixed rural governance system. The chapter addresses the following key questions: What roles do these groups play in the operations of traditional leaders and elected officials? What mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that they participate in rural governance? Is there a difference when these subalterns interact with both the traditional leaders and elected officials?

The first part traces the interactions between traditional leaders and women. It looks specifically at the role of women in public platforms, how the spaces are safe for women to effectively contribute. It analyses the way various representatives of traditional leaders treat women and regard the views they raise. The same scrutiny is done for elected leaders. The study assesses how elected leaders allow women to participate in their platforms and whether their platforms offer safe spaces for women and the girl child. More importantly, this section looks at opportunities available for women to fully participate in rural governance. Specifically, the section establishes

how easy it is for women to be elected as either officials or traditional leaders. Additionally, it looks at the hindrances towards full recognition of women in rural governance.

The second part looks at how traditional leaders and elected officials treat issues of hierarchy. Specifically, the following questions are addressed: What role do youths play in the operations of the two institutions? In decision making, how do these institutions ensure that the voices of the subalterns are taken into considerations? Are they protected in public platforms? How these are marginalised groups treated *vis-a-vis* the wealthy and the elderly. Answers to these questions will assist the study in contributing to the analysis on the role of traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance. The other questions addressed here are: How are the disabled, the elderly who can't attend meetings enabled to make contributions? How strategic are the selections of venues in ensuring that all can equally participate?

The Chapter is structured as follows: It asseses issues of patriarchy in the dual rural governance system, interactions between traditional leaders and women, platforms where traditional leaders and women interact as well as opportunities available to women traditional leaders. The chapter also looks at the institution of elected leaders. Specifically, it looks at how the elected officials deal with issues of patriarchy. More importantly, it examines whether there are differences between the ways that modern governance institution deals with patriarchy compared to the traditional leadership institution. More importantly, in their dealing with issues of patriarchy, are they in line with the basic principles of deliberative democracy as espoused by the scholars? The chapter then engages empirical evidence on rural governance and hierarchy. While it looks at the evidence pertaining to traditional leaders and elected officials separately, the analysis is combined for the purposes of finding differences and similarities. More importantly it uses the data on elected leaders to raise specific phenomena on traditional leaders. The chapter ends by making conclusions on issues of patriarchy and hierarchy in rural governance.

7.1 Dual Governance and Patriarchy

This section takes a look at patriarchy in rural governance. In particular, it examines how both the institution of traditional leaders and elected officials deal with issues of patriarchy. As a background, it is important to briefly recall the discussion in Chapter 4.

The thesis sought to empirically test the implications of polity dualism on equality. The questions that this chapter is responding to are as follows; how do marginalised groups negotiate and push for their interests in these spaces? What tactics do they use? How do the two institutions mediate the interests of the marginalised? More importantly how do the traditional leaders and elected officials interact with the marginalised. Is there a difference between the way marginalized groups are treated, for example, when it is a female chief? What are the gender relations during the engagements? The thesis therefore uses patriarchy to deal with issues of gender equality and hierarchy to look at how these institutions relate to the marginalised.

The first part traces the interactions between traditional leaders and women. It looks specifically at the role of women in public platforms, how the spaces are safe for women to effectively contribute. It analyses the way various representatives of traditional leaders treat women and regard the views they raise. The same scrutiny is done for elected leaders. The study assessed how elected leaders allow women to participate in their platforms and whether their platforms offer safe spaces for women and the girl child. More importantly, this section looks at opportunities available to women in rural governance. Specifically, the section establishes how easy it is for women to be elected as either officials or traditional leaders. Additionally, it looks at the hindrances towards full recognition of women in rural governance.

The findings in this study show that women under mixed rural governance livelihoods are dominated by unequal power relations which affect their agency. This is in line with the general impression in the literature. Evidence from the study suggests that patriarchy is so entrenched in the way traditional leaders make their decision to the extent that they do not even expect women to come to the courts without being accompanied by a male relative. For instance, according to one respondent, the Chief's court was so insensitive to women to the extent that listening to a woman seemed like a burden to them. Even where a woman was attending court sessions she was supposed to be accompanied by a man. This respondent narrated that,

> "One day I attended the chief's court. A woman had been brought to court because her cows had grazed in someone's maize plantation. The Husband to the accused woman is based in South Africa. So when her name was called, she got into the chiefs court on her own. And the elders assisting the chief (he was still relatively young then & had recently been appointed) were not amused. They took an issue with her over her appearance in court without

being accompanied by a male relative. Moreover according to the elders the cattle belong to the man and not the women. They even suggested that she should have asked for any man to accompany her. Their conclusion was that the reason why she cannot get any man to accompany her was precisely because she was unable to live harmoniously with others, if she was a good wife, her father in-law would not have allowed her to appear alone. Eventually she was dismissed without even a hearing and fined."

In this case, the chief's court deprived the woman of her agency. They treated her as a person of lower status primarily because of her gender. The people who assist the chief, who are generally men, represent a system that supports patriarchy.

As a way of corroborating that evidence, the researcher observed a meeting chaired by the chief in one of the areas. A woman had raised her hand first in a meeting and the chief was supposed to choose one speaker to air their grievances before the meeting was closed. The chief decided to give the opportunity to a man to speak, arguing that the woman who had her hand raised had already been represented by her husband who had spoken earlier. This was despite the fact that the husband was addressing a totally different issue. This action not only side-lined the voice of the woman but it also took away her agency. This finding seems to be at odds with the findings from Comaroff and Roberts (1977) who had argued that within the context of matriarchy and patriarchy, women had some power with which to exercise agency and control over their lives and thus could also negotiate their security.

Evidence from the study also indicates that women lost their negotiation power, which has had devastating long-term consequences for their security. A civic society activist operating on issues of gender and sexual rights testified that they deal with a number of cases where the traditional leadership system takes away the negotiating power of women - even in as far as how to use their bodies is concerned. She highlighted the fact that they had dealt with cases of marital rape. In one such case, one victim reported to the traditional leaders court. However, she could not attend the case because of the remarks made by the elders in the chief's court. For instance, one of the elders argued that how could it happen that a married woman, whose bride price was paid thinks that she could negotiate her way out of sleeping with her husband? In his view, this simply meant that she now had a boyfriend who was sexually satisfying her. The woman concluded that she would not get help from people who had such kind of thinking.

The above evidence not only shows that the voices of women had been taken but also shows that a woman, especially a married one, has little or no negotiating power. Consequently, this has an effect on their overall security as women can be raped in their marriages, and do not even have the power to negotiate the use of a protection during sexual intercourse. This gives men rights over women resulting in domestic violence as well as exposure to many diseases. This finding seems to be in tandem with that of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) who argues that Ndebele governance was characterised by the prevalence of patriarchy and viewed women as minors or people subordinate to men.

Also, in line with the general findings by other scholars, evidence from the study shows that women are discriminated against when it comes to succession matters where the institution of traditional leaders is concerned. The study showed that the ascension of women as traditional leaders is something that is frowned on by most people of Matabeleland. One source indicated that,

> For a long time, we didn't have female chiefs because of the belief that when a woman becomes a chief, the chieftaincy will be lost to the husband. As it is a lot of men are not comfortable with the elevation of Chief Sinqobile Mabhena. They ask if since she is married, whose culture are they going to follow?

This evidence was corroborated by another responded who argued that the traditional leadership system was constituted to be a male institution hence the male oriented names like *inkosi* (king) and "*induna*" (Chief). Given that in one of the chieftaincies chosen for the study one of the chiefs is a woman, focus was then zeroed in to her ascension to power. The other 3 chiefs indicated that in terms of culture, Sinqobile Mabhena was not supposed to be a chief. They however argued that she ended up taking the throne specifically because of her mother who held a high political post. One chief exclaimed that,

> It is not possible for a woman to be a chief because traditional leaders are custodians of a culture and will need to constantly interpret the beliefs, values, customs and tradition of the people. For them to do that they need to be fully able to represent the interests of a specific group of people. So when they get married, change surnames and location how do they ensure all those objectives are met?

The fact that the other chiefs, a young man who had recently graduated from university,

an old man who had been a chief from the colonial era, fought the war for equality and a former Falcon student (an elite private school) who has also spent more than 15 years in the middle of the United Kingdom being schooled and working there believe so much in entrenched patriarchy despite the fact that they are different shows how entrenched the system is. The views from other chiefs are compatible with the views from Ndlovu and Dube (2012). They argue that in Ndebele culture, women are perpetual minors (*abesintwana*) who have no place in the chieftaincy. They contend that Chief Sinqobile Mabhena was a chief because of political reasons and not cultural reasons. While Sinqobile Mabhena used her political linkages to gain chieftaincy, she also could not use her political influence to change the council of advisors that is made up of males only. Respondents argue that even though she is a chief, she spends much of her time outside the country. This therefore implies that she occupies that position but it's the men who do the job for her on a daily basis.

Evidence revealed that while in some areas the issue of having females in the council of elders is still frowned upon, there is movement towards realising that women can actually play an important role in rural governance. Some chiefs have started a process of gradually including women in their decision-making process. Evidence from Chief Maduna shows that there are some areas where patriarchy is the order of the day. For instance, Chief Maduna argues that,

> "We cannot include women to sit and determine the fate of the community. In households, men do not sleep with their women when there are having periods so why should we allow them to sit among us when they are on periods. In their homes it is easy because their husbands have a way of knowing if they are on periods. Here how do we ascertain that? The best way is to just exclude them forever".

This evidence explains why the elders seem to be uncomfortable sitting with the women in decision making processes. Instead of appreciating that menstruation is a natural process for women, they use the process as a basis for exclusion. This evidence was also supported by one village elder who argued that,

> The challenge with women is that either way they do not belong. As such we cannot entrust them with decision-making responsibilities. For those that are from here, they are on their way out and when they make decisions they make for their families and not the community. For those that are coming in through

> marriage, they do not know our culture and customs to be able to sit down and make decisions.

While many chiefs continue excluding women in decision making processes, a growing number have stood their ground and refused to partake in the repression of their people based on gender. For instance, ever since her assumption of office as a chief, Chief Sinqobile Mabhena has ensured that there are at least two women sitting in the council of elders. Moreover, while the normal route is for chiefs to select their advisors based on a number of issues, Chief Mabhena has involved the community in the selection of her advisors. She has also deliberately put aside a quota for women. One Civic society activist narrated that,

> In our situation ever since chief Mabhena became a chief, at least two women sit on the bench. It is the community that choose according to villages. The chief is referring the bench according to qualifications and capabilities. For example, the man who is a Clerk of court is a teacher"

In Nkayi, Chief Nkalakatha also indicated that for him it was never about gender. Women that are capable are also included as advisors of the chief. In his words, Chief Nkalakatha stated that,

> Advisors to the chief are chosen by the chief. Their selection is based on their history or personality. Women sit in my court. However, some chiefs argue that they are just maintaining a tradition where women were excluded.

One respondent also indicated that there was an evolution that is taking place as a result of the various types of ground-breaking work being done by gender-based organisations. There is a gradual appreciation of the roles of women in rural governance. He narrated that,

> "There is no law that says women should not sit *enkundleni*. It's just part of patriarchy. It was set up by men for men. In certain chieftaincies women are already participating. They are chosen by the chief. It's people who are respected in the community"

Despite the little changes that keep occurring within the institution of traditional leaders, in the main, the traditional leadership structure remains a distorting institution in

Zimbabwe. Encouragingly however, as earlier noted, some traditional leaders have been able to include women as their advisors. But this may turn out to be not enough to pass the bar of deliberative democracy. The practice has not become a norm as yet.

One respondent indicated that the issue of patriarchy was a myth given the fact that in history and indeed in Ntabazinduna, Chief Khayisa's mother, Queen Masuku was the matriarch of the family after the death of her husband. This was taken to show that women could also be powerful.

> When there were problems between the Khayisa family and a government minister, it was Gogo Masuku who summoned Chief Maduna and sent him to the president to talk to the government minister. While her power with the Khayisa family was not much of a problem, her ability to summon another chief, worse still Chief Maduna leaves a lot of questions about the source of her powers.

