

Liminality, Papers and Belonging amongst Zimbabwean
Immigrants in South Africa

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
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Declaration

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Abstract


Introduced in 2010, the Dispensation Zimbabwe Program (DZP) regularised undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa. When DZP was closed, the Zimbabwe Special Permit was introduced, which was also replaced by the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit. This thesis examines the lived experiences of Zimbabwean migrants from the time they arrived in South Africa without papers, visas, or permits. It then examines the processes of acquiring DZP papers, processes of replacing it, and how conditions on the permits reinforce a particular notion of belonging for Zimbabwean immigrants. I draw on work inspired by the anthropologist Victor Turner's (1967) concept of liminality to show that Zimbabwean migrants had been going through various phases of uncertain legal statuses which are all liminal.

Through accounts of lived experiences and biographical narratives of migrants who see themselves as 'entrepreneurs' in Cape Town, I consider how migrant's experience the structural effects of documentation and having or not having 'papers'. It starts with a state of "illegality" because of being an undocumented migrant in South Africa. It proceeds to "amnesty" from deportation following the announcement of DZP. It then proceeds to the filling of application forms for legalisation at Home Affairs. The DZP permits make them "liminal citizens" in that they got political citizenship by virtue of being documented, but at the same time, the migrants do not enjoy full citizenship status economically. There is also "legal suspension" as in the period between applications for replacement of the permit with another for example from Zimbabwe Special Permit (ZSP) to Zimbabwe Exemption Permit (ZEP). The imposition of conditions in permits that it will not be renewed or extended throws them into a condition of "temporary conditional legality". As a result, the liminality experienced is both existential and juridical. Juridical liminality results from uncertain legal status whether the migrant is documented or not. Juridical liminality is inherent in law and immigration policy. Existential liminality is because the uncertain legal status permeates all aspects of Zimbabwean immigrants' lives and delimits their range of action in different spheres.

This includes jobs, transnational capabilities, business, family, housing, and schooling for their children.

Most studies on migration do not extend their arguments beyond that permits matter as they see them as giving immediate access to social and economic rights. In this thesis, I do not only examine how a condition of being an undocumented immigrant shapes aspects of immigrants' lives but I further examine the experiences of living with temporary visas and their impact on their lives and family. Whereas in a rite of passage, the liminal stage is temporary, Zimbabweans in South Africa are living in chronic liminality. In all phases of liminal legality, the thesis demonstrates state power through documents/visas in shaping migrant lives deepening our understanding of immigrant incorporation, exclusion, citizenship and belonging.

Keywords: papers, liminality, migrant illegality, regularisation, legal aliens, legal suspension, civic marginalisation, temporary conditional legality, waiting, belonging, Zimbabwe, South Africa.




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
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Acronyms

AU	African Union
ANC	African National Congress
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DZP	Dispensation Zimbabwe Project
EU	European Union
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JOC	Joint Operations Command
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TPS	Temporary Protected Status (United States of America)
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress for Trade Unions
ZEP	Zimbabwe Exemption Permit
ZSP	Zimbabwe Special Permit



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I dedicate this thesis to my mother, siblings and my late father who passed away in February 2008. You left us without saying good bye. Tears have dried but memories never end. You are forever missed.

Rest in Peace Mudhara Chisa



1. Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Introduction

The political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe of the early 2000s led to the unprecedented influx of its population into South Africa (Bimha, 2017). Using the 2001 South African census as a baseline, Makina (2010) estimated that over a million Zimbabweans lived in South Africa by 2007. Most Zimbabweans lived on the margins of illegality without valid visas/permits. Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera (2015: 371) note that only 7000 Zimbabweans had work permits by 2005 while only 1000 asylum applications were approved from a total of 44 000 applications between 2002 and 2006 (Polzer, 2009). South Africa arrested and deported illegal migrants back to Zimbabwe; 97 000 were deported in 2005, 200 000 in 2007 and 165 000 in 2008 (Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2015: 371). The economic and political decline in Zimbabwe which forced them to migrate from Zimbabwe still persisted (Raftopoulos, 2009), that those deported always found their way back to South Africa. Polzer (2008) argues that the Zimbabwean migration tested Pretoria's legal and institutional infrastructure for migration management to the limit such that a new approach was required.

The South African Immigration Act of 2002, Section 31(2) indicates that: "Upon application, the Minister of Home Affairs may under terms and conditions determined by him: grant a foreigner or a category of foreigners the rights of permanent residence for a specified or unspecified period when special circumstances exist which should justify such a decision. Provided the Minister may (i) exclude one or more identified foreigners from such categories (ii) or with good cause, withdraw such rights from a foreigner or a category of foreigners". Under this provision, the South African government regularised the residence status of undocumented Zimbabweans in 2010 through the Dispensation of Zimbabwe Project (DZP) process. DZP permits were valid from 2010 to 2014. When

DZP was closed, Zimbabwe Special Permit (ZSP) was introduced in order to regularise former DZP holders until December 2017. The ZSP was then replaced by Zimbabwe Exemption Permits (ZEP), valid from 2018 to 31 December 2020¹.

Prior to the DZP, the South African government had granted three immigration amnesties between 1996 to 2000. These amnesties offered permanent residence to contract mineworkers from SADC countries who had worked in South Africa for at least ten years before 1995, undocumented citizens of SADC member states who had entered the country clandestinely during the apartheid period and lived in South Africa for more than five years and former Mozambican refugees who had entered South Africa before 1992 (Perbedy, 2001). Perbedy (2001) argues that the granting of amnesty set a new ground rules and defining the boundaries from which it could work to exclude all new undocumented migrants. As a result, the South African government then introduced draconian measures to raise the rates of identification, arrest, detention, and repatriation of undocumented migrants. The methods were evocative of the old pass law or *dompas* operations employed by the apartheid state and were certainly reminiscent of past apartheid practices, and contravene some of the most basic human rights of migrants (Perbedy, 2001). Unlike previous amnesties that offered permanent residence status, the DZP was the first immigration amnesty which did not provide a pathway to permanent residence. It is similar to the United States of America's temporary protected status (TPS) which offers legal residency to nationals of designated countries and does not offer a pathway for permanent residency (Menjívar, 2006).

This thesis examines the lived experiences of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa from the time they arrived as undocumented migrants, to their life experiences as

¹ The South African government uses the language that the permits were “closed” instead of expired and “replaced” than renewal. Zimbabweans on these permits cannot refer to closed permits when making a claim.

holders of special permits (DZP, ZSP and ZEP). I start by examining their settlement and labour experiences on arrival in South Africa as undocumented migrants before the DZP. I then focus on the process of acquiring DZPs; processes of replacing it, the extent to which the regularization led to the inclusion of migrants, and how conditions on ZEP permits orient people towards the future. The examination of these processes brings into dialogue our normative understanding of immigrant incorporation often presented through regularisation programs and the anthropology of integration presented as analysis of empirical conditions. In doing so, it links legal anthropology and the anthropology of transnational migration, on one hand, with phenomenological scholars interested in experience, on the other. This thesis demonstrates how state power operates through permit regulations and issuing of documents/visas that grant legal status in shaping migrants' lives. Knowledge of such deepens our understanding of immigrant incorporation, exclusion, citizenship and belonging (Menjívar, 2006).

Zimbabwean migrants had been going through various phases of legalities, starting with a state of "illegality" due to being undocumented in South Africa. Then there was a period of "amnesty" from deportation following the announcement of the DZP. This was followed by the filling of application forms for legalisation at Home Affairs. The DZP permits make them "liminal citizens²" in that they got political citizenship by virtue of being documented, but at the same time do not enjoy full citizenship status economically. There is also "legal suspension" during the period between applications for replacement of former permits, for example from DZP to ZSP and from ZSP to ZEP. The imposition of the conditions in ZSP and ZEP that it will not be renewed or extended threw them into a condition of "temporary conditional legality".

² Other terms used to refer to people with a tenuous legal position with more protections than undocumented status but with no pathway for permanent residency or citizenship include semi-legality, in-betweens (Schuck 1998); mixed status households (Chavez 1992); liminal migrants (Menjívar 2006); learning to be illegal (Gonzales 2011); legally illegal (Rigo 2011); civically stratified (Morris 2002); quasi-legal (Düvell 2008); a-legal (Lindahl 2010)

As a conceptual guide, I borrow from various theorists, with Victor Turner's (1967) concept of liminality as the main anchor to capture the lives of Zimbabwean special permit holders as being characterised by ambiguity and uncertainty in their territorial rights of passages. Liminality is conceptualized as "a transitional intervening period between two relatively fixed or stable conditions" (Turner, 1967:93). It is a space "where people are neither one thing nor another; or maybe both" (Turner, 1967:94). While liminality is understood as a temporary condition, the Zimbabwean migrants in question had been living in a condition of liminality which has not come to an end. I retain the original conceptualization of liminality as "in-between and uncertainty", but destabilise the notion that liminality is temporary to show that liminality can be experienced on a permanent basis (Johnsen and Sørensen, 2015). Liminality is either existential or juridical. Juridical liminality results from uncertain legal status whether the migrant is documented or not. Juridical liminality is inherent in law and immigration policy. Immigration in South Africa is controlled by the Immigration Act of 2002, which is the principal law that is further supported by directives issued by the Department of Home Affairs from time to time. Existential liminality is caused by the uncertain legal status that permeates all aspects of immigrants' lives and delimits their range of action in different spheres. This includes jobs, transnational capabilities, business, family, housing and schooling for their children. The being or personhood of people stuck in between place; their everyday life is in a limbo. Existential liminality is contrasted to Turner's (1967) ritual liminality in that it is not voluntary, but I agree with Turner that it may not be resolved in a generational lifetime.

To examine the cause of this chronic liminal condition, I focus mainly on one feature of Weber's model of bureaucracy, documents. Max Weber (1978) developed his theory of modern bureaucracy with six principles deriving from his idea of rational-legal authority. The six principles can be summed up as "fixed and jurisdictional areas, the principle of office hierarchy and levels of authority, management of office based on written

documents, expert trainings for office management, full working capacity and the management of office based on written rules” (Weber, 1978:218). Looking at Weber’s principles, one factor that remains highly relevant today is that of written documents. Heyman (2004) notes that files are records that are used to track people and places. Hull (2012:256) further notes that “the best way in dealing with documents is to precisely look through them in order to address the ethnographic narratives about scene and events that were not directly observed by researchers because documents construct objects, subjects and socialites”.

Anthropologists have studied various documents such as forms, files, registers, petitions, maps, photos, signatures, seals, stamps and other graphic artefacts among others (Hull, 2003; Charrow, 1982; Latour, 1999; Saumarez Smith, 1985; Silverstein and Urban, 1996; Weber, 1978). However, in this thesis I draw attention to a different type of file that controls the life of a migrant; a permit/visa which migrants often refer to as a paper/document. Menjívar (2006:1000) notes that an immigrants’ legal status shapes “who they are, how they relate to others, their participation in local communities, and their continued relationship with their homelands”. Akhil Gupta (2012) commenting on Hull’s (2012) work on the use of papers in planning in Islamabad argues that documents should be studied in what they enable people to do, and their materiality limits their possible uses and their possible users. If we take the paper as a thing, Arjun Appadurai (1998:5) argues “...
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...we have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories. It is only through the analysis of these trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions and calculations that enliven things. Thus, even though from a theoretical point of view human actors encode things with significance, from a methodological point of view it is the things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social context”.

Cabot (2012) also notes that the materiality of documents as things is that they enable and foreclose various legal, political and social futures. Along the same lines, I am interested in the effect of the presence or absence of the document on the lived experience of the immigrant; how the document is acquired; processes of renewing it, the extent to which documents lead to the inclusion of migrants, and how conditions on the document orients a person towards the future.

The main paper/permit/visa of focus is DZP which was acquired when the South African government sought to regularize the residence status of undocumented Zimbabweans following an unprecedented influx. The DZPs incorporated some Zimbabwean migrants into mainstream society and formerly undocumented persons were granted temporary legal status. In this thesis the DZP permit and its variants, the ZSP and ZEP gave Zimbabwean migrants a status of uncertainty whereby they have had to straddle between experiences of being documented and undocumented at varying stages.

In rites of passage, the first phase of separation entails detachment of the individual from a set of cultural conditions (Turner, 1967). Likewise, this thesis first looks at why Zimbabwean migrants left their home country. I then look at their settlement and labour experiences in South Africa as undocumented migrants. The decision to cross the Limpopo River into South Africa marks the beginning of liminality which for many people never comes to an end. Some people occupied a liminal space in that they were separated from friends and family but did not have a friend or relative in South Africa. Others did not have a place to stay and had no resources to go back to their country of origin. More so, by virtue of being undocumented, the migrants occupied a physical space in no man's land. The migrants were no longer in Zimbabwe, but not legal in South Africa as they did not have residence permits. In this transitional period, I look at their experiences such as harassment by police officers, underpayment and exploitation at work places, with no recourse to law as they were rightless because no law existed for them as undocumented migrants (Arendt, 1979:375).

I then focus on how Zimbabwean migrants were incorporated in South Africa through the obligatory rite of passage that Zimbabwean migrants went through en masse through the DZP process. This rite de passage was not only about queuing at Home Affairs offices but the understanding of one's status meant Home Affairs had to be endured (Sutton et al, 2011). The act of applying for a DZP was a set of life processes and routines of repeatedly travelling to Home Affairs offices, learning the workings of the lines (queues) and experiencing harassment, victimization by criminals and security officials – all of which could not be avoided or averted. Those legalised through DZP were able to access to the labour market where some gained some experience and started entrepreneurial ventures. The documents upgraded people's status to a condition of legal personhood, putting an end to a condition that made them vulnerable to exploitation, under employment and constant fear of the police (Gordillo, 2006).

In the subsequent chapters, I look at the limitations of incorporation by demonstrating how legal residence permits do not guarantee economic equality in the host country. I argue that while documentation of migrants matters in that it guaranteed legal status, it did not account for full inclusion. The DZPs made them liminal citizens in that they got political citizenship by virtue of being documented, but at the same time, the migrants do not enjoy full citizenship status economically. The thesis shows that there are other legal prescriptions that determine company registration, business accounts, lines of credit and business permits. I also pay particular attention to the experiences of people between applications for renewal of permits from ZSP to ZEP, in particular, the period between application and adjudication. ZEP applicants have lived in South Africa for more than a decade, which is long enough to accumulate capital to be fully incorporated in the host economy. However, the conditions of special permits link documents to places. The conditions that: (1) the ZSP and ZEP do not allow change of status of permit, (2) that they are not renewable and (3) do not grant holders permission to apply for permanent residence regardless of period of stay in South Africa has cultivated

temporality which makes them see homes apart from Zimbabwe as temporary living spaces rather than permanent homes (Briseno, 2017).

1.2. Liminality

Turner developed his theory of liminality from Arnold van Gennep's theory of rites of passage. Van Gennep defined *rites de passage* as "rites which accompany every change of place, state, social position and age" (cited in Turner, 1967: 94). Van Gennep suggested that individuals in society go through a series of passage from one age to another. Examples of rites are pregnancy, birth, marriage and death. Birth is transition to life and funerals transition to death (Bigger, 2009). The passages can be divided into three phases namely: separation (pre-liminal), transition (liminal) and incorporation (post liminal). This thesis is mainly concerned with the liminal phase. The first phase involved the detachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions, or from both (Turner, 1967).

In the "liminal" period, the characteristics of "the ritual subject are ambiguous; he passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state" (Turner, 1967:96). In reaggregation or reincorporation, "the passage is consummated and the ritual subject is in a relatively stable state once more and, by virtue of this, has rights and obligations vis-a-vis others of a clearly defined and structural type; he is expected to behave in accordance with certain customary norms and ethical standards binding on incumbents of social position in a system of such positions" (Turner, 1967:96). Van Gennep compared rites of passage to territorial rites of passages. For instance, one presenting their passport entreat the point of entry into another country (Daniel, 2009).

Turner popularized liminality by looking at how other thresholds were experienced through the examination of rituals to determine their underlying function in the community. According to Turner (1967:95),

Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial...Thus, liminality is frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon... Their behaviour is normally passive or humble; they must obey their instructors implicitly, and accept arbitrary punishment without complaint.

Daniel (2009:161) notes that in the liminal phase, "One will have left the earlier status, but will not have attained the new one to which he aspires. It is a state without a defined status. It is meant to prepare the person for hardships of life through virtues which help ameliorate them". Toedorescu and Walker (1997) note that the individual confronts three stages in the liminal phase: the uncertainty of ambiguous state, the possibility to adapt to new norms, rules and values, and the third being integration. Fischer-Lichte (2005:38) adds that "the state of liminality allows for many other kinds of transgression and accordingly for new, sometimes shocking, confusing, horrible, and unbearable experiences".

Turner (1967) believed that rites of passage are not limited to the movement between ascribed statuses such as those associated with birth, marriage and death. He used liminality to understand riots, theatre, history, political gatherings and sexual orientation. Bigger (2009) notes that by doing so, Turner adapted into a general program far removed from the intention of the originator which has resulted in a range of confusions. For example, Turner used the concept of liminality to explain the solving of social

disputes. Bigger (2002) argues that other studies in anthropology were capable of more dynamic interpretation of disputes.

Van Gennep's (1909:xxv) invited readers to check his theory by "applying the conceptual scheme of rites of passage to data in his own realm of study" cited in Hockey (2002). Turner (1967:10) also called for investigators of culture "to focus their attention on the phenomena and processes of mid-transition". This has resulted in various disciplines using liminality to enrich understandings and analysis of various cases of cultural positioning.

Bruce et al (2014) highlight stories of their participants with HIV who were alive but not living upon realizing they had been reduced to managing illness. Blows et al (2012) note that women who go for pap smear tests assuming they are normal enter an ambiguous situation wherein they are neither healthy nor sick until scan results come back. Johnson and Sørensen (2012:324) note that training programs to promote employees to managers resemble transitional rites. The candidates are removed from the ordinary work environment and enter assessment centres. This places them in a limbo in which newcomers are neither in their old roles nor in their new ones until the trainee program concludes and the employee gets new status. Degan and Hill (1991) argue that PhD students writing dissertations in Sociology embark on a liminal journey that is dangerous because the path is laden with challenges and obstacles such as unforeseen rivalries, enemies, bureaucratic traps and myriad opportunities for self-doubt.

Hockey (2002:312) argues that van Gennep's model offered an all-encompassing model to earlier more complicated models of ritual behaviour which had been based neither on the entire sequence of ritual action nor the study of rituals in relation to another. He avoided a law like a model by offering a schema which allows overwhelming details of ritual practices to yield up their commonalities. Turner and Turner (1978: 2-3) argue that by identifying liminality, "van Gennep discovered a major

innovative dimension of the social for liminality cannot be limited to traditional rites of passages in which it was first identified". However, van Gennep's model also had limitations. Hockey (2002) notes that authors concerned with difficulties experienced by bereaved people have identified the lack of an extended period of liminality as highly problematic for example the ambiguous period between wife and widow.

Following Turner's analysis, Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa have had the experience of "transitional beings," who are "neither one thing or another; or maybe both; or neither here nor there; or maybe nowhere . . . and are at the very least 'betwixt and between' all the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification" (Turner 1967: 96). The "betwixt-and-between" exposed by Turner's analysis captures the lives of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. Van Gennep compared rites of passages to territorial rites of passages such as one presenting a passport when entering into another country. In this study, I argue that territorial rites of passage involve not only presenting a passport at the point of entry but involve applying for a residence permit and abiding by the conditions of the permit. In Turner's conceptualization, liminality is temporal, located in pre-liminal and post liminal phase. In this thesis, Zimbabwean migrants had been in a state of chronic liminality from the time they crossed the border. I retain the original conceptualization of liminality as "in between and uncertainty", but destabilise the notion that liminality is temporary by discussing how it can be experienced on a permanent basis (Johnsen and Sørensen, 2015). I also retain that in the liminal state, the performing subject experiences "shocking, confusing, horribleunbearable experiences" (Fischer-Lichte, 2005:38).

Some scholars have also argued that liminality is not temporary. In their discussion on pervasive liminality, Bruce et al (2014) explain that discrete experiences overlap and fluctuate over time. Johnsen and Sørensen (2015) note that a constant threshold without any stable ground prior to and after is permanent liminality. Moran (2013) notes that disabled people live in a permanent state of liminality as they are suspended

between “the sick role and normality”, between “wrong and right bodies” which prevents any social incorporation.

This thesis examines the lives of Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa as characterized by chronic liminality. Using the concept of liminality provide insight on subjective experiences in liminal spaces and on ways in which governments “create architectures of exclusion and containment of the ‘other’ in the contemporary world” (O’Reilly, 2018:16). The experiences in South Africa are in a long line of liminal injustices in the lives of Zimbabweans which start in their home country as the rights of citizenship were not afforded to them because of the daily experience of hunger, poverty, lack of access to water and of electricity, brutalities at the hands of security services.

In their early days in South Africa, the migrants lived in a state of illegality because they were undocumented, lacked classification, were deprived of legal status and vulnerable in all aspects. The amnesty from deportation and application for DZP was a space between deportability and legal residence status while the application process itself was full of danger. There is no doubt that immigration status makes a difference. It provides avenues of protection and for accessing rights but also puts an end to a condition that makes migrants vulnerable as animals (Gordillo, 2006; Bloch 2010). Having a residence permit is a prerequisite for migrants to make any claim against the state and other agencies such as banks. I argue that the new status did not enable full incorporation but made them liminal citizens in that it did not give them “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to standards prevailing in the society” (Somers and Roberts, 2008:386).

More so, when DZPs were renewed, the ZSP and ZEP came with the condition that holders of the special permit were not allowed change of status to other permit categories, unless if they applied for such from their home country, Secondly, the

special permits are not renewable and do not allow holders to apply for permanent residence regardless of their period of stay in South Africa. By giving these conditions, the permits “recreates an excluded population and ensures its continued vulnerability and precariousness by creating grey areas of uncertainty, with the potential to affect broader issues of citizenship and belonging” (Menjívar, 2006:1001). The conditions of the permits thrust migrants into abjection as “the possibility of realizing one’s full and proper personhood was indefinitely suspended in the host land” (Worby, 2008: 430). The conditions in the permits have created “the sense of which the promise of *migration* had been betrayed and the people are thrown in the full circle of humanity, thrown back into the ranks of the underclass and cast down into a world of rags” (Ferguson, 1999: 236). The permits make the migrants see their host land as a temporary living space rather than permanent homes.

1.3. Background

Historically, people used to migrate in and out of Zimbabwe (Crush & Tevera, 2010). However, from the year 2000, it became a country typified by mass migration due to a crisis period. This period was characterised by political violence and economic decline (Raftopoulos, 2009:202). Political violence manifested itself in the “imprisonment of opposition supporters, repression of the electorate by security forces and ruling party militia, death of opposition officials and supporters, thousand politically motivated beatings and the displacement people mainly in rural areas” (Bratton, 2011:359). The consequence of this is that it “created a society traumatized by fear, withdrawal and collective depression based on memories of violence, intimidation and harassment” (Sachikonye, 2011: xvii).

Economic decline was characterised by massive unemployment, majority of people living below poverty datum line, chronic shortages of fuel, electricity, water and non-availability of basic commodities as supermarkets shelves were empty (Tarisayi,

2009:19). More so, the health sector was characterised by a shortage of drugs and brain drain of skilled personnel while poor remuneration pushed many health professionals to resign en masse thus creating a vacancy rate of over seventy percent (Tarisayi, 2009:19).. The country's GDP also "shrank from an estimated US\$9 billion in 1997 to estimated US\$ 4 billion by 2008 and a debt burden constituting 120 percent of the country's GDP" (Sachikonye, 2012:85;104). In September 2008, Zimbabwe's inflation reached a stratospheric level of about 222 million per cent. By February 2009, a crate of eggs cost two trillion Zimbabwean dollars (Z\$2 000 000 000 000).

Dendere (2015:11) notes that because of the political and economic crisis, "Men left their wives and children. Young people gave up on their dreams; those who did not quit school altogether gave up on their dreams to become engineers and doctors and instead fought for positions as gardeners, cleaners and nurse aids in foreign countries". Zimbabweans are scattered in many countries beyond the Southern African region such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and United Kingdom among others. Migrants in these countries were usually drawn from the elite and middle class who could afford long-distance flights and had professional qualifications and contacts necessary to make the journey (McGregor, 2010). Within the region, most Zimbabweans are found in South Africa even though some are found in other neighbouring countries (McGregor, 2010).

1.4. Problem Statement

Zimbabweans make up the largest group of African foreign nationals in South Africa, having been pushed to leave their home country due to skyrocketing inflation, impoverishment and violence from the state (McGregor, 2010; Crush & Tevera, 2010). Their existence as a major migrant community in South Africa has been widely documented. Themes examined in literature include abuse of Zimbabweans in South Africa, xenophobia, challenges in keeping families together, urban food insecurity

amongst Zimbabwean immigrants, challenges in securing employment, challenges in obtaining Home Affairs documents, policy responses by the South African government to migration from Zimbabwe and challenges in accessing health services in public hospitals (Manjengenga, 2014; Crush & Tawodzera, 2014; Rutherford, 2010; Kriger, 2010, Crush & Tawodzera, 2016; Crush, Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2012). These various themes of research “confirm that migration from Zimbabwe is a complex, dynamic and increasingly diverse phenomenon” (Crush and Tawodzera, 2016: 1). More so, these studies have provided insights on the experiences of Zimbabweans in South Africa, but there are still some notable gaps that require further exploration, exposition and theorisation.

In a review of migration literature on Zimbabweans in South Africa and the United Kingdom, McGregor (2010:27) noted the lack of studies on Zimbabwean diaspora entrepreneurs. The study participants are Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs involved in agro-processing, transport and logistics, information technology, transport, education, accounting, remittances among others.. Rogerson and Mushawemhuka (2015:140) argue that “South Africa and Zimbabwe represents a modest opening up for of empirical research and debates around the south to south forms of transnational entrepreneurship”. The study began with the intention of studying entrepreneurs and their activities. However, I realized that the people were linking their experiences to life with or without permits regardless of the specific questions asked. At the time of the interviews, the migrants were waiting for ZEP adjudications and the waiting itself was a form of legal suspension. Some of them received their ZEP permits in September 2018 after having applied for them between October and December 2017. As I listened to them, it seemed the special permits and their effects emerged as a paramount theme. Using a sample of twenty seven entrepreneurs, this study decided to focus on the people and their relationship to permits to highlight “the enduring power of the nation-state in creating immigration laws that shape immigrant liminal legality” (Menjívar,

2006:1003). It is imperative to emphasise that entrepreneurialism and its' success stories still matter deeply to the analysis, even though papers came to be an important hinge for understanding liminality.

1.5. Research Questions

The main research question is

How do uncertain legal statuses affect the lives of Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa?

The sub questions are

- What political and economic factors led to the exodus of Zimbabweans from their home country?
- What processes were involved in acquiring Dispensation Zimbabwe Permits and what subjectivities did they reproduce?
- How did the waiting for ZEP permits affect the lives of the applicants?
- How do conditions imposed in ZEP permits influence their belonging towards South Africa?

1.6. Justification of the Study

Studies on Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa focus largely on people who are undocumented and how the undocumented are denied fundamental human rights and other social entitlements such as accessing health care, work opportunities, schooling and preserving family identity (Kriger, 2010; Crush & Tawodzera, 2014; Manjengenja, 2014; Makandwa, 2014). This rapidly expanding body of research confirms that

migration from Zimbabwe is a complex, dynamic and increasingly diverse phenomenon (Crush and Tawodzera, 2016: 1). However, all these studies see papers/permits as giving immediate access to social services, but precisely how the document affect the life of immigrants post regularisation is relatively unknown. Many scholars stop at the argument at that documentation of migrants will help in social and economic inclusion.

Most studies on migration do not extend their arguments beyond the perspective that documents matter because they simply see them as giving immediate access to social and economic rights. In this thesis, I do not only examine how a condition of being an undocumented immigrant shapes aspects of immigrants' lives but I further examine experiences in acquiring the DZP and how the conditions in its successor permits have an impact on the lives, business and the future of their children. The examination of the lives of Zimbabwean migrants through the lens of chronic liminality "lay bare crucial aspects of immigrant life essential for theorizing about immigrant incorporation, exclusion, citizenship and belonging, that lie at the core of varied forms of assimilation" (Menjívar 2006: 1008). Chapter eight, for example, uncovers various challenges faced by migrants as a result of conditions imposed in their permits showing how some Zimbabwean migrants are caught between here and there, in a psychological space of undecided belonging to divided geographies and cultural identities (David Ip, 2011). The examination of this ambiguity bring to the fore state power in shaping and regulating the lives of immigrants.

Multiple studies have analysed Zimbabwean migrant experiences as characterized mainly by hardship, exclusion and distress. These studies adopt a structuralist position and underestimate the capabilities of human actions in times of crisis. Crush and Tevera (2010:2) notes that Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa as a whole are denigrated, devalued and marginalised. Methodologically, these studies are dominated by quantitative techniques. This study employs ethnographic methods and other qualitative techniques that "elicit the perspectives and experiences of immigrants

themselves and evoke the kind of densely descriptive and textured interpretive representations of daily life that anthropologists tend to relish” (Genova, 2002:421). Hammar and Rodgers (2008:361) point to the importance of examining the agency and multiple positionalities of different actors associated with displacement and trace how they turn their agency into practice. Hammar (2014:4) calls for the critical examination of economies that emerge from displaced people combining political economy and cultural sensibilities not just the economy in the classic sense. Giddens (1984) points out in his structuration theory that structure and agency are mutually dependent and internally related. In other words, there exists a layered interlocking of spaces: involving distress and entrepreneurship, opportunities and exclusions (Mbiba, 2011:55).

There is surprisingly little scholarly research on the DZP and its successor permits, the ZSP and ZEP. Scholarship that directly addresses the DZP can be divided roughly into two categories. The first focused on the application process for DZP (Amit, 2011; Amit & Kriger, 2014). The second provides humanitarian grounds for DZP (Bimha, 2017; Thebe, 2016; Moyo, 2018). There is limited focus on the experiences of people in acquiring DZP and its successor replacements. After the introduction of DZP, the South African government offered similar special permits to migrants from Lesotho and Angola as well on same conditions as Zimbabwe Special Permits. Examining a case study of one of the special permits can shed light on the realities of living with temporary legal status. Zimbabwe presents a pertinent case as its immigrants are the only ones who have the received a special permit in South Africa that had been replaced twice.

1.7. Outline of the study

Chapter 1: Introduction of study, background, justification and problem statement

Chapter 2. I explain how data collection took place and how the analysis of data was approached. It demonstrates how ethnographic interviewing and participant observation

were used for data collection. The chapter also shows how the Zimbabwe Excellence Awards made it easier to find research participants.

Chapter 3. I explain the demographic characteristics of participants and their different ventures in South Africa.

Chapter 4: This chapter provides political and economic crises that forced people to be separated from their home country Zimbabwe. I trace it back to the early 1990s starting with the structural adjustment program, war vets pay-out and the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as an opposition political party in 1999, which triggered violence and other populist economic policies. I relate these challenges to push factors cited as reasons for leaving home by the interview participants.

Chapter 5: This chapter focuses on transitional experiences of Zimbabwean migrants when they entered South Africa. It also examines their labour markets experiences as undocumented migrants. I argue in this chapter that Zimbabwean migrants occupied a liminal space in that they were no longer in their home country, but not legal in South Africa, which exposed them to precarious labour experiences.

Chapter 6: This chapter explores the incorporation of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa through the special permits. I argue in this chapter that the incorporation process was a liminal process that involved a lot of waiting and queuing as individuals generally had to queue, often over several days. The queues were also liminal in terms of physical space- migrants in the queue were in a legal no-man's land, whereby they were no longer in their home country, and those that failed to apply for the DZP became eligible for deportation.

Chapter 7: This chapter focuses on the experiences of Zimbabwean migrants between application for replacement of permits and adjudication of permits. In particular, I look at

the period between ZSP and ZEP. I argue that the Zimbabwean migrants in question had their legality suspended while waiting to get replacement permits.

Chapter 8: Looks at the various challenges that Zimbabweans face on account of their foreign origin. The concept of liminal citizenship is applied to the analysis of ways in which legally resident aliens are discriminated against by laws which determine spaces for insiders and outsiders.

Chapter: 9 This chapter looks at notions of home and belonging by focusing on attitudes towards return. I look at how ZSP and ZEP conditions cultivate temporality.

Chapter 10: This chapter summarises the study and sets out conclusions from the research.



2. Chapter Two: Methodology

2.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the research approach, design and methods adopted for the study. It also provides explanations regarding the choice of approaches adopted in the analysis of the empirical data. Ethnographic interviewing and participant observation were used for data gathering because “they allow researchers to document how persons simultaneously maintain and shed cultural repertoires and identities, interact within a location and across its boundaries, and act in ways that are in concert with or contradict their values over time” (Levitt and Schiller, 2004:1013). Therefore qualitative methods and their reliance on establishing trust are good for this study. Geertz (1973: 10) notes that qualitative studies must be able “to capture the microscopic details of the social and cultural aspects of human life”. Qualitative studies involve asking questions such as how and why of human interactions (Agee, 2009). The emphasis in qualitative research is on documenting the everyday experiences of individuals by observing or interviewing them (Basit, 2003).

2.2. Fieldwork

MacGaffey and Bazenguisa-Ganga (2000:19) note that fieldwork is an active practice of anthropology which is a form of social engagement and does not constitute a secluded withdrawal from academia and it is the way in which anthropologists connect directly with social reality. Interviews were done from January to August 2018 with Zimbabwean migrants who see themselves as ‘entrepreneurs’ in the various suburbs of Cape Town, namely Bellville, Maitland, Platterkloof, Platterkloof Glen, Joe Slovo, Epping, Goodwood, Wynberg, Somerset West, Kuils River, Parow, Brooklyn, Kensington, Milnerton, Parklands, Brackenfell and Cape Town city centre. As the study was in Cape Town, I stayed at my university campus residence and would drive to meet participants

after making an appointment. Most of the interviews were done at their homesteads, business offices or at restaurants.

Cape Town serves as the legislative capital of South Africa. Statistics on the number of migrants in particular, Zimbabwean migrants living in Cape Town and South Africa in general, is not readily available due to poor record keeping and clandestine movements given the proximity of the countries. Not all Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa used ports of entry to cross into South Africa. The fact that Zimbabwe shares a border with South Africa further complicates the matter as some people are “permanent circulatory migrants”. Some reside in South Africa but visit Zimbabwe when their visitor’s visas are about to expire, in order to regularise their stay and evade being classified as illegal.

Being Zimbabwean made it easier for me to gain access to the target population. I got short waiting periods between making contact and holding interviews. Rarely was an interview appointment cancelled. As MacGaffey and Bazenguisa-Ganga (1999:18) note, the urban researcher must select certain activities, anchors and locations as the anchor points of fieldwork. All names used in the thesis are pseudonyms. The first person I interviewed added me to a group of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs on the Telegram social media platform and I would inbox people asking for interview appointments. The person runs an online clothing shop and a private college where lessons are based on Zimbabwe’s national primary and secondary school curricula, to cater for children who struggle to get places in South African public schools. This group had 40 members when I joined, but some of the people in that group were based in other cities such as Johannesburg and Durban. I would send them messages with the following words:

“Hello, my name is Shingirai Nyakabawu. I am a PhD student at the University of the Western Cape. For my PhD, I am focusing on Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape Town. I was asking if I could interview you for my study if possible”.

I usually forwarded the message to five people at the same time. Some would respond that they are not in Cape Town, but Johannesburg. Others advised me that they are just starting and do not have much information at the time. For those that agreed to be interviewed, the maximum waiting period I was given was not more than 48 hours. Some of them were available to be interviewed within the next hour. I managed to interview 10 people whom I got hold of through this social media platform. This was in March 2018.

I kept a research diary throughout the fieldwork process where I recorded the address of the interview, duration, observations made during interviews and personal reflections. The importance of the diary was to reflect on the appropriateness of my research questions and how I could improve or rephrase questions in the next interview. After I interviewed the first ten people, I found the description of migrant entrepreneurs as self-employed migrants problematic. Some who had ventures I considered successful were full-time employees for other companies as the last section of this chapter will show. As a result, the questions in qualitative research do also change in the process of research to reflect understanding of the problem (Creswell, 2007).

In April 2018, the nominees for the 2018 excellence awards were announced on Facebook. The Facebook page of excellence awards provided the names of the nominees, a short background of what the entrepreneur is doing, and his/her contact number, email or website. I then called or emailed them to ask if I could interview them for my study. I would in turn ask them to refer me to other entrepreneurs that they know. I managed to interview 17 people who were nominated for the awards.

I also searched for nominees for the 2017 awards on the internet. Some of the nominees for the 2017 awards were again nominated for 2018. The only major difference was that for the 2018 awards, nominees included entrepreneurs from other cities in South Africa such as Johannesburg and Durban. I attended an exhibition by

Zimbabwe entrepreneurs on 23 April 2018 at Belmont Square in Rondebosch. I also attended the Zimbabwe Excellence Awards ceremony on 26 May 2018 at the same venue.

Bender and Winer (2001:1) remind us that “research and academic endeavour have to respond to the urgency of contemporary developments worldwide to help us understand how people in a turbulent place create a sense of place, belonging, loss and negation”. I realized that about 15 people that I interviewed were trying to form a cooperative company looking to invest in Zimbabwe. I attended about eight of their meetings, during which we debated a draft constitution. The company was eventually registered and a bank account was opened.

2.3. Life Histories

I utilized life history interviews to capture the experiences of Zimbabweans in Cape Town. The interviews were in the language of choice of the participants mainly English and Shona, which I also speak. The location of each interview was determined by the choice of each participant. I did open-ended interviews as they minimise interventions and allowed respondents to tell their own stories. The interviews were open ended in nature which made it possible for the participants “to generate, challenge, clarify, elaborate or decontextualize the nature of their transnational engagements, but also their way of living in the host country and their relationship with fellow Zimbabweans” (Mupakati, 2014:83). Most of the interviews were conducted at participants’ work stations. Even though I had an interview guide with questions, respondents were allowed to talk about their life histories in an open-ended way based on the following themes: demographic characteristics such as hometown, year of emigration, reason for emigration; life in South Africa, how, when and why they ventured into entrepreneurship; challenges they face in entrepreneurship; how they use social networks and whether they will return to Zimbabwe in future. In a review of migration literature on

Zimbabweans in South Africa and the United Kingdom, McGregor (2010:27) noted the lack of studies on Zimbabwean diaspora entrepreneurs and I decided to focus on them. However, I realised that people link their experiences to life with or without permits regardless of the specific questions asked.

