



**AN INSTANCE OF XENOPHOBIA: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE VIOLENCE  
AGAINST SOMALI TRADERS IN KHAYELITSHA**

**BY**

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## DECLARATION

I Abdi Ahmed Aden hereby declare that this thesis entitled , *An Instance of Xenophobia: An Investigation into the Violence Against Somali Traders in Khayelitsha*, is my own work and that I have not previously submitted it at any university for a degree or examination. All sources that I have quoted have been indicated and duly acknowledged by means of referencing.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_



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## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is exclusively dedicated to my late father Ahmed Aden Ibrahim for initiating my education though unfortunately he did not live to see its fruits, and my mother Saadia Abdille for her constant love, patience, support and encouragements, throughout my academic career.



## ABSTRACT


South Africa has been praised by many as having the most democratic constitution in the world which safeguards the rights of all who live within the borders of the nation. Ironically this has not been so with migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, mainly of African origin. Attacks on these groups have been on the increase since the 1990s with little protection of their rights and dignities by the South African authorities. Many of the attacks reported takes place in townships and informal settlements which is mostly inhabited by black South Africans. The purpose of this study was to investigate the attacks on Somali traders in the township of Khayelitsha.

The study adopted the theory of prejudice functionalism and relative deprivation theory. In addition, the Scape-goat hypothesis, the isolation hypothesis and the Bio-cultural hypothesis theories were also applied through the study. Qualitative research approaches were used to probe into the attacks against Somali traders in the township of Khayelitsha. Analysis of data was done through content analysis where data was presented thematically by narratives that relate to the study objectives.


The findings indicate that the major causes for xenophobia operated in a cycle that has four stages. Hatred causes of the attacks by the local community, which are criminal in nature. Finally, once the attacks have subsided, the Somali traders cope by opening up new shops; either within Khayelitsha or in other areas. After some time; the cycle repeats itself. The behaviour of government officers in different departments also displayed acute hatred for the Somalis and as a result, the service delivery of those departments was not satisfactory. The study therefore recommended that the government should put in place a mechanism where the victims can access justice. This starts from reporting at the police to the investigation and prosecution of culprits in courts of law.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| DHA          | Department of Home Affairs                                  |
| NAFCOC       | National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry |
| SAHRC        | South Africa Human Rights Commission                        |
| SALDRU       | South Africa Labour Development Research Unit               |
| SRA          | Somali Retailers Association                                |
| Statistic SA | Statistics South Africa                                     |
| UNHCR        | United Nations High Commission for Refugees                 |
| USBS         | University of Stellenbosch Business School                  |



## KEYWORDS

Bio-cultural

Functionalism

Isolation

Khayelitsha

Prejudice

Relative deprivation

Scape-goat

Social identity

Somali traders

Xenophobia



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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### 1.1 Background to the Study

Xenophobia is the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state. Its manifestation is a violation of human rights. It is a global problem, and is not limited to South Africa. Various societies across the world have exhibited xenophobic tendencies. This has been caused by immigration, which has become a focal point of heated national debates (Dillon 2001; Fuentes 2006; Munro 2006; Smith & Edmonston 1997; Toy 2002). Immigrants are repeatedly associated with the declining economy, overpopulation, pollution, increased violence, depleted social resources (i.e., medical and educational), erosion of cultural values, and terrorism (Munro 2006). Immigrant individuals are often portrayed as criminal, poor, violent and uneducated (Espanshade & Calhoun 1993; Muller & Espanshade 1985). Negative attitudes toward immigrants have begun to receive the attention of social psychologists.

According to Stephan *et al.* (2005), little or no attention has been given to the detrimental influence of xenophobia on the targets of the prejudice, such as the psychological implications of prejudice toward immigrant individuals. In 1993, the European Commission conducted a large scale survey within the European Union member states to assess racism and xenophobia and concluded that extreme racism/xenophobia occurred more in countries with a greater population of immigrants such as Belgium, France and Austria compared to more homogenous countries such as Sweden, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. Although anti-foreigner sentiments may have intensified in countries like Sweden, the survey illustrates a concern within Europe with questions of belonging, and the need to address the rise of these racist, extremist, ethnocentric and xenophobic expressions. The European Union's first meeting in 1993, revealed a disturbing

trend regarding the growth of aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, which suggested new expressions of xenophobia (Crush, 2002).

In Germany, for example, xenophobia has been considered a strong dislike for foreigners. This dislike, however, though not an end in itself requires an ideology to exhibit the dislike by the local masses (Meredith 1996). An evaluation of political ideologies and how they fuel anti-migrant sentiments forms part of the drivers that promote xenophobic tendencies. Muslim women reported discrimination in employment and housing following the passage of legislation in certain German States banning the wearing of headscarves in all or some parts of the public sector (Crush 2001).

According to a study conducted by the International Helsinki Federation for human rights (IHF) in 2015, ten per cent of the Finnish population held strongly xenophobic sentiments. The most innovative method the government was the passing of the Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers 493/1999. The objective was “to promote integration, equality and freedom of choice of immigrants through measures which help them to acquire the essential knowledge and skills they need to function in society and to ensure the essential livelihood and welfare of asylum seekers by arranging for their reception” (IHF Focus 2001). The act made provisions for local authorities to draw up integration programmes with NGOs and employee and employer organizations. This constituted an agreement between the authority, the employment office and an immigrant on measures to support the immigrant and their family in acquiring the essential knowledge and skills needed in society and working life. The Finnish government has made concerted effort to engage anti-racist NGOs in legal processes, and to aid them in raising awareness regarding humanitarian and ant discriminatory law (IHF Focus 2001).

In Sweden, studies show that xenophobia exist in the education system in which adolescents between the ages of 15-16 displayed negative sentiments towards foreigners in the Swedish education system (Silove 1999). This is an indication that the dislike for foreigners may be evident in various forms, at various levels. The National Council for Crime Prevention reported a 28% in “Islamophobic” hate crimes in 2009, recording 194 incidents down from 272 in 2008. This was the first time the number of incidents dropped below 200 since official monitoring of “Islamophobic” crimes began in 2005 (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008).

In the United States, xenophobia is evident in the negative views against immigrants by the locals (Suarez-Orozco & Suarez-Orozco 1995). The United States is known throughout its history as a nation of immigrants (Smith & Edmonston, 1997). At the same time, the United States has a long history of xenophobia and intolerance of immigrants (Fuchs 1995; Takaki, 1989). White Western Europeans, who colonized the Americas, as well as individuals from many other nations, moved to the United States relatively freely and in great numbers until the restrictions of the early 1900s (Daniels 2002). In 1921, the U.S. Congress passed the Quota Act, which established a new system of national origin restrictions, favoring northern European immigrants over those from other regions of the world. In 1924, the Johnson-Reed Act further reduced the quota and created the U.S. Border Patrol. Subsequent immigration policies continued to be guided by race and social class-based policies (e.g., Chinese Exclusionary Act, the Alien Land Act, the McCarran Walter Act) that denied entry or the right to citizenship to non-White immigrants (Daniels 2002). Non-White immigrants were first able to become naturalized citizens only in 1952, whereas this privilege had been granted to the majority of White immigrants since 1790 (Daniels 2002).

In Russia, xenophobia is directed at both the foreign nationals and Russian citizens of certain ethnic groups, like Caucasians (Ekaterina 2007). Since the mid-1990s, human rights groups, scholars, government agencies and the media in the Russian Federation have documented a rising wave of individual and group acts of violence, destruction and, or intimidation targeting ethnic and/or religious “others.” In addition to the massive brutality in Chechnya, Russia in recent years has witnessed skinhead riots and street raids by chain and-rod wielding thugs; torch light marches and attacks on mosques and synagogues; murders and beatings of foreign residents and diplomats; desecration of Jewish cemeteries; and intimidation of Chinese traders by whip-cracking Cossack gangs. In 2000, the Moscow Helsinki Group reported an average of 30 to 40 assaults a month by local gangs targeting darker-skinned individuals in Moscow alone.


Since the 1980s, Russian liberals have been decrying the rise of Nazism in Russia, the increase in the number of extremist youth organizations, the rising number of violent attacks and murders of non-Russians and the worryingly high levels of support that nationalist parties have received. However, it is only very recently that the Kremlin has recognized the problem and resolved to react. This is mainly due to the fact that a type of anti-American xenophobia has been used by elites for their own political purposes. However, it is becoming clear that supporting such sentiments is an extremely dangerous game, and that even a strong state can be overwhelmed by the public’s passions of hatred and the anarchy that is likely to ensue (Shlapentokh 2007).

Collective fear of groups like immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers leads to negative attitudes about such minorities, which in turn can lead to active hostilities, such as ethnic violence. Evidence suggests that xenophobia has become more prevalent in Europe in the last few decades, supporting the notion that the economic conditions created by the rapid transition processes in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 have fostered the re-emergence of



xenophobic thinking. In addition, the integration of the European Union, combined with a culture increasingly favoring individualism over collectivism, has accelerated sentiments supporting the exclusion of non-nationals (Strabac & Listhaug 2008).

There is a longstanding strain of political discourse in Europe that has projected Muslim immigrants as a threat to European security, homogeneity, and culture (Kunovich 2002). The situation has worsened in recent years in the context of official government responses to terrorist attacks. The rise of racist and religious violence against Muslims in Europe has occurred in tandem with the adoption of anti-immigrant political platforms by both fringe and mainstream political movements. Radical political leaders have sought to legitimize xenophobia and have contributed to the growth of popular anti-Muslim sentiment and intolerance across Europe. The global rise in fundamentalist sentiments, including nationalism, right wing conservatism, and religious fundamentalism shows that state governments are taking a passive stance in policy making that counteracts these processes (Kunovich 2002).



In South Africa, xenophobia is not a new phenomenon either. In this regard, before the apartheid system broke down; there was income inequality between the whites and the black majority. Poverty co-existed with income and racial inequality (Ian and Kahreen 2015). Statistics show that 24% of South Africa's population was living below the poverty (Seekings 2007). The new government had an uphill task to ensure that it readdressed the imbalance created as a result of race, poverty and inequality. As such, the reception of the democratic dispensation in South Africa brought a wave of expectations of a better life for South Africans. This was accompanied by high hopes that income, poverty, and inequality would be reduced. Unfortunately, income inequality and poverty was still on the increase (Seekings 2007). This increase was due to

persistent unemployment, low demand for unskilled labour as opposed to increased demand for skilled labour. Other factors included an unequal education system (Seekings 2007).

According to Polzer (2007), the apartheid system did not recognise refugees in South Africa. In contrast the regime allowed white settlers from neighbouring countries. It provided no protection for black refugees (Polzer 2007). It was only until 1993, that South Africa recognised refugees after becoming a signatory to the United Nations and Organisation of African Unity conventions on refugees after its transition to democracy (UN, 2006). Before 1994, the apartheid government used the migration policy as a tool of control. The Aliens Control Act provided that a person could only migrate to South Africa if that person's habits of life were suited to the requirements of South Africa (Fatima 2007). This meant that one had to be assimilated into behaving like a South African. The blacks came to South Africa as temporary contract migrants under bilateral agreements between the apartheid government and neighbours including Lesotho, Mozambique, and Malawi (Crush 2008).



South Africa was a closed society during apartheid. It had its own political, social and economic patterns that characterized the apartheid system. The South African black community felt were denied access to basic human rights such as : education, medical care and other necessities This ushered in hatred, violence and the need for entitlements from the apartheid government. The institution of democracy ushered in a new hope of entitlements; which were to be enjoyed by the black community that had been deprived of the same for so long (Matsinhe 2011). The use of social exclusion, violence to solve problems, use of scapegoats and isolation continued to characterize the democratic dispensation. When the country opened up after the apartheid era, the government failed to solve the social problems that were inherited from the apartheid system. The migration patterns in South Africa have become complex and diverse, since 1994, attracting

refugees, asylum seekers, skilled professionals and political and socioeconomic migrants (Matsinhe 2011). Most migrants have generally exploited the asylum system for their legal status in South Africa. The ever increasing numbers of immigrants remain a challenge as they try to settle in the community.

A poor immigration policy which seeks to control instead of regulating the migrants fails to address the intricate details of migration to the Republic. This shows that there is no government will to handle the issue of foreigners in the republic. This lack of political will is evident in the civil servants who, in the course of executing their duties in various capacities as immigration officers, police officers, doctors, teachers refuse to perform their duties, especially when an immigrant is involved. The isolation of South Africa in the apartheid years, the arrival of migrants and refugees from elsewhere in Africa was worsened by this immigration policy reform (Crush 2008). This meant that a strain on the resources for the South African and the immigrants, with limited input to satisfy their entitlement promised under the democratic dispensation was a recipe for disaster. This environment embraces foreigners who come to South Africa and thrive on one hand, while the South African feel they are given a raw deal by the government. They also fit between these diverse communities wherein there are those who are highly skilled and those who are low-skilled as well as those with no skills at all. This study, therefore, seeks to establish the causes of the xenophobic attacks against the Somali traders in Khayelitsha in light of South Africa's historical social and economic background.

### **1.1.1 History of Xenophobia**

During the apartheid system, there was a tight migration system which did not acknowledge the recognition of refugees in South Africa. South Africa only recognised refugees in 1993, when it became a signatory to the United Nations and Organisation of African Unity conventions on

refugees after its transition to democracy (Polzer 2007). Likewise, before 1994, immigration policy was an instrument of racial domination. Until 1991, the official definition of an immigrant was that he or she had to be able to assimilate into the white population. In this context Africans were not considered immigrants. Rather, they came to South Africa as temporary contract migrants under bilateral agreements between the apartheid government and neighbours including Lesotho, Mozambique, and Malawi (Crush 2008).

The Refugees Act was enacted in 1998 and it established institutions and procedures to offer protection to those who are fleeing persecution and instability in their home countries. The Refugee Act offered a more liberal framework which incorporated all basic principles of refugee protection such as freedom of movement, the right to work and access to basic social services (UN, 2006). Later on in 2002, a new Immigration Act was signed into law. The Act puts in place a friendly framework which focused on attracting skilled migrants. However the framers of this act did not incorporate the mode of entry of refugees, who were not affected by the various immigration permits in place (Polzer 2007). These laws required a clear government policy, to streamline migrant reception and their subsequent proper settlement in the country; which in the view of the author, was lacking.

Three reasons may be advanced for the current rise in hostility towards foreigners in South Africa. First, after the isolation of the apartheid years, the arrival of migrants and refugees from elsewhere in Africa caused widespread panic and intolerance among South Africans. Second, the government immigration policy reform which was primarily a tool of control and exclusion, rather than management and development of opportunity hampering its efforts to move beyond the structure inherited from the apartheid era. Thirdly, progress on immigration reform was slowed by a bitter partisan row within the Cabinet and Parliament between the Inkatha Freedom

Party (IFP), which held the immigration portfolio, and the ruling African National Congress (Crush 2001). Thus in the aftermath of the 1994 elections and with the absence of the anti-immigrant apartheid regime, the country witnessed an influx of migrants mainly from sub-Saharan African countries. These countries had been in turmoil, due to war, conflicts, political instability and economic crisis (Polzer 2007).


On their arrival, African migrants were easily granted access into the country, due to the fact that the nation now under majority black rule was celebrating its democratic victory which of course they owe a lot to other African countries who hosted its struggle movement and thus felt senseless to turn down asylum request of African migrants, as well as owing to the greatest human right goal the country had achieved and thus the nation had to uphold such a record in which turning away migrants and asylum seekers would have meant the other way round so to speak. However, Crush (2001) argues that despite the fact that the country was celebrating the end of the apartheid regime, it was completely unprepared for an influx of migration and thus it was premature for the nation to lift the anti-immigrant measures that it inherited from its predecessor. Soon things started falling apart, as South Africans became antagonistic and turn on fellow Africans who sought refuge in their country, just as South Africans did elsewhere on the continent under the apartheid regime. This was because government framed an immigration policy as a way of control and exclusion, rather than as a management and development opportunity. This hindered its efforts to move beyond the structure inherited from the apartheid era (Crush 2001).

### **1.1.2 International Human Rights Law**

The government is also bound, legally and morally, to a number of international conventions and treaties. According to Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, the term

refugee applies to “any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted, for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence and as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.

Refugees enjoy first and foremost the protection accorded to them by the refugee law and the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). If they are in a State involved in an armed conflict, refugees are also protected by international humanitarian law. Apart from the general protection accorded by international humanitarian law to civilians, refugees also receive special protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I. This additional protection recognizes the vulnerability of refugees as aliens in the hands of a party to the conflict and the absence of protection by their State of nationality (UN 2006).



Article 4(a) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which South Africa is a signatory, requires States Parties to declare, amongst others, an offence punishable by law, all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1960 guarantees migrants a number of basic rights, including: the right to life; to not be subjected to torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; to the liberty and security of person; to liberty of movement;

to the freedom to choose ones residence for those lawfully within the territory of a state; and to the right to protection from arbitrary or unlawful interference with their right to privacy. The covenant also states that migrants lawfully within the territory of a state may be expelled only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (UN 2006).

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families of 1990 guarantees fundamental rights to workers and their families, as well as equality before the Courts and Tribunals and to treat migrant workers not less favourably than nationals be it in respect of remuneration for employment or conditions of work in terms of employment. Emergency medical care and basic education are also guaranteed and regular migrant workers are to have the right to vote (UN 2006).

## **1.2 Research and Study Area**

Most countries are made up of two distinct geographic areas, that's rural and urban. But South Africa's landscape also includes townships and informal settlements which are made up of large, underdeveloped communities with working-age people desperate for economic opportunity, being spatially disconnected from urban centers that offer better economic prospects (Sandeep 2014). According to Sandeep (2014 p109), half of South Africa's urban population lives in the townships and informal settlements, accounting for 38% of working-age citizens, but home to nearly 60% of its unemployed.

One of these townships is Khayelitsha- the area in question. It is located, about 35 Kilometers South East of Cape Town. Khayelitsha is the largest township in Cape Town and one of the biggest townships in South Africa (Polzer 2007). The major challenges that Khayelitsha faces

include unemployment, poverty and migration inflows from within and outside South Africa (Polzer 2007).

With its foundation in apartheid planning, Khayelitsha retains a marginalized and racial character to this day. Marginalization takes up the forms of economic marginalization and social marginalization (Nleya & Thompson 2009). The township's unemployment rate is estimated at 37.7 %, which is much higher than the provincial unemployment rate of 17%; the average income per household was given as R21.000, which is very low compared to the provincial average level of R76.000 (Brown 2001). Khayelitsha Township is one of many high risk townships in South Africa the high levels of poverty unemployment rate, which play a significant role in contributing to its high crime rates (StatsSA 2015). It is on the basis of its size, social economic problems and migration statistics that make it a good study area.

### **1.3 Significance of the Study**

There have been various attacks on immigrants in South Africa between 2006 and 2012 (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012). These attacks have been carried out by locals on immigrants. The attacks have been seen in townships, predominately inhabited by the black South Africans. The reasons for the attacks are connected to the local's assumption that foreigners have taken up entitlements that were meant for South Africans (Sandeep 2014). Somali traders have been a target of these attacks because of their residence in the locations and their thriving businesses.

Against the backdrop of the attacks, Khayelitsha residents suffer from unemployment, poor living conditions, low household incomes, low education level and barely have other sources of income to sustain themselves. In contrast, Somali traders have been able to set up thriving



businesses in Khayelitsha, an aspect which partly triggered repeated attacks on them that are more than a coincidence and needs to be studied.

In light of the above, there has been barely no studies that have been conducted on why there were repeated attacks on the Somali traders in townships, like Khayelitsha. There is need for continuous research on such repeated attacks so as to understand the phenomenon and for improved policy development to address the issues. The study therefore sought to contribute to the body of knowledge on xenophobia, and fill the gap in literature on the causes of xenophobic attacks against Somali traders in particular.

#### **1.4 Rationale for the Study**

The research was conducted to establish why there have been numerous attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha. Attacks and violence against migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are not new in South Africa and date back to the 1990s. These attacks have established a rising pattern in terms of persons affected since 1998. In most of these occurrences, the Somali immigrants have been most affected by the xenophobic attacks (Hickel 2014). Many studies focusing on the general theme of xenophobia have been carried out (Crush 2008). However there is barely any study which has been written specifically about the attacks against Somali traders in Khayelitsha.

Thus, there is a clear academic gap of which the proposed study is intended to fill. The study was intended to investigate the attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha and how Somali traders cope with this violent environment. The study was designed to contribute to the field of knowledge in relation to xenophobia against Somali traders. This would fill the existing gap in the literature in this aspect.

## 1.5 Problem Statement

Recent studies show that migrants across South Africa face many difficulties ranging from discrimination and prejudice to outright violence and intimidation, with xenophobia being at the center stage (Hickel 2014). The hostility and violence directed at foreign immigrants have become an integral feature of everyday life in cities like Johannesburg, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. It is hard to establish the poor treatment of immigrants because the available evidence consists largely of sensational media accounts (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012). Other studies suggest a lack of proper understanding and narrow use of the term 'xenophobia'. It is estimated that there are high levels of xenophobia in South Africa based on the facts that 65% of a national sample, state that illegal immigration is a bad thing (Polzer 2007).