Gogo Masuku has also shown her strength in a number of occasions. According to one source,

> …She is the one who chaired the family meetings that decided that despite having other elder brothers, Nhlanhla Ndiweni would take over as the heir to Chief Khayisa Ndiweni. One informant intimated that, Gogo Masuku ably chaired the meetings and gave proper direction based on the wishes of the late chief. She spoke with authority and no-one could challenge her.

Gogo Masuku was also visible as the government tried to dethrone Nhlanhla as Chief. The defiant statement that reinstated Nhlanhla Ndiweni as the Chief of the Mangwes in Ntabazinduna was signed by the Matriarch. The statement argued that the choice of Nhlanhla as a chief was a family choice and no-one had the powers to defy the family agreement.

However, despite all the compelling arguments that portray Gogo Masuku as a woman in power, this study takes the view that patriarchy is about systems and not individuals. The fact that Ntabazinduna has thousands of women and Gogo Masuku is the only woman who can exercise such authority shows that actually Gogo Masuku is a beneficiary of patriarchy. This view is in line with the findings from Ndlovu and Dube (2012) who argues that Queen Lozikeyi, Zinkabi was powerful. This study concludes

that Queen Masuku, just like Queen Lozikeyi, was powerful because of her association with men. In that regard, Queen Masuku was powerful because of her relationship with Khayisa, the father. She got her power from the fact that she was married to a Chief and gave birth to a chief, a privilege not all women have. The fact that there are no systems in place to ensure that women are looked at equally like men suggests that patriarchy is still deeply entrenched in the Zimbabwean traditional governance system.

The involvement of traditional leaders in land distribution also seemed to be a barrier towards the participation of women, the study found. Interviewed women complained that whether young or old, it was difficult for them to own land. During the focus group meeting the prevailing sentiment was that traditional leaders were not even willing to consider the issue of giving land to women and the girl child. One participant indicated that,

> For us the expectation is that we will get married and leave the land of our fathers. Land allocation is primarily targeted at the boy child.

Participants and interviewees all concurred that it is easy for a male stranger to come and ask for land and get it than it is for a local girl child to have access to it. Traditional leaders who were interviewed also weighed in and said,

> According to our tradition the land belongs to man. If women want land they can only get it through their husbands. This is done primarily to preserve our culture. How do you think we will be in 20 years if we allow women to get land and then bring their husbands who might be strangers to our culture. Imagine the confusion that will be there after that"

According to one chief,

> Land belong to our ancestors and the only way if preserving our relationship with our ancestors is through the land. When we give women and they get married and invite their husbands to our land how then do we bury those strangers when they die. It would bring problems for us.

Another respondent indicated that sometimes it is even worse for older women who come back from failed marriages. They are all told to go back and stay in their fathers' homes. Ownership of land for them becomes very difficult.

There is also a view on the relationship between traditional leaders and patriarchy that has currency, especially among civic society organisations. This view argues that while the system of traditional leadership is highly patriarchal, it has been enabled by society and serves as a reflection of how patriarchal the society is. One participant argued that,

> It is unfortunate that many a times the institution of traditional leadership is the only one that has been put under scrutiny hence the belief that it is the symbol of patriarchy. If you go to churches, schools, political parties where traditional leaders are not there you will also see the same patriarchal tendencies. Some churches still do not allow women to preach.

Another activist indicated that,

> Our experience is that when you raise issues of equity, the people that stand up to defend are not traditional leaders, it is churches and elderly women.

This section has shown that while there is a growing number of traditional leaders that are working towards ending inequality, the position of women within and under the institution of traditional leadership remains very precarious. Women are excluded from opportunities to become chiefs, their negotiating powers are deemed to have been taken by virtue of their gender. The next chapter looks at how elected leaders interact with women in rural governance.

7.2 Elected officials and Patriarchy

The study found that elected officials are a product of a violent patriarchal system where violence and insults against women are the order of the day. The findings reveal that while elections are an integral aspect of democracy, they do not necessarily lead to inclusivity and equality. Evidence from the study shows that the election process that produces elected officials is usually marred by violence. According to one source,

> …the process is marred by violence and many women are not able to cope resulting in them pulling out. More so the sustenance of violence needs resources and in the rural areas the economic architecture is tilted against women.

Another source argued that,

> …sometimes the violence is not physical but psychological as women competitors are called names that are degrading. The impression given is that women who participate in electoral processes are wild"

The study also found that consultative meetings held by elected officials are not intended to cater for the concerns of women and yet they are at the receiving end of service delivery. For instance, one respondent argued that meetings were called at odd hours when women were busy with their reproductive roles at home. As such, it becomes difficult for women to participate in those meetings. Those who would have sacrificed their times to participate are also called by degrading names. Sometimes they are not even given opportunities to contribute. For instance, in one meeting observed, where the moderator had to choose one speaker from two hands he chose a man and said to the woman, "your husband has already spoken for your family, let's give others who have not said anything a chance". The assumption was that the man had raised the issues to represent the whole family thus resulting in the side-lining of the woman.

Furthermore, in that meeting it was observed that women were relegated to ushering duties, and had the responsibility of making the place look presentable while men just sat there and focused on the meeting. The challenge is that all these acts take away the agency from women.

The study found that the violence that dominated the primary elections discouraged women from participating in the electoral process. According to the Chronicle (26 August 2017) a total number of 36 women pulled out of the different political party elections citing issues of violence. This view was corroborated by Stabiles organisation which noted that it had dealt with a number of women that had been frustrated by the intra-party violence as candidates fought for the right to represent their parties. One of the women candidates who was frustrated out of the election highlighted the fact that,

> It was not easy. Either I had to pull out or my family was constantly living under threat. At one point they told my husband that if he does not reign me in they will deal with him. For the safety of my family I had to withdraw and support the male candidate.

The study also found that sometimes the violence is not physical but psychological as women competitors are called names that are degrading. A civic society activist from one of the study areas indicated that women were at a disadvantage when it comes to elections. According to the source,

> We saw a situation where a woman was called names. From being called a prostitute to being called a thief. And these things were being said to her in front of her children who are of school going age. While she was convinced that she will be able to deal with the insults the challenge was on whether her children would be able to deal with it.

The study observed that the impression given is that women who participate in electoral processes are not normal women. More so the sustenance of violence needs resources and in the rural areas the economic architecture is tilted against women.

There were also instances where women had to pay through sex in order to get their papers signed as candidates. All these serve as challenges within the institution of elected officials.

The study also found that consultative meetings held by elected officials are not intended to cater for the concerns of women and yet they are at the receiving end of service delivery.

The study found that the timing of the meetings was inconvenient, resulting in women not being able to attend. One woman explained that,

> In a number of occasions we have explained to the councillor that the timing of the meetings perpetuates our exclusion as women. How can a meeting that talks about service delivery be pencilled for 5pm? This is the time when most of us are preparing to start cooking.

This view was corroborated by one Civic Society Activists who explained that in a number of times they have been approached by concerned women stating that the timing of the meetings excluded women who bore the brunt of service delivery failure. The study also observed one of the service delivery meeting where a meeting was

supposed to start at 5 PM but ended up starting at 6 PM because it took long for people to arrive.

The study also observed that there were problems with some of the venues of the meetings. Instead of using schools or churches that are usually neutral venues, elected officials sometimes use beerhalls as venues of consultative meetings, as explicitly explained by one of the representatives of women's groups in one of the four studied areas,

> Beerhalls have a certain stigma around it. Not every woman is comfortable with getting into a beerhall and siting there for a meeting. Resultantly, some women simply decide to stay away from the meetings.

Respondents also complained about the agenda of the consultative meetings held by elected officials. In most cases women complained that they were never consulted when it came to the agenda of the meetings. Consequently, issues that are at the core of women's needs are rarely discussed in those meetings.

Respondents also expressed concern about the role of women during consultative meetings. According to one respondent,

> It is normal to go to a meeting where it's an all males panel and women are just invited to listen. And from the presentations you can tell that these men have no clue about how service delivery affects women and children

The meetings are deliberately designed as men's gatherings. Women are given decorative roles. For instance, through observation, the study found that most women who attended the meetings came early to ensure that the venues of the meetings are clean and well decorated. During the meetings they had to ensure that drinking glasses for the panellists were constantly filled. Another respondent indicated that even during plenary very few women are given platforms to air their views.

The study found that in most of the committees in the chieftaincies studied there is a low uptake of women. In a committee out of an average of 10 people there is an average of 3 women. According to one key informant,

> The reason why there are few women is because you need people that you can call anytime to be in the committee. It is difficult to have more women because most of the times they have tasks to do at home. When there are emergencies to be followed you will not find them.

This information was corroborated by participants in the focus group meetings. It was argued by one participant that,

> The challenge is that when you are part of the committee they assume that you have nothing to do and they expect you to run every time they call a meeting. Unfortunately, some of the times we can't leave our homes anytime.

Through observation, this study substantiated some of the sentiments above. On one such occasion observed, the committee meeting was called without notice as there were urgent issues, the person who was supposed to write minutes of the meeting was a woman who at that particular time had family engagements and hence could not avail herself.

As indicated above, the study found that the women were assigned menial roles in these committees. In one committee, a key informant who is a woman indicated that,

> My role is to make sure that our meeting place is clean. It's not good that we can come to s meeting and the meeting place is dirty and I am here.

This was corroborated by information obtained from focus group discussions. One participant indicated that,

> "If you don't make the place clean as a woman the men start asking you what kind of a woman you are. They also assume that it means even where you stay it's very dirty".

This researcher observed a meeting where an elected Member of Parliament came in and said, "How can this place be dirty as if there are no women around. If these women are not able to clean this small place, how are they even able to wake up and clean their places"?

The study also found that even when some women try to stand up to men they face fierce antagonism from society -sometimes including other women. In one meeting one woman refused to clean arguing that,

> "Why don't these men also bring their wives to clean or clean themselves if they think the place is dirty"? This response did not go down well with the councillor who had convened the meeting and he exclaimed that, "If you are going to poison our women we will not invite you to our meetings".

Other women in the meeting also commented, with one of them arguing that,

> "She should not have embarrassed people in public. It was better for her to just maintain her silence and let other women do it".

Others were even saying things like,

> "Her behaviour is a reflection of where she is coming from. We wonder how her husband is surviving, possibly he was bewitched".

The woman was now treated as an outcast by both men and women. In a number of follow-up meetings that were carried out, it was observed that the woman was no longer participating. A key informant explained that,

> "It was going to be difficult for her to continue participating in community development issues. Either the men in the structures were going to frustrate her or they had simply stopped inviting her for the meetings"

This section has grappled with the marginalisation of women by elected officials. It has shown how several strategies that include violence are used to exclude women from decision making processes in rural governance. The next section is a discussion of these findings.

7.3 Discussion of the Findings

Based on the above, the study concludes that the operations of both traditional leaders and elected officials fall far off from the requirements of deliberative democracy. Instead, the study contends that both systems of rural governance operate within a

highly patriarchal society. The fact that traditional leaders, elected officials as well as representatives of churches all show entrenched patriarchal tendencies demonstrate that it's actually society that is patriarchal. Patriarchy in other words is not a preserve of the institution of traditional leaders alone.

The findings present an interesting dimension of gender discourses and gender politics in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Patriarchy has been a consistent and constant feature of the body politic right from the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial societies of Zimbabwe. The findings seem to illustrate that while there is an attempt by modernity to de-link from the patriarchal nature of our communities, in actual fact and in practice, women's rights, tradition and modernity seem to be at loggerheads. Given the backgrounds, exposure and democratic inclination of the four chieftaincies studied and the elected officials used in the present study, one would have thought that there would be a difference in the way they handled issues around patriarchy. As discussed above, one chief who is a female struggled to get installed as a chief since other chiefs and the community rejected her for a male and had to be saved by the government. The other chief is old, a custodian of the Ndebele tradition in Matabeleland. Another chief is a young man, a recent university graduate who has been exposed to modernity. The last chief is a product of an elite private school, a beneficiary of Western education, culture and employment. Given that they all share the same view on patriarchy, it could be argued that the issue probably has nothing to do with the institution of traditional leadership but has everything to do with the society.