The interview guide was also adjusted after interviewing the first five people by eliminating questions that seemed irrelevant and adding other questions that were emerging. Two interviews were done at a restaurant. All participants were comfortable in being recorded. One person before the interview demanded my proof of registration and ethical clearance before I could go out to meet him. He assumed that I was an intelligence operative. This was understandable since he had left Zimbabwe because his friend was murdered by the police at the University of Zimbabwe.

Dhunpath (2000:343-344) notes that life histories prefigure traditional conceptions of epistemology which are concerned with a quest for universal truth. Many cultures across the world “have a long tradition of telling stories from one generation to the next, from father to son, from mother to daughter” (Germeten, 2013:612). In life history research, researchers study and analyse how people talk about their lived experiences and events within the social contexts they inhabit (Dhunpath, 2003). Noddings (1990: 280) who advocates for the use of life history methodology notes:

“Stories are powerful research tools. They provide us with a picture of real people in real situations struggling with real problems. They banish the indifference generated by samples, treatments and faceless subjects. They invite us to speculate on what might be changed and with what effect. And of course, they remind us of our persistent fallibility. Most importantly, they invite us to remember that we are in the business of teaching, learning and researching to improve the human condition”.

This method has been used successfully by other authors (MacGaffey & Bazenguisa-Ganga, 2000; Ong, 1999; Meagher, 1999; Stoller, 2002; Mbiba, 2011). Portes et al (1999: 220) note that a study that begins “with the history and activities of individuals is the most efficient way of learning about the institutional underpinnings of transnationalism and its structural effects”. From data collected by interviews, it “becomes possible to delineate the networks that make transnational enterprises possible, identify the transnational entrepreneurs’ counterparts in the home country and garner information to establish the aggregate structural effects of these activities” (Portes et al, 1999: 220).

MacGaffey and Bazenguisa-Ganga (2000:20) argue that life histories have the advantage of revealing dissonance voices. Portes et al (1992:220) argue that the choice of individuals is also motivated by the fact that “entrepreneurial activities were not initiated by actions or policies of governments, national or local. Nor were they the brainchild of large corporate managers”. Instead, these activities “are commonly developed in reaction to governmental policies and to the condition of dependent capitalism fostered on weaker countries, as immigrants and their families sought to circumvent the permanent subordination to which these conditions condemned them” (ibid). Chen and Tan (2009:1082) noted that at the individual level, factors such as “human capital, cultural capital, firm age and size and immigration experience should be taken into account”.

Dhunpath (2003:544) suggests that life histories approach “is probably the only authentic means of understanding how practices reflect the intersection of institutional and individual experience”. Life histories provide “rich information through their open-ended format, giving the researcher more information he/she may not have set out to explore in the beginning” (Marquez and Paddilla, 2004:16). MacGaffey and Bazenguisa-Ganga (2000:20) argue that life history as a methodological tool has “the advantage of

revealing dissonant voices, changing views or varying perspectives of persons of different classes and religions”.

Life histories and other forms of writing enable the reconstruction and interpretation of subjectively meaningful features and critical episodes in entrepreneurs’ lives. The focus following the life histories approach is not on the actual accuracy of the story constructed, but on the meaning, it has for the respondent (Dhunpath, 2000). In this regard, it is also constructivist since the story is a composition of construed meanings and self-representation (Dhunpath, 2000). The intensely individual nature of a person’s experience enables the researcher to gather a lot of data and hear diverse experiences.

In constructing life histories, people usually select critical incidents in their lives. In this study, I asked people about their life histories from their background in Zimbabwe up until the day I interviewed them. Van Hear (2003:51) argues that migrants are people with a “baggage of migratory cultural capital and this involves stories from the dreams of a search for a better life, to the process of arrival in the host country”. The gathering of data through life histories may be said to be interactionist “since human behaviour always results from a meaningful interaction with the social and cultural environment and with other actors” (Dhunpath, 2000:346). When people are telling their stories and other kind of narratives, “they are engaged in a perpetual activity that organises data into a special pattern which represents and explains experience” (Bruner, 1990 cited in Dhunpath, 2000:346).

I stopped interviewing people when I felt I was experiencing data saturation. Glaser and Strauss (1967) introduced the concept of data saturation in qualitative research to refer to the point in data collection where one feels that there is no new data that can develop aspects of a conceptual category. Francis et al (2010:1230) note that “the idea of data saturation is a very useful guide to in which the appropriate size is a function of the purpose of the study and complexity, range and distribution of experiences or views of

interest, rather than statistical parameters used in quantitative research”. Sample size is also important in that the use of sample sizes that are larger than needed is an ethical issue as they waste research funds and participants’ time.

2.4. Participant Observation

Participant observation is one of the methods of gathering data in anthropology. Bryan and Burgess (1999:xvii) note that participant observation is generally described as “the process by which the researcher immerses him/herself in a social context with the aim of pursuing an empathetic understanding of the meanings and systems of participants to see the world from their viewpoint”.

I attended an exhibition by Zimbabwean entrepreneurs at Belmont square on 23 April 2018 and to get an overview of what other Zimbabwean entrepreneurs were doing in Cape Town. Levitt and Schiller (2004:1013) note that “observation and ethnographic interviewing allow researchers to document how people simultaneously maintain and shed cultural repertoires and identities, interact with location and across its boundaries and act in ways that are in concert with or contradict their values over time”. I also attended the Zimbabwe Excellence Awards ceremony on 26 May 2018 at Belmont Square. However, I depended highly on the life histories derived from interview conversations. Finally, the thesis also made use of Home Affairs announcements and general discourse from the state as data to show how the Home Affairs discourses contribute to liminality.

2.5. Data Analysis

Data analysis is the most difficult and most important aspect of qualitative research (Basit, 2003). It is not a discrete procedure only taken at the final stages of research. Data analysis began from the moment I started gathering data, until when I started

making sense of what I was told by participants. I then decided the codes I was going to use to explain the phenomena. After collecting data, all interviews were transcribed in English. Data analysis was aided by a computer assisted software Atlas.ti. Basit (2003: 144) notes that qualitative data analysis software substitutes “the slow process of manual searching and filing as the software programs take over the marking up, cutting, sorting, reorganising and collecting tasks qualitative researchers used to do with scissors and note cards”. I uploaded the transcribed data on to Atlas.ti. I coded the data in order to make sense of the data. Codes or categories “are tags or labels for allocating units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study” (Basit, 2003:148). Codes capture interesting information relevant to the research question (Clarke and Braun, 2017).

I created codes and phrases as I read through the data. Atlas.ti also allows the researcher to link external pages such as internet links, pictures audio and material relevant for the project. I was able to exploit the code group’s facility on Atlas.ti to group data into themes. These themes were then generated as reports which I saved and printed. The program was also advantageous in that I could code and uncode information or link it to other codes. I could also rename certain codes with time. The data was placed in thematic categories. I identified commonalities and uniqueness in data, contradictions as well as missing information in consideration of a research question. After grouping the data in code groups, Atlas.ti makes it easier to retrieve and manipulate data instead of browsing a lot of pages.

2.6. Ethical Issues

Agee (2009) notes that developing qualitative questions should include careful thought about how the direction of inquiry will position the researcher in relation to the participants. The researcher also has to be sensitive about the implications on participants’ lives. To avoid challenges that arise from studying undocumented

immigrants, I limited my focus to participants whose papers/visas/permits were in good standing. I also focused only on those engaging in legitimate businesses that are done according to the laws of the land. The participants reserved the right to withdraw from the research at any stage for any reason whatsoever. The identities of participants were protected by use of pseudonyms in the thesis write-up. Audio recordings of interviews were transcribed and then destroyed to eliminate the identification of participants. Respondents' consent was obtained through signed, informed consent forms. It was communicated to research participants that involvement in the study is voluntary and does not attract any remuneration. It was explained that findings of the study would be used for academic purposes only. Clearance to conduct the study was obtained from the University of the Western Cape Humanities and Social Sciences Research Committee.

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter outlined the research approach by highlighting how participants were approached and providing an overview of the data collection and data analysis processes. This study benefited mainly from the Zimbabwe Excellence Awards which made it easier to find participants. My identity as a Zimbabwean made it easier to approach potential participants. I did not struggle to interview participants as evidenced by the short waiting period between interview requests and the date of interviewing consenting participants. Rarely was an interview appointment cancelled. Only on one occasion was I suspected of being an intelligence operative and almost turned down. I also gained moral support while doing the interviews. Many people who are on temporary visas saw my study for doctorate as an opportunity to gain critical skills visa which enables one to apply for permanent residence. The research also benefited from meetings with some participants who were trying to set up a cooperative. By

participating in such I gained an understanding of issues relating to belonging and homeland orientation.

3. Chapter Three: Demographic Characteristics of Participants

3.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the distinct types of entrepreneurial ventures undertaken by participants. Unlike other studies in anthropology and sociology that focus on “informal economy” or marginal sectors of the economy (Stoller, 2002; Kate, 2002; Bazenguisa and McGaffey; Little, 2003; Jones, 2010; 2014), entrepreneurs who were interviewed in this study are involved in formal sectors of the economy in sectors such as agro processing, transport, information technology, transport, education, accounting and remittances, among others. By focusing on people with ventures in these sectors, this study also challenges established sociological and anthropological thinking that sees Africa as the cradle of the informal economy. Rogerson and Mushawemhuka (2015: 144) argue that there is still need to explore the activities of formal sector Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in South Africa.

3.2. Demographic profiles

In total I interviewed 28 people, seven of them being women. This is different from other studies such as those done by Makina et al (2007) where their gender breakdown was 41 percent female and 59 percent male and by Dendere (2015) where the breakdown was 50 percent female and 50 percent male. However, this should not be taken as an indication that there were more men than women, involved in entrepreneurship. For instance, I interviewed Kativhu who has a business that manufactures peanut butter. They buy peanuts as raw materials, roast them, clean them up, and grind them into a peanut butter paste. In the 2017 and 2020 edition of the Zimbabwe Excellence Awards,

his wife won an award for female entrepreneur of the year. The point here is that rather than focusing on gender differences, it is best to see such business activities as family businesses. One of the women I interviewed was a referral from her husband who told me that she is the one who does the marketing, accounts and administration of their business. The husband advised me that she knows everything about what he does and his experiences.

In terms of age, the respondents were between the ages of 22 and 42. Most of them exited Zimbabwe between the ages of 17 and 26, after completing secondary school. While some left in the early 2000s, the majority left Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2008. This age range in Africa experience 'waithood' which refers to a prolonged period of suspension when young people's access to social adulthood is delayed due to failed neo-liberal economic policies, bad governance and political instability (Honwana, 2013: 2433). While chronological age may have defined them as adults, their inability to attain the social markers of adulthood such as earning a living, being independent, establishing families, providing for their offspring and other relatives, and becoming taxpayers condemned them to a liminal space in which they were neither dependent children nor autonomous adults (Honwana, 2013: 2433). Dendere (2015:98) notes that the profiles of Zimbabwean emigrants is linked to the profiles of those opposed to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF); that is the young, urban, educated and unemployed. Most of the respondents did not have passports when they left Zimbabwe. Some of them used emergency travel documents which expired after two weeks from date of issue. Two people did not migrate directly from Zimbabwe. One first exited to Botswana in 2001 and then came to Cape Town when her husband got a lecturing job at one of the top universities in the city. The other one migrated from the United States of America (USA) when the company he was working for was establishing an office in Africa and he chose not to go back to the USA.

In terms of immigration status, twenty-three had Zimbabwe Exemption Permits, one had South African citizenship, two had a permanent residence and two had refugee status. The study did not intentionally select people with this status. The majority of responses captured in this thesis are from ZEP holders. If the experience of a person with another immigration status shed more light to a point raised by a ZEP holder, it was utilised. The study began with other objectives which changed during the fieldwork and data analysis process upon realizing that the majority of the people link their responses to the permits they held. I found out that, regardless of the specific questions asked, the special permits and their effects emerged as paramount in the immigrants' lives. This highlights "the enduring power of the nation-state in creating immigration laws that shape immigrant integration, playing a significant role in opportunities for work, rights, and social benefits" (Menjívar, 2006:1003).

In terms of educational qualifications, all participants had secondary school qualifications, whilst ten indicated that they had tertiary qualifications. Four participants had pursued further education in South Africa. When they finished high school, they could not afford to go to university in Zimbabwe due to economic hardship. One of them left university in Zimbabwe because his friend was murdered by the police at the institute. Most of the business owners who participated in the study had run some informal enterprises of their own prior to moving to South Africa. Reports of pre-migration entrepreneurship are plausible considering that from 2000 to 2008, the Zimbabwean economy had become informalised and many people survived the informal economy. All respondents had migrated from urban locations in Zimbabwe. This is consistent with findings by Dendere (2015) who noted that the the majority of participants in her study had migrated from Zimbabwe's urban areas.

3.3. Respondents Entrepreneurial ventures

Entrepreneurship entails bringing into existence new goods, services and raw materials (Shane, 2000: 451). Cope, Jack and Rose (2007: 214) argue that “the sustained interest in the subject of entrepreneurship by academics, practitioners and policy makers demonstrates that it is unlikely to be a fad”. The word entrepreneur is said to have French origins in its use by Cantillon in an article posthumously published in 1734. (Kates, 2015). Its use by Jean-Baptiste Say in 1803 in his *Traité* is the landmark moment when the word and its associated concept crossed into use amongst economics in French. According to Say, the entrepreneur “shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and greater yield” (Dees, 1998:1). Later Schumpeter defined an entrepreneur as someone who creates new products and services (Baumol, 1968). In all these classical references to entrepreneurs, “the essential ingredient at the heart is the market process” (Kates, 2015: 4).

Anthropologists and sociologists have always studied entrepreneurs. Max Weber’s (1930) book, the *Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism* speaks on religion, cultures and norms of entrepreneurial societies. In the *Argonauts of Western Pacific*, Malinowski (1922) describes and analyses the mesh of economic social relations that made up the Melanesian kula ring is also about entrepreneurship. From Malinowski’s time, anthropologists have studied various entrepreneurial activities such as exchange, the behaviours of hunter gatherers, industrial agriculture, and the informal economy, among others (Stoller, 2002, Hart, 1973, Bazenguisa and McGaffey, 1998; Little, 2003; Jones 2010; 2014). Saxenian (1994) uses the term “New Argonauts” to refer to foreign-born skilled entrepreneurs who travel back and forth between Silicon Valley in America and their home countries creating businesses. Transnational entrepreneurs are “entrepreneurs that migrate from one country to another, concurrently maintaining

business-related linkages with their former country of origin and currently adopted countries and communities” (Drori et al., 2009, 1001). I narrate the profile of a few entrepreneurial activities by Zimbabweans in detail by focusing on a few individuals.

3.2.1 Transport and Logistics

Many Zimbabweans that I interviewed are into what I call broadly transport. Edward for example has a driving school. He has two small cars for the code eight license, four trucks for code ten licenses and two heavy trucks for code fourteen licenses. Edward started his driving school in 2016. He also assists clients with preparations for the driving theory test.

Killian has a 30 ton haulage truck, a car on the e-hailing service called Uber in South Africa and a 13 seater omnibus which operates in Zimbabwe. He started the business as a back up as he was always getting one year work contracts. Killian is employed full time as a credit controller.

Charles has a furniture moving company. He operates in Cape Town, and to Johannesburg and Durban. He also transports furniture to parts of Mpumalanga, North West, Northern Cape and Eastern Cape provinces. In addition, Charles offers storage facilities and warehousing. He owns five 30 ton haulage trucks. He is a qualified accountant but focuses on the business on a full time basis.

Charles' trucks are serviced by Wellington who is into air brakes and fleet maintenance. Wellington is an airbrakes technician. Whereas small cars use brake fluid, airbrakes is the braking system for buses and haulage trucks. A compressor pumps the air and the pressure goes into the system to brake.

Shumba has got eleven tipper trucks. His company has 14 vehicles in total, excluding the cars that he and his wife drives. Shumba's tipper trucks are for hire to those in road

maintenance and construction. At the same time, Shumba buys sand from sand mines and delivers it to customers especially those who are building houses. In Zimbabwe, Shumba is involved in cattle husbandry. He acquired a farm through the fast track land reform program and is involved in cattle fattening.

3.2.2 Agro processing

Kativhu is a qualified chartered accountant who has a peanut butter manufacturing company. His factory buys peanuts as raw materials, roasts them, cleans them up, and grinds them into a peanut butter paste. The peanut butter products come in different flavours. These include smooth which is made up of just grounded nuts; crunchy which is fused with some nuts, cinnamon raisins flavour, chop chip flavour and then honey which is made from a mix of peanut butter and honey. Finally, there is a seed and nut flavour comprised of pumpkins seeds and other healthy seeds. Kativhu peanut butter is 100 percent peanuts which differentiates him from the majority of peanut on the South African market as it has no preservatives. His philosophy is that if its peanut butter, let it be just peanut butter.

The raw materials especially the peanuts are sourced from different parts of the world depending on the season and prevailing socio economic conditions. The latest batch of peanuts available in the production at time of interviews was ten tonnes of peanut kernels brought from Tanzania. Sometimes, the peanuts are sourced from Brazil, Malawi and Mozambique and in South Africa as well. However, in 2017 there was a huge challenge in Southern Africa and peanuts were really scarce due to drought conditions. Then, peanuts were coming from as far as India because there were limited supplies of peanuts from the southern African region. In 2018, the local supply of peanuts from South Africa was readily available as well because the harvest was good.

However, Kativhu does not directly source the peanuts. He buys them online from Alibaba.com which is one the largest e-commerce sites in the world. The founder of

Alibaba, Jack Ma is one of the richest people in the world. The agents whom he buys from are responsible for customs clearance. Some of these agents are in big organisations, and some have got farms. When I interviewed him, I came to understand that there are big organisations that focus on sourcing peanuts and would negotiate with farmers in different parts of the world. They spread the risk by negotiating with farmers all over the world. If the climate is not good in Southern Africa, they move to another region so that they do not run out of supply.

The machines that he uses to roast and grind the peanuts were bought overseas, particularly from China. He ordered them online at Alibaba.com as well. Kativhu has managed to make some good strides in terms of market penetration. At the time of the interview, Kativhu's peanut butter was available in some of the big retail stores in South Africa namely Spar, Pick,n'Pay, Wellness and Know How, and Faithful to Nature. In 2017, Kativhu won a national award for the Eskom Business Investment Competition. He came first in that competition on agro processing. In the same year again, Kativhu won an award from Western Cape Government. He was identified as the second best emerging business in the Western Cape Province. Kativhu also received a grant for his business from the Provincial Government. After getting the awards, Kativhu was interviewed on several media platforms including national television stations, SABC 3 and ETV, as well as the and China Television Network. This worked to boost his business and market access. At the time of interview, Kativhu had eight permanent employees. He took me through the production room. He showed me the recently received order of ten tonnes of peanuts. He explained to me how the process of roasting, grinding, and packaging was done in the workshop. In line with safety requirements in the production room, I was putting something on my head. There were about ten 300 litre containers full of processed peanut butter. There was also above 300 by 300ml peanut butter containers that were already packaged . Above all, Kativhu is a

qualified auditor, and works full time as a finance manager at a renewable energy company in Cape Town.

3.2.3 Crafts

Tanyaradzwa designs bags using used tea bags. She designs make up bags, baskets, pencil bags, clutch bags and lamp holder covers. Tanyaradzwa started working for a company that recycles tea bags in 2005 on a temporary basis in Houtbay, Cape Town. She lived in the informal settlement of Imizamo Yethu. She had problems with her work mates in that she could not speak Xhosa. Her employer decided to put her in a shop where goods are sold mainly to tourists as she was fluent in English. Tanyaradzwa was creative in her designs and the employer gave her an opportunity to create her own products that were also sold in the shop. The company she works for is registered with a tour guide. Many tourists who come to Cape Town and take tours pass through her work place. It is one of the stops on the Cape Town tour guide map. It attracts a number of customers, especially in summer. While she is still employed in this company, she has managed to employ three ladies who help her with her own designs.

Some of the bags that she makes are sold at the Waterfront Blue Shed Craft Market. Carine Khali a well-known Paris fashion designer who owns Ithemba designs in Paris liked her designs when she visited Cape Town and is buying directly from her. She continuously receives orders for her products from overseas. From 2017 to 2018, Tanyaradzwa has had over 25 radio interviews and more than 12 television interviews on SABC channels, ETV and BBC. These interviews which are available on the internet showcased her tea bag inspired designs which ended up being exported to France. In July 2018, I boarded a FlySAFair plane from Johannesburg to Cape Town, where one of the periodic magazines made available to passengers included a feature on Tanyaradzwa' story with the headline "Taking the Humble Tea Bag to New Heights". Tanyaradzwa had a refugee visa and she travelled to Zimbabwe. Home Affairs picked it up and continued to give her problems. She relocated to Ireland.

Betty is a 54 old woman who works for an organisation that works closely with marginalised communities. The organisation has a footprint in over 33 different countries. Its focus is to help capacitate women work with their own hands or to organise themselves to lobby for land services and housing. Through her work, she then connects these communities with people that own curio shops in various countries that the organisation has a foot print in. She asks the owners of the curio shops to introduce their products to women in these marginalised communities for quality control purposes. As a middle-person between the communities and the curio shops, she then gets five percent on every product sold. Casson and Giusta (2007) notes that an entrepreneur does not need to own a business, but can be rewarded for his or her judgement by a generous salary.

3.3.4 Accounting

Jack is a 44-year-old accountant. He specializes in preparing annual statements, annual reviews, corporate and individual tax returns as well payroll services. Before Jack came to South Africa, he worked in the treasury for different rural district municipalities. Jack also got a farm in Zimbabwe through the land reform program. He plants crops there during the rainy season. Because of his experience and connections in local government, Jack has signed an agreement with the Rural Districts Associations to audit all their financial statements. He will also assist with financial management training since the Zimbabwean government is moving towards the accrual based international public sector accounting in local government and the public service. Previously the government reported their financial statements on a cash basis.

During the time of interviewing, Jack had just incorporated a company of auditors and accountants. It is predominantly based in South Africa where it has about 25 auditors and accountants . In his personal capacity Jack audits rural district municipalities. With

the consortium, the focus is on Zimbabwe as part of efforts to reduce the government's over reliance on the big four auditing firms KPMG, EY, Delloite and PriceWaterHouseCoopers. As stated by Sorenson and Audia (2000: 4560) "individuals that have ties to both existing organisations in an industry and geographic regions distant from these organisations might have the ability to translate these positions into particularly promising entrepreneurial opportunities" cited in Drori et al, (2009: 1002). Jack exploited his background in local government in Zimbabwe and signed an agreement with the rural district association to help with financial management training in all of the country's rural districts.

3.2.4 Remittances

Takunda worked as a mortar mixer supervisor. When he left his job as a mortar mixer supervisor, he went to work for global online commerce giant Amazon. From there he went on to work for Mukuru, a company that specialises in sending cash remittances to Zimbabwe and other parts of the world. When he was at the money sending agency, he noted that people sent money to Zimbabwe and often heard that such funds were misused instead of being used to purchase groceries and building materials. Because of his experience at Amazon, he customized a system which would fit the needs of Zimbabwean remittance senders. His business is exclusively run online, where customers can buy groceries including meat and alcohol, building equipment, agricultural and farm inputs, and generic medicine for people in Zimbabwe. A person confirms the list of groceries he/she wants then provides the company with the delivery details before paying for the service. Once the payment is confirmed the goods are delivered to the designated address in Zimbabwe. Takunda has a partnership with Zimbabwe's largest grocery and hardware businesses, N-Richards and Metro Pitch respectively.

The interesting thing about this business is that it is exclusively online and is neither registered either in Zimbabwe or South Africa. However, it goes to the heart of remittances. The business redefines our understanding of remittances. Apart from paying in the South Africa rand currency, website users have the option to view prices in the British Pound, Botswana Pula, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar and the Euro. The currencies actually reflect something pertinent. While acknowledging that the majority of Zimbabwean migrants are in South Africa, it also acknowledges that some are scattered around the world. As Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera (2015: 264) noted that, “the Zimbabwean diaspora is now scattered in over 100 countries”. Takunda can be defined as migrant entrepreneur, one “who emerges to bridge the distinct complementary needs of migrants and home country population” (Portes et al 1999: 299).

With the cash crisis in Zimbabwe, Takunda may be the biggest beneficiary. From 2016, Zimbabwe had been experiencing a very serious liquidity crisis. People were sending remittances to their loved ones but recipients were failing to collect the cash. Unlike in the early 2000s when the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) could print money, Zimbabwe is using the multi-currency regime, which is dominated by the use of the United States dollar. In Zimbabwe, people are failing to receive their remittances because of cash shortages. Currently, withdrawal limits are limited to US\$30 a day. Some people sleep on bank queues in order to access their cash. Instead of sending money to families which they cannot get, they can buy groceries or building materials from Takunda directly and it would be delivered to designated recipients. In the case of Takunda, the technological innovations that used to be a privilege of companies like Amazon are now being used by him to implement his own brand. By using e-commerce technologies that are used by large corporates, “transnational entrepreneurs not only deny their own labour to would be employers at home and abroad and become conduits of information for others” (Portes et al, 1999:299).

3.2.5 Information technology

Farai is not a beneficiary of the DZP. He studied in the United States and worked for a big software company in New Jersey. The company he worked for usually works with governments by providing military and intelligence software, corporate software, and data protection. When he worked for this company, he was a penetration analyst. In layman's terms, he was a hacker, if a company built a firewall system, he was supposed to break into it so that the company could investigate ways of improving their firewall grid. The company he worked for decided to set up a satellite office in Africa. Previously the company had clients in Africa but had never really had a supporting office.

After a year working for that company in South Africa, Farai decided not to go back to the United States, thus he remained behind and started his own company. Farai's decision to remain in South Africa agrees with Nee and Sanders (2001:386) who note that immigrants "gradually move towards self-employment as they acquire work and socialization experiences in the host society, develop a network of contacts and develop business know how". In South Africa, some of his clients include the National Treasury, the Navy and City of Johannesburg. He also worked with the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA). The government departments contracted him to be a penetration analyst for their firewall grids. He was involved in testing loopholes in their data security and supplying recommendations to improve their systems.

In Zimbabwe, Farai works with the Department of Justice and Correctional Services and the Office of the President. In the office of the president, he consults on security. In the Department of Justice, he is working with a section responsible for company registration. He got a contract to digitise the company registration system which at the time of writing is still manual. If someone wants to register a company, it usually takes three months at minimum, unless if one buys a shelf company. The officials had to

manually check if there is no other company registered in that name. Farai is looking to cutting down company registration in Zimbabwe to less than five minutes so that it will be done online either using ones mobile phone or a computer. Farai also worked to improve the Air Zimbabwe booking system.

Farai is also working with Zimbabwe's Department of Home Affairs to create a centralised system. This centralized system wants to digitize everything by integrating departments of Home Affairs, Prisons, Traffic and Justice. For example, if they scan an identification document at a road block, the system must would show details of who you are and where you were born. The system will be linked to a mobile app used by traffic officers to scan licenses. They would then be able to detect the owner of the car, their address, whether he/she has a passport or not, and whether they supposed to be in the country or have left. They can also trace pending fines or court apperances, as well as criminal records. I am not sure if the system that Farai developed, is the new Zimbabwe Integrated Transport Information Management System (ZIMTIS) had displayed at the Vehicle Inspection Department (VID)'s stand at the Harare Agricultural Show held at the end of August in 2018.

3.2.6 Cleaning

Makanaka was previously employed as a nurse in Zimbabwe's public sector. She quit nursing to work in a hotel in Zimbabwe because of the deteriorating economic situation . She acquired a certificate in pastel accounting before leaving for South Africa in 2007. Upon arrival the only job she could get was as a domestice worker, in very poor conditions. She upgraded herself by studying a diploma in human resources. However after having furthered her studies; she faced new barriers in language in that human resource opportunities required fluency in either Afrikaans or Xhosa, which are the two main languages spoken in Cape Town. Makanaka then started a cleaning business for the placement of people in domestic work. She started by helping other Zimbabweans who were looking for jobs in Cape Town but did not even know how to write a resume.

She used her human resources skills to start the company and manage the placement of people who were looking for domestic work. Most of her beneficiaries were those who had arrived in Cape Town to join friends and relatives but these networks would then switch off their phones to avoid being contacted. Some of the women she assists would have followed their husbands to Cape Town, only to discover that they were now living with new spouses. The diploma fully equipped to her with skills on recruitment practices, training and labour relations legislation. Besides the placement business, Makanaka has a clothing boutique in Wynberg

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of entrepreneurial ventures by Zimbabweans in Cape Town. It has also shown how Zimbabweans are taking advantage of how the global economy now works in terms of e-commerce and taking advantage of tourism. The technological innovations that used to be reserved for corporate organisations are now being used by ordinary Zimbabweans as they implement their own enterprises. As Rogerson and Mushawemhuka (2015:140) argue, South Africa and Zimbabwe “represent a modest opening up for of empirical research and debates around the south to south forms of transnational entrepreneurship”. However, despite the success highlighted in this chapter, subsequent chapters demonstrate how these people remain liminal because of papers. The argument that entrepreneurship is done by people in a condition of disadvantage is not always the case for Zimbabwean entrepreneurs living in South Africa. Some with successful ventures are still employed with well-paying jobs. The home country and host country linkages are not the defining feature of transnational enterprises.

4. Chapter Four: Separation from Zimbabwe

4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines causes of Zimbabwe's double political and economic crisis that forced people to migrate to South Africa and other countries across the world. I relate this to reasons for leaving home that were cited during my research interviews. I pay particular attention to the period between 1994 and 2008 when the political and economic crisis were inextricably linked. This period saw the country's gross domestic product declining consistently while a large number of people left their homeland (Pasura, 2012). I demonstrate that the option to migrate was not an easy one, but that Zimbabweans were in a liminal situation; choosing to live in a country with massive unemployment, political violence, relentless price hikes and extreme material shortage or leaving the country to pursue expected life courses or progress. I demonstrate the liminal injustices in the lives of Zimbabweans as the rights of citizenship were not afforded to them in their home country. The daily experience of hunger, poverty, lack of access to water and of electricity, brutalities at the hands of security services altered people's ideoscapes about modernity and influenced people to move across the border as a safeguard against the physical and symbolic uncertainties of Zimbabwean life (Morreira, 2010; Ferguson, 1999; Appadurai, 1990).

It is worth noting that problems that caused migration from Zimbabwe "can not only be understood in reference to these years as that would require a longer historical analysis" (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004:355). Some scholars link the crisis to "the inception of the Third Chimurenga (land reform) in 2000, while others trace it to the policies of the pre-colonial state since the early 1890s, yet others see the footprints of the crisis in the colonial past" (Masunungure and Badza, 2010:213). Peters-Berries (2002:185-86) describes the crisis as a complex situation and he traces it to several structural factors rooted in the country's history including colonially inherited imbalances

in land ownership between blacks and whites, imprudent policies of the post-colonial government, endemic corruption and the authoritarian inclinations of the post-colonial state.

However, neither the land reform nor the governance perspective sufficiently explain the nature, latitude and outline of the Zimbabweans crisis. The explanations are mutually reinforcing though the crisis spawned by the land question can be regarded as the earliest manifestation of a deeper and broader problem that was structurally rooted in the governance style associated with the ZANU PF regime (Masunungure and Badza, 2010: 213). For my study, the first person to emigrate left because because of the structural adjustment program (ESAP) which resulted in the economic decline and the out migration of many skilled workers (Bloch, 2006) and the last person left Zimbabwe in July 2008 at the height of political violence.

4.2. Zimbabwe South Africa migration pre 1990

Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is not necessarily new but different historical antecedents have helped shape the migration. Foremost, the Mfecane wars of Tshaka in 1800, the WENELA labour movements and the 1970s liberation war (Mupakati, 2012). Mfecane is associated with the rise of the Zulu Kingdom under King Tshaka which led to the displacement of ethnic groups such as the Ndebele, Shangaan and Tonga, northwards into present-day Zimbabwe and Zambia. WENELA, which stands for Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was a recruitment agency in South Africa formed in 1897 (Mupakati, 2012). It had exclusive rights to labour recruitment in the entire Southern African region. Other people migrated during the Gukurahundi precipitated by the post-colonial conflict in Matabeleland where over 20 000 Ndebele people were massacred (Bloch, 2006). White Zimbabweans also migrated prior to and post-independence in 1980 (Pasura, 2008). Tevera and Crush (2003:6) note that between 1980 and 1984, 50 000 to 60 000 whites left the country because they could

not adjust to the changing circumstances and the net migration was over 10 000 per year. While some went to South Africa, most of them migrated to Britain where they reclaimed their ancestral citizenship.

4.3. Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

When Zimbabwe gained independence from Britain in 1980, the country had the most industrialised and diversified economy in sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of apartheid South Africa. It had the most enviable infrastructure on the African continent (Sachikonye, 2012:85). The Zimbabwean economy's three key economic pillars then were agriculture, mining and manufacturing (Mlambo, 2017:99). In the first decade after independence, the country embarked on a developmental phase (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004). However, the remainder of the 1980s experienced slow growth and increased the budget deficit and rising debt (Sachikonye, 2011). Defense commitments in Mozambique and expenditure on drought relief and social services ensured that budget deficit remained high during the 1980s (ibid). The limitations of a welfarist program unaccompanied by sustained economic growth became apparent in the late 1980s and Zimbabwe was drawn in by global imperatives of the structural adjustment program (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004:357). The Mugabe government approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) seeking comprehensive help to counter anaemic growth, lacklustre export performance and slow trickle of investment flows (Sachikonye, 2012:19).

In response, the IMF developed a five-year program, which promised five per cent annual growth, 100 000 new jobs per year, accelerated export growth and significant reductions in budget deficits (Sachikonye, 2002:14). The structural adjustment entailed liberalisation of trade, monetary, fiscal and public enterprise reforms, budget deficit reductions and government non-interference in investments and labour (Sachikonye, 1999). ESAP optimistically projected five percent annual growth, reduction in budget

deficit to five percent of GDP by 1995, reduction of account deficit to four percent of GDP and reduction of debt service ratio to 20 percent by 1995 (Sachikonye, 2002).

However, instead of triggering economic growth, growth proved elusive at below one percent per annum between 1990 and 1995. Instead of creating expanded employment opportunities, unemployment crept up from about 30 to 50 percent. The poor sequencing of the program contributed to a significant erosion of the export competitiveness of the domestic industry. Hasty trade liberalization resulted in deindustrialization in certain sectors of manufacturing. By the end of ESAP, the economy was in a much weaker than a strong position. Even the World Bank itself admitted in its audit of the program that it had been flawed from the beginning (Sachikonye, 2002:14).

The outcomes of ESAP were not impressive as a program that was launched with so much political fanfare (Sachikonye, 2011). Nyazema (2010:235) notes that the period from 1990 to 1997 was a period of stagnation due to the devastating effects of structural adjustment policies which placed the market in a central position of dominance and arbitrator of all processes. The indicators included a real wage decline from an index of 122 in 1988 to 88 in 1997, a drop in share of real wages in the gross national income from 54 percent in 1987 to 39 percent in 1997, and the figure of households living in poverty increased from 61 percent in 1995 to 75 percent by 2000 (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004:358). More so, peasant production which was a mere 8 percent in 1980 and had shot up to 45 percent by 1985 declined because of the program and the percentage of households living in poverty increased by 14 percent in five years (Mamdani, 2009:3).

In terms of health, Nyazema (2010:357) notes inequities arose due to the introduction of fee paying health services, apparent politicisation of senior management positions, inability to maintain confidence of a highly skilled professional health work force that

moved away from public sector, centralizing health management back to Harare from provinces and inability to maintain financing in relation to escalating inflation. The peripheral effects of capitalism were evidenced by statistics of high infant mortality , chronic malnutrition, and vulnerability to preventable diseases, low life expectancy and high illiteracy (Moyo and Yeros, 2007:104). The health sector also bore the brunt of emigration because of ESAP as the vacancy rate in the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare rose to 30 percent by 1997 (Mupakati, 2012). The social crisis that intensified under structural adjustment persisted into the 2000s. Thus, ESAP had deleterious consequences because, among others, “it led to a higher level of foreign borrowing, contributed to domestic recession, higher import costs and in reduction wages” (Sachikonye, 1999:11). Mupakati (2012) argues that the migration of skilled professionals during the ESAP period was more visible than that of unskilled people. Betty was forced to leave Zimbabwe because of ESAP. When I interviewed her on what made her leave Zimbabwe, she said:

It was pure economic challenges which made me leave Zimbabwe. It was difficult, I could not bear it anymore. In Zimbabwe, I had worked for the Ministry of Finance as an accountant from 1981 up to 1994. However, it reached the point when the money was now useless, I could not afford to feed my family and I decided to quit my job. I even had a butchery on the side, but I couldn't. I left for Botswana when Maun was being established as a tourist resort town.

Her illustration of the economic situation around 1994 shows the liminal mobility of people supposedly considered middle class Zimbabweans. She chose to quit an accounting job in the country's treasury and opted for migration. She worked with the expectation of being able to feed her family but when that was threatened, the only option was to leave the country. As someone who worked in the finance ministry, she was well placed to read the future of the country's economic climate before things got worse as following sections will show. The failure of ESAP created a crisis for the social

contract characterized by decline in living standards, unemployment and dim prospects of growth and transformation (Sachikonye, 2012). The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) benefitted from the growing discontent with the ESAP (Moyo and Yeros, 2013). Membership to the union from industries and mines decreased to less than a million from 1.5 million from 1991 to 1998 (Crush, et al 2015). ESAP made the ZCTU to undergo a qualitative transformation both in political perspective and strategy and succeeded in incorporating public sector unions, built alliances with other civic organisations and stepped up strike action, to unprecedented levels (Moyo and Yeros, 2013:104). ZCTU managed to harness the popular tide, organise and lead resistance to state, capital and ESAP (Moyo and Yeros, 2013:396). It enjoyed widespread support as the leader and mouthpiece of opposition.