In addition to the above, Crush (2008) documented a daily pattern of violence perpetrated against foreign migrants by South Africans residing in Cape Town informal settlements, whereby refugee communities were forced off their dwellings and their properties looted by South Africans. Attacks on Somali nationals were reported in Maspumelele, in Cape Town in 2006 and Motherwell, in Port Elizabeth in 2007. Shops owned by Somalis were burnt and looted, and shopkeepers killed because of business Competition (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012).

While there has been a lot of research done on xenophobia, there is barely any study on the cause of attacks on Somali traders in the townships of the Western Cape in general and Khayelitsha in particular. This is unfortunate, yet there has been a wave of attacks on Somalis since 2006. Lack of information in this regard is essential to understanding the cause and nature of the attacks. The purpose of the study is therefore to conduct a study on the attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha, as a way of establishing why they are attacked and to cover the gap in the literature. If this research is not done, the continued attacks on the Somali traders shall continue to be

unexplained and misunderstood. The study shall offer insight to policy makers on how to handle future attacks against immigrants.

## **1.6 Research Questions**

In the context of the research problem identified above, the main purpose of the research was to provide answers to the following research questions:

- i. What are the causes of the attacks against Somali traders?
- ii. What is the motive behind the attacks on Somali traders?
- iii. How do Somali traders cope with the violent environment in the township?
- iv. What are the relevant conclusions and recommendations for stakeholders involved in violence prevention in the township of Khayelitsha and other areas in general?

## **1.7 Objectives**

This study was aimed at analyzing the causes of the attacks against Somali traders in the township of Khayelitsha.



### **1.7.1 Specific Objectives**

The study was guided by the following specific objectives.

- i) To empirically assess the motive behind the attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha Township
- ii) To investigate and identify the causes of the attacks against Somali Traders in Khayelitsha Township
- iii) To understand how Somali traders cope with the violent environment in the township in Khayelitsha Township

- iv) To provide relevant conclusions and recommendations for stakeholders involved in violence prevention in the township of Khayelitsha and other areas in general.

## **1.8 Research Agenda**

### **Chapter 1: Introduction and Background**

This section gives background to the research, a research problem, significance of the study, research question, research objective and the rationale of the study.

### **Chapter 2: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework**

This chapter will place the academic study into a theoretical and conceptual context. The theoretical framework will provide the organization for the study and will guide the interpretation of the results. The conceptual framework will be justified on the basis of the existing literature review.



### **Chapter 3: Literature Review**

This chapter will evaluate the available literature on Xenophobia in South Africa. While it will understand the status of the available literature, it will also highlight the gap in the literature. The chapter will address the definition of xenophobia, causes of xenophobia, mobilization of attacks on foreigners, the print media, and the various hypothetical causes of xenophobia.

### **Chapter 4: Case Study Site**

This chapter introduces the historical background of the research site (Khayelitsha), participants, demographic profile, economic profile, dwelling profile and statistics of the immigrant population. This chapter is used by the researcher to understand the profile of Khayelitsha to provide a basis for conducting the research.

## **Chapter 5: Research Methodology**

This chapter presents the methodology adopted for the study and explains the research processes employed throughout in the study. The methodology of the research is important as it helps draw emphasis on systematic ways of providing answers to research questions and solving the research problem. This chapter will discuss the research methodology to be used in collecting the data, and ethical considerations. The chapter will elaborate the research process, methods, and assumptions used for the study.

## **Chapter 6: Qualitative Data Analysis**

This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected and discusses it and the finding from the research. It responds to the research questions and seeks to fulfill the objectives of the research as espoused in the first chapter of the study. The main purpose of the research is to analyze the attacks on the Somali traders in Khayelitsha. The chapter thus focuses on exploring the foregoing based on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks presented earlier.

## **Chapter 7: Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations**

This chapter serves as the concluding part of the study and is divided into three sections. The first section presents a summary of the ethnographic findings from the research site, based on the findings of the study. The second section proposes recommendations that are appropriate for addressing the violence against Somali traders in Khayelitsha. The last section provides a relevant conclusion for the study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

#### 2.1 Chapter Overview

The preceding chapter has given a literature review on xenophobia as a concept, from global, Southern Africa and South African perspective. This chapter offers a theoretical and conceptual framework for the study. According to Wilkinson (2004) theories offer ways in which researchers understand the world.

The chapter aims at providing the necessary basis for the study through a presentation of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks used for the study. This is also intended to demonstrate the rationale for the attacks against the Somali traders, in Khayelitsha. The Chapter starts with an exposition of the theoretical considerations of the causes of xenophobic attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha. It considers the various causes, theoretical conceptions of isolation, bio-cultural, scape-goat and entitlement, in understanding xenophobia, as well as the notion of participation as empowerment. It also provides a critique of these theories and attempts to create a response.

According to Hickel (2014), developing a theoretical framework guides the logic of what a researcher is doing. Peberdy (1997) contends that while research has two domains of theory and observation, a theory or a set of theories guide every aspect of the study from the formulation of the research questions and problem statement, through discussing the findings of your data analyses and writing the conclusions. This is an indication, therefore, that the theoretical framework provides a well-supported rationale to conduct a study while at the same time, placing the reader that the type of investigation proposed is not based solely on personal instincts or guesses, but rather it is informed by established theory and empirical facts from credible sources.

### **2.1.2 Concept of Xenophobia**

Several authors have observed that a deep understanding of xenophobia refers to the ‘fear of the unknown’, or anything that is seen as ‘different’ in which they suggest that this broader kind of definition need to be adopted in order to systematically gauge South Africans’ supposed intolerance for people, ideas, and cultures that are different from their own and try to relate this intolerances to their attitudes towards immigration. Conventional definitions of xenophobia, as a dislike of foreigners, need to be evaluated, whether the dislike is for all foreigners or only black foreigners (Harris 2002b). The author argues that the definition is misleading, due to the fact that in South Africa, xenophobia is not confined to the hatred or dislike and fear of foreigners but results into tensions and violence against foreign migrants by some South Africans. It is also rooted in hatred based on the current racial and economic lines. In this regard, xenophobia needs to be explained and understood in the context in which it is used.

According to Morris (1998), xenophobia emanates as the product of social transition. It is also seen as a defense against the anxiety induced by the “unknown”. From a cultural perspective, Crush (2002) presents xenophobia as a phenomenon which operates through a level of physical and cultural appearance, giving rise to the fact that anything which is not of the required culture is forcibly removed. It is to this effect that the International literature on nationalism views xenophobia as a negative consequence of nation building (Harris 2001a).

The word 'xenophobia' describes violent actions against foreigners, as well as negative social representations of immigrants and refugees. Through the application of the term, hypotheses, such as the scapegoating, isolation and biocultural hypotheses, have been developed. While these hypotheses suggest certain reasons for xenophobia, they do not interrogate the term itself. That is, they accept and present the term as a given neutral term of description. Contemporary


language theory teaches that words and texts are not, however, neutral (Harris 2002a). Rather, words are 'multifunctional, always simultaneously representing the world (ideational function) and enacting social relations and identities (interpersonal function) (Harris 2001a). In Morris' (1998) the terms, scapegoating, isolation and biocultural hypotheses of xenophobia function at the 'ideational' level. They engage with the phenomenon as representative and descriptive of the South African world.

To better understand xenophobia, however, it is also necessary to consider the social relations and identities that are reproduced in the term itself. Just as African foreigners are criminalized and tainted, so xenophobia is presented as a contaminant in South African society. It appears as an unstoppable and irrational fear or plague, sweeping across the country. Through metaphors of disease, floods and the laager mentality, xenophobia is pathologized. That is, it is represented as pathology, as something abnormal and unhealthy. This notion of pathology is strengthened by the phonetic confusion of xenophobia with the psychological phobias. The suffix 'phobia' is regularly used in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (4th edition) (DSM-IV) by psychology and medical practitioners (Crush & Pendleton 2007). In this manual, a range of anxiety-depression disorders are listed under the phobias, e.g. agoraphobia, social phobia, and simple phobias such as claustrophobia and arachnophobia. A psychological 'phobia' is diagnosed if exposure to the object of phobia results in intense anxiety (Crush & Pendleton 2007). Xenophobia, as a violent practice, does not have the characteristics of psychological phobias. Yet, although it is not listed in DSM-IV, it has the phonetic potential to be associated with the phobias, as a psychological pathology (Peberdy 1997).

Peberdy (1997) states that 'patriotism and pride are the positive phase of nationalism while xenophobia and chauvinism the unacceptable phase of nationalism. In this regard, xenophobia is



conceptualized directly in relation to nationalism, and is seen as one side of a nationalism coin. This argument is important because it ties xenophobia to the process of nation-building; it interprets xenophobia as a negative consequence of nationalism and nation-building. As such, xenophobia is not totally divorced from national processes and discourses, as the previous hypotheses have done. However, because they separate the positive face from the negative face of nationalism, cannot escape the pathologising of xenophobia (Peberdy 1997). It is still seen as negative, unhealthy and different from the positive, healthy functioning of a nation. This approach does not allow for the possibility that xenophobia is part of the 'New South Africa', rather than a parasitic pathology or a negative consequence of nation-building. Such a possibility must, however, be entertained as the following section on South Africa's culture of violence reveals.




The international economic environment is broadly characterized by globalization. Changes in the economic organization and the reduction of state capacity have contributed to inequality and poverty which are the underlying explanatory causes of immigration (Harris 2001). In developing countries, modernized economic production has eroded traditional and social support mechanism; this has accentuated the need for migration for better opportunities with all its consequences. Environmental degradation and resource shortages have rendered areas untenable and have reduced the viability of rural life styles. This has been an underlying explanation for immigration with linear increase of inequality and poverty in the world. This relates directly to the number of people seeking more prosperous and stable living condition in other countries (Human Rights Watch 1998, Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015; Dinbabo, & Carciotto, 2015).

Peberdy (1997) is of the opinion that violent conflict and persecution are key explanatory variables for refugee flow and displacement across international borders. Civil and ethnic

conflict, state collapse and government persecution are associated to violence that has led to directly mass migration. A similar study by Crush & Pendleton (2007) argues that cheap and easy transport across great distances offers greater awareness and better opportunities. They are also of the opinion that, proximity to a higher income country is one of the determining factors of migration. Crush & Pendleton (2007) concludes that asylum seekers are fleeing situations of real conflict and violence that is influenced by a lack of economic development and prejudices (Crush & Pendleton 2007).

Peberdy (1997) postulates that the political domain in every nation is the engine of a population pull. These researchers outline hypotheses that once the political domain of a nation is stable, it is bound to act like a refugee ground for neighboring nations with political instability. Harris (2001) and Dinbabo & Nyasulu, (2015) relate South Africa's immigration policy during the 1990's. Harris further argues that South Africa only became credible after they embraced democracy.



According to a South African Migration Project (SAMP) survey conducted in 2001, South Africans take an extremely restrictive view towards immigration by international standards. About 21 per cent wanted a complete ban on the entry of foreigners and 64 per cent wanted strict limits on the numbers allowed entry. South African respondents were also asked what percentage of their population, they believed to be 'foreign' and what percentage of that number was perceived to be in the country illegally. The answers were 26.9 and 47.9 respectively, demonstrating that perception is at the heart of xenophobic discourse (Crush & Pendleton 2007).

The manifestation of xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, and good governance, and constitutes a violation of human rights. Furthermore, as South Africa is party to international human rights and humanitarian treaties, especially on refugees and asylum seekers,


obligations to combat xenophobia have both a legal and a moral force. As a liberal democratic country, fostering the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Africa Union (AU), South Africa is hardly in an ethical or an economic position to close its borders. Such organizations were set up to encourage fraternity and greater regional cooperation and integration. To allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimately extremely destructive to regional cooperation and harmony (Crush & Pendleton 2007; Dinbabo & Nyasulu, 2015; Dinbabo, & Carciotto, 2015).

Beyond the moral implications of allowing xenophobia to continue unabated, an additional worry for the government should be on its international image. The South African expression of intolerance towards their fellow Africans has attracted analysis from all over the globe due to its somewhat hypocritical nature. Migration is a sign of South Africa's emergence as Africa's preeminent economic, educational and cultural center; and from an international perspective it is seen as something of a duty to share this prosperity with its African counterparts. As Jacobsen and Landau (2003) contend, 'the promises of freedom and prosperity are resonating beyond the country's borders' and so it seems only reasonable that this ray of hope for the rest of Africa will attract migrants from less privileged situations.

Of course, this is a somewhat liberal perspective, but the point is that South Africa cannot afford to appear xenophobic and at present, the issue is manifesting itself in a way that is attracting an increasing amount of international attention. Riots and violent attacks have been the result of hatred targeted at immigrants; for example, in the Eastern Cape in early 2007, resentment towards Somalis from locals for supposedly stealing trade and jobs led to rioting that caused the death of over three people and displaced dozen Somalis. In a similar but more serious case,

rioting in Zandspruit due to the mere presence of ‘illegal’ immigrants, culminated in more than 100 informal Zimbabwean dwellings being burnt down.

Even more alarmingly, such discrimination seems to have been exhibited by the police; apparently, Zimbabweans frequently complain that they are targeted by criminals and harassed by the police in Johannesburg and other major cities (Nyamnjoh 2002). However, this does not come as much of a surprise. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) research in 2004 showed that only 35 per cent of the South African Police Service had received ‘some’ training on race and discrimination, and that diversity training is largely seen as irrelevant to police work by station commanders (Palmary 2002). The police can hardly be expected to police, foreigners impartially if they do not understand their language or cultures and have no basic training in human rights. Indeed, the research suggested that a significant number of officers were predisposed to assume that ‘foreigners lie all the time’.



African migrants have experienced systematic xenophobia in their contact with state authorities, in particular with the police, but also with Home Affairs officials and Lindela (the notorious repatriation centre for refugees) employees (Nyamnjoh 2002). Whilst xenophobia persists amongst state authorities, it also persists amongst the general public and the issue of xenophobia can only continue to become ever more serious.

Clearly, immigrants are not only stereotyped in the media, but also branded as potential criminals, drug smugglers and murderers by politicians and unreliable figures are bandied around Parliament. The government has also been criticized for its legislation and its focus on reducing the number of immigrants through repressive measures (Palmary 2004). The Immigration Act 2002, for example, gave police and immigration officers’ powers to stop anyone and ask them to

prove their immigration status. The 1999 White Paper also contained provisions for a “community enforcement policy” of the detection, apprehension and deportation of undocumented migrants, which could be construed as representing a form of state-sanctioned xenophobia, however this section was dropped by the time the Bill was re-submitted for comment in 2002. Significantly, whilst the Bill was replete with clear and explicit law enforcement measures to reduce immigration, conspicuous in their absence were specific strategies to prevent xenophobia or to protect and promote the rights of foreigners, as Neocosmos (2006) points out.

Possibly the most contentious piece of legislation is the 1991 Aliens Control Act, amended in 1995 and 1996, which has been described as “an archaic piece of apartheid legislation, at odds with international human rights norms and the new South African constitution” (Human Rights Watch 1998). The act has its roots in the 1937 Aliens Act, which was intended to exclude German Jews fleeing Nazi persecution from coming to South Africa, and has led to the term ‘alien’ becoming synonymous with ‘unwanted immigrant’. Subsequent amendments of the act were almost invariably designed to increase the repressive power of officials, to place greater control on people’s mobility, to circumscribe the legal rights of ‘aliens’ and to extend the range of people to which the act applied (Crush and Pendleton 2007). This term, ‘alien’ is unfortunate as it not only suggests that migrants do not belong, but also implies difference, strangeness and otherness.

The government must do more to combat, not only xenophobia as a general concept, but also the specific negative attitudes directed towards other SADC countries. At present, it could even be accused of contributing to such attitudes as immigration authorities have been known to introduce tougher entry procedures (for example, higher visa application fees, restriction of

multiple entry visas, requirements to show bank statements and other documentation) for citizens of certain countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Crush and Pendleton 2007). Such restrictions may result instead in more ‘border jumpers’ among those denied formal entry, in more employers securing the cheap labour of such undocumented or illegal ‘border jumpers’ and in greater exploitation and impunity by employers.

The 1998 Refugee Act was somewhat more progressive, as it allows any person to apply for asylum and states that no person should be denied the right to apply. Whilst the application is being processed, they are not allowed to work or access education. If, after six months, their status has not been determined, the applicant is entitled to apply for permission to work and receive education. However, the law is silent on whether other public services, for example, housing and health care can be accessed during this time and if these services should be delivered under the same conditions as South Africans, for example, free primary health care. Once status is granted, all refugees are entitled to health care, to seek employment and education. They are also entitled to the rights enshrined in chapter two of the constitution, with the exception of political rights and rights to freedom of trade occupation and profession (Palmary 2004).

## **2.2 Theoretical Framework**

Xenophobia, as a concept is also described as “new racism” or “cultural racism” must not be confused with racism, it differs from the latter in that cultural rather than racial differences become the basis of exclusion (Crush & Ramachandran 2014). The term “xenophobia” is defined as, “a strong feeling of dislike or fear of people from other countries (Oxford Learner's Dictionary 2016). According to the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (2016) xenophobia is a fear and hatred of foreigners. According to Crush (2009), xenophobia represents highly

negative perceptions and discriminatory practices against foreigners on the basis of their foreign nationality. The foregoing definition leads to one similar concept – dislike for foreign nationals.

There are various theories that account for the causes of xenophobia. There are general and specific theories. An evaluation of a general theory will aid the understanding of the specific theories. The general theory is prejudice, and the specific theories are scape-goat, isolation and biocultural theory.

### **2.2.1 Theory of Prejudice**


The first theory to look at is the prejudice theory. This is a social identity theory which propounds that prejudice rests on the identification of groups and the influence of group membership on the identity of an individual. According to Tajfel *et al.* (1971), people build their identities from their own group membership. They inhibit tendencies that categorize themselves into one or more in groups, developing a part of their identity. This development of a specific group enforcing boundaries with other groups. These identities that are built tend to create a system of distinctiveness which creates a boundary between the two groups. Consequently, people relate to groups in such a way as to maximize their positive distinctiveness with groups, offering both identity and self-esteem.

According to Botha (2012), positive social identity can be achieved by comparing the in-group with a relevant out-group. This will lead to a derogation of the out-group. There is an assumption that inter-group comparisons are related to the degree of someone's in-group identification. This is an indication that the higher the importance of the in-group for the members, the stronger the inter-group differentiation will be. For example in the case of Khayelitsha, residents develop an identity with regard to their position as locals and natives of Khayelitsha in one identity group

and place the Somali traders in another identity group with regard to their position as foreigners operating spaza shops in their community.

The main yardsticks for classification of identification in society include class, gender, political affiliation and ethnicity (Botha 2012). This theory, therefore, explains the presence of social groups and the nature of relations between them (Hook & Eagle 2002). For purposes of this study, the ethnicity of the residents of Khayelitsha creates ground for the creation of an identity on one hand, and the creation of another identity by the Somali traders who are from a different ethnic background. An engagement with this theory helps establish the role of identity in creating prejudice by the residents of Khayelitsha against the Somali traders.

Tajfel *et al.* (1971) support the idea above that people are willing to see their group as better in some way than other groups. To this end, therefore, social phenomena such as chauvinism can be used as a predictor of xenophobia. This theory, however, has some shortfalls. It does not explain why there are individual differences in the level of prejudices shown.



### **2.2.2 Theory of Functionalism**

The functionalism theory as propounded by Durkheim, deviance is a normal and necessary part of social organization (Macionis & Linda 2010). They state further that, likewise, individuals may commit crimes for the good of an individual's group, due to lack of ties, or because the societal norms that place the individual in check no longer have the power to do so, due to society's problems. In reference to xenophobia, the research is driven by the assumption that the causes of xenophobia against Somali traders are an indication of deviance. To answer the question as the causes of the attacks on the Somali traders, the reason for the criminal elements shall be examined.



Still related to the above, another sub-theory, which would explain functionalism, is the anomie sub-concept. Anomie refers to the influence of a lack of norms governing a given societal vice (Harris 2002b). With regard to South Africa, despite the country's democratization, it is still marred by prejudice and violence (Harris 2002b). This violence starts evolving due to lack of regulations in terms of policy, monitoring and a legal framework. Xenophobia becomes the effect of this lack of proper regulation and the country's history.

On the basis of the anomie- functionalist theory; the relative deprivation theory narrows down the theoretical framework of this study. The relative deprivation theory refers to the lack of resources to sustain the diet, lifestyle, activities and amenities that an individual or group is accustomed to or that are widely encouraged or approved by the society to which they belong (Walker & Smith 1984). In South Africa today, the change from the apartheid to the democratic system of government ushered in a trail of entitlements and rights; including the right to housing, employment, and thriving businesses. Where the community does not get to enjoy such entitlements; a potential cause for riots and social movements occurs (Harris 2002b). The various reasons for xenophobia on Somali traders shall be the reasons to justify the validity of the theory in this study.