It would be interesting to do a study of the church to see if what others said about its relationship with patriarchy would be reflected. There is uniformity in the way both the elected and traditional leaders deal with issues of patriarchy. The views of both traditional leaders and elected leaders towards the chieftaincy of Chief Sinqobile Mabhena are instructive. While most of the leaders claim to be fighting against patriarchy, they unite in rejecting the chieftaincy of Chief Mabhena primarily because she is a woman. This serves to show the entrenchment of gender stereotypes within the Zimbabwean society in general and the research site in particular.

This section concludes that the side-lining of women in decision making by both traditional leaders and elected officials is a result of a deep patriarchal system that goes beyond these two institutions. The institutions are just a miniature of the entrenched problem. This section illustrated the exclusion of women in key decision-making processes in both traditional leadership and elected officials operations. In

cases where it is difficult to exclude women, weapons such as the objectifying of their bodies and actions are used. Women are objectified and belittled in their interactions with both systems. While a number of studies have shown how insecure women are under the traditional leadership system, this study shows that the situation of women does not improve under a dual governance system. In actual fact, the two systems connive to deepen and entrench patriarchy. Women are not represented at the core of decision making in rural governance. Where expectations have been that elected officials will ensure equality and inclusive decision making, women are just receivers of decisions made in their absence by their male counterparts. In the section below, the study discusses how elected leaders and traditional leaders interact with issues of hierarchy in rural governance.

7.4 Dual Governance and hierarchy

7.4.1 Traditional leadership, Elected leaders and Hierarchy

This section looks at the second part of equality which is hierarchy. It specifically looks at how traditional leaders and elected officials treat issues of hierarchy. Hierarchy is used to group groups like youths, the poor and people living with disabilities. Specifically, what role do youths play in the operations of the two institutions? In decision making, how do these institutions ensure that the voices of the subalterns are taken into considerations? Are they protected in public platforms? How these are marginalised groups treated vis-a-vis the wealthy and the elderly. Answers to these questions will assist the study in contributing to the analysis on the role of traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance. The other questions addressed here are: How are the disabled, the elderly who can't attend meetings enabled to make contributions? How strategic are the selections of venues in ensuring that all can equally participate?

This study found that it is not difficult for youths to assume traditional leadership positions as long as they meet the set criteria applicable to everyone else. An informant from the Civic Society indicated that,

> "As long as you are the boy child and inline we have not witnessed a situation where they say you are a youth and hence you can't be a traditional leader. If you are under age they put you under the tutelage of elders and as soon as you come of age they allow you to carry out your responsibilities".

During the period under discussion, a number of documents were reviewed. These included copies of *The Chronicle* newspaper and reports from the District and provincial administrators of the two provinces. The chronicle carried out a number of articles where youths were taking over as chiefs. These include stories of 3 chiefs in Matabeleland namely Chief Mathema, Chief Nkalakatha and Chief Mathuphula. One of the chiefs in the areas studied, Chief Nkalakatha is the youngest chief in Matabeleland Provinces. He assumed his chieftaincy at the age of 20. According to him,

> "When my father passed away there was no doubt that I was next in line. I was just disturbed by the fact that I was at school and they put "ibamba" (regent). As soon as I was done with school I was allowed to start carrying out my duties without any challenges".

This view of traditional leaders and youths seems also to be in line with the view about elected officials and the youths. The study established that a number of youths were taking up positions as elected officials. Records from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) indicated that in the four chieftaincies that were studied a total of seven youths participated in the elections and are now elected officials. During the focus group meetings, youths highlighted that,

> "While it was not an easy process to get the nomination to represent the party, once you have secured the nomination you get the backing that you need. Furthermore, after being elected, fellow elected officials and villagers accord you the respect that you deserve".

This view was corroborated by key informants who are elected officials who highlighted that,

> "The challenge is with getting elected. Once elected people rarely look at your age. People are more worried about what you bring to the table rather than your age".

During observation of some of the processes in rural governance, the study found that indeed Chief Nkalakatha, despite being youthful, was able to carry out his task without challenges. Villagers and all stakeholders respected him as their chief. The researcher was also able to observe a number of gatherings called especially by youthful elected officials. The study found that there was no distinction between elected leaders who

were youthful and those who were not. They almost behaved in the same manner and would get almost the same respect.

While the study found that it was possible to be a young chief, youths were excluded in the council of advisors for the youth. Through observation of a number of meetings conducted by the chiefs' advisors, the researcher noted that youths were excluded and given peripheral roles. In some meetings, youths were given the role of *ukuhlinza imbuzi (slaughtering the goats)*. They would spend the whole day *behlinza imbuzi besidla amathumbu (slaughtering the goats and eating offals)* while the elders discussed serious issues. This view was supported by one elder who indicated that,

> The chiefs' advisors are elders who are highly respected and experienced in the community. The youths should not rush, they will also get their time. Right now they should also focus on establishing themselves as future advisors.

This view seemed to permeate across most chieftaincies. An informant from the Civic Society argued that,

> "It has been difficult for us to lobby for the inclusion of youths in the chiefs' council because of the criteria that they have used. That's why even where there is a chief who is a youth, the council of advisors still get to be dominated by the elderly".

Another informant argued that,

> "The issues that are discussed by the elders are sometimes sensitive. How do you involve youths where sometimes you are discussing the infidelity or impotency of their parents? They first have to be allowed to be parents first so that they can go through these processes and understand that being impotent is part of life. Right now you include them in those discussions, it is easy for people to lose faith in our processes. It might be difficult to control the information getting out of the court".

In the same vein, when the study focused on elected officials, it observed that the youths played a peripheral role when it came to development committees put up by elected officials. In most meetings attended, most youths were standing outside the

venue serving as security while adults were in closed door meetings. This view found support from one informant who argued that,

> "…most of the times that youths are just comfortable with sitting outside the venue of the meetings, singing and drinking their beer. Sometimes you invite them in the meeting and they are just rowdy".

Another informant who is an elected official disagreed and stated that, "We provide platforms for youths to participate. While most of them will be outside, an equally good number will be inside playing a role". This study observed that in most cases those roles were limited to passing the microphone to elders who cannot speak. At one point one person who was chairing the meeting stated that *'mayouths phangisani leMic abadala can't hold a mic bephinde bekhulume. Lani lizaguga lizakubona".* (Youths quickly provide a mic for the elders to speak, the elders can't be busy talking and holding the Mic at the same time. You will also grow up see).

During focus group interviews the youths highlighted that,

> The politics is always tilted against us. Elected officials usually confine us to peripheral roles of security. In most cases they see our value when there is violence needed.

Another young respondent added that, "If they want to see us participating they should include our issues in the agenda". This study actually observed one meeting where the youths were on the agenda but we're not represented in the meeting. The meeting concluded by asking the councillor to organise a separate meeting with the youths where they were told that their behaviour is now a concern to villagers.

In one of the study areas, the study observed a situation where a developmental project set up for the youths without engaging them was collapsing. The councillor was angry that,

> "I looked at these youths and tried to create employment for them. I bought a brick moulding machine so that they could be able to at least earn a living but they all run away preferring to spend time drinking beer".

However according to an informant,

> "…the youths saw this project differently; the youths argue that this is a money spinning project for the councillor. When he sees the youths he sees sources of cheap labour and the youths have seen into his plan".

This study looked at the land allocations by both traditional leaders and elected officials, especially councillors. The study found that there is a procedure on the allocation of stands in the rural areas. According to a youth who benefitted, "For me my father just went to the kraal head and advised him that his son needed land. It didn't even take time for me to get allocated land".

A kraal head indicated that, "we do not even debate allocating land to our youths because it is their land". This message was corroborated by a CSO representative who indicated that, "It's usually not a problem for young males to get land as long as they can be traced to that place. However, it's a big challenge for young women to get a challenge." In a meeting the kraal head explained that,

> "it's much more difficult to give land to young women because the expectation is that they will get married and moved in with their husbands. If you give them land and their husbands move the community might be overwhelmed by strangers bringing in their different traditions".

The study also noted that even fathers don't even attempt to find land for their girl children. The evidence shows that while there are no issues of hierarchy in land allocations, there are deep-seated issues of patriarchy. The study also noted that there are procedures for allocations of municipal land controlled by elected officials, mainly councillors. A council CEO advised that, "For anyone to be eligible for land allocation they have to have a council waiting form. This council waiting form can be gotten by anyone above the age of 18".

In the focus group meeting the youths indicated that getting a form

> "…was not a problem for the youths the problem was in getting the actual land. When land is available, they need you to have money and as youths we usually do not have any money ".

This evidence found corroboration from one CSO activist who also noted that while it is easy to get forms for male youths, it was a challenge for the female ones. A lot of questions are asked about their marriage status etc.

The study also sought to understand the interactions between the wretched of the earth, the subalterns and the elected leaders and traditional leaders in rural governance. Evidence from the study shows that there is not much effort that is put towards ensuring inclusivity by both elected leaders and traditional leaders. One key informant indicated that, "With traditional leaders it's always about how much cattle you have. If you can't have *cattle (cattle is used as a symbol of wealth)* surely what can you tell people?". This view was corroborated in a focus group meeting where one participant indicated that,

> "Your contribution in a meeting is measured by what you have. It could be cows, how big your house is and also how many wives you have. The number of wives shows that you are able to sustain a certain way of living".

Another informant corroborated this view by saying, "Many a times you don't see the poor people in the king's court. The criteria to choose is how successful you are and if you are poor you can't say you are successful". An activist from the Civic society also indicated that,

> …my observation is that whether it's in a meeting or being invited in the chief's court, reference is made to what you have achieved. If you have nothing to show in form of property, children in town you are hardly invited.

One key informant who is a chief also added that,

> You want to select people who have achieved something, whose words will carry weight. So if you choose very poor people who spend time asking for food from their neighbours no one will take you seriously. The credibility of the whole process becomes suspect.

Another issue that came up from the focus group meetings was the failure to accommodate people with various disabilities. One participant argued that,

> "There is no effort among traditional leaders to accommodate people with disabilities. How do you explain that till today no effort has been made to cater for people who use sign language? Every time they make a contribution we struggle to understand them".

Another respondent added that,

> "...we don't know if they are making good or bad contributions because there is no translation. Most of the times as they begin to make their contributions people either start doing something else or just use them as an icebreaker".

The study found that there is not much difference when it comes to elected leaders. While efforts are being made to ensure that the poor participate in elections, more often than not no effort is made to ensure their continued contribution for democratic sustenance. One informant indicated that,

> "…if you look at the committee's that work with elected officials they are dominated and chosen on the basis of what one has. Those who are seen as rich are given respectable portfolios such as treasurer. The wretched if the earth are the foot soldiers. They are more than willing to walk around the villagers doing the dirty work because at the end of the day they are given either food or small monies to Cater for themselves".

Another informant argued that, "even when it comes to sitting arrangement in a meeting, the best chairs are given to those who seem to be rich". Through observation, the study noted a discussion about the venue of the next meeting. The feeling expressed in the meeting was that people were more likely to attend a meeting that was held where there is comfort and where the host was likely to provide refreshments. This automatically excluded a number of people in the committee who knew that they were unable to provide those requirements.

Issues of hierarchy were also pronounced during consultative meetings. One key informant indicated that,

> "…in most cases the venues do not take into considerations that some people are old and disabled. The venues are too far and those who can't walk are not able to freely participate".

Another informant added that,

> "…preference to make suggestions and suggestions that are always carried out are those from people with something. It is as if they are meant to maintain a capitalist system where the priorities if the rich are the ones that carry the day".

In the focus group meetings one participant highlighted that,

> "During the meetings the rich are respected because elected officials are looking at donations for their next events so they have to ensure the rich people are kept comfortable. Those who have nothing will be taken care of easily when they are sent to do menial jobs and paid with either food donated by the rich or just small monies".