In 1996, the national public sector went on a strike which dealt a particularly hard blow to the confidence of the state (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004). The national strike served as a warning that party loyalties could no longer be taken for granted and links were strengthened between the public-sector workers and the ZCTU (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004:358). In 1997 as the year before, strikes gripped several industries that spanned construction, commercial, hotel and catering, clothing, commercial farming, cement and lime as well as railways, urban councils and postal and telecommunications (Yeros, 2013:220). The year 1997 saw, 230 strikes in 16 sectors. The general strike of 1997 and the mass stays aways in 1998 announced the arrival of a major social force on the political scene, an organisation with countrywide structures and an alternative national political perspective.

Migration to South Africa since the early 1990s soon “led to exaggerated claims that the country was being swamped by Zimbabweans” (Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2015: 370-1). In 1996 South African government imposed draconian visa conditions on Zimbabweans. People intending to apply for a South African visa were required to provide proof of paid and confirmed accommodation or a letter of invitation from a friend

or relative or business associate legally resident in South Africa. The letter had to also include “the national identity number of the applicant, address to be visited in South Africa, and the length of the intended visit and an indication of how they would sustain themselves while in the republic (e.g., bank statements or travellers’ cheques), a letter from their employer to confirm that they were gainfully employed in Zimbabwe and would return immediately upon completing their business, and, for unemployed persons, proof of marriage in Zimbabwe or an affidavit from a spouse” (Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2015:371). In 1998, DHA declared that “no one in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories would normally be accepted as an immigrant worker and employers wishing to introduce skills, even on a temporary basis, have to justify why the positions cannot be filled by South African citizens or permanent residents” (Perbedy, 2001). The policy succeeded in reducing legal cross-border flow and pushed Zimbabwean migrants to use clandestine channels and pay for the services of informal guides who helped cross the Limpopo River using various informal crossing points.

4.4. War veterans pay outs

In 1997, war veterans openly confronted the state to be given compensation for their participation in the war of liberation and accused the government of being negligent to their plight since 1980 (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2003). The government unilaterally agreed to pay long-neglected demands for financial compensation (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010) with an unbudgeted once payment of ZWD\$ 50 000 each to fifty thousand war veterans, and further monthly pension payments of Z\$ 2000 (Masunungure, 2010). To meet this unbudgeted expenditure, a 5 percent war vet levy was imposed. Electricity rates increased by 5 percent, sales tax went up by 2,5 percent and there was an increase on fuel duty for fuel by 20 cents per litre (Yeros, 2013). These new levies put the the labour movement and war veterans in direct confrontation and struggle over the status of each constituency in national life (ibid). The unbudgeted pay out to war veterans sent the

economy into a tailspin that it had never recovered to date (Mupakati, 2012). On 14 November 1997, the Zimbabwean dollar crashed by about 75 percent and many people linked it to the payment of war veteran gratuities. The payment sparked a run from a “strong Z\$12 per US\$1 before November 1997 as the currency weakened to Z\$55 to US\$1 and Z\$300 to US\$1 by 2001” (Sachikonye, 2002: 17).

The payment of war veterans resulted in the creation of an alliance between the state and war veterans (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010). This new political crisis proved crucial in the state’s response to other issues explained below, such as response to defeat at constitutional referendum, land reform and political violence against opposition. Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2003) argues that the payment brought the war veterans to the side of ZANU-PF as they began to intimidate, harass, threaten and even torture civilians on behalf of the ruling party. At the same time, the Mugabe’s opportunistic intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1998 onwards created further problems for the Zimbabwean economy (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004). In an already weakened economy, “the annual expenditure of US\$360 million in DRC proved a tremendous strain” (Sachikonye, 2002:17).

4.5. Formation of Movement for Democratic Change and Referendum

As the economic crisis deepened and the government remained largely unresponsive, the ZCTU skilfully articulated the linkages between the crisis and the broader problems of democratisation (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004). This led to the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998. When the NCA was formed, the government dismissed it as “a grouping of individuals under a tree thinking they will come up with a constitution for Zimbabwe” (Sithole, 2001:163). The main agenda of the NCA was constitutional reform. ZCTU had managed to establish an alliance with a wide range of groups and begun to speak about problems of democratization and human rights - areas in which the ZANU-PF abuses had become blatant. Masunungure and

Badza (2010: 212) argue that the NCA noted poor governance as the root of the Zimbabwean crisis. This bad governance was presumed to “encompass the decay of the rule of law, grand corruption, fiscal and monetary mismanagement, politically motivated violence, draconian legislation and defective elections that resulted in predetermined outcomes where the ruling party has always won” (ibid). The constitutional reform debate gave “rise to a new opposition political party that opposed ZANU PFs plans which drew its membership from the NCA” (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010: 210).

In September 1999, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed with then secretary general of ZCTU, Morgan Tsvangirai as founding President. It was woven out of “the broad coalition of forces including civil society, and its’ various components such as labour, youth, students, the middle class and business” (Sachikonye, 2002: 18). This was a watershed moment in Zimbabwe’s post-colonial period as issues of human rights and civil rights which were part of the liberation struggle returned to the centre of political debate (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004). From the formation of the MDC in 1999, Zimbabwe’s political landscape became polarized among the two protagonists President Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai of MDC for almost two decades. Mugabe was eventually removed from power through a military coup in November 2017, and died September 2019. Morgan Tsvangirai succumbed to cancer of the colon in February 2018.

In 2000, there was a referendum on the new constitution which included executive presidency and provisions for land acquisition without compensation, from white commercial farmers. ZANU PF advocated for a YES vote while the MDC advocated for a NO vote. The No Vote won. Sparks (2003:267) notes that the humiliation of losing the constitutional referendum transformed Robert Mugabe from being a benign reconciler into a raging tyrant. The loss was a “turning point for ZANU PF politics and national politics by extension, as parliamentary elections were around the corner” (Yeros,

2013:220). ZANU PF interpreted the 2000 referendum result as a worrying victory for the MDC as it was just months before a scheduled parliamentary election (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010).

This was the first major loss of popularity for Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF (Masunungure, 2010). Since then, elections in Zimbabwe have demonstrated a falsity between the presumed linear link between elections and democratic development in Zimbabwe. The No Vote acted as an important trigger to embark on land acquisitions (Cliffe et al, 2011). The ruling party interpreted the referendum result “as a vote against the government proposed constitution that Britain should pay for land appropriated by the state” (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004: 365). This narrow and self-serving reading of “the defeat informed the subsequent ruling party strategy of locating the Zimbabwe crisis squarely on the land question” (ibid). This reignited and enhanced interest crystallised around two controversial issues of land and governance (Masunungure and Badza, 2010: 207). Soon after the rejection of the constitution, the alliance with the war veterans was mobilised and ZANU PF supporters embarked on a series of mass land occupations of white commercial farmers and sought to violently crush MDC supporters and party structures (Yeros, 2013: 221).

The 2000 election pitted MDC's Morgan Tsvangirai against ZANU PFs Robert Mugabe. Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2003) argues that the MDC mounted a serious challenge to ZANU-PF political dominance, especially in the urban areas. With a desire to suppress the rising popularity of MDC in the run up to the 2000 parliamentary elections, the ruling party unleashed war veterans on the general populace, white commercial farmers and MDC supporters, causing untold damage to the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe (Pasura, 2011). The ruling party crafted the draconian Public Order Security Act (POSA), which enabled security forces to harass MDC members, deny them permission to hold rallies and campaign freely (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2003).

However, despite formidable factors working against it, the MDC with less than a year from its formation lost by five seats to gain a majority in parliament in an election that had been marred by widespread violence (Sachikonye, 2002). MDC won 57 out of 120 parliament seats, challenged another 15 in the high court and won but these were later dismissed by the Supreme Court on appeal (Sithole, 2001). This was a seismic shift in post-independence politics and a challenge to the one dominant party status that had endured since 1980. Since then, Zimbabwean politics has remained mainly with two players, ZANU PF and MDC.

The emergence of a strong opposition led to the emergence of a revived nationalism delivered in a particularly virulent form, and a selective rendition of the liberation history deployed as an ideological policing agent in public debate (Raftopoulos, 2004). At the centre of it was an invocation of autochthony; creating insiders and outsiders on who were the rightful sons of the soil (Muzondidya, 2007). Those who criticized the land reform program “were dismissed as sell-outs to western imperialism” and this rhetoric had its counterparts in intimidation and violence which claimed 31 mainly opposition supporters and displaced of about 70 000 between January and March 2002 rising to 300 000 by 2004 (Sachikonye, 2002: 16; Crush et.al, 2015, 370). In 2001, the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (2001) was legislated and it worked to disenfranchise the largely immigrant white farmers and farm workers for their perceived support to MDC. Mamdani (2009) notes that a fifth of the farm workers came from neighbouring countries and were regarded with suspicion by peasants in communal areas. Even if they were born locally, they were seen as foreign and denied citizenship.

4.6. Fast Track Land reform

The issue of land dispossession was a popular grievance during Zimbabwe’s liberation war. However, the government did not compulsorily acquire commercial farms until its defeat in the 2000 referendum. Soon after the rejection of the constitution, the alliance

with the war veterans was mobilised and ZANU-PF supporters embarked on a series of mass land occupations of white commercial farms and violently crushed MDC supporters (Yeros, 2013). Through land occupations, ZANU-PF was raising itself from the looming political cemetery through a populist articulation of the land question as a monumental concern of ZANU-PF concern with human security after 20 years of neglect (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2003). The land acquisition tactics “varied from political protest to noisy disruption and violent intimidation, beatings and killings. They dislodged owners, managers and sometimes their farm workers” (Cliffe, et al 2011:909). The approval of farm occupations and “the use of violence in acquiring land were part of ZANU-PF’s response to opposition, aimed at mobilizing support and punishing political foes, the white farmers and their workers” (Cliffe et al, 2011: 910).

The Land Acquisition Act of 2000 allowed for compulsory acquisition without compensation and the president changed clause 57 of the Act to disclaim any responsibility on the part of the government, to compensate any land taken for redistribution (Cliffe, 2011). The slogan “*The Land is the Economy, Economy is Land*” was popularised at the expense of other pertinent issues such as employment creation and reduction of inflation (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2003). Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004: 364) note that “ZANU-PF focused on anti-MDC campaigns around the land legacy and assimilated the MDC into the category of agents of imperialism to divert debates from wider issues facing the economy”. Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2003) argues that if the fast track land reform is anything to go by, then credit must go to the emergence of a credible opposition that forced ZANU PF to go back to the people.

The immediate impact for local and international capital was the eviction of white commercial farmers who had served as as a significant force of the Zimbabwean farming sector (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004). Farm workers were considered allies of commercial farmers and foreigners. Thus they became victims of brutal treatment by the ruling party. Mamdani (2009) notes that a fifth of the farm workers came from

neighbouring countries and were regarded with suspicion by peasants in communal areas. Even if they were born locally, they were seen as foreign and denied citizenship. Those who criticized the land reform program “were dismissed as sell-outs to western imperialism and this rhetoric had its counterparts in intimidation and violence which claimed 31 mainly opposition supporters and displaced about 70 000 between January and March 2002” (Sachikonye, 2002:16). Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004) note that the land question symbolized the political binary in which the ruling party represented the true sons of the soil against the opposition who were evils puppets of imperialism.

The land reform and inflation led to the decline of GDP by 38 percent between 1998 and 2003. Agricultural output plummeted from negative 12 percent to negative 20 percent in 2002 which became the lowest since independence (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004). Industrial production had fallen by 44 percent since the mid-1990s, inflation rose from 199 percent at the end of 2002 to 526 percent by October 2003, worker savings were seriously eroded because of mishandling of pension funds by the ruling party and the official foreign exchange inflows declined from US\$18.5 million in September 2002 to US\$500 000 in December of the same year (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004:373). Sachikonye (2002:17) further notes that domestic debt levels shot to 3.5 billion and foreign debt to US\$4.5 billion. By that time, Zimbabwe had arrears of US\$1.2 billion.

The political violence which accompanied elections and land invasions deterred potential investors who cited the absence of the rule of law and disregard of property rights as hindrance (Sachikonye, 2002). More than two million workers lost their jobs in the agricultural sector, worsening the unemployment situation in the country. Most of the farm workers were from neighbouring countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique who found themselves stateless after the government revoked the citizenship rights of people born of foreign origin for their perceived support of the opposition MDC (Muzondidya, 2007). However, Moyo and Yeros (2007) argue that such

an analysis of the land reform from the negative lens is subject to Eurocentric influences whose results render the whole process as an instance of chaos, crisis and tyranny as a seemingly incurable African pathology. They further argued that the political economy of Zimbabwe cannot be understood based on an idealized model of bourgeois democracy. During these years, some emigrated to the the United Kingdom as Zimbabweans did not need a visa (Dendere, 2015). While South Africa had changed its visa requirements, its proximity remained accessible to those with money and those without (Dendere, 2015).

4.7. Operation Murambatsvina

In 2005, there was mass displacement and violence by the state against the urban poor. This came to be known as Operation Murambatsvina or Operation Clean out Trash. It was reminiscent of the Gukurahundi, another effort to clean out opposition filth (Dendere, 2015). Gukurahundi is the term used to refer to post-colonial conflict in Matabeleland where over 20 000 Ndebele people were massacred (Bloch, 2006). For more than two months from 19 May 2005, the homes and businesses of urban poor communities were targeted for demolition and hundreds of thousands of people were violently displaced (Parsons, 2010).

The main objective of the operation was to get rid of all sorts of illegal activities in the city of Harare and restore it to the status of a Sunshine City. Potts (2006) notes that the operation did not only destroy informal sector enterprises, trading locations and houses that had contravened by-laws, but legal buildings were destroyed too. Home industries were bulldozed, tuck-shops were destroyed and most places where producers operated vandalised (Jones, 2010). This operation led to the forced migration of hundreds of people while others were subjected to what scholars have called in situ displacement (Magaramombe, 2010). This form of displacement entails the physical destruction of production assets and dismantling of production systems as people are separated from

their ecosystems, work places and livelihood opportunities (Magaramombe, 2010: 364-65). This was the case with Kativhu. When I asked him, what made him leave Zimbabwe, he said

Basically, I was looking for better opportunities. I tried to do business in Zimbabwe soon after high school. I could not do as much as I wanted to do because that is when Murambatsvina came. I was staying in Chitungwiza. There was a place called Roam Industries; we used to do our business there. It was destroyed during Operation Murambatsvina. I used to have my company and used to apply pleats to skirts for women from Methodist church, gym skirts and for school uniforms for girls. At that time, I could not afford to go to university. I decided to try something else by coming here as opportunities were not there in Zimbabwe.

Kativhu here demonstrates how the life in Zimbabwe presented him with two options, to live in a country where his expected progress was rendered immobile. He was in a situation of liminal mobility, remaining in a country where survival strategies he used before were destroyed and being economically stuck in Zimbabwe. He chose to leave the country into the unknown. Morreira (2009) asks whether when people like Kativhu move from being internally displaced to being in their eyes, displaced across the international borderlands makes them eligible for refugee status in their country of destination. The operation was deemed brutal and it received widespread condemnation both internally and externally (Masunungure and Badza, 2010). It was so vicious that locals referred to it as Zimbabwe's Tsunami, following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami that caused so much devastation.

Morreira (2010b) highlights that victims of Murambatsvina were assumed to have a rural home, often erroneously, and moved internally in Zimbabwe multiple times prior to crossing the border into South Africa. Secondly, those who returned to their rural areas were targeted for political violence as perceived sympathisers of MDC to the extent that some were even murdered. In a parliamentary debate in 2005, a Zanu-PF parliamentarian and Deputy Minister Phineas Chihota claimed that victims of

Murambatsvina were alien urbanites who “had no identity and recognition (as Zimbabweans). He said “It is common cause that the definition of an indigenous person is one who has a rural home allocated to him by virtue of being indigenous and (not) a home one has acquired in an urban area because he has either bought it or it has been allocated to him by the state” (Muzondidya, 2007: 334). The framing of urbanites without a rural home by Mugabe as ‘undisciplined, totemless elements of alien origin’ meant that urban dwellers, with their assumed urban values; thus perceived themselves to have been placed below the rural population in a symbolic hierarchy of proper ‘Zimbabweanness (Muzondidya, 2007; Morreira, 2009). Thus Zimbabweans who moved to South Africa were already liminal before arrival in South Africa, in that the rights of citizenship have not been accorded to them in their home country.

The office of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General deployed a special envoy on a fact-finding mission. The UN report estimated that the operation led to the unemployment of 700 000 people and affected a further 2,4 million countrywide. The report concluded that the operation could have been a pre-emptive strategy designated to prevent popular uprising in light of increasing food insecurity and other economic hardships (Tibaijuka, 2005). However, Moyo and Yeros (2007:115) argue that “the UN team that conducted the study employed a shoddy methodology, relying mainly on evidence from unaccountable civil society organisations rather than doing the more demanding research that was required. It is worth noting that the UN estimates before the enquiry had placed the number of affected people at 350 000 or 700 000 families; these numbers were also questionable. There was no differentiation between residential and industrial structures, thus allowing for double counting of families with residential and industrial structures”.

This operation also left a “severe psychological and emotional impact on people as their homes and forms of livelihoods were destroyed” (Dendere, 2015: 80). Patients who suffered from chronic ailments like HIV/AIDS slept outside or were forced to relocate to

rural areas. The longer-term effects included an increase in resistance to HIV drugs because they were forced to abandon their medicines which require strict adherence (Potts, 2006). More than 80 000 children were withdrawn from schools when their families relocated to faraway places (Dendere, 2015: 80).

The operation was seen as an attack on MDC strongholds because of the determination by ZANU-PF that people should return to the rural areas (Potts, 2006). By destroying houses and informal businesses, the ruling party was strengthening its hand whilst weakening that of the opposition. Dendere (2015) argues that a peak of exit occurred in soon after the 2005 election and operation Murambatsvina in the same year. Most of those who left during this period went to South Africa. Operation Murambatsvina greatly contributed to the general crisis in Zimbabwe because a reserve of employment was lost, income and sources of cheaper goods in the informal sector were also lost during a time of massive shrinkage in formal sector employment (Raftopoulos, 2006).

4.8. Political violence

Since ZANU-PF's defeat in the constitutional referendum in 2000, the party has responded to opposition politics by stepping up its nationalist authoritarianism, violence and intimidation (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2003). In the early 2000s, it revived the so-called national service. This national service was the revival of the 1980s ZANU-PF youth brigade, famous for intimidating people to vote for the ruling party. Johannes who left Zimbabwe in 2005, had this to say about the political landscape in Zimbabwe:

The cities were taken over by the opposition. ZANU PF as the ruling party was not happy with it. The political tensions would come in the form of people being frog marched to rallies. We were being forced to support what we did not want. We were being forced to go into politics when we were not into politics. You were supposed to be seen as supporting what the ruling party would want. When I was there, it had become so volatile. Every rally we were being forced to go there. Every time there was a rally, I would leave the city or go to my rural

home. I did not want to be known I was in the city. I was well known and was expected to be seen at rallies. I had attended a few but most of the rallies I would drive out of town. They just tell you tomorrow there is a rally and would like to see you there. I knew quite several people because of the kind of work that I did. The company that I worked for was doing irrigation equipment. Because of the land reform that has happened, we were forced to go to see new farmers. You would go to areas because you want business, you will be invited to come advertise your business on a field day but in fact, it was a political rally.

The politics of Zimbabwe have been volatile for the past two decades, characterised by state sponsored violence abductions and vote rigging. The situation has forced many like Johannes to leave the country. It is rare to find anyone in Zimbabwe who has not directly or indirectly experienced violence at the hands of the police, army, intelligence officers or ZANU PF supporters. As this section will show, many people lost their lives from ZANU PF sponsored violence. While ZANU PF adheres to regular elections, “it claims its legitimacy on the legacies of the liberation struggle and a dominant ethos of force, which characterizes most electoral processes in the post-colonial period in Zimbabwe” (Raftopoulos, 2013:7). The ZANU PF government has always been permeated by a culture of violence, intolerance and intimidation, derived from the liberation struggle (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2003). It prides itself in a violent past and its capacity to deploy this infrastructure of violence to those who dare to challenge it. Bratton and Masunungure (2009:44) argue that in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF has always “depicted the MDC as a stalking horse for regime change, funded by the British, European, and US governments”. On the other hand, the MDC was limited in its denunciation against Mugabe as he put a law that criminalized anyone insulting the authority of the president. Mugabe and ZANU-PF had successfully denounced the MDC by institutionalising a patriotic history claiming them as the legitimate power holders while the MDC were demonised as treasonous enemies of the state (Beardsworth, 2012: 21).

Ever since the 2000 elections campaign period, the MDC and its supporters were subject to widespread violence, murder, attempted murder, torture, rape, disappearances and death threats, mostly carried out by ZANU-PF militia, war veterans and some members of the security services (Raftopoulos, 2009:215). Not only was the opposition attacked and displaced, but “press freedom was assaulted through bombings of newspaper offices, detention and deportation of critical journalists. Civil society was also targeted and threatened, and domestic critics were labelled unpatriotic, whilst foreign critics were lumped together as imperialists” (Sachikonye, 2002:16).

While the MDC narrowly defeated ZANU-PF, the 2000 parliamentary elections and 2002 presidential polls were characterised by violence. The international community discredited these elections citing allegations of political violence and intimidation of opposition as events that undermined free and fair polls (Masunungure and Badza, 2010). An estimated 300 000 people were victims of torture with some of their homesteads having been destroyed between 2000 and 2004 (Crush et al, 2015:370). On 11 March 2007, the state security viciously attacked Morgan Tsvangirai and other civic leaders; one person was shot dead, 50 were hospitalized and over 200 arrested (Masunungure, 2009).

There was international pressure from the USA, UK, the European Union as well as concerned voices in SADC. This led to an extra ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State in Dar es Salam, held from 28 to 29 March 2007. Thabo Mbeki who was then president of South Africa was commissioned to facilitate dialogue between government and opposition in Zimbabwe (Masunungure, 2009a). Negotiations led to the repeal of a presidential patronage appointment of additional members of parliament and levelled the electoral playing field for contesting political parties and increased the parliamentary seats from 120 to 210 for March 2008 (Sachikonye, 2011:27). On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe then held “its first ever-harmonized election on one day and the results were posted outside every polling station for everyone to see” (Masunungure, 2009b:1).

ZANU-PF was defeated in the parliamentary election and Mugabe was also defeated by Tsvangirai in the first round of the presidential election. The two MDC factions “won a total of 109 parliamentary seats against ZANU-PF’s 97, with Tsvangirai polling 47.9 percent of the presidential vote against Mugabe’s 43.2 percent thus failing to deliver a decisive 50 percent plus one majority victory” (Raftopoulos, 2009:229). The bigger MDC faction was led by Morgan Tsvangirai, which garnered 99 seats, the other smaller MDC factions led by Mutambara got 10 seats. This then mandated a constitutionally mandated presidential run-off election.

The presidential run-off was characterised by violence. The police together with the army and ZANU-PF militia engaged in electoral cleansing which left more than a hundred opposition supporters dead, 200 000 displaced and others injured due to politically motivated beatings (Bratton and Masunungure, 2009:49). The period witnessed systematic orchestrated violence deployed against opposition supporters by the Mugabe regime (Masunungure, 2011:54). The military and central intelligence provided logistical support and weapons to war veterans while the police turned a blind eye (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010).

Zimbabwe was reduced to a “Hobbesian state of nature, in which life became solitary, nasty, brutish and short” (Masunungure, 2009b:87). One of the authoritarian regime’s main strategies is to describe its opponents as sell-outs of the state who have betrayed the values of the liberation struggle by collaborating with European imperialist nations through an agenda of regime change by favouring liberal political and economic reforms (Bratton and Masunungure, 2009:44). The police whose responsibility is to enforce the law and dispense justice in society abdicated their responsibility as they consciously turned a blind eye on violence against opposition supporters, while at the same time showing enthusiasm to investigate allegations of violence against ZANU-PF supporters (Sachikonye 2011:41).

The brutality of the beatings, torture and killings was alarming; ten percent of victims were under the age of 12 and 15 percent were over the age of 60 which makes it incredible if not shocking (Sachikonye, 2011:51). Sachikonye (2011:45) argues that the cleansing strategy was code named CIBD meaning Coercion, Intimidation, Beating and Displacement. The overall campaign was termed Operation *Makavhotera Papi* (Operation whom did you vote for). Apart from inflicting fear and killing victims, the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators has helped to build a political culture within which personal dreams are strangled as millions now vote with their feet (Sachikonye, 2011: xviii).

Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the run off, sought refuge at the Dutch Embassy and “Mugabe grasped a hollow victory from a brutalized and shrunken electorate which was rejected by the international community” (Bratton, 2011:359). This made Mugabe lose political legitimacy. The post-election crisis re-triggered SADC re-engagement with the Zimbabwe crisis. Mbeki was tasked with facilitating talks to ensure a power sharing deal, as an ideal first option, then inspired by the success of a similar process following Kenya’s 2007 electoral crisis (Masunungure & Mutasa, 2011:134). This led to the signing of the 21 July 2008 Memorandum of Understanding and the 15 September 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) after intense pressure from SADC and the international community as the only pragmatic solution to the fast deteriorating crisis (Masunungure, 2009a). The GPA principals were Robert Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara.

In post-independence Zimbabwe, the University of Zimbabwe maintained a tense relationship with the state. The student movement continued to make demands on the state and the state responded by arresting protestors. Student leaders have been continuously harassed and arrested by the police. One respondent Marowa, came to South Africa because his friend was murdered by the police at the University of Zimbabwe. When I asked him, what made him leave Zimbabwe his response was

I am a political refugee. One of our fellow students was murdered by riot police and I decided to move out of Zimbabwe.. You can google it. Just search Batanai Hadzizi, he was killed by the police at UZ. It was traumatic. I was doing electrical engineering. I did not even go back to see my results. It just destroyed everything, I just couldn't cope. It was traumatic.

An internet search on Batanai Hadzizi showed that he was assaulted to death by the police at the University of Zimbabwe when they found him doing an assignment in his room following a student protest. Dendere (2015:110) notes that students' political association "was punishable by beatings and in more extreme cases death, and the increase in cases of political violence against opposition student activists forced many students to quit politics and in some cases, both politics and the university". However, Moyo and Yeros (2007:105) argue that violence was unavoidable in Zimbabwe:

"With the onset of mass land occupations on the one hand and urban political mobilization on the other hand, the bureaucracy was confronted with a situation in which violence was unavoidable; either against land occupations or against the opposition; either against neo-colonialism or in its service. This predicament is poorly understood by most left-wing critics, who resort to a human rights moralism. The respect for human rights requires a secure economic, social and political context and they cannot simply be detached from the deeply contradictory context of Zimbabwe which amounted to no less than a revolutionary situation".

While migrants emphasise economic causes of migration, the majority have experienced violence at the hands of the army, the police, war veterans, youth militia or ZANU PF supporters (Morreira, 2010). While violence reached its peak in 2008, hyperinflation also reached its peak following the March 2008 harmonised elections which sparked an outmigration to neighbouring countries (McGregor, Landau and Hammar, 2010). By 2008, more than eighty percent of the population was unemployed

and living below the poverty datum line. The situation became more serious due to chronic shortages of fuel, electricity, water and basic commodities, as supermarkets shelves were empty. More so, the health sector was characterized by a shortage of drugs and brain drain of skilled personnel, while poor remuneration forced many health professionals to resign en masse, creating a vacancy rate of over 70 percent (Tarisayi, 2009:19). The number of people who “died from HIV and related illnesses was very high and this put a lot of pressure on grandparents in rural areas as they were left to care for orphans” (Dendere, 2015: 60). In 2008, a cholera epidemic infected over 40 000 and left more than 4000 dead.

During this period some South African companies took advantage of the situation in Zimbabwe to take people to South Africa and pay them meagre wages as highlighted by Shumba below.

You know what XY hotel was doing, it was taking people from Zimbabwe, and they were taking advantage of the economic situation in Zimbabwe. They were taking people directly from Zimbabwe to Cape Town. They would make us stay in their hotels. We were not paying rent and we were being given food and everything. All the labourers, we were from Zimbabwe including the supervisors. There was only one Xhosa lady. They will go to a hotel in Zimbabwe; like when I got here, they took people from Elephant Hills in Victoria Falls. They would go to a hotel in Zimbabwe, apparently, they were trafficking people. They would tell people your pay here is coming late, we will take you to South Africa. We will provide transport for you. We will give you a place to stay. In 2006 and 2007, that is when things had become very bad in Zimbabwe. We will pay for your bus tickets for City to City coaches. You know the first cut is the deepest. People used to come to South Africa with Munhenzva buses. These guys would oppress us and give us R1600 a month saying we have deducted this and we have deducted this including soap. We then sat down and told them do not give us food from your hotel. Rather buy us polony and bread or bread and butter. We cannot afford a breakfast of R150. When the pay comes, it will say we have deducted this and we gave you the meals at staff price. They were giving us R1600 which was nothing.

In 2006, civil servants were reportedly earning starvation wages, as their salaries were only equivalent to 16.6 percent of the poverty datum line (Raftopoulos, 2009:225). By 2008, Zimbabwe's economy was on its knees with inflation reaching a stratospheric level of about 222 million per cent by September 2009 (Masunungure, 2009). In explaining his experience of inflation during 2008, Takunda said:

I used to buy flour in Banket and would take it to Bulawayo to bake doughnuts and selling the other as flour. I was doing that for a year; with two friends. We used to get about two tonnes of flour, bake 500kgs. In a night, we would bake 250kgs. It got to a point where we would sell all doughnuts and the flour, and still go back with the whole profit and all it could buy was two tonnes of flour again. You would go home with nothing. Remember I am the first born as both of my parents are dead. I had to take care of my brother who was at UZ, to pay for his fees, and a younger one who was at high school. So you then juggle that you spent a week moving up and town, but your *blues* are still waiting for you. I then decided to look for money in the vacuum. I then decided after the last batch to split the money with my two friends, got an emergency travel document and came to Mzansi (South Africa).

Inflation in Zimbabwe was so extreme that prices changed in hours. The value of salary would change whilst one was in a banking queue. If one chooses to compare prices in different supermarkets, by the time you come back, prices would have changed. It was under these conditions that people chose to leave Zimbabwe. The result of inflation included the breakdown of health care; the state was incapacitated to provide basic services to its citizens. The country's GDP shrank from an estimated US\$9 billion in 1997 to estimated US\$ 4 billion in 2008 and a debt burden constituting 120 percent of the country's GDP (Sachikonye, 2012:85;104). The rate of deindustrialisation was phenomenal and by 2009, the country was operating at ten percent of its industrial capacity (Mawowa and Matongo, 2009). Makina et al (2007) found that 57 percent of respondents in their study identified worsening economic conditions as the primary reason for migrating to South Africa. Dendere (2015) also found that the majority left as


they could no longer afford to support their families as their salaries were shrinking in value every day.

The unemployment crisis was linked to the political and economic crisis (Dendere, 2015). Political crisis refers to a crisis of legitimacy and it dovetails with the economic and social crisis (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). This legitimacy, argued in the Gramscian sense of hegemony is generally found wanting in the periphery, rendering political crisis as endemic as economic and social crises (Moyo and Yeros, 2007:104). Many respondents talked about the lack of employment as the main motivation for leaving Zimbabwe. There is a whole generation of children who dropped out of school between 2005 and 2008. The majority were from rural areas (Dendere, 2015: 60). All public services disintegrated. In 2008, there was a massive shortage of basic commodities which piled on political turmoil and violence (Jones, 2010). In response to the troubles on the economic and political front thousands left for Botswana and South Africa (Dendere, 2015: 88). Tevera (2010: 5) notes that 15 200 teachers deserted their jobs between 2007 and 2008, for careers in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and eSwatini, which compelled some schools to close due to shortage of teachers.

As a result of the political and economic situation, families of all social classes were compelled to send members abroad to ensure basic survival, escape from brutal attacks or meet aspirations for accumulation and education” (Bloch, 2008:68). Vulnerable people such as the visually impaired saw their grants wiped out by hyperinflation and chose to join others in search of redemption in South Africa (Mupakati, 2014:110). Bloch (2010) noted that nine percent of the respondents cited the political situation as their main reason for leaving Zimbabwe. Dendere (2015:80) notes that by 2008, the situation was under turmoil that traditional economic classifications of upper and working classes no longer made sense. Everyone was living from hand to mouth. In fact, the wealthiest Zimbabweans were those who worked in the informal sector, selling

foreign currency and basic groceries on the black market”. The figure below shows reasons for leaving Zimbabwe.

Figure 4.1: Reason for leaving Zimbabwe



Source: Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2015: 370

The unstable economic environment during the crisis years led to “the proliferation of the informal sector and parallel black market which absorbed most young people as agents or brokers” (Dendere, 2015:102). Anthropologist Jeremy Jones (2010:285) argues that during the political and economic crisis, the economy of Zimbabwe came to be defined as *kukiya kiya* or getting by. In this economy, no straight transactions were being conducted according to known rules. Rather activities formerly associated with down-class urban youth and part-time female work became the means of livelihood for much of the urban population, as the new discourse of necessity justified any kind of

economic act from illegal currency dealing to prostitution and mugging (ibid). People were securing livelihoods in a battle with circumstances and that survival was a matter of persistence and out right force. Some of the people I interviewed indicated that they used to get by through engaging in anything that would bring income. For instance, Kudakwashe, said:

"I used to kiya kiya. I looked for money everywhere in Zimbabwe. There is nothing that I did not do. I did all things in Zimbabwe. I drove kombis, I went to Chiadzwa to dig for diamond, I sold petrol, and I ordered bales of clothes. Bus transporters like Eagle liner and Phadziri know us, I sold in flea markets. I tried all those things. I had my profession in mechanics but I had to set it aside because there was no money. It came to a point where I could not realise the money. I just grabbed my satchel. I hid my certificates in a book and went to Roadport Bus Station got into a bus and came to South Africa"

While Kudakwashe had educational qualifications, he pursued informal ways to get livelihoods. He tried everything, but it got to a situation where the only option for him was to leave. He left Zimbabwe, he just boarded a bus heading to Johannesburg, not knowing where he was going upon arrival. His experience upon arrival in South Africa is further explored in the next chapter. On a similar note, Jack worked as chief executive finance for a rural municipality. He had a hardware store and used to sell motor spares and building equipment. The situation forced him to sell everything in the hardware or anything he would think customers needed.

The political and economic situation explained above proved to be a powerful push factor (Crush & Tevera, 2010, Sachikonye, 2012; McGregor & Primorac, 2009). The wave of migration during the crisis period "consisted of the healthy and unhealthy, the educated and uneducated, married and unmarried and a myriad other who were moving in search of new life and money" (Mupakati, 2012:112). As a result, Zimbabweans are now scattered in many countries of settlement beyond the Southern African region, such as in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and United Kingdom among others.

Migrants in these countries were usually drawn from the elite and middle class who could afford long distance flights and had professional qualifications and contacts necessary to make the journey. They had networks that could allow them to do so (McGregor, 2009; Dendere, 2015). Between 2001 and 2008, the population of Zimbabwean immigrants in the United Kingdom increased from 47 158 to 200 000, and the number continues to increase (Dendere, 2015).

Within Southern Africa, South Africa is the major destination for labour migrants, professionals, refugees and circulatory traders, even though Zimbabweans are also found in other SADC countries. Some of those that went to South Africa did so relying on cross border smugglers, taking great risks in the migration process (Bloch, 2010). Many people died while trying to cross the crocodile infested Limpopo River, some were murdered and raped along the way. Every social class in Zimbabwe encountered a situation of liminal mobility which forced them to leave the country. The number of Zimbabweans in South Africa is unknown because of poor record keeping.

However, of concern is the deteriorating economic and political environment in Zimbabwe, which is likely to force many more thousands to flee the country. In 2019 the UN deployed special rapporteurs; one on the right to freedom of assembly and association and another on the right to food. The former noted that there had been “very subtle forms of government interference and threats by public authorities to suppress protests and dissent. The report also indicated how the judicial system has been used to impose unlawful charges and/or the use of disproportionate and excessive force, resulting in massive violations against...civil society actors, trade union leaders or representatives of dissenting political parties” (Voule, 2019). The latter reported that 60 percent of Zimbabwe's population of 14 million was food insecure and an estimated eight million people required urgent action to reduce food consumption gaps and save livelihoods (Elver, 2019). The coronavirus pandemic further worsened the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe. The World Food Program estimates that seventy


percent of the country's population will be food insecure by December 2020. The worsening political and economic situation will force families of all social classes to continue sending family members abroad to ensure survival, escape from brutal attacks from the state or meet aspirations for accumulation and education. However, the government of Zimbabwe is currently incapacitated to even provide passports that those who applied in February 2019 do not have their passports yet.

4.9. Conclusion

The discussion above shows the interlinkages between political and economic developments in Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2008. The chapter has shown that migration flows from Zimbabwe cannot be understood without looking at the entrenchment of authoritarianism by the Mugabe regime alongside worsening economic conditions. As a result of factors explained above, the displacement from Zimbabwe was on such a big scale that a quarter of the population across all racial, political and gendered boundaries embarked on a phase of voluntary and involuntary migration to various countries (McGregor, 2007). Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera (2015:264) contend that "the Zimbabwean diaspora is now scattered in over 100 countries".

Crush and Tevera (2010:9) described the demographic profiles of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa as follows: "There are as many women as men, there are migrant of all ages, from young children to the old and infirm, those fleeing poverty and hunger join those fleeing persecution and harassment, they are from all rungs of the occupational and socio economic ladder, they highly read and illiterate, professionals and paupers, doctors and ditch diggers". All social classes encountered liminal mobility as the prospect of a stable livelihood seemed increasingly remote and the sense of a damaged future made people to migrate looking for ways to fend themselves and their families.