### **2.2.3 The Relative Deprivation Theory**

Relative deprivation is looked at as a key psychological factor in generating social unrest, arising from a subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to. When there is a gap between aspirations and reality, social discontent is likely to arise (De La Rey 1991). While violence is not an inevitable outcome of relative deprivation, the anger caused by deprivation and perceived or real threats from immigrants relates to the lack of resources from the government. The relative deprivation theory is used to justify the three

hypotheses of xenophobia as discussed in the literature review. According to Tshitereke (1999), the socio-economic analysis conceptualizes xenophobia in terms of frustration and relative deprivation.

#### **2.2.4 The Scape-goat Hypothesis**

The scape-goat hypothesis explains why frustrated people on a ‘frustration scape-goat.’ According to Tshitereke (1999), frustrated people vent their anger on that ‘frustration- scape-goat’. In the case of this study, the frustration scape-goat refers to the non-national minorities; the Somali traders. The scapegoat hypothesis, emerging through sociological theory, locates xenophobia within the context of South Africa’s transition from an authoritarian state to a democracy (Harris 2002b). Heightened expectations are linked to limited resources, unequal distribution of wealth and increasing poverty.



The scape-goating hypothesis, coined by Tshitereke, (1999) explains xenophobia in the sense of how South Africans direct their anger on foreigners in relation to problems of scarce resources, such as Jobs, housing, and healthcare, coupled with high expectation during the transition. According to Tshitereke (1999) people in a period of difficulties, often create a “frustration-scapegoat” in which they create a target to blame for on-going social problems and thus in the light of the scapegoating hypothesis, foreigners become such a scapegoats. Foreigners here are made to be the scapegoats in the sense that they are seen to be a threat to jobs, housing, education, and healthcare. However, Harris (2002a) argues that anger caused by deprivation and perceived or real threats from immigrants as it relates to resources does not directly cause the nationals to commit violence, but it frustrates them. This hypothesis does not, however, explain the anger directed by South African to other targets other than foreigners. South Africans are

known for rioting; whereby they destroy infrastructure, buildings, vehicles, among other things (Tapiwa 2010).

Generally, scapegoating theory explains xenophobia in terms of broad social and economic factors. Tshitereke (1999) introduces a psychological level of explanation to supplement this sociological interpretation. He conceptualizes xenophobia in terms of frustration and relative deprivation. Relative-deprivation theory suggests that 'a key psychological factor in generating social unrest is a sense of relative deprivation. This arises from a subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to. When there is a gap between aspirations and reality, social discontent is likely to result (De la Rey 1991). Tshitereke (1999) further states that violence is not an inevitable outcome of relative deprivation.

Relative-deprivation theory offers a psychological explanation for scapegoating. Concepts of frustration and aggression are interpreted as subjective, intrapsychic processes. In this way, the theory understands xenophobia from the inside out. Psychoanalytic theory similarly offers an intrapsychic explanation of scapegoating as a projective and defensive process. For both these theories, De la Rey (1991) points out that 'The cause of social unrest cannot be simply located within subjective perceptions of reality. The search for causes of social action must extend beyond the subjective psychological realm to include its complex inter-relatedness with objective social reality (De la Rey 1991; Sithole, & Dinbabo, 2016).

Tshitereke's (1999) psychological interpretation of scapegoating must not be divorced from the socio-economic realities of contemporary South Africa. He reminds us that the psychological process of relative deprivation rests on social comparison. This takes place at the level of jobs, houses, education and even women, such that foreigners are scapegoated for taking our jobs,

taking our houses and stealing our women. Politics, economics and patriarchy impact on the scapegoating process.


### **2.2.5 The Isolation Hypothesis**

The scape-goat hypothesis leads to the isolation hypothesis; whereby the foreigner is isolated as a result of his or her foreignness in contrast to the internal isolation of South Africans within South Africa as a result of apartheid. Xenophobia, separatism, and fundamentalism are comprehensible symptoms of social disorientation, as a result of the isolation. The isolation hypothesis views xenophobia as a consequence of the country's exclusion from the international community, due to apartheid (Harris 2002a).

The isolation hypothesis has “foreignness” at the heart of hostility towards people from foreign countries. This is because it views xenophobia as a consequence of the country's exclusion from the international community, brought on by apartheid (Harris 2002a). During the isolation period, foreigners represented the unknown to South Africans. With the opening of the country's borders during the transition period, South Africans were brought in direct contact with foreigners – the unknown. This hostility can be explained by the fact that the once segregated South Africa was opened up to foreign nationals. According to a study by Morris, that was carried out among the Congolese and Nigerians reveals that inadequate education and the isolation of South Africans during apartheid explains the hostility towards foreigners. He arrived at the findings that when a group has no history of incorporating strangers, it may find it difficult to be welcoming (Morris 1998). Intolerance towards foreigners is ascribed to the creation of strict boundaries between citizens as well as between South Africans and other countries. The isolation hypothesis understands xenophobia as a consequence of apartheid South Africa's exclusion from the international community.


Morris (1998) further argues that apartheid insulated South African citizens from nationalities beyond Southern Africa. In this hypothesis, foreigners represent the unknown to South Africans. With the political transition, however, South Africa's borders have opened up and the country has become integrated into the international community. This has brought South Africans into direct contact with the unknown, with foreigners. According to the isolation hypothesis, the interface between previously isolated South Africans and unknown foreigners creates a space for hostility to develop.

The isolation hypothesis suggests that suspicion and hostility towards strangers in South Africa exists due to international isolation. The hypothesis also explains contemporary xenophobia by recourse to internal isolation, the isolation of South Africans from South Africans, as a consequence of apartheid and thus there is little doubt that the brutal environment created by apartheid with its enormous emphasis on boundary maintenance has also impacted on people's ability to be tolerant of difference (Morris 1998).



This hypothesis, however, fall short of giving a convincing argument. According to Botha (2012), the hypothesis is based on a wrong perception that South Africans did not have contact with people of different races or ethnicities until 1994. A research carried out by him in Port Elizabeth indicates that Senegalese migrants have not been the targets of the local population and therefore, the isolation hypothesis does not explain how the unknown produces anxiety and why this automatically results in aggression. And in light of his findings he argues that, there may be a need to establish whether the foreigners have something that they do to spark off the aggression.

The isolation hypothesis, coined by Morris (1998), is based on the explanation that under the apartheid regime South Africans were isolated from the rest of the world. However, in the post-1994, South Africa opened its borders and became part of the international community, bringing South Africans into contact with the unknown foreigners (Harris 2002b). In essence, the hypothesis explains that “the interface between previously isolated South Africans and unknown foreigners creates a space for hostility to develop. The hypothesis also explains xenophobia, as a result of internal isolation in which South Africans themselves are isolated from one another, as a result of apartheid and that there is little doubt that the brutal environment created by apartheid with its enormous emphasis on boundary maintenance has also impacted on people’s ability to be tolerant of difference (Morris 1998). However, the hypothesis does not explain the lack of tolerance is directed only at African migrants and not to other migrants such as those migrants from Europe, America or Asia.




### **2.2.6 The Bio-Cultural Hypothesis**

The biocultural hypothesis of xenophobia offers an explanation for the asymmetrical targeting of African foreigners by South Africans. The biocultural hypothesis locates xenophobia at the level of visible difference, or otherness, i.e. in terms of physical, biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African foreigners.

The isolation and scape-goating hypotheses of xenophobia provide a general explanation of the phenomenon. The scape-goating hypotheses argues that foreigners are scapegoats of social ills, and the difference (or foreignness) engendered by foreigners’ accounts for violence and hostility. In both theories, the foreigner is treated as a homogeneous category, and there is no scope for differentiation between various types of foreigners.

In reference to the relative deprivation theory, the isolation and scape-goating hypotheses of xenophobia provide a general explanation for the biocultural hypothesis of xenophobia. The relative deprivation theory, using the biocultural hypothesis locates xenophobia at the level of visible difference or otherness that is in terms of physical biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African foreigners in the country. This exacerbates the frustration and the isolation into criminal acts on the identified victims. Nigerian and Congolese are easily identifiable as the 'other' because of their indigenous languages, they are in general clearly distinct and local residents are able to pick them out and scape-goat them (Morris 1998). In addition to the physiobiological characteristics and cultural differences such as bearing, skin colour, clothing styles; the inability to speak an indigenous language are indicators that promote xenophobia between nationals and foreigners, in the sense of locals easily identifying possible victims (Harris 2002b). Surprisingly the contrast in skin colour serves to classify people in South Africa, with persons with a lighter skin associated with socio-economic privileges and a darker skin with criminality and poverty (Botha 2012).



Generally, the bio-cultural hypothesis explains xenophobia on grounds of visible differences and otherness, in terms of physical, biological and cultural differences represented by African foreigners (Morris 1998). Thus African foreigners become a target because of their skin colour and because of their physical, biological, and cultural difference. For example, it is very easy to notice a Somali migrant in a South African population due to his/her physical and biological difference to the phenotype of most black South Africans. There is also a popular perception that, darker skin colour represents "foreignness" and that it does not belong to South Africa, 'you are too black to be South African' a popular statement by South Africans. This stereotype together with difficulty in pronunciation, such as saying 'Sud' African instead of South Africa

for Mozambicans when asked for their nationality, and the difficulty of pronouncing the letter ‘r’ as ‘error’, in the case of Malawians is reported to have been used as a leading method by the South African Police Service in hunting down foreign nationals despite their legal status (Crush 1999).

However, there are instances where, the foreigners colour does not easily distinguish the foreigner in the context of blackness concept. Ethnic groups such as the Banyankole and Bagisu from Uganda, Kikuyu of Kenya; Siswati from Swaziland do not greatly attribute to the foreign blackness concept. There are also instances where some South Africans are black enough to conform to the blackness concept attributed to foreigners. These instances defeat the bio-cultural concept.

### **2.3 Conceptual Framework**


The key to understanding the causes of the attacks on the Somali traders lies in revisiting the tenets in three theories. These are the theory of prejudice, the functionalism theory, and the relative deprivation theory. The theory of prejudice uses social identities built along ethnic lines that create boundaries which keep an individual who does not ascribe to the ethnic grouping out of the group. These groups agitate for the need to look at other groups as negative and bad. The functionalism theory uses the principle of anomie to explain the conscious decision by individuals to involve in deviant acts against others, due to lack of a clear legal process which deals with criminal acts in the times of xenophobic tendencies. In addition, the relative deprivation theory uses the three hypotheses of scape-goat, isolation and bio-cultural to explain the attacks. On this note, therefore, the created social identity of the local people in Khayelitsha community, coupled with the socio- economic problems: like poverty, income inequalities and




unemployment have paved the way for xenophobic attacks against the Somali traders in Khayelitsha.

Furthermore, there are other key concepts that guide this research and they include but are not limited to: the concept of social identity, the anomie sub-theory, the scape-goat hypothesis, the isolation hypothesis and the bio-cultural hypothesis. The concept of social identity is defined as a situation where people relate to groups in such a way as to maximize their positive distinctiveness with groups, offering both identity and self-esteem. This distinctiveness can be classified along, gender, political affiliation and ethnicity (Botha 2012). The anomie concept refers to a situation where there is a lack of norms governing a given societal vice in society (Harris 2002b). The vice, for purposes of this study, is xenophobia.

The other concepts are the three hypotheses of the scape-goat, isolation, and biocultural hypotheses. A fusion of these concepts will be establishing why the Somalis are a subject of attack in Khayelitsha.



The trends in the field are divided, while most of them related to relative deprivation theory as the reason for the attacks; these studies are not focused on Somalians. Studies that have focused on the prejudice theory point to the prejudice from the angle of journalism and media reporting. Other trends are generalized attacks against foreigners, which do not offer adequate insight into the attacks on Somalis in Khayelitsha.



**Figure 1 Theoretical Framework**

Source: Own Compilation

## 2.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has offered a theoretical and conceptual framework for the study and provided the necessary basis for the study through presentation of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks to be used for the study. The Chapter has also explained in detail the theoretical considerations to the causes of the attacks on the Somali traders in Khayelitsha as the theoretical framework for the research. The chapter also explained the various hypotheses of isolation, bio-cultural, scape-goat and entitlement, in an attempt to understand xenophobia, as well as the notion of participation as empowerment and also provided a critique of these theories.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **3.1 Chapter Overview**

Xenophobia is rooted in various communities globally. Despite the insistence that South Africa has been noted to have the highest xenophobic tendencies in the world, it does not dispel the presence of these tendencies in other communities across the universe. The proper conception of a literature review entails looking at xenophobia from a global perspective to a Southern Africa perspective before embarking on the South African context.

This chapter discusses the conceptual aspects of xenophobia and its empirical occurrence on the globe, Southern Africa and South Africa. The chapter will evaluate the attacks on Somalis in the Western Cape and Khayelitsha in particular. The chapter analyses the concept of xenophobia and evaluates the background to xenophobia. Thereafter the chapter offers empirical research on xenophobia from a global to a regional and South African perspective. An evaluation of the causes of xenophobia is then done. Some of the literature that is addressed involves the role of the media and perceptions of South Africans against foreign immigrants.

#### **3.2 Empirical Research on Xenophobia**

##### **3.2.1 Global Research**

Scholars in the field (e.g. Meredith 1996; Winterdyk & Antonopoulos 2008; Rhazia 2006; Mikaei 2005; Debra 2015; Marsella & Ring 2003; Suarez-Orozco & Suarez-Orozco 1995; Ekaterina 2007; Hovey 2000; Oksana 2009; Hovey & Magana 2003; Pernice 1994; Esses *et al* 2001; Pratto & Lemieux 2001; Mugny *et al.* 1984; Sanchez-Mazas 1996; Sue & Sue 1999; Licata & Klein 2002; Schirmer 1998; Horenczyk 1996) under took emperical research to

examine xenophobia in the context of different countries. In Germany, for example, xenophobia has been considered a strong dislike for foreigners. This dislike, however, is not an end in itself. It requires an ideology to exhibit the dislike by the local masses (Meredith 1996). An evaluation of political ideologies and how they fuel anti-migrant sentiments forms the vehicle that exhibits xenophobic tendencies.

In addition, Germany's history of victimization and the holocaust provides a unique example of the atrocities, victimisation, and genocide against minority Jews. A proposal was presented in 2001, to combat crimes committed against minority groups. It was proposed that crimes with racist and xenophobic motives should be made aggravating factors and enhances penalties against individuals (Winterdyk & Antonopoulos 2008). Despite the existence of this law, xenophobic tendencies still exist. One foreigner in Germany claimed that as an Asian, she came to Germany at the age of 16, but has felt so much discrimination in all aspects of her life, including education. Despite the fact that she has a German name, and German passport, she is still considered an outsider (Rhazia 2006).

In Sweden, xenophobia exist in the educational system. A study that was carried out by the Swedish Board of Education during the period from October to December 1999, showed that adolescents between the ages of 15-16 displayed negative sentiments towards foreigners in the Swedish education system. Education, is medium that is expected to enhance civil liberty, yet it is grappling with xenophobia in that country (Mikaei 2005). The results of the study indicated one in every eight teenagers were of the view that neither should immigrants keep using their own language nor should their children be accorded the same opportunities in education. This is an indication that the dislike for foreigners may be evident in various forms, at various levels. These results show the multi-dimensionality of xenophobia as a concept. It can cut across any

social setting, provided it has an ideology to fuel its effects. In addition, most of the refugees who flee to Europe, hope to reach Sweden, a country known for its acceptance and tolerance. Unfortunately, Sweden turns out not to be as welcoming as they had hoped (Debra 2015).

In countries like the United States, as noted earlier, xenophobia is often associated with times of economic and political instability, where economic imbalances attract foreigners to the United States with prospects of higher earnings, followed by political, economic and cultural survival (Marsella and Ring 2003). However, the negative views of immigrants emerge from fears of diminished economic resources, rapid demographic changes, and diminished political influence (Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco 1995). Such immigrants are then targeted as convenient scapegoats during difficult cultural and economic transitions (Oksana 2009).

Because the pressure to acculturate is closely related to xenophobia, studies about ethnic identity and acculturation may provide insights into the influences of anti-immigrant sentiments on newcomers. Hovey (2000) reported a strong link between an experience of acculturation stress and depression and suicidal tendencies among recent immigrants from Mexico. Similarly, higher levels of anxiety were reported by migrant farm workers from Mexico who experienced greater acculturative stress (Hovey & Magana 2003). Struggles with acculturation and cultural adjustment were associated with mental health distress in a sample of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean youth (Yeh 2003). These studies highlight that discrimination is a reality for many immigrants and that discrimination has detrimental effects on their mental health.

Pernice (1994), in her article titled “Methodological Issues in Research with Refugees and Immigrants,” the author highlighted the uniqueness of studying a population in relation to all other minority groups. She proposed six areas that must be taken into consideration when

conducting research with immigrants and refugees, especially from developing or non-Western countries. The first area deals with contextual differences between the researcher and the researched such as the contrasts between relative political calm in the West versus other countries' experiences of war and political instability and capitalist versus socialist or communist governments, as well as protection for legal rights versus living in fear of authority. As a result of these contextual differences, immigrant and refugee participants may avoid all contact with "official" researchers, refuse to sign consent forms, decline taping or recording, and respond to questions in ways that seek to protect them rather than reveal vulnerabilities.

Counseling psychologists can enter public debates on immigration by highlighting the harmful effects of xenophobia on immigrants' wellbeing and the cost of prejudice for native-born persons and society at large. Empirically based recommendations for pro-immigrant policy work have included a focus on native-born Americans' commonalities with immigrants as well as a dispute of fallacies about immigration as a social and economic burden and not the benefit (Esses *et al.* 2001; Pratto & Lemieux 2001). Moreover, studies have shown that advocacy by majority members on behalf of minorities and immigrants can lead to a change in attitude among majority members (Mugny *et al.* 1984; Sanchez-Mazas 1996).

Xenophobic prejudice results in negative influence for individuals who experience it and are sometimes similar to other forms of prejudices. Studies about racial minorities in the United States have shown that experiences of blatant and subtle racism have great effect on victims (Sue & Sue 1999). Recent migrants are not immune to the effects of xenophobia.

Unlike other prejudices, xenophobia is a multidimensional phenomenon. Xenophobia is intricately tied to notions of nationalism and ethnocentrism, both of which are characterized by a

belief in the superiority of one's nation-state over others (Licata & Klein 2002; Schirmer 1998). Esses *et al.* (2005) teased out some important distinctions regarding constitutive elements of xenophobia. They found that individual and group national identity focuses on nativism (i.e., believing that national identity is based on birth) rather than civic and cultural (i.e., believing that national identity is based on voluntary commitment to institutions) and results in stronger negative views of foreigners. Their experimental studies also revealed that nationalism (belief in the superiority of one's nation over others) rather than patriotism (affective attachment to one's nation) is related to increased negative views of immigrants. Last *et al.* (2001) have shown that high social dominance orientation, which is related to individual belief in inherent cultural hierarchies and inequalities within a society, is predictive of anti-immigrant sentiments. Thus, this scholarship suggests that ethnocentrism, nationalism, nativism, and belief in a hierarchical world order have been strongly associated with xenophobia.

Horenczyk (1996) theorized that inconsistent and negative treatment of immigrants results in their vulnerability to anxiety and related disorders. Barry and Grilo (2003) found that East Asian immigrants perceived both individual and group discrimination in their host community and this perception negatively influenced their functioning. Perceived discrimination was related to psychological distress in a sample of 108 Arab Americans, a majority of whom were born outside the United States (Moradi & Hasan 2004). Several recent studies with larger samples of recent immigrants to Finland have shown that perceived prejudice and discrimination were detrimental to their psychological functioning (Jasinskaja-Lahti *et al.* 2006; Liebkind & Jasinskaja-Lahti 2000; Liebkind, Jasinskaja-Lahti & Solheim 2004). These studies found that immigrants' cultural or racial similarity to the host country did not protect individuals of various groups from experiencing perceived discrimination because of their immigrant status.


The negative influence of perceived discrimination and prejudice may extend to the second generation of immigrants. For example, Hernandez (2006) found that psychological and social functioning of immigrant children and adolescents declined from first to second generation across all studied immigrant groups. It is possible that one of the explanations for this finding is related to both the racist and xenophobic environments to which immigrants are exposed in their host country.

Several studies have shown that members of the host culture tend to demand that immigrants assimilate into their culture, leaving their own cultural heritage behind (Shamai & Ilatov 2001). Such demands may result in increased cultural confusion and isolation as immigrant individuals and groups attempt to hold on to their sense of cultural identity while making an effort to connect to their host community and create a home for themselves and their children. Kurman, Eshel and Sbeit (2005) found that immigrants' perceptions of host environments' hostile pressures to assimilate resulted in a diminished psychological adjustment for these immigrants.