Another one added that, "sometimes when it is known that that one is poor, they are not even given chances to say out what they want. Iris as if by being poor they also don't have an opinion". The study also found that there is no uniformity in as far as acceptance of youthful chiefs is concerned. One respondent indicated that,

> The question of whether a youthful chief is accepted or not is dependent on a number of things. Chief among them is the way the people viewed your father. If they respected your father, then they are likely to respect you. Secondly, it's about where you grew up. If you grew up with them, and you learnt their culture, they are likely to respect you but if you come from town and are just parachuted to rule them they will create another centre of power.

Another responded argued that,

> "…it has not been easy for other traditional leaders; especially kraal heads up accept youths as chiefs because it means they now become their heads. For them to be seen to be reporting to a young person doesn't sit well with them".

Another responded, a young chief also indicated that,

"…the biggest challenge was that long ago the chiefs and Kings used to establish themselves through fighting but nowadays as killing is a criminal offence, it is difficult for chiefs to prove themselves. This approach disadvantages young chiefs who might not have the benefit of doubt".

Another respondent argued that the institution of traditional leadership has put in place systems to ensure that even the youth can become chiefs without being undermined. The kraal heads are supposed to offer that protection but in this area it is the kraal heads who are the first to undermine a youthful leader. As for young girls, they do not seem to be considered for leadership positions in society.

7.5 Discussion and Reflections on the Findings

Based on the above findings, the study concludes that in both traditional leaders and elected officials, issues of hierarchy are at the bottom of the table. While in both systems there are youths in the system, not much has been done to ensure that it is entrenched within the system.

Within the institution of traditional leadership, youths are allowed to be either kraal heads or chiefs just like Chief Nkalakatha who remains surrounded by elders in a gerentocratic system. They control what he does and most of his processes - including the most important courts that make the decisions. In the same vein, a glance at the elected officials also shows that while there is a negligible number of youths who are Councillors and MPs, they all ride on the shoulders on their senior party members. Even in meetings they are still referred to "*mfanomncane*" (young boy).The fact that their equals among elected officials still ask them to run their errands like giving them water goes a long way towards showing that hierarchy in terms of age is very prevalent.

More so, the study shows that both systems are more prone towards not listening to the voice of the poor. While within the institution of traditional leaders issues of what you own are important, to the extent that people listen to you when you have something and even address your kids as "*abantwana bendoda*" (the man's children), within elected officials the wealthy are given positions as a way of ensuring that they keep finding processes spearheaded by elected officials. These actions by both traditional and elected leaders ensure that the poor are excluded from contributing towards

deciding on issues that affect them as a community. Based on the requirements of deliberative democracy, the two institutions fall far off the mark when it comes to issues of inclusivity.

When it comes to elected officials, evidence from the study shows that youths are included as elected officials just for tokenism. Their roles during meetings are reduced to being runners who either have to sing and *toyi-toyi* for the elders or have to ensure that the elders are protected. There seems to be no incentive for the youths to participate effectively in the platforms created by the elected officials. In the same vein, in the platforms created by traditional leaders, youths are used to *ukuwosa/ukosa inyama* (to roast meat) for the elders who will be discussing serious issues. This means that based on their age, the youths are excluded and not seen as people who can make a meaningful contribution.

This evidence therefore shows that issues of hierarchy are not exclusively the domain of traditional leaders. Even elected leaders practice so much hierarchy in their operations. To be sure, the evidence shows that issues of inclusivity and hierarchy have nothing to do with the system whether it is democratic or not. Specifically, while there has always been evidence that the system of traditional leaders promotes hierarchy, this section shows that there is hierarchy in the system if elected leaders too. As such, the argument that the traditional leadership institution is undemocratic and exclusive and therefore should be done away with seems not to be supported by facts as these same challenges seem to bedevil elected officials. The most sensible thing is to find a way of making both institutions that have complementary and not competing roles to work together for the benefit of the villagers.

This study affirms findings of previous studies by a number of scholars (see Lipuma and Koeble, 2012; Ntsebeza, 2006; Gatsheni-Ndlovu; 2010; Ndlovu and Dube, 2012) who have concluded that the institution of traditional leadership is patriarchal in its operations. The study concludes that women struggle to be recognised as traditional leaders as evidenced by the controversy around the assumption of chieftainship by Chief Mabhena. In public platforms men are given more prominence and women are expected to be accompanied by men if they are doing any activity that has anything to to with the institution. This study also evidences that patriarchy is not a monopoly of traditional institutions only, even elected leaders are patriarchal in their operations. The violence involved in elections make it difficult for women to participate in electoral processes especially as canddates. The name calling, the role to govern women by

elected leaders during public interactions only serve to show that women are included not only for appeasement purposes but also for purposes of numbers.

The evidence in the study also sustains evidence gathered from previous studies conducted by (see Lipuma and Koeble (2012), Ntsebeza (2006), Gatsheni Ndlovu (2009) Ndlovu (2012) who conclude that the institution of traditional leadership promotes issues of hierarchy. The youths, people living with disability and the subalterns are not included in the programs orchestrated by the traditional leaders. Specifically, the evidence in the study suggest that no efforts are made by traditional leaders to be inclusive. While there is a case of chief Nkalakatha, who is a youthful chief, the study found that he is surrounded by the elderly who give him advice. This study posits that villagers see no contestations in terms of the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials. In fact, the institution of traditional leadership has a big role to play in enhancing democracy in these four areas. The evidence in the study also show that when it comes to issues of inclusivity, the elected officials fare no better. It is a mammoth task for youths to get elected as councillors mainly because of issues of resources. Their roles during meetings are peripheral at most. Candidates who are youthful usually face a challenge of proving their worth as compared to their older counterparts.

The study argues that issues of inclusivity and equality are a challenge for both elected officials and traditional leaders. It seems to be more about the society than any particular institution. This is compounded by the fact that although the chiefs in the four areas have varied backgrounds, experiences and levels of education, patriarchy and hierarchy dominate their mode of operations. Chief Khayisa is private schooled, has vast experience from the United Kingdom, having learnt and worked there, Chief Nkalakatha is a recent university graduate, Chief Mabhena, a teacher by profession, is from a highly political family, is usually based in Botswana and has travelled extensively around the globe while chief Maduna is a paramount chief who also fought the liberation struggle. Given this diversity the study is compelled to argue that patriarchy is not about the institution of traditional leaders, instead it has everything to do with society.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the perception, treatment and subjugation of women in rural governance. Specifically, the chapter has shown that there is little difference in

the way women are treated by both traditional leaders and elected officials in rural governance. While the methods of subjugating women are different, they have the same end. The chapter has shown that with traditional leaders, women are disenfranchised through taking away their negotiating power, rights to participate as traditional leaders as well as being viewed as minors who cannot stand for themselves in public fora like the chiefs' court. With elected officials, women are also denied the opportunity to participate as elected officials through the use of violence, they are can't participate in service delivery meetings because of the timings, the venues of the meetings among others. The behavior of elected officials in the areas studied demonstrates the continuing futility of elections as policy windows for citizens to exercise their power to give or take away electoral mandate from political elites. This is an outcome of the institutional framework for the conduct of elections, which favors man at the expense of women.

Now that the findings of this study have been presented in the two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7), the next and last chapter will now pull the study together. Apart from reiterating the key findings, the chapter will also make some recommendations to be considered by various role-players – including policy makers, government officials and researchers.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Implications of Polity Dualism and Deliberative Democracy

8.0 Introduction

The aim of this study was to deploy deliberative democracy in order to examine polity dualism in Zimbabwe. In order to achieve this goal, the thesis proposed two major objectives. The first objective was to examine the stakeholders' perception of the roles of traditional leaders and elected leaders in rural governance. This objective has been achieved in two ways: Firstly, by examining how the stakeholders that include villagers, Civic Society Organisations, traditional leaders and elected officials view the roles of these two institutions in rural governance. The understanding of the roles helps in determining whether there is confusion, contestations or cooperation between these institutions. Within this context, the study aimed to explore the issues surrounding either the conflicts or the co-operations between these two institutions in the polity dualism.

The second objective was achieved by examining the decision-making processes of the two important institutions. Specifically, this put under scrutiny the manner in which traditional leaders make decisions in the context of the chiefs' courts. It also looked at how councilors and members of parliament make their decisions in council and Parliament. Within this context, the study further examined the currency of the argument that elected officials are, by virtue of being elected, democratic. The second objective also set out to explore how traditional leaders and elected officials deal with issues of equality and inclusivity by examining their operations in rural governance in Zimbabwe. This objective was achieved in two ways: Firstly, the thesis explored the interactions between the two institutions of rural governance with patriarchy. Specifically, it examined how these institutions treat women and girls. In that context, the study examined if there is a difference in the way in which the two institutions relate with women and girls. Secondly, the study then scrutinized how issues of hierarchy are dealt with by these two institutions. Specifically, it examined measures that are put in place to ensure that the youths, people living with disabilities and the poor in the society contribute effectively and how their contributions are taken onboard. This concluding chapter therefore aims to pull these two objectives together and to discuss the implications of the themes that emerged from the thesis for better and broader understanding of the role of traditional leaders in a democracy and specifically the

implications of their coexistence on deliberative democracy even beyond the Zimbabwean case study.

The chapter proceeds as follows: It begins by reflecting on the context of traditional leaders and democracy where it raises theoretical and operational challenges in dealing with the subject of traditional leaders and democracy. After that, the chapter traces the rise of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. This section shows how traditional leaders have remained integral in communities despite attempts by the post-colonial government to do away with them. The chapter then looks at the major findings and conclusions of the study. These findings are linked to the objectives of the study. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the implications of the findings and by flagging probable future areas of inquiry specifically with regards to Zimbabwean politics but also broadly regarding the African continent, especially given the fact that the coexistence of traditional and elected leaders has been one of the contentious issues in post-colonial Africa.

8.1 Traditional leaders and Democracy: Context and interpretation

The study was premised on two major problems in the way the issue of traditional leadership is generally perceived and studied. First, there is a theoretical problem in terms of how we study and talk about traditional leaders and their contribution in a democracy. The theorising about traditional leaders and democracy across the globe reflects the influence of two germane theories - the traditionalist perspective and the modernist perspective. These perspectives sit on opposite sides of a spectrum that characterizes the realm of traditional authority – both normatively and empirically in terms of actual practice of traditional authority. On one hand, traditionalists regard Africa's traditional chiefs and elders as the true representatives of the people who are accessible, respected, legitimate, and therefore essential to developing democratic politics (Chakunda and Chikerema, 2014). From this perspective, the role of the chief in community-based decision-making is to "reflect and discuss the opinions expressed in the village assembly and ultimately to suggest and publicly approve a decision of consensus, considering different opinions and interests of involved persons" (Dusing, 2001: 1). Traditionalists like Mandela (1994) have argued that traditional leadership constitutes a potentially indigenous form of participatory deliberative democracy. Wekwete (2015) also adds that chieftaincy has re-emerged as a vehicle for indigenous political expression. Again, Omen (2005) viewed traditional leaders in a positive light as the cultural foundation of community, compatible with the vision of decentralized democracy.

On the other hand, modernists view traditional authority as authoritarian, and an increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy (Logan, 2008; Ntsebeza, 2006). Modernists sceptically label traditional leadership systems as 'a major setback to democracy' holding traditional values which are patriarchal, silencing the views of the youth and women in general' (Kohn, 2014; Koeble, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2001). They condemn traditional leaders as the least qualified to talk about democracy while also perceiving traditional political systems as relics of the past that impede democratic development (Khunou, 2011). Over the years, a number of scholars have looked at traditional leaders as agents of electoral authoritarianism. For instance, Levitsky and Way (2002) contend that electoral authoritarian regimes have established institutional facades of democracy, including regular multiparty elections for the chief executive, in order to conceal (and reproduce) harsh realities of authoritarian governance. Meanwhile, Mamdani (1996) argues that the institution of traditional leadership represents lingering species of despotic domination. Koeble and LiPuma (2009) add that the institution of traditional leadership is likely to entrench autocracy, patrimony and despotism. These are some of the views held by the modernists.