The daily experience of hunger, poverty, lack of access to water and of electricity, brutalities at the hands of security services altered peoples ideoscapes about modernity and influenced people to move across the border (Morreira, 2010; Ferguson, 1999; Appadurai, 1990). Thus the erasure of democratic freedoms and economic possibilities made life uncertain and constrained that migration from Zimbabwe was understood as a safeguard against the physical and symbolic uncertainties of Zimbabwean life to pursue socioscaples and ideoscapes of progress (Morreira, 2010). Many Zimbabweans used temporary travel documents or crossed into South Africa using informal entry points. Moreso, Harare was the only neighbouring government which had no visa free agreement with Pretoria then. At the same time, South Africa's denial of the crisis explained in this chapter created a documentation crisis later as fully explored in chapter five. In the next chapter, I focus on the experiences of Zimbabwean migrants when they arrived in South Africa.



5. Chapter Five: Settlement and Experiencing Marginality in South Africa

5.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the experiences of Zimbabweans upon arrival in South Africa in the early 2000s. Chavez (1992:65) argues that crossing the border is a symbolic and physical experience that marks the beginning of territorial rites of passage. This chapter focuses mainly on two aspects. The first is settlement experiences on arrival and the second being labour experiences as undocumented migrants. To explain different settling experiences, I use the concept of capital and how it worked for Zimbabwean migrants during the transitional period. Migration entails moving into a strange area, and the experiences of being received in a new culture, society and languages different from the country of origin leads to liminality. Marginalisation refers to a social, legal, economic, normative and political process through which subjects and groups are both disempowered and constituted as not belonging (Turner, 2016). Marginality invokes notions of exclusions and abjection wherein certain subjects are denied access to common resources. In this case, marginality and liminality describes Zimbabwean migrants juridical statuslessness, the social condition of being an undocumented immigrant, as well as the space between their former social and economic status and their aspirations towards economic success in South Africa (Kihato, 2009).

Migration from Zimbabwe removed people from previous social structures and placed them in liminal situations which are difficult and dangerous. The migrants were no longer in their home country, but at the same time they were not yet settled or incorporated into the new society in the space between origin and destination. Migrants in the transitory phase have to rely on different forms of capital in order to assimilate into the new environment. When migrants enter South Africa, there are no mechanisms to ensure that newcomers easily integrate in the new host society. Zimbabwean migrants were at risk of homelessness, destitution, isolation and lacked economic

opportunities. Without various capitals, migrants would have found it difficult to navigate through the new society. It was a daunting and frustrating process for those without. My argument is that capital acts as a bridge to avoid destitution; it assists in ensuring familiarity with the city and ease in finding jobs. To understand this, I compare the experiences of those who had such capital to those that did not by examining how they experienced or averted destitution and homelessness in the new environment.

Labour experiences in this chapter were shaped by the status of the Zimbabwean immigrants at the time of arrival. Except for two people, one came from the US on a work visa and another with an accompanying spouse visa. Most of the participants had utilised the option of emergency travel documents which were only valid for a week from the date of issue. They did not have passports and therefore were not eligible to apply for residence visas, thus exposing them to legal violence³ (Menjívar and Abrego, 2012). This was before the regularisation of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants through a special amnesty known as the Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project, explored in the next chapter. As Menjívar (2006:1008) argues, legal nonexistence is “a state of subjugation that results in vulnerability to deportation, confinement to low wage jobs, and the denial of basic human needs”. The previous chapter discussed the severity of the crisis in Zimbabwe between 2005 and 2008. While the conditions in Zimbabwe were extremely bad, residence was legal. Morreira (2009:61) argues that the movement of people across the border puts people in a place with a different type of uncertainty, the uncertainty of marginality that is reflected in legal status. Migration to South Africa comes with commitments to send remittances and this means that migrants have no choice but to take whatever employment opportunity comes their way so that they can feed themselves and those left behind back home. This subjected migrants to deskilling and people questioned their being as they felt that “the possibility of realizing their full

³ Menjívar and Abrego (2012: 1380) use the term legal violence to refer to the harmful effects of United States immigration law on Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadoran immigrants in that it justifies violence against the undocumented because they have no recourse to law.

and proper personhood in the new society was indefinitely suspended” (Worby, 2008:430). This was the first manifestation of existential liminality.

5.2. The concept of capital

Bourdieu (1986:242-243) argues that capital makes the game of society and it manifests itself in three guises. These include: (1) economic which is converted into money, (2) cultural which is long lasting dispositions in the objectified state and (3) social capital which is “the aggregate of the potential resources which are linked to the possession of durable networks of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition”. Casson and Giusta (2007:221) note that sociologists typically “regard capital as a stock that is accumulated steadily over time, while economists tend to adopt a forward looking approach in which capital is valued in terms of the benefits derived from its future use”. Lin (1999) conceives capital as investment, for example, education with expected returns. Thus, people go to school investing in knowledge so that they can be rewarded for their skills

Bourdieu’s notion of capital is important in understanding the settlement of immigrants in a new environment and their labour market experiences when they first entered South Africa. In their study on Asian migrants in Los Angeles, Nee and Sanders (2001: 386) argue that “the social, financial and human capital of immigrant families predict the sorting of immigrants into various labour trajectories”. Rishbeth and Powell (2013) note that social networks, language skills, employment history and legal status play an important role within a new country. Pasura (2008) also noted that the mix of capital migrants arrive with and subsequently accumulate shape the degree of integration and participation in the host land’s labour market. Along the same lines, the social, human and financial capital Zimbabwean immigrants had at their disposal determined their settlement and livelihood strategies. Mutsinziwa (2012) notes that studies on the movement of people in Southern Africa hardly employ the concept of capital on

migration to explain preference of destination choices and hostile reception in host countries.

5.3. Settling in South Africa.

The concept of social capital is very important in understanding the settlement experiences of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. Social capital is “valued resources that generate returns to individuals and collective actors in a society” (Lin & Erickson, 2008:4). Scholars who contribute to the discussion of social capital agree on the general premise that social capital is network based (Coleman, 1988; Flap, 1991; Lin, 2000; Putman 1993) among others. Lin and Erickson (2008:4) argue that “there should not be any dispute that social capital is rooted precisely at the juncture between individuals and their social relations and is contained in social networks”. Portes (1998: 7) distinguishes various forms of capital, noting that:

Whereas economic capital is in people's bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads, social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships. To possess social capital, a person must be related to others, and it is those others, not himself, who are the actual source of his or her advantage.

Most migration researchers have adopted the social capital perspective in looking at migration. Migration itself entails the movement of people into strange areas, with different cultures and languages from the country of origin. Social capital thus becomes indispensable. One of the important things to consider when people move to a new environment is having a place to arrive at. For people that had connections or knew friends or relatives in South Africa, their settlement experiences were more pleasant in that regard. For example, Killian who worked as a credit controller at a bank in Zimbabwe before migrating to Cape Town was privileged to have a place to stay when he arrived. He recounted his settling experiences in the following manner:

My mother sells things here. In fact, this is how we were raised. In my family, my mom and dad were traders. My mom always came to Cape Town. Although she knew the systems, she did not want us to come here saying there is high crime rate in South Africa, and it is not a conducive environment socially. When things became tight in Zimbabwe, because my mom always came here, I said I will go straight to Cape Town. When I arrived here, I stayed in the house my mom used to stay when she sold things. In fact in Gugulethu, there is a house that Zimbabweans stayed when trading in Cape Town. It was easy for me to arrive and stay there while looking for what I wanted to do. The house was like a base of Zimbabweans. Somehow we were linked to a social network because of that house. One of the members of the house took my CV to his work place. His boss liked the CV and called me to talk. He told me I was educated and he wanted to help me. He looked for something for me to do for the moment. I did not have a job title then. Anything that the boss wanted me to do, I would do. I would distribute magazines. The company distributed sports magazines. I would do anything I was asked to do. Whenever I will get an interview call, he would accompany me. He allowed me to use his internet and phone to look for a job in my profession. He took me to one or two interviews.

Killian's story reveals how social capital helped him with accommodation and employment. Whilst looking for a job in line with his qualifications, his network was able to provide him with temporary employment. He was accompanied to interviews which was very essential considering he was a new person in the city. Using the internet and telephone helped him look for a job which was not a privilege for some without social capital as the discussion below will show.

Having social capital also helps provide an alternative when things do not go well at the intended place of settlement. Castles (2004:207) notes "Today, migration scholars emphasise the role of social networks in easing the move to a new country and providing help with work, housing and other needs on arrival". Castles further posits that "migrants in Europe after the cold war succeeded only if they could link with existing social networks of previous migrants". Machava and Polzer (2006:171) in their study on Mozambican migrants in Bushbuckridge also discovered that "..the presence or

absence or nature of social networks and their effect on migrants' job seeking has been much debated. Social networks among migrants generally facilitate finding employment, independent of legal status, although they may not consistently increase wage levels or quality of employment". Those with proper documentation and without social networks experience hard times in finding employment (ibid).

Tanyaradzwa came to South Africa when she was 17 years old in 2001. She first worked as a housemaid for a few years, while based in Johannesburg. However, because the earnings were meagre, she decided to migrate to Cape Town where her uncle lived, but almost returned to Johannesburg because of the conditions in the place she had wanted to live. Tanyaradzwa, vividly remembers the story as follows:

I had an uncle [her mother's brother] who stayed in Cape Town; he had visited Zimbabwe at that time. My mum told me about him and gave him my number. My uncle called me, and I told him I did not like the conditions of Johannesburg. He told me Cape Town is better if you can find a job as a domestic worker; at least the salary is better. I convinced my uncle to find me a job, but he said it is best to come stay at his house, and then look for a job because sometimes he may find a job and I am needed on a quick notice. I said it is fine and I came to Cape Town. When I was coming to Cape Town, on my way to Cape Town, I met these other ladies in a train. These ladies were so nice. They were speaking Shona. Remember those years, it was a few Zimbabweans who were in South Africa. If you would hear someone speaking your language, you would say, wow, someone from home. They were speaking Shona; they were nice and friendly and we spoke. I told them that I was going to Cape Town. They asked me where I was going, I told them I did not know where I am going. My uncle is coming to fetch me up and I am looking for a job. These ladies told me they stay in Houtbay. They were friendly all the way and when we arrived in Cape Town, we exchanged numbers. These ladies said I must visit them whenever I feel and they will call to check up on me. So, when I arrived in Cape Town, I waited, and my uncle came to fetch me and went to my uncle's house. I stayed with my uncle only for a week. My uncle used to fight with his wife. Oh it was bad, the very day I arrived, my uncle had a fight with his wife, they were fighting, and they were having their own family issues. I stayed at my uncle's house for like 3 or 4 days

then I decided to go back to Johannesburg because they used to fight every day. My uncle used to smoke and drink. I think he was also doing drugs. Ah my uncle was involved in a lot of bad things. I decided I want to go back to Johannesburg. I convinced my uncle to give me the money for transport. I was planning to go the following morning, and one of the friends I met in the train called to find out how I was. I said I was ok but planning to go back to Johannesburg, she asked why, and I told her, yoh my uncle, I cannot stay there anymore. So, my friend said No, you do not have to go back to Johannesburg. I had told them I was desperate and looking for a job, the salaries I was getting when I was in Johannesburg, and they felt pity for me. Then she said you can come stay with us while looking for a job, I was like really? She said come. They stayed in Houtbay.

Tanyaradzwa only avoided going back to Johannesburg because she had established social capital with women she met on the train. Her friends were willing to help her when the conditions at her uncles' house were not conducive for her to live in while looking for a job. It was in Houtbay that Tanyaradzwa ended up having a tea bags enterprise.

In contrast, Zimbabweans without social capital arrived in Cape Town without a clear sign of where they were going to live and what they would do in order to make a living. Their only aim was to better their life from the economic situation they had run away from in Zimbabwe. Kudakwashe came to South Africa in 2008 as well. He had realized that the economic situation was becoming difficult for him. His situation demonstrates the challenges that migrants face in the transitional period when they arrive in a new place without knowing anyone. When he arrived in Cape Town, he knew no one. He said:

I stayed in Cranborne in Harare, and I could see the economic situation becoming difficult for me. I just grabbed my satchel, I hid my certificates in a book and went to Roadport bus terminus, got into a bus and came to South Africa. When I arrived in Johannesburg, I decided Johannesburg was too crowded and too close to home. I decided to go far and took a bus to Cape Town. I arrived in Cape Town station, it was at 2:30pm. The bus left me there. I had nowhere to go. It was totally a new

place for me. But I was not that confused. I took a walk with my satchel at the back. I saw people running into the entrances of the train platforms at Cape Town train station. I also went there. I was told to go and buy a ticket. I just went to buy a ticket, I did not know where I was going. I bought a ticket. I just bought the same ticket which the old lady who was in front of me bought. I followed her and I sat in the same train next to her. The train drove from Cape Town using the Simons' Town route. When we were around Kenilworth [which is almost 15km away from Cape Town Train station] I asked the lady sitting next to me where the train was going. She laughed at me. You know Xhosa people have this culture that when you ask them things in English, they respond in Xhosa. She asked me where I was going. I said I do not know. She laughed at me again but she then realised that I was serious. I then explained to her that I had just arrived from Zimbabwe. She felt pity for me at that time. She asked me, how you came not knowing where you are going. I just told her long story, let's reserve that for another day. I had my money but I had hidden it. She said where she drop offs, I must also disembark the train. She was staying in Capricorn in Muizenberg. She began looking for a house for me. They looked for a house for me in a taxi. A shack was found. The rent was R350. It was empty and just a ground. I took the satchel which had five or so pairs of clothes. I wore them all and I slept. I did not go far from the house for one week. I was very afraid. I was told by the landlord that there was a Zimbabwean guy who stays around but he woke up very early and come back late at night because he was working as a security guard. I saw that guy after one week. When the guy had off, he took me for a walk. Then I bought a pot, some plates, and other groceries. The guy also gave me blanket.

Kudakwashe's story highlights how the economic situation in Zimbabwe became so terrible that people were willing to go to unknown destinations. Kudakwashe was homeless and did not know which direction his life would take in the new society. The goodwill of people he met on the train was a start to his life. His story demonstrates the challenges that many Zimbabweans fled from political and economic chaos confronted in the receiving country. My argument is that transitioning into the new environment is a dangerous endeavour because it is venturing into the unknown, which makes it liminal. Another example is, Edward who arrived in 2008 from Zimbabwe. He used to buy and

sell things between Zimbabwe and Zambia but left when inflation became unbearable. When he arrived in Cape Town, he knew no one. He said:

My very first time I arrived here, I knew nobody, I had no friend, I had no contact. Basically, when I came I was in the streets. My first night in Cape Town I slept under the bridge in Cape Town. It was in winter, it rained. For food, my first meals in Cape Town were getting those left overs in the bin. It was that then the following day, I went to *point* at the traffic light. I got a job to do mortar mixing. The employer liked me and I was called the second, third and fourth day. The guys later realised I had nowhere to stay and the boss offered me somewhere to stay at his place in Bothasig. That's how I started having some contacts and later on got a job as a petrol attendant.

Edward was homeless in the transitional period. He ate food from bins and he slept under the bridge in the cold weather conditions of Cape Town as he came in winter. Edward also highlighted that his lack of social capital made the situation worse. If a liminal situation is “likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to the wilderness” (Turner, 1967:96), then Kudakwashe and Edward's experiences highlight that migrating to a new environment is venturing into the wilderness, not knowing what lies ahead. While doing field work, many people always said “I used to go point”. I later on realized that the term point was derived from a hardware called Point Hardware found near Sea Point. Most contractors working in Sea point, Camps Bay and surrounding areas come to the hardware to buy materials and to take people to work for the day, either to pick rubble or to mix mortar as Kativhu explains:

When I came here, I did not have money for a living. One of my friends gave me money for a week and I had to look for means and ways to make it work. Going to point was that you cannot sit, you have to start somewhere in life. I used to wait towards Sea Point next to a hardware called Point Hardware. Most contractors working in Sea point and Camps Bay used to come at the hardware to take people to work for the day. I would go there, sometimes I used to pick rubble, sometimes as a handyman mixing mortar. That's where I used to get money for rent and food waiting to get other opportunities. You cannot sit and

wait for manna to rain from heaven. It does not work that way. That is how I started in Cape Town. I used to do construction work.

For Kativhu, it was better because at least his friend gave him a place to stay. His experience also highlights how Zimbabwean migrants were caught in between surviving and sending remittances back home. This forced them to take whatever job for survival so as to meet family obligations. However, this came with some risks as shown below.

5.4. Exploitation of people without documents

Liminality is caused first and foremost by immigration law. It is important to look at the legal provisions that produce liminality. Perbedy (2001) notes that South African government post-1994 label immigrants as "illegals," as if most non-South Africans and all undocumented migrants are criminals. The employment of immigrants is governed by Section 38 of the Immigration Act. The section states that:

(1) No person shall employ -

(a) an illegal foreigner;

(b) a foreigner whose status does not authorise him or her to be employed by such person; or

(c) a foreigner on terms and conditions or in a capacity different from those contemplated in such foreigner's status.

(2) An employer shall make a good faith effort to ascertain that no illegal foreigner is employed by him or her or to ascertain the status or citizenship of those whom he or she employs.

The Immigration Act is a borderland in that it defines migrants and conditions of their residence in South Africa as legal and the illegal, the legitimate and the illegitimate, the overt and the clandestine (Coutin, 2003). Those who are not legal and employed legitimately exist in a space of legal non-existence or juridical statuslessness. In this

space, migrants can be physically present and socially active but lack legal recognition. The space of nonexistence excludes people, limits rights, restricts services, and erases personhood and is largely a space of subjugation (Coutin, 2003:173). The borderland is a liminal zone which lies betwixt and between places, “whilst being neither one thing or another, a space of violence, where the ordinary is suspended and where the usual moralities and laws do not apply-it’s a legal grey zone” (Morreira, 2013:134). Morreira further argues that “the borderland is a space where legal rights that are assumed to be attendant upon individual persons fall away, a space of harms and violations and bodily integrity and security of a person is fiction” (2013:135).

The provisions of the Immigration Act highlight the difficulties Zimbabwean migrants encounter in trying to make a living in South Africa. They fled from hunger to look for opportunities where there are legal barriers to their access to employment. Most Zimbabweans arrived in South Africa without permits or visas let alone passports. Most of my participants had dispensation permits (see next chapter) which were only made available by in 2010. Prior to that, most Zimbabweans were exploited as they did not have documents in their respective workplaces. Elisha talked of his exploitation when he used to go to go and stand by the traffic lights looking for jobs. He said:

One day a company that specialized in tree cutting approached us. They employed me and my friend to go work in Constantia. We were cutting tree logs so that it does not roll into the grapes. To be honest, I had to admit that guy was racist. We were just employed on the road we did not bring food. We asked him that since we were far from the shops, here is our money. Can you kindly buy us food or bread on your way? He answered that he was not our dad. We should have brought our own food, he cannot do that. The guy started even shouting at us. He would say you Zimbabweans you do not want to work, you just need food. You foreigners you do not even have papers. His remarks were negative. We worked from 8am to 6pm and we were only paid R120 rands. It was on a Friday. He asked us if we could come back on Monday again. We told him, we

want money but we cannot work like slaves. We were so tired that day that when we got to the train station we fell asleep. This is how tired we were.

The above text shows how some employers take advantage of undocumented migrants knowingly, even going to the extent of denying them food. Somers (2008:22) argues “that undocumented migrants are indentured servants who are rightless and can be exploited”. The way Elisha’s employer referred to them as being undocumented highlights how the law is a site of violence, making it socially acceptable to abuse undocumented migrants because they broke the law by being undocumented. The lack of Elisha’s juridical existence meant that he could not report the abuse to the police who are mandated to dispense services on the basis of legal identity. The status of being undocumented therefore determines under what circumstances the law provokes legal relationships such as rights and becomes the medium for negotiating one’s position in addressing perceived wrongs (Morreira, 2013: 137).

Fischer-Lichte (2005:38) notes that after separation, “the performing subject enters a new state where: they have all transgressed the boundary separating the ‘normal’ state from the different worlds – into what Turner calls a state of liminality – which allows for many other kinds of transgression and, accordingly for new, sometimes shocking, confusing, horrible, in short, unbearable experiences”. Turner (1967:94) argues that “Liminal entities are neither here nor there; Their behaviour is normally passive or humble; they must obey their instructors implicitly and accept arbitrary punishment without complaint”. The excerpt above shows that Elisha as an undocumented migrant occupied a liminal space as he was rightless with no recourse to law when subjected to harassment and exploitation. The employer was well aware that undocumented migrants do not have protection from the law. This is evident in the words, “...You Zimbabweans you do not want to work, you just need food. You foreigners you do not even have papers”. While work is a key marker of personhood for migrants, Elisha’s

employer reminded him that his physical presence was not legally registered and he simply does not exist without papers (Coutin, 2003).

Without legal authorisation to work, “migrants find themselves in extremely precarious conditions subject to abuse and exploitation by employers and denied access to education and health care (Basok and Wiesner, 2018:1274). While undocumented migrants have rights, by virtue of being undocumented, they are powerless, marginalised and vulnerable (Bloch, 2010). Undocumented immigrants are in a liminal position because they are “outside of the law of a country due to their status as illegal immigrants but are still regulated and constrained in legally-sanctioned, although extra-legal ways” (Agamben, 1998: 1). This category of undocumented people is the legal form of what cannot have legal form (Mosselson, 2010). Muzondidya (2008) also argues that being undocumented brings with itself ambiguities and contradictions absent from documented travellers. On a similar note, Wellington explains his experiences:

I saw an advert for a job in Brackenfell and I applied. I was invited for an interview and to do some hands on. I was good at it but my friend, the job was very difficult. I worked there, day and night. Some days, I would go home at 2am in the morning. At this company, everything was difficult. At that place, you do not want work at a company like that. When you enter the door, you were told to switch off your phone.... It was almost like you were in a confinement of some sort. You worked overtime, there was no overtime payment. I would work from 7 am to 2 am, it did not matter, and you just work.

Wellington likens his working conditions to some confinement. The situation also reveals challenges that migrants face. It is a liminal situation. Migrating imposes the burden to send remittances to family members in Zimbabwe. The economic situation in Zimbabwe meant that migrants had no choice but to continue going to work to feed themselves and their families back home. Turner (1967:97) notes that the “liminal phase entails sometimes shocking, confusing, horrible, in short, unbearable experiences”. The experiences highlighted by Wellington were unbearable but had to be endured.

Godfrey is another case. He first arrived in Johannesburg in December 2004. In December 2005, he came to Cape Town and experienced exploitation at his work place. He said:

I came to Cape Town in December 2005. When I came to Cape Town I was not working. I arrived and came to Philippi. I looked for a job. I went to the traffic lights. The first day I got there, a truck came through looking for people who can work for him for carpentry. We were doing renovation jobs, renovating some homes and stuff. I got a job there and I was paid R80 a day. I was renting a shack in Phillipi. I was paying R60 a month and R20 for electricity. That boss used to be very rough. He was the kind of a person who would ill treat you, shout at you, and call you all names. He would always say if you're tired go back to Mugabe because I am just helping you. I used to be underpaid because I did not have papers. I used to be paid R80 per day. If I work over time, he promises to give me money. I never received the money. He would say go and report wherever you want to go. How am I going to report when I do not have papers to start by? So I was working in fear, and I decided to walk away. I got sick and tired of it, and told myself I am going to look for another job. The boss asked where are you going to go, and I replied I will look for another job. In, the second job I got, I had favour with the employer.

Godfrey raises a couple of issues. First, the reference to former Zimbabwe President Mugabe is "an exclusionary tactic - that identity serves distinguish a migrant as belonging somewhere" (Hungwe and Gelderblom, 2014:83). This is done by making references to political leaders. I have also been a victim of this at the university, banks or hospitals. My first name is Shingirai. I first came to South Africa to study in 2010, Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai were in an inclusive government following the 2008 disputed elections. When people ask me my name, the next question would be, "So are you related to Morgan Tsvangirai? Do you think Morgan Tsvangirai will rule Zimbabwe? Do you think it was wise for Tsvangirai to join the inclusive government?" In most instances, it took longer to receive the services I had gone looking for while we

discuss politics. Even if I told people my name, they heard it as Tsvangirai instead of Shingirai I ended up providing a short cut to them that I am called Shingi.

Secondly, the lack of documents explains Godfrey's reasoning behind maintaining isolation even when he should have reported criminal behaviour to police. Manjengenja (2014:21) notes that undocumented migrants face the risk of deportation and avoid confrontation with the state. A minor incident may jeopardize their entire existence and it is best to avoid contact with the state to the minimum. The situation makes migrants afraid of availing themselves of the rights they may enjoy for fear of being exposed to immigration authorities. Basok (2006 et al) note that the position of these migrants is made more vulnerable because of the interconnectedness between human rights and citizenship which makes it difficult for those without.

Rutherford and Radisson (2007:627) in their study on farm workers in the Limpopo province observed that “employers took advantage of the desperation of Zimbabwean immigrants and the fact that their legality was unclear”. Undocumented migrants need “to remain invisible to authorities for fear of deportation, so employers can exploit these migrants because they are well aware of the desperate situation and their need to earn money to support themselves and their dependents in Zimbabwe” (Bloch, 2010:246). Arendt (1979:375) argues that “the calamity of the rightless is not that they're equal before the law, but that no law exists for them”⁴. In other words, undocumented migrants exist outside the community of their existence as they are effectively expelled from humanity (Shaap, 2011). Section 36 of the South African Constitution has a limitation clause that allows for the suspension or removal of constitutional rights in particular cases in dealing with undocumented immigrants. The 1999 White Paper on International Migration pointed out that being an illegal immigrant in South Africa – “triggers this section of the Constitution and makes it legal

⁴ Arendt observed how the two world wars rendered millions of people stateless, and were treated badly because they lacked right to have rights.

to deprive illegal immigrants of basic human rights and due processes of law” (Moselsson, 2010: 645). The emphasis on those deemed to be undocumented foreigners shows that they are a different category who are excluded from the normal course of law and are de facto in a ‘right-less’ space

Abrego and Lakhani (2015:267) note that in United States of America, undocumented immigrants are “often labelled criminals for behaviour that was historically not criminal thereby facilitating forms of structural violence and symbolic violence that harms immigrants and their loved ones”. Structural violence manifests itself in wage insecurity and a general uncertainty that effectuates the suffering for vulnerable communities from thriving economically (Farmer, 2004). When migrants are repeatedly exposed to inequalities and violence, it becomes symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Mosselson (2010:648) also notes that in South Africa “undocumented immigrants are frequently arrested alongside other criminals and rounded up in fishing trips by the police. These arrests are included in crime statistics even though to be an illegal person is not a serious crime; it is an immigration offense and not a criminal offense”.

Bloch (2010:246) notes that “the lack of rights and protection for undocumented migrants is a global phenomenon and one that maintains unequal and stratified societies”. She further argues that undocumented migrants do not benefit from “international protection, human rights and nation state citizenship associated with more recent concepts of post-national citizenship” (2010: 234). For the undocumented, the fear of being caught and deported makes them to remain invisible and not make a public display of their national origin. The inability of the government “to protect undocumented immigrants as well and the harsh manner in which they are treated when caught by police officials encourages them to remain silenced” (Manjengena, 2014:21). South Africa deported thousands of undocumented migrants to Zimbabwe every year.

In Britain for example, McGregor (2007:812) highlights that if abusive employers are reported, in the legislation, “there is no protection for vulnerable and desperate workers who risk not only losing their jobs but also detention and deportation”. As a result individuals exploited can only look for jobs with better conditions or end up setting up businesses to create employment for themselves. Kriger (2010:78) notes that while Zimbabweans “are looking for work to help their families at home to survive, but because they are deemed to be in the country illegally, they are vulnerable to arrest, detention and deportation by government officials and open to exploitation by employers”.

Worby (2010) highlights that Zimbabweans in Johannesburg limited their activities in the city centre as a way to avoid meeting police officers. Tatenda came to Johannesburg in 2004 and this was his experience with state officials when he was working as a driver.

The first thing I did was picking up kids at a school with a kombi. I would pick kids to and from school. At night, I would pick up people at restaurants. I would drive at night dropping people in the whole of Johannesburg. It was hectic. I dealt with all the problems; cops at night. Generally, these people I picked at night were Zimbabweans working in restaurants. Most of them did not have documents. The cops were always on the lookout for kombis like mine. They would search us at night. One night I was coming from Fourways at night, as I was driving; this was the same year a business man was shot and killed. This had happened in the same road. There was so much traffic. I remember cops appearing from nowhere and stopping me and told everybody to get out of the van. They started saying give us your documents you *kwere kweres*. That day I did not have my passport with me. I was taken to Sandton police station and was locked there for the whole night until the owner of the van came to bail me out the next day. These guys were so rough in handling the matter. The way they treated us; it was like they were treating animals. They were not willing to listen or hear anything. They were just too rough. They would not have done the same thing if they were dealing with white people or other people from other places. Because we were black people from Zimbabwe, it was always that kind of treatment.

The main conclusion drawn from the above mentioned encounter with the police shows how the police tend to portray immigrants as foreigners who do belong to South Africa. Hungwe and Gelderblom (2014:82) argue that the police seem to have monopolized the use of the word *makwerekwere* when dealing with foreigners. Makwerekwere means people whose language is not understandable. The police also have a tendency of institutionalizing “border performances” at any given time in public space (Hungwe and Gelderblom, 2014:83). This not only affects undocumented migrants but the documented as well, as they embarrass people found without possession of required documentation. Bauder (2008:315) argues that “citizenship as a key mechanism of distinction renders migrants vulnerable and exploitable”.

Neocosmos (2008:688) notes that “the police are particularly notorious in using their powers to avoid intervening to help foreigners when attacked by criminals by raiding and beating up migrants in sanctuaries and by tearing their official documents”. Noting further, Neocosmos highlights that “there is partial evidence on several occasions where the police and employees of various government departments encouraged communities to uproot or round up illegal immigrants leading to systematic xenophobic violence” (ibid). Mupakati (2012) also notes that the police in Polokwane and employers colluded to conduct raids at the end of the month so as to deprive migrants of their earnings. However, thanks to mobile phones, workers now get to hear about those raids before the police arrive so they can run away and avoid clashing with the police.

Muzondidya (2010) notes that Zimbabweans have been a target of xenophobia and racism in South Africa. In their first days in South Africa, the respondents in my study experienced both xenophobia and racism, not in the terms of physical violence per se. Some experienced xenophobic discourses that assert South Africa’s superiority over Zimbabweans drawing upon western notions of modernity as well as apartheid supremacist ideologies (Muzondidya, 2010:46). For many South Africans, Africa is a

dark continent that is underdeveloped while South Africa belongs to the developed world of Europe and America.

Formulated within this discourse, the South African public discourse about Zimbabweans and other African migrants sees them as “primitive and uncivilized beings from the African jungles north of the Limpopo River” (Muzondidya, 2010:47). This was the case with Mbada at his workplace. He said:

I got into a new working environment. I took my food to warm in the kitchen. The tea lady was a local person. She asked me if I even knew how to operate a microwave. I looked at her. She said I did not know that there were microwaves in Zimbabwe. I thought Zimbabwe was a desert or so. I don't blame her or anyone. It is probably people were raised or made to believe about the situation in Zimbabwe. Before I came here, I stayed in Botswana for a couple of months. The people there were more humane than here. I think nowadays things are better because there is so much Zimbabweans and other foreign nationals as compared to ten years back. Ten years back, if you hear people speak Shona, you will turn around because they were few Zimbabweans then. The treatment that we got from the local people that we were staying with made the stay more challenging.

Charles' experiences of how South Africans perceive Zimbabwe as a backward nation whose people are not familiar with microwaves is linked to thoughts of Zimbabwe being a desert. This relates to popular discourse among South Africans who see other Africans as coming from strange and backward contexts that are characterized by primitivism, corruption, authoritarianism and poverty. Their origins are thought to be failed states whose inhabitants “wish only to partake of South African resources and wealth at the expense of its citizens” (Neocosmos, 2008: 590). Zimbabwean migrants “have to deal with categories of ethnicity and race which are still used to denote boundaries and status hence making it doubly difficult for them to cope” (Manjengena, 2014: 21). In 2008, xenophobic attacks were directed at people from Zimbabwe, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique and some minority South African ethnic groups. This left more

than 60 dead while others were injured. This will be explained in greater detail in chapter eight. Secondly, the excerpt from Charles shows that like many Zimbabweans, he entered South Africa with ideas of treating strangers and quickly learned that he was an outsider and notions of regionalism and commonality are disregarded in favour of difference (Morreira, 2010).

5.5. Underemployment

Many Zimbabweans come to South Africa to improve their economic conditions having left Zimbabwe. The migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa resembles liminal transitional rites. The people will have left their earlier professions to enter a new country which places them in a kind of limbo in which they are neither in their old roles nor their new ones, until their job search gets them a new job, commensurate to positions held before departing Zimbabwe. While job searching, migrants are condemned to taking whatever comes their way which makes them question their being. Bourdieu (1986:242) notes that academic qualifications are cultural capital in an institutionalised state. Noting further, “an academic qualification makes it possible to establish conversion rates between cultural capital and economic capital by guaranteeing the monetary value of a given academic capital” (ibid).

Most migrants did not use their qualifications (papers) and professional experience when they first entered the South African labour market. This finding is consistent with other studies that highlight that Zimbabweans facing a tough job market are forced to sell cheap labour in various economic sectors in South Africa (Bloch, 2010; Kupakuwana, 2017). Jack for example had an accounting degree and had worked for over ten years in various rural districts as finance director, treasurer, group accountant for a big corporation, and then came to South Africa. When he arrived in South Africa, he used to go to *point* to look for any job. Jack used to stand by the traffic lights, stopping cars and asking for any job. He worked in construction from September to

December 2007. From January 2008, he worked in construction, helping to mix mortar. In addition to his accounting degree, Jack had a Masters in Business Administration (MBA), with more than seven years working experience but could not get a job based on his papers and experience. In a similar case, Killian came to South Africa in 2005. He had studied towards a finance degree in Zimbabwe and worked as a credit controller for three years at a bank headquarters before migrating. When he arrived in South Africa, he started by welding. He had taken metal work, as a secondary school practical subject, in line with the Zimbabwean educational system's requirement that a student must choose at least one practical subject. Such subjects include but are not limited to: building, agriculture, metal work, food and nutrition, as well as fashion and fabrics. Mbada was 25 when he came to South Africa. He had just completed his university degree. He spoke of his frustration with not finding a job within his area of study. He said:

Look, if you have an honours degree in Finance and Banking and you go and work in farms picking grapes or you go and work in a construction company digging trenches. Or you go and work at a rubble company loading rubble. Surely speaking that is a real struggle, it will make you think that you spent seven years in primary school, six years in secondary school and four years in university, you feel wasted. To make matters worse, you will be staying in a shack.

From the above quote Charles was experiencing existential liminality because of the nature of job, the housing environment and felt his schooling was a waste of time. This feeling is called abjection. Worby (2008:430) defines abjection as "the condition in which an appropriate or desirable morality is impossible to maintain and therefore the possibility of realizing one's full and proper personhood is indefinitely suspended". Makanaka came to South Africa in 2005. She had first visited Cape Town and South Africa in general after winning an award at work in Zimbabwe. She said;

I worked at a five-star lodge in Zimbabwe. Before that, I was a nurse at Harare Hospital but left because of the salaries. At the hotel, I used to do a lot of things and in 2004, I got an employee of the year award. The company bought for me five flight tickets, Harare to Johannesburg, to Cape Town, to Durban, to Johannesburg and then back to Harare. When I came, I used to stay in Kenilworth [one of the affluent suburbs of Cape Town] in a hotel. By that time, coins were still buying in South Africa. In Zimbabwe coins were no longer in use. I was carried away that I decided to come back as soon as I got back to Zimbabwe. I also thought money was very easy to find. While I was working, I was doing a short course on computers. In the 2000s, that is when people became interested in computers. I did pastel accounting. I thought I had it all enough to make it possible to look for a job in South Africa. I then came here in 2005. As a person who came with a flight, I skipped a lot of places and did not get to experience the real life of Cape Town as I was a holiday maker. When I then came back by to myself, I realized what I observed at first was because I was using company sponsorship, using money that I did not personally work for. I then realized things were not all good. I got employed as a domestic worker, yes I was driving a mop. It was not easy to get an office job. I worked in Tamboerskloof earning R1700 a month. I thought of returning to Zimbabwe, but it was difficult to do so because I had told them life in South Africa was paradise. Life in Cape Town was a whole difficult than the life I lived in Zimbabwe. Because here I had to work hard, if it is in the kitchen, I had to work hard. I had to clean a very big house with three storeys, I had to do all the washing while earning R1700. That R1700 was different from what I expected. When I resigned in Zimbabwe, my boss had offered me a company car and an office in Zimbabwe. I would have been in a better position than that the R1700 I was earning here. While working, it was always in me that I had let myself down by coming to South Africa. It was better to be at home than what I experienced here. As I said, here you have to work for the money with too much energy. While sitting at your verandah at home in Zimbabwe, you could ask your friends to give you such amount of money and survive. I worked for that white person for a year. I did not even get bonus but was given a pair of worn out tommy shoes. At home I used to get bonus. But to go back, it was impossible. I had let myself down. Because domestic work is very hard. I decided to upgrade myself in by enrolling for a human resources and labour relations diploma with University of South Africa. It was the only get way for me to upgrade myself into office work. So, while working

in domestic work, I had to hide my laptop under the bed so that the boss would not know I am studying. If she knows, she will think I will leave him at any time. When I finished my course, I thought it was an easy thing. I wanted to leave the apron for a bow tie, looking smart as an office lady. But when I finished my course, I thought it was an easy thing. I was called and went to so many interviews. I realised human resources wanted someone who was bilingual. I did not speak Afrikaans, or Xhosa. Another challenge again.

