

**An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and
Democratic Development Policies: A Case Study of the
National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS)
Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda**

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**Submitted as a requirement for the award of degree doctoral of philosophiae in
Public Administration in the School of Government, Faculty of Economics and
Management Sciences, University of the Western Cape**

November 2011

Supervisor: Prof Lisa Thompson

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled: **An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and Democratic Development Policies: A Case Study of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda** is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other University, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

STUDENT



Mwesigye Edgar Kateshumbwa



DATE: 15/ November/ 2011

ABSTRACT

An Appraisal of the Nexus Between Citizen Participation and Democratic Development Policies: A Case Study of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (Naads) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda

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While the term participation is widely used by development agencies and government alike, its meaning is still widely contested. An emerging consensus on citizens' participation is the active involvement of the people in the planning process, the communication of their preferences, demands, interests, needs, and collective problems and aspirations in relation to those in charge of democratic development policies. For many, particularly in the rural areas, citizen participation has proved problematic as it is often tied up to the implementation of development projects conceptualized and spearheaded by outsiders. Participatory approaches provide few insights as to how to go about resolving the contradictions and paradoxes that participation unveils when introduced into systems with long histories of top-down approaches to decision-making. In Uganda, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government introduced a participatory development programme of National Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS) which entails contracting Agricultural Extension Services (AES). This was done to boost participation, expand coverage and

improve agricultural performance in rural areas. The objective of this dissertation was to analyse elites and grassroots understandings of democracy and citizen participation using the case study of NAADS programme. To achieve this objective, a variety of research assessment criteria – qualitative and quantitative interviews with elites and grassroots – were employed.

The results demonstrate that Uganda has made strides towards encouraging inclusive and meaningful participation through NAADS in Bushenyi district. Yet the research also illustrates that there are salient mismatches in terms of perceptions that exist between elites and grassroots conceptualisations of citizen participation in NAADS. The majority of elites interviewed were concerned with getting NAADS programme right as required by the legislative frameworks, rather than creating ties with grassroots with a view to promoting participatory development and empowering grassroots communities. The grassroots communities exhibited willingness to participate in the NAADS programme, although the research findings illustrate that it has been implemented in a top-down fashion. There is also proof to show that NAADS participants were barely consulted in making decisions and no effective mechanisms are in place to handle complaints inclusively. Although there is evidence to show participation in the NAADS programme improves the socio-economic reality of farmers elsewhere in Uganda, this has not been consistently the case in Bushenyi. The dissertation concludes by underlining the benefits of democracy and citizen participation, but cautions that the findings show that the

discourse on democracy and citizen participation, like any other discourse, contains many practical limits.



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KEY WORDS

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Citizen Participation

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Policies

Programme

Uganda



DEDICATION

Kirsten and Kateshumbwa Family



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ABBREVIATIONS

AEP	Agricultural Extension Project
AES	Agriculture Extension Services
BDL	Bushenyi District Leaders
BDT	Bushenyi District Technocrats
BoP	Balance of Payments
BoU	Bank of Uganda
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CPI	Consumer Price Index
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DC	District Councillor
DDSP	District Development Support Programme
DFID	Department for International Development
DLGs	District Local Governments
DNC	District NAADS Coordinator
DTB	District Tender Board
DTPC	District Technical Planning Committee
EAP	Economically Active Poor
EDD	Empowered Deliberative Democracy
EPG	Empowered Participatory Democracy
ERP	Economic Recovery Programmes
FEW	Field Extension Workers

GDP	Growth Domestic Products
GFG	Grassroots Farmer Groups
GFS	Government Financial Statistics
GoU	Government of Uganda
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IFAD	International Funds for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LCB	Local Competitive Bidding
LCV	Local Council Five
LG	Local Government
LGDP	Local Government Development Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFI's	Microfinance Institutions
MoAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MSEPU	Micro and Small Enterprise Policy Unit
MTCS	Medium Term Competitive Strategy
NAADS	National Agriculture Advisory Services
NPs	NAADS Participants
N-NPs	NON-NAADS Participants
NARO	National Agriculture Research Organisation

NGO	Non-governmental Organisations
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NSO	NAADS Secretariat Official
PAF	Poverty Action Fund
PAP	Poverty Alleviation Plan
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Programme
PMA	Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RCs	Resistance Councils
ROSC	Report On Observance Standards
SAO	Sub-county Administrative Officer
SCR	Sub-County Representative
SFF	Sub-county Farmer Forums
SMSs	Subject Matter Specialists
SNC	Sub county NAADS Coordinator
T&V	Training and Visit
TDSs	Technology Development Sites
ToT	Transfer of Technology
UBoS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UEP	Unified Extension Approach

UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Funds
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP	Uganda National Development Plan
UNFA	Uganda National Farmers Association
UPE	Universal Primary Education
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWESO	Uganda Women's Effort to Save Orphans
VLPA	Village Level Participatory Approach



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION, ORGANISATION AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Introduction

Over the last decade, there has been an increase in studies on democracy and citizen participation in some developing countries of the South. Such studies have provided deeply grounded insights into the meanings of inclusive citizenship (Gaventa, cited in Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010). The studies have also pointed out that citizen mobilisation for democracy is an active process of ongoing engagement and action (Mahmud, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Leach, Scoones & Wyne, 2005; Newell & Wheeler, 2006; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010; Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010; Gaventa & McGee, 2010; Gaventa & Tandon, 2010). The studies have also demonstrated evidence of bottom-up forms of citizen engagement aimed at realising democratic ideals (Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010). In addition, the literature suggests that citizen participation produces tangible benefits by meeting not only the need for citizen 'voice', but also the need for citizen agency and influence (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2001; Mahmud, 2004). All these aspects have contributed towards the understanding of the distances between states and their citizens (Common Wealth Foundation & CIVICUS, 1999).

The assumption is that when citizen participation takes the shape of collective action, it becomes a mechanism for claiming rights based on equal and full citizenship in the modern state, replacing traditional claims based on 'norms, charity, benevolence and patronage' (Gaventa, cited in Coelho & Von Lieres,

2010;Kabeer, 2002). Democracy proposes that participation allows citizens to communicate their preferences, demands, interests and collective problems, thereby improving governance (Mwesige, 2004; Cornwall & Coelho, 2006; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; UNDP, 2003). But entrenching a form of government in which supreme power is vested in the people, and exercised directly by them or their elected agents under a free electoral system, has remained a major challenge in emerging democracies,¹ especially in Africa.

While the notion of democracy is well accepted in both the North and the South (Elster, 1998; Dryzek, 1990; Gaventa, 2006; Cohen & Sabel, 1997; Pateman, 1990; Young, 1990a; Cohen & Fung, 2004; Mouffe, 1992), there is no template for a perfect democracy which has only to be accurately reproduced in order for democracy to flourish (Nyerere, cited in Museveni, 1992). Rather, forms of truly democratic organisation differ from one country to another. Cohen and Fung (2004) and Dahl (1956:4) have observed that rationalising democracy frequently requires compromise, and the various perceptions of the concept of democracy are filled with

¹ The use of the term 'emerging democracy' in this dissertation is chiefly to differentiate between newly-formed democracies such as Uganda and Western democracies such as the United States. For too long, research on democracy has been dominated by experiences of older, Western democracies, and by scholars based in those countries (Gaventa, cited in Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010). In addition, there is also a big difference between the forms and machinery of democracy now operative in countries of Europe and North America, and those of the young states in Africa and other continents of the South. The former have evolved and been developed over many centuries, while the political systems of the latter were destroyed, regardless of whether they were providing dignity and decent living conditions to the people concerned or not (Nyerere, cited in Museveni, 1992).

clashing ideologies. Moreover, emerging democracies typically have weak state institutions.

In the emerging democracy of Uganda, the existing patterns of democracy and citizen participation have been unique in several respects, and the product of a combination of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial governments. According to Mamdani (1997), before independence Uganda was run by decentralised despotism; officials were barely accountable to the population, whom they classified as mere subjects. Even the attainment of political independence in 1962 did not significantly alter the status quo; the first post-independence government ruled by a pact between the colonialists and the Ugandan elites. In the immediate post-independence period, Uganda was wracked by authoritarianism and political instabilities, which encouraged the centralisation of power as a means of suppressing dissent. Successive governments neither allowed citizen participation nor encouraged democracy to flourish. When the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) government seized power in 1986 in a *coup d'état*, it inherited a situation in which the practices of democracy and citizen participation in state affairs were perilous for the majority of Ugandans.