The implication has been the predominance of a functionalist binary theorising of traditional leaders in modern societies. In other words, traditional leaders are depicted based on the aggregate elements of democracy. This focus on the representative elements of democracy has meant that little attention has been put to the equally important and potentially democratic elements of the institution. In focusing so intently on the absence of elections before assumption of office by traditional leaders, there is a tendency to neglect other features of traditional systems that may also be relevant to the democratic compatibility of the institution of traditional leadership (Logan, 2009). These divergent views necessitated a case study investigation so that the merits of each position could be subjected to scrutiny.

The second problem that underpinned this research stems from the fact that the consensus by modernists to eradicate the institution of traditional leadership seems to ignore the historically proven resilience of the institution. The proven resilience of the institution of traditional leadership, coupled with the failure of the structures inherited from the colonial state to govern in line with the development aspirations of Africa's population, has led to renewed interest in indigenous institutions (Chikerema, 2013). This resurgence of interest in traditional institutions has largely been manifested in the increasing popularity of decentralization, which has occupied centre stage of policy

experiments in several developing countries in recent years, including many in Asia and Africa (Makumbe, 2010). Chakunda (2016) argues that, in recent years, the call to involve traditional authorities in the governance and development of "modern" African states by both African scholars and Western donor agencies has become louder and louder as a result of the social changes that have transformed the African social and political landscape. For instance, several scholars have observed the juxta positioning of Western-style democracy, which is based on the notion of the political and social rights of individuals and the ethnic-based collectivism characteristic of African societies (Alexander, 2018). This means that traditional structures can now operate alongside modern structures as development agents (Kurebwa, 2014).

This resilience of the institution of traditional leadership can be traced across Africa. Countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi and Mozambique once toyed with the idea of dismantling the institution of traditional leadership. In Botswana's case, the situation was slightly different because the country's leaders were deeply rooted within the institution of traditional leadership. South Africa was the last country to be liberated. Until 1993, the African National Congress (ANC) held the view that traditional leaders would have no space in an independent South Africa. However, during the course of 1993 the ANC realized that shutting traditional leaders out would cost it many votes. As such, the institution of traditional leadership was included in the 1993 Interim Constitution, and again in the National Constitution, which was adopted in 1996 (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa). From this synopsis, it is evident that traditional leaders have been resilient. In cases where they were sidelined, they came back with full force (Oomen, 2005).

8.2 The Rise of traditional leadership in Zimbabwe – A brief Recap

The proximity of traditional leaders to ruling party elites and state leadership has always been fluid both in pre- and post-colonial Zimbabwe. Prior to independence in 1980, chiefs were made into "decentralised despots" used by the colonial government to enforce the will of the colonisers on black Zimbabweans. Numerous laws such as the 1898 Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, the African Affairs Act of 1957, the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967 and the African Law and Regional Courts Act of 1969 were introduced to cement their powers (Chigwata, 2015). Post-independence, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's new government first resented traditional leaders, and

largely ignored them as an anachronistic vestige of colonialism that had no place in the new administration (Wekwete, 1991). It relegated traditional leaders to peripheral zones of governance, condemning them to play customary and cultural custodial roles through the Chiefs and Headman Act of 1982. After a cogent analysis of the role of traditional leaders, the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 was used to restore the legislative powers of the traditional leaders (Chigwata, 2016). This marked a new beginning.

The 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution gave more impetus to the rise of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe to occupy important positions even in institutions such as parliament and senate. It recognised the role of the institution of traditional leadership alongside modern state structures (Chakunda, 2015). Section 281 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe specifically outlines some of the acceptable and unacceptable conduct of traditional leaders, stating that they must not be members of any political party or in any way participate in partisan politics, act in a partisan manner, further the interests of any political party or violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of any person (Chikerema, 2013). The 2013 constitution also provides that traditional leaders are responsible for promoting and upholding cultural values, traditions and heritage, powers to administer communal land and resolve disputes among people in their communities (Chigwata, 2016). Traditional leaders are also represented in Parliament and Provincial councils. In the Rural District Council, they sit as ex-officio members. They share all these platforms with elected officials. Chigwata, 2016) argues that the relationship between traditional leaders and state actors has been characterized by contestations as councillors and traditional leaders fight.

From the foregoing literature review, it is clear that while attempts have been made in various countries to eradicate the institution of traditional leadership, these attempts have spectacularly failed. While a number of scholars have attributed the resilience of the institution to failure by government structures to provide services, research still has to be conducted to ascertain the real factors around the resilience of the institution. This study takes the position that the institution is so resilient to the extent that the practicality of doing away with it is impossible. Therefore, an analysis of the current and future role of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe that fails to factor in its resilience, especially in the face of adversity, risks making superficial conclusions as to the way forward in terms of the role of traditional leaders. It was therefore important to empirically understand the functions of the institution in a localised place like Matabeleland in Zimbabwe, hence this study. There actually seems to be a dearth of

literature and empirical studies on the role of traditional leaders in democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe which is based on empirical data. Importantly, the 2013 Constitution has not yet been analysed in the context of traditional leadership as well as assessing relations between traditional and elected leaders. It is this gap that the present study set out to address as its contribution to knowledge on the subject.

In order to address the problems flagged above, within the context of putting empirical data to the thesis, deliberative democracy was deployed as a theory. It is important to conceptualize the criteria that concern the conditions for the fruition of deliberative democracy.

A pivotal attribute of deliberative democracy is that it must strive for inclusivity. A well-deliberated decision must include all those affected by such a decision (Ryfe, 2005). All members should be equally entitled to have a voice on how to resolve relevant collective issues (Batchtiger et al, 2010). This means that deliberative democracy is to be differentiated from elitist or authoritarian schemes, including the ones in which deliberation and dialogue play an important role (Bowman and Richardson, 2009). Direct participation by all members affected will be preferred as compared to indirect representation. Through this deliberation, affected individuals sincerely weigh the merits of competing arguments in their discussions (Ryfe, 2005). Against this background, the thesis assesses the operations of traditional leaders and elected leaders given the polarized, power dynamics, resource dynamics, gender dynamics and the class dynamics in communities. The thesis also looks at how during the interactions between traditional leaders and elected officials, the voices of ordinary citizens are balanced with the voices of the elites.

The second key component of deliberative democracy was that every participant must be appreciated and treated as equal to all other participants. Every participant has to be appreciated and treated as politically equal to every other. The process must overstep existing forms of hierarchisation based on economic status or gender (Bowman and Richardson, 2009). All citizens with capacities to engage on issues have equal standing at each stage of the consultative process and they have the right to put issues on the agenda, suggest solutions, and provide reasons in support or in criticism of proposals (Nabatchi, 2010). In addition to that, each has an equal voice in the decision (Ryfe, 2005). The substantial aspect of equality refers to the fact that the existing distribution of power and resources does not affect their chances to contribute to deliberation or their authority in the deliberation (Cohen 1997). In simple terms,

gender and hierarchy issues should never determine whether their views are listened to or not. This study sought to establish what happens in reality as opposed to dwelling much on the theory part of an ideal world. To be sure, given the importance of power dynamics and the influence of resources, it would be important to see how class differences, race and ethnicity shape decisions. Most importantly, how do the two institutions in rural governance take all those factors into cognisance? This remains a pertinent question. In the second criterion, the thesis empirically tests the implications of polity dualism on equality. Among the key questions are: How are marginalised groups treated in rural governance? How do the two institutions enable the poor and women to negotiate and push for their interests in these spaces? What tactics do they use? How do the two institutions mediate the interests of the marginalised? More importantly, how do traditional leaders and elected officials interact with the marginalised? Is there a difference between the way marginalized groups are treated, for example, when it is a female chief? What are the gender relations during the engagements? These are some of the critical questions that this thesis grapples with.

8.3 Implications of Polity Dualism on Democracy

8.3.1. Main findings for Objective 1: Roles of Traditional leaders and elected leaders, inclusivity and accountability

The first major research question looked at the perception of the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials by stakeholders in rural governance. The thrust was to determine if the perception of the roles of these two institutions have a bearing on democracy. In order to answer this question, two forms important sub-questions emerged. The first question was on how the role of these two institutions is perceived in rural governance. Specifically, do villagers think there are contestations, conflicts or cooperation? What are the implications of this interaction between traditional leaders and elected officials on the key principles of accountability and inclusivity? The second sub-question deals with issues of decision-making in rural governance. Specifically, what processes are followed by traditional leaders and elected officials in decision making? Do they consult? If they do consult, who do they consult? More importantly, are there any checks and balances in the event of unilateralism?

This study found that when it comes to the issues of roles of elected officials and traditional leaders in rural governance there are no contestations. Both traditional leaders, elected officials, villagers and other stakeholders who were interviewed were clear on the separate roles of elected and unelected officials in rural governance.

Where villagers used traditional leaders in service delivery issues, it was primarily because they thought traditional leaders were able to push elected leaders to carry out their service delivery mandates. Linked to this finding is also the appreciation by the study that in rural governance there is also no contestation over the superiority of traditional leaders over elected officials. The study found that stakeholders in rural government appreciate the view that traditional leaders are more important as compared to their elected counterparts. The source of the importance is varied. While others believe that traditional leaders are the link between communities and their ancestors, many other villagers view traditional leaders as key in service delivery and development initiatives. In addition to that was the fact that traditional leaders do not have to campaign, their term of office is not temporary like the elected officials. This portrays them as stationery bandits who, while benefitting from the community, are also concerned about the survival and development of their community. Given the polarisation that has engulfed Zimbabwe's politics, the study found that traditional leaders in the studied area operate a middle ground. They play a very important role of not only watching over the behaviour of elected officials to ensure that they do not promote divisions but also play an important role of being the glue that binds communities together.

The study also found that traditional leaders are key in promoting inclusivity and accountability. The study shows that traditional leaders perform this task in a number of ways. First, they give civic society access to the communities. This has allowed a lot of civic societies to train communities and thereby building active citizenry. Second, they ensure civil interactions between civic society and elected officials. In this context, traditional leaders have a role of mediating the conflictual relationship between civic society organisations and elected officials. Thirdly, traditional leaders also provide a platform for stakeholder engagement. Given their popularity in rural governance, traditional leaders have been able to bring together various stakeholders to engage, not only on development issues, but to also ensure accountability by everyone. In this regard, elected leaders account to the communities, villagers also account to each other on their tasks that they would have been given.

The findings from the study also reveal that the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials is not always conflictual. Actually, it is dominated by cooperation. The appreciation by elected leaders that traditional leaders are superior has made this cooperation much easier. Elected officials see an opportunity for political mileage when they work with the traditional leaders. Traditional leaders bring with them the whole

community, most of whom elected officials would not ordinarily be able to gather alone, hence this always serves as a political opportunity for elected leaders. This, however, does not mean there are no conflicts at all. This study found that most of the conflicts are never about contestation around roles or superiority, they are mostly fuelled by the attempts by central government to control the local narratives and opinions. The post-colonial government is to blame for the assumed animosity between traditional and elected leaders. This is done for political expediency. The issue around the Khayisa Chieftaincy serves as a case in point. There was never a contestation about the roles of Chief Khayisa and elected officials operating in his chieftaincy. The challenges are associated with the refusal by Chief Khayisa to tow the central government line. Consequently, his life was made difficult by the government.

The study also found that decision-making within the institution of traditional leadership is consensus based. It is not a preserve of the traditional leaders. Contrary to the arguments advanced by the critics of the institution of traditional leadership, there are systems put in place to ensure that there are checks and balances. The linkages from the kraal head, the chiefs' council and the modern courts have all ensured that there are checks and balances. All these structures are accountable for their decisions. However, the same cannot be said about the elected leaders. Contrary to what a lot of scholars think, elected officials in the studied areas are not as accountable as many scholars believe and/or assume. The only useful accountability measure available for the villagers seems to be the election. The study shows that putting much focus on elections ends up neglecting the other key elements of democracy. The end-result is a situation whereby people are elected as representatives of the people, they come out as bosses of the people, never bother to consult and think on behalf of the citizens. While they are elected democratically, their deliberative democracy aspect is either weak or absent. Evidence from the studied areas shows that while elections are important in democracy, they are not sufficient to ensure democratic practice.