Makanaka's visit to South Africa left her imagining a sense of modernity she was to experience when she migrated. She imagined living an opulent life if she gets a job in line with her work experience. She was a qualified nurse, she had done pastel accounting, and she had worked in a hotel. She had experienced the paradise kind of life in South Africa when she first came on a sponsored holiday. This made her to leave Zimbabwe. However, she found herself worse off than the position she previously occupied. Makanaka was in an existential liminality similar to Ferguson's (1999:236) definition of abjection as the process of being thrown aside, expelled or discarded. In his work on mine workers in the Zambian Copper Belt, Ferguson (1999: 236) described abjection as "the sense of which the promise of modernization had been betrayed and they were thrown in the full circle of humanity, thrown back into the ranks of the underclass and cast down into world of rags". According to Ferguson, "abjection was not only the futility of realizing one's life goals that rendered one's situation abject, but the collapse of a specific way of imagining temporality-the promise of modernity itself that did it so" (ibid). To Makanaka, it was not only the futility of realizing her dream that rendered her abject, but that even after having furthered her studies; she faced new barriers in language. The disparity between what she expected and what she experienced in South Africa rendered her abject. Nee and Sanders (2001:386) note that "the human capital that migrants bring with them and continue to accumulate can be important resources which open up employment in the social main stream and in the ethnic community". This was not the case with Makanaka.

In Johannesburg, Worby (2010) observed abjection amongst Zimbabweans who were stigmatized yet earning a living motivated them to remain under cover of relatives. Worby (2010) speaks of how Zimbabweans in Johannesburg would turn off their mobile phones to avoid relatives or friends who would be intending to visit them so that they do not find out their shameful ways of earning a living. McGregor (2008: 466) in her study of Zimbabweans in the care industry in the United Kingdom uses the concept of abject spaces “to capture the ways in which Zimbabweans are situated in relation to their previous lives, and the legal and economic constraints on their capacity to lead a dignified life in aspiring to be upwardly mobile in relation to their peers and relatives back home”.

However, having the language capital can be a pathway out of abjection and lead to social mobility of newly arrived immigrants. Siziba (2014) argues that there has been some recognition of the importance of languages in understanding Zimbabwean migrants' experiences in South Africa, but with little effort to foreground language as the primary point of analysis. Scholars have mainly limited their analysis to the role of language in Zimbabwean migrants' negotiation of identity politics. Polzer (2008: 20) for example argues that “the linguistic and cultural affinity of Ndebele speaking Zimbabweans allows them to pass as South Africans in everyday interactions”. Worby (2008:425) notes “with the advantage of being Nguni language speakers and often sharing South African surnames, Zimbabweans from Matabeleland such as Dingani and his sister have open to them an avenue of incorporation that is generally not available to speakers of ChiShona”.

Familiarity with the language of the host nation is an example of “human cultural capital that can yield profit in the majority society” (Nee & Sanders, 2001:386). For example, Takunda, was thrust into abjection in his first job, but his language capital provided a path for social mobility for him in the transitional period. He said

I arrived in Cape Town in winter 2008 and after about three days. I went to wait on the traffic lights. We were taken for this destruction and demolition company for four days. I won't forget it. We were working very hard and earning R80 a day, I won't forget that. I would always calculate how much I was getting in US dollars. Does it make sense what I have done? Then after that, we spent two weeks, no work, it was raining. The first job after that was a mortar mixer again. The other Xhosa guys I worked with did not understand English neither did they understand Afrikaans. Fortunately, I have some bit of Ndebele upbringing. So could understand what was happening with the clicks in Xhosa language and my English was fluent. With that I became a go-between of instructions between the boss and my other work colleagues. Eventually the Xhosa guys eventually left, and I was told to look for people that I can effectively work with. From a mortar mixer I became a supervisor for mortar mixers because of language (laughs). I became a supervisor. I was a supervisor for three years from 2008 to 2011.

Takunda's earnings when he arrived in South Africa made him question his being and he wondered if his decision to migrate was worth it. He desired to experience a better life in South Africa, but found himself doing manual labour work with very little earnings. However, he was able to use his language capital since English is the medium of instruction in Zimbabwean schools from first grade in primary schools. The indigenous languages, Shona and Ndebele, are taught as one of the subjects that pupils study from grade one in primary school. English is the medium of instructions for all other school subjects. Comparing the case of Makanaka and Takunda, we see that the "social character of language and its function as a key transactional instrument of human groups" (Prah, 2011:3) make it a supreme cause of abjection and at the same time a path out of abjection. Ndebele is one of the official languages in Zimbabwe. In South Africa, it is also an official language and mutually intelligible to other languages such as Zulu and Xhosa.

5.6. Conclusion

The migration to South Africa for Zimbabweans altered their lives in many ways. This chapter has shown that Zimbabwean migrants experienced liminality in three ways during their early days in South Africa. Firstly, many migrants lived on the margins when they first entered Cape Town and South Africa in general. They were at risk of homelessness, destitution, isolation and lacked opportunities. Without various capitals, migrants would have found it difficult to navigate through the new society. It was a daunting and frustrating process for those without.

Secondly, the immigration status of being undocumented subjected migrants to legal violence through low wages, working long hours with very little pay and no recourse to law, as they were rightless. South Africa's immigration policy deprives undocumented immigrants certain rights and due processes of law as those deemed to be illegal aliens constitute a different category and are de facto in a 'right-less' space. Without legal authorisation to stay and work, Zimbabwean migrants found themselves in extremely precarious conditions which subjected them to juridical liminality through abuse and exploitation by employers. The examination of everyday experiences of the migrants during their transition sets the foundation for various liminal experiences which for many migrants never came to an end as future chapters will show.

Thirdly, migration to South Africa brought with itself commitments to send remittances and this meant migrants had no choice but to take whatever job comes their way to feed themselves and their families back home. This subjected them to deskilling and people questioned their being whilst working in certain occupations. The existential liminality which they experienced stemmed from their own motives of migration. They migrated with their qualifications and professional experience and expected to earn enough to feed their families back home. To understand this marginality, I compared their work experiences to pre-migration labour experiences so as to demonstrate how specific

ways of imagining a decent life was suspended. It was the futility of realizing one's life goals through deskilling, "thrown back into the ranks of the underclass and cast down into world of rags" (Ferguson, 1999: 236) in the migratory context. This rendered them existentially liminal as the promise of migration itself was a certain modernity different from what they experienced.



6. Chapter Six: Liminality in Incorporation: Regularisation of Undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa

6.1. Introduction

Zimbabweans continued to enter South Africa because of the severe political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe explained in chapter four. The sheer number of Zimbabweans increased in South Africa that “the word Zimbabwean was being used as a synonym for foreigner” (Muzondidya, 2010:42). The “numerical preponderance was greater than that of Mozambican refugees during its civil wars in the 1980s and 1990s” (Kriger, 2010:81). However, most of them were undocumented. This chapter focuses on the incorporation process of undocumented Zimbabweans through the Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project (DZP). Studies on immigrant regularisation rarely discuss the detailed conditions, procedures and bureaucratic requirements in the documentation of undocumented migrants.

I argue in this chapter that the incorporation process was characterized by various liminal experiences. Sassen (1998:56) argues that “migrations do not just happen; they are produced. Migrations do not involve just any possible combination of countries; they are patterned”. This argument applies more precisely to the existence of undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa. Their undocumented status was not simply self-generated or random, but it was produced and patterned (De Genova, 2002). To understand this, we need to examine South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe during the Mbeki era. Moreso, South Africa had a policy that it will not poach skills from other African countries (Crush et al, 2015). This means that many Zimbabwean migrants were left with the option of applying only for asylum. The options of either applying for work permits or seeking asylum were closed to them thereby producing illegality.

6.2. South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe

Thabo Mbeki took over the South African presidency from Nelson Mandela in 1999. His foreign policy approach towards Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe was that of quiet diplomacy (Graham, 2006). After the surprising success of the MDC in the 2000 parliamentary election, Mbeki viewed the opposition party as a symptom of weakness and errors committed by ZANU PF. To him, this could be warded off by “a combination of sustainable and stabilising macroeconomic policies pushed by reformers in ZANU-PF” (Raftopoulos, 2010: 710). Mbeki was interested in preserving Robert Mugabe and a reformed ZANU PF than a complete regime change (Masunungure, 2010). Pretoria was also concerned that Zimbabwe's security sector “would not accept an elected MDC government and worried that the opposition would not have capacity to run the state” (Raftopoulos, 2010: 710). Thus the Pretoria's government involvement in Zimbabwe's crisis was driven largely by the motive to promote stabilisation and not democratisation. Mbeki moved closer to ZANU PF ignoring the centrality of violence as a modality in Zimbabwe since 2000 (Raftopoulos, 2013:3). Gupta (2012) argues that modern states normalise structural violence that state violence, poverty, malnutrition and inadequate livelihoods are perceived as the normal order of things and this is the approach the South African government took towards Zimbabwe.

Another school of thought argues that Mbeki was also constrained to intervene in Zimbabwe because of the close relationship between MDC, a worker based party and labour federations in South Africa in particular the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Mlambo, 2006:68). In Zambia, a worker based party, the Multi Party Democracy dislodged the nationalist party from power and in Zimbabwe MDC emerged from nowhere to pose a serious challenge to the ruling party ZANU PF in the year 2000. To South Africa, should the MDC had succeeded in toppling ZANU PF, it would have sent a

wrong message to the labour federations in South Africa that they can dislodge the African National Congress from power (Mlambo, 2006: 69)

More so, to Mbeki, the crisis in the north of the Limpopo was another “grand imperialist conspiracy to forcibly reform or dislodge all African revolutionary liberation movements with Zimbabwe just being a second pilot project” (Badza, 2009:149). Thus, the crisis “was a conflict between African revolutionaries and imperialist backed reactionaries disguised within democratic movements and being used to reverse gains attained by liberation movements” (ibid). Mbeki’s political cover ensured that Mugabe was free to intensify state repression against political opposition and pursue disastrous economic policies (McKinley, 2004). When the Western world raised concerns over violence in Zimbabwe, Mbeki would defend Mugabe by accusing the West of having a stubborn mind-set that at all times thought it should determine what everyone else does. Mugabe’s violent rule was solidified by the crucial backing of the Mbeki government (ibid).

Raftopoulos (2010:710) notes that Pretoria was thoughtful “about being perceived as a regional bully”. It thus walked on a tight rope by not opposing Mugabe whilst hoping not to repel Western support. From 2000 to 2008, the South African government denied the existence of the crisis in Zimbabwe. It supported the Mugabe regime which not only delayed a political solution in Zimbabwe, but also undermined those displaced by the situation who sought protection and assistance in South Africa (McGregor, 2010:3). Some of the people that left Zimbabwe during this period might be considered under the 1951 convention as they left because of political persecution. The convention defines a refugee as “any person who is outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, on account of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group, or political opinion” (Bloch, 2010: 237). However, South Africa considered all Zimbabweans as economic migrants (Bloch, 2010: 237).

Moreso, when most Zimbabweans entered South Africa, Harare was the only government which had no visa free agreement with Pretoria. A combination of this policy and Zimbabwe's political and economic conditions made it virtually impossible for the poor to enter legally into South Africa (Polzer, 2008). Dendere (2015:88) notes that by 2008, the country was under turmoil such that "traditional economic classifications of upper and working classes no longer made sense". Everyone was surviving from hand to mouth. The visa policy demanded an invitation letter from a relative in South Africa and R2 000 cash from the person intending to visit. This meant that the main entry point for those without these requirements was informal border crossings, otherwise termed 'illegal entry'. As a result, many Zimbabweans in South Africa lived on the margins of illegality and faced myriad of hardships, distress, abjection and exclusion. The refusal to admit that there was a political crisis was reflected in the "miniscule number of people granted refugee status in South Africa and continued deportation policy which was only halted when Jacob Zuma assumed power in 2009" (Mupakati, 2012:33).

Polzer (2008) also notes that Zimbabweans were white-listed by the Department of Home Affairs in 2002; only 1000 asylum applications were granted from a total of 44 000 between 2002 and 2006. This contrasts with the United Kingdom which gave 19 370 asylum permits applications to Zimbabweans during the same period (Pasura, 2008). Crush et al (2015:370) note that, South Africa did not "offer work permits to African migrants because Pretoria did not want to poach skills from other African countries thus leading to the rise in forged documentation, made possible by corrupt government officials". The nature of relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe led to a homogenized rejection of any asylum claims by Zimbabweans. The result was the increase in the number of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants and pressure on the asylum system which was the only alternative means of accessing permission to remain in South Africa legally.

Nevertheless, Zimbabwe remained a South African problem. In 2002, Zimbabwe held a controversial violent presidential election. South Africa endorsed the elections as free and fair. However, the election period was characterised by electoral malpractices which were condemned by the international community. This also led to the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. This left President Thabo Mbeki “trying to make the best from a bad job by trying to bring the two antagonists Robert Mugabe (ZANU PF) and Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC) together” (Phimister, 2004:274). While the dialogue failed to materialise, Mazarire (2013:71) argues that “the patterns that shaped the interests represented in 2002 manifested themselves six years later in the form of South Africa playing a central role, the key interests of Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe”. Following the violence on civil and political leaders on 07 March 2007, “Mbeki was appointed by SADC to facilitate electoral reform in Zimbabwe” (Sachikonye, 2011:1). The post 2008 presidential run off crisis re-triggered SADC re-engagement with the Zimbabwe crisis, with Mbeki negotiating for a power sharing deal as the ideal option, drawing lessons from the template applied in other African contexts. A similar process had been conducted following conflict during Kenya’s 2007 polls. The Mbeki-led talks resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 15 September 2008” (Masunungure & Mutasa, 2011:134). His mediation between MDC and ZANU-PF “was driven by the motive that Mbeki did not want to be seen as a Western ally against one of the continent’s most prominent nationalist figures. He therefore sought to protect Mugabe from direct criticism and outright defeat” (Cheeseman, 2011:339). His mediation can best be seen through the lenses of anti-colonialism and not democratisation and the struggle for human rights. The mediation led to the government of national unity between ZANU-PF and MDC between 2009 and 2013. As the political crisis deepens in 2020, the South African government and the ruling party ANC are also trying to mediate the Zimbabwe crisis again.

6.3. The Dispensation Zimbabwe Permit (DZP)

The South African Immigration Act of 2002 is a principal law governing migration. It is supported by various subsidiary directives issued by Home Affairs. The Act provides for thirteen different temporary permit classes: visitor's permit; study permit; treaty permit; business permit; crew permit; medical treatment permit; relative's permit; work permit; retired person's permit; corporate permit; exchange permit; asylum transit permit; and cross-border and transit permit. Different conditions apply to these permits. People from other countries without permits are deemed illegal and according to the Act must be arrested and deported.

Section 31(2) (b) of the South African Immigration Act 13 of 2002 indicates that:

*“Upon application, the Minister of Home Affairs may under terms and conditions determined by him: grant a foreigner or a category of foreigners the **rights of permanent residence** for a specified or unspecified period when **special circumstances** exist which should justify such a decision. Provided the Minister may (a) exclude one or more identified foreigners from such categories (ii) or with good cause, withdraw such rights from a foreigner or a category of foreigners”.*

It is imperative to note that the minister may change the conditions when he deems necessary as the permits are given under special circumstances. A close reading of the section of the Act shows that foreigners may be granted rights of permanent residence and not temporary legal status. This was the approach taken by the South African government when it granted three immigration amnesties from 1996 to 2000. These amnesties offered permanent residence to contract mineworkers from SADC countries who had worked in South Africa for at least ten years before 1995. The other were undocumented citizens of SADC member states who had entered the country clandestinely during the apartheid period and lived in South Africa for more than five years and former Mozambican refugees who had arrived before 1992 (Perbedy, 2001).

Unlike previous amnesties that offered permanent residence, the DZP was the first immigration amnesty which does not provide a pathway to permanent residence. The DZP is similar to the United States of America's temporary protected status (TPS) which offers legal residency to nationals of designated countries and does not offer a pathway for permanent residency (Menjívar, 2006). It is just deferred deportation.

In 2010, the South African government introduced the DZP special documentation process. In naming the process dispensation, the South African government was signalling the temporality and insecurity of the legality the permits would provide. The DZP was part of South Africa's foreign policy towards Zimbabwe which Polzer (2010) argues was fragmented and delayed. Polzer (2008:2) argues that Zimbabweans' unprecedented migration tested Pretoria's "legal and institutional infrastructure for migration management and refugee protection to the limit". More so, the lack of a coherent response attracted critical local and international attention when Mbeki was mediating between the key political parties. Zimbabweans' migration to South Africa was also mixed, making it difficult to differentiate between refugees and economic migrants. Political instability and economic difficulties occurred hand in hand giving people multiple reasons to leave the country. Morreira (2009) argues that when people move from being internally displaced-be it by Murambatsvina, farm invasions or any other means to being in their eyes displaced across an international borderland make them fit into the category refugee but the South African government saw it not as a legitimate coercive force. A report by the UNHCR released in 2009 conceded that:

The case (of Zimbabwean migration) poses a particular challenge for the international refugee protection regime because the majority of people leaving fall neither within the legal definition of a 'refugee' nor are they voluntary, economic migrants. Rather, they fall within a broader category of 'survival migration', fleeing an existential threat to which they have no domestic remedy.

The reasons for their flight have mainly been a combination of state collapse, livelihood failure, and environmental disaster (Betts and Kaytaz, 2009:1).

The Zimbabwe documentation process targeted those who were working, studying or operating their own businesses (Amit, 2011). The DZP permits were issued with the aim “to regularize Zimbabweans residing in South Africa illegally; curb the deportation of undocumented Zimbabweans; reduce pressure on the asylum seeker and refugee system, and provide amnesty to Zimbabweans who obtained South African documents fraudulently” (Carciotto, 2018:1105). Amit (2011) notes that between 2008 to 2010, 400 000 Zimbabwean applied for asylum. Crush et al (2015) note that the problem of asylum applications was the state’s own doing, since it failed to acknowledge the Zimbabwean crisis, thus denying those who fled, the opportunity to seek refuge and relief in South Africa. Pretoria’s response was wholly inadequate. Polzer (2010) alleges that Zimbabweans who sought refuge were rarely successful in their applications. Most lived as undocumented immigrants and this left them vulnerable to labour abuse, arrest and deportation. Undocumented migrants often choose to remain invisible so as to maintain their livelihood practices and evade arrest or deportation

Most DZP beneficiaries were unskilled labourers who would have been ineligible to apply other category of permits prior to the regularisation process. A total of 275 762 Zimbabweans applied for regularisation under DZP and 255 582 permits were granted. Thebe (2016:621) argues that the DZP’s main aim was to further exclude more than to relieve Zimbabweans from the asylum process. In doing so, the South African government missed an opportunity “to align immigration management to its constitutional, democratic and Africanist emphasis and to promote the ideals of regional integration and cooperation” (ibid). Legal representation was not required.

The application process involved three primary components:

- 1) A completed application form, together with fingerprints

2) A Zimbabwean passport

3) Documentation confirming one of the following: a) proof of employment (e.g., an affidavit from the employer); b) proof of registration with an educational institution; or c) Proof of business (e.g. company registration, registration with the South African Revenue Service) (Amit, 2011: 4).

The requirement for the undocumented Zimbabweans to submit the required documentation raises theoretical questions. The DZP process required documentation from the undocumented Zimbabweans to prove that they were in South Africa illegally. This was problematic in that most Zimbabweans did not have passports. The acquisition of passports posed the greatest challenge. Firstly, many applicants “had to return to Zimbabwe, a journey that levied a significant time and financial burden in order to obtain a passport” (Amit, 2011:8). Secondly, the consulate of Zimbabwe was not able to meet the demand for passports. Thirdly, most business owners would not have registered companies without documents nor would they have been registered with the revenue service. The requirement for passports was dropped in the last two weeks of the process. In the last week of the DZP application period, Home Affairs then instructed applicants to register with “any documentation proving their nationality, stating that these applicants would be able to complete their applications after the deadline” (Amit, 2011:18). Additionally, some employers did not help DZP applicants with proof of employment fearing that acknowledging employment of illegal migrants would leave them vulnerable to fines from the Department of Labour. As a result, many employers were not helpful in providing affidavits or copies of employment contracts to their employees for fear of prosecution. This left many applicants without all the necessary supporting documents.

6.4. Queuing in liminal spaces

Ayaß (2020) notes that queuing is a modern form of waiting and a discernible social formation that has drawn attention of various theoretical approaches. While queuing is a form of waiting, this chapter focuses more on queuing and the next chapter explains more about waiting. The DZP application process involved a lot of queuing. Amit (2011: 13) notes that individuals generally had to queue, often over several days, for each of the following steps in the application process:

- 1) Picking up the application form;
- 2) Returning with the completed application form to receive a number; and
- 3) Waiting for the number to be called to submit the application.

Often, they had to return to the office on another day to

- 4) Pick up receipts acknowledging their applications; or
- 5) Enquire about the results of their application because of the lack of communication from the DHA.

At some offices, applicants who had received an SMS arrived at the office to find there were two additional steps in the process:

- 6) Submit their passport number to a security guard who would conduct a block-and-trace procedure to check the applicant's record.
- 7) Return to the office to collect their receipt and/or decision after being cleared under this procedure

Jones (2019:546) argues that queues have a special place in people's understanding of wider events and their significance outweigh the amount of time spent in them. More specifically, occupying the queue as a particular kind of social practice through which

one's predicament as un- or insufficiently-documented and potentially deportable registers in and on the body, and through which claims to be or become legally legible are asserted and negotiated (Reeves, 2019). For Zimbabweans seeking to regularize their situation, the process entailed encountering the queue as a living, breathing, many-headed, socio-material thing. One becomes part of it, one reproduces it through one's own bodily submission. Noting further, Reeves (2019) argues the queue is not simply a manifestation of suspended or empty time, but should be understood as persistence to end the perils of legal indeterminacy. In making people queue in precarious and unsafe environments, the South African government was exercising the sovereign power in the Foucauldian sense as disciplinary power is exercised in society by controlling people's time (Foucault, 1994: 80).

Sutton et.al (2011:30) argue that queuing at Home Affairs "is part of a ritual which has the ultimate aim of making things happen". Hoag (2014:411) notes that Home Affairs is "an obligatory passage point and legions of hopeful permit applicants pass through its halls daily". Every migrant who stands in a queue at Home Affairs is in a liminal phase in that cannot be avoided or averted; but has simply to be endured. Zimbabwean migrants could not afford to abandon the queues because they anticipated a Home Affairs or police raid at their workplaces or homes. The migrants understood that the status of being documented was desirable and would enable them to gain access to a variety of services which made them endure to undertake the ordeals of queuing. This shows that Zimbabwean migrants strived to make the experiences of being in a illegal limbo end. Gold (2019) notes that when migrants apply for regularisation, they go through rituals of degradation where they are expected to be submissive, thankful and to obey instructions or forfeit their chances of getting documented.

When Zimbabwean migrants applied for regularisation, the borders of the state were redrawn as they waited to cross "the threshold from illegality through the acquisition of

papers” (Cabot, 2012:15). Therefore, “queues were liminal both in terms of time (i.e. waiting for the new official status as from undocumented to DZP) as well as in terms of physical space- migrants in the queue stand in a legal no-man's land, where they are no longer in their home country, but are also not yet legal in South Africa” (Sutton et.al, 2011: 32).

The application process is liminal in that Zimbabwean migrants entered a Home Affairs building, seeking protection from the very authorities who deport them. This imbues documents with simultaneous meanings of its protective attributes from exploitation and “the violence associated with the policing and enforcement apparatus of the state” (Cabot, 2012:15). The failure to apply for the DZP made some eligible for deportation. Amit and Kriger (2014) note that DZP was a more calculated programme serving to justify the resumption of deportations. The government of South Africa also then stopped issuing asylum permits to new Zimbabweans applicants and started deporting those who did not apply for DZP (Crush, et.al, 2015). South Africa also started rejecting asylum applications from Zimbabweans noting that the country was going through a transition in reference to the coalition government (Morreira, 2013). In this context, the relationship between liminality, precariousness and documentation becomes evident. Butler (2016:201) defines precariousness as the people inhabiting unlivable conditions, exposed to violence without recourse, living in liminal conditions waiting for the prospect of living with documentation.

Vally (2016) writing on social grants payment processes in South Africa argues that people experience insecurity because of their encounter with state’s bureaucracy. The queuing exposed DZP applicants to similar insecurity. Some people came from far cities and queued overnight. Mothers with childcare needs found it difficult to queue for long periods, or overnight and many of them did not complete the application process. Morreira (2013:133) argues that migrant experiences at Home Affairs offices show that the right to shelter, food or healthcare cannot be accessed nor the right from freedom

from violence and bodily integrity. In Zimbabwe's crisis years, people did not only stand in queues for money, food and fuel, but sat and slept in them, ate and drank in them, talked and laughed in them, argued and fought in them, gave birth in them and sadly others died in them (Jones, 2019:546). Similar experiences were encountered at Home Affairs offices in South Africa. Vigneswaran & Hlalambelo (2008:6) vividly captures the experiences migrants go through at Home Affairs offices in the following excerpt;

..applicants at Marabastad *Home Affairs offices* have taken to sleeping outside the office, in the hope that this will improve their chances of getting inside. There are regularly between eighty and three hundred people sleeping outside. At night armed criminals visit the site. Incidents of theft are common. There have been several reports of rape. There is no shelter in the vicinity of the office and people often endure rain and very cold conditions. Many women sleep with babies by their side. On some occasions the police have visited during the night and arrested asylum seekers or extorted them for bribes. Fights about places in the queue are common, sometimes degenerating into the throwing of bricks and stones and leading to several cases of hospitalisation. On at least one occasion metropolitan officials arrived in the morning to clear all temporary shelters, bedding, and belongings of people gathered outside the office... No-one knows how they will be received, who will be chosen and how many will gain entry. The police arrive and on occasions make arrests. There are also beatings; by the police, by security guards; on occasions by street vendors, who join in. Almost everyone is in a heightened state of anxiety and there is pushing, shoving and then more fights, particularly when people push in or rearrange the line. All this occurs in a venue that reeks of urine and sweats with anticipation and fear. All of this occurs before anyone has seen a Home Affairs official.

The above narrative shows that migrants played their dutiful part by queuing at Home Affairs offices but “were subjected to various forms of state and non-state violence which kept them constantly 'on edge' and undermined any attempts they might have made to imbue their waiting experience with hope” (Sutton et al 2011:34). The cumulative effect of queuing “was a condition which was not only 'betwixt and between', but one in which applicants were also victimized for their hope, locked in a sort of existential purgatory or an experience of entrapment” (ibid). Writing on the asylum-seeking process in Switzerland, Gold (2019) notes that the liminal state of the asylum seeker is not merely a moment of transition from one status to another (from foreigner/outsider to citizen); but rather a space/time of annihilation and a negation of sociality.

The queues also demonstrated that Home Affairs was not prepared for the large numbers of Zimbabweans who wanted to apply for documentation. However, the department ignored the queues and relied on the numbers of applications submitted as proof that previous estimates of Zimbabweans in South Africa was greatly overestimated despite the department having previously relied on them (Amit and Kriger, 2014). Gupta (2012:2) writing on poverty alleviation programs in India argues that “when the state is in control, it plays with citizens, wilfully ignoring the urgency of their needs, the value of time, dismissing them and making excuse”. Gupta (2012:33) further argues that “structural violence is enacted through the everyday practice of bureaucracies in corruption, governmentality and in the way the forms that are filled in, the filing systems, and the entire technologies of listening, that the poor are condemned to death by an entire bureaucracy”. Noting further, Gupta notes that structural violence against the poor is evident in bureaucratic interventions in the lives of the poor and how such policies and programs affect them. In this case, the promise of getting DZP forms to fill in and the waiting endured count as bureaucratic violence to people who had

experienced life without documents. More importantly, the migrants remembered their experience without documents as an ontological condition that made them experience long hours at work, violent punishment, overtime that was not paid and they had no recourse to law because they were undocumented. The hope that they had in applying for the DZP made them persevere in queuing, even though it was a hope born out of desperation. Morreira (2013) documents instances where migrants starved to death queuing for asylum applications in Cape Town.

Hoag (2014:411) argues that “time is central to the experience and operation of bureaucracy as bureaucracies trap people in queues, delaying endlessly with senseless networks of procedure”. Writing on the asylum seeking processes in Greece, Cabot (2012:17) demonstrates how asylum seekers “are suspended in limbo between multiple bureaucratic stages, conveying possible acceptance, rejection, or appeal and (2) between divergent possible outcomes for their cases, entailing extremely different legal trajectories”. Glytsos (2005: 823) also notes that the legalisation of foreigners in Greece was “very complicated, cumbersome, time consuming, bureaucratic in its implementation, costly for the immigrants, and characterised by lack of preparation or ignorance of the administration process”.

The long queues were also caused by the distribution of Home Affairs offices which were limited mainly to big cities such as Polokwane, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Bloemfontein. However, Zimbabwean migrants are dispersed throughout the whole country including in farming areas and rural villages. A focus on the offices’ regional distribution reveals that the distribution of DZP reception offices created a barrier of limited access, symbolically and physically excluding many Zimbabweans. The office's gatekeeping provided “the sovereign state with a means to express its capacity by making migrants queue and wait, and to make the office a metaphorical border” (Sutton et.al 2011:33). Amit and Kriger (2014) conclude that through waiting, the

Department of Home Affairs achieved contradictory objectives of trying to maintain a record of who is in the country while at the same time limiting access to documentation because of the rights that came with it.

In Turner's terms, the process of transition from the status of undocumented foreigner to a DZP holder was both attenuated and independently operative. It was a life experience in and of itself. In other words, the act of applying for the DZP acquired its own set of life processes and routines: "of travelling to and from the reception office; of maintaining one's documents and copies; of learning the workings of the lines and the character and disposition of particular officials; of avoiding the harassment and victimisation by criminals; and of understanding the terms and conditions of one's status" (Sutton et.al, 2011:34).

Some people surrendered their asylum documents but their DZP applications were not successful (Bimha, 2017, Amit and Kriger, 2014, Muchichwa, 2017; Thebe, 2016; Amit 2011). For refugees whose DZP applications were approved, they remained legal, but if a refugee permit holder's DZP application was rejected or unsuccessful, the "permission to stay was revoked and one was rendered, de facto undocumented migrant, thrown into liminal legality again" (Cabot, 2012:17). The only options left were to either leave South Africa voluntarily to apply for other permits categories or become eligible for arrest and deportation. Some potential DZP applicants who had asylum documents were advised by Home Affairs officials that they were already documented and did not need to apply for DZP. Tanatswa explains this below.

I heard about the DZP. I was told it works the same. If you want to continue with your asylum it is ok. I however applied. Then later on, I noticed that if you have a permit, you can go home and come back freely. There are some people who are no longer using asylum papers. Computers were showing that they went to Zimbabwe. It was lots of questioning. They used to renew asylums for six months and now they were giving only one month. Everyone is crying. Obvious people go home. Their system is picking it up. Imagine.

However, what is not known is the proportion of the Zimbabwean population in South Africa, that applied for DZPs. Makina estimated that there were a million Zimbabweans in South Africa by 2007, with less than 10 000 with regularised status. DZP permits were granted were about 240 000. In some households, the father who was working applied for regularisation leaving children and wives without legal papers, only to realise later that DZP does not grant spousal visa or legal family reunification. In other cases, the whole family slipped into “illegality” About eighty percent of DZP applicants had not “previously applied for asylum and were not in possession of fraudulent South African documents, 17 percent were persons who had previously made asylum claims but voluntarily resorted to applying for DZP permits and two percent of the applicants were in possession of fraudulent South African documents” (Bimha, 2017: 50). Most of the respondents for this study did not have passports when they entered South Africa. They took advantage of DZP and applied for regularisation.

Amit (2011:7) notes that “the short lead time for the DZP, and the brief period allocated to the process itself, were the greatest obstacles as neither the DHA offices nor applicants had sufficient time to prepare”. As a result, pressures because of the short duration of the process hindered its effectiveness. The DZP permits were valid from 2011 to 2014. They were replaced by the Zimbabwe Special Permit (ZSP), valid from 2014 to 2017. The ZSP was succeeded by Zimbabwe Exemption Permits (ZEP) valid from 2018 to December 2020 is. All permits expire on the same day (31 December) regardless of the day on which one would have obtained their permit. In August 2018, some Zimbabweans were still waiting for the outcome of ZEP applications that were submitted in 2017. The experiences of waiting for renewal are discussed in the next chapter. The ZSP and ZEP processes were only open to former DZP applicants. What is most concerning is the massive decline in the number of recipients of these permits. DZP holders were over 240 000. This number decreased to 198 000 for the ZSP and to

140 000 under the ZEP. This cannot be successfully explained by migration to other permits, deaths or relocations.

The South African government is likely to continue replacing the special permits as a way of denying any new applications. Nevertheless, DZP reduced number of deportations to Zimbabwe as shown in the table below.

Table 5.1. Deportations of Zimbabweans from South Africa, 1994 – 2013.

Year	Number of Deportation to Zimbabwe	Total deportations from South Africa	Zimbabwe Deportations as percentage of total deportations
1994	12,931	90,692	14.3
1995	17,549	157,084	11.2
1996	14,651	180,713	8.1
1997	21,673	176,351	12.3
1998	28,548	181,286	15.7
1999	42,769	183,861	23.3
2000	45,922	145,575	31.5
2001	47,697	156,123	30.6
2002	38,118	135,870	28.1
2003	55,753	164,808	33.8
2004	72,112	167,137	43.1
2005	97,433	209,988	46.4
2006	109,532	266,067	41.2
2007	204,827	312,733	65.5
2008	164,678	280,837	58.6
2009	35,693	105,960	33.7
2010	4,805	56,793	8.5

2011	10,100	65,383	15.4
2012	38,987	103,259	37.8
2013	35,251	113,554	31.0

Source: Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2015: 374

De Genova (2002:429) argues that “every legalization process has an inherently episodic and strictly partial character that it never eliminates “illegality” but simply refines and reconstitutes illegality as some will remain undocumented along with all subsequent “illegal” arrivals”. Amit and Kriger (2014) note that DHA strategies limited documentation by establishing barriers around accessing documentation for the first time and then maintain documented status of the documented. In 2020, the population of undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa might have increased to the one of 2010. This is because the political and economic conditions in Zimbabwe have not yet improved. At the same time, immigration laws were tightened in 2014 to make it virtually impossible for one to get a work visa.

The queues witnessed in the DZP process were addressed in 2014. Home Affairs outsourced visa handling services to Visa Facilitation Services (VFS) Global for all permit applications except refugee permits. Permit applications are now filled online via the VFS website. Applicants then book an appointment for the capture of biometric photographs and finger prints. However, technical breakdowns with the VFS system meant applicants needed internet access for a long period. The application and scheduling for an appointment may not be completed in one sitting. The VFS technical difficulties replaced long queues during the DZP but access to the internet remains a barrier for applicants (Bimha, 2017).

6.5. Importance of DZP to Zimbabwean immigrants

The regularization of Zimbabweans made a difference not just in terms of protection but with regard to employment opportunities. Bloch (2010:238) argues that immigration

status allows “access to the regularized labour market and this would change the lives and experiences of the most marginalised and vulnerable migrants and their families by facilitating higher wages and greater scope for transnational activities”. The regularization process provided an opportunity for Zimbabwean migrants to move from part time temporary work to full time jobs. Kudakwashe was a mechanic moved from working part-time at an unknown garage to working for German automobile manufacturer Audi, at their Cape Town branch. He vividly remembers how the permit changed his life.

After I got a permit, I went to work for Audi Centre Cape Town. That is where I changed my life. I began earning real money which had value. I even left from living in shacks to live in a brick and mortar houses. I was now having time for my family and time to rest on weekends. I even managed to buy a stand to build a house in Zimbabwe. Even when I quit my job I was given all my pension money, it was almost R300 000.

Before moving to Audi Centre, Kudakwashe used to earn a paltry R300 a week. When Kudakwashe left Zimbabwe, he had impregnated his wife and ran away from responsibility. When he started working for Audi, he managed to regularize his relationship with in laws by paying lobola for the mother of his child after which she then joined him in Cape Town. On a comparative note, in the United States, people granted temporary protected statuses indicated more socio economic stability and earned relatively higher earnings than before (Abrego and Lakhanyi, 2015).

The DZP permits enabled Zimbabweans to use their human capital experience in the labour market. On a similar note, Elisha who used to work any casual jobs he found went to work for the South African retail giant Shoprite Checkers as a warehouse manager before moving to automobile maker Toyota as a production planner. Elisha was also able to further his studies which was impossible whilst he was working part time in construction and gardening. Takunda who used to work as a mortar mixer in the construction industry moved to working for one of the biggest global online commerce

company Amazon. It would have been impossible to work for these big companies without work permits. South African regulations fine companies R100 000 for employing an undocumented person. Most of the research participants managed to raise start-up financial capital and came up with entrepreneurial ideas in their work places after they got documented.

The DZP permit did not only improve the social mobility of migrants, but also enhanced their transnational capabilities. Transnationalism refers to continued relations between immigrants and their places of origin (Vervotec, 1999, Portes et al, 2002). Portes (2001: 181) notes that “the discovery of transnational practices among immigrants by an enterprising group of anthropologists led by Nina Glick Schiller, Cristina Blanc-Szanton, and Linda Basch led to an enthusiastic flurry of activity seeking to document the most varied manifestations of this phenomenon”. Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc (1994:48) define transnationalism as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement”.

The Financial Intelligence Centre prohibits South African banks to open bank accounts for undocumented immigrants. Having a permit allows migrants to open bank accounts with South African commercial banks. More so, banking and other financial institutions have the duty to inquire into the immigration or citizenship status of individuals and must report illegal foreigners to the Director-General's office. Without a bank account, the life of the immigrant remains precarious as he/she cannot secure formal employment or provide financial records for landlords prior to signing lease agreements. Without bank accounts, migrants remain confined to unskilled labour regardless of qualifications (Achieme, 2013). Having bank accounts enables migrants to send remittances to their home countries in safe ways. However, research is still needed on how after obtaining DZPs, Zimbabwean migrants felt incorporated and went on to open clothing, cell phone

and furniture credit accounts, failed to maintain them leading to their indebtedness to this day.

6.6. Conclusion

The South African government denied the existence of the crisis in Zimbabwe. This not only delayed a political solution in Zimbabwe, but also produced “precarious legality” from those displaced from Zimbabwe seeking protection and assistance in South Africa (Basok and Wiesner, 2018). The documentation process provided a window of opportunity for many people to regularize their status. Most of the entrepreneurs interviewed for this study relied on short-term work opportunities in construction and farms before the arrival of the documentation process. Without the documentation, it was going to be difficult for entrepreneurs to run businesses because of the law which prohibits even opening of bank accounts to people without proper documentation.