It is important to recognize that incidences of xenophobia are as common in communities with shared racial characteristics as in those with distinct racial groupings. Tensions between native-born racial minority individuals and immigrants have been documented and examined (Espanshade 2000; Kim 2000; Thornton & Mizuno 1999; Waldinger 1997). The UN's (2006) State of the World's Refugees, highlights that refugees across all areas of the world are subject to xenophobia and that experiences of prejudice are common for refugees who cross no boundaries of race. Xenophobia in western and eastern Europe, Australia, and the United States is well documented and publicized (Baumgartl & Favell 1995; Oakley 1996; Pettigrew 1998; Smith & Edmonston 1997; Sue 2003). Xenophobia is also widespread in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Gray, 1998)



In Russia, xenophobic groups in Russia, particularly skinheads, direct their violent anger mostly at foreign nationals, and Russian citizens of certain ethnic groups, like Caucasians (Ekaterina 2007). Unlike in America, where Caucasian means “white,” in Russia Caucasian refers to people from the Caucasus, mountains between Russia and the Middle East where Chechnya is located. “Caucasian” is a collective term for any nationality of the Caucasus. They are called “black” or “dark” by many Russians and are treated with a lot of hostility (Ekaterina 2007). “Black phobia” on the other hand, is a phenomenon that can be attributed to many factors, but the result has been that xenophobia and racism equally become a burning issue in Russia. Cases of violence against foreigners, immigrants, and certain ethnic groups holding Russian citizenship; particularly people from the North Caucasus, Roma, and members of the Jewish community are most vulnerable (Ekaterina 2007).



Xenophobia is often associated with times of economic and political instability. Economic imbalance pulls individuals to countries with prospects of higher earnings or sheer survival, whereas political, economic, and cultural tensions push many out to new lands (Marsella & Ring 2003). In turn, the migration of large groups of people across borders can result in the host community’s reaction of feeling threatened by the newcomers, whether because of perceptions of economic strain or of cultural dissimilarity (Esses *et al.* 2001). Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco (1995) argued that negative views of immigrants emerge from fears of diminished economic resources, rapid demographic changes, and diminished political influence. Scholars from both Western Europe and the United States indicated that foreigners are often targeted as convenient scapegoats during difficult cultural and economic transitions. Fritzsche (1994) suggested that prejudice against immigrants can offer an emotional outlet for fear when both the internal and external affairs of a country are unstable.

### 3.2.2 African Perspective

In the context of Africa, scholars (e.g. Crush & Pendleton 2007; Nyamjoh 2002; Nyamnjoh 2002; Halisi, Kaiser & Ndegwa 1998; Crush 2002; Danso and McDonald 2001) undertook empirical research to examine xenophobia in the context of different countries in Africa. For instance, Crush and Pendleton (2007) determined that the phenomenon of xenophobia as a regional concept in Africa, largely depends on the country that one is referring to, the person one is speaking to and the degree of knowledge of the person about the migration process and types of immigrants. Outside South Africa, citizens across Southern Africa region tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries and view migration as a problem rather than an opportunity. This is evident in Namibia and Botswana, and much more relaxed in Swaziland, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The citizens of most Southern African Countries with the exception of Zimbabwe have various misconceptions about immigration. It is on the basis of these misconceptions that they hold their views on immigration, the way they do (Crush & Pendleton 2007).



In Botswana for instance, hierarchical tension has been identified as a source of xenophobia. Nyamjoh (2002) argues that there is a hierarchy of citizenship fostered by political, economic, social and cultural inequalities. The presence of this hierarchy gives the ability to particular individuals and groups to claim and articulate their rights. This is an indication that being Motswana is a matter of degree and power relations, where some individuals are less Batswana than others (Nyamnjoh 2002). Furthermore, hierarchical tensions among the Batswana, is a parallel hierarchical structure among the foreigners or immigrants on the basis of their accorded respect, privileges or rights by Batswana. He succinctly conveys the fact that understanding the ongoing tensions over entitlements among majority and minority ethnic groups in Botswana is


the background for understanding changing and hardening attitudes towards foreigners in general, and certain categories of foreigners in particular (Nyamnjoh 2002). He is careful not to label it as xenophobia. Botswana as a SADC partner to South Africa may imbue the same xenophobic attitudes in light of this study (Halisi, Kaiser & Ndegwa 1998). If there was a recent study on xenophobia in Botswana, it would help us understand the same here in South Africa in a hierarchical context.

According to Crush (2002) 10% of the population in Namibia want a complete ban to migration into Namibia and are opposed to the idea of open borders when it comes to allowing free movement within SADC. In addition, the majority of citizens in Namibia (at 82.5%) advocate for a restrictive immigration policy, subject to job availability. In 2002, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) carried out a study on the interpretation of Namibian attitudes towards immigration. It was established that those who are better off economically were more tolerant and less xenophobic to foreigners than the poor and those with low household incomes. The study also concluded that economic conditions are strongly related to educational achievement (Crush 2002).

### **3.2.3 South Africa**

Several researchers in South Africa (Mattes 1999; Mish 1997; Warner & Gillian 2003; Morris 1998; Hickel 2014; Crush & Ramachandran 2014; Crush 2000, Crush & Ramachandran 2014; Neocosmos 2010; Danso & McDonald 2000; Harris 2001; Crush 2006; Jacobsen and Landau 2003; Harris 2002a; Van der Wield 1997; UN 2006; Mattes *et al.* 1999; Hamber 1997; Hamber & Lewis 1997; Sinclair 1999; Tapiwa 2010, Harris 2002b; Crush 1999) undertook empirical research to examine xenophobia in the context of South Africa.

For example, a study done by Mattes (1999) showed that there are high levels of xenophobia in South Africa. This was based on 65 % of a national sample who said illegal immigration was a bad thing or a very bad thing. The author agrees that this term is very loosely or rarely defined. Xenophobia is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as ‘fear or hatred of strangers or foreigners or of what is strange or foreign’ (Mish 1997). This implies that xenophobes would display a dislike for all foreigners on the basis of their foreignness; however, this is not the case. The patterns that emerge from the targets of the attacks suggest otherwise, especially if a particular group of foreigners are targeted (Warner & Gillian 2003). The majority of the xenophobic incidents reported by the media is perpetuated against black Africans (immigrants and asylum seekers/refugees from other African countries). This study does not conform to the definition of xenophobia. This is because mainly African immigrants are targeted and not the white or Chinese immigrants. There is therefore the need to establish why African migrants are targeted more than other migrants; with an emphasis on Somalis.



Studies investigating the experiences of refugees in South Africa have found that they experience radicalized prejudice, with black South African men being the most hostile (Morris 1998). According to Neocosmos (2010), xenophobia should be approached from an ethnocentric view where people readily though not inevitably develop strong loyalties to their own ethnic group and discriminate against outsiders. This ethnocentric view does not explain the attacks between the isiZulu and the Isikhosa; who are both South African. This study validated the need to establish whether the causes are from male blacks or female blacks. The study will narrow the perspective of the attacks on Somali traders.

Since 1994, xenophobic attacks on African immigrants have increased significantly. Hickel (2014) noted that Somalis have been a target for so long. And despite the fact that the United

Nations expressed concern; no forthcoming recommendations were made to reduce or eliminate the attacks (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). Although many studies has been written on migrants and refugees in South Africa, none of these studies adequately address the causes of attacks on Somalis, and in particular Somali traders living and trading in Khayelitsha hence this study seeks to address this gap.

The first post-apartheid attacks on foreign immigrants erupted in Alexandra in Johannesburg for several weeks in December 1994 and in the beginning of 1995, a violent campaign known as Buyelekhaya (loosely translated as ‘*go back home*’) in which through the use of violence, mobs tried to eject migrants whom they saw as illegal immigrants, blaming them for various social ills (Hickel 2014). In 1996, foreign traders in Johannesburg were attacked and seriously assaulted; this led to a situation whereby violence against migrants spilled over to other cities. According to Hickel (2014), in 1998 three African foreigners were killed after they were thrown out of a moving train by a group of South Africans, who were striking against unemployment. Two years later in 2000, six white South African police set dogs on three black migrants from Mozambique in a mission aimed to clamp down on illegal migrants (Crush 2001). In this regard, he argues that while the incident may justifiably be seen as evidence of the old plague of racism, it might equally be read as evidence of a new plague of xenophobia.

Subsequently, in 2006, at least 28 Somali traders were brutally killed in the townships of Cape Town (Crush & Ramachandran 2014), in what was widely seen an organized xenophobic attacks on Somali migrants as well as an opportunistic way of clearing foreign traders from the spaza industry. However, the police continue to maintain that these incidences are merely criminal in nature. In the same year, in the black township of Masiphulele, near Fishhoek in Cape Town, shops belonging to Somali migrants were entirely looted and destroyed by mobs chanting,

hambani! hambani!, amasomalia (*leave! leave! Somalis*), which created a huge debate in the city, not only due to the rising levels of anti-immigrant sentiments, but also the aggressive way in which xenophobia was manifesting itself in the townships.


In May 2008, less than two years to host the soccer world cup, the country was taken by surprise by the nationwide barbaric attacks on foreign migrants, in which 62 people, including 21 South Africans were killed, 670 injured and 150,000, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers were displaced (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). But despite these unfortunate events government officials in all ranks from the president, the ministers, to the newly recruited police cadets, maintained that the cause of such tragic events were not xenophobic, but purely of criminal nature, with even some claiming the possibility of a 'third force'. The government, under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, stated this was not xenophobia but simply traits of historical ties to fighting colonialism (Mail & Guardian 2008). These comments are instrumental in understanding the follow-up to the attacks in 2012 and how the government reacted. They are critical to establishing whether the situation would be different if the government had addressed the problem from the start.

According to Morris (1998), xenophobia is due to failure by government to combat poverty in the country, foreigners, especially black Africans have become scapegoats for the slow progress in reaping the rewards of liberation from apartheid rule. According to Sinclair (1999), on the other hand, the xenophobic attacks against migrants in South Africa can be seen as a failure to appreciate the positive impact of foreign migrants.

Xenophobia is viewed as racially and ethnically inspired because it has problematic tendencies oscillating from identity in terms of cultural differences, with little regard to the reality of

interconnections and on-going relationships forged across communities by individuals (Nyamnjoh 2002). According to Sichone (2008), South Africa's hostility towards foreigners is attributed to unemployment and poverty that characterizes the majority of the male youth in South African Townships. There is a need to expand this argument to establish if it is one of the reasons for the continued attacks on Somalis in Khayelitsha Township.

Studies show that there are very high levels of intolerance across the entire population against immigrants in South Africa, making South Africa one of the countries in the world that are the most hostile towards foreigners. According to Mattes (1999), South Africans dread foreigners because they are a threat to the local citizen's access to employment, social grants, health care and housing. This approach, in the author's view, is simplistic in that it does not explain the fact that most foreigners carry out their own businesses and do not benefit from social services such as grants and housing.



Xenophobia in South Africa is as a result of a political discourse rather than explanations around poverty, scarce resources and lack of service delivery. As a result, reckless remarks made by politicians about exclusion; tend to become an ideology with which the effects of xenophobia become apparent (Neocosmos 2010). Neocosmos (2010) argues that the political notions of exclusion from the community and the state under apartheid have been transferred to post-apartheid and that xenophobic incidents in the country are as a result of statecraft. In his discussions of what he calls 'Four Theses', Neocosmos (2010) explains xenophobia as a discourse used in the social and political exclusion of some groups, seen or believed to be the 'other', from the community in order for the 'we' to be preserved. He further argues that the state plays a bigger role in the notion of exclusion crafting a particular position and perception of the citizen against the 'other' (the foreigner), which finally explains the discourse of xenophobia



as a result of two set of politics, namely state politics and popular politics (Noecosmos 2010). The most popularly quoted of such statements was the infamous statement made by Buthelezi , surprisingly being the Minister of Home Affairs by then, responsible for the protection of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, yet, seemed to have taken a different direction with the following statement he made in 1998, when he said that “if South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then they could bid goodbye to their Reconstruction and Development programmes” (Neocosmos 2008).


Similarly, xenophobic comments made by the former police commissioner Bheki Cele addressing police officer in a meeting in Khayelitsha, aimed at crime prevention during the 2011 December holiday season, in which he particularly targeted Somali immigrants and challenging their legal status in the country as well as their business activities in the province, portraying them as illegal migrants who came into the country unfairly in which he said that “South Africans, can’t have a country that’s run by people who jump the borders” (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). Such distorting and disturbing comments made by politicians may have contributed to the negative perceptions of the public, which in turn may have fueled the growing attacks on Somali traders in the province. Thus, it’s against this backdrop that this study evaluates the possibility of an identity ideology in the attacks on the Somali traders.

Perceptions of South Africans about xenophobia have jeopardized the ability of the government to provide resources and employment (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). South African perceptions recorded by the South African Migration Project in its 50<sup>th</sup> migration policy series, generally shows a growing trend of intolerance and hostility among citizens towards foreigners, and highest of its kind compared to other countries in the world, which shows that South Africans are generally very antagonistic towards foreign migrants in the country and anti-



immigration (Crush 2008). This perception requires an evaluation, because most immigrants start up their own work and its only few who apply for formal jobs. In addition, the squatter problem was evident in South Africa before migrants started coming to South Africa.

A study by Harris (2001) shows that foreign immigrants into South Africa are associated with crimes like prostitution, human trafficking, and drugs. The immigrants are said to bring diseases like AIDS, take their jobs and bring crime as well as contribute to a range of other economic and social ills in society (Harris 2001). Crush (2006) shares a similar view when he suggested that many South Africans have no direct interaction or contact with foreigners; hence have no experience of them, even the immigrants from neighbouring countries. In his study, he reveals that only four per cent of South Africans have a great deal of contact with people from other countries. With eighty percent having almost no contact are statistically most likely to have a negative opinion of foreigners. The more contacts citizens have with foreigners, the more likely they are to have tolerant opinions about them (Crush 2006).



Jacobsen and Landau (2003) and Harris (2002a) are of the opinion that the various institutions put in place in South Africa to cater for the rights of the immigrants more often than not abuse the rights given to them. According to Van der Wield (1977), these institutions deliberately deviate from the UNHCR Acts that governs immigrants especially refugees. Van der Wield (1977) further harness that these institutional system makes foreigners vulnerable to corruption. Aligning with institutional abuses, Harris (2001) attested that following incessant xenophobic attacks that usually comes up against foreigners in South Africa, the concerned department plays very little role to put an end to it.

## **The origin of xenophobia in South Africa**

An investigation into the historical origin and the reasons for xenophobia can be traced to the apartheid era. The previous government developed strong anti-immigration policies which were aimed primarily at people from other parts of the African continent entering South Africa. Crush and McDonald (2001) refer to the Immigration Act of 1913 and to the Aliens Act of 1991, which defined blacks from the rest of Africa as migrants. They were allowed to stay temporarily as long as they were a source of cheap labour. If not, they were considered to be illegal aliens who posed a threat to the country's security and economy.

## **Categorizing Migrants**


According to the UN (2006) South Africa is host to various categories of foreigners. These include; refugees, asylum seekers, migrants and immigrants. About fifty two thousand asylum seekers and sixteen thousand refugees are residents in South Africa (UN 2006). According to section 22 of the Refugee Act (1998), a refugee is entitled to a wide range of economic benefits. This comprises the right to work and study. However, asylum seekers are not allowed to work and study for the first span of 180 days of their application, under section 22 of the Refugee Act (1998). To this effect, Harris (2001) argues that genuine asylum seekers are prohibited to earn a living for at least 6 months. Compounding the problem is the lack of state and civil assistance for asylum seekers and refugees living in an urban environment (Harris 2001).

A research by Van der Wield (1977) identifies various types of migrants. He presents labour migration as migrants who leave their homes in search of jobs in other countries and after a period, leave again to another country they considers more viable. Van der Wield (1977) identifies four hundred thousand immigrants of this category in South Africa as of 1976 and

concludes that the majority of these are labourers working in the mining industry (Van der Wield 1977).

Mattes *et al.* (1999) postulated that immigration or migration is a global phenomenon. The same authors postulated that skilled labour migrants are very important to a country's economic growth and development. The gaps created by emigrating skill and the inadequacy of a country's education and training system can be filled by immigrants.

Research by Mattes *et al.* (1999) observed that immigrants in other countries rarely fit the skill labour demands of the host country. He argues that this is the case in South Africa that has greatly exacerbated xenophobia. Immigrants of low capacity fights with locals, resulting in reduced prices for labour. The locals become jobless resulting to increased social ills. This is the main cause of xenophobia in South Africa that spread over the entire territory. Mattes *et al.* (1999) suggests that one of the remedies of xenophobia was a pull of skill or scarce skill labour immigration.




### **Xenophobia and Violence in South Africa**

By presenting xenophobia as negative and abnormal, a contrasting comment is made on the normal functioning of the nation. In the South African context, the normal society is not, however, divorced from violence. A solid body of research highlights what has been termed South Africa's 'culture of violence' (Hamber 1997; Hamber & Lewis 1997). The culture of violence can be described as a situation in which social relations and interactions are governed through violent, rather than non-violent. This is a culture in which violence is proffered as a normative and legitimate solution to problems. Violence is seen as a legitimate means to achieve

goals particularly because it was legitimized by most political role-players in the past (Hamber 1997).


The culture of violence is a legacy of apartheid. It found its roots in the 1980s, when violence was predominantly political in nature. That is, 'where the dominant motivation for violence was based on political difference or the competing desire for political power. During this period, violence was utilized and sanctioned across the political spectrum (Hamber 1997). The politics of the 1980s effectively laid the foundation for an ongoing culture of violence in the 1990s. According to analysts, the form of violence has altered across this period. Hamber (1997) explains that 'whilst levels of political violence have generally dropped the transition has been characterized by dramatic increases in violent crime'. Hence, violence today is described as criminal rather than political in nature. So, although the form of violence may have altered across time, violence itself still persists as the dominant means to solve problems in South Africa. It is in this context of a culture of violence that xenophobia in South Africa must be conceptualized.



Despite the pervasiveness of South Africa's culture of violence, it is ironic that xenophobia has been represented as something abnormal or pathological. Xenophobia is a form of violence and violence is the norm in South Africa. Violence is an integral part of the social fabric, even though the 'New South African' discourse belies this. Indeed, by belying and excluding xenophobia, the 'New South Africa' discourse is able to define itself as peaceful and tolerant. It is similarly able to coexist with the 'African Renaissance' discourse and to perpetuate the ideals of harmony and diversity. But in order to do this, it is necessary that xenophobia is created and represented as pathology. Consequently, xenophobia as a pathology is central to national discourse. It must be recognized as part of the new nation, and is not separate from the 'New South Africa', even though it is the pathologist within and by the discourse. It is also not a

negative consequence of nationalism. Rather, it functions within the culture of violence to give definition to the 'New South Africa' and the forms of identity that accompany this discourse. Xenophobia can thus be understood as a central feature of nationalism. This point is borne out by looking at the experiences that black foreigners have had in South Africa, which suggests that xenophobic violence is an integral feature of their daily lives here (Hamber, 1997).

Sinclair's (1999) engaged with the impact of xenophobia on foreign identity in post-apartheid South Africa. Drawing on interviews with seventy-seven African foreigners, she notes that 'hostility towards foreigners has become one of the most significant features of post-apartheid South African society'. Hostility and abuse are reported throughout her sample, spanning a range of institutions and interactions, from the police and the Department of Home Affairs to employers and neighbours.



As a consequence of this hostility, social networks and support structures have developed among non-South Africans during the post-apartheid era. Sinclair (1999) explains that these communities have been established largely along national lines, and do not span nationality divisions. Rather, they exist as discrete networks, representing particular nationalities, such as Nigerians, Angolans and Mozambicans. These local communities have developed as safe havens and comfort zones for migrants.

Company and mutual protection, rather than long-term assimilation, are the central criteria for these local migrant communities. There is no permanence or long-term stability about them. Indeed, the element of transience impacts directly on foreign identities here and this, Sinclair explains, is a direct response to xenophobia. For many migrants permanence has become untenable, given the realities of the harsh life in South Africa (Sinclair 1999).

South African hostility encourages foreigners to leave South Africa, and to feel impermanent while living in the country. Another response to xenophobia is that of resentment and hostility on the part of foreign migrants: 'Many migrants respond with anger and indignation to the hostility that they face' (Sinclair 1999). Morris notes this from Nigerians and Congolese living in South Africa: 'the antagonism and prejudice experienced has resulted in an unfortunate cycle. It has encouraged a strong sense of nationhood among the Congolese and Nigerian immigrants. The harsh treatment has also encouraged a tendency to view South Africans as the inferior 'Other' (Morris 1998).

Besides the feeling that South Africans are prejudiced and parochial, a prominent perception was that South Africans, especially black South African men, are extremely violent: Informants often depicted South African men as lazy, adulterous and not nurturing of their partners. Often, laziness and crime were interlinked. South Africans were portrayed as less enterprising, wasteful, poorly educated and ignorant (Morris 1998). In contrast, respondents portrayed themselves as hard-working, enterprising, caring, educated and cultured (Morris 1998).

It must be recognized that responses to xenophobia may manifest in hostility, and possible acts of violence, from foreigners themselves. Indeed, the potential for violence rests within the actions and interactions that develop at the point of national identity. Morris comments that identity is caught up in a cyclical and complex relationship at the border of nationality. The Nigerians and Congolese interviewed generally exuded self-confidence and were often disparaging about the local Africans. There is little doubt that this combination further alienates the local black population from them (Morris 1998).