More importantly, this study reveals that there are checks and balances within the institution of traditional leadership. While the colonial process removed checks and balances to achieve their means, the current rural governance arrangement ensures that modern systems are also involved in monitoring the operation of traditional leaders. The mixed polity arrangement that brings together the customary and modern institutions has placed checks and balances on the institution of traditional leadership. The overturning of the ruling by Chief Khayisa (see methodology chapter) provides a classic example of how these checks and balances have been used to curtail the

excesses by traditional leaders. The focus on elections as an indicator of democracy has also meant that a number of dictatorial practices by elected officials have escaped scrutiny. Evidence from this study shows that beyond an election, decision making by elected officials in Zimbabwe is highly undemocratic. Unlike in the instance of traditional leaders where checks and balances can result in the nullification of a decision, a number of undemocratic decisions by elected officials are always implemented. Elected leaders make decisions in Parliament and Council that affect villagers without even consulting them.

Moreover, in as far as this objective is concerned, the study argues that the cooperation between traditional leaders and elected leaders is fuelled by the recognition of superiority of the various roles played by stakeholders in rural governance. This appreciation has allowed traditional leaders to play a pivotal role in ensuring inclusivity and accountability in rural governance. Profoundly, the study argues that decision-making by traditional leaders has not really been inclusive but has had a lot of checks and balances. However, when the study focused on elected officials it recognised that there is not much to provide checks and balances within that institution. Based on the fact that they are a product of elections, they are able to escape the scrutiny that traditional leaders are exposed to. This is an angle that needs special attention.

8.3.2 Main findings for Objective 2: Polity dualism, inclusivity and equality

The second major research question looked at how the institution of traditional leadership and elected officials interact with the key issues of inclusivity and equality. Specifically, the question looked at what mechanism are put in place by the two institutions to ensure the effective participation of the marginalised in community issues?

This study has found that there are lots of initiatives being made by traditional leaders in their interactions with patriarchy. To begin with, despite the challenges, women are being installed as traditional leaders. The chieftaincy of Chief Sinqobile Mabhena attests to this. In addition to that, lots of women are also being included in the chiefs' councils as shown in the cases of Chief Nkalakatha and Chief Mabhena. Traditional leaders, as shown in the case of Chief Mabhena, Khayisa and Nkalakatha are also at the forefront of fighting against genital mutilation. However, these positives are

overshadowed by the negatives. The latter are then given prominence by those who despise the institution of traditional leadership.

The study found that women struggle to be recognised as traditional leaders. The institution of traditional leadership is not only dominated by men but also decisions that are made are biased towards men. The furore around the assumption of chieftainship by Chief Mabhena is a case in point. The fact that even traditional leaders fought to oppose her assumption of office shows how patriarchal the institution is. The study shows that even after being installed as the chief, Chief Mabhena had the challenge of being accepted by her community. Her Chief's Council was dominated by men who all thought that she was just a beneficiary of political calculations. In addition to that, in public platforms men are given more prominence and women are expected to be accompanied by men if they are doing any activity that has anything to with the institution. As shown in the examples in Chief Maduna's chieftaincy, women have their agency taken away. They cannot even represent themselves in traditional court processes and always need to be accompanied by men. This paints the institution in a bad light.

This study also established that patriarchy is not a monopoly of traditional institutions only, even elected leaders are patriarchal in their operations. The violence involved in elections make it difficult for women to participate in electoral processes, especially as candidates. The name calling and the roles accorded to women by elected leaders during public interactions only serve to show that women are included not only for appeasement purposes but also for purposes of numbers. On those interactions, women's roles are confined to ensuring that venues are properly decorated and that clean water is provided for the speakers. They are also expected to clean the venue after the event while their male counterparts either leave the venue or have social talks.

On issues of hierarchy, the study found that within the institution of traditional leadership, youths are allowed to be either kraal heads or chiefs just like Chief Nkalakatha. However, the chief seems to be under the control of the elders who determine how he operates. What is instructive about the treatment of youths among traditional leaders is the view shared by Chief Nkalakatha who asserted that even among traditional leaders, he is treated as a young boy. Other traditional leaders have no problem with sending him on errands. Added to that, the institution of traditional leadership is portrayed as highly hierarchical. To begin with, issues of surnames are very critical. There are no mechanisms to ensure that the poor contribute and that their

contributions are taken on-board. In most cases the wealthy seem to dominate the meetings convened by traditional leaders.

When it comes to elected officials, the study found that youths are included as elected officials just for tokenism. Their roles during meetings are reduced to being runners who either have to sing and *toyi-toyi* for the elders or have to ensure that the elders are protected. There seems to be no incentive for the youths to participate effectively in the platforms created by the elected officials. In the same vein, in the platforms created by traditional leaders, youths are used to *ukuwosa/ukosa* inyama (to roast meat) for the elders who will be discussing serious issues. This means that based on their age, the youths are excluded and not seen as people who can make a meaningful contribution to the discussions.

This study shows that issues of hierarchy are not exclusively the domain of traditional leaders. Even elected leaders practice so much hierarchy in their operations. To be sure, the evidence shows that issues of inclusivity and hierarchy have nothing to do with the system whether it is democratic or not. Specifically, while there has always been evidence that the system of traditional leadership promotes hierarchy, this section shows that there is hierarchy in the system of elected leaders too. As such, the argument that the traditional leadership institution is undemocratic and exclusive and therefore should be done away with seems not to be supported by facts as these same challenges seem to bedevil elected officials. The most sensible thing is to find a way of making both institutions that have complementary and not competing roles to work together for the benefit of the villagers. Where challenges exist, they should be addressed collectively as opposed to apportioning the blame to one institution.

8.4 Contributions of the study: Theoretical and Empirical

This thesis contributes to several empirical and theoretical conversations in Africa around the role of traditional leaders in post-colonial Africa. It moves the conversation on how traditional leaders can contribute to democracy forward. The study does so through an analysis of the roles of traditional leaders in terms of decision-making as well as their interactions with patriarchy and hierarchy.

During the process of writing this thesis, a number of landmarks were witnessed in as far as the operations of traditional leaders in Zimbabwe is concerned. The arrest of a traditional leader based on his line of work and his subsequent dethronement either

depicts shifts in the way the government of Zimbabwe is now dealing with traditional leaders (from engagement to coercion) or more importantly shows how the government of Zimbabwe is afraid of an independent popular chief. The friction between the Khayisa chieftaincy and the government of Zimbabwe is not new but what is ground-breaking is the way in which the Zimbabwe government has gone out of its way to attempt to silence the chief. This has implications at a theoretical and operational level. Theoretically, the challenges in the central-local level relations are brought to the fore. The insistence by the centre to control the local is manifest, especially for a government that was preaching devolution as part of its election manifesto. The inadequacy of the modernists' argument on the role of traditional leaders is brought to the fore. While modernists view traditional leaders as an aberration to democratic progress, it seems to take less cognizance of the contribution of the operating environment and the state structures. The use of force by modern state structures to dovetail the operations of the traditional leaders to suit their political ends is glaring in this study. This puts into question the democratic portrayal of elected leaders.

The above incident also calls into question the conceptualization of polity dualism. The role of the state in determining the roles of traditional leaders and elected officials at the local level is evident from the discussion above. While in a dual polity these roles are explicit, what is clear from this thesis is that central government frequently changes and shifts these roles to suit its end. At an operational level it shows the attempt by the post-colonial government to reinvent the institution of traditional leadership. While scholars like Mamdani advocate for the democratization of the institution, the Zimbabwe government is happy with rural villagers being subjects as long as it's to their political and electoral benefit. What, therefore, is the future and nature of relations between traditional leaders, the state and democracy in Zimbabwe? This study takes the view that there is a growing number of traditional leaders who have been exposed to modern democracies (through universities, experiential learning) who have been accountable to their subjects and have also gone further to ensure accountability by modern state structures in Zimbabwe. But this number is still negligible to make a meaningful impact. At least, this constitutes a good starting point.

Secondly, the usually complementary relations between traditional leaders and elected officials in Zimbabwe highlights a major limitation of a modernist's analysis that interprets the relationship as more conflict-ridden as a result of the struggle for authority. In other words, the discourses of contestation between traditional leaders

and elected leaders is either deeply exaggerated or context specific. For example, this study has shown that on more occasions than not, there is cooperation and mutual respect between these institutions. Given the similarities between these two types of leadership, this study takes the position that elected leadership in Africa taps into traditional leadership which existed before elected leadership. This study therefore regards the negativity around the role of traditional leaders as nothing short of an attempt to do away with the institution of traditional leadership on groundless reasons. Ironically, this happens at the time when the call for Africanization is getting louder.

Thirdly and linked to the point above, is the role of traditional leaders going forward. There has been a lot of critical junctures in the life of traditional leaders in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Immediately after the attainment of Independence in 1980 up to 1990, traditional leaders faced a decade of onslaught as the post-colonial government attempted to dismantle the institution in favour of modern elected state structures. After withering that storm, the government, towards the end of the 1990s, took a script from the colonial period and assisted traditional leaders to "subjectivise" villagers as long as it came with electoral benefits for the ruling party. Upon realizing the resilience and the influence of the institution of traditional leaders, a symbiotic relationship was created between traditional leaders and the ruling party. According to Fayayo (2018), after the fall of Robert Mugabe as the President of Zimbabwe, traditional leaders have continued to play an important role in Zimbabwe's politics, albeit more discreetly now.

What cannot be disputed is the resilience of this institution. What however remains unclear are the reasons for its resilience. Is it because of the fetishizing by the government or the government is simply taking advantage of the institution of traditional leadership to benefit from its resilience? More importantly, is there a historical moment in Zimbabwe's political development where a new ideational framework and new principles of organising the operations of traditional leaders could have been developed? This study suggests that the institution of traditional leadership does not need a big moment, it is gradually changing and responding to the modern needs of the citizens. The fact that it is dealing with a hybrid citizen (Who is a subject in the rural areas and also a citizen in the urban areas) is evidence to that metamorphosis.

8.5 Beyond Traditionalists and Modernists theory of traditional leaders – Traditional leaders as enhancers of democracy

This study which builds on Baldwin's theory on traditional leadership and democracy has shown that there has to be a movement away from the common claim that chiefs are undemocratic, they undermine accountability by standing between citizens and their elected representatives and that the institution of traditional leadership is autocratic. This has been used by a number of modernists to argue that the institution of traditional leadership should be eradicated. Modernists and traditionalists are all inadequate in terms of explaining the role of traditional leaders in a democracy. This study expands the contribution by Baldwin (2015) that traditional leaders can facilitate the responsiveness of politicians to their constituents. The contribution of this study is based on four fundamental conclusions.

First, it argues that traditional leaders can provide a platform for engagements between service providers, elected officials as well as ordinary citizens. Second, the study clearly demonstrates that the Civic Society organisations have been able to use traditional leaders to access villagers and elected officials. Thirdly, the study argues that in a polarized environment like in Zimbabwe, traditional leaders are not only the glue that brings people together but they are also pivotal in mobilizing residents to participate in service delivery issues. Fourth, chiefs in the studied area have been able to moderate the behaviour of elected officials during elections. These four arguments provide a premise for the argument that traditional leaders can facilitate the responsiveness of democratic governments in rural Africa. These are dealt with in detail below. Before explaining the above findings and their relationship to chiefs' promoting responsiveness, there is a need to acknowledge the following from the study and use it as a basis to move forward:

a) Traditional leaders are a popular institution in rural governance. As shown in the study, there is much preference for traditional leaders ahead of elected leaders. This is a view that finds a lot of traction from sources like Afro barometer which has always had a set of questions about citizens' perceptions of "trust in institutions". These questions compare citizens' levels of trust in different types of leaders - including religious leaders, elected officials like MPs and Councillors. Overwhelmingly, traditional leaders enjoy the highest levels of trust of

any types of leaders, almost at par with religious leaders. MPs and Councillors are the least trusted leaders.

b) Patriarchy in rural areas is not a function of traditional leadership but a broader societal issue. The study has shown that contrary to the assertion that traditional leaders are the hosts of patriarchy, institutions like churches, elected officials that have nothing to do with traditional leadership are patriarchal and do a lot in sustaining patriarchy in society.

c) Traditional leaders have strengths that could be useful in the democratization agenda. Among them is their ability to mobilise society and to preach peace. The popularity of traditional leaders and the huge respect accorded to the institution could be used to leverage for democratic practices.

d) The resilience of the institution of traditional leadership implies that it can't just be wished away. Previous attempts to obliterate the institution failed. Current and future attempts are also bound to fail. As such, new ways have to be found to identify its potential contributions to democracy. The argument by Ntsebeza (1996) that the institution should be done away with is difficult to implement at a practical and operational level. In fact, such an argument seems to be oblivious to the history of the institution and the failed attempts to destroy it.