This chapter has shown that while the regularisation was a transition from being undocumented to a more secure legal status, the DZP process itself was liminal phase. The DZP application process involved a lot of waiting and queuing at Home Affairs offices over several days. This exposed DZP applicants to danger. The migrants slept outside the office, were visited by criminals at night, rape incidents were common, and people endured rain and very cold conditions. Some were harassed by passers-by or others in the queues, while others were mistreated by security guards. Everyone in the queue was in a liminal phase as a passage could not be avoided or averted; but was to be endured to get legal status. The queues were liminal in that the Zimbabwean migrants were not in their home country and those that failed to apply for the DZP became eligible for deportation. The waiting for the new official status was like living in a legal no-man's land.

This chapter has also shown that the regularisation process provided an opportunity for many Zimbabweans to escape structural and symbolic violence in part-time temporary work to full-time jobs in line with their educational and professional interests. This facilitated higher wages and greater scope for remittances. The migrants also managed to open bank accounts with South African commercial banks and were now able to provide financial records for landlords prior to signing lease agreements. Without these permits, the migrants would have remained confined to unskilled labour regardless of qualifications.



7. Chapter Seven: Legal Suspension: Waiting for Zimbabwe Exemption Permits in South Africa

7.1. Introduction

Waiting is a crucial aspect of immigration systems as it produces insecure subjects who do not belong (Turnbull, 2016:67). This chapter focuses on the experiences of waiting, between application for replacement of permits and adjudication. In particular, I look at the period between ZSP and ZEP. I conducted interviews while people were waiting for ZEP permits. It is for this reason that it does not focus on the transition from DZP to ZSP. I argue that the legality of applicants was suspended while waiting to get new permits. Suspension in this chapter means “a temporary debarment from or cessation of a privilege” (Oelgemöller, 2011:420). The suspension affected people through deprivation of various socio-economic privileges until their permits are adjudicated. The person waiting for his/her permit is thus at a juridical threshold between legality and illegality.

Waiting for ZSP replacements can take up to a year due to lengthy adjudication processes. The waiting for ZEP is a liminal experience as it demonstrates how states disrupt livelihoods affecting the chronological mobility of migrants through pegging conditions to legal statuses; giving vague directives that leaves room for varied interpretations by government departments. The waiting does not only disrupt livelihoods but it demonstrates how the South African government alienates and marginalises non citizen residents resulting in frustrated futures. As ZEP applicants wait for their permits, they are deprived of legality, livelihoods are threatened and jobs are lost. The person is sometimes not legally identified, meaning the person has disappeared from political recognition. This chapter concludes that waiting in a zone of suspended legal existence is an embodied experience of immobilised and suspended life (Haas, 2017).

7.2. Waiting

Waiting is a prominent feature of everyday life, but it is the neglected Achilles heel of modernity (Bisell, 2007). People wait for someone to arrive at a meeting, wait for a bus or train, wait for water to reach a boiling point in a kettle, wait for snow to come in winter and wait to see a doctor at a hospital (Gasparini, 1995). While no modern society is immune from waiting, waiting can be a source of irritation as it is wearisome, boring and annoying (Schwartz, 1974). Janeja and Bandak (2018:18) note that waiting as an ethnographic object in cultural and social anthropology has been waiting to be addressed in its own right. The familiarity of waiting has perhaps contributed to the relative neglect of the phenomena of waiting (Janeja and Bandak, 2008). More so, it is difficult to differentiate waiting from other forms of inactivity such as hanging around, day dreaming or idleness (Ayaß, 2020). The anthropological enterprise was established with waiting as a tool and method as Malinowski waited on the Trobriand Island becoming transformed into ethnographic fieldwork resulting in one of the most important texts in anthropological methods (Malinowski, 1920).

The anthropological and social science literature has focused on waiting as a social fact and remains by and large sprawling and dispersed despite repeated calls to for the need to develop an ethnography of waiting as an analytical category in its own right (Janeja and Bandak, 2018). Ayaß (2020: 423) regards waiting as an anthropological constant found in every society. Various anthropological and ethnological literature repeatedly describe waiting with respect to “primitive people” as hunters wait for the game, fisherman for the fish and farmers wait for the right time to sow a harvest. However, in recent years, waiting has generated a lot of scholarly interest as the bureaucratisation of the state created multiple settings that people wait (Jeffrey, 2008). This is because waiting draws our attention to a terrain where the state is both present and absent (Oldfield & Greyling, 2015). In Argentina, for instance, habitual exposure of

recipients of welfare grants and housing to long delays and waiting produces political subordination thereby making grant recipients patients of the state (Auyero, 2012). Waiting for housing in South Africa is immersed in party-political struggles of politicians who make promises of housing projects and in national debates which promote integrated human settlements (Oldfield and Greyling, 2015).

It is imperative to explore the phenomena of waiting in a world where there is a “growing number of situations where people wait for years or whole lifetimes” (Jeffrey, 2008:954). Jeffrey also notes that the political situation following the 29 March 2008 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe kept the whole country waiting for a future. Janeja and Bandak (2018) further argue that waiting is a particular engagement in and with time as individuals for a period, find themselves in a situation where what is hoped for or anxiously anticipated has not been actualized. Hoag (2014:411) notes that “time is central to the experience of encounters with the bureaucracy but it has received relatively little substantial attention in anthropological inquiry”. Noting further, Hoag (2014: 411) argue that through waiting, “bureaucracies trap people in ques with endless procedures”. In South Africa, migrants as outsiders face lengthy waiting periods, waiting for documents and other government services (Sutton et al, 2011: 30). In the sections that follow, I examine how the waiting in suspended legality is graver for the migrant. In doing so, I contribute to the flourishing literature on migration across the world, with a particular focus on the corrosive effects which waiting has on migrants (Mountz 2011; O’Reilly 2018; Griffiths 2014; Glytsos 2005; Haas 2017).

7.3. From ZSP to ZEP

The application for the ZEP was done online and applicants booked an appointment date to submit supporting documentation at VFS facilitation centres. The application process started in September 2017 and was only open to those with valid ZSP permits. Applications were submitted online via VFS website and an administrative fee of R1 090

(USD\$70) was required for Home Affairs, together with an additional R1 300 (USD110) handling fee for VFS. The closing date for applications was 30 November 2017. Applicants were required to submit a valid Zimbabwean passport, evidence of employment, business for ZEP business category applicants and proof of enrolment for those applying the ZEP study permit. At the VFS office, the applicant would be issued with a receipt which allowed him/her to continue to enjoying services until the outcome of the application was released.

On 11 December 2017, Home Affairs issued an advisory on its website to the attention of South African banks, employers and learning institutions. The advisory read

The Department of Home Affairs requests all Companies, Employers, Banks and Learning Institutions to note that applicants for the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit who are in possession of ZSP permits which expire 31 December 2017 must be allowed to continue giving and receiving services as necessary until such a time they get their new ZEP permits, effective 01 January 2018. The condition is that they must provide proof of application either for a ZEP permit or mainstream visa. The proof of application maybe a VFS receipt or proof of payment.

The Department has discussed this arrangement with the South African Banking Information Centre (SABRIC) so that ZEP applicants will be allowed to transact and have access to their bank accounts. This is to ensure that ZEP applicants continue to transact with banks while their applications are being adjudicated.

The Department has notified its officials in all Ports of Entry to allow those who wish to travel to Zimbabwe to do so without hindrance as long they provide the necessary proof of application or VFS receipt/proof of payment. In terms of the directive, ZEP applicants will not be marked as undesirable. We will allow all ZEP applicants with a ZSP visa or visitor visa to accompany parent on the ZSP to travel in and out of South Africa provided they submit required proof.

The transitional arrangement is in light of the approval by the Minister of Home Affairs of a new four year permit (ending 31 December 2021) for all Zimbabweans in possession of ZSP permit. The submission of fully completed applications commenced on 1 October 2017 and was extended until 31 January 2018. The closing date for submissions of online applications and payment for prescribed services was 30 November 2017.

We look forward to the cooperation of all parties concerned” (Department of Home Affairs, 2017)⁵

The advisory above seems to be addressed to all areas likely to cause juridical liminality, banks, employers and learning institutions were named in the advisory. Section 38 of the Immigration Act prohibits the employment of foreigners who are illegal and those whose status does not authorise them to be employed. A person on a visitor’s permit may not seek employment. Section 8 (1) of the Employment Services Act of 2014 notes that “An employer may not employ a foreign national within the territory of the Republic of South Africa prior to such foreign national producing an applicable and valid work permit, issued in terms of the Immigration Act”. South African regulations fine companies for employing an undocumented person. In Section 39(1) of the Immigration Act (2002) notes that “no learning institution shall knowingly provide training or instruction to (a) an illegal foreigner; (b) a foreigner whose status does not authorize him or her to receive such training”. Furthermore, if they do help them, they can be charged with aiding and abetting an ‘illegal foreigner’ under Section 42(1). The Financial Intelligence Centre Act prohibits South African banks to open bank accounts for undocumented immigrants. .

⁵ ZEP advisory <http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/statements-speeches/1065-advisory-zimbabwean-exemption-permit-zep-applicants>

7.4. Waiting in suspended legality

In the advisory above, the Transport Department is missing and this came back to haunt Edward who has a driving school when he wanted to renew license disks for his cars. When a foreigner wants to renew their motor vehicle license or driver's licence, the local municipal traffic department requires proof of residence; and a passport with a valid permit. The traffic department insisted that the advisory did not include the Department of Transport. The fact that Edward could still cross the border freely and bank but not renew car licence disks meant that he was in a state of inclusive exclusion (Agamben, 1998). He was not absolutely illegal as directed by Home Affairs, did not have a permit in his passport but he was experiencing legal suspension in accessing traffic services. However, what this case reveals is disaggregation of state actors and power in the governance of individuals with liminal legal statuses (Chacon, 2015). Understanding these dynamics is important in that it overrides the presumption of a monolithic state responsible for governing its diverse population.

The traffic department insisted that the advisory was only written to banks, learning institutions, employers, and therefore it was not obliged to render services to migrants whose permits will have expired. Edward narrated his challenge with the traffic services which is a division from the Department of Transport as follows:

I applied for ZEP business permit, it's not yet out. This is March 2018. I submitted in October 2017. I have a business to run. I need to renew my license disks for my vehicles to be on the road. I need to go to the bank to do transactions. You go to traffic department, they say we cannot help you without a permit. What am I going to do? I am in the country legally. I tried to explain to them that take me as an example. There is my permit, I applied for it. I have been on this permit since 2010. I had a DZP, moved to ZSP and now I applied for ZEP. I have vehicles on the road. They tell me you need to wait for your permit to be licensed. Those are regulations we work with. They should understand since I have got a receipt, and I have been in the system. They just make things difficult where it is not necessary especially for foreigners. Me as a

foreigner, I go through this. I wanted to renew my license disks, they gave me hard time. You go to Home Affairs, and they say we gave them a letter, and if they do not want it, what do you think we must do? You go back to traffic, they say the letter does not state traffic department. You have those situations. It does affect our clients who are foreigners as well. I personally as a foreigner gets such challenges from the traffic department because that is where we do our business. If people give you regulations that you must stick to this, if they cannot help you, there is nothing you can do.

Edward's narration reveals some of the challenges of waiting that migrants face, especially during the period between submission of an application and adjudication of their application. To conceptualize waiting in relation to liminality, Sutton et al (2011:32) note the importance of looking at a common characteristic in all angles of waiting, "it is consistently an ambivalence of space and time; in between. It always has a before and an after but is also highly subjective - linked to hope, despair and impatience and for migrants, the threat of being an illegal immigrant". Edward's narration has a before and after, when he said "I tried to explain to them... I have been on this permit since 2010. I had a DZP, moved to ZSP and now I applied for ZEP. They tell me you need to wait for your permit to be licensed... They just make things difficult where it is not necessary especially for foreigners". Therefore through waiting, people's past is denied while their present activities are dictated and their future is taken possession of. Edward's experience highlights existential limbo as his narrations reflect embodied experience of an immobilised and suspended life (Haas, 2017).

Waiting as a concept enables us to ethnographically explore the forms of action and social relations that occur in the gap as man engages in and with time (Janeja & Bandak, 2018). In many instances, waiting is done to elicit particular subjectivities as a weapon to make the existence intolerable for certain groups. In the United Kingdom, Turnbull (2016:67) observed that people who applied for asylum were kept waiting in a state of ignorance and anticipation until they got weary from waiting and eventually agreed to go "home" because of prolonged uncertainty. Edward's movement from the

Traffic Department and back to Home Affairs and his statement that they just make things difficult for foreigners shows not only his impatience but frustration. His frustration is mainly because the Traffic Department has license testing as one of their responsibilities and they do not allow an unlicensed vehicle to be used for a driving test.

Hoag (2014:414) notes that clients waiting for their applications at Home Affairs “oscillate between a state of care and neglect, a condition that he calls dereliction”. Hoag (2014:414) defines dereliction as “an emergent condition of near care and near abandonment which sharpens our understanding of being in limbo”. Hoag further argues that dereliction is a liminal state between policy and practice of that policy. The actions of the Department of Transport did not only affect his renewal of license disks. His main target (Zimbabwean customers) seeking to obtain driver’s licenses were also affected. In Greece, Glytsos (2005: 823) also observed that when migrants wait for their permits, they “have no papers to show and therefore cannot contact any authorities for any problems during that period”. In this case of legal suspension, the person who applied for the permit is not outside South Africa, but is in fact made to be outside thereby being “exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable” (Agamben, 1998: 28).

The waiting for the replacement of permits gains particular meaning in relation to contexts in which it plays out (Sutton et al 2011). This makes the waiting an exercise of power to manipulate other people’s time (Turnbull, 2016). In the case of Edward, the traffic department also enforces laws on the road and offer renewals of license disks. By denying him the renewal of license disks for his cars, it meant he cannot continue with his business because the traffic department also administers driving tests. In the years preceding 2017, the Department of Transport did not require permits for anyone taking drivers licenses or renewing vehicle licenses for migrants. Instead for someone from Zimbabwe, a Zimbabwean identity document-not passport and proof of residence were the only requirements. Acquiring driver’s licenses became an avenue for many migrants

to escape low-skilled work on farms, construction sites and in factories, to work as truck drivers or Uber drivers. In order to close the gap, the government responded by imposing the work permit requirement to those intending to acquire driver's licenses or renew their vehicle licenses.

Sutton et al (2011:30) note that migrants waiting for their documents show emotions of powerlessness, hopelessness and vulnerability. Jeffrey (2008:955) distinguishes between four types of prolonged waiting, namely: "heightened suspense, lost time, panic and inertia". In the case of inertia, waiting has a general feature of confidence in the outcome or indifference to it. In this instance, one is capable of biding time and awaiting more or less patiently without necessarily being particularly anxious about the outcome. Unlike migrants who will have applied for asylum, who are not certain whether they would attain a status (Sutton et al 2011), ZEP applicants had assured hope they would get their permits because this had happened before when they applied for the ZSP, following the closure of DZP permits. However, the period it took for the permits to be adjudicated made them anxious as they were denied certain services. It is the impatience of the waiting that haunts applicants as it creates a subjective potential for an outcome to be negative. During the time, the migrant is contained and the loss of livelihood threatens the transcendental life of existence (Bisell, 2007). During the waiting period Edward's life was in limbo, lacked direction, light, purpose; which embodies an uncertain state of being in which life is confounding and incoherent at best (Haas, 2017)

However, there was hope that their permits would make them persevere; hence Edward emphasized that he was in the country legally and he had been on this permit since 2010. The South African government does not recognise the continuity of the permits as it uses the terms "closure" and "replacement" than expiration and renewal. It means that the affected Zimbabwean migrants cannot refer to closed and replaced policies as Edward did in this case. In the United States, Abrego and Lakhani (2015:

284) highlight that migrants who are eligible for permanent residency are stuck in a grey area “between undocumented marginality and permanent residency while their applications are being evaluated”.

Writing about waiting on the asylum seeking process in Ireland through the Direct Provision System (DP), O’Reilly (2018:834) argues that the DP becomes for many people “a limbo an in-between space, inside Ireland but outside of Irish society, included and yet excluded in Agambennian terms” as applicants to exist in a ‘zone of indistinction’ (Agamben, 1998). Agamben (1995:18) defined a zone of indistinction “as a state between inside and outside where there is no difference between law and force, wherein individuals are subject to the law but not subjects in the law”. Noting further, Agamben (1998:18) argues that “what is outside is included not simply by means of an interdiction or an internment, but rather by means of the suspension of the juridical order’s validity - by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the exception and abandon it”. In the case of ZEP, they were not necessarily illegal but were also not legal. The Home Affairs gave them protection from deportation but they could not enjoy the benefits of legal status. This becomes more clearer with experiences of teachers as explained below.

ZEP applicants employed as teachers by various provincial governments endured the most. For example, the Education Department did not pay teachers for marking Grade 12 final year exam papers because their permits had expired, despite the permits being valid when they rendered their services in 2017 (Menzelwa, 2018). The Western Cape Education Department for example did not pay Zimbabwean teachers who had applied for exemption permits until their permits had been adjudicated. After the adjudication of the permits, teachers submitted copies of the permits to the department, but it said that it wanted to first verify if the permits were not fraudulent. While banks or the traffic Department take minutes to verify if a permit is genuine, the Education Department was

taking more than three months to verify permits for teachers (Washinyira, 2018). Some teachers went for as far as nine months without being paid, exhausted their savings by paying for rent, food and school fees. Some sold cars to help meet household costs and others moved to suburbs where rentals were lower. Such areas are usually prone to high crime rates, thus posing a security threat to residents. As people waited, the sense of life moving forward became suspended or stuck as their ZEP applications lingered, placing the very viability of their lives in a state of profound uncertainty (Haas 2017).

The notion of waiting also makes it possible to consider time in reading Edward's narration of between hope and despair. Arendt (1968) argues that in modernity, humans are situated in particular relation to time. The onset of modernity in Europe and North America was associated with the institutionalisation of chronological time (Jeffery, 2008). Human beings thus began to measure their lives and activities more closely with respect to abstract units of time, such as days, weeks, years, and decades. Arendt (1968:11) notes:

“Seen from the perspectives of man who always lives in the interval between past and future, time is not a continuum, a flow of uninterrupted succession, it is broken in the middle, at the point where “he” stands and “his” standpoint is not usually present as we usually understand it, but rather a gap in time which “his” constant fighting: “his” making a stand against the past and the future, keeps in existence. Only because man is inserted into time and only to the extent that he stands his ground does the flow of indifferent time break into tenses”.

It is through waiting in relation to time that makes us aware of what Arendt designates as the human condition wherein one is made bare as it shows how temporal categories are shaped and inhabited by migrants (Haas, 2017). Edward was caught between the present and his awaited future with little capacity to change his situation which rendered

him passive (Rotter, 2016). In this case, the human condition that migrants find themselves is that of places of limbo where people and the scene of waiting act as “transgression and disruption and ambiguous forms of belonging are morphed into partial forms of citizenship and statelessness” (Mountz, 2011: 383). The temporal space is painful to the migrant in due to existential insecurity and the lack of control over the situation (Haas, 2017).

Despite the fact that time is central to understanding the experience of the migrant, it has received little attention yet migrants are always thinking about waiting in queues, minding expiration dates, and awaiting processing of their paper work (Hoag, 2014: 415). Edward emphasized this when he said “This is March 2018. I submitted in October 2017. I have a business to run”. To him, it shows that Home Affairs was not giving urgency to his application and his circumstances which affect other foreigners as well. He said:

The Traffic Department is very strict to foreigners who might have the other documents or expired. Like now we have the ZEP. There are people who applied, and are waiting for ZEP to come. Some people have applied their permits in October, they are not yet out. It is over five months now since a person has made an application for a permit, it's not yet out. He goes to traffic department, his learners is expiring in June and wants to book. The traffic department will tell you we need a valid permit. Home Affairs will tell you to use that receipt. Traffic department will say on your receipt it's not written traffic department, its only written banks, companies, employers, and things like that. The people don't book and by the time he gets his permit, his learners will have expired. This is what we will feel... We know how it is in Home Affairs, it has piles and piles of people applying for asylum and workers permit. At least when someone has a paper to show that he is in the country legally. That person should be helped. We have put up the issue with Home Affairs, but they cannot really help. The last time, I sent an email to traffic department that these people have applied for ZEP, they were on ZSP, the Home Affairs has written a letter that the people can be help them. Someone is going to wait for seven eight months for the ZEP to come out.

The waiting for adjudication is something that can be considered “a rite of passage for migrants, as it cannot be avoided or averted, but it has to be endured” (Sutton et al 2011:32). By saying “we know Home Affairs it has piles and piles of people applying for asylum and workers permit”, Edward was affirming the common perception that “DHA as a notoriously inefficient and corrupt state bureaucracy which for many observers in South Africa is a hopeless state department” (Hoag, 2014: 411).

In September 2018, there were some Zimbabweans who were still waiting for their permits to be adjudicated which they submitted in September 2017. Some banking institutions completely disregard the advisory. What happens in the waiting period is hard to decipher. It is characterized by “secrecy, ambiguity and uncertainty as a sequence between structure and anti-structure or as an ambiguous phase between two states of being” (Sutton et al, 2011:30).

The trade-off between Home Affairs and the Department of Transport is called departmentalism in public administration. The problem emanates from the specialization in “the development of policy proposals which gives government department jurisdiction and discretion to act, in its own department independent of another government department” (Laver and Shepsle, 1996:13). The refusal by the Transport Department to accept the advisory from Home Affairs is one form of discretion that is sustained “principally by the control over the policy agenda that each department exercises in its own jurisdiction” (1996:32). This discretion results from a “departmental ability to use its own power to influence the substance of any specific proposals that matters within his or her own jurisdiction” (ibid). The problem with departmentalism is that the worst effects are suffered by citizens or by people who fail to secure the much-needed services. In this case, the department of Transport and Home Affairs were exercising their powers in competing zones of authority known as jurisdictions negatively affecting Edward and his business. The actions of the

Department of Transport did not only affect his renewal of license disks. His main customers who also happen to be foreigners were also heavily affected.

7.5. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that applicants waiting for replacement of their ZSP permits experienced liminality as they were thrown into legal suspension. This was caused by the prolonged waiting period during which applications were being adjudicated. Applicants also experienced exclusive inclusion. This was evidenced by how certain departments not listed on the directive issued by the DHA. More so, they were not recognised as legal in South Africa by certain government departments. The lack of horizontal coordination exposes the legal suspension and 'zones of indistinction' in which applicants were located as their legality was suspended during the period of waiting for the ZEP. The experience of the migrants in this zone of no distinction make them the subject of 'bare life' for what it is. This is known as the abandoned subject of modernity that nonetheless exposes the potential relationship of all subjects to modern forms of power (Agamben, 1998). The suspended individuals' livelihoods were threatened, some children dropped out of school, and teachers were not paid as the waiting legally suspended them from enjoying the benefits of legal status. This chapter also showed that various government institutions share power among themselves in producing liminality thereby overriding the notion that the central government is the monolithic entity responsible for governing populations within its jurisdiction.

8. Chapter Eight: Legal Aliens: Experiencing Civic Marginalisation in South Africa

8.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the challenges that Zimbabwean migrants face which emanated from the limitations of documentation that grants them the status of legal personhood, but with limited economic rights. Former Zimbabwe Consul General in Cape Town, Mr Mugobogobo in his speech at the 2018 Excellence awards said that the event demonstrated “the tenacity and determination of both existing and emerging Zimbabwean business entrepreneurs in the Western Cape Province to succeed against all odds in a foreign country.” Why is entrepreneurship in a foreign country difficult? Migrants living in a displacement context are constrained by the specific geographical, historical, social and political economic realities of each context (Hammar, 2014:13).

This chapter challenges concepts such as “transnational citizenship and post-national citizenship which are based on universal notions of personhood and allow people to claim rights across borders” (Bloch, 2010: 235). Citizenship is generally understood as as a sorting device for allocating human populations to sovereign states (Baubock, 2006). Miller (2001) defines economic citizenship as covering employment, health, and retirement security through the redistribution of capitalist gains and the use of the state as an agent of investment. Political citizenship permits voting and appeals to representative government and guarantees physical security in return for ceding the right to violence to the state (Miller, 2001). In a migration contexts, citizenship marks a distinction between members and outsiders based on their different relations to particular states and limits state obligations towards foreigners (Baubock, 2006). When a migrant becomes regularised, the permits gives them political citizenship to be able to belong in a given nation state. The High Court of South Africa provides a more detailed explanation of the kind of political citizenship a permit offers to a migrants in the case of

of *Eisenberg and Others v Director-General Home Affairs and Others* 2012 (3) SA 508 (WCC) paragraph 85 of the judgment by Cloete AJ reads:

“For a foreigner in South Africa these permits are the single most important document they can possess. It is the basis of their legal existence in this country. Every aspect of their lives – the ability to travel freely (s 21 of the Constitution); the ability to work and put food on the table for their families (a component of the right to dignity in s 10 of the Constitution, (see *Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Watchenuka and Another* 2004(4) SA 326 (SCA) at 339B-C and F-G, 340G); the ability to keep their children in school (ss 28 and 29 of the Constitution); and the basic right to liberty (s 21(1) of the Constitution) – is dependent on the physical possession of a valid permit. The acquisition of a valid permit is the primary pre-requisite for any foreigner in South Africa”.

However, visas in South Africa come with limited access to political and economic rights. The disjuncture between the political citizenship that a permit gives to a migrant and economic citizenship is conceptualised as liminal citizenship.. Some scholars argue that the entitlement to rights is not dependent upon the status of citizenship, but foreigners are incorporated into the civil and social rights regimes when they become legal residents (Benhabib, 2005). This view supposes that “citizenship has been superseded by residence status which grants the same social and economic rights as citizenship to migrants” (Morris, 2003:79). The questions raised in this section are also raised by other authors elsewhere. For example, Glytsos (2005:819) speaking on the Greek government’s legalisation of undocumented migrants posed the questions, “If legalisation results in integration, how do institutional factors or objective conditions hinder or delay integration, how the society treats migrants upon attaining legal equality”.

8.2. Limits of Documentation

Morris (2003) developed the concept of marginal citizenship from Lockwood's (1996) concept of civic stratification. Civic stratification refers to "the relative deprivation that arises from civic disqualification of a minority from enjoying a full range of political and economic rights enjoyed by the majority" (Lockwood, 1996:53). Drawing from this, Morris (2003) argues that marginal citizens are people who have full citizenship but do not enjoy full citizenship status economically because of relative poverty and socially by racism. Meaningful political rights include the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to standards prevailing in the society (Somers and Roberts, 2008).

This chapter demonstrates that the modern state determines spaces for aliens, residents and citizens (Friese, 2010). Bauber (2008:315) drawing on Bourdieu's theory of capital argues that citizenship is a form of capital that manifests formally (legal and institutional) and informally (practiced and cultural aspects). It distinguishes between the migrant and a citizen. When citizens receive only conditional labour access, the lack of formal citizenship acts as subordination. By denying the migrants citizenship rights and access to a shared identity, governments ensure that migrants remain in positions of vulnerability and contribute disproportionately to the economy of the host nation. Abrego and Lakhani (2015) argue that marginal membership in a country makes migrants vulnerable to structural and symbolic violence. Citizenship as a form of capital helps reproduce economic privilege for the host nation's people and maintains vulnerability for migrants. Baubock (2006:18-19) argues that citizenship is not only "a device of sorting out desirable and undesirable migrants, but it establishes a second gate that migrants must pass". Perbedy (2001) argues that post 1994 was built for South Africans alone and the Constitution made citizenship than ethnicity as marker of identity and ultimately exclusive and restrictionist policies towards migrants .

The South African government regularised illegal Zimbabweans through the DZP, ZSP and ZEP special permits. These permits gave holders access to the regularized labour market that changed the lives and experiences of the most marginalised by facilitating higher wages and greater scope for transnational activities. Immigration status makes a difference, “not just in terms of limited avenues for protection and for accessing rights but also with regards to the economic and transnational lives” (Bloch, 2010: 245). It puts an end to a condition that make migrants to be vulnerable (Gordillo, 2006: 171). Having a residence permit is a prerequisite for migrants to make any claim against the state and other agencies such as banks (Gordillo, 2006).

This chapter demonstrates that legal residency does not offer documented migrants economic equality in their country of residence. The dispensation permits implied that people had to comply with new patterns of legibility because in South Africa “there is a particular kind of state politics; a politics of which reduces citizenship to indigeneity and to a politically passive conception of citizenship...The opposition citizen foreigner denotes the creation of a new community as well as the exclusion of some from community. As this community is based not only on a common identity but also on legal prescriptions (rights and duties) and socio-economic benefits (access to social services, bank loans), it is not certainly imagined, but materially experienced” (Neocosmos, 2006: 18: 89). . Peberdy (2001) argues that the country's exclusionary immigration and temporary residence policies indicate that the benefits of South African citizenship are only for citizens, not non citizens who are also "here" or want to be "here". The bill of rights in the constitution differentiates between the rights of citizens and non citizens and therefore signalled entitlement to state resources by citizenship. Those who are documented migrants become liminal citizens in that they have political citizenship by virtue of being documented, but do not enjoy full citizenship status economically (Morris, 2003). Ong (1999:6) points out the importance of analysing “the regulatory effects of cultural institutions, regimes and markets that shape people’s motivations, desires and

struggles and makes them particular kinds of subjects". Sassen (1996:71) adds that "governments place the responsibility to immigrate on the individual; and the individual and his activities becomes a site for the exercise of state's regulatory authority". This happens through laws and policies.

Achiame (2013) notes that laws, policies and practices that discriminate against foreigners fall into two categories. The first one contains laws and policies called "de jure alienage exclusive". These are laws and policies for "independent and legitimate reasons, explicitly exclude migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from entire sectors of industry on the basis of citizenship and immigration status" (2013: 338). The second category relates to laws, policies and practices that are "de facto alienage exclusive". These policies "do not explicitly or on their face exclude refugees and asylum seekers from formal economic opportunities" (2013:342). In principle, the policies are alienage neutral, but nonetheless subject foreigners to requirements or conditions that exclude them based on their nationality or immigration status. Luu (2000) also notes that in the 1500s foreigners in London did not face threats of violence or physical abuse in the streets, but "it was parliamentary acts designed to limit the rights of aliens and their children" that were a major threat.

In the sections that follow I explain the lived realities that Zimbabweans migrants go through by focusing on access to finance, xenophobia and their experiences with affirmative action. Having legal status does not result in inclusion because immigration policy creates conditional legal eligibility in other spheres of life. The phenomenon of being (or becoming) marginal relative to the abstract norm of equal membership in the democratic state is what this chapter refers to as "the civic marginalisation of migrants" (Owen, 2013:328). Issues highlighted in this chapter lend support to the scholarship that emphasizes the enduring power of the nation-state as it shows how legal status can

become an important axis of stratification (Menjívar, 2006). This research rejects the perspective that national citizenship is declining in favour of post-national citizenship⁶.

An interesting dimension of issues highlighted in this chapter came during the Corona virus pandemic that swept across the world in 2020. South Africa went into lockdown and the government announced that relief grants would be disbursed to distressed persons, excluding migrants on special permits and asylum seekers. The Scalabrini Centre, a non governmental organisation that advocates for migrant rights and refugees took the government to court arguing for relief grants to be opened “to asylum seekers and special permit holders, as it is irrational and unreasonable to exclude such persons from being able to apply for the grant solely on the basis of their nationality or immigration status” (Karim, 2020). On 19 June 2020, the Gauteng High Court in Pretoria ordered the Minister of Social Development to develop criteria for inclusion and make the necessary changes to the legislation within five days, to include asylum seekers, those with special papers and those with documents that expired during the lockdown to be granted relief benefits. In future, this judgment may form the basis in which legally resident migrants can argue for equal access to state benefits in South Africa.

8.3. Finance and Banking

In entrepreneurship, financial capital plays an important role in starting a business or expansion. At the same time, banks adhere to international money laundering and anti-terrorism policies that require them to have full details of clients. These details include, information about one’s place of residence and employment details (Hungwe and Gelderblom, 2014). Business in South Africa is governed by the Companies Act which

⁶ Postnational citizenship is a concept that seek to describe process in which foreigners make claims in their current country of residence without being considered outsiders (Tambini, 2001). Zimbabweans in South Africa for example could have access to same benefits based on supranational discourses of human rights. Other concepts used include transnational citizenship (Fox, 2005), supranational citizenship (Baubock, 2006), cosmopolitan citizenship, multi cultural citizenship or global citizenship

requires all businesses to have a business banking account, to pay tax, and that the company be registered. For migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, the first challenge is opening a bank account before mentioning lines of credit. To open a business account, you need a business permit. This requirement subjects foreigners to requirements or conditions that exclude them on the basis of their nationality or immigration status. As a result, migrants face an uphill task opening a business bank account which enables them to transact. Some entrepreneurs therefore start their ventures whilst residing in South Africa on work visas. In legislation, they cannot operate businesses neither can they open business accounts. Below, Jack explains this challenge.

If you do not have a South African ID and you do not have a business permit, you cannot open business bank accounts. You will be just operating as a sole trader, the money getting into your personal account or you're forced to work for someone. So, you're not supposed to open a business. So, to open a business bank account it's difficult.

A sole trader is just a simple form of business and Jack highlights that it is the only furthest you can do without a business bank account. In other words, you cannot call yourself an entrepreneur or businessperson when you are operating as a sole trader. Permanent residents and citizens do not have any capital requirements to open a business account. For foreigners, the Immigration Acts requires a current minimum capital of R500 000 to apply for a business permit. This requirement assumes that all businesses require some capital injection and that all people who apply for business permits will come from outside South Africa.

To make matters worse, most of my participants had dispensation permits which had a provision that did not allow for change of status from a work permit to a business permit. While the dispensation permits had been replaced two times, they always come with these conditions; does not allow change of status and not renewable. Even if they had

that money, the conditions in their permits acted as barriers to migrate to business permits. The minimum capital requirement may be necessary for people who are coming from outside South Africa, I argue that there must be some flexibility for those who will be in South Africa with work permits who would want to venture into entrepreneurship. It is a great setback for people with work permits to first have R500 000 in banks accounts, then apply for a business permit and then start a business. When the DZP permits were started, the applicants intending to apply for a DZP business permit were required to produce proof of company registration and registration with the revenue authority. But migrants can only register businesses if they have a business visa.

For skill-based entrepreneurs like Farai for example who is a penetration analyst/hacker, that requirement is unnecessary. For him to do his work, all he needs is a laptop and some expensive software which all will cost below R80 000. Farai narrates his frustration with regards to the R500 000 capital requirement.

You have to be legal. You can't do a business as an individual, you have to be a company. I have a bit of a problem in South Africa. You can't register a business if you're on a work permit; and how do you go about it is you must come with 500 000 rands. They do not care about your intellectual property, or your skills set. It's counterproductive, its puts us back as a nation and they do not respect what you have learnt; your brain is worth everything. I sacrificed to live in South Africa, not because I had money, but I got a skill set. That is a problem with a lot of people. Fortunately, I have gone past it.

Farai highlights his existential risk of not being able to use his intellectual property well. Farai initially worked as a penetration analyst for one of the biggest software companies in the world when he was studying and working in New Jersey. The company he worked for provided military and intelligence software, corporate software, and data protection for banks. His job was to break into firewall systems that the company would have built. The statement that he sacrificed is based on his decision to

remain in South Africa after helping the company to set up an office here. He regrets taking that step.

Some people have business accounts with work permits, but it is not legal. Levitt and Schiller (2004:1013) note that “people living in transnational social fields experience multiple loci and layers of power and are shaped by them, but they can also act back upon them”. Killian maneuvered around the business permit requirement needed to open a business bank account by going from branch to branch.

Opening a business bank account for me though was a problem. They wanted a business permit and I had a work permit. However, what I realized is that here in South Africa they do not apply their policy consistently. I am not stopped by anyone. If they did not allow me here, I went to the next branch and next branch until I found someone who overlooks, and this is what happened. Right now, I have a business account, but I opened it with a work permit.

Besides opening business accounts, the other challenge is accessing lines of credit. Even if one has a brilliant business idea, lines of credit are not easily accessible for foreign entrepreneurs. Edward narrated the challenge:

In terms of being a foreigner, you must buy everything cash. You just have a permit, where you're given three years only. You go to the bank; the bank will not finance you. The businesses and everything you must fund yourself. If you were a local person, you go to the bank, they see your business plan, what you have achieved in a certain time, what is getting in and what's getting out. They will sponsor you or get financed because you have the right papers. But for a permit expiring in three years you cannot get. Imagine if I had this business in Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean economy was fine. I could do a lot of things and I could maneuver. I would have a better cash. But because you're foreigner, there are challenges of always being a foreigner.

Edward has a driving school. He has two cars for code 08 licenses, four trucks for code ten licenses and two haulage trucks for code 14 licenses. All these vehicles he bought them for cash. Lack of access to loans means that migrants have difficulties

buying capital equipment since they have to pay cash for everything. Hungwe and Gelderblom (2014) note that while migrants in South Africa have the same access to credit facilities when it comes to buying clothes, they do not enjoy the same when it comes to buying capital equipment. Another example is Kativhu, who has a peanut butter business who explains the challenge of getting lines of credit from banks. He said:

Some of the challenges that we face is because we are foreign nationals. It is very difficult to secure funding. It is very difficult. We are self-financed. The idea is we want to finance the operations as we want to get somewhere. Mostly those are the challenges in terms of business. Also being foreign nationals you are not regarded in terms of preference. You go to a bank, you're not treated the same as South Africans. If I was a local person, I am sure we will have achieved more than we have achieved now. The progress and the rate at which we are growing is slower than our counterparts. What I still remember very clearly is we went to a bank. We wanted an overdraft and they began saying you're foreign nationals you do not qualify blah blah. I know that foreign people qualify because I do accounting. I have some of my clients who are foreign nationals who do have overdrafts.