Exclusion, alienation and hostility operate in a complex, ongoing spiral across the line of nationality, i.e. between South Africans and foreigners, particularly African foreigners. Studies such as those conducted by Sinclair (1999) and Morris (1998) reveal that xenophobia impacts directly on foreign identity. It cannot be separated from the normal foreign individual in South Africa. Through xenophobia, foreigners feel foreign. This effect, in turn, alienates and excludes foreigners further from South African society. It also contributes to foreign hostility, and possibly violence, towards South Africans. This understanding of the impact of xenophobia on identity, together with the culture of violence that pervades ordinary South African life, suggests that xenophobia is not the pathology it is represented to be. Rather, it is a key component of the 'New South African' nation. To read xenophobia as pathology is to contest traditional, normal understandings of psychopathology. It is not individually located and is not counter normative, but rather operates through the social, for the social, serving to disguise relations of power and discursive contradictions. It is for these very reasons that such a reading is valuable, as its seeming incongruence with psychopathology highlights the subtle ways in which certain pathologies are problems of political control, representing the failure of regulatory systems to fully govern particular aspects of the individual.

At the level of the social, instead of accepting xenophobia as something abnormal and separate from the ideals of nationalism, it is vital to interrogate why it has been represented in this light. It is also crucial to uncover what such pathologisation does in order to understand the consequences of seeking a cure. This is particularly important in light of the inherent contradiction between the 'New South Africa' and 'African Renaissance' discourses at the point of nationalism. The struggle to create the nation-state is a struggle for the monopoly of the means of violence (Sinclair 1999).

Immigration policy in South Africa during apartheid and after apartheid sets and arranges the boundaries for belonging to the nation and exclusion from the society. This situation is clearly defined by a study conducted by Peverdy (2009). With globalization and technology, people are moving across the world for one reason or another, and in increasing numbers, from one place to another, from one country to another, from one continent to another. This global move and global movement to transform the world to a multi-cultural world, sheltered by hostilities in the destination country (Peverdy, 2009).

Legislation and government policy in South Africa is to a certain extent designed to allow in the country only those who are seen to be potentially valuable and useful members to the South African nation or those who will be suitable members to the South African society. The immigration policy in contemporary South Africa seems to be, to a certain level, a continuity and change of the past apartheid immigration policy. As Peverdy (2009;3) points out the immigration policy of the post-apartheid South African state and the language used to justify it at times seem to contradict its stated and apparent commitment to democracy, inclusivity and human rights, and raises questions about continuity and change with the past.

Morris (1998) states that scholars believe xenophobia is due to failure by government to combat poverty in the country, foreigners, especially black Africans have become scapegoats for the slow progress in reaping the rewards of liberation from apartheid rule. He further asserts that as South Africa considers institutional reform and policy plans, rights of foreigners need to be placed into perspective.

According to Sinclair (1999), xenophobic attacks against migrants in South Africa can be seen as a failure to see the positive impact of foreign migrants.




Watts (1996) hypothesized that xenophobia is a “discriminatory potential,” which is activated when ideology, such as ethnocentrism, is connected to a sense of threat on a personal or group level. An example of such threat is an individual or cultural perception that foreigners are taking jobs from native workers. Watts further suggested that this prejudice produces political xenophobia, which results in the desire to create and apply public policies that actively discriminate against foreign individuals. Similarly, Radkiewicz (2003) suggested that xenophobia is related to an ethnocentric “syndrome” with two separate dimensions: (a) beliefs about the national superiority and (b) hostile, reluctant attitudes toward representatives of other countries.

There are several causes of xenophobia mentioned in the literature (e.g. Harris 2001; Danso & McDonald 2001; May 2008; Pierre, Landau & Monson 2009). The most widely given cause is that xenophobia is caused by a fight for ‘scarce resources’ (Harris 2001). The media are also said to be the cause of xenophobia because of their negative reporting on cross-border movement and migrants in South Africa (Danso & McDonald 2001). According to an International Organization of Migration (IOM) report, prepared by Pierre, Landau and Monson (2009), poor service delivery, poverty, ineffective migration management, perceived competition for resources, jobs, women, houses and high crime rates”, are cited as some of the causes of the May 2008 violence. Dodson (2010) also argues that “the attacks of May 2008 were indeed xenophobic; that their causes lie in a complex of economic, political, social and cultural factors both contemporary and historical”. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, the cause of the 2008 xenophobic attacks are due to policy failures on the part of the government, such as failing to maintain the rule of law, poor border control, corruption, unemployment, poor education, slowing economic growth, poor foreign policy, poor service delivery (Cronje 2008). This is an

indication that xenophobia thrives because of South Africa's failure to address its socio-economic problems.

It's also argued that the media play a greater role in regard to the information or misinformation about attitudes towards noncitizens. In six Southern African countries including South Africa, the public get its information and misinformation about migrants from the media and as such, the role of the media critical in creating and propagating images about foreigners. Foreigners are persistently labeled negatively, due to media reports (Nyamnjoh 2002). Research shows that media coverage of immigration issues in South Africa, for instance is on a persistent negative bias (Danso and McDonald 2001). The above assessment shows that while some writers are skeptical to label attitudes of foreigners as xenophobic; Namibia and Botswana have a high affinity to dislike for foreigners. This is due to embedded social strife and the effect of the media and its negative publicity about immigrants.




In recent years, the South African media, particularly the print media have come under scrutiny for their negative reporting regarding cross border migration and migrants in the country. The media have been criticized by some scholars for spreading negative stereotypes about foreigners, which might indeed contribute to xenophobia in the long run (Danso & McDonald 2000). There is a large scale stereotyping in the English-language newspapers, whereby, immigrants are categorized and portrayed as migrants, job-stealers, criminals and illegals (Danso and McDonald 2000). The use of sensational language in news headlines is common, as is the conflated use of the terms, migrant, immigrant and refugee and the questionable use of statistics on the number of undocumented migrants in the country. This then leads to a situation whereby reading such stereotypes in the media, the South African public gets to believe that migrants are indeed job stealers, criminals and carry diseases with them – hence this becomes an aspect of huge concern

about the role of the media in anti-immigrant stereotypes (Danso and McDonald 2000). A similar study carried out in Alexandra (Johannesburg) that reviewed the news content from 36 media, notes that the media content findings show a very strong stereotyping and bias against African immigrants which is enough to feed to the xenophobic attitude (Tapiwa 2010). It's argued that the negative way in which media contents, especially those pertaining to foreign migrants (mainly of African origin) is framed can indeed contribute negatively into the thinking of a society.

In his analysis of the role of the media in the 2008 xenophobic attacks on African foreigners, Harber (2008) looks at how the media fueled the negative public perception about foreigners. Haber (2008) argues that the Daily Sun paper covered the 2008 xenophobic attacks on African migrants in a very negative and xenophobic manner. He notes that the Daily Sun use of negative language such as the word 'aliens', referring to African black foreigners from other parts of Africa, who were the victims of the 2008 violence in its headlines such as, 'war on aliens'. He also observes that the Daily Sun downplayed the violence and only had a coverage of the events three days later when the news was on the headlines nationally and internationally and even this time the angle it took was a message of caution to those it believes was 'proudly South African' in its headlines, 'Be careful, don't look or act like a foreigner'. when asked about the stand the daily sun took in the coverage of the 2008 violence, Deon du Plessis defended the paper as the supporter of the home team saying, that although it may not be a very worldly view, but it served the paper's audience. It is imperative to establish if such media coverage instigated violence against Somalis in Khayelitsha.


Xenophobia in South Africa is as a result of a political discourse rather than explanations around poverty, scarce resources and lack of service delivery (Neocosmos 2010). Neocosmos (2010) believes that the political notions of exclusion from the community and the state, under apartheid have been transferred to post-apartheid South Africa. In his discussions of what he calls ‘Four Theses’, Neocosmos explains xenophobia as a discourse used in the social and political exclusion of some groups, seen or believed to be the ‘other’, from the community in order for the ‘we’ to be preserved (Neocosmos 2010). He further argues that citizenship is reduced to indignity and that “citizenship is state-constructed while the state sees citizenship as being concerned with populations within a territory under its control” and that the state plays a bigger role in the notion of exclusion crafting a particular position and perception of the citizen against the ‘other’ (the foreigner), which finally explains the discourse of xenophobia as a result of two set of politics, namely state politics and popular politics (Neocosmos 2010)



The political use of the discourse of exclusion and citizenship was common throughout the post-colonial era in South Africa, in regard to the creation of citizens’ negative perception against foreign nationals, which in turn may have led to xenophobic attacks in the country. Available evidence in the literature shows that indeed the use of the two discourses has been apparent mainly in statements made by politicians in power (Neocosmos 2008). The most popularly quoted of such statements was the infamous statement made by Buthelezi, surprisingly being the Minister of Home Affairs by then, responsible for the protection of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, but instead seemed to have taken a different direction with the following statement he made in 1998, in he said that if as South Africans are going to compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens who are pouring into South Africa, then it can bid goodbye to its Reconstruction and Development Programme (Neocosmos 2008). With this onset, politics of

fear became prevalent in the country, with politicians making inflammatory statements enough to fuel a potential xenophobic attack.

For instance, in Western Cape, distorting and disturbing comments made by politicians may have contributed to the negative perceptions of the public, which in turn may have fuelled the growing attacks on Somali traders in the province. For instances, xenophobic comments made by the former police commissioner Bheki Cele addressing police officer in a meeting in Khayelitsha, aimed at crime prevention during the 2011 December holiday season, in which he particularly targeted Somali immigrants and challenging their legal status in the country as well as their business activities in the province, portraying them as illegal migrants who came into the country unfairly in which he says that South Africans, “can’t have a country that’s run people who jump the borders (Neocosmos 2010).



WESTERN CAPE

Similar xenophobic sentiments were also echoed by the Premier of Western Cape, Helen Zille during a meeting with local business people in Cape town, in which she demanded the change what she called “myriad laws on foreigners”, need to be changed (Lynette 2011). Statements she made was both confusing and distorting, enough to fuel a xenophobic attack. The claim that immigrant traders in Khayelitsha are rather political rather economic refugees, they do not employ locals, and that their contribution to tax is negligible as many of them do not use banks (Lynette 2011). Thus, such kind of statements and many others may not only contribute to negative perceptions and fuel attacks against foreign migrants, but also can lead to the political and social exclusion of foreign migrants from the various communities in which they live in.

Some South Africans have argued that African immigrants have jeopardized the ability of the government to provide resources and employment (Crush 2000). Accordingly, the influx of

African immigrants into South Africa has resulted in unrest in this country. This is exacerbating the competition on the job market and is also contributing to the squatter problem. South Africa has the highest opposition to immigration in the world. The recent xenophobic attacks and the killing of African immigrants in South Africa could further underscore the fact that South Africans do not want African immigrants in South Africa (Crush & McDonald 1999). South African perceptions recorded by the South African Migration Project in its 50<sup>th</sup> migration policy series, generally shows a growing trend of intolerance and hostility among citizens towards foreigners, and highest of its kind compared to other countries in the world, which shows that South Africans are generally very antagonistic towards foreign migrants in the country and anti-immigration (Crush 2008). This perception requires revisiting because most immigrants start up their own work and it few who apply for formal jobs. In addition, the squatter problem was evident in South Africa before migrants started coming to South Africa.

It's argued that the negative way in which media portrays foreign migrants who are mainly of African origin, contributes to the negative perceptions of society. In his analysis of how public opinions is shaped and amplified by the media, Vasterman (2005) observes that media channels exaggerate and distort news content for purposes of making the stories marketable. He notes that in fact, the one single news will change gears as reporters search for more topics within the same topic and hence in quick succession, events accumulate in the news, creating the impression that a situation has suddenly deteriorated into a real crisis (Vasterman 2005). An example to explain this best was the May 2008 xenophobic eruptions which first started in Alexandria in Johannesburg and later spread like a bush fire to the rest of the country. People in other parts of the country were following media, visually through national televisions, audio via radio stations

and reading and both text and horrific pictures from the print media particularly newspapers, and soon foreigners mainly from African countries were under siege.

Although the attacks on African migrants have been directed at all immigrants, regardless of their nationality, there is available literature that shows that Somali migrants have been the most affected, not only because of their nationality but also due to their success in the spaza industry (Liedeman *et al.* 2013). This is because the spaza shops account for 6.6% of South Africa's self-employed labour force, while 9.2% are home-based spaza shops (Liedeman *et al.* 2013). This accounts for approximately 145,000 persons who rely on spaza shops and a spaza sector which comprise of 100,000 enterprises with a collective annual turnover of R7 billion (Wills 2009 cited in Liedeman *et al.* 2013;4). Somali traders in townships run the spaza industry, which is highly contested in the townships. According to Liedeman *et al.* (2013), this has led them to be targets of both criminals and xenophobes. This follows the need to establish if the Spaza business could be a case for the attacks against the Somali traders in Khayelitsha.

### **3.3 Analysis of Attacks on Somalis in Western Cape**

The attacks on Somali traders have been extensively reported by the media. However, some of these attacks went unnoticed, due to the fact that such incidents were not reported as a result of reluctance from the victims side for security reasons and fear of victimization or that the unwillingness of the media to report such attacks in cases where it felt as not newsworthy (Crush *et al.* 2014). Albeit the fact that attacks on Somalis in the Western Cape are almost on a daily basis as mentioned above, this section of the study will focus only on major incidents from 2006 to 2012, in an attempt to give a picture of the attacks on Somalis in the province.

Generally, there have been three major waves of attacks on foreign nationals in the Western Cape and Somalis in particular. These include the killings and looting of Somalis in 2006,

followed by the nationwide xenophobic attacks in 2008. The third wave was in 2010, shortly after the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament. In addition to these attacks, there have been other notable attacks carried on Somali traders in specific townships notably those in Zwelethemba in Worcester, Franschhoek, Gugulethu, Kraaifontein and recently in Varhala Park and Bishop Lavis (Crush *et al.* 2014).

In 2006 Somali traders were randomly and brutally killed in many of the city's black townships to an extent the former leader of the Democratic Alliance leader, Tony Leon has described it as an 'ethnic cleansing' (Mariette 2006). According to media estimates, 28 to 40 Somalis were killed in the townships of Cape Town in August 2006 alone (Mail & Guardian 2006). Ironically, in response to the attacks, the government downplayed the killings by blaming Somalis for the killings and calling them war people, substantiating it with a single incident in which a Somali national was suspected of attempting to kill an Ethiopian national (Mail & Guardian 2006). Such reasons for the attacks need to be studied within the context of Khayelitsha, to establish if they are informative for this study.

The government's attitude in reducing the attacks on Somali traders led to another attack on Somali traders same year in Masiphumlele in which 27 Somali shops have been entirely looted and dismantled by angry residents in a mission alleged to be spearheaded by local business leaders (Le Roux 2006). This led to the then Western Cape premier Ebrahim Rasool to take a very strong stance on the growing number of attacks against Somali immigrants (Le Roux 2006). While it may be argued that it was time for elections and Ebrahim as a strong and practicing Moslem used religious solidarity; the strong stance reduced the attacks on the traders.



After the nationwide xenophobic attacks against African foreign immigrants in 2008, members of local business associations and individuals who threatened Somali shopkeepers not to return to their townships received overwhelming criticism by community leaders and residents in various townships (Leila 2008). This facilitated the return of Somali traders back into their respective communities. Subsequently, the return of Somali traders led to the formation of resistance groups to the return of Somali traders primarily made up of local traders. One of these resistance lobbies was launched by a local business group, the Zankhanyo Retailers Association under the umbrella of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NAFCOC), in which they sent threatening letters demanding the closure of all Somali shops as from 25 August 2008 for 21 days. The letters stated further that, if the contents of the letter were not implemented, members of the organization would resolve to much higher actions that would include physically fighting (Mail and Guardian 2008). This threat coupled with the horrific nationwide attacks on foreign immigrants made the government to react swiftly and arrested some of the culprits. Unfortunately, the culprits were released after a few days. This showed a lack of a deliberate, strong will to handle the issue of attacks on foreigners (Mail & Guardian 2008).

Despite the horrific and devastating effects in the aftermath of the 2008 nationwide xenophobic attacks, the government was reluctant in adopting anti-xenophobia measures and instead maintained its usual gospel that the attacks were criminally motivated and had nothing to do with xenophobia (Braam & Leigh 2010). In reality, by maintaining such stands, the government did not only downplay the attacks on immigrants but also created a space in which such tragic events of 2008 were likely to surface again in the years that were to follow. This was evident in the

looting of foreign own shops in the townships, that took place in 2010 a day after the FIFA's World Cup final (Crush *et al.* 2014).

According to Matilda (2010), after the soccer tournament ended, residents went on rampage looting, destroying shops belonging to Somali traders and other immigrants. This forced the immigrants to flee their businesses to safer zones in the province, while others crossed borders to their home countries. The researcher believes that the lower effects of the 2010 xenophobic attacks can be attributed to the following factors. Firstly, given the early conveyance of the rumors, many immigrants were alerted as a result and hence adopted measures prior to the attacks facilitating their safe exit from the affected areas at most with their belongings for some and at least with their lives for others reducing effects of the attack in contrast with that of 2008. Secondly, following the rumors, concerned community leaders, human right organizations and the larger civil society devoted incredible efforts to counter the xenophobic attacks that were anticipated in line with the rumors. Thirdly, with the tragic results of the 2008 nationwide xenophobic attacks still fresh in the minds of many including the international community, the government could not afford a repeat of such events – especially at a time when the country successfully hosted the world soccer event.

Similarly, devastating attacks on Somali traders took place in townships such as Gugulethu in 2009 where the Gugulethu Business Forum issued letters to Somali traders to leave the township within seven days allegedly supported by the Anti-Eviction Campaign (Matilda 2010). In Zwelethemba, Worcester, members of the South African Police Service were alleged to have supported the looting of Somali shops by failing to take any action against the perpetrators and refusing to investigate the case (Crush *et al.* 2014). In addition, in May 2009, at least 10 Somali shops were forcefully closed in Town Two, Khayelitsha by a group of 50 local businessmen. The

businessmen claimed that they were enforcing a local business agreement executed in 2008 (Matilda 2010).

The latest attacks on Somali traders in the province have taken place in coloured townships of Varhala Park, Bishop Lavis and Beacon Valley (Matilda 2010). According to Matilda (2010), the government maintained its stand that these were business rivalries between the local and foreign business persons, which were partly due to lack of regulation of the spaza businesses. The continued stand that it was not xenophobia greatly affected any government effort to stop the attacks (Crush *et al.* 2014). The shocking aspect of this attack was that the police did not make any attempt to stop the attacks, but rather stood by, as shown in photos taken by a local newspaper, Die Burger, forcing Community Safety MEC, Dan Plato to call for independent investigation into the incident (Crush *et al.* 2014).

### **3.4 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has offered a literature review of the concept of xenophobia. The chapter has explored the concept of xenophobia, the history of xenophobia and empirical research on xenophobia. In addition, the chapter has offered a discussion of the literature on xenophobia from a global to a Southern Africa perspective. Thereafter the Chapter has given an understanding on xenophobia from a South African perspective to the study site. It is important to note that Somalis have been the target of xenophobia since 1996. This chapter shows that no research has been done to establish the causes of xenophobia in Khayelitsha.

## CHAPTER FOUR


### A CASE STUDY AREA: KHAYELITSHA

#### 4.1 Chapter Overview

The main purpose of this study was to investigate the attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha and how Somali traders cope with this violent environment. The chapter therefore focuses on exploring the history and socio-economic profile of the study site

The following sections comprise the study area (a) background (b) economic activities (c) household income (d) criminal statistics and (e) dwelling profile. Finally, a concluding remark of the chapter is provided. The information on the research site is based on the Statistics SA 2011 census and the City of Cape Town 2011 Census.

#### 4.2 Background of the Study Area




Khayelitsha Township is divided into three major sections namely Site C, Site B and Makhaza. It is the second biggest after Soweto in Gauteng (Curry 2001). It is also reputed to be the largest and fastest growing township in South Africa (Curry 2001). It is highly probable that any event that takes place in Khayelitsha is likely to spread to other townships in the province or the entire country (Saff 1998). Secondly, Khayelitsha is described as a migrant township in which even the original dwellers, are believed to be migrants from Eastern Cape who settled there in the 1980s, when the township was first established under the apartheid's Group Areas Act (Pinnock 2016).

The township has considerably attracted other migrants apart from the original inhabitants the Xhosa, many of them from African countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Congo, Nigeria, Cameroon and an ignorable number from Bangladesh (Steiner, Alston & Goodman 2008). In fact, the township holds the largest number of Somalis who are living in townships in

Western Cape, has the highest number of shops owned by Somali migrants (Field 2001). However there are neither accurate statistics of the number of Somali migrants in the township nor the number of their shops (Ross & Mirowsky 1999). Thirdly, there have been several attacks on Somali migrants who are living and trading in the township such as the xenophobic attacks in 2008 and 2010, as well as intimidations and threatening letters, which has been dispersed to Somali shopkeepers in 2008 (Morris 1998).