With that background in mind, it is important to acknowledge that the institution of traditional leadership is resilient. Most importantly, the following show that traditional leaders have actually played a pivotal role in enhancing democracy in rural governance.

1) Provision of Platforms for engagement

This study has shown that traditional leaders play an important role of providing platforms for engagement between stakeholders in their areas. By providing this platform, as well their presence, they guarantee villagers that there is continuity on the issues that are being discussed. Availability of the traditional leader in a meeting gives the villagers the impression that the issues to be discussed are serious and are not

issues being brought out for political expediency. These actions give residents the agency to stand up knowing fully well that there won't be any political repercussions accompanying their views during the meeting.

2) CSOs, Traditional leaders and Accountability

The study has demonstrated in many ways that governance in rural areas is about contestation for space. Specifically, the study has shown how elected leaders have a tense relationship with civic society groups. These groups have the potential of either building other leaders to contest the incumbent or to simply expose deficiencies in the way elected leaders operate. In most instances, elected leaders either refuse to participate in CSO activities, stop their party members from participating in the meetings or simply gang up with law enforcement officials to stop the meetings. The study has shown that in such instances traditional leaders come in handy as they allow CSOs access to their areas. With approval from traditional leaders, it becomes very difficult for elected officials or any other stakeholder in the area to have a divergent view. In this case traditional leaders facilitate not only the free operations of CSOs but also the interactions between the protagonists.

3) Traditional leaders, polarisation and civic participation

Given the polarisation that has engulfed Zimbabwe around two political parties, mainly ZANU PF and the MDC Alliance, elected officials have had challenges with calling for consultative meetings. At the least, they only consult their political party members through their structures and at the worst they don't even bother to call for meetings. In the event that they call meetings, in most cases it is members of their political parties who will attend. Traditional leaders have been handy in such scenarios. They have done this by either calling meetings to facilitate engagement between all stakeholders in the community or by simply attending consultative meetings to ensure accountability from elected officials and service providers.

4) Traditional leaders and Elections

While a number of studies have shown traditional leaders as fetished electoral ambassadors of the ruling party in Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2019) and vote brokers (Baldwin (2015), this study has portrayed traditional leaders as "electoral referees". In this case, they not only make sure that there is no violence during electoral periods but they also ensure fair play.

This section has provided a new explanation for the power and political relevance of traditional leaders in a democracy. It has shown that traditional leaders not only increase the responsiveness of elected officials and service providers but also improve the participation of villagers in community issues. By so doing they are contributing in building an active citizen. This implies that traditional leaders may enhance rather than hinder democratic responsiveness and citizen participation.

8.6 Recommendations

Based on the findings articulated above, this study makes the following policy recommendations:

a) **Harmonization of local government laws in Zimbabwe**. The current legal framework for local government in Zimbabwe is disintegrated, disparate, disjointed and conflicting, creating room for the central state to abuse and use them for political aggrandizement. The state of the legal infrastructure on local government ferments unnecessary contestations and provides room for co-optation of traditional leaders by the ruling elites. These challenges can be addressed through harmonization of laws to create a unified framework that is clear and clarifies the functions of each local government player and how these components relate.

b) **Constitutional protection of traditional leaders' remuneration**: The remuneration of the traditional leaders should be constitutionally guaranteed. Such guarantees will safeguard traditional leaders from manipulation by politicians who often appear to offer remuneration as a favour. These guarantees will improve traditional leaders' independence and allow them to make decisions based on their conscience rather than the fear of withdrawal of privileges and income. Such protection also mitigates the possibilities of central government using remuneration to hold traditional leaders at ransom regarding towing party of government lines.

c) **Independence of the institution of traditional leaders**: The Institution of traditional leaders should be an independent institution that is able to

specifically deal with its own succession issues. The involvement of the government in both pre and post-colonial Zimbabwe has led to invented chiefs.

In addition to policy recommendations, this study's findings indicate outstanding questions and lines of enquiry on the study of traditional leaders and democratisation. It recommends the following as some of the possible fruitful lines for further research;

a) **Traditional Leaders and new communities and cleavages created by the Land Reform Program:** The land reform program in Zimbabwe was dynamic and reshaped geographies, politics and communities made up of people from different cultures. How traditional leaders have been able to deal with these changing socio-political and economic dynamics as well as spatial and social dynamics is still an open empirical question worth exploring. Of interest is also how traditional leaders have been (un)able to make decisions using the consensus-based model, and how new settlers who may not be co-ethnics of presiding traditional leaders have (in)subordinated themselves to extant traditional authorities in the areas they were settled.

b) **The imbrication of cultures between elected and traditional leaderships**: One of the emerging conclusions in this and other studies is that contemporary democratic values of inclusivity, accountability and equality tap from traditional leadership which existed before elected leadership. However, the extent to which this is the case and the implications of such conclusions to the making of democracy in Africa beyond elections remains an open empirical question in need of further study.

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Appendix 1

Consent Form: Focus Group Discussions

RESEARCHER: **Rodrick Fayayo**
STUDENT NUMBER: **3983596**
Political Studies Department
University of the Western Cape
Email**:** **infor@uwc.ac.za**

Research Title: Local government duality and its discontents: A study of rural governance and contestations of power and influence between elected officials and traditional leaders in Zimbabwe with specific focus on Matabeleland.

Purpose of the research:
This research puts under scrutiny rural governance in Zimbabwe. Specifically, it looks at the interactions between hereditary leaders and elected leaders and the effect of their engagement on deliberative democracy in Zimbabwe. The research feeds into the broader question of whether traditional leaders and elected officials can co-exist and if so at what expense or benefit?

Thank you for agreeing to be involved in this FGDs as part of the above research project. Ethical procedures for academic research undertaken from South African institutions require that interviewees explicitly agree to being interviewed and how the information contained in their interview will be used. This consent form is necessary for us to ensure that you understand the purpose of your involvement and that you agree to the conditions of your participation. The discussion will take approximately 90 minutes. I don't anticipate that there are any risks associated with your participation, but you have the right to stop the interview or withdraw from the research at any time. Would you therefore read the accompanying information sheet and then sign this form to certify that you approve the following:

- The focus group will be recorded and a transcript will be produced
- The researcher will analyze the transcript of the interview
- Access to the focus group transcript will be limited to the researcher, academic colleagues and researchers with whom he might collaborate as part of the research process
- Any summary content, or direct quotations from the interview, that are made

available through academic publication or other academic outlets will be anonymized so that you cannot be identified, and care will be taken to ensure that other information in the FGDs that could identify yourself is not revealed.

- The actual recording will be (kept at the department of Political Studies, University of Western Cape.

By signing this form, I agree that:

- ✓ I am voluntarily taking part in this project.
- ✓ I understand that even if I agree to participate now, I can withdraw at any time or refuse to answer any question without any consequences of any kind.
- ✓ I have had the purpose and nature of the study explained to me in writing and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.
- ✓ I understand that participation involves contributing my knowledge on the subject matter.
- ✓ I understand that I will not benefit directly from participating in this research.
- ✓ I agree to the discussion being audio-recorded.
- ✓ I understand that all information I provide for this study will be treated confidentially.
- ✓ I understand that in any report on the results of this research my identity will remain anonymous. This will be done by changing my name and disguising any details of my interview, which may reveal my identity or the identity of people I speak about.
- ✓ I understand that if I inform the researcher that myself or someone else is at risk of harm they may have to report this to the relevant authorities - they will discuss this with me first but may be required to report with or without my permission.

I understand that signed consent forms and original audio recordings will be retained in within the department of Political Studies at the University of Western Cape until the exam board confirms the results of the researchers PhD project.

I understand that a transcript of my interview in which all identifying information has been removed will be retained for and used specifically for academic purposes.
I understand that I am free to contact any of the people involved in the research to seek further clarification and information.

Contact Information

This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of Western Cape Ethics Board. If you have any further questions or concerns about this study, please contact:

Name of researcher: Rodrick Fayayo

E-mail: rfayayo@gmail.com

You can also contact Prof Bheki Mngomezulu **Email** – bmngomezulu@uwc.ac.za

If you are worried about this research, or if you are concerned about how it is being conducted, you can contact the Head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Western Cape. Prof Piper Email lpiper@uwc.ac.za

Department of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape, South Africa Tel: 021-959-3228

Participant:

Name of Participant	**Signature**	**Date**

Researcher:

Name of Researcher	**Signature**	**Date**

Appendix 2

Consent Form: Key Informant Interviews

RESEARCHER: **Rodrick Fayayo**
STUDENT NUMBER: **3983596**
Political Studies Department
University of the Western Cape
Email: **infor@uwc.ac.za**

Research Title: Local government duality and its discontents: A study of rural governance and contestations of power and influence between elected officials and traditional leaders in Zimbabwe with specific focus on Matabeleland.

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Thank you for agreeing to be involved in this FGDs as part of the above research project. Ethical procedures for academic research undertaken from South African institutions require that interviewees explicitly agree to being interviewed and how the information contained in their interview will be used. This consent form is necessary for us to ensure that you understand the purpose of your involvement and that you agree to the conditions of your participation. The discussion will take approximately 90 minutes. I don't anticipate that there are any risks associated with your participation, but you have the right to stop the interview or withdraw from the research at any time. Would you therefore read the accompanying information sheet and then sign this form to certify that you approve the following:

- The focus group will be recorded and a transcript will be produced
- The researcher will analyze the transcript of the interview
- Access to the focus group transcript will be limited to the researcher, academic colleagues and researchers with whom he might collaborate as part of the research process
- Any summary content, or direct quotations from the interview, that are made

available through academic publication or other academic outlets will be anonymized so that you cannot be identified, and care will be taken to ensure that other information in the FGDs that could identify yourself is not revealed.

- The actual recording will be (kept at the department of Political Studies, University of Western Cape.

By signing this form, I agree that;

✓ I am voluntarily taking part in this project.

✓ I understand that even if I agree to participate now, I can withdraw at any time or refuse to answer any question without any consequences of any kind.

✓ I have had the purpose and nature of the study explained to me in writing and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.

✓ I understand that participation involves contributing my knowledge on the subject matter.

✓ I understand that I will not benefit directly from participating in this research.

✓ I agree to the discussion being audio-recorded.

✓ I understand that all information I provide for this study will be treated confidentially.

✓ I understand that in any report on the results of this research my identity will remain

✓ anonymous. This will be done by changing my name and disguising any details of my interview, which may reveal my identity or the identity of people I speak about.

✓ I understand that if I inform the researcher that myself or someone else is at risk of harm they may have to report this to the relevant authorities - they will discuss this with me first but may be required to report with or without my permission.

I understand that signed consent forms and original audio recordings will be retained within the department of Political Studies at the University of Western Cape until the exam board confirms the results of the researchers PhD project.

I understand that a transcript of my interview in which all identifying information has been removed will be retained for and used specifically for academic purposes.

I understand that I am free to contact any of the people involved in the research to seek further clarification and information.

Contact Information

This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of Western Cape Ethics Board. If you have any further questions or concerns about this study, please contact:

Name of researcher: Rodrick Fayayo

E-mail: rfayayo@gmail.com

You can also contact Prof Bheki Mngomezulu on bmngomezulu@uwc.ac.za

If you are worried about this research, or if you are concerned about how it is being conducted, you can contact the Head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Western Cape. Prof Piper Email lpiper@uwc.ac.za,

Department of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape, South Africa **Tel**: 021-959--3228

Participant: _____ _____ _____

Name of Participant Signature Date

Researcher:

_____ _____ _____

Name of Researcher Signature Date

Appendix 3: Focus Group Discussion and Key Informant Interview Guide

University of the Western Cape
Department of Political Studies
Robert Sobukwe Road,
Bellville, 7535
Tel: +27 21 959 3228 Fax: +27 21 959 3621
www.uwc.ac.za

Focus Group Discussion and Key Informant Interview Guide

RESEARCHER: **Rodrick Fayayo**

STUDENT NUMBER: **3983596**

Political Studies Department

University of the Western Cape

Email: **infor@uwc.ac.za**

Research Topic: Local government duality and its discontents: A study of rural governance and contestations of power and influence between elected officials and traditional leaders in Zimbabwe with specific focus on Matabeleland.

1) From your point of view what are the roles of (1) traditional leaders and (2) elected officials in your area?

2) Discuss how you view the relationship between traditional leaders and elected officials like Councilors and Members of Parliament.

3) In which platforms do traditional leaders and elected officials meet (Both officially and unofficially)?

4) In your own view who seems to have more power than the other between the two groups of leaders? Why do you say so?

5) What is the effect of their relationship on community programs?

6) How does the relationship between these two groups affect the participation of women in leadership?

7) How do the two structures ensure accountability?

8) What do you think should be done in order to improve the relationship between traditional leaders and elected representatives?

University of the Western Cape
Department of Political Studies

Appendix 4 Focus Group Discussion Participant Information Sheet

Robert Sobukwe Road,
Bellville, 7535
Tel: +27 21 959 3228 Fax: +27 21 959 3621
www.uwc.ac.za

Participant Information Sheet: Focus Group Discussions

RESEARCHER: **Rodrick Fayayo**
STUDENT NUMBER: **3983596**
Political Studies Department
University of the Western Cape

Title of Research: Local Government Duality and its Discontents: A Study of Rural Governance and Contestations of Power and Influence between Elected Officials and Traditional Leaders in Zimbabwe with Specific Focus on Matabeleland.

Dear Participant,

This serves as an invitation for you to participate in a research project that I am conducting as part of a thesis for a PhD in Political Studies, at the University of the Western Cape.

Before you decide to participate, please ensure that you understand why this research is being conducted, what you are being requested to do. In that regard, please take the time to carefully read and understand the information below. You can discuss it with others if you wish. For the avoidance of doubt I will also explain the provisions of this information sheet before the start of any focus group discussion related to this study.

Once you understand the request and purpose of the research and you decide to continue with the participation, please go through and append your signature to the consent form. My details, and the details of my supervisor, are provided at the end of this document.

Purpose of the Research

This research puts under scrutiny rural governance in Zimbabwe. Specifically it looks at the interactions between hereditary leaders and elected leaders and the effect of their engagement on deliberative democracy in Zimbabwe. The research feeds into the broader question of whether traditional leaders and elected officials can co-exist and if so at what expense or benefit? The research also seeks to highlight if there is

any evidence of the existence of differential power asymmetries between the two local government structures.

Description of the Research and Your Involvement

This study looks at the implications of the co existence between traditional leaders and elected officials in Zimbabwe. It uses focus group discussions as a data collection tool. Focus Group Discussion is part of the collection of data for purposes of the research. You have been chosen to participate in this discussion because of your proximity and or knowledge of the work of traditional leaders and elected officials. Focus Group Discussions are with adults (above 18), who are members of the community. As such the discussions will focus on your knowledge of the subject.

The focus group will be audio-recorded and someone will be taking notes in order to accurately capture what is said. If you participate in the study, you many request that the recording be paused at any time. You may choose how much or how little you want to speak during the group. You may also choose to leave the focus group at any time. There will be no punishment, loss of benefits or services to anyone who either decides not to participate or walk away during the discussions. Participation in this study is voluntary. The contents of the recordings and the notes taken will not be used for any purpose except this study. The contents will not be shared with anyone, be it the chief or any of the elected officials.

Procedure

As part of this study, you will be placed in a group of 6 – 12 individuals. A moderator will ask you several questions while facilitating the discussion. As indicated, this focus group will be audio-recorded and a note-taker will be present. However, your responses will remain confidential, and no names will be included in the final report. You can choose whether or not to participate in the focus group, and you may stop at any time during the course of the study.

Please note that there are no right or wrong answers to focus group questions. The study requires that there is a need to hear the many varying viewpoints and would benefit more if everyone to contribute their thoughts. Out of respect, please refrain from interrupting others. However, feel free to be honest even when your responses counter those of other group members.

Confidentiality

Please note that your name **will not** be recorded during the Focus Group Discussions so as to maintain confidentiality at all times. Please note that all participants **are obliged not to** share any information or views shared by other Focus Group participants. The researcher will keep all records and recordings of your participation, including the signed consent form that you will be requested to complete if you agree to participate. All of these records will be safely kept and destroyed once the research has been completed. The information you will share with us if you participate in this

study will be kept completely confidential to the full extent of the law. Participants will be asked not to use any names during the focus group discussion. Please be advised that although the researchers will take every precaution to maintain confidentiality of the data, the nature of focus groups prevents the researchers from guaranteeing confidentiality. The researchers would like to remind participants to respect the privacy of your fellow participants and not repeat what is said in the focus group to others. Reports of study findings will not include any identifying information. Audio-recordings of the focus groups will be kept on a password-protected computer in the departments locked office. After the focus group recording is typed it will be destroyed. The typed transcription will be kept on the password-protected computer.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal

Your participation in this research is voluntary. You are free to refuse to participate or withdraw, without stating your reasons, at any time you decide to do so. There will be no consequences if you decide not to participate and it will not affect you relationship with the researcher, traditional leader of the area and the elected official of the area. If there is anything you would prefer not to discuss, please feel free to say so. Please note that if you decide to participate in the Focus Group Discussion, you will retain this information sheet. You will then be requested to sign a consent form.

Benefits and Costs

There will be no direct benefits or rewards for participating in this study. There are no costs for participating in this research other than your time spent in the Focus Group Discussion. The discussion will last between 1 hour and 1 and a half hours (60—90 minutes). The Focus Group Discussion will be conducted at your convenience, so there will be no costs such as transportation. Participating in this study may not benefit you directly, but it will help us learn. You may find answering some of the questions upsetting, but we expect that this would not be different from the kinds of things you discuss with family or friends. We do not envision any significant risks related to participation in this study.

Risk Statement

There is no foreseeable risk to participate in the study

Informed Consent

Your informed consent to participate in this research is required before you participate in the Focus Group Discussion.

Further information:

Should you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me through any of the details below:

Phone: 0639265554

E-mail: rfayayo@gmail.com

My supervisor for this research is Prof Bheki Mngomezulu. You are also welcome to contact her should you have any further questions:

Contact:
Department of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape, South Africa Tel: 021-
--959---3228
E-mail: bmngomezulu@uwc.ac.za

Or contact the Western Cape's Senate Research Committee and Ethics Committee.

HSSREC, Research Development, UWC,

Tel: (021) 959 2988,

Email: research-ethics@uwc.ac.za

Thank you for considering to be part of this research.

Appendix 5: Letter Requesting Permission to conduct research to Council

30 October 2019

The Chief Executive Officer
Mzingwane Rural District Council

Ref – Permission to do a Study

The CEO

I hope this letter finds you well. My name is Rodrick Fayayo (08-616949y26), a PhD student at the university of Western Cape. I am doing a study titled: **'Local government duality and its discontents: A study of rural governance and contestations of power and influence between elected officials and traditional leaders in Zimbabwe with specific focus on Matabeleland."** My areas of study are the Khayisa Chieftancy, Nkalakatha Chieftancy, Mabhena chieftancy and the Maduna Chieftancy.

In your area I would love to get information on the relationship between Chief Mabhena and elected officials in his chieftancy.

Through this letter I also request an interview with either yourself or any designated person in your office.

The information collected will be used only for the purposes of the study and will be safely stored at the department of political studies at the University of Western Cape.

I also enclose my ethics clearance form from the University of Western Cape.

Your assistance will be greatly appreciated

Rodrick Fayayo
0772570938
0788719385

Appendix 6: Letter Requesting Permission to conduct a study from the PA's office

30 October 2019-10-30

The Provincial Administrator

Ref – Permission to conduct a Study

Provincial Administrator

I hope this letter finds you well. My name is Rodrick Fayayo (08-616949y26), a PhD student at the university of Western Cape. I am doing a study titled '**Local government duality and its discontents: A study of rural governance and contestations of power and influence between elected officials and traditional leaders in Zimbabwe with specific focus on Matabeleland."** My areas of study are the Khayisa Chieftaincy, Nkalakatha Chieftaincy, Mabhena chieftaincy and the Maduna Chieftaincy.

In your area I would love to get information on the relationship between Chief Mabhena, Chief Maduna and elected officials in his chieftaincy.

Through this letter I also request an interview with either yourself or any designated person in your office.

The information collected will be used only for the purposes of the study and will be safely stored at the department of political studies at the University of Western Cape.

I also enclose my ethics clearance form from the University of Western Cape for your appreciation.

Your assistance will be greatly appreciated

Rodrick Fayayo

0772570938

0788719385

Appendix 7 Newspaper Articles used in the study

Newspaper Articles

https://www.chronicle.co.zw/chiefs-families-urged-to-document-family-trees/ accessed on 11 May 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/ed-tackles-gukurahundi-with-chiefs-historic-indaba-touches-on-drought-development/ accessed on 30 January 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/chiefs-must-resist-tribal-divisions/ accessed on 2 August 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/ed-to-meet-chiefs-in-cyclone-idai-hit-areas/ accessed on the 4th of June 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/first-lady-ropes-in-chiefs-wives/ accessed on 22 February 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/government-liberalises-marriages-chiefs-vapostori-to-solemnise-unions/ accessed on 11 May 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/government-to-craft-law-to-protect-chiefs/ accessed on 19 july 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/president-meets-13-chimanimani-chipinge-chiefs/ accessed on 10 May 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/president-to-meet-chiefs/ accessed on 29 June 2019
https://www.chronicle.co.zw/zna-appeals-to-traditional-leaders-to-help-end-gold-wars/ , accessed on the 26 October 2018
https://www.herald.co.zw/align-traditional-leaders-act-chiefs/ accessed on the 7th of March 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/chiefs-play-key-role-vp-mohadi/ accessed on 30 May 2019

https://www.herald.co.zw/chadzamira-warns-traditional-leaders-against-selling-land/ accessed 24 February 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/chief-ndiweni-caught-offside-in-land-wrangle/ accessed on 17 May 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/chief-ndiweni-jailed/ accessed on 17 Aug 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/chief-ndiweni-stage-manages-attack/
https://www.herald.co.zw/chimonyo-hails-traditional-leaders-role-in-development/ 18 October 2018
https://www.herald.co.zw/da-warns-rogue-traditional-leaders/ accessed on 1 January 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/ed-meets-mid-matland-chiefs/ accessed on 28 June 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/government-avails-stationery-to-chiefs/ accessed on May 21 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/gukurahundi-tops-ed-chiefs-indaba/ accessed on 29 Jan 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/hybrid-varieties-way-to-go-chiefs/ accessed on 5 June 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/minister-mpofu-sues-chief-for-defamation/ accessed on 9 May 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/ndiweni-23-villagers-convicted/ accessed on

https://www.herald.co.zw/obert-mpofus-warrant-of-arrest-cancelled/ accessed on 18 Aug 2018
https://www.herald.co.zw/traditional-leaders-keen-on-devolution/ accessed on 29 November 2018
https://www.herald.co.zw/up-food-rations-chiefs-urge-govt/ accessed on 14July 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/vp-mohadi-meets-midlands-chiefs-over-gukurahundi/ accessed on 18 July 2019
https://www.herald.co.zw/work-closely-with-govt-traditional-leaders-urged/