However, in 2017 Kativhu won a national award in the Eskom Business Investment Competition as he came first in the agro processing category. He also received an award from the Western Cape Government, for being the second best emerging business in the province. The awards make Kativhu seem included but denial of loans made him an outsider, thus confirming his liminal citizenship.

Matters will be difficult if one starts out a business without the relevant papers. This was the case with Godfrey when he started his crèche. When he was establishing a photography studio; he was using personal funds as well. He said:

My struggles have basically been in terms of finance like wanting to start something and discover you do not have enough cash and I do not have papers. Being a Zimbabwean you come here, you do not have documentation,

you do not have back up and you do not have somewhere you can run to when faced with a challenge. For example, when we started the crèche, we did not have a loan. Something that could take you three months, you end up spending one year trying to set up something from personal funds. It was the same thing with photography, when we were setting the studio, we did not have enough funds. I would work and 70 percent of all I get would use it as a loan for the business. If I get R1000, I use R700 back in the business and 300 I use it. With that I bought another camera, I bought lights, and I managed to renovate the place where I am and build a website, business cards. Currently I just employ one person at the studio, and three people at the crèche.

8.4. Black Economic Empowerment

Zimbabwean entrepreneurs' main challenge is the South African government's policy of black economic empowerment (BEE). The BEE policy attempts to redress the effects of apartheid by redistributing resources to groups that were previously disadvantaged. Empowerment credentials of businesses in South Africa are assessed based on "management representation, employment equity, skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise development and corporate social investment" (Ponte et al, 2007:934). One of the aims of BEE is to promote black economic empowerment in a bid to deracialise the white dominated economy through entrepreneurship and ensuring occupation of management seats at all levels, by black South Africans (Hungwe and Gelderblom, 2014). Perbedy (2001) argues from 1994, black South Africans enjoyed a framework of full citizenship with all its rights and obligations. As a result, black Africans from outside the borders are seen as threats because they they can become part of the nation (legally or otherwise), and therefore deprive citizens of their hard-won rights, entitlements, and access to state resources (Perbedy, 2001).

The BEE policy categorises Africans, coloureds and Indians as black people. In 2012, the policy was amended and blacks are now defined as citizens of South Africa by birth or descent or those who became citizens of South Africa by 1994 through, naturalisation. The provisions of the policy acts as a double sword for migrants in that it hampers mobility at work, as only black South Africans are promoted while it blocks opportunities for you when you get involved in entrepreneurship. Pardon said the following about BEE;

If you look at the way BEE is structured, it is structured in a way that if you're a foreigner you're deemed white. That is why you see most Zimbabweans who have ventured into entrepreneurship because of limitations on access to advance within a company just because you're not a South African citizen and you fall outside the constructs of BEE. Therefore you do not qualify to be promoted to senior management or to be a CEO. Unless obviously you been here before 1994. If you're Zimbabwean and have been here before 1994 and you're naturalised and a South African citizen then you can have those kind of opportunities and you're exempted from BEE. Yes, we can register on BEE, but it only comes as BEE exempt but does not come as any other, it does not give you points.

In the above interview, Pardon highlights that Zimbabweans are forced into self-employment because of the obstructions of the BEE in job promotions. While in entrepreneurship, BEE will also prove to be an impediment again. It is important to note that their businesses are potential sources of employment even for South African citizens. Research has established that migrants are not job takers, but job creators. Shumba for example employs five South African brothers. Wellington's front staff are whites and coloureds (mixed race) South African citizens. Most Zimbabwean entrepreneurs employ South Africans as clerks or receptionists. However, the majority of the staff are usually Zimbabweans. Hungwe and Gelderblom (2014:79) noted that "if a state openly and elaborately puts in place legislation that makes it difficult for migrants to participate in the labour market and entrepreneurship, it is essentially telling them that they have no part to play". The potential customers of migrant

businesses may avoid them because they get points for supporting BEE businesses. Jack highlights this:

Because you're black, some will ask for your BEE because they get some scoring because they have given a job to a black person. Or this supplier who is BEE because most white guys are level 7, unfortunately that one we are just like white people. When you came into South Africa after 1994, you don't qualify to be considered black. The definition of black refers to someone who was here since 1994 is African or Indian. Even if you are black but came after 1995, you're classified as other. So that one is a challenge when you're tendering or doing big jobs. But for some of us who do not depend on tendering, we are not worried. But if we are looking for growing and tendering in government, BEE would matter.

Farai highlights his frustration with the BEE policy as follows:

I think the issue of BEE is a little bit of wolf in sheep's clothing. It's a farce. They say BEE equals equal opportunities for everyone. They say you need to be level X to do business with government. They don't care whether you're qualified, you have to be black; black before 1994. While the idea was ok to give business to black regardless of how much experience you have. Government had to change their procurement system. Basically when they say BEE, it means who you know. I had problems with it constantly. For a while we had to get a silent partner who was black. Currently we are level two. At the end of the day; I would say the South African market is a bit open. Some organisations have started looking at capacity regardless of BEE status. They constantly ignore our BEE status by saying if you guys can provide us with specific services; then we will go ahead.

The BEE policy is discriminatory in that it is designed to exclude foreigners. Achiume (2013) notes that structural discrimination originates in laws, policies and practices that fall into two categories. Some of the laws are "de jure alienage exclusive" in that for independent and legitimate reasons, they explicitly exclude foreigners from entire sectors of industry on the basis of citizenship and immigration status. Citizenship is a more discriminating concept between insiders and outsiders. If one crosses "the

boundary of citizenship, status, rights and obligations in relation to the political community change as a consequence” (Baubock, 2006:19). Bauder (2008) highlights that citizenship is a mechanism of distinction between migrants and non-migrants based on associations with place, origin and national community. Nyasha also highlighted that the BEE policy is discriminatory in that it is designed to exclude foreigners and the only way he goes around it is to look for partnership with a South African citizen.

Definitely, they do not want us foreigners to be involved in business. Anything that involves BEE a foreigner should not get. The only way I could get into a tender is to enter into a partnership with a South African. I am actually forced to enter into a partnership with a South African on a 50/50 basis. In doing this, you need to be smart. As a foreigner, you need to play with the system and work with the system. For some reasons, the foreigners know the opportunity, the South Africans do not. When you approach them, they do not want. They feel threatened. What I did is I approached my cousin who married a South African, gave them the opportunity, and said guys lets go 50-50. That is how I beat the BEE system. Anything I want to do in South Africa, I am covered on that. The only shortcoming is I have to go 50-50 on profit.

Liminal citizenship is about “denial of social rights and entitlements to strangers to the community, not just foreigners as conceived by the law” (Neocosmos 2006:16). Tsitsi came to South Africa when she was two years old is now a naturalized South African citizen. She can vote in local government and national elections. Her business is oriented towards feminine hygiene and menstrual products. She migrated to South Africa in the late 1990s therefore she is not eligible to get start-up funding opportunities by state institutions because she is not full a BEE citizen. She says:

It is very hard to get into government without connection and it is very hard to get into government when your name reads Zimbabwean irrespective of whether you have papers or not. Often when you apply to government institution like the Industrial Development Cooperation or Technology Innovation Institute or Innovation Hub. I had to alter the equity of the company to ensure that we are more than 50 percent South African. I had to bring another South African. People prefer not seeing a Zimbabwean. When people read my name, they will ask whether I am South African. They assume I am not because of my name or

they just prefer BEE people with South African names who are from their own country.

Tsitsi's example shows us that having citizenship did not give her equal social and economic rights like other South African citizens. This makes her a liminal citizen in that she has full citizenship and South African identity documents. She can vote in elections, but does not enjoy a full citizenship status economically. Tsitsi's experience of liminal legality reveals grey areas which affect naturalised South African citizens as they are delimited (Menjivar, 2006). Fassin (2011:215) noted that "the logics of inclusion and exclusion become more visible in naturalized people where the state constantly reminds its other citizens on how they differ from indigenous fellow citizens". Somers and Roberts (2008) argued that meaningful political rights imply the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to standards prevailing in the society. Hage (1998:49) distinguishes "between official citizenship which signifies a formal recognition of one national status by the state and practical national belonging which refers to everyday acceptance or non-acceptance as a subject of belonging by the dominant national community". This is discussed further in the next chapter.

McGregor (2010:5) notes that "Zimbabweans manoeuvre within and around constraints that influence the circumstances of displacement to their own ends". Zimbabweans use their networks in South Africa to circumvent regulations which work to their disadvantage. For example company registration, BEE or bank accounts. Elisha used his girlfriend's identity card to open a business. He said:

I wanted to start my own company as the expertise I was giving to the company did not tally up with what I was getting. In 2015, I then registered a company whose main target was outsourcing products and selling. I registered it with my girlfriend who had a South African ID. Things did not work out well later with my girlfriend in our relationship. I left the company even though it was making money. From my ex-girlfriend we used her ID to register a business, open a

business bank account and register on the City of Cape Town procurement database to get direct tenders. People could trust our company more and especially it was owned by a black woman. When dealing with government departments, they will be supporting black business women. Currently, I have a friend Kenneth who is a South African. He stays in Johannesburg. I admitted him to my company so that I can benefit in terms of the BEE and some other credentials we can get using his experience and credentials. As a result we can get critical funding from the government. He is South African and he is compliant. Since Kenneth is a shareholder in our company, we are getting the finance from Industrial Development Cooperation.

In using his girlfriend's identity document, Elisha was demonstrating the logics of flexibility in circumventing limitations of the law. Elisha as a Zimbabwean passport holder is "an apt contemporary figure who embodies the split between state-imposed identity and personal identity" (Ong, 1999: 2). Flexible citizenship refers "to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel and displacement, that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political and economic conditions". Ong (1999:19) notes that "under transnationality, the new links between flexibility and the logics of displacement on the one hand, and capital accumulation give valence to strategies of manoeuvring and positioning".

8.5. Xenophobia

The ways in which migrants experience liminal citizenship will be incomplete without discussing xenophobia. Neocosmos (2006:1) notes that post-apartheid South Africa "has experienced a massive problem of xenophobia which is shocking given the massive international support in its struggle against apartheid". The othering of foreigners is "linked to feelings of superiority derived ironically from a sense of superiority and initiated by the celebration of the success of South Africa's transition, but it simultaneously created another underclass around the same conceptual primitiveness upon which apartheid rested" (Vale, 2002:13).

Various authors define xenophobia differently. Everatt (2011:7) defines xenophobia as “hostile attitudes and actions of South Africans towards African migrants”. Neuman, (1995:1428) notes that “xenophobia is an exaggerated hostility towards or fear of foreigners which is a widespread human trait across the world”. Pillay et al (2008) used the term xenophobia as hatred of groups of people who may be within or outside a society but not considered part of that society. Dodson (2010:5) notes that “the lives of African foreign nationals residing in South Africa, whether recent arrivals or long established, legally or illegally resident, economic migrants, asylum seekers or refugees, are marked by discrimination, exclusion and fear”.

Various studies have been done on xenophobia in South Africa (Vale, 2002; Pillay et al 2008; Dodson, 2010; Charman and Piper, 2012). In 2008, xenophobic violence occurred in South Africa. Dodson (2010:2) notes that “graphic images of violent attacks on foreign nationals such as scenes of knife and stick wielding aggressors, wounded victims, burning houses and horrific photographs of a burning man shocked the world”. This wave of violence left 62 dead, more than 700 injured and a hundreds of thousands displaced across the country (Everatt, 2011). Some local South Africans were not spared either, especially Shangaans from Limpopo. Life and death for them “was determined by the capacity to answer the interrogative *yini le?* –what is this pointing to an elbow and requiring a correct isiZulu word in an immediate and unequivocal response” (Everatt, 2011: 8). South African citizens who also failed the test by not responding with the term “*indololwane*” met fatal consequences.

Some experienced xenophobic discourses that assert South Africans superiority over Zimbabweans “drawing upon western notions of modernity as well as apartheid supremacist ideologies” (Muzondidya, 2010:46). For many South Africans, Africa is a dark continent that is underdeveloped while South Africa belongs to the developed world. Neocosmos (2008:590) notes that this discourse sees the rest of Africa “as a strange backward continent characterized by primitivism, corruption, authoritarianism,

poverty, failed state and its inhabitants wish only to partake of South African resources and wealth at the expense of its citizens". Betty says South Africans only think Zimbabweans can only be domestic workers. She said:

The moment people from South Africa hear that you're from Zimbabwe. They just think everyone is a domestic worker. They just think everyone does not have documents. They think it is those Zimbabweans who just came running away from war. In one of the days, I went for a conference in Cape Town, things shifted when I said I am from Zimbabwe. We ended up talking about ZANU PF instead of business and sometimes it angers me.

On a similar note Makanaka said South Africans refer to her boutique shop as belonging to a mukwerekwere; a term that means people who speak a language is not understandable. She said:

Last week, some ladies were passing by outside this shop saying this is a shop for mukwerekwere. You must not get sad over that because when you're a foreigner, you must know that you're not in your own country. You will get others that will support you.

In extreme cases, South Africans are involved in violent activities against foreign entrepreneurs. This can range from demonstrations or the destruction of property. This has been the experience for Prince Shumba who owns 10 tipper trucks. He said:

These people want to push us from here. They do not want us here. They tell us you came to make our area dirty. Why don't you go to Zimbabwe? Sometimes they mount up. They come here marching and singing. You see all those taxi bosses there; they are now my friends. When they were paid off their money from taxi finance-remember when MyCiti⁷ came, it was paying them off taxi owners. When they were being paid off that money, they were building flats. You know South African law is different from Zimbabwean law. Community law goes above the nation's law if I may say it that way. When they come here and march, those guys will go there and say you guys you are just being jealousy because he is making money. He is at his corner. He disturbs no one. He does

⁷ MyCiti is a bus rapid transport system for the City of Cape Town

his business. He is not like Nigerians who sell drugs. I have been called several times to meetings. The community leaders stood up for me. If this neighbours does not complain seeing my trucks parked here, why do you people come from ten houses afar and say he is making noise. It means you have another problem. They just say you're making noise. They come here. It does not make sense. I park at an open field. This is council's land. I am standing here. This is saving us something like R20 000 in parking fees. They once came here with a petrol bomb to bomb a quantum and a truck⁸. The van was insured. The truck did not catch fire because it is made from diesel. When I was in Zimbabwe someone just started my truck, and went to smash the truck at that school there, and it was a write off. There used to be a bill board here. It was smashed by that truck. I do not know whether they wanted to steal the car or not. The lady from that house saw him starting the truck. He drove away for ten minutes. The lady was surprised why the car was being started at 3am. He drove away for ten minutes and came back to smash the car at that billboard at that school there. You cannot say, you steal here and go away, then decide to come back to smash my truck. The guy just wanted to smash my truck. So those are the challenges you get. In this business thing is in you, you just have to find something to do. I feel there will be a lot of construction in Zimbabwe after elections. This is the time to move on... they will start resuscitating hospitals, but come January, they will start renovating existing dilapidated buildings, condemned buildings that will collapse on people. I am going to Zimbabwe.

Shumba parks his tipper trucks in an open area just in front of his house. The interesting factor here is that community leaders who had often been accused of coordinating xenophobia in South Africa defended him. However, this must be understood against a background of social capital. Shumba first attempted to have a quantum mini bus driving from Dunoon to Maitland as well as from Dunoon to Cape Town city centre. However, things did not go well with fellow South African drivers and taxi operators as they were always arguing and fighting, at the taxi rank. He concluded that this business was not going to work for him as he did not like fighting. He sold the quantum to buy his first tipper truck. When the City of Cape Town introduced the My

⁸ A quantum is a thirteen seater mini bus mainly used for public transport in South Africa.

Citi bus rapid transport bus system, some of the taxi owners were bought out and they built their houses adjacent to where Shumba currently stays. Most of them are now community leaders, so whatever happens, Shumba just reports the case to them and they always come to his defence. Outbreaks of xenophobic violence have become a common occurrence in South Africa every year. Foreign owned businesses and foreign employees are always targeted. Xenophobic violence will continue in South Africa in the foreseeable future as politicians blame African foreign nationals for exacerbating economic challenges.

8.6. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that the legal status of a migrant does not equate to full social and economic rights in the country of settlement. This chapter contributes to the discussion on differential inclusion by highlighting the importance of economic rights in the analysis of immigration policies. Legal residents in South Africa including those with citizenship through naturalisation are disbarred from the right to share to the full the social heritage in the host nation. While Turner (1967) argues that the incorporated subject will be stable and have rights and obligations vis-a-vis others, this chapter showed the ways in which legally resident aliens are discriminated against through laws which determine spaces for insiders and outsiders.

Documentation of migrants matters, but it does not account for full inclusion. The challenges that Zimbabwean entrepreneurs face are not mainly violence or physical abuse in the streets but laws and policies designed to exclude them from participating in the mainstream economy. This chapter also showed that measures designed to address xenophobia may fuel discrimination of migrants later. For example, following the 2008 xenophobic violence, Pillay (2008) et al recommended that foreigners who were resident in South Africa should be able to claim formal residency, receive

identification, enter the country's taxation system and be legally traceable. The regularisation of Zimbabweans in South Africa was one such initiative, but it led to experiences of liminal citizenship. The DZP and its successor permits invalidate the idea of post-national or transnational through legal fictions of residence which establishes hierarchical statuses based on economic rights for those deemed as non citizens. Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs are stuck in a state of permanent liminality, as they are included by virtue of being documented but excluded from participating fully in the mainstream economy. It seems that the conditions that they cannot be renewed reinforces the notion that holders of such permits are guests who are dependent on Pretoria's hospitality.



9. Chapter Nine: Temporary Conditional Legality and the Construction of Belonging in South Africa

9.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the attitudes of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs towards permanent settlement in South Africa and towards return to Zimbabwe. While conducting my interviews, I asked entrepreneurs if they would consider living in South Africa forever given that they were making money here. I realised there was much to discover as the responses I got from this question invoked various issues to do with the relationship between permits, home and belonging to a place. The responses showed that people lacked fixity in South Africa because ZEPs came with a condition that the permit will not be renewed and will not allow application for permanent residence status, regardless of one's period of stay in South Africa. The examination of these conditions exposes the grey area of "liminal legality," which affects assimilation and belonging in important ways (Menjívar, 2006).

The impositions of conditions created a sense of temporary conditional legality in the lives of Zimbabweans in South Africa. This temporality is a key feature of existential liminality as people do not know whether they will be in South Africa, whether their permits will be renewed, whether they can buy houses in South Africa and remain fearful for the possibility of their papers not being renewed. Existential liminality is evident by having no sense of secure future and a damaged belonging to the hostland. People with ZEP are in between, with the possibility of being uprooted from a place they have been living for the past decade. At the same time, the deteriorating political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe-the place they call home weakens prospects of return, while in South Africa they are insecure, and waiting on the state to renew their existence in South Africa.

Teo (2011) notes that no matter how settled, migrants still dream of eventually returning to their homeland. The idea of return provides a framework within which migrants maintain a relationship in both home and diaspora. This chapter focuses on migrant ideas and practices in recreating and maintaining home (Mand, 2010). Hammar (2014: 09) argues that displacement itself cannot be separated from place, personhood and possibilities. It touches on issues of belonging to a given social group, to actual locality and to the nation (2014:09). Living in a diasporic context “makes people to be in a place but not of it, to be neither guest nor host” (Landau, 2014:301). Gilmartin (2008) argues that studying issues of belonging in a migration context helps us uncover various challenges faced by migrants through the erection of various barriers, policing of borders and practice of social exclusion. More so, it sharpens our understanding of transnationalism as a process (Teo, 2011).

9.2. What is belonging

Social scientists know very little about what belonging stands for and how it is claimed. Antonsich (2010:644) notes that “belonging is a notion that has been both vaguely defined and ill theorized”. Mallet (2004:62) argues that while researchers understand home as a multidimensional concept, “there has been little sustained reflection and critique of the diverse and contradictory meanings of this term”. As a result, various social science disciplines take this notion for granted, as if its meaning is somewhat self-explanatory. Skrbis et al (2007: 261) note that belonging may well be “one of the softer social science concepts but it is central to any discussion of some of the hardest issues facing societies today, with regards to immigrant integration and cultural diversity”.

Various authors define belonging differently. Stratford (2009:796) notes that “belonging denotes an attribute, adjunct, or dependent status, attachment or possession and fitness, connection and appropriate classification. In the first instance, towns are

attributed to regions or titles. In the second, feelings are attached to places, felt by someone, affixed to how that someone is in a place and belongs there". Stratford further notes that belonging should be understood as opposite to displacement, dispossession, discord and misfit. Feeling dispossessed or a misfit in a society is a key characteristic of existential liminality. Based on this supposition, it is evident that emotional attachment to a particular place relates to the security which that area gives to the person.

In a migration context, belonging is the mediated representational practice of the diasporic condition, articulated through experiences of home and migration (Marcu, 2004: 331). Belonging is thus "shaped by mobility and the extent to which nostalgic and affective spaces shape the migrant's identification" (Marcu, 2004:331). Following Marcu, belonging is about evoking memory of a distant place in relation to the current environment that one is living in. Home in this chapter represents a symbolic space of familiarity, comfort, peace and emotional attachment. It does not represent "the domestic material space which feminist authors criticized for reproducing gender patriarchal relations of oppression, violence and fear" (Varley, 2008:47). Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs referred largely to the country of origin as home but the concept was extended to mean a place that holds considerable social, psychological and emotive meaning for individuals (Easthope, 2004). Varley (2008:49) notes that "criticisms of home as an oppressive and apolitical space drew a response from black feminists who argued that such criticisms emerged from a position of privilege and that home was a space of safety and resistance for blacks in a racist society".

Antonsich (2010:644) notes that belonging should be "analysed both as a feeling of feeling of being at home in a place (place belongingness) and as a discursive resource that constructs, claims, justifies or resists forms of socio-spatial inclusion/exclusion (politics of belonging)". In the paragraphs that follow, I develop my argument by analysing the different story lines in relation to the criteria outlined above. I draw upon

the complex decisions, rationales and emotions underlying attitudes towards return and permanent settlement in South Africa.

9.3. Legal Belonging

Legal factors are an essential component in “producing security which is regarded by migrants as a vital component of belonging” (Antonsich, 2012: 648). For many people, the idea of home is very simple: “It is a place where no one questions your right to be; a place of belonging that points to your history, your past; an archive of sorts that metaphorically documents that marks you as non-alien” (Silva, 2009:694). One of the disadvantages of those permits is that it is very difficult to extend to a spouse or to children. More so, ZEP have conditions that the permits could not be renewed, and would not allow application for permanent residence, irrespective of period of stay in South Africa. By giving these conditions, the permits have oriented people towards the future by cultivating temporality. This temporary conditional legality resulted in lack of fixity. By stipulating such conditions, the government of South Africa is passively telling Zimbabwean migrants that holding a ZEP is not a fully fledged immigration status. It is simply a special conditional legality to be in South Africa for a specific period of time. It can be terminated at any time when the government decides not to replace it.

Moyo (2018:13) argues that the conditions on ZEP permits “depoliticise and make Zimbabwean migrants invisible by constructing them as temporary sojourners who do not and should not belong”. Briseno (2017: 4) notes that the feeling of being an outcast makes transnationals “see their host lands as temporary living spaces rather than permanent homes”. It is the feeling of having no place in South Africa that goes hand in hand with the hope of one day returning to their homeland. Therefore liminality in this case is a temporary and socially uncertain transitional state of partial belonging that arises out of marginal legal status (Chacon, 2014). The ZEP is an example of a policy and legal mechanisms that produce liminal legality.

Building on Coutin's (2003) notion of the "spaces of nonexistence" inhabited by legally marginalised immigrant communities, Menjívar (2006) conceptualised liminal legality as referring to migrants from El Salvador and Guatemala with lawful status in United States but with no rights as other immigrant visas. Menjivar posits that the liminal legality of these individuals was not because they have a temporarily lawful status, but because they and the members of their families and communities move in and out of status, between tentative lawfulness and more complete marginalisation (2006:1016). Menjivar conceptualised liminality from Turner (1967) to explain liminal migrants as structurally invisible because they are at once no longer classified and not yet classified. In 2012, the American government announced the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) which does not confer any form of legal status, much less citizenship; it simply means that, for a specified period of time, an individual is permitted to be lawfully present in the United States (Chacon, 2015). Just like ZEP holders in South Africa, liminally legal migrants in the United States are legal, but exist in and out of status, between tentative lawfulness and more complete marginalisation.

Writing on the regularisation of central Americans in Mexico, Basok and Wiesner (2018) argue that conditions attached to status regularization of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and Columbia render the legality that migrants have insecure and unstable. Even though the South African government later changed its stance by introducing the ZEP as a successor permit to the ZSP, the conditions that come with the special permit make life planning difficult. More so, the language used in the launch of these permits is also telling. For example, at the expiry of the DZP, it was announced that it will be replaced with ZSP, ZSP expired and it was announced that it would be closed and ZEP would come. The South African government by using the terms closure and replacement means that the affected migrants "cannot refer to closed and replaced policies, if they ever attempt to claim permanent residence in future" (Moyo, 2018:11).

Ong's (1999:215) theory of zones of 'graduated sovereignty' indicated that "nation-states construct personhood and mobility through popular and policy discourses on immigration where national borders are used as a disciplinary force to manipulate national identity". The ZEP makes it clear that it has no path to permanent residence, regardless of period of stay in South Africa. By granting this temporary conditional legality, the South African government "indefinitely prolongs the experience of displacement, denies individuals many rights afforded to other immigrants, and actively shapes their identities" (Mountz et al, 2002:336). Without prospects of permanent residency, Zimbabwean migrants remain as 'temporary' residents. Noting further Mountz et al (2002:342) argue that when the state constructs identities of 'temporary residents', "it affects the material struggles of daily life in profound ways". In the United States, people with temporary protected statuses save as much money as they could all the time because they expect a possibility of their papers not being renewed (Abrego and Lakhani, 2015).

The extension of special permits from DZP, to ZSP and then ZEP resulted in prolonged state of perpetual limbo for beneficiaries. Through the ZEP, the South African government required applicants to accept that they would remain remain "temporary," by not integrating too much into the fabric of the host society. The ZEP positioned permit holders in and outside South Africa. The succeeding paragraphs will show how the temporary status highlights "the nation-state as a disciplinary force with a vested interest in dictating constructions of personhood" (Mountz et al, 2002:340). Migrant identities are produced through policies on immigration.

The main legal factor affecting Zimbabwean migrants is proper documentation. Shumba when asked if he will return to Zimbabwe answered:

Me, I am busy moving back to Zimbabwe. Nothing welcomes me here. If they put a fee of R200 000 to get permanent residence, I know I can buy a house. I can make proper papers for my family. I know we can fly to Zimbabwe anytime. We cannot fly to England. Now that is life. Now we have money which we cannot even enjoy. I can only enjoy it myself. Home is in Zimbabwe. We will go back home. Policies and systems of every country do not welcome foreigners. The problem with us is we want to stay. We should get what we want here and go back home to reinvest. We are moving back home now. To be honest, I would love to stay here, but it is a pity we are building going back home. South African government does not want to give us permanent residence. I am here for how many years, I do not even know. I don't even have a house.

Shumba said he cannot visit the United Kingdom. It is because the conditions of the ZEP have led to visa denials amongst Zimbabweans intending to visit other countries. The embassies always respond that the conditions of the special permits signal the probability that they may not return to South Africa. Holders of the special permits do not know if they will be in South Africa in future. The conditions of ZEP are not ideal for house ownership. Owning a house signifies a person's belongingness to a particular space and lack of it means some is experiencing existential liminality. Zimbabwean entrepreneurs are unwilling to buy houses without permanent residence status.

Mand (2010) notes that migrants construct houses through remittances. However, the literature does not focus on how these buildings maintain migrants'symbolic ties to the country of origin. The house itself is a site of materiality in which claims of belonging are made. Collins for example said that he will consider living in Zimbabwe because he built a house in Chitungwiza which he has not lived in it yet. As other sections below will show, building a house in Zimbabwe was the most important project for Zimbabweans living in South Africa. Rykwert (1991:53) notes that "the association between house and home was consolidated in English case law in the early 17th century by the Jacobean

Judge, Sir Edward Coke”. The judge declared, “The house of everyman is to him as his castle and fortress, as well as his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose” (Rykwert, 1991: 53). Having a house in Zimbabwe also constitutes a proper person as understood by Zimbabweans as part of their personhood. The anthropological concept of personhood refers to the ways in which social persons are created in different societal contexts (Morreira, 2013).

Shumba’s main challenge which will make him leave South Africa is the immigration status of his children and wife. While the ZEP provides for an accompanying spousal visa and for children, it is not easy to obtain such . A person qualifies for a spousal visa after five years in marriage. I will discuss more about children in the next section on schooling. As a result, Shumba’s wife and child cannot fly to Zimbabwe from Cape Town neither can they plan a holiday to the United Kingdom. It can be argued that Shumba has been thrust into abjection wherein “the possibility of realizing one’s full and proper personhood is indefinitely suspended” (Worby, 2008). Similarly, Ferguson (1999: 236) defines “a sense of which the promise of modernization had been betrayed and there were thrown in the full circle of humanity, thrown back into the ranks of the underclass and cast down into world of rags”. It is the futility of enjoying his wealth with his family that renders Shumba abject because of the juridical status of his family members. As a result, his family can only use a bus to travel across the border. The issue is that immigration officials at the airports will arrest you if they discover that you overstayed.

On the other hand it is alleged that immigration officials at the Beitbridge border post between South Africa and Zimbabwe accept bribes from over stayed people. They then roll back the stamp to the date on which one should have left South Africa. It is also alleged that there are also cross border bus drivers who have links with immigration officials. When people enter the bus, those with permits that are not in good standing pay a certain amount so that the driver will help negotiate with the officials at the border.

Under current legislation, a person who overstays for three months is declared undesirable to enter South Africa for a period ranging between one year and five years. I will return to the other issue with regards to children's access to schooling at the end of this section.

Even if these entrepreneurs attempted to employ their spouses in the family company; the conditions of getting a work permit are so difficult. For instance, one of the conditions is that the Department of Labour must issue a certificate that there is no South African with remotely similar qualifications than those sought from the foreigner. The certificate is issued to the High Commissioner of the country in which the immigrant comes from where he/she must apply for a permit. More so, to apply for a child's permit, the father's permit and the mother's permit must be available. DZP and its successor permits do not provide for spousal or child visas. In the United States, beneficiaries of TPS were unable to petition family legalisation of their children or family members who remained in the country of origin (Abrego and Lakhani, 2015).

On a similar note, Charles who has five haulage trucks says that given that he has been established in South Africa, it has become home. Even if he visits Zimbabwe, he misses Cape Town which means it has become his home but the papers remain a problem.

I do know home is always best. But I have got family here, and I have established myself here. It is no longer about me. It involves my family and the people that I work with. It is not an issue of waking up one day and saying I want to go back. I do not know what the future holds because of our papers but I do not think I will go back home anytime soon. I go to Zimbabwe every year just for a week. When I am there, I always miss here which means home is here.

There is a consistent pattern in which married people conceptualise home as a place where the whole family will feel comfortable. The entrepreneurs are caught in a liminal context, to serve the interests of family or business interests because of documents. In

deciding whether to permanently return to Zimbabwe, the welfare of children takes centre stage. Home can thus be defined as a place where the whole family feels comfortable. Charles also defines home as speculative by waiting for what the future holds after the ZEP expires. O'Reilly (2018) notes that people who do not have a sense of security or control over the future are exhibiting ontological liminality.

Caruthers (2002:426) notes that “we must not lose sight of an equally important critique of citizenship that has come through feminist and post-colonial theory to which the concept of national citizenship must be understood not only as a universal and empty juridical category, but as a social performance of national identity”. Following this perspective, an immigrant’s achievement of legal citizenship does not immediately confer acceptance into the local community. He or she must “in addition achieve mastery of the modes of gendered, cultural, linguistic and bodily performance that underpin the principle of citizenship, despite its pretension to abstract universality” (2002: 426). Migration can produce conditions of liminality where people are separated from their home country but remain marginalised in their host nation resulting in liminal detachment in both countries. This produces a disorienting state of “homeland-lessness where neither the sending nor the receiving country acts as a place of belonging” (Tsuda, 2013:123). Such experiences are apparent to naturalized Zimbabwean migrants.

In the previous chapter, I discussed how marginal citizenship differs from full citizenship because the former do not enjoy full citizenship status economically. Being a naturalised citizen in South Africa does not mean the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to standards prevailing in the society (Somers and Roberts, 2008). Vora (2013:5) argues that “citizenship is not a binary formulation of having or not having legal membership; but the excluded and the impossible need to be brought into the same frame in order to study citizenship as a shifting and dynamic form of legality, membership, state-making, and governance”.

Zimbabweans who moved to South Africa in the early 2000s and managed to acquire citizenship are constantly reminded that they do not belong to South Africa. Gilmartin (2008: 1843) notes that states use “citizenship as one of the tools of inclusion and exclusion, as marker of belonging, a way of rearticulating national identity through the exclusion of people who are not citizens”. However, having formal citizenship does not equal access to all rights. It can make one feel excluded.

Tsitsi came to South Africa as a two-year-old child when her parents migrated to South Africa in the late 1990s. She is a naturalized South African citizen, but neither belongs to South Africa nor Zimbabwe. Her experiences further sheds lights beyond just having permanent residency. She said:

In South Africa, I am constantly reminded that I am originally Zimbabwean and I am not from South Africa. In Zimbabwe when they hear the way I speak, or the way I behave or because of my identity documents, they say I am a South African because I have not been in Zimbabwe my whole life. I do see myself belonging in neither of the context... When people read my name, they will ask whether I am South African. They assume I am not because of my name or they just prefer people with South African names who are from their own country...I was definitely raised by Zimbabweans parents, there are certain things that I see in South Africa that I was not raised to relate to, and I am like no. At the same time, there are certain things that Zimbabweans do, because I grew up in South Africa, I am like no. Even constitutionally, we are different countries on things we are allowed or open to. It forms a barrier on both where I am and neither. Culture and language are the issues but I relate to one more than the other I guess.

Tsitsi highlights that being at home is not only an economic matter, but a social and constitutional one. McNevin (2006) argues that people can claim full belonging if they are part of the economy of that place (economic belonging), participating in everyday social relations (social belonging) and appeal to human rights (universal belonging). In the previous chapter, I highlighted how Tsitsi was denied funding by South African government institutions such as the Industrial Development Cooperation or Technology

Innovation Institute or Innovation Hub. She was not considered South African enough. It is those experiences that make her feel that she does not have a stake in the country she currently lives. Zimbabwe and South Africa are different culturally and in terms of economic advancement, as well as in constitutionalism. South Africa is economically advanced compared to Zimbabwe which is often referred to as a pariah state. Culturally, Zimbabwe is considered to be more culturally conservative while South Africa is considered liberal. Constitutionally, Zimbabwe is considered as more of an authoritarian state than South Africa that is widely perceived as beacon for democracy in Africa. It is due to a complex mix of these factors that Tsitsi failed to find a country to rightly claim belonging to. Antonsich (2010:651) notes that a person's "intimate feeling of belonging always come to terms with discourses of inclusion and exclusion at play in that very place and inexorably conditions one's sense of place belongingness". Amin (2005:9) calls for "new metaphors of belonging by putting forward the idea that people belong to neither context, but to situations - that is - everyday encounters".

Tsitsi's experience calls for the need to interrogate the concept of citizenship. It is not just official as "identity documents but is also social and practical (Hages, 1998: 49). In this lane, the concept of citizenship denotes whether one is either fully citizen or fully not a citizen. Practical belonging by contrast has a cumulative logic. In the daily life of the nation, Hages argues that there are "nationals who on the basis of their class, gender or ethnicity for example, feel and are made to feel to be more or less national than others" (1998: 49). Legal citizenship gives certain rights and privileges, but "it is only a pass of the game of achieving an embodied and performed citizenship that is recognized as legitimate by the dominant national community" (Caruthers, 2002: 427).

Teo (2011:817) argues that exploring "the possibility of return migration opens up notions of citizenship and nationality to further complicate the cultural politics of belonging". Noting further, Teo argues that formal citizenship "may not necessarily reflect the layered nuances of migrant identity, yet it may account for the significant

impact of a migrant's life" (2011: 817). Ways of belonging refers to "practices that signal an identity which demonstrates a connection to a particular group" (Levvit and Schiller, 2004: 1010). One person "might have many contacts from the country of origin but not at all identify herself as belonging to that country" (Levvit and Schiller, 2004:1011). They are engaged in transnational ways of being, but not belonging. Similarly a person may eat certain foods or worship certain saints because that is what her ancestors have always done. But doing so does not signal a conscious identification with a particular ethnicity or with their ancestral home.

Another way of looking at Tsitsi's experience is through Nyamnjoh's (2017: 254) lens of incompleteness whereby every baby is inadequate or incomplete at birth who undertook the journey of self-activation in a process of cultivation or domestication through relationships and interactions with social others. As a result, as children grow, they embody the ways of seeing, doing and being of the social contexts in which they are born and grow up. Instead of expecting to show allegiance or belonging to Zimbabwe or South Africa, analysis must focus on interconnections, hierarchies and gradations that spring from lived experiences that continually reconfigure human reality (Nyamnjoh, 2017). To Nyamnjoh, Tsitsi is a frontier African who who contests the taken-for-granted and often institutionalised and bounded ideas and practices of being, becoming, belonging, places and spaces. Therefore, Tsitsi adapts different forms and manifest themselves differently according to context and necessity. Tsitsi's capacity to straddle physical and cultural geographies enables her to point attention to the possibility and reality of a world beyond neat dichotomies. Her world is characterised by flexibility in mobility, identity, citizenship and belonging. This allows her to explore the fullness of her potentialities without unduly confining herself with exclusionary identities. Therefore fundamentalist and exclusionary claims and articulation of belonging based on countries borders are profoundly at odds with Tsitsi for she is neither an insider nor an outsider to South Africa and Zimbabwe.