**Map of Khayelitsha Illustrating different Sections of the Township**



**Figure 2 Map of Khayelitsha**

**Source:** (Chris 2016, p1)

Fourthly, the township is where the 2008 informal agreement between local spaza owners and Somali traders were signed and adopted in an attempt to control the influx of foreign shops, which was also mistakenly adopted in many of the other black township in the province as a method of stopping or removing foreign-owned shops and has caused a lot of conflicts in such areas (Steiner, Alston & Goodman 2008). Finally, the researcher has been a trader, a community activist and a spokesperson of the Somali traders in Khayelitsha from 2006- 2010 and has personally been attacked. He has also witnessed many Somali traders killed, maimed, robbed, looted or their shops set on fire. This background gives him the ability to obtain first- hand information and vast experience in regards to the violence against Somali traders in Khayelitsha.

#### **4.2.1 Origin**

Khayelitsha was established in the 1980s under the Group Areas Act, by the apartheid regime due to the housing crisis in the Western Cape and influx in the former townships of Guguletu, Nyanga, and Langa as well as the struggles in Crossroads (Ndigaye 2005).

About the same time, the Colored Labour Preferential Policy froze the erection of new houses in the townships of Langa, Nyanga, and Gugulethu. This created overcrowding in the existing settlement areas. And in an attempt to alleviate the situation, the township of Khayelitsha was formed (Ndigaye 2005).

According to Stats SA Census (2011), Khayelitsha has a population of 391,748 people of which about 98.6% are blacks, 0.6% are coloured, 0.1% are whites and 0.1% are Asian. In addition, 48.9% are male and 51.1% are females. Further, most of the recent studies of Khayelitsha rely on the Census of 2011 by Stats SA. As a result, the researcher shall use the statistics as at 2011, to give a foundational and situational analysis of the study site.

## Demographic profile of Khayelitsha

**Table 1: Population Profile of Khayelitsha**

| Khayelitsha<br>Population | Male    |       | Female  |       | Total   |        |
|---------------------------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|--------|
|                           | N       | %     | N       | %     | N       | %      |
| Black African             | 188.336 | 48.1% | 198.022 | 50.5% | 386.358 | 98.6%  |
| Coloured                  | 1.024   | 0.3%  | 1.291   | 0.3%  | 2.315   | 0.6%   |
| Asian                     | 164     | 0.0%  | 107     | 0.0%  | 271     | 0.1%   |
| White                     | 168     | 0.0%  | 159     | 0.0%  | 327     | 0.1%   |
| Other                     | 1.869   | 0.5%  | 608     | 0.2%  | 2.477   | 0.6%   |
| Total                     | 191.561 | 48.9% | 200.187 | 51.1% | 391.748 | 100.0% |

Source: City of Cape Town 2011 Census, p27

The Demographic profile according to the 2011 Census shows that 99% of the population is predominantly black, about 49% of the population in Khayelitsha is below 24 years of age. Out of this population, the black Africans are the majority population, followed by the coloured, the Asians, and the whites. These numbers are relevant in so far as they are indicative of the bulk of the population under study. The table below illustrates this information.

**Table 2: Age Demographics of Khayelitsha**


| Khayelitsh<br>a Age | Black African |       | Coloured |       | Asian |       | White |       | Other |       |
|---------------------|---------------|-------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                     | N             | %     | N        | %     | N     | %     | N     | %     | N     | %     |
| 0 to 4<br>years     | 46.246        | 12.0% | 227      | 12.0% | 26    | 9.6%  | 25    | 7.6%  | 199   | 11.9% |
| 5 to 14             | 62.985        | 16.3% | 384      | 16.6% | 40    | 14.7% | 47    | 14.4% | 104   | 16.2% |

|                |        |       |      |       |    |       |    |       |      |       |  |
|----------------|--------|-------|------|-------|----|-------|----|-------|------|-------|--|
| years          |        |       |      |       |    |       |    |       |      |       |  |
| 15 to 24 years | 82.552 | 21.4% | 418  | 18.1% | 61 | 22.4% | 58 | 17.7% | 712  | 21.4% |  |
| 25 to 64 years | 188.24 | 48.7% | 1.17 | 50.7% | 14 | 52.2% | 18 | 55.7% | 1.45 | 48.8% |  |
| 65 years +     | 6.330  | 1.6%  | 63   | 2.7%  | 3  | 1.1%  | 15 | 4.6%  | 11   | 1.6%  |  |
| Total          | 386.35 | 100.0 | 2.31 | 100.0 | 27 | 100.0 | 32 | 100.0 | 2.47 | 100.0 |  |
|                | 8      | %     | 5    | %     | 2  | %     | 7  | %     | 6    | %     |  |

Source: City of Cape Town 2011 Census, p30

### 4.2.3 Education

In addition to the age demographics, only 36% of the entire populations have completed grade 12. This is an indication that 64% have never been to grade 12. A total of 2.6% of the population has never received any formal education. The table below illustrates this information.



**Table 3: Education Demographics**

| a Age             | Black African |      | Coloured |       | Asian |       | White |      | Other |       | Total  |      |
|-------------------|---------------|------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|--------|------|
|                   | N             | %    | N        | %     | N     | %     | N     | %    | N     | %     | N      | %    |
| No schooling      | 6.066         | 2.5% | 45       | 3.2%  | 21    | 12.3% | 18    | 8.5% | 327   | 16.1% | 6.447  | 2.6% |
| Some primary      | 23.613        | 9.8% | 219      | 15.4% | 12    | 7.0%  | 9     | 4.2% | 156   | 7.7%  | 24.009 | 9.8% |
| Completed primary | 10.662        | 4.4% | 126      | 8.8%  | 9     | 5.3%  | 6     | 2.8% | 75    | 3.7%  | 10.878 | 4.4% |



|                |             |            |           |            |         |            |         |            |           |            |             |            |
|----------------|-------------|------------|-----------|------------|---------|------------|---------|------------|-----------|------------|-------------|------------|
| Some secondary | 114.67<br>5 | 47.4%      | 651       | 45.7%      | 63      | 36.8%      | 84      | 39.4%      | 768       | 37.8%      | 116.24<br>1 | 47.3%      |
| Grade 12       | 74.442      | 30.8%      | 327       | 22.9%      | 57      | 33.3%      | 51      | 23.9%      | 585       | 28.8%      | 75.462      | 30.7%      |
| Higher         | 11.886      | 4.9%       | 51        | 3.6%       | 9       | 5.3%       | 45      | 21.1%      | 81        | 4.0%       | 12.072      | 4.9%       |
| Other          | 411         | 0.2%       | 6         | 0.4%       | 0       | 0.0%       | 0       | 0.0%       | 39        | 1.9%       | 456         | 0.2%       |
| Total          | 241.75<br>5 | 100.0<br>% | 1.42<br>5 | 100.0<br>% | 17<br>1 | 100.0<br>% | 21<br>3 | 100.0<br>% | 2.03<br>1 | 100.0<br>% | 245.59<br>5 | 100.0<br>% |

**Source: City of Cape Town 2011 Census, p33**

#### 4.2.4 Migration


Successive population censuses that have been conducted by Statistics South Africa have found that the population of Khayelitsha has grown since 1996. In 1996, the census puts Khayelitsha's population at 252,000. In 2001, it had raised to 329,000 (Statistics SA 2013 p23). In 2011, the population had grown at about 400,000. The question that requires answers was where these other people were coming from. A study carried out by the South African labour and Development Unit (SALDRU) shows that a significant number of the population of Khayelitsha had migrated from the Eastern Cape Province. The major reason for moving is an attempt to escape poverty in the Eastern Cape (Derek & Sihaam 2008).

It is important to note that 84% of black adults were born outside Cape Town. The majority of the adults were born in Transkei, Ciskei and other areas of the Eastern Cape. 68% of the male adults migrated before 1969, while 60% of the female adults migrated after 1969 (Derek and Sihaam 2008). Recent studies indicated that 13 out of 18 migrants from the Eastern Cape came to Khayelitsha to look for employment (Nontembeko & Rasmus 2006).

### **4.3 Economic Activities**

The labour force indicators of Khayelitsha show that about 70% of the labour force is between the age of 15 to 64 years, that is 274, 986 people. While this is a welcome development, the labour force includes the employed and unemployed people. The unemployment rate is at about 38% and the labour absorption ration 40.4 percent. There are also people who are not economically active on account of discouragement.

A study carried out by the University of Stellenbosch in 2013, shows that Khayelitsha has about 85 000 small, medium and micro-enterprises, operating in the metropolitan township (University of Stellenbosch Business School 2013). For those concerned about the development and expansion of small enterprises in an area like Khayelitsha discussions usually centre around problems, needs and challenges experienced by local business entrepreneurs. While many entrepreneurs regard “difficulties in the access to finance” as the biggest hurdle in the way of business success, it is clear that there are in fact many different issues and challenges facing local enterprises.



### **4.4 Household Incomes**

Almost half of Khayelitsha’s households live below the food poverty line. Statistics South Africa calculates the poverty line by determining the food and non-food items that are essential for daily survival. The upper-bound poverty line is R779 (US\$70) per month: people can buy essential food items and spend R444 on non- essential food items. The lower bound poverty line is R501 per month, meaning that people probably have to sacrifice some essential food items in order to be able to buy essential non-food items (Seekings 2013). There is a significant difference between income distribution within Khayelitsha and Cape Town. Studies in 2011 showed that

the annual median household income was about R20 000. In addition, the median household income for Cape Town was about R40 000 (Seekings 2013;31).

The monthly household incomes of the population are below R 3200 per month. A total of 72.9% of the population earns less than 3200 Rands a month. A bulk of this group which is about 30% of the entire population, earns less than 1600 rand a month. This establishes a trend of poor household income in a populated township with little income and having every reason to attack foreigners who have businesses in their neighborhood.



**Table 4: Monthly Household incomes in Khayelitsha**

| Khayelitsha<br>Age   | Black African |        | Coloured |        | Asian |        | White |        | Other |        | Total  |        |
|----------------------|---------------|--------|----------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
|                      | N             | %      | N        | %      | N     | %      | N     | %      | N     | %      | N      | %      |
| No Income            | 22.080        | 18.8%  | 66       | 13.5%  | 12    | 17.4%  | 15    | 15.6%  | 126   | 15.7%  | 22.299 | 18.8%  |
| R 1- R1.600          | 35.355        | 30.1%  | 126      | 25.8%  | 21    | 30.4%  | 21    | 21.9%  | 198   | 24.6%  | 35.721 | 30.1%  |
| R1.601- R 3.200      | 29.175        | 24.9%  | 87       | 17.8%  | 9     | 13.0%  | 18    | 18.8%  | 192   | 23.9%  | 29.481 | 24.8%  |
| R3.201- R 6.400      | 17.622        | 15.0%  | 84       | 17.2%  | 9     | 13.0%  | 9     | 9.4%   | 180   | 22.4%  | 17.904 | 15.1%  |
| R6.401-<br>12.800    | R8.388        | 7.1%   | 57       | 11.7%  | 9     | 13.0%  | 12    | 12.5%  | 69    | 8.6%   | 8.535  | 7.2%   |
| R12.801-<br>25.600   | R3.333        | 2.8%   | 45       | 9.2%   | 3     | 4.3%   | 9     | 9.4%   | 27    | 3.4%   | 3.417  | 1.0%   |
| R25.601-<br>51.200   | R1.131        | 1.0%   | 18       | 3.7%   | 3     | 4.3%   | 3     | 3.1%   | 12    | 1.5%   | 1.167  | 2.9%   |
| R51.201-R<br>102.400 | 135           | 0.1%   | 0        | 0.0%   | 3     | 4.3%   | 6     | 6.3%   | 0     | 0.0%   | 144    | 0.1%   |
| R102.401 or more     | 144           | 0.1%   | 6        | 1.2%   | 0     | 0.0%   | 3     | 3.1%   | 0     | 0.0%   | 153    | 0.1%   |
| Unspecified          | 0             | 0.0%   | 0        | 0.0%   | 0     | 0.0%   | 0     | 0.0%   | 0     | 0.0%   | 0      | 0.0%   |
| Total                | 117.363       | 100.0% | 489      | 100.0% | 69    | 100.0% | 96    | 100.0% | 804   | 100.0% | 118.82 | 100.0% |
|                      |               |        |          |        |       |        |       |        |       |        | 1      |        |

Source: City of Cape Town 2011 Census, p37

#### 4.5 Criminal Statistics

Khayelitsha poses a particular problem for the administration of criminal justice and state structures enjoy little legitimacy (Department of Community Safety 2015). On 29 September 2015, the Western Cape Provincial Government identified the Western Cape as a 'zone of poverty and unemployment,' Khayelitsha has the second highest number of murders in the province in relation with other black townships of Nyanga, Gugulethu. Harare is within Khayelitsha however, for purposes of criminal statistics, it is taken as a distinct township. This is because of the existence of police administration in Harare and Khayelitsha. Harare, therefore as a part of Khayelitsha reports the highest number of murders in the Western Cape (Department of Community Safety 2015). In relation to other townships in Cape Town, Gugulethu, Nyanga, and Harare (which forms part of Khayelitsha but are distinct for crime demographics) Khayelitsha has reported a higher rate of murders, sexual offences, robbery, arson and malicious injuries.

Statistics from South Africa Police Services (SAPS) show that Khayelitsha reported the second highest number of murders in 2015, the highest number of sexual offences, robbery with aggravating circumstances, arson and malicious injuries. The challenge posed by Khayelitsha is the use of vigilantes instead of reporting cases to the Police Stations. According to Haefele (2011), prior to April 2002, vigilantism was not officially recorded, but after an incident in which three suspected criminals were killed, the police management of the Khayelitsha precinct started to register vigilante incidents and the Khayelitsha Police Crime Intelligence Analysis Centre (CIAC) began to report on the phenomenon.

**Table 5: Statistics of crimes across four townships in Western Cape**

| Township    | Murder | Total Sexual Offences | Robbery with aggravating circumstances | Arson | Malicious injury to property |
|-------------|--------|-----------------------|--|-------|------------------------------|
| Gugulethu   | 165    | 229                   | 707                                    | 18    | 555                          |
| Khayelitsha | 146    | 229                   | 1421                                   | 25    | 613                          |
| Nyanga      | 300    | 292                   | 1242                                   | 31    | 800                          |
| Harare      | 141    | 235                   | 867                                    | 23    | 565                          |

**Source: Department of Community Safety 2015, p6**

#### **4.6 Dwelling Profile**

Poverty is widespread, with the majority of Khayelitsha's residents living in overcrowded shack settlements, accessing electricity illegally, sharing communal water taps, and relying on grossly inadequate sanitation arrangements (Seekings 2013). Despite overall poverty levels, some areas such as Lingalethu West, contains parts that are relatively prosperous (Seekings 2013). The dwelling profile of Khayelitsha can only be understood by looking at the statistics on types of dwelling people stay in and their tenure status. A total of 44.6% lives in formal dwellings while 8.2% live in informal dwellings or shacks in people's backyards. Another 46.3% live in informal dwellings, not in a backyard. This makes up the bulk of the dwelling on the population in Khayelitsha.

**Table 6: Table showing dwelling profiles**

| Types of dwelling                           | Black African |        | Coloured |        | Asian |        | White |        | Other |        | Total   |        |
|---|---------------|--------|----------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|---------|--------|
|   | N             | %      | N        | %      | N     | %      | N     | %      | N     | %      | N       | %      |
| Formal dwelling                             | 52.186        | 44.5%  | 339      | 69.6%  | 34    | 33.9%  | 62    | 60.2%  | 369   | 46.1%  | 52.990  | 44.6%  |
| Informal dwelling/<br>shack in backyard     | 9.463         | 8.1%   | 47       | 9.7%   | 6     | 8.1%   | 4     | 3.9%   | 211   | 26.3%  | 9.731   | 8.2%   |
| Informal dwelling/<br>shack NOT in backyard | 54.679        | 46.6%  | 95       | 19.5%  | 22    | 35.5%  | 36    | 35.0%  | 198   | 24.7%  | 55.030  | 46.3%  |
| Other                                       | 1.028         | 0.9%   | 6        | 1.2%   | 0     | 4.8%   | 1     | 1.0%   | 23    | 2.9%   | 1.058   | 0.9%   |
| Total                                       |               | 100.0% |          | 100.0% |       | 100.0% | 103   | 100.0% | 801   | 100.0% | 118.809 | 100.0% |

**Source: City of Cape Town 2011 Census, p44**

The tenure status of most of the households is owned, but not fully paid off at a percentage of 49.9 of the entire population. Those that own dwellings, but not yet paid off stand at 6.8%. Renting is at 11.8% and occupation that is rent free is at 27.6%. This kind of tenure system shows that the majority of Khayelitsha residents live in poverty.

**Table 7: Tenure Status in Khayelitsha**

| Khayelitsh<br>a Tenure<br>System | Black African |            | Coloured |           | Asian  |           | White   |           | Other   |            | Total       |            |
|----------------------------------|---------------|------------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|------------|-------------|------------|
|                                  | N             | %          | N        | %         | N      | %         | N       | %         | N       | %          | N           | %          |
| Owned<br>and fully<br>paid off   | 58.89<br>7    | 50.2<br>%  | 19<br>8  | 40.7<br>% | 2<br>1 | 33.9<br>% | 4<br>0  | 38.8<br>% | 7<br>1  | 8.9%<br>%  | 59.22<br>7  | 49.9<br>%  |
| Owned but<br>not yet<br>paid off | 7.980         | 6.8%       | 69       | 14.2%     | 5      | 8.1%      | 17      | 16.5%     | 12      | 1.5%       | 8.083       | 6.8%       |
| Rented                           | 13.190        | 11.2%      | 126      | 25.9%     | 22     | 35.5%     | 21      | 20.4%     | 63<br>8 | 79.8%      | 13.997      | 11.8%      |
| Occupied<br>rent-free            | 32.659        | 27.8%      | 74       | 15.2%     | 11     | 17.7%     | 23      | 22.3%     | 49      | 6.1%       | 4.687       | 27.6%      |
| Other                            | 4.632         | 3.9%       | 20       | 4.1%      | 3      | 4.8%      | 2       | 1.9%      | 30      | 3.8%       | 8.535       | 3.9%       |
| Total                            | 117.35<br>8   | 100.0<br>% | 487      | 100.0%    | 62     | 100.0%    | 10<br>3 | 100.0%    | 80<br>0 | 100.0<br>% | 118.81<br>0 | 100.0<br>% |

**Source: City of Cape Town 2011 Census, p49**

#### 4.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has provided a historical and geographical background to the research site. The demographic profile, economic profile, dwelling profile and criminal statistics show that it is majorly blacks who reside there, 50% of the population is below 24 years of age, and only 30% of the populations have received an education. In addition, 54.5% of the population live in



shacks, 72.9 % earn less than 3200 Rands per month and the crime rate is so high, compared to other townships like Gugulethu and Nyanga.

The situational analysis of Khayelitsha gives ground for the researcher to establish the most appropriate methodological framework for the research. Therefore, the next chapter provides the methodological approach used in the research.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 5.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter presents the methodology adopted for the study and explains the research processes employed throughout in the study. The methodology of the research is important as it helps draw emphasis on systematic ways of providing answers to research questions and solving the research problem.

The chapter starts with a detailed explanation of the research design. It also presents the sampling techniques, data collection methods, data analysis process as well as the ethical statement that guided the research procedures. The chapter thus intends to provide a strong footing for the subsequent chapters.

#### 5.2 Research Design



A research design is a roadmap used for planning when undertaking a research study (Berg 2001). It ensures that evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial questions as unambiguously as possible (De Vos, Fouche and Delport 2004). The nature of the objectives of the study demands in-depth probing into the attacks against Somali traders in the township of Khayelitsha. This means approaching this exercise without any pre-determined theory, but rather with an open mind to understand these attacks. This further entails that a qualitative research design and methods will be relevant following Creswell's argument that qualitative research methods are better suited for studies that are exploratory, dealing with topics that are new, or where existing theories are limited in the extent to which they can explain the problem (Creswell and Miller 2003). The study, therefore adopted qualitative research methods.

### **5.3 Research Methodology**

There are two major traditions of doing research in social sciences, which are quantitative and qualitative research methodologies (Firestone 1987). Quantitative Research is a form of research that is employed to generate data and transform it into useable statistics; data such as attitudes, behaviours and other defined variables are used as a way of generalizing results from a sample of a given population. Qualitative Research, on the other hand, involves exploration, with the aim of gaining an understanding of the reasons, opinion, motivations for a given research theme. When qualitative research is used, trends in thoughts and opinions are uncovered. The collection methods include the use of unstructured or semi-structured techniques, focus groups, individual interviews, and participation or observations. The sample size is typically small, and respondents are selected to fulfill a given quota.


In this research, the author shall use the qualitative research method, with the aim of establishing the motive and rationale for the attacks on the Somali traders in Khayelitsha. The researcher shall employ primary and secondary modes of data collection.

### **5.4 Sampling Procedure**

Sampling is defined as a fair representation of the population drawn out purposely for obtaining or eliciting information for research problems. According to Stagnor (2011), sampling refers to the selection of people to participate in a research project, usually with the goal of being able to use these people to make inferences about a larger group of individuals. He refers to the entire group of people that the researcher desires to learn about is known as the population, and the smaller group of people who actually participate in the research is known as the sample. A representative sample is defined as a sample that is approximately the same as the population in

every important respect Stangor (2011). The selection of the sample involves selecting a representative group of the Somali traders in Khayelitsha and local people who were involved in dealing with the violent riots between 2006 and 2012.

According to Babbie and Mouton (2004), a purposive sample is one that is selected on the basis of the knowledge of a population and the purpose of the study. Purposive sampling is also used where the participants are grouped by preselected criteria relevant to a particular question. Purposive sampling is usually used on the basis of a theoretical saturation of the data, or a point in data collection when new data no longer bring additional insights to the research questions. According to Given (2008), to engage in purposive sampling, the researcher sees sampling as a series of strategic choices about with whom, where and how the study can be done. In purposive sampling, the subjects are selected owing to some characteristics that they have that are relevant to the study.



For the purposes of this study, purposive sampling method was utilised to select the sample for the study. In this research, the sample selected was Somali traders running businesses in Khayelitsha, local traders of Khayelitsha and local civic leaders. Information obtained from Khayelitsha Administration indicates that the study site has about three hundred Somali traders. A total number of Fifty respondents, involving forty four Somali traders and six people from Khayelitsha who are local leaders and people who were directly or indirectly involved in the study were selected owing to the characteristics that are relevant to the study.

## **5.5 Methods of Data Collection**

For this study, data collection took place from September 2015 to December 2015. The research study utilised both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through the use of

open-ended interviews, focus group discussions and participant observation. Secondary data collection was done through a review of relevant literature which included official documents, books, articles in journals and working papers mainly from libraries and websites.

The collection of both primary and secondary data revolved around the following major themes: (1) Demographic characteristics of the case study area, (2) Nature of violence on Somali traders in Khayelitsha, (3) Rationale for the attacks on the Somali traders in Khayelitsha (4) Organisation of the violence on the Somali traders, (5) the response of police protection to the Somali traders during the attacks. The methods of data collection used were as follows:

### **5.5.1 In-depth Interviews**

Interviews as a form of data collection enable a researcher to attain rich, personalized information (Hancock & Algozzine 2006). To conduct a successful interview, the researcher should firstly, identify key participants with characteristics that show that their knowledge and opinions are vital to the study. The interviewer must give permission to be interviewed and should not be deceived, but protected (Hancock & Algozzine 2006).

According to Hancock & Algozzine (2006), interviews may be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Semi-structured interviews are particularly well-suited for case study research. Using this approach, researchers ask predetermined, but flexibly-worded questions, the answers to which provide tentative answers to the researchers' questions. In addition to posing predetermined questions, researchers using semi-structured interviews ask follow-up questions designed to probe more deeply issues of interest to interviewees. In this manner, semi-structured interviews invite interviewees to express themselves openly and freely and to define the world from their own perspectives, not solely from the perspective of the researcher.

The researcher interviewed Somali traders because they were the centre of the violent riots that took place in Khayelitsha between 2006 and 2012. The setting used for this interview was the place that the Somali traders were comfortable with to offer information. Most of the participants opted for a venue of their choice and in some cases, the interviewees (Somali Traders) requested interviews not to be recorded for fear of victimization despite clarification of the study as purely for academic purposes.

The researcher interviewed forty Somali traders trading in Khayelitsha, many of them victims of xenophobic attacks, two Somali community leaders, two Somali women as a gender balance, although Somali shops in Khayelitsha are predominantly owned and run by men. The researcher interviewed two local community leaders and four Khayelitsha residents in an attempt to get their perceptions on the violence against the Somali traders and their feelings towards the migrant community. In total, the number of participants who were formally interviewed by the researcher is fifty people in number. Somali participants were predominantly male except two female. Most of the Somali participants were also young between the ages of 20 to 35, except two men and one woman who were 45, 52 and 57 respectively.

### **5.5.2 Focus Group Discussion**

Traditionally, focus group research is “a way of collecting qualitative data, which essentially involves engaging a small number of people in an informal group discussion (or discussions), ‘focused’ around a particular topic or set of issues” (Wilkinson 2004). Social science researchers in general and qualitative researchers in particular often rely on focus groups to collect data from multiple individuals simultaneously. Focus groups are less threatening to many research participants, and this environment is helpful for participants to discuss perceptions, ideas, opinions, and thoughts (Krueger & Casey 2000).

The researcher conducted two focus group discussions one with a group of six local leaders and residents of Khayelitsha, and another with ten Somali traders. The researcher's aim of conducting focus groups was to gather more in-depth information on the subject matter and to create a space for a live debate and discussions which he believed could reveal more information that could not come up in the one-on-one interview. Group discussions were also crucial in the sense that they were more open compared to the one-on-one interviews and participants had a greater zeal to speak up in response or addition to the points made by their fellow participants. However its noteworthy to mention that the resercher, in the course of having the focus group discussions, noticed that some participants embraced the ideas of other participants who were active speakers, and therefore were just more or less concurring on their opinions.

The group discussions were held in a suitable, convenient and safer venue of the participants choice, given the fact that the topic was very sensitive. For example, Somali traders preferred a venue in Bellville. This was because the respondents felt Bellville was safer since its dominated by Somalis and also away from the township where they had fears that locals could easily hear the interview conversations and hence felt it was easier to express themselves freely without attracting the attention of the locals.

On the other hand, the Khayelitsha residents' focus group was made up of six participants, including one community leader and one youth leader in an attempt to understand the residents' perception towards Somali traders who are living and trading in their community.

#### **5.5.4 Participant Observation**


According to Hancock & Algozzine (2006), observations are a frequent source of information which may provide more objective information related to the research topic. Unlike interviews,

which rely on people's potentially biased perceptions and recollections of events, observations of participants in a research setting, enables the researcher to get his own version of what is "there". The researcher has to be guided by the purpose of the research, as a focal point in placing the observation into perspective. While jotting down notes, the researcher observed the way the participants expressed themselves, how they perceived the subject under study and how they relayed their experiences to the researcher. It was observed by the researcher that most of the participants from the Somali traders expressed themselves in their mother tongue, to adequately express themselves. The researcher observed that most of the participants spent a great deal of time in furthering their business ambition - in the sense that, to them business comes before anything else. The researcher realized this aspect which he calls 'business first', during his interviews with them. Interviews were interrupted for a couple of minutes or even postponed for another time, whenever they are customers who need attention in the shop, or when there is a business emergency such as , when some items go out of stock and therefore none of the participants were ready to compromise on their business issues.

In terms of the language discourse, what came under the researcher observation was very serious and one that suggests migrant community integration will not be possible anytime sooner. This was in the sense that, whenever a slight mistake arises in the business transactions or misunderstanding, local clients shout out statements like, 'these foreigners must leave', 'they came here to take our money', 'forsake amakwerekwere', 'nizakudubula (*I will shoot you*)' and so forth. When I asked participants about their feelings on such statements, they responded by saying that such statements, does not only make them annoyed but also takes away their zeal of staying and living in South Africa.



The shops of Somali traders that i visited were mostly located in two roomed houses known as RDP house or Mandela House. Also some of the shops i visted were made of informal structures built of iron sheets and boards while others were shipping containers located in peoples yards or municipal land. Almost all shop owners pay rent to local people ranging from R1200 to 5000 depending on the foot trafficking. There are also those which are paying reasonable rent to the local municipality. What was more fascinating and suggesting the level of insecurity that the researcher observed was the defensive mechanisms that have been put in place by the Somali traders in their shops. Almost all shops have a cemented bricks barrier in the entrance covered on top by a strong wire mesh or metal bars just to allow a small gap where customers can beep to see the goods in the shop and get their goods through. A few shops which are walk-through like supermarkets still have their till or money counters build in the same way. The researcher also observed signs of previous gunshots that were still visible either on the doors, the counter, fridges of some shops as well as bullet holes that can be seen on some vehicles as evidence of attacks.



### **5.5.5 Literature Review**

According to Barbie and Mouton (2004), a literature review helps in using the existing body of knowledge to build on a research to ensure that the researcher does a research in a given area. The review of relevant literature enabled the researcher to place the study in a research context, to demonstrate the use of the appropriate theoretical and conceptual framework, while at the same time, addressing emerging issues and concepts surrounding the topic. The literature review focused on literature drawn from academic sources from the library resources; textbooks, journal articles and other online sources such as Academic Search Complete and EBSCO.

## **5.6 Data Analysis and Presentation**

According to Kultar (2007), the mode of data analysis and presentation is important in social research as it provides the platform for interpreting data to understandable information. The analysis of qualitative research is aimed at drawing qualitative inferences as well as providing meaning to information drawn from participants. Responses from even an unstructured qualitative interview can be entered into a computer in order for it to be coded, counted and analyzed. A method of identifying the labeling or coding data needs to be developed that is bespoke for each research. This is called content analysis.


### **5.6.1 Qualitative Data Analysis**

According to Henning, Rensburg, & Smit (2004), the instrument of research in qualitative research is the human mind, which requires the continued process of learning to become a researcher. This process includes the use of interviews, focus group discussions, observations and a review of existing documentation. The major aim of the researcher in qualitative research is to appreciate and understand the situation under investigation primarily from the participants' and not the researchers' perspective. Because of the focus on the participant as the source of data, the researcher becomes the primary instrument for data collection and analysis in qualitative research (Hancock & Algozzine 2006).

Data gotten from the semi-structured interviews were analyzed using thematic content analysis after selecting, arranging and abstracting information from written up field notes and transcriptions of the questionnaires, focus group discussions and interviews. This analysis involved a verbal description of the patterns, frequencies, meanings and relationships as well as similarities and differences of variables. According to Anderson (2007), the thematic content analysis gives a descriptive presentation of qualitative data which depicts the thematic content of

interview transcripts by the identification of common themes in the texts provided by the analysis. For this study, a manual process of analysis was done.

Information in the data was understood through transcription of the recordings verbatim immediately after each interview. All the transcriptions from the data were read, over and over again to establish the picture presented by all the participants. Manual coding was done for all the transcripts and the quotes that emerged through line by line analysis of the data were grouped together to form categories. Themes were thereafter formed through the analysis of the relationships and patterns that connect the categories. The process was reiterated for all the transcripts after which cross analysis of all the transcripts was undertaken, and this helped provide a clear picture of the commonalities in the transcripts. The recurring themes and commonalities were presented in the form of text and narratives in the appropriate section of the research.



## **5.7 Ethical Statement**

Ethical clearance for this research was obtained from the University of the Western Cape's Institute for Social Development (ISD), and the Senate Higher Degree Committee. The research was conducted in alignment with ethical research standards and the legal ethical requirements of the University of the Western Cape. Written permission to conduct interviews with the research participants indicated in the primary data sources (subsection above) was sought from them prior to the meetings. Participation in the research study was voluntary. Research participants were informed that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any point. Where the prospective participant asks for a clearance to be obtained from his/her superior, authority before the interview, the researcher accordingly obliged and obtained the permission from the superior of

the prospective participant. Where necessary, the researcher endeavoured to explain and clarify in advance to participants of this research, the objectives of research in general and the interview in particular. The researcher also endeavored to live by his promise to treat all information provided by participants confidential. In this regard, the researcher ensured that research participants remained anonymous to each other.

Getting information from some South African participants was complicated at first due to the sensitivity of the topic and thus for this reason the researcher had to assure them that his study was purely for academic purpose. Same clarification was also given to Somali participants who were also sensitive to the study, due to safety reasons.

Participants who requested not to be recorded were not recorded in any case, but instead, notes were taken. Participants were allowed to remain anonymous if they wish so.

Finally, participants were requested to fill in the consent forms to ensure that the study has been conducted with their full consent and were allowed to contact the Institute for Social Development, of the University of the Western Cape in case they wanted to confirm the legitimacy of the study. Finally, all participants were fully informed that the study is purely for academic purpose.

## **5.8 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has presented the methodology adopted for the study and explained the research processes employed throughout in the study. The methodology of the research is important as it has helped draw emphasis on systematic ways of providing answers to research questions and solving the research problem.

The chapter has offered a detailed elucidation of the research design. Sampling techniques, data collection methods, data analysis processes and a statement of ethics that guided the conduct of the research has been discussed.



## CHAPTER SIX

### DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

#### 6.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected and attempts a discussion of the analyzed data and fact findings. It responds to the research questions and seeks to fulfill the objectives of the research as espoused in the first chapter of the study.

The main purpose of the research was to establish why there have been numerous attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha. The chapter thus focuses on exploring the foregoing based on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks presented earlier. The following sections comprise (a) qualitative assessment of the results and (b) the causes of the attacks on the Somali traders in Khayelitsha. Finally, a concluding remark of the chapter is provided.

#### 6.2 Qualitative Assessment Results

This section of the study uses the qualitative research methodology to assess why there have been numerous attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha. The study adopted a purposive sampling method to select the sample for the study. In this research, the population involved Somali traders running businesses in Khayelitsha, local residents of Khayelitsha and local leaders. Information obtained from Khayelitsha Administration indicates that the study site has about three hundred Somali traders and other South African traders. A total number of fifty respondents, involving forty four Somali traders and six locals from Khayelitsha were selected. Findings from the qualitative analysis are presented below.

### 6.2.1 Causes of attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha

Several scholars (Crush, 2001; Dodson, 2010, Harris, 2002b; Misago, Landau, and Monson, 2009; Neocosmos, 2008; Sharp, 2008) have indicated that there are a number of causes for the attack of foreign traders in South Africa, which include the poor and ineffective government interventions and the causal factors that contributed to apartheid era unrest. Essentially, these failures contributed to create a perfect storm of lawlessness, poverty, and unfulfilled expectations which has now erupted into violence.

Central to the aim of this study was the assessment of causes of the attacks on the Somali traders in Khayelitsha. The questions asked were designed to ensure that the responses address the research questions of the study with regard to the causes of the attacks on the Somali traders in Khayelitsha. This led to follow-up questions to establish the motive behind the attacks on Somali traders, and secondly, how the Somali traders cope with the attacks.

The researcher asked the respondents to give their responses to the causes of xenophobia in Khayelitsha. In order to understand and analyze the causes of the attacks on the Somali traders in Khayelitsha, respondents were asked about their experiences, attitudes and perceptions of the causes of the attacks. Based upon the information obtained from several respondents, the causes of the attacks were the media, social factors, government attitude and reluctance to act and cultural factors among others. While explaining the cultural factors that trigger xenophobia in the area, one of the participants explained:

*I think the main source of xenophobia has been social transition. The people here see us as being not part of them. They therefore consider getting us out of their culture as the*

*best option, since they view us as those people who have come to corrupt their culture. If this idea circulates around the area, it becomes easy to trigger xenophobic feelings.*

Evidently, the above statement is an indication that the culture of the people of Khayelitsha was not good to the foreigners in the area. The respondents clearly had fear that violence could erupt at any given time because the culture of Khayelitsha people was not good enough for them. This created fear among foreigners, which made them to be worried about their lives.

The findings obtained agree with the findings of Strabac & Listhaug (2008) who found out that collective fear of groups like immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers leads to negative attitudes about such minorities, which in turn can lead to active hostilities, such as ethno violence. Additionally, in line with the findings of this study, Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco (1995) found out that the negative views of immigrants emerge from fears of diminished economic resources, rapid demographic changes, and diminished political influence.

In determining the other factors that could have led to the escalation of xenophobia in the area, the media influence was a major factor. For example, based on the data the respondents of the study, a number of respondents were of the view that the media had a biased role and therefore could trigger xenophobia in the area. The following was the response from one of the respondents of the study:

*The attacks on Somali people have not been extensively covered by the media as some of the attacks go unnoticed, due to the fact that such incidents are not reported as a result of reluctance from the victims who fear for their security. However, the main cause of these attacks I can say are contributed by the media not reporting very important instances of this issue. Despite the fact that attacks on Somalis in the area*



*are almost on daily basis the media ends up reporting different issues which are very far from the truth.*

Another respondent, supporting the above respondent on the bias of the media said:

*I can say the media is basically biased. This is because they report issues which tend to paint the picture of the Somali people as bad and who deserve to be thrown out of the area. Generally i am disappointed by the media in this place.*


It is evident from the above responses that the respondents were dissatisfied with the reporting of the media on issues concerning xenophobic attacks. In support of the present findings, Comaroff & Comaroff (2012) observed that it is hard to establish the poor treatment of immigrants because the available evidence consists largely of sensational media accounts. Other studies suggest a lack of proper understanding and narrow use of the term 'xenophobia'. Polzer (2007) estimated that there are high levels of xenophobia in South Africa based on the facts that 65% of a national sample state that illegal immigration is a bad thing. This has hugely been contributed by the media in the country.

Further, the respondents were against the government attitude in dealing with the xenophobic attacks in the area and the country at large, citing it as a major cause to the xenophobic attacks experienced in the area. Some of the responses obtained in the study are as follows:

*The government's attitude in downplaying the attacks on Somali traders has been a major contributor to the attacks in the area. The Somali traders are continuously attacked in the area despite the cases of attacks being reported to the authorities, and no action is being undertaken by the government to protect the Somali traders. This has made us soft targets of these attacks.*

Evidently, the attitude of the government towards the attacks in the area was a major contributor to the attacks. Since the locals knew that the government could take less action against them for practicing xenophobia, they could go on and put the practice into place without the fear of the government action. The study findings also clarify the findings obtained by Braam and Leigh in (2010) that saw the government being reluctant in adopting anti-xenophobia measures and instead maintained its usual gospel that the attacks were criminally motivated and had nothing to do with xenophobia. Further, Le Roux (2006) observed that the government's attitude in downplaying the attacks on Somali traders led attacks on Somali traders in Masiphumlele in 2005 in which 27 Somali shops were entirely looted and dismantled by angry residents in a mission alleged to be spearheaded by local business leaders.

The respondents, while still showing their dissatisfaction with the government way of handling xenophobia in the area supported this method of the government downplaying the attacks they experienced. One respondent had the following to say concerning the reluctance of the government to take action:



*The government usually downplays the attacks on immigrants and this creates an environment in which such tragic events are likely to surface again in the years that will follow. This continuous looting of property in the area will not end in the near future if the government cannot take action.*

Another respondent added:

*We have seen some instances where the members of the South African Police Service support the looting of Somali shops by failing to take any action against the perpetrators and refusing to investigate the cases we report to them.*

The responses above evidently show that Somali traders of Khayelitsha were not satisfied with the government responses towards xenophobic attacks. Mariette (2006) had earlier noted that the Somali traders were randomly and brutally killed in many of the city's black townships to an extent the former leader of the Democratic Alliance, Tony Leon has described it as an ethnic cleansing. Ironically, Mariette (2006) argued that in response to the attacks, the government downplayed the killings by blaming Somalis for the killings and calling them war people, substantiating it with a single incident in which a Somali national was suspected of attempting to kill an Ethiopian national, similar results recorded by Mail & Guardian (2006). Similarly, attacks on Somali traders in the province have taken place in coloured townships of Varhala Park, Bishop Lavis and Beacon Valley (Matilda 2010). The government again maintained its stands that these were business rivalries between the local and foreign business persons, which were partly due to lack of regulation of the spaza businesses.

### **6.2.2 Reasons for Attacks on Somali**

According to Palmary (2004), Zimbabweans frequently complain that they are targeted by criminals and harassed by the police in Johannesburg and other major cities. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) research in 2004 showed that only 35 per cent of the South African Police Service had received 'some' training on race and discrimination, and that diversity training is largely seen as irrelevant to police work by station commanders (Palmary 2004). The researcher also wanted to know the reasons why the Somali people were attacked in Khayelitsha. The findings of the study indicate that business related issues and criminal activities (insecurity) in the area contributed to the attacks.

Giving the rivalries in the businesses in the area as the reason why the Somalis were attacked, one respondent recorded the following statement:

*We have had business rivalries between the local and foreign business persons for some time now. For me I can say the reason for the rivalry is lack of regulation of the spaza businesses. Therefore the locals see foreigners as one reason why their businesses are not doing so good and therefore end up attacking them either to scare them to avoid competition with them or to get them out of the town completely.*

Another respondent, while describing the rampant cases of crime in the area as one of the reasons for the attacks said:

*Most of the attacks in Khayelitsha by their nature are related to criminal activities. For instance in the last two months, there have been over 20 criminal activities in the area.*

Although the response above reveals that the attacks were not xenophobic, but criminal attacks; the various utterances by residents that Somali traders should go back to Somalia suggests that the attacks were more than just criminal attacks. One of the respondents of the study said:

*I was told when I was attacked that I should start considering going where I came from because I was not part of the community. Next time we come here and find you, consider yourself dead.*

In addition, various respondents commented that on the causes of the attacks, the major cause of the attacks was hatred as the basis for the other causes. One respondent of the study said:

*....we are usually attacked and told by the attackers that the Somalis infiltrate the community and therefore should leave the area.....*


Another respondent added:

*I was attacked by the locals because of what they had seen was happening in Alexandria.*

From the responses given by the respondents of the study, it is clear that the attacks are related to insecurity and criminal activities. In reference to the relative deprivation theory, xenophobia is located at the level of visible difference or otherness that is in terms of physical, biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African foreigners in the country. This only exacerbates the frustration and the isolation into criminal acts on the identified victims. Morris (1998) in support of this argued that Nigerians and Congolese are easily identifiable as the 'other' because of their indigenous languages, they are in general clearly distinct and local residents are able to pick them out and scapegoat them.

### **6.2.3 Response from Local Authorities**

The researcher sought to determine the police response to the attacks on the Somali businessmen in Khayelitsha and established that the police was of no help. Among the responses obtained, one respondent said:



*The police told me, "I can protect you but not your property. Go now before things become bad".*

Another participant reported that the police took them from their shops to the police station; actually assaulted them, and later released them. Here is one of the responses given in the study:

*I was arrested by the police who assaulted me and treated me badly before they released me.*

In reference to the community response to the attacks on the Somali businessmen in Khayelitsha; it was established from the participants that the response was mixed. While some community


members were willing to help; others remained cold towards the Somalis. One participant said:

*We left for you the spaza shops and now you are coming to the taxis; we shall deal with you*

Another participant retorted that the community members used derogatory language like

*“you amakwerekwere you go back to your country”*

From the findings of the study, it is clear that the police did not take the necessary actions to protect the people from being attacked. The findings are in line with the findings of Palmary (2004) who found out that Zimbabweans frequently complained that they were targeted by criminals and harassed by the police in Johannesburg and other major cities. In addition Nyamnjoh (2002), in line with the findings of the present study, found out that African migrant experienced systematic xenophobia in their contact with state authorities, in particular with the police but also with Home Affairs officials and Lindela staff.



Clearly, immigrants are not only stereotyped in the media, they are branded as potential criminals, drug smugglers and murderers by politicians and unreliable figures are bandied around Parliament. The government has also been criticized for its legislation and its focus on reducing the number of immigrants through repressive measures. Palmary (2004) argued that the Immigration Act 2002, for example, gave police and immigration officers' powers to stop anyone and ask them to prove their immigration status

#### **6.2.4 Coping Strategies**

Coping strategy, according to Morris (1998) is the effort, both psychological and behavioural that a person or people adopt to tolerate and minimize stressful events. With regard to the coping

strategy, the study determined that after the xenophobic attacks, the Somalis would re-organize themselves and start business again. One Somali trader had this to say:


*I was first attacked when I was in Alexandria in 2008. I moved to Khayelitsha. These people, who call me brother, again attacked me. I almost lost my life. After, I still got some money and opened this spaza shop.*

Another Somali trader had this to say:

*I was attacked in Kraaifontein in 2008; I moved to Khayelitsha and I was attacked again. I decided to move to Bellville. It is in town, where it is not easy to attack us.*

A third Somali trader said:

*After being attacked in Khayelitsha, I was able to raise money and I bought a mini- bus. I drive passengers; Cape Town- Bellville...*



It is clear from the above that, the Somali traders had a coping strategy which entailed starting a business after the initial attacks; either in Khayelitsha, the place of the attack or outside Khayelitsha. It is only one Somali trader who did not restart a business. The reason was because he did not have money to start the business after his brother had been killed in the xenophobic attacks.


The attacks took on a cycle that was evident after every attack. The cycle was fuelled by hatred from the local community. As a result of the hatred, attacks against the Somali community took on the form of criminal attacks ranging from robbery to looting, to murder to arson, and malicious damage, with little help by the Police. After the attacks had subsided, the Somali traders would cope by starting up new shops; within and outside Khayelitsha. This cycle

repeated itself in 2006, 2008 and 2012 (Weston 2014).

Similarly, according to Mariette (2006), devastating attacks on Somali traders took place in townships such as Gugulethu in 2009 where the Gugulethu Business Forum issued letters to Somali traders to leave the township within seven days allegedly supported by the Anti-Eviction Campaign. In Zwelethemba, Worcester, members of the South African Police Service were alleged to have supported the looting of Somali shops by failing to take any action against the perpetrators and refusing to investigate the case (Matilda 2010). In addition, in May 2009, at least 10 Somali shops were forcefully closed in Town Two, Khayelitsha by a group of 50 local businessmen. The businessmen claimed that they were enforcing a local business agreement executed in 2008 (Mariette 2006). This kind of trend forced Somali traders to start all over again, in a way of coping with the attacks.







**Figure 3 Cycle of the causes and coping mechanism of attacks**


**Source: Own Compilation**

### 6.3 Theoretical Assessment Results

The study used theories to examine why there were instances of xenophobia in Khayelitsha. The theories used were the theory of prejudice, functionalism theory, relative deprivation theory and pathology theory.

#### 6.3.1 The Theory of Prejudice as a Cause

According to Tajfel *et al.* (1971) the theory of prejudice sees people as willing to see their group as better in some way than other groups. Botha (2012) viewed the theory as one which is able to promote positive social identity by comparing the in-group with a relevant out-group. Derogation of the out-group is likely to be the main result. With the objective to measure the theory of prejudice as a cause, respondents were asked to give their views on how they viewed others. Many respondents clearly explained that the locals considered themselves as superiors and have more entitlement to their localities than the foreigners. One Somali had this to say:



*One day, a South African came to buy bread. I gave him the change. He came back after ten minutes, saying that I had not given him his change. I insisted and he said he does us a favour to allow us 'amakwerekwere' to have shop in their good town.*

This is an indication that the developed identity of the South Africans being better than the Somalis because the latter are foreigners, created an identity on the grounds of ethnicity. This identity thereafter raised pressure, which acclimatized into the attacks on the Somalis. For purposes of this study, the ethnicity of the residents of Khayelitsha created the ground for the creation of a social identity on one hand, and the creation of another identity by the Somali traders who are from a different ethnic background. An engagement with this theory has shown

that the role of identity in creating prejudice by the residents of Khayelitsha against the Somali traders is prevalent.

Previous studies (Morris, 1998; Quint, 1999) found that interactions with the police were major sources of anxiety for foreigners. This was confirmed by the participants in the study:

*'If you walk at night, and there are police, [who] saw you, they call you, put you on the wall search your body'.*

Although both men and women were wary of the police, it was the men who felt more anxious about encounters with police.

### **6.3.2 Functionalism as a Cause**

The relative deprivation theory, according to Walker & Smith (1984), refers to the lack of resources to sustain the diet, lifestyle, activities and amenities that an individual or group is accustomed to or that are widely encouraged or approved by the society to which they belong. According to Harris (2002b) when the community does not get to enjoy such entitlements; a potential cause for riots and social movements occurs. In order to assess and to examine the effect functionalism as a cause, respondents were asked to give their views on the state of Khayelitsha town and whether there was any linkage between crime and xenophobic attacks. According to the information obtained, many of them had an opinion that there was a strong linkage between xenophobia and criminal attacks.

The findings from the research and an engagement with the functionalist theory showed that the attacks against the Somalis were criminal in nature. The focus group discussion with the residents of Khayelitsha showed that some people were taking advantage of the tense situation to rob Somalis and claim it is criminal and not xenophobia. In the researcher's view, the criminality

too had a role to play. It showed that South Africans in Khayelitsha were willing to go to lengths of being criminally deviant to show their distaste for foreigners. This is due to the fact that seeing attacks on foreigners in other parts of the country, Khayelitsha residents informed Somali shop owners that they would come attack them at night and loot their shops. One respondent said that:

*My friend... have you heard what happened in Alexandria? Our brothers are taking things from shops there. I am coming to your shop tonight. By tomorrow, it will be mine.*

The results obtained from the study are supported by the findings of Macionis & Linda (2010) who observed that individuals may commit crimes for the good of an individual's group, due to lack of ties, or because the societal norms that place the individual in check no longer have the power to do so, due to society's problems. Additionally, Neocosmos (2010) argued that the political notions of exclusion from the community and the state under apartheid have been transferred to post-apartheid and that xenophobic incidents in the country are as a result of statecraft. In his discussions of what he calls 'Four Theses', Neocosmos (2010) explained xenophobia as a discourse used in the social and political exclusion of some groups, seen or believed to be the 'other', from the community in order for the 'we' to be preserved.

### **6.3.3 Relative deprivation as a cause**

Relative deprivation, according to De La Rey (1991) is an important psychological factor in generating social unrest, arising from a subjective feeling of discontent based on the belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to. When there is a gap between aspirations and reality, social discontent is likely to arise. With the objective to measure the theory of relative deprivation as a cause, respondents were asked to give their views on how three hypothesis

which include scape-goating, the isolation and the biocultural affected them in Khayelitsha. In this regard residents of Khayelitsha stated that the attacks went on because of poverty, income inequality, and unfulfilled promises from the government. One participant stated that:

*The people are poor; that is why they steal from the Somalis... and they steal from everyone... just now, the criminal stole from a South African, because they are poor.... Somalis have a lot of shops and money ... making from our community. If we do not reduce the shops, they will be attacked.*

The evidence of poverty was a factor leading to the attacks of the Somali traders. The Somali traders, as a scape-goat were used as a way of venting frustration. In addition, this hostility can be explained by the fact that the once secluded South Africa was opened up to foreign nationals. Accordingly; one of the respondent stated that:

*Somalis need to go back to where they came from! they must leave our free land.!*

The above statements clearly confirm the existence of scape-goating and the isolation of Somalis in Khayelitsha. These findings obtained are in line with the findings obtained by Tshitereke (1999) who postulated that the socio-economic analysis conceptualizes xenophobia in terms of relative deprivation. Additionally, De La Rey (1991) observed that whenever there is a gap between aspirations and reality, social discontent is likely to arise in the community involved.

#### **6.3.4 Pathology as a cause**

Xenophobia as a pathology is central to any country's national discourse (Quint, 1999). It must be recognized as part of the new nation, and is not separate from South Africa, though it is pathologised within and by the discourse. In order to assess and to examine the effect pathology as a cause, Somali participants were asked to give their views on how they are perceived in the

Khayelitsha community. The individual interviews and the focus group discussion led to the similar reaction when they were asked whether South Africans like their stay in Khayelitsha. One participant retorted that:

*These people are tired of us.... They feel we jump the border and come here to steal their jobs, take their homes, and their rights. We are not wanted here.... There is nothing your research will do to change the situation.*

This response illustrated that the presence of the Somali in Khayelitsha was seen as a negative and unwanted thing that had to be eradicated from the society. This finding was in line with the findings of Hamber (1997) who found out that, xenophobia as pathology was central to national discourse. It is also not a negative consequence of nationalism. Rather, it functions within the culture of violence to give definition to the forms of identity that accompany this discourse. Additionally, Quint (1999) observed that through metaphors of disease, floods and the laager mentality, xenophobia has been pathologized. That is, it is represented as a pathology, as something abnormal and unhealthy. This notion of pathology is strengthened by the phonetic confusion of xenophobia with the psychological phobias.

#### **6.4 Chapter Summary**

The chapter has presented the results of thematic analysis of the transcriptions of interviews with participants on their experiences of xenophobic attacks on them in Khayelitsha. The results revealed that the attacks on Somali traders form a four stage cycle, which is bound to repeat itself. The chapter also presented observations on the nature of attacks, causes of the attacks, persons responsible for the attacks, poor response of the police and the community, and the coping strategies of the Somalis in the wake of the xenophobic attacks. Out of the observations, the

chapter presented patterns, tentative hypotheses and a theory on the research hypotheses. The next chapter presents the conclusions that can be drawn from these results and makes certain recommendations.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

#### 7.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter serves as the concluding part of the study and is divided into three sections. The first section presents a summary of the ethnographic findings from the research, based on the findings of the study; the second section proposes recommendations that are appropriate for addressing the violence against Somali traders in Khayelitsha. The last section provides a relevant conclusion for the study.

#### 7.2 Summary of Findings


The study focused on the analysis of the violence against Somali traders in Khayelitsha. It also examined the relationships between the causes of the violence, the nature of the violence; the perpetrators of the violence; the response of the community, the police and Somali community to the attacks and the coping strategies of the Somali community in the aftermath of the attacks. The foregoing was done using qualitative methods of data analysis in social science research.

The study confirms that the objectives of the research; that is to analyze the attacks against Somali traders in the township of Khayelitsha. The study also reveals that the attacks took on a criminal nature, caused by hatred and perpetrated by the local black Africans with a little help from the police and the local community. It also reveals that the Somalis were easily attacked because of their bio-cultural composition, and their influx in the community. Further the coping strategy for the Somali traders after every attack has been re-opening shops either in Khayelitsha or in other areas.



Considering the completion of the research, findings indicate that participants were chosen using a sampling method to be representative of all the Somalis with businesses in Khayelitsha. All the Somalian participants came to South Africa as refugees fleeing from the war in Somalia. And with the absence of a government's support, refugees resorted to opening up shops in various areas that created their influx in the local communities; to which Khayelitsha is no exception.

The research used thematic analysis to analyze the data in the interviews and an inductive approach was used. The researcher uses four stages; to arrive at a working theory which explains the attacks on the Somali traders. The four stages included; observation of the data and coding it from 25 thematic codes to 7 thematic codes. Thereafter; patterns reflecting relationships between the thematic codes were established and were then used to generate tentative hypotheses. Seven hypotheses were analysed to form four sub theories, which were used to generate the main theory. This mode of analysis was consistent with Yin (2011) and Patton (1990) approach to qualitative data analysis.



Furthermore, the study examined the different nature of criminal attacks and created charts to give a visual depiction of the magnitude of the various attacks. The study examined the number of robberies, murders, fraud, looting, arson, malicious damage, assaults, and shootings. The study also examined the causes of the attacks and found that hatred, patriotism, media influence, community infiltration of Somalis, unemployment and the fight of scarce resources were some of the causes of the attacks. The study found a relationship between the robberies and use of hatred as a cause of the attacks. Most of the participants cited hatred as a reason for being attacked; and being robbed. This concurred with observation reported by Strabac & Listhaug (2008) and Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco (1995).

The study further examined the relationship between the persons who caused the attack and the relationship with attacking Somalis. It was established that hatred was a basis for the prospective and actual attacks and the locals vested their anger of the socio-economic problems like unemployment, poor performance of their businesses and poor service delivery at Somalis in an attempt to isolate them from the community.

It is thus conclusive from the foregoing observations that xenophobic attacks on Somalis Traders in Khayelitsha operate in a cycle that repeats itself. Hatred is the major cause of the attacks on Somali traders by the local community, which are criminal in nature and the black African community takes responsibility. The behaviour of government officers in different departments also displayed acute hatred for the Somalis and as a result, the service delivery of those departments was not satisfactory as observed by Matilda (2010) and Mariette (2006).

### **7.2.1 Conclusion**

The xenophobic attacks on Somalis Traders in Khayelitsha operate in a cycle that has four stages. The study has presented the results of thematic analysis of the transcriptions of interviews with participants on their experiences of xenophobic attacks on them in Khayelitsha. The results revealed that the attacks on Somali traders form a four stage cycle, which is bound to repeat itself. The study has concluded by giving recommendations to the various agencies to deal with xenophobia through an early detection, at the community level and by putting in place proper mechanism and strategies to counter xenophobic attacks.

It is significant to note that although Somali traders and nationals did comment on the poor service delivery by public servants in departments like Home Affairs and Hospitals, this study was limited in scope to attacks on Somali traders and as a result did not conduct research into a

history and operation of government policies and adequacy of legislation on immigration. This research should serve as a foundation for further research; at the doctoral level for the assessment of the history and implementation of government policies and laws on immigration.

### **7.3 Recommendations**

These recommendations are mostly intended for Khayelitsha as the area of focus for the study. While the recommendations may affect other areas, it is not conclusive enough to act as binding recommendations to the rest of the country. There are commendations to the government, local leaders, and justice institutions in line with the research questions posed by this research.

The government should put in place a mechanism where the victims can access justice. This starts from reporting at the police to the investigation and prosecution of culprits in courts of law. This may involve putting in place an Anti-Xenophobia Unit in the police and in courts to deal with xenophobic tendencies before they sprout to crisis level. It must be noted that in many cases, victims of xenophobic violence are unable to access justice. In some instances, the police who are supposed to protect migrants are instead involved in xenophobic attacks. Perpetrators are often not held accountable, which results in a perception of impunity for crimes against foreign nationals. In a number of cases, victims of xenophobic violence are intimidated into dropping charges in return for reintegration or are too afraid to press charges against perpetrators. Perpetrators of xenophobic violence should be accountable by ensuring the cases of xenophobia are investigated and taken to courts of law for adjudication. The communities such as Khayelitsha should have victim empowerment programmes with the aim of identifying victims as a priority and ensuring they access justice (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

In addition to the above, the mechanism should be supported and strengthened across the country with clear written directives through the chain of command within police services on the necessity to co-operate. There is also a need to review the lessons learned from the experience of the large-scale violence of 2008 with a view to strengthening the response capacity and speed of response in the event of actual or threatened violence on a similar scale.


The government should disseminate information and use mass media mobilisation to give information about foreign nationals. The myths that people hold that foreign nationals have taken their jobs, resources should be dealt with. In addition, the government should prioritise the use of its resources to cover issues of unemployment in the country; encourage people to use the informal sector to obtain self-employment. The campaign should include information that addresses concerns around foreign nationals and their documentation as well (Ekaterina 2007).

There should be a deliberate effort by the government to strengthen the ability to detect and respond to threats or outbreaks of xenophobic violence, at the community level as the lowest unit of administration. This can be done through strengthening the detection of xenophobic tendencies by gathering intelligence information from all available sources. Reports should then be channelled to the nearest police station where a unit on Anti-Xenophobia is put up to deal with this intelligence (Hamber & Lewis 1997). This shall go a long way in ensuring that the xenophobic tendencies are checked at the community level.

The media should be objective in reporting information. The information should be balanced at extending information and not incite masses to take on xenophobic tendencies because of the media coverage. Laws should be put in place to regulate coverage and place sanctions on improper, negligent reporting that are geared towards causing mass hatred, as observed by Mail

& Guardian (2006). Likewise, leaders should use their position to advocate for unity and Ubuntu and not to stir up the masses to rise up against foreign nationals.

Fighting Xenophobia should not be left to the police, security and other government agencies only. Government employees particularly those of the department of home affairs should be warned to stop using xenophobic tendencies through threats against foreign nationals, by delaying or refusing to grant them their legal status in some instances, which is in contravention of the immigration law. This may contribute to a public perception that foreign nationals are not protected by the state and can be attacked with impunity. There is a need to improve the accountability of these state employees by strengthening the mechanisms by which those affected (including foreign nationals) can report such abuses or contraventions of the law. This may take the form of a centralised hotline or including the reporting of such concerns via existing mechanisms such as the Presidential hotline on service delivery or to the Public Service Commission.



The Department of Education should use a long term plan to add subjects on xenophobia and social cohesion that will inform learners on the need to tolerate all persons from different walks of life, in the school curriculum. This will help in addressing prejudices at an early age. In many cases, children are involved in xenophobic violence and intervening within schools to address xenophobia is one further way of combating xenophobic violence.

All threats and outbreaks of xenophobic violence need to be acknowledged and condemned by government leaders at the appropriate levels. The Bill of Rights provides for the right to equal protection of the law and the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources, regardless of a person's nationality or legal status in the country. Threats and

outbreaks of violence need to be condemned by all officials and politicians both at local and national government as well as by civil society organizations. This is essential as some perpetrators of xenophobic violence appear to believe they have the tacit support of public and political actors.

There is a need to develop law and policy to address crimes motivated by prejudice. This does not only include xenophobic attacks, but also racist attacks; and other attacks on other vulnerable or marginalised persons in society. The citizens should be made aware that the rights of the individuals have corresponding obligations. These measures shall increase social cohesion and unity by demonstrating that crimes against minority groups will be effectively dealt with. Mechanisms to address hate crimes in other countries include fast-tracking criminal cases through the justice system where prejudice is suspected to be a motivating factor, mandatory enhanced sentencing of hate crimes offenders as well as special mechanisms to report and investigate suspected hate crimes. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the South African Human Rights Commission, and a variety of civil society groups has called on South Africa to introduce specific law and policy on hate crimes. This research should be extended to evaluate the government stand on xenophobia by looking at the government policies, laws and deliberate efforts taken to deal with xenophobia. This will change the perception that public servants have of foreigners.

#### **7.4 Suggestions for further research**

Despite following an exhaustive research method and carrying out rigorous data analysis, however, the study experienced limitations which serve as suggestions for future research as follows:

The study done was limited to Xenophobic attacks against Somali traders in Khayelitsha. Therefore, the scope of generalization is limited to the study area and the population studied. Therefore, the study suggests that other researchers can undertake a similar study in other areas in South Africa, apart from Khayelitsha. Other populations from other countries apart from Somalis can also be studied. In addition, the study used qualitative approaches in data collection and analysis. Therefore, other researchers can undertake a similar study using quantitative approaches.



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## Appendices

### Appendix I: Questions to Respondents

#### **An Instance of Xenophobia: An Investigation into the Violence against Somali Traders in Khayelitsha.**

Dear Respondent,

These Questions are designed to collect information on the above topic. All information received will only be used for academic purpose and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

1. What is the Cause of attacks on Somali traders in Khayelitsha?
2. What are some of the reasons why Somalis are attacked?
3. What is the response from local authorities?
4. How do the Somali traders cope with the attacks?