The NRM sought to democratise political life in rural Uganda by introducing all-inclusive government, through elected councils and through embracing neo-liberal political and economic reforms that were inspired by the Washington consensus, driven by the Western super-powers, and promoted by multinational financial

institutions – chiefly the World Bank and the IMF. This, it was hoped, would undermine despotism and promote accountability at the lowest levels of local government. While some of the reforms are ongoing, it is important to analyse whether citizens are familiar with newer reforms that have emerged at grassroots level.² Moreover, given that these reforms have been carried out simultaneously with democratisation (and indeed as part of the process), it is pertinent that an analysis be made of this phase of the Ugandan reform process.

In an effort to research citizenship in action more deeply, this study made use of an Agricultural Extension Services (AES) programme – the National Agriculture Advisory Services programme (NAADS)³ – as a concrete example of how liberal democratic reforms have been not only idealised but also implemented in a participatory fashion at the grassroots level. Hence, the research questions seek to analyse (at the level of both the elite and the grassroots) the understandings of democracy and citizen participation in a grassroots development mechanism prescribed by many multinational development organisations as part of a democratic development style of governance.⁴ Grassroots as a term has been

² The word ‘grassroots’ is used because this dissertation relates to people and society at the local level.

³ In Uganda, the agriculture sector employs over 77% of the population, with 75% of Uganda’s 4-5 million households engaged in agriculture, while 68% derive their livelihoods directly from the agriculture sector (Rwakabamba, 2011).

⁴ It is important to note that the discussion in this dissertation is based on the first phase of the NAADS programme implementation in Bushenyi. The second phase of implementation started in June 2010, after the field study for this dissertation had been carried out. This second phase, implemented under the Agricultural Technology and Agribusiness Advisory Services (ATAAS) framework, is scheduled to run for five years. In this phase, efforts are directed at consolidating

commonly used to address different non-profit and non-governmental movements and organizations acting at the level of ordinary-people (Mitlin, 2004; Castells 1997: 187-188). According to Takada (1985:178), the word grassroots is used to identify ordinary citizens and refers to activities in a broad range of areas, from locality to family, and from county to neighborhood (see Haruno, 2011). The concept has also been linked to development. Grassroots development refers to bottom-up approaches to development. The implication is that control, direction, knowledge and legitimacy are gained from individuals and the communities in which they live and operate (Abdelnour, et al, 2011; Kaufman, & Alfonso, 1997). Kavuja (2007) observes that grassroots refers to the totality of non-state actors at this level. She further points out that both the concepts of community and grassroots, in turn, are equated with the notion of agency, referring particularly to ordinary-people capable of taking actions as members of different social networks (Giddens, 1984:9). In this dissertation, grassroots is understood as the ability ordinary people to act have an impact, which in turn, reflects their communities' positions in collective social systems.

In the neo-liberal development rhetoric, there is a sense of an urgent (even desperate) attempt to stabilise democratic development and bring order out of


increases in productivity, with emphasis on (i) the provision of market-oriented advisory services and value chain development, (ii) creating a foundation for commercialisation through increasing farm household food security, (iii) enhancing commercialisation through supporting various farmer categories at sub-county level, and through nucleus and out-grower schemes; and increasing farm incomes through increased productivity, and the integration of production, agro-processing and marketing.

ambiguity (Berg-Schlosser & Kersting, 2003; Crush, 1995; Mills, 2010; Sen, 1999; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992). This merely confirms that development is an elusive concept, which Sach (1992:1-5) suggests that no attempt should be made to define. In this study, no exact definition of development or the theory of development is provided. The dissertation draws on the writings of Booth (1985), Binder (1986), Crush (1995), Edwards (1989), Hunt (1989), Mathur (1989) Sutton (1989), Corbridge (1990), Hettne (1990), Slater (1990), Manzo (1991), Kay (1993), and Schuurman (1993), among others. Much has been written on the theme of what development is, what it does, and how it can be better implemented (Toye, 1987; Kothari, 1988; Norgaard, 1992; Alvares, 1992; Pottier, 1992; Hobart 1993; Moser, 1993). Rather than asking what development is (or is not), or how it can be more accurately defined, better theorised, or substantially practised, this dissertation is focused on a different kind of question; namely, how do the elites and grassroots in emerging democracies understand certain neo-liberal democratic mechanisms – inspired by the Washington consensus, driven by the Western super-powers and promoted by multinational financial institutions –

For example, the AES NAADS programme was established by the Government of Uganda (GoU) to boost participation. Such participation was aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and profitability, and shifting production from low-value staples to higher-valued commodities,⁵ so as to liberate the rural citizens from the shackles of poverty. The programme is participatory in nature; it embraces liberal

⁵ See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the NAADS programme.

democratic ideals such as citizen participation. The programme is a micro-level development strategy, and its use in this dissertation is that it may be examined as an experiment on the part of government to demonstrate the effects of controlled participation aimed at development at a practical level. At the same time, analysis of the NAADS programme assists in generating new knowledge about elites' and grassroots' conceptions of participation, in relation to their rights and their actual, daily-lived experiences in spaces of engagement aimed at development.⁶ This helps to link the debate on democratisation in the South to democratic development (or the possibility thereof). This dissertation thus links democratic principles such as citizen participation to the NAADS development programme. Such an analysis has not been carried out before in the Bushenyi District of Uganda.



Bushenyi District was created in 1974, out of what was then Ankole District. Between 1991 and 2002, the counties of Rushenyi and Kajara were carved out of Bushenyi District to form Ntungamo District. During the course of the research for this dissertation, Bushenyi District underwent tremendous change.⁷ During 2010, four more districts (Sheema, Ruhinda, Buhweju and Rubirizi) were excised from Bushenyi. The district has a total population of 246 400, with an anticipated population of 251 400 by 2012 (see Appendix C). Like the rest of Uganda, Bushenyi has not escaped the burden of poverty (see Appendix E). In the 2002/3 financial

⁶ The study was based on interviews using semi-structured and open-ended questions with elites, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In all, 360 participants contributed to the findings.

⁷ Bushenyi is located in the south-western part of Uganda. District headquarters are 317km by road from Kampala (the capital of Uganda).

year, Bushenyi introduced the NAADS programme to the citizenry, with the aim of extending agricultural services so as to greatly boost participation and increase agricultural productivity.

The major reason Bushenyi district was selected for this case study is that agriculture is the main economic activity, and there are many small-scale producers engaged in a wide range of crop production, with the aim of increasing household income and food security, thereby promoting socio-economic development. Bushenyi district is relatively successful,⁸ and the researcher is familiar with most of areas where the NAADS programme is being implemented. In addition, the present model of development at local government level in Uganda is premised on the primacy of local citizen participation, defined as the organised effort to increase control over resources and regulative institutions by communities; by Ugandan standards, Bushenyi is considered to employ 'best practice' in this regard. This chapter states the justification for this study, and then sets out the objectives that inform the dissertation. It goes on to outline the methodology used, followed by the layout of the dissertation, and finally a summary of the dissertation's structure.

1.2 Justification for the dissertation

The rationale for undertaking this dissertation is informed by four considerations. Firstly, in Uganda, *all-inclusive* participatory democracy emerged post-1986, when

⁸ See the 2000 Participatory Poverty Assessment Process Bushenyi District Report, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.

the current government took over. Yet despite the 'emergency' participatory democracy, engagement with the state and some of the programmes it has initiated is still hardly noticeable. In fact, in some rural communities (such as in Bushenyi), aside from voting⁹ and very rare protest action,¹⁰ *all-inclusive* citizen participation in development programmes remains undetectable.¹¹

Secondly, citizen participation has proved problematic, more so when inspired by the Washington Consensus policies, as stated previously (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). For example, contracting out agricultural extension services (for example, the NAADS programme) was a participatory strategy promoted by the GoU to expand agriculture coverage and improve its performance in rural Uganda. To that end, Uganda replaced its public extension service delivery with contract extension

⁹ The results released by the Electoral Commission for the 2011 presidential elections indicate that of the 13 954 129 registered voters, only 8 272 760 voted, representing 59.28%. A total of 5.6 million registered voters (40%) didn't turn up to vote.

¹⁰ It should be noted that protest as a form of participation has been witnessed recently, mainly in Kampala and a few other urban areas; for example, the Walk to Work Protests in April and May 2011, because of the increase in the prices of consumer commodities and fuel. The culture of protest is completely non-existent in the rural areas of Uganda.

¹¹ Some of the leading newspapers, such as *The Daily Monitor* and *The New Vision*, have consistently demonstrated the difference in the nature of participation between urban and rural dwellers in Uganda. For example, in urban centres it is the unemployed – mainly the youth, and a few civil society activists – that would be involved in protests against escalating food and fuel prices as a form of participation, while the elites working in offices remain instinctively trapped by the fear that participation in such protests would cause them to lose their privileges. On the other hand, participation in rural areas relates to popularity coupled with material possessions. Those with financial resources have bought their way to offices of power; the financially challenged have remained subordinates and objects of administration manipulation. Their participation is restricted mainly to voting and (in rare cases) attending community meetings as a form of participation, as opposed to urban centres where there is an emerging trend towards protest.

services under the NAADS programme (Oleru et al, 2005). However, citizen participation in this agricultural extension through NAADS remains barely visible¹² in relation to the programme objectives.¹³ In fact, Rwakakamba (2011) points out that in Uganda, the agriculture sector employs over 77% of the population, with 75% of Uganda's 4-5 million households engaged in agriculture, while 68% derive their livelihoods directly from the agriculture sector (see also UBOS, 2003). However, given the huge sums of money pumped into the NAADS programme, all-inclusive participation is still sorely lacking (Rwakakamba, 2011).¹⁴

¹² It was envisaged that NAADS would establish six families whose farms would act as demonstration centres, for the other citizens in the same parish to emulate their farming techniques. Assuming that six families are selected from each of the 64 parishes, the implication is that in the end, participation in the programme would be carried out by 384 families; statistically, this equates to 0.001% of the entire projected population of Bushenyi District. Such statistical representation suggests that all-inclusive participation is still a far-fetched hope. In fact, informal consultations before empirical data collection demonstrated dissatisfaction among some individuals, who pointed out that the programme favoured those with large land holdings.

¹³ See *The Daily Monitor*, 8 March 2011. The National Agricultural Advisory Services rewards a few high-performing farmers, but its reputation has been badly damaged by the fact that the NRM used it in what was widely seen as an exercise in electoral bribery. See also *The Daily Monitor*, 25 May 2011: Redesign NAADS-Luweero LC5 boss. In this news paper article, Abdul Naduli (LC5 boss) points out that the NAADS project has failed to meet the people's demands at grassroots level, due to poor design which only benefits the elites who work as co-ordinators and end up mismanaging and abusing the entire project. He also called for the project to be redesigned to have services brought directly to the farmers, bypassing the middle-men and the few elite who have positioned themselves to profit from poor farmers and the youth. He observes: "I will not entertain a situation where a few elite continue abusing the NAADS project under the guise of guidelines... these people use these guidelines to suffocate the local farmers who need the services."

¹⁴ Participation in the programme has been marred by the low levels of education of the beneficiaries; corruption at sub-county level; embezzlement of funds; provision of substandard agricultural inputs; and lastly, a programme seemingly more top-down than bottom-up.

Understandably, agricultural extension services around the world do continuously undergo major transformations in both structural set-up and approach (Oleru et al, 2005). This has been attributed to the criticism that public extension systems are not delivering and are not relevant (Bukenya, 2010; Rivera & Gustafson, 1991). This pressure to improve performance and deliver results has given rise to calls for changes to traditional public extension delivery systems, which are seen as top-down, inflexible and subject to bureaucratic inefficiency (Rivera et al, 2000). As a result, Uganda proposed to transform its public agricultural extension service delivery alongside its other socio-economic policies. Essentially, public sector extension delivery was replaced by private sector advisory services operated on a contract basis; farmers' institutions were to contract the extension service providers to do specific assignments, and NAADS was to co-ordinate service provision to farmers under this contract approach (Oleru et al, 2005). According to Oleru et al (2005), NAADS was to develop demand-driven, client-oriented and farmer-led service delivery, particularly targeting the poor.¹⁵ However, little was known about the contract extension system in the developing world, and in Uganda in particular. Instead, NAADS was to build on its experience and lessons learnt as it spread across the country (Oleru et al, 2005). Yet Hagmann et al (1999) remind us that before any actual work is started, extension workers need to work with communities to identify their needs and find ways to address them.

¹⁵ The NAADS strategic framework and the Constitution of Uganda state clearly that the people should be the driving force of national programmes, and decentralisation should be the mechanism through which citizen engagement is achieved.

Thirdly, though the term 'participation' has become part of the everyday language of many development agencies, it is not clear exactly what they mean by it (Pretty et al, 1995; Sachs, 1992). Contrary to what is considered normal practice in rural development, people's participation is not limited to stakeholders attending meetings, or contributing their labour to the implementation of projects designed by officials (Oleru et al, 2005; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992). Genuine participation entails the active involvement of the people in the planning process, enhanced by their interaction with experts through educational methods that increase the influence that participants can exert upon the programme planning process (Douglass & Sicilian, 1997; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Oleru et al, 2005). Hence, privatised extension can only offer improved services if it is able to deliver according to the participants' diverse requirements (Oleru et al, 2005; Chapman & Tripp, 2003). In fact, the degree to which extension provision in contract farming responds to farmers' priorities is a function of the distribution of power (Oleru et al, 2005).

Farmer involvement in priority-setting helps to generate needed support in improving efficiency and quality of service provision (Scarborough et al, 1997). Client-based and client-controlled approaches are better positioned to serve the needs of specific target groups, notably those of disadvantaged groups (Schmidt, et al, 1998). In fact, for an innovation to be accepted and adopted, it ought to be relevant to the peoples' need, conform to the existing system, and potentially capable of enhancing people's income status (Erbaugh et al, 2001; Addo et al, 2001).

Yet this seems not to be the case with the NAADS programme. Worse still, the advocates of participatory extension approaches provide few insights into how to go about resolving the contradictions and paradoxes that participation throws up when introduced into a system with rigid structures and a long history of top-down approaches to decision-making (Douglah & Sicilian, 1997; Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008).

Fourthly, the Ugandan government claims to use the 'best practice' in sub-Saharan Africa on local government issues, respecting democratic principles; in practice, undemocratic tendencies abound (Riruako, 2007) – for instance, inadequate citizen participation in programmes; officials unconstrained by accountability; elite capture of the decentralisation process; and lack of information available to constituents, due to the absence of proper local institutions.¹⁶ This raises concerns about how the whole notion of citizen participation has been assimilated and put into practice.


There has been an upsurge in advocacy for *all-inclusiveness* in development in countries of the South, without the necessary interrogation as to whether the rural recipients of such development prescriptions understand and are able to meaningfully utilise the prescribed mechanisms for their betterment. Hence the need for an analysis of the perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in development programmes – in this case, NAADS. This dissertation, being

¹⁶ Some of the findings from the case study allude to the differences between claims and reality described, especially concerning the elite capture of decentralisation processes and the lack of accountability. See for example the challenges to participation in Uganda described in Chapter 3.

exploratory in nature, provides insight into the extent to which elites and grassroots understand participation in relation to development mechanisms prescribed by development agencies, using the prototype of the NAADS programme.

1.3 Objectives of the dissertation

The major objective of this dissertation is to analyse elites and grassroots understandings of citizen participation within prescribed democratic development mechanisms – such as the agricultural extension service prototype, which formed part of the NAADS programme in Uganda. In order to achieve this objective, the dissertation:

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1. Develops an analytical framework using selected discussions on the liberal perspectives of democracy and citizen participation as these are incorporated into development strategies designed by governments;
 2. Analyses the literature on democracy and citizen participation in Uganda as an emerging democracy;
 3. Introduces an agricultural extension service prototype of NAADS as a national programme born in an emerging democracy where citizen participation is ostensibly a key priority; and

4. Analyses and draws conclusions on the perceptions of both elites and grassroots regarding democracy and citizen participation in purportedly democratic development initiatives, drawing on the case study findings.

1.4 Methodology of the dissertation

A variety of research assessment criteria were employed in this dissertation to overcome the weaknesses arising from the use of a single method, and also to ensure accuracy and objectivity. The justification for the use of various methodologies is that research in social sciences is very broad, and encompasses different processes, approaches, principles, strategies, assumptions and techniques to arrive at a conclusion. In fact, a host of authors has pointed out that the use of various methodologies in research increases the credibility and validity of the results (Cohen & Manion, 1986; Altrichter et al, 1996; Denzin, 1978; Babbie & Mouton, 2001; Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000; Davids et al, 2005; Mouton, 2001; Wood, 2001b). Both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies have been combined - in this case, not merely to validate findings, but also to achieve innovation of conceptual frameworks (Flick, 2004). It is argued that this strategy often leads to multi-perspective meta-interpretations (Olsen, 2004).

In summary, I applied a literature review, the case study methodology, and interviews.¹⁷ Qualitatively, the analytical framework was developed using the concepts of democracy and citizen participation based on a review of the relevant literature on both. Thereafter, I carried out qualitative interviews with individuals categorised as elites. In addition, a quantitative analysis was conducted with randomly-selected grassroots communities, using a survey instrument that was deployed in five selected sub-counties of Bushenyi in order to analyse the democratic development mechanisms they employed in using the NAADS programme. The analysis was done using the Statistical Programme for Social Sciences (SPSS). The following section discusses the methodological design in detail.

1.4.1 Construction of analytical framework

As previously alluded to, studies on democracy and citizen participation have been performed in many developing countries of the South (Ake, 2000; Estrella & Iszatt, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003; Koelble & Lipuma, 2008). However, these studies barely capture whether the recipients of such liberal democratic ideals understand the contestation inherent in such discussions juxtaposed to their relevance to development, especially those in the rural communities of the developing countries of the South. Many authors point that developmental state is the apparatus which embodies such developmental ideology (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Ashton et al,

¹⁷ Johnson and Reynolds (2005) suggest that interviewing is an excellent form of data collection when dealing with individuals who are deeply involved in the political process. They further claim that “it often provides a more comprehensive and complicated understanding of political phenomena than other forms of data collection, and it provides researchers with a rich variety of perspectives”.

1999; Wade, 1990; Masaki 2006; Castells, 1992; Chang, 1999 2010; Thompson, 1996; Marwala, 2006; Woo-Cumings, 1999). The concept of development state was popularized by Johnson (1982) in his analysis of the rise of Japan and its critical role in strategically guiding the nation's economic growth, at least between 1955 and 1985. Johnson (1982) argues that in a developmental state, the political elites aim at rapid economic development and give power and authority to bureaucracy to plan and implement efficient industrial policies (see also, Masaki, 2006; Ashton, et al 1999; Marwala, 2006 and Onis, 1991). He further points out that those state-driven industrial policies are developed and implemented with cooperation between the government and private enterprises (Johnson, 1982).

The above observations are concretized by Chang (1999: 183) who underlines that 'economic development requires a state which can create and regulate the economic and political relationships that can support sustained industrialization - or in short, a developmental state'. Castells (1992:56) in the same vein, points out that a state is developmental "when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy". However, Castells (2000:284) clarifies that for developmental state, economic development is not a goal but a means because to become competitive in the world economy is the way of surviving as a state and thereafter, economic development becomes only a way of asserting national interests in the world.

In the light of the above, Woo-Cumings (1999: 2) points out that a developmental state is often conceptually positioned between a free market capitalist economic system and centrally planned economic system, and called a plan-rational capitalist system, 'conjoning private ownership with state guidance' However, according to Bolesta, (2007), positioning the theory of developmental state between a liberal open economy model and a centrally planned model suggests its being neither capitalist nor socialist in texture. Loriaux, (1999:24) reminds us that the developmental state is an embodiment of a normative or moral ambition to use the interventionist power of the state to guide investment in a way that promotes a certain solidaristic vision of national economy'. The notion of the developmental state, in the African context has been linked to certain practical policy framings that will be explored in this thesis. For example, the NAADs programme itself is a form of increasing the commercial ability of poor rural farmers through subcontracting agricultural extension services. The vision of the developmental state's role is one of multi-tasking, undertaking effective participatory planning while leaving sufficient space for private and civil society actors to engage freely in the developmental process. At the same time, the developmental state in the African context will need a firm grasp of the socio-politico-economic and cultural situation of its citizens to make adequate development strategies while taking into account the internationally agreed development agenda. The practical realisation of the "developmental state", in encouraging *all-inclusive* socio-politico-economic and cultural development, forms part of the discussion in this dissertation.

As part of the analytical framework of this study, both international and national discussions on democracy and citizen participation are reviewed, so as to establish whether there is a relationship between the theory and what the elites and grassroots understand by such discussions. This dissertation traces the intellectual progression of the concepts of both democracy and citizen participation, to inform the reader about the most relevant discussions concerning both disciplines in light of the major research objective. In constructing the analytical framework, I focus on two areas. The first deals with the debates around democracy, with emphasis on deliberative or discursive democracy; participation and participatory governance; empowered participatory governance; an examination of the emergence of democracy in Africa; an assessment of democratising development in Africa; and lastly, scrutiny of the dialectical relationship between democracy and good governance, with an emphasis on Africa. The second part examines citizen participation in terms of the development discourse, with emphasis on the necessity for greater citizen participation; invited and invented spaces in institutions of government; and critiques of participatory development strategies. This analysis of the concepts of democracy and citizen participation was chiefly to establish how both concepts have been conceptualised and understood at international level, mainly in the context of emerging democracies. All the discussions above are presented in Chapter 2 of the dissertation.


1.4.2 Case study methodology

Heng-Yu et al (2008) point out that the case study has a long history in the field of research. In this study, the case study method was employed mainly because it is best suited to developing a reasonably detailed description of a 'subject', in this case citizen participation in the NAADS programme in Bushenyi district. The particular need for a case study arose from a need to comprehend complex social, economic and political activities; and also the need to examine such activities on a more practical level, as suggested by Creswell (1998; 1994), Merriam (1998), and Yin (2003). Case studies consist of in-depth interviews (Seidman, 1998) and repeated focus/support groups (Krueger & Casey, 2000; Morgan, 1993; 2002). These interviews help to establish contemporary phenomena within a real life context, and expose the boundaries between phenomenon and context that in many cases are barely visible (Yin, 1994).

Indeed, many publications on research methodology suggest that case studies are directed at understanding the uniqueness and distinctiveness of a particular phenomenon in all its complexity (Gall, Borg & Gall, 1996; Johnson, 1992; Stake, 1994; 1995). For example, Merriam (1998) states that case studies are appropriate when one wants a rich, descriptive understanding of in-depth experiences. In addition, Lahman and D'Amato (2006) observe that case studies convince the reader and make clear the complexity of the case. Heng-Yu et al (2008) also contribute to the

discussion by mentioning that if one wants the reader to understand how life is for the participants, then the case study offers a compelling story.

Moreover, case study research involves the detailed study of a unit, which is naturally bounded by the people, place, or experience involved, and may be bounded by time (Stake, 1995; 2005). Similarly, Bushenyi consists of one group of people, living in the same place and bound together by time and experience. However, it should be noted that this dissertation is not a positivist attempt to isolate and reduce the number of variables that can be identified as determinants of citizen engagement in an emerging democracy; instead, it uses a social-political perspective to analyse popular perceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme.




Therefore, a broader understanding of the specific context is important in order to go beyond mere universalised socio-economic generalisations. Indeed, using the case study methodology provides an analysis and explains the interrelations among politics, institutions and choices at societal level. In fact, there exists a dialectic or reciprocal relationship between institutions that structure political and economic activity, and the synchronised attempts of society to influence these institutions to serve their interests. Therefore, I opted for case study methodology chiefly because it lends itself to dealing with a wide variety of evidence – documents, interviews and observations – and relies on different types of variables that make it possible to triangulate data. The following section details my methods of data collection.

1.4.3 Interviews

Four categories of interview were prepared, as shown in Figure 1 below. The first three categories of semi-structured interviews were aimed at recording the perceptions of individuals categorised as elites in this dissertation – namely, (i) government officials (Members of Parliament, Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries and NAADS secretariat officials), (ii) political party leaders (Forum for Democratic Change and National Resistance Movement),¹⁸ and lastly (iii) Bushenyi District leaders (district councillors, sub-county representatives, district technocrats) – on their perceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme. The reason for this categorisation is that the NAADS programme was developed at national level and executed through a decentralised framework, and the selected elites had contributed to the planning and eventual implementation of the programme. The other side of the coin is category (iv): structured interviews using a questionnaire that was given to 311 selected grassroots respondents, whether participating in the NAADS programme or not. Figure 1 below summarises the structure of the interviews in terms of category, type of respondents and number of participants. Their responses are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation.

¹⁸ Political party representatives were incorporated mainly because of conflicting perspectives, especially on the current governments' development programmes, which in many cases have been politicised.

Figure 1 Structure of interviews



1.4.3.1 Elite interviews (Semi-structured interviews)¹⁹

Elite interviewing, in this case, involved interviewing respondents in an individualised manner, as suggested by Johnson and Reynolds (2005) using face-to-face questioning of the respondents. This kind of data collection method was chosen because of inadequate research material available on local rural conditions. Bearing this constraint in mind, I scheduled several interviews with authoritative informants. The interviews were carried out with government officials, representatives of selected political parties, and Bushenyi district leaders. The purpose was to examine their perceptions of their participation in the programme, so as to gain first-hand information on various aspects of participatory forms of engagement. Although the interviews were flexible, they still addressed the pre-formulated themes of the

¹⁹ In this case, elite interviews were preferred, because the researcher in the first case did not have sufficient understanding of events to be able to design an effective, structured survey instrument in the form of a schedule of questions suitable for elite respondents. I was more interested in the interviewees' own interpretation of events or issues, and did not want to lose the valuable information that elites possess by unduly constraining their responses.

dissertation. Rubin and Babbie (1997:387-389) claim that consultation with authoritative sources of information is an important research tool for exploratory studies.


I took note of the strengths and limitations in the application of the principles of democracy and citizen participation in programmes, thereby deriving a concrete guide to the construction of the measuring instrument. This was informed by Berg's (1998:25) attestation that operational definitions concretise the intended meaning of a concept in relation to a particular study, and provide some criteria for measuring the empirical existence of the concept. In this way an agreement is reached on what the different concepts mean, and how they relate to each other – and how they are applied in practice. The study (being exploratory in nature) also employed quantitative forms, using a survey instrument developed and deployed among grassroots in the five sub-counties, as described in the following section.

1.4.3.2 Grassroots interviews (Structured interviews)²⁰

In this case, a questionnaire was developed and issued to participants who were requested to offer their perceptions on the NAADS programme. Half the grassroots participants were participants in the NAADS programme, and the other half were not. The questionnaire comprised a mixture of open- and closed-ended questions. This method was employed as a data-gathering tool because of Babbie's (1998:264)

²⁰ The detailed methodology of grassroots interviews is discussed in after the introduction of Chapter

claims that in order to capture the insider's perspective, the most appropriate strategy is that which is less formally structured and flexible enough to align with the interests of the respondents. Bailey (1996:174) supports this argument, and notes that questionnaires are more flexible and can probe for specific responses, resulting in increased response rates. In addition, the interviewer is present to observe non-verbal behaviour and to assess the validity of the respondent's answers; there is better control over the environment, including aspects such as noise and privacy; the question order can be maintained; the responses are spontaneous; only the respondents can answer questions; and a questionnaire ensures that all questions are answered. More importantly, as Bailey (1996:174) points out, the complex questions can be probed further in an interview situation by a skilled, experienced and well-trained interviewer.



Nonetheless, even with a structured interview schedule one cannot claim with certainty that all the responses obtained are valid. Gochros (1988:269-273) and Bailey (1996:175) identify certain weaknesses inherent in such an interview technique. They hold the view that by standardising interview schedules, the results achieved often represent the lowest common denominator in the assessment of people's attitudes, orientations, circumstances and experiences. By designing questions that will be at least minimally appropriate to all respondents, one may lose what is most appropriate to some respondents. Another objection is that interviews cannot guarantee anonymity. Respondents may potentially feel threatened, particularly if the information sought is incriminating, embarrassing or otherwise sensitive in

nature (Bailey, 1996:175). However, participants in this dissertation were assured of the strict confidentiality of the information they volunteered to the research assistants. As a result, there was a significant response rate to all the questions relating to their conceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme.

1.4.4 Data analysis and presentation

For the semi-structured interviews with elites, their responses are narrated, and in some instances quoted verbatim; the dates when such observations were made are explicitly noted. The analysis of these interviews appears in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. The structured interviews contained a range of quantitative responses, grouped into thematic categories. All the data from questionnaires was coded, processed, and analysed using SPSS® for Windows 2007. Descriptive statistical analyses of data were carried out to obtain information regarding the frequency distribution of biographic information (occupations, age, and educational level); perceptions of economic conditions; and details of participation in the NAADS programme.

Descriptive statistics and frequencies were categorised in groups and summarised in the form of tables and graphs. In some cases, cross tabulations were made to assess the degree of correlation between variables. However, according to Clare (2003), presenting data in critical social sciences research poses particular issues. She argues that unlike interpretive or analytic research, critical research requires that data is not just presented as individual interpretation, but must demonstrate the discursive

relationship between interviewer and interviewee (Clare, 2003). Furthermore, she states that the data must also demonstrate outcomes such as potential for actual social change (Clare, 2003). In a nutshell, data must demonstrate dialogic relationships between the insights into some of the variables under investigation.

1.5 Dissertation overview

The dissertation is composed of two parts. Part I is based on an extensive literature review, in which the theoretical approaches to democracy, citizen participation and the NAADS programme are analysed. This takes up Chapters 1 to 4. Part II of the dissertation builds on the conceptualisation developed in Part I, and develops an empirical study for the Bushenyi District illustrating elites and grassroots understanding of democracy and citizen participation as development mechanisms prescribed from the development perspective. Part II consists of Chapters 5 to 7. The individual chapters are described in more detail below.

Chapter 1: provides an overall context for the dissertation and the topic researched. The first part sets the background and lists the objectives of the dissertation. The second part outlines the methodology developed and deployed to achieve the objectives of the study.


Chapter 2: forms part of the analytical framework of the dissertation. The chapter is split into two. The first part is a discussion on democracy, while the second tackles citizen participation from the development perspective. On the understanding of

democracy, the chapter points out that it is a political concept, concerning the collectively binding decisions about the rules and policies of a group, association or society that are consensually deliberated. The chapter further shows that decision-making is actually under the control of all members collectively, considered as equals and embracing principles of popular control and political equality that form the guiding thread of democratic audit in a world of free, congenial political interactions.

In the second part of the chapter, the discussion on citizen participation is limited to the development perspective point of view. It makes evident the need for greater citizen participation in community activities and in development programmes or projects. For instance, in emerging democracies, new mechanisms of promoting more active citizen engagement in the processes of governance have been established through the creation of new, decentralised institutions, so as to harness a variety of participatory and consultative processes in national and global policy deliberations. There has also been increasing emphasis on using such mechanisms to support the inclusion of the poorest social groups – those who do not usually have sufficient resources to influence the outcomes of traditional policy processes. The questions of how citizens (especially the poor) express voice with influence, and how institutional responsiveness can be ensured, has been taken into account.

The chapter also discusses some of the criticisms levelled against participatory development strategies. It demonstrates how the dominance of multinational agencies and funders is to be found just beneath the rhetoric and practices of

participation, which casts doubt on the enduring decision-making control held by agencies and funders – there is an emphasis on ‘participatory’ practices which obscures the many limitations and manipulations that suppress local power. The discussion also reveals that entering poor countries from rich ones and working with locals to ‘develop’ their country economically, politically, and socially is inherently fraught with complexity. For example, allowing public participation in decision-making processes appears to fix multiple problematic elements of such processes – for a time; perhaps partly because participatory development projects have to be sold to donors and institutions, where overstatements of the utility of participatory process are routinely made.



Chapter 3: gives an account of the trajectory of democracy and citizen participation in Uganda, dating back from pre-colonial times to after independence. The discussion links the impact of colonialism to the existing citizen participation patterns, and lists the major political, economic and cultural forces in Uganda’s history that influenced the capacity of Ugandans to participate in their own governance through public debate. It demonstrates how nebulous colonial policies constrained participation in pre- and post-independence Uganda, coupled with structural factors such as poverty, an illiterate majority of people in rural communities, and language barriers. The chapter also notes how the formation of a public sphere with a national character has been obstructed; first by the nature and philosophy of indirect rule, and later by the factionalism and chaos that characterised post-independence governments.

Chapter 3 also demonstrates how participatory politics in Uganda were popularised by the NRM government after they reinstated constitutionalism in 1986. Citizen participation gained significance in the constitution and other legislative documents, and was placed at the very heart of the system of local government. The Constitution of Uganda (1995) emphasises democratic principles (as seen in Section II). The chapter also shows how development agencies (mainly the World Bank and the IMF) have played an instrumental role in advocating citizen participation, and have embraced methods of citizen participation in the implementation of their policies; for example, making citizen participation a condition for reporting formats. But there are certain elements that continue to impede citizen participation; notably, the militarisation of politics, and the resultant fear generated; political patronage and impunity from consequences; corruption and electoral commission misconduct; elite capture; insufficient pecuniary aptitude; lack of accountability and transparency; and lastly, repetitive local government disagreements.

Chapter 4: provides an entry point to the National Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS), as a programme born in an emerging democracy. The chapter commences by historicizing the development of Agriculture Extension Services (AES) as a nexus for citizen participation in Uganda, as part of ongoing development reforms. Thereafter the chapter introduces the NAADS programme, which was adopted by the government of Uganda in 2001/2002 and subsequently established in various districts. Through the focus on the NAADS programme, the chapter accounts for

principles relevant to the thesis, the programme's organisation and co-ordination; and lastly, relevant components and activities. The intention of the discussion on the NAADS prototype is not to judge the performance of the programme as a success or failure in terms of achieving development; but rather, to assess popular conceptions of democracy and citizen participation in the programme. This chapter acts as a preface to Chapter 5, which focuses on analysing the elite's conceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme, considering its assumed participatory nature.

Chapter 5: reports on experiential information obtained from the interviews carried out with respondents categorised as elites. The majority of the elites interviewed acknowledged that there was sufficient citizen participation in the NAADS programme. They point out that the participation experienced denoted elevated levels of ownership among the participants, and also yielded development. The elites also believe that the NAADS programme was positioned within the democratic arena, and that the ideals of citizen participation were deeply rooted in it. However, their belief seems to be sieved through a range of predefined ideological categories, under the guise of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. They seemed to be more concerned with getting the NAADS programme right, as required by the NAADS Act (2001) and conceptualised in the NAADS Report (2000), rather than with creating ties with the grassroots or promoting participatory development and empowering grassroots communities.

Chapter 6: assesses the conceptions of grassroots respondents (311 in total), of whom half (155) were NAADS participants (NPs) and the other half (156) were Non-NAADS Participants. The chapter uses quantitative data from a questionnaire that was distributed to participants in the five sub-counties of the Bushenyi district. The picture that emerges from the discussion is of a rural population that shares a similar basic pattern of understanding of citizenship attitudes. It shows evidence of willingness to participate in the NAADS programme, but also reluctance. This reluctance is based on the fact that the programme has been top-down, though disguised as bottom-up; and the elites have failed to extend and popularize the programme, and involve a greater proportion of farmers.

The chapter show that NPs were rarely consulted in making decisions, and there are no substantive official mechanisms or processes for handling the complaints of participating farmers. Such aspects are major obstructions to participatory development. Although there is evidence of improvement in the material reality of farmers after participating in the NAADs programme elsewhere, based on the data of Benin et al (2007), this is inconclusive in relation to Bushenyi, particularly in attitudinal terms. The NPs' belief in NAADS efficacy in Bushenyi was low. In fact, the majority of the NPs believed that NAADS officials were only "fairly qualified" and "very unqualified" in terms of their competency and efficacy. Yet, despite this doubtfulness, the NPs participated in anticipation of the programme improving their material reality. The chapter concludes by stating that participatory development as

officially described by NAADS remains somewhat rhetorical compared to how it has been implemented in Bushenyi.

Chapter 7: revisits some of the major arguments of the dissertation. In summary, the chapter states that citizen participation in an emerging democracy reinforces the notion that struggles for human rights are fundamental to development. It notes that the dictatorship, corruption, structural inequality, injustice, marginalisation and exclusion often evident in emerging democracies (Uganda being no exception) are conducive to the emergence of democracy, which seeks to employ the instrument of rights in the struggle to eliminate injustices. The literature cited in the analytical framework resonates profoundly with the need for citizen participation at grassroots level, though it is recognized that much more is required to be done to achieve an understanding of broader trends of participation. From a theoretical perspective, it is notable that Uganda has taken strides in embracing participation in its development agenda.

The chapter also acknowledges that participatory politics and representative democracy have become popularised at both national and international level, making way for more inclusive and deliberative forms of engagement between citizens and the state. It demonstrates how emerging democracies have endeavoured to encourage inclusive and meaningful participation in national programmes such as NAADS, especially in poor, rural communities such as those of the Bushenyi district. Yet these developments have not necessarily resulted in meaningful participation by

the indigent. Exclusionary tendencies linked to political party affiliation, the elites' failure to sensitise the rural communities about development programmes, poverty, insufficient knowledge of constitutional entitlements, fear emanating from a long history of dictatorship, and corruption at institutional level have proved detrimental to democracy and citizen participation.

The chapter states that the majority who occupy rural areas are in many cases not active participants; rather they are mere recipients of government's pre-designed programmes, and their presence in some cases is for symbolic purposes. Borrowing from Friedman (2006:3), the chapter points out that citizen participation in government is not when governments create formal mechanisms to ensure it, but when they develop attitudes and institutions accessible to citizen action. Friedman (2006:14) further observes that the lack of participation of the poor in formal structures is not due to the inability of the poor to represent themselves on these platforms; in fact, inability to participate lies in the capacities expected of participants in structured participation exercises. Their inability to engage with technical issues makes the forums in which the voices of the poor are to be heard even more difficult, even if their issues do get to the table. Friedman (2006:14) points out that if policy is to reflect grassroots preferences, their voices need to be heard, in conversation with each other, in open, democratic processes with those who command power and wealth. The chapter in conclusion states that democracy and citizen participation have been acclaimed for bringing participatory development policies to an end. However, just as other bold claims have been discounted in the

past, so too it must be realised that democratic development and citizen participation, like many other discourses, contain within them their own limits.

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter summarised the character and focus of the dissertation. Existing patterns of democracy and participation in Uganda are unique in several respects, and are also a product of both colonial and post-colonial governments that were barely accountable to the population, and rife with authoritarianism and political instabilities, which encouraged centralisation of power as a means of suppressing dissent. Accordingly, participatory democracy in Uganda emerged only after 1986, when the NRM government seized power through a *coup d'état*. The chapter notes that citizen participation has proved problematic; more so when inspired by Washington Consensus policies and spearheaded by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.


For example, citizen participation in the agriculture extension programme NAADS remains barely visible. The chapter notes that there has been an upsurge in advocacy for all-inclusiveness in development in countries of the South without necessarily an interrogation into whether the rural recipients of such development prescriptions understand and can use the prescribed mechanisms meaningfully for their betterment. While the term 'participation' has become part of the standard vocabulary of many development agencies, its definition is not clear (Pretty et al, 1995; Sachs, 1992). Contrary to general practice in rural development, people's

participation is not limited to stakeholders attending meetings or contributing their labour to the implementation of projects designed by officials (Oleru et al, 2005; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992). Democratic participation entails the active involvement of the people in the planning process. As a result, participants can exert upon the programme planning process (Douglass & Sicilian, 1997; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Oleru et al, 2005).

On one hand, democracy grafted onto liberalism provides the procedural and institutional guidelines by which individuals may determine their social affairs – based, of course, on the ideal of freedom for the individual (Kymlicka, 1989). Freedom rights are located at the individual level of analysis rather than the collective (Hughes, 2005). However, democratic institutions alone are not sufficient to guarantee the freedom of the individual, when it is recognised that democracies can behave illiberally if the majority of individuals chooses to do so (Lynn-Jones, 1996: xxxii; Owen, 1994:153). On the other hand, participation has a long history; and over the decades, its philosophy and methods of citizen involvement have been well documented (Ziegenfuss, 2000; Filipovitch, 1999; Nisbet, 1999; Sennett, 1991; Kotler, 1969; Morris & Hess, 1975).

Indeed, citizen participation has been discussed in reference to justice, education, policy development, city planning, environment and telecommunications (Rosenstraub, 1987; Farrell, 2000; Fischer, 1993; Zotti, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Donecq, 1998). There is even more attention paid to the few fields of participation that are as

yet unexplored; and in each field, there are underlying assumptions about common processes and benefits (Thomas, 1995; Box, 1998). Many administrators and politicians are interested in increasing public participation in public decisions (Ziegenfuss, 2000). Yet there is considerable evidence to suggest that their efforts are ineffective (Crosby et al, 1986; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; 1987). Sometimes this is due to poor planning or execution. Other efforts may not work because administrative systems that are based upon expertise and professionalism leave little room for participatory processes (Parsons, 1990; De Leon, 1992; Fischer, 1993; White & McSwain, 1993; King et al, 1998).



Nonetheless, these efforts towards public participation have filtered into major development institutions and governments' development policy documents, and have led many authors to refer to a shift in the development paradigm. And while some argue that a 'second generation' of reforms should be implemented, for others, the fundamental problems associated with the 'Washington Consensus'-inspired policies are not being solved by new generations of reforms. Such problems result from a tendency to subordinate social policies to economic policies, and to disregard the notion that it is citizens who should choose what economic and social institutions they prefer (Ocampo, 2004:3).

For some, this implies the recognition by major multinational development agencies (particularly the World Bank and the IMF) of past failures, and is seen as a positive shift away from both market-led and traditional top-down and centralised

approaches, and towards an 'alternative' or emergent approach. For others, however, this incorporation implies the loss of the radical perspective, in particular the so-called alternative approaches (Cammack, 2002; Gardner & Lewis, 2000; Kothari & Minogue, 2002). As Ocampo asks, is this so-called 'new consensus' an indication that the development agenda is in fact changing (Ocampo, 2001)? The issue of the depth of the new democracy and citizen participation consensus is complex, and by no means uncontested. Therefore, in Chapter 2 an effort is made towards clarifying what is meant by these catchwords and the expectations that they raise. A careful analysis of democracy and the citizen participation rhetoric incorporated into the mainstream development dictionary illustrates the diverse meanings associated with these concepts. Hence, Chapter 2 fleshes out the meanings and conceptual understanding of the concepts as part of the analytical framework. The chapter also reviews their definitions, stated advantages and objectives, and critically assesses them as operational and policy tools. It also assesses the extent to which such practices are being implemented, the challenges faced during their implementation, and the promises associated with them.

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

2.1 Introduction

Over time, different liberal perspectives on democracy and citizen participation have proliferated, and have subsequently been linked to development. For this reason, this chapter does not aim to present a chronological overview of democracy and citizen participation discourses; but to highlight how (and to what extent) contemporary debates are conditioned by certain theoretical assumptions that have a long and uneven history. Some scholars have pointed out that democracy is a result of citizen participation, while others have observed that citizen participation promotes democracy (Saul, 1994; Dahl 1956; 1989; Beetham, 1994; Houtzager et al, 2007; Collier & Levitsky, 1997).²¹ The relationship between democracy, citizen participation and more inclusive models of development is not straightforward and remains uncertain (Robino, 2009; Kymlicka, 1989; Hughes, 2005; Lynn-Jones, 1996: xxxii; Owen, 1994).²²

Some scholars have noted that both democracy and authoritarianism lead to development. However, in this chapter I argue that democracy and citizen

²¹ However, it is also important to understand the factors affecting the environment and the macro context in which democracy and citizen participation is intended to occur.

²² Roodt (2001) is concerned with the way in which certain groups and individuals monopolise power and development resources at local level, excluding other groups and individuals from participating. See also Fox and Aranda (1996), Leach et al (1999), McEwan (2005), Molyneux (2002), Pozzoni and Kumar (2005) and Schönwälder (1997) for similar observations.

participation are synonymous, and that they resonate profoundly with issues of governance and accountability.²³ Furthermore, the concepts of democracy and citizen participation can only be gathered from experiences borrowed from elsewhere; and there is no template for a perfect prototype of democracy that can be accurately reproduced in order for democracy to flourish (Museveni, 1992). In fact, democracy and participation cannot be separated from the broader issues of political economy that contextualize the potential of participatory development to be transformative (Robino, 2009).²⁴ On exploring the literature, one finds that democracy, citizen participation, and good governance (now incorporated into the mainstream development lexicon) have very diverse meanings associated with different visions of development (Mohan & Stokke, 2005; Phillips & Edwards, 2000; Schönwälder, 1997; Robino, 2009). Thus, this chapter seeks to provide an overview of the concepts of democracy and participation by reviewing their definitions, stated advantages and objectives; and by critically assessing their utility as operational and

²³ The researcher is aware that the mechanisms of democracy are not the meaning of democracy: they are merely a means to an end. The researcher is convinced that people must be able to choose those who govern them freely, and the government must be responsive to freely-expressed views through a political machinery which people can understand and use when it makes sense in terms of their own cultures, and which is accessible within the framework of their own income and educational levels.

²⁴ For democracy and citizen participation to transform formal democratic institutions, institutionalising a more inclusive model of development, it must be stressed that such political agency and processes are reliant on conjunctural conditions that must be investigated (see for example Mohan & Stokke, 2005; Phillips & Edwards, 2000; Schönwälder, 1997). The 'consensus' established regarding democracy and citizen participation is thus deep and complex, and by no means uncontested. It is clear that for change to materialise, democratic theory and practice must go well beyond the mere prevalence of this new terminology (see also, Robino, 2009).

policy tools. The chapter also assesses the extent to which such participatory developmental practices are being implemented, and the challenges faced during their implementation.


The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part interrogates the various conceptions of democracy, with emphasis on deliberative/discursive democracy, participation and participatory governance, and empowered participatory governance. It also examines the emergence of democracy in Africa, and then links democracy to governance and development debates. The second part examines citizen participation from the development perspective. It illustrates the necessity for greater citizen engagement, then discusses participation within invited and created spaces in institutions of government; and lastly, it critiques participatory development strategies.



The intention behind analysing the concepts of both democracy and citizen participation is to assess the extent to which such practices are being implemented, the problems and challenges faced during their implementation, and the promises associated – mainly in the context of emerging democracies. It is also imperative to point out at the onset that the chapter will not provide a more exact definition of democracy and citizen participation, or a theory which attempts to verbally model the real-world process of democratisation and its recurring crises and bottlenecks; rather, it highlights some of the liberal democratic understandings on democracy and citizen participation, to demonstrate their assumed relationship to development.

2.2 Interrogating the myth of democracy²⁵

Democracy is not intended to be efficient, linear, logical, cheap, the source of absolute truth, manned by angels, saints or virgins, profitable, the justification for any particular economic system, a simple matter of majority rule or for that matter a simple matter of majorities. Nor is it an administrative procedure, patriotic, a reflection of tribalism, a passive servant of either law or regulation, elegant or particularly charming... the key to its secret is the involvement of the citizen. (Saul, 1994)



This quotation from Saul (1994) epitomises what is often meant by the contemporary conceptualisation of democracy as used in this chapter. To begin with, democracy in its early conception was generally linked to the ancient city-states of Greece (McQuido-Mason et al, 1994:16; Catt, 1999:5). Recently, some authors have discussed democracy with reference to justice, education, policy development, city planning, environment, neoliberal market forces, political parties, and social movements (Rosenstraub, 1987; Farrell, 2000; Fischer, 1993; Zotti, 1991; Cohen, 1995; Donecq, 1998). The ancient Greek word *demokratia* may be broken down into *demos*, meaning 'the people', and *kratos*, meaning 'authority' or 'rule' (McQuido-Mason et al, 1994:16; Catt, 1999:5). *Demokratia* in ancient Athens advocated equality, but what remained

²⁵ The origin of democracy is a 'false story' or sacred narrative explaining how various nations in the world came to be in their present form. However, the definition offered is unequivocally incongruous to its practicability in the real world – even in Greece, to where the origins of the concept are traced.

ambiguous was the type of equality; especially where pressing matters requiring collective action met conflict from different parties and identities (Warren, 1999). The literature on democracy suggests that the Athenians had realised certain aspects of equality as desirable characteristics for their political system; that is, the right of all citizens to speak in the governing assembly (*isegoria*), and equality before the law (*isonomia*) (Dahl, 1989:14).

These high-flown ideals cherished by Athenians were often considered to be characteristics of democracy during the first half of the fifth century, when the people (*demos*) steadily gained acceptance as the sole legitimate authority in making rulings. 'Democracy', or 'rule by the people' also gained ground as the most appropriate term for the new system (Dahl, 1989:14), though the new term did not pass smoothly into the public domain. It attracted a range of mild adversaries, such as Aristotle, who disliked the idea and argued that the expansion of democracy necessarily gave power to the poor, and Plato, an outright opponent who condemned democracy as rule by the unfit, advocating instead the perennially appealing system of government by the best qualified (Dahl, 1989:14). Even after the 15th century, various commentators continued to offer various interpretations of democracy.


During later times, other trends came and went while the world tried to define and rationalize democracy (Catt, 1999; Dahl, 1956; Id21, 2007:1). For example, the collapse of communism resulted in our current contextualised understandings of

democracy, meaning equality of representation and recognition of opposition politics – although this understanding contains many conceptual deficiencies (Shapiro & Hacker-Cordon, 1999; Dahl, 1999; Tobin, 1999). As Storm (2008:215) observes, “with hundreds of different definitions of democracy in use, it has almost become impossible to gauge what is meant by the term when applied in the academic literature, unless the author specifies exactly what democracy denotes in the publication in question”. While agreeing with Storm’s observations, Dahl (in his book, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*) points out that “it is anomalous, perhaps, that after so many centuries of political speculation, democratic theory should continue to be – if I am right in my basic assumption – rather unsatisfactory, whether the theory be regarded as essentially ethical in character or essentially an attempt to describe the actual world” (1956:1). Indeed, understanding the concept of democracy since the cold war, while trying at the same time to realise it, has proved problematic – especially in communities considered to be emerging democracies.

Some observers suggest that the concept of democracy is still in its ambiguous state. But prominent scholars such as Beetham (1994), Dahl, (1956), Storm (2008), Koelble and Lipuma (2008), Houtzager et al (2007), and Collier and Levitsky (1997) have conclusively stated that democracy is a situation in which there are free and fair elections; in which basic civil liberties are respected and protected; and in which the cabinet has effective power to govern. For instance, Beetham (1994) suggests that democracy is a political concept concerning the collectively binding decisions made about the rules and policies of a group, association or society. He further points out

that such decision-making is actually subject to the control of all the members of the collective, who are considered equals; that is to say, democracy embraces related principles of popular political control and political equality which form the guiding thread of democratic audit.

Beetham (1994:30) separated the process of popular control over government into four distinct (though overlapping) dimensions. The first and most basic of the four dimensions is the election of parliament or legislature and the head of government. He shows that the degree or extent of popular control is there to be assessed by such criteria as: its inclusiveness; its *fairness* between parties, candidates and voters, and the range of effective choice it offers; and lastly, its *independence* from the government of the day and so on (Beetham, 1994:30).



The second dimension of analysis concerns what he refers to as open and accountable government. He points out that besides popular elections, continuous accountability of government directly to the electorate – through public justification for its policies, or indirectly, to agents acting on people’s behalf – is essential.

The third dimension is of guaranteed civil and political rights, or liberties. Here, Beetham states that the freedoms of speech, association, assembly and movement, the right to legal process, and so on, are not something specific to a particular form of democracy called ‘liberal democracy’; they are *essential* to democracy, since

without them no effective popular control over government is possible (Beetham, 1994).

The fourth and last dimension is civil society. Beetham (1994) points out that the nexus of associations through which people organise independently to manage their own affairs, can act as a channel of influence upon government and a check on its powers. However, he acknowledges that this is a contestable dimension of democracy – not only because the criteria for its assessment are much less well formed than for the other three areas, but also because there is room for disagreement as to whether it should be seen as a necessary condition for democracy, or even as an essential part of it (Beetham, 1994:29). While Beetham's four dimensions are insightful, they can only be realised in an environment where they can unreservedly be interpreted without looking at them as mere democratic ingredients, to be added or left out on a whim. Instead, they ought to be considered an inviolable recipe for social, political and economic transformation.

Though Beetham's dimensions still hold currency in their abstract form, Collier and Levitsky (1997) offer another form of analysis which separates democracy into six categories, namely: non-democratic, electoralist (ED), procedural minimum (PM), expanded procedural minimum (EPM), prototypical conception of established industrial democracy (PCEID), and maximalist. From these categories, Collier and Levitsky (1997) develop four significant, underlying conceptual benchmarks from which democracy can further be contextualised: RCE, or Reasonably Competitive

Elections – devoid of massive fraud, with broad suffrage; BCL, or Basic Civil Liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and association; EP: Elected governments have Power to govern; and lastly, AF: Additional political, economic, and social Features associated with industrial democracy (Collier & Levitsky, cited in Storm (2008:217)).

The forms of democracy suggested by Beetham and Collier and Levitsky and explained above, and those suggested by other scholars such as Storm (2008), Koelble and Lipuma (2008), and Houtzager et al (2007), are universally acknowledged. In addition, a host of authors have acknowledged that democracy takes various forms which favour deeper forms of engagement by citizenry, and contain important but often implicit assumptions about strategies and political choices (Dahl, 1956; Dryzek, 1990; Elster, 1998; Gaventa, 2006). For instance, Dahl (1956:1) points out that ‘there is no democratic theory – there are democratic theories’, and states that democratic theory is concerned with the processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders. Dahl (1956:3) candidly admits that such a minimal definition can easily be translated into a variety of equivalent statements to interpret its relevance. This dissertation selectively utilises the conceptual frames of (i) deliberative/ discursive democracy; (ii) participation and participatory governance; and (iii) empowered participatory governance. These conceptual framings are linked to the liberal notions of democracy that encompass ways on how to organize the political and economic life

of the state (Catt, 1990). The following section discusses the various framings, and links these to liberal democratic theory.

2.2.1 Discursive / deliberative democracy

With reference to a book titled *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by Elster (1998:1), the idea of deliberative democracy (or decision-making by discussion between free and equal citizens), as well as its practical implementation, is old as democracy itself. For instance, during the 5th century, Pericles (in his eulogy to Athens) said, "...our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for unlike any other nation, we regard the citizen who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless..." (Thucydides, II.40, cited by Elster, 1998:1). Such observations of Athenian democracy were viewed by Elster (1998) as the start of a tendency to debunk discussion through sophistry or demagoguery. Democracy by deliberation was viewed both positively and negatively; some people argued that it would improve decision-making (Elster, 1998), while others have said that it would lead to bad decisions (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999; Dahl, 1999; Tobin, 1999). The notion of deliberative democracy is largely influenced by the philosophical works of Jurgen Habermas and was later propounded by theorists such as Dryzek (1990; 2000), Gaventa (2006) and Cohen and Sabel (1997), among many others; their ideas suggest that democracy revolves around the transformation of preferences, rather than simply their aggregation.

Dryzek, in his book *Discursive Democracy: Politics policy and political science*, describes how discursive democracy looks forward to a world of free, congenial, political interaction, where politics – properly understood – is returned to its Aristotelian primacy in the order of things (1990:ix). In addition, “...more immediately, discursive democracy charts escapes from some contemporary impasses in political arrangements... which are currently beholden to instrumental and objectivist notions about rationality and human affairs” (Dryzek, 1990:ix). While such claims still feature prominently, Cohen and Sabel (1997) and Dryzek (2000), cited in Gaventa (2006:17) point out that discursive democracy encompasses scenarios in which citizens address public problems by reasoning together about how best to solve them. They observe that the ambitious aim of deliberative democracy, in short, is to shift from bargaining, interest aggregation, and power, to the common reason of equal citizens as the dominant force in democratic life. Elster’s voice on the same subject cannot be ignored; she states that the notion of deliberative democracy involves collective decision-making, with the participation of all who will be affected by the decisions of their representatives (1998:8). However, more recently, Gaventa (2006:17) suggests that deliberative democracy emphasises the nature and quality of deliberation that occurs when people come together for discussion and debate in public spheres.


2.2.2 Participation and participatory governance

The agitators for deliberative democracy call for collective decision-making, whereas those for participation and participatory governance, in the same vein, call for equal

engagement with citizens in the process of governance with the state, so as to deepen democracy (Gaventa, 2006:15). Scholars such as Ackerman (2004:447) have pointed out that "...the best way to tap into the energy of society is through 'co-governance', which involves inviting social actors to participate in the core activities of the state... to exit solutions based in market theories, or to 'voice' solutions grounded in 'co-production' social protest or consultation". These claims have been substantiated by Cohen and Fung (2004), who indicate say that "...citizens should have direct roles in public choices or at least engage more deeply with substantive political issues and be assured that officials will be responsive to their concerns and judgment". There has been criticism of this oversimplification of the whole notion of participation as part of governance (Crosby et al, 1986; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; 1987). For instance, participatory governance may be subject to abuse and easily captured by elites, and thus less meaningful (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Christens & Speer, 2006; Williams, 2005; Hickey & Giles, 2004). Houtzager (2003) suggests that proponents of participation have a naive view of power, and that participation has failed to deal with the hard politics of party building and mobilisation of demands, thus enabling weaker forms of participation to be easily captured and co-opted by neoliberal agendas.

These criticisms of participation and participatory governance have been countered by recent research done by Estrella and Iszatt (2004) in their book *Beyond Good Governance: Participatory democracy in the Philippines*, as cited by Gaventa (2006:17). Estrella and Iszatt analysed how citizens combined and used a number of different

participatory strategies to engage in and occupy an emerging democracy in a small, imitative project known as the 'BATMAN', which later grew into a movement of NGOs, people's organisations, social movements and progressive local officials, loosely known as the Barangay-Bayan Governance Consortium (BBGC). According to Gaventa (2006:17), this is one of the largest organised consortia working on participatory local governance anywhere in the world. The BBGC argued for 'dual power' within local governments through strategies of collaboration and partnership, while also maintaining strong community-organising strategies at grassroots level (Gaventa, 2006:17). These reports suggest that participatory democracy can work in legal frameworks, and facilitate the operation of a community and its elected representatives in decision-making.



2.2.3 Empowered participatory governance (EPG)

The third related but equally important approach to deepening democracy focuses on the citizen empowerment/participatory governance nexus. Following this approach, Fung and Wright (2003:5) state that empowered participatory governance (EPG) relies upon the commitment and capabilities of ordinary citizens to make sensible decisions through reasoned deliberation, as cited by Gaventa (2006). Furthermore