9.4. Schooling

Schools in South Africa follow the 2002 Immigration Act. The Act places schools in the position of having to enforce immigration policy. Section 39(1) of the Act makes it clear that “no learning institution shall knowingly provide training or instruction to (a) an illegal foreigner; (b) a foreigner whose status does not authorize him or her to receive such training”. Section 2(1)(c) notes that Department of Home Affairs function is to “detect and deport illegal foreigners” and in achieving this objective it should “inspect institutions of learning to ensure that illegal foreigners are not enrolled therein”. In Section 39(1) of the Act, “no learning institution shall knowingly provide training or instruction to (a) an illegal foreigner; (b) a foreigner whose status does not authorize him or her to receive such training”. Furthermore, Section 39(2) states that “if an illegal foreigner is found on any premises where instruction or training is provided, it shall be presumed that such foreigner was receiving instruction or training from or allowed to receive instruction or training by, the person who has control over such premises unless *prima facie* evidence to the contrary is adduced.” In this Act, schools are responsible for ensuring that they do not admit students whose legal status in South Africa is undocumented. Furthermore, if found with such pupils, they can be charged for helping an ‘illegal foreigner’ under Section 42(1) which prohibits anyone from “aiding, abetting, assisting, enabling, or in any manner help” an illegal foreigner. This includes, but is not limited to, providing accommodation, letting or selling any real estate, or entering into an agreement to conduct business.

Section 29 (1) (a) of the South African constitution establishes the right to basic education (for all children and adults) “as an immediate right unqualified by any limitation related to progressive realisation.” Government has an obligation to take active steps to ensure that every child has access to educational facilities and enjoys the right to education (Crush and Tawodzera, 2011). The inability of Shumba to

successfully apply for a study visas for his children will make him leave South Africa for Zimbabwe. However, Shumba is on the dispensation permit which does not provide for a spousal visa. He said:

I have tried to apply for permits for my kids without success. My first born is now 10 years old. She is in school, but she does not have papers. We have tried to apply for permits for them, they will tell you, like now, my ZEP permit is not yet out. When I want to apply for my kids, they will say we're still giving permits those that applied before. Those are my challenges. My children cannot get proper schooling. My child was at a school in Bothasig. I had to take her to Brooklyn because they were giving me a hard time. Every time I went there to pay for fees, or when the school open from holidays every term, they phone me saying they want papers to the extent they told me that we can write you a nice transfer letter or we are going to stop your child. So I can only put her in private schools which are very expensive. In private schools, they do not worry about the papers, they just want their money. Alternatively, I can put her in a cheap school where it is not competitive. Like now where she is, there are no sports. I was making a decision now that at least she can be in grade five so that I can take her home in Zimbabwe. Then I put her in a boarding school where she can get proper schooling, where she can play netball, where she can do swimming. When we grew up, we all had those privileges at school, why not her. I feel this land is for someone who is struggling. If you're not struggling you do not need to be here.... I know we can fly to Zimbabwe anytime. We can fly to England anytime. Now that is life. Now we have money which we cannot even enjoy. I can only enjoy it myself. Home is in Zimbabwe. We will go back home. Policies and systems of every country do not welcome foreigners.

Shumba's narration shows how school boards and principals are caught in between Constitutional provisions and directives from Departments of Education and Home

Affairs (Crush and Tawodzera, 2011). The Admission Policy for Ordinary Public Schools also contains three clauses on the admission of non-citizens which note that “this policy applies equally to learners who are not citizens of the Republic of South Africa and whose parents are in possession of a permit for temporary or permanent residence issued by the Department of Home Affairs”. However, this was not the case with Shumba’s child. They wanted the child’s documentation so that she continues going to the school. As Gonzales and Chavez (2012) also argue that second generation migrants in the United States wrestle with the contradiction of being socialized by American values through their education and environment, yet simultaneously holding the status of undocumented migrants. Unlike in Greece where foreign children “have obligations of minimum schooling as any other Greeks and graduates from Greek secondary schools have access to education under the same conditions and prerequisites as Greeks” (Glytsos, 2005:821). In South Africa, undocumented children do not have the right to access schools offering insights into the disjuncture between a “cultural citizen” raised in South Africa and undocumented migrant.

The same special permit conditions imposed on Zimbabwean migrants were also applied to migrants from Lesotho and Angola. The Angolan case is more interesting in that the permits were issued upon the expiry of refugee permits that were originally issued in the late 1990s. However, the Angolan Special Permit was only granted to people who applied for refugee status in the 1990s, leaving children born between 1998 and 2015 in illegality. Gonzales (2002) argues that the structural obstacles which exclusionary immigration and citizenship laws create entrench the marginalisation of migrants and their children, fundamentally limiting possibilities for change. The concept of citizenship allows us to examine the ways in which migrants and their descendants have been accepted in the receiving society. Bloemraad et al (2013) note that immigration challenges reaffirm sovereignty and state control, both of which are linked to citizenship. Some children also experience xenophobia in public schools where they

are called makwerekwere or referred to as Tsvangirai or Mugabe (Hungwe and Gelderblom, 2014).

On 12 December 2019, the High Court of South Africa ruled that “Sections 39 and 42 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 do not prohibit the admission of illegal foreign children into schools and do not prohibit the provisions of basic education to illegal foreign children.” The High Court also interdicted schools from removing or excluding children, including illegal foreign children, who were already admitted on the basis that the child has no identity number, permit or passport, or has not produced any identification document. However, by end of March 2020, media reports indicated that schools were still turning away foreign children without visas, saying they were still waiting for guidance from the Department of Basic Education. While the judgment provides reprieve for children, as long as their parents are undocumented, with no access to banking, the reprieve is not enough. It is yet to be seen if a parent may not be deported in the interests of a child in school. Currently, there is another case before the high court where parents are fighting not to be separated from their legal children.

9.5. Place Belongingness

Antonsich (2010:646) notes that “the first level in the study of belonging is to understand how an emotional feeling comes to be attached by an individual to a particular place so as to generate place belonging”. Easthope (2004) argues that the place belongingness “irrevocably ties the physical world with the social, cultural and emotive worlds of people”. Place attachment is a term that seeks to “illuminate emotional, symbolic and affective dimensions of peoples thinking and places” (Risbeth and Powell, 2013:161). Easthope (2004:136) notes that place provides the theoretical basis for “addressing the relationship that people have with the external world. In this context, place is felt as home and accordingly to belong means to find a place where an individual can feel at home”. Given the emotional attachment associated with belonging as a feeling at home,

the notion is also rendered in terms of rootedness (Antonsich, 2010: 646). I asked Jack if he will ever return to live in Zimbabwe. His response was:

Yes I want to return to Zimbabwe even tomorrow. I do not like staying here at all, I do not belong here. I have a very big house in Zimbabwe. Since it was completed, I have not yet stayed there. I am eager to stay in that house. I am someone who likes to stay in the farm. In December when I visit my farm, I feel so happy to see goats, cows. I just want to live at my house resting. My future is I want to stay in Zimbabwe; if things will be excellent at work, I will be calling these guys you see here from Zimbabwe to ask if they had filed tax returns. I can also file tax returns with internet while in Zimbabwe. That is why I chose a profession that is cloud based. You can do accounts, tax returns, where ever you're. When I was in Zimbabwe in December, I did seven tax returns. The money just get transferred to my account. That is what I cherish, I don't like being here. I have a house here but I will rent it out and go. SA is not in my heart, my heart is in Zimbabwe. My children though do not want to hear about Zimbabwe. They ask what is this- seeing cattle and blair toilets and syphoning water, but they like trees and mangoes.

According to Jack, home is not just about the physical location of the place, but a place with some emotive meaning for him. Jack's idea of home is about a "traditional rural" lifestyle of having a house and domestic animals such as cattle and goats. To place this issue into context, Jack is one of the beneficiaries of the land reform and he is interested in farming on the piece of land. His children's notion of home is different from his own. For them it is also about the amenities they grew up with. While some things in Zimbabwe give them homelike comfort, home is were the best and modern amenities are. For children in urban areas, an outside toilet does not signal comfort and thus is not home. Home is not just a measure of home as in "back home in Zimbabwe", but home has the comforts that one is used to and if a place does not match the expectations of what a home is, the person may not be happy see it as home. There is an argument in the literature exploring home and belonging, that children do not matter in construction of belonging. This is because childhood is seen as a natural phase of life that is

associated with passivity (Mand, 2010). The narrative above shows that social relations and objects are central to children's conceptualisations of home. Jack also showed that children are fundamental to where home is and this had been highlighted in greater detail on the section on legal belonging.

Leycevant and Duyvendak (2017:67) note that a place can "foster feelings of home in that people can achieve some sense of control over it and imbue the place with meaning, incorporating elements that satisfy personal needs and preferences at a given time. This is the case with Jack highlighted above". The absence of place belongingness is a sense of loneliness, isolation, alienation and displacement (Antonsich, 2010). This is the case of Elisha when I asked him if he now considers Cape Town to be home, he responded:

Nooh. My home is Bindura. Honestly home is always Zimbabwe. Here I am just a refugee. Here is just for experience money and exposure. I feel comfortable if I am at home. It does not mean I am not going to buy properties here. But my goal is to raise as much finance as I can in South Africa and invest in Zimbabwe. I am going to invest much as I can in Zimbabwe.

Elisha raises the issue of maintaining home by saying that he was in South Africa just for money. In this sense, home requires of us to leave and seek the means to sustain it from elsewhere. The idea of mobility has also allowed us to shift the notion of home as a fixed place. This relates to participants' description of several homes stretched across space (geographic) and place (sense, rural urban, city camp). Home is constructed through the series of activities of its various members who may or may not be present. In this case, home is made in being away. Thus home is a place where one is reared and departs when one come of age (Mallet, 2004). The fundamental aspect here is being away from home is admittedly needed for this strong sense of home to exist. Taking the idea of migrant's home into consideration, home exists in their memory as

place of origin - a past place where one was born/and or place they hope to return (Sabra, 2008).

Easthope (2004) argues that the idea of mobility reinforces the idea of home. It is a “constellation of relationships represented in spatial and relational realm from which people venture into the world and to which they generally hope to return” (Mallet, 2004: 77). Noting further, the birth place holds “symbolic power as a formative dwelling place, a place of origin and return, and a place from which to embark upon a journey” (Mallet, 2004:63). In contrast, the outside is perceived as an imposing, if not threatening or dangerous space. Elisha thus sees being in South Africa as being a refugee. Home encompasses the house or dwelling that a person lived in immediately after birth and/or their childhood family house(s). It also symbolizes the “family relationships and life courses enacted within those spaces” (Mallet, 2004:73).

Stratford (2009) notes that it is the relation to a place and the loss of place that informs the debate on belonging. Rishbeth and Powell (2013:163) argue that the “significance of evoking of memory within place experience is well served by stories of nostalgia - a looking back, but a continuing resourceful process”. In the United States, Mexicans articulate the idea of home in response to the “everyday realities of alienation and abandonment” (Silva, 2009: 694). This also means home is not really a place but a very modern feeling that is the result of modernity’s push into the city and the alienation of labour and sociability. Mallet (2004: 65) highlights how home goes beyond the idea of a structure that is located in space.

It can be a dwelling place or a lived space of interaction between people, places, things; or perhaps both. The boundaries of home can be permeable and or impermeable. Home can be singular and or plural, alienable or inalienable, fixed and stable and or mobile or changing. It can be associated with feelings of comfort, intimacy, relaxation and security and or oppression, tyranny and persecution. It can

or cannot be associated with family. Home can be an expression of one's possibly fluid identity ... (Mallet, 2004:84).

Mallet's definition of home corresponds with most respondents' sentiments. In particular, the notion that it is not a fixed place. Beyond comfort, Mallet also tells us that home can be a source of oppression and persecution as the next section will explore. While home is a multidimensional concept, Mallet's conception does not engage with the idea of home for migrant communities. Various sections in this chapter have shown that migrants associate home with the country of origin. Others associate home with the place that they grew up in, where they work, or where their children live. Benya (2016) writing on women in mining in South Africa notes that home is a place where people feel their relations are strongest.

9.6. Economic belonging

Economic factors matter in the construction of belonging as they "contribute in creating safe and stable material conditions for the individual and her/his family" (Antonsich, 2010: 648). A study by Yuval-Davis (2006) showed that Kosovan, Kurdish and Somali refugees in London showed that a sense of belonging was stronger to the British society among refugees who rather than being engaged in casual labour had built a professional life. This was the case with some of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs. For example Makanaka, when asked if she will ever return to Zimbabwe said:

Zimbabwe is tricky because of the way we came. Some of the frustrations that made us come here are still haunting us. Sometimes home is home, but there are some people who are doing things there. Sometimes I go to Western Union to receive money that comes from Zimbabwe. I collect my money from Zimbabwe. I have been offered a global account. I can still manage the life of Zimbabwe while here. I will go when things get better. As a business person, I cannot say home is best without money. I will die of hunger. Home is best, when I have money to buy things that I want. I get phone calls from Zimbabwe of people that aspire to do

business here because in Zimbabwe things are not working. There is no money in Zimbabwe. But if money becomes available, I will go.

Makanaka introduces another dimension of home as involving trauma. Home can thus be defined not just as a place of comfort, but as fantastical assemblages that include tales of ghosts, the dead and horrors of the past. Trauma denotes a “negative inability to effectively deal with a past sad event” (Legg, 2004:102). Legg further describes trauma as the strength of a wound and truth of memory. Mallet (2004:72) argues that the characterisation of home as an “idealized, romanticized and even nostalgic notion, is at odds with reality of people’s lived experiences”. While other respondents equate home with familiarity and comfort, Makanaka rejects that idea and shows us that for the traumatically haunted, they can be homeless at home. Staeheli and Nagel (2006:1599) note that home can be “a site of contradictions as it conjures feelings of safety and belonging, but can be a site of violence, alienation and oppression”. Makanaka’s narrative shows that “fear, danger and insecurity are not necessarily located in the outside world” (Mallet, 2004:72).

When she came to South Africa, their house was destroyed during Operation Murambatsvina which I discussed in chapter three. Her mother used to work for a white commercial farmer and was also displaced during the fast track land reform. During the land reform process, farm workers were considered allies of commercial farmers and the opposition party MDC. Therefore they became victims of brutal treatment of the ruling party militia and war veterans. The way in which land reform and Operation Murambatsvina occurred left a permanent mark in her understanding of Zimbabwe as home. These two programs were violent in nature. Operation Murambatsvina was brutal and received widespread condemnation both internally and externally (Masunungure, 2010). It displaced over 700 000 people. It was so vicious that locals referred to it as Zimbabwe’s Tsunami following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami that caused so much devastation.

More so, she highlights that without opportunities to make money, it is worthless to conceive the idea of home as she will die of hunger. She will not just go back for the sake of Zimbabwe being home. The unavailability of money in Zimbabwe is not just a lack of business opportunities, but the lack of cash itself which is impacting businesses. The daily life in Zimbabwe is characterised by extreme cash shortages, fuel shortages and non availability of running water amongst other services. LeyCevantes and Duyvendak (2017) argue that the potentiality of a place to be called home depends on achieving some sense of control over it and imbue it with meaning if it incorporates some elements that satisfy personal needs and preferences at a given point in time. Wellington who is an air brakes technician is one of them. He said since he left Zimbabwe, he had never visited . However, he has a daughter who was completing high school in Zimbabwe. He said “I do not think I will. I do not intend to, and I do not want. I went through hell in Zimbabwe. I won’t go back”. These experiences shows how the political and economic conditions created a society “traumatized by fear, withdrawal and collective depression based on memories of violence, intimidation, harassment and hyperinflation” (Sachikonye, 2011: xvii).

9.7. Transnational ways of belonging

Transnational ways of belonging do not stand for the territorialisation of belonging, but “for increasingly plural, multiple forms of belonging in the receiving society as well as the place left behind” (Antonsich, 2010: 644). In this case, the imagination of home as a space of permanency has become “an elusive commodity; the metaphorical home of distance geography is constructed as home, at the same time, and the current geography stands as a monument - an archive for immigrant experience” (Silva, 2009: 696). Nyasha sees both, South Africa and Zimbabwe as homes. He said:

For me home has always been Zimbabwe because this is a foreign land. But now I am here, this is where I am working this is home. I used to have that mind-set that

I will start to take care of myself properly when I get home. That is wrong. Where you are right now is home.treat yourself like a king because where you are right now is home. Yes we need to build our houses in Zimbabwe. You need to have a contingency plan. When you travel right now to home, where do you arrive at? That is home yes, but if you're here, this is home.

This case is also interesting because Nyasha suggested that to be homeless is to be in a place where you cannot take care of yourself properly. He also suggested that home is a moment and work can be home. Nyasha also signifies that a house in Zimbabwe remains a signifier of home. Nyasha's argument of taking care of oneself like a king is a response to how some Zimbabweans would rather live in informal settlements in South Africa, buying second hand property while at the same time building good houses in Zimbabweans cities and sending new household property there. However, when engaging in simultaneity, migrants are caught between here and there, a condition of liminality with divided geographies, sociographies, cultural identities, or a psychological space of undecided personal identity and belonging (David Ip, 2011)

Nyasha here highlights the "double consciousness" of being (Walsh, 2006), on the need to balance investing in Zimbabwe and in South Africa. On a similar note, Johannes also explains his transnational belonging as follows:

I belong to Zimbabwe but at the moment I belong to South Africa because that is where everything is happening for me. I have properties in Zimbabwe. I have recently acquired a piece of land in Zimbabwe where I would like to build in future if all works out. Right now I am exploring business opportunities back home. I am just waiting for elections to take place.

While acknowledging that he belongs to Zimbabwe, Johannes highlights that where his business is situated is where he currently belongs. However, to him, home remains Zimbabwe, where he has acquired some property and is looking forward to further investments there. He also highlights that home can be speculative in that he was waiting for elections to take place in considering the future security of his investments.

Chapter four discussed the nexus between disputed elections and economic instability in Zimbabwe. The July 2018 elections were disputed even though ZANU PF candidate Emmerson Mnangagwa was declared winner by the courts. Since the elections, relations between ZANU PF and MDC have reached extreme levels of polarisation with the former using the security apparatus of the state to suppress opposition. As a result, inflation rates which had remained below 10 percent from 2009 to 2018 was 756 percent by June 2020. The inflation is rising monthly in hundreds and the coronavirus pandemic will further worsen the situation. At the same time, services such as water, electricity, even cash itself are extremely scarce.

9.8. Performative way of belonging

The use of a transnational lens to look at ideas about home enables researchers to explore not only ideological claims to belonging, but also practices in which home is maintained. In the above sections, participants discussed home mainly based on the perception that the concept relates to one's place of origin, but home can also be a lived experience outside the country of origin. Mallet (2004:67) notes that analysis of home should not be just about "what people think about home, but on practice, that it is the diverse ways people do to feel at home". Thus belonging can be "performed, displayed and enacted through individual and collective practices" (Antonsich, 2010:652). Skrbis et al (2007:262) note that belonging can be "enacted, displayed, paraded, exaggerated, and frequently articulated in the jargon of essentialism or ethnicity".

Mand (2004:275) argues that a central focus in literature on transnationalism and diaspora is on "migrant ideas of and practices of recreating and maintaining home and a concomitant sense of belonging". This can be specific practices relating to specific social and cultural spaces, which link individual and collective behaviour and are crucial for the construction and reproduction of identity narratives and constructions of attachment. Levvit and Schiller (2004:1010) refer to this as "ways of belonging which

are practices that signal or enact an identity which demonstrates a particular group". Vervotec (1999) argues that an emphasis on home enables researchers to explore ideological claims of belonging alongside practices through which migrants maintain ties to the country of origin.

On the evening of 26 May 2018, Zimbabwean entrepreneurs gathered at J and J Belmont Conference Centre in Rondebosch, in Cape Town, for the fourth edition of the Zimbabwe Excellence Awards. The ceremony started with the singing of the Zimbabwe National Anthem followed by the South African National Anthem. The categories of the awards were female entrepreneur of the year, male entrepreneur of the year, upcoming young business person of the year, and business person of the year. The nominees for these awards were announced on the Zimbabwe Excellence Awards Facebook page in April 2018, and a short biography of each nominee was published on the site, giving people an opportunity to read through before choosing who to vote for, using an electronic voting system. The guest of honor at the event was then Zimbabwe Consul General in Cape Town, Mr Mugobogobo. In his address he acknowledged the fortitude of Zimbabweans who succeeded in a foreign country against all odds and urged them to invest back home as well.

The Zimbabwe Excellence Awards shows performative dimensions of belonging by Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape Town. Giddens (1984:82) conceives home as a "discursive construct which is brought into life through practice and interactions and as a bridge between the individual and society". In his theory of structuration, Giddens (1984) notes that "the structural properties of social systems exist only in so far as forms of social conduct are reproduced chronically across time and space. The structuration of institutions can be understood in terms of how social activities become 'stretched' across wide spans of time-space" (Giddens 1986: xxi).

The excellence awards were an interaction between the individual and the home country. The ceremony was sponsored by Zororo Pumlanzi, a funeral assurance company that repatriates bodies to Zimbabwe. This meant that home is a place where one is buried after he/she dies. This resonates with Shipton (2009:20) argument that “graves are the symbolic focal points of human attachments to place: the living and dead, the social and the material, all connect here”. The repatriation of bodies’ reinforces people’s homes as that place where one would be buried – which is basically linked to the place of origin.

The director of the awards, Pardon said:

You see on the wall there, the pictures that you see on the wall there, we celebrate Zimbabweans flying the Zimbabwe flag high in South Africa. Since 2015, I have launched that, it has grown and this year it will be the fourth edition of the Zimbabwe Excellence Awards. We are in the diaspora, if we don’t motivate ourselves, encourage ourselves, support ourselves, no one ever will. Most of the celebrations done in South Africa do not include the diaspora. As a foreigner, a Zimbabwean cannot even enter idols. Some of the awards that are done in South Africa do not include foreigners, only include South Africans. South Africans put their citizens first. The most things that they do, most events, most projects they put their citizens first. Even if you look at the way BEE is structured, it is structured in a way that if you are a foreigner you’re deemed white... Excellence Awards are meant to motivate, to inspire them and to continue a culture of success. It also keeps the bad press on us. When bad things happen, they will say but these guys are doing well, they motivate, they encourage and inspire each other. We are also kind of countering the bad press.

The awards demonstrate the exclusion that Zimbabweans experience from being recognized in South Africa. As a result, events such as excellence awards are a manifestation of the exclusion or non-recognition that they experience from the broader South African society. However, some Zimbabweans had been recognised. For example, in 2017, Kativhu won a national award in a Eskom Business Investment Competition. He came first in the agro-processing category. In the same year again, he

won an award from the Western Cape Government, for being the second best emerging business in the province. He also received a grant for his peanut butter business from the same institution

The remarks by the Consul general highlight some performative aspect of belonging. In his speech, he said that while Zimbabweans were doing well to establish themselves in South Africa and even sending much needed remittances back home. He encouraged them to try and set up businesses and investments back home. He also thanked the government and people of South Africa for generously hosting and supporting the multitude of Zimbabweans. He told them that, "In return for the warm reception you have been accorded, you are duty-bound to respect the country's laws and to desist from unlawful conduct and activities as the chief ambassadors of Zimbabwe."

Most of the entrepreneurs I interviewed send remittances to Zimbabwe on a monthly basis, in the form of cash for groceries, school fees and building materials for the construction of their houses back home. The money is sent through banks or money remitting agencies such as Mukuru and Mama Money. Some send remittances through friends or relatives who would be visiting Zimbabwe. Over the past five years, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has reported migrant remittances averaging around one billion United States dollars annually. Given Zimbabwe's fragile investment climate, remittances are the biggest source of foreign investment. Zimbabwe gets more money from cash remittances than gold or tobacco. Others who were concerned that their money will be used for other purposes made use of Takunda's business whereby remittances arrived mainly in the form of groceries and building materials. Takunda has a business that sells Zimbabwean groceries and building materials to the diaspora. Payment is made in South Africa and the goods are taken from stores in Zimbabwe to the relevant address.

There are a number of buses that now run directly from Cape Town to Harare which people can utilise to send money and goods. These include: Chihwa Tours, Mhizha Tours, Munhenzva, Intercape, Munorurama, and Eagle Liner among others. Some make use of *malayitshas* which are small, often unregistered couriers using pick-up trucks or mini buses that ferry money and other goods from South Africa and deliver to households in Zimbabwe. The name *malayitsha* is “an isiNdebele term which means the one who carries a heavy load” (Nyamunda, 2014: 40).

The reference to the diaspora as chief ambassadors of Zimbabwe who must desist from conducting unlawful activities in South Africa is a form of diaspora nationalism. It is a way in which Zimbabweans try to correct negative perceptions about themselves and their country by developing a positive image of themselves (Muzondidya, 2010:47). Zimbabweans thus perceive themselves as law abiding and saintly compared to South Africans who are morally decadent, alcoholics that are mostly idle and only good at drinking and fighting (ibid). The Consul General also noted that investing back home is another way of showing allegiance to one’s home country. At the excellence awards, Mr Donovan Chimhandamanda, the Chairman of the Diaspora Infrastructure Development Group (DIDG) gave a key note address urging Zimbabweans to invest back home. DIDG is an investment company run by Zimbabwean Diasporans, mainly resident in the South African commercial city of Johannesburg. Their main target is infrastructure development projects. In October 2017, DIDG sealed a deal of about US\$408 million to recapitalize the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) in partnership with South Africa’s freight rail parastatal Transnet. Pardon, the director of the awards also said they have been trying to push for investments in Zimbabwe. He said:

Over and above that we have also, since the dispensation of the new government we have started to push for investment into Zimbabwe but that is not limited to Zimbabweans but is open to everybody, any company that feels they need to invest in Zimbabwe. We have done so through two successful companies that have already set up shops and offices in Zimbabwe. One of them

is called Mineral Resources. They are based in Mpumalanga. Their main interests are in infrastructure development, mining and agriculture and already they are operating in Zimbabwe. We also have a company called Tessa. They are also into infrastructure development and mining and they also set up projects and offices in Zimbabwe. We have one of our own guys here called Prosper. Prosper was working for a certain computer company that started to help him set up offices in Zimbabwe, Gweru. Prosper has already gone back to Zimbabwe.

The “new dispensation” is a phrase used by the post November 2017 government to differentiate itself from Mugabe’s rule even though it is still made up of his former allies. In January 2018, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a presentation on investment options for the diaspora in Cape Town. While the government is trying to attract diaspora investments, there is also a mistrust between the diaspora and the government. The government is calling the diaspora to invest but at the same time it refuses them a right to vote. At the same time, President Mnangagwa have proved no different from his predecessor Robert Mugabe in terms of economic mismanagement, corruption and resort to authoritarianism. As Bratton and Masungure (2008:41) predicted five features which were going to outlast Mugabe’s biological and political career “an ideological belief in a right to rule in perpetuity, a party machinery that penetrates the organs of state, a corrupted economy vested in the hands of party loyalists, an institutionalized role in policy making for military commanders, and a heavy reliance on violence, increasingly outsourced to auxiliary forces”. The issues have followed Mnangagwa’s reign and are manifesting in greater dimensions.

Bender and Winer (2001:1) remind us that “research and academic endeavour have to respond to the urgency of contemporary developments worldwide, to help us understand how people in a turbulent place create a sense of place, belonging, loss and negation”. For Zimbabweans in South Africa, this turbulence is about hostile immigration policies that make people not belong. At least 15 people that I interviewed were trying to form a cooperative looking to invest into Zimbabwe. I attended about eight meetings

with them, during which we debated their constitution. The company was eventually registered but the launch which was initially scheduled for 29 September 2018 was postponed indefinitely. Arguments in those meetings were on whether the group should focus on investing in Zimbabwe or creating a pensions scheme for the diaspora. The first draft included a clause on how the company would assist members in building houses in rural areas. I was fascinated by the adverts they had released, ahead of the now postponed launch, which demonstrated an interest in home country. For example:

Our mission is to partake in the rebuilding of Zimbabwe and contributing immensely in the economy as well as harnessing relationships with government and stakeholders.

We want to take ownership of our financial future and growth decisions by responsibly investing in projects that we believe will propel the growth of the economy and group financial growth.

We focus on increasing the awareness and importance of this investment platform to avail and initiate a traction towards our main goal for the benefit of our members and shareholders

Most people will fail to produce necessary documents e.g. (credit score rating) even works permit and three months bank statements, which is where we come in.

This is a savings scheme especially for Zimbabweans in the diaspora seeing that we are likely to be here till retirement, working but without pension or houses.

By joining and investing just a little amount per month you will be preparing your pension and the one for your children. If you then want to buy a house, you can use that money as deposit as well. More so, our facility is open to Zimbabweans without permits.

It is unto to our hands to unite and change our nation through businesses that shall create jobs back home. This is where an idea of diaspora investment comes into the picture. Let us join hands and invest so we can run businesses in Zimbabwe .

In their draft constitution, there was a phrase on “helping the diaspora build a rural home” as one of its objectives. If one looks closely at their draft statements, they reveal the extent of inequality or lack of social protection faced by Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. This initiative is an example of self-social protection. More so, given that special permits are always valid for three years, many employers had been reluctant to make pension deductions. It is imperative to note that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade established a diaspora directorate to make attempts to engage with Zimbabweans in South Africa and elsewhere since 2018, though its success is yet to be seen. The statements above also show that some Zimbabweans prefer retiring in their country of origin. This is a key marker for diaspora. Shuval (2007:47) notes that diaspora “differs from all other types of migration in that in many cases it is based on a natural right to return to a historic homeland”. As a result, diasporans feel, maintain, invent and revive a connection with a prior home by engaging in activities that reinvigorate their connection to the home country such as the excellence awards. .

9.9. Conclusion

This chapter explored attitudes towards return migration which helped shed light on the existential crisis faced by many Zimbabweans in South Africa, in particular those on ZEP permits. The conditions attached to these special permits render their legality liminal. The feeling of insecurity and the perception that the papers may not be renewed torment ZEP beneficiaries. This temporary conditional legality has created existential liminality in the way people feel towards themselves because of lack of fixity, thereby reinforcing the idea of diaspora. Shuval (2007:47) notes that diaspora differs from all other types of migration in that in many cases it is based on a natural right to return to a historic homeland. The responses from research participants showed the centrality of home in their activities and representation in the diaspora. At the same time, the

deteriorating political and economic situation in Zimbabwe keeps them in between, wondering whether to return or not.

This chapter has also shown that entrepreneurs desire to be grounded somewhere, a place which they consider to be their permanent home, a place where they do not feel dispossessed or like refugees. Home is thus a constellation of things, ideas, emotions, identities and activities. It is linked to cattle, goats, graves, grandparents, uncles, friends, ghosts and healers, cultivation or whatever else denotes a place that one refers to as home. For the traumatically haunted, they are homeless at home as it is a site of violence, alienation and oppression. Those who have been naturalised in South Africa but remain marginalised in the host nation have a liminal detachment in both countries, producing a disoriented state of “homeland-lessness” where neither country acts as a place of belonging. The migrants who exhibited double consciousness are caught up in between here and there, with divided geographies, sociographies, cultural identities, or a psychological space of undecided personal identity and belonging (David Ip, 2011). The existential and juridical liminality of Zimbabweans is characterised by living in temporary time with a damaged horizon on what might happen in future, and having a damaged political and economic belonging to South Africa (Butler, 2016).

This chapter has also shown that home is not only fluid and plural, but also a place of attachment, trauma and grounding. Home is not simply a place that people think of, but it can be performed through remittances or building of houses in Zimbabwe. In writing anthropologically, it is useful to ask what is the status of being at home is like? Malkki (1995:515) provides the answer as she notes that such questions lead us into “considerations of citizenship, and nationality, origin and nativeness, nationality and the concepts of ethnicity and culture. In short, all theoretical surfaces that are still hot from the recent thinking in anthropology, cultural studies and other fields”.

10. Chapter Ten: Conclusion

This study examined the lives of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa as characterised by juridical or existential liminality. This was demonstrated by focusing on the impact of the presence or absence of papers/visas/permits on the life of the migrant. Issues discussed include: processes of acquiring and replacing DZP permits, the limitations of the papers in the incorporation of migrants, and reflections on how conditions on the papers orient a person towards the future. Existential liminality results from uncertain legal status and permeates all aspects of Zimbabwean immigrant lives, delimiting their navigation of different spaces be it jobs, sending remittances, housing and schooling for their children. Existential liminality of the Zimbabwean migrant being can be contrasted with Turner's (1969) understanding of a ritual liminality that is voluntary and temporary, which is not inherent in classic definitions and notions of liminality. I agree with Turner that in existential liminality, transformation may not be resolved in a life course.

This thesis has demonstrated that juridical liminality results from uncertain legal status, whether one is documented or not. I have shown that the state produces illegality through juridical processes such as the denial of documentation, cumbersome bureaucratic processes in application and replacement of permits and imposing conditions on permits that are not family friendly. As a result, Zimbabweans have gone through five stages of legal ambiguities, namely: illegality, amnesty, legal suspension, liminal citizenship and temporary conditional legality because of the imposition of conditions in the permits that it will not be renewed or extended .

While Zimbabwean migrants have a temporary lawful status, the period between replacement of ZSP permits with ZEP permits showed how applicants move in and out of status. The Zimbabwean migrant who had applied for the replacement of the permit was deemed to be legally suspended until their application adjudication process had

been completed. The person waiting for his/her permit is thus at a juridical threshold. In other words, existential liminality also captures the entire in-between existence of moving in and out of legality. Moreso, the replacement phase of permits is also a place of surveillance by the state as a person must provide proof of employment, business ownership or school enrolment and the absence of disqualifying criminal conduct. The failure to provide the required documentation is itself a disqualifying factor. The liminal legal status exposes teachers to governmental exploitation through the suppression of wages during legal suspension. An important contribution which this thesis makes is the discussion on how various government departments share power among themselves in producing liminality thereby overriding the notion that the central government is a monolithic entity responsible for governing populations within its jurisdiction.

The thesis demonstrated that documentation does not equal access to share to the full participation in the social heritage of the host country. The concept of liminal citizenship helped us understand the ways in which legally resident aliens are discriminated against through laws which determine spaces for insiders and outsiders. Migrants must comply with new patterns of legality. The thesis showed that there are other legal prescriptions that determine company registration, business accounts, lines of credit and business permits, which help reproduce economic privilege for host the nation's people and maintain vulnerability for migrants. Therefore, this research rejects that national citizenship is declining in favour of post national citizenship or supranational citizenship. The thesis also showed that even those who are naturalised South Africans did not enjoy full inclusion in the host nation.

More so, the South African government uses the terms "closure" and "replacement" instead of renewal. This means that the affected Zimbabwean migrants "cannot refer to closed and replaced policies if they ever attempt to claim permanent residence in future" (Moyo, 2018:14). The limited time on their permits means they will go home soon which has created a tenuous and fragile belonging to the hostland. It makes

Zimbabwean migrants share a common rootedness that provides them with a sense of belonging. They have a shared fate that their permits will not be renewed and they will not become permanent residents in South Africa irrespective of length of stay. The feeling of having no place in South Africa influences their attitudes towards return. The feeling of being temporary makes them see homes apart from Zimbabwe as temporary living spaces rather than permanent homes (Briseno, 2017). The visas have conditions that do not allow change of status, not being renewable, and that holders cannot apply for permanent residence. This means migrants live in a limbo situation, with no sense of security or control over the future, exhibiting what O'Reilly (2018) calls ontological liminality. The inherent legal uncertainty comes from lack of assurances of definitive stay in South Africa and the permits have generally been replaced as a matter of grace. This inherent fragility creates instability in many aspects of the lives of Zimbabwean visa holders.

The approval or granting of permanent residence to people special temporary permits in South Africa is highly unlikely. The 2017 White Paper on International Migration called for the replacement of permanent residency with long term visas thus delinking the progression from residence to citizenship. Chapter eight showed how long-term secure legal status, permanent residency or citizenship are difficult to obtain. The state of temporality has reinforced the idea of diaspora amongst Zimbabwean migrants, characterised by homeland orientation and the idea of return (Brubaker, 2005). The movement of Zimbabwean migrants “from one temporary permit to the other places them in a state of liminality, which makes them comparable to those migrants fleeing war and are thus always on the move” (Moyo, 2018:14). This means that the specific way of imagining a decent life in South Africa is definitely suspended as these migrants are in a permanent predicament and their being or personhood is stuck due to the tentative lawfulness of their stay.

There is no doubt that the DZP and its replacements offered a temporary reprieve. This thesis demonstrated the centrality of state power in making decisions regarding the duration and conditions of visas. The DZP was replaced by the ZSP, which was then succeeded by the ZEP, prolonging the state of perpetual limbo for holders of the special permits. Through the ZEP, the South African government asked Zimbabwean immigrants to accept certain responsibilities such as working, doing business or studying, but remaining “temporary,” by not integrating too much into the fabric of the host society. As we approach 2021, these Zimbabweans await an announcement from the Department of Home Affairs, on whether the ZEP will be replaced. If that is so they must then apply and wait for the adjudication of the applications.

However, the current political and economic situation in Zimbabwe characterised by authoritarianism, hyperinflation, shortages of food, fuel, medicines, money, water, electricity black-outs for long hours and skyrocketing inflation will cause migrant entrepreneurs to remain liminal as they defer their return and remain in South Africa where they know their future is uncertain. However, there is a huge risk faced by entrepreneurs and other migrants with ZEP permits in general. In 2019, the government of Zimbabwe recognized a backlog in printing passports which it noted may be cleared by 2021. The main risk for ZEP permit holders is that most of them acquired their passports in 2010 and these are due for renewal in 2020/21. Even if the South African government decides to renew ZEP permits, some will find themselves with expired passports, expired visas and become illegal again.

The case of Zimbabweans in South Africa is not an exception in today’s world. However, the understanding of migrants living liminal lives had been limited to studies in the global north. The experiences examined in this thesis parallel those of other immigrant groups in the United States and in other major migrant receiving countries in such as Spain, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and Mexico. Studies from these countries have shown how immigration policies create and recreate exclusion of populations to

ensure continued migrant vulnerability and precariousness by blurring the boundaries of legality and illegality (Cabot, 2006; Tucket, 2017; Menjivar, 2006; Gold, 2019; Abrego and Lakhani, 2015; Mountz et al 2011; Chacon, 2015). This study has reminded scholars to think about temporary migrants who fall between permanent authorisation and undocumented status around the world.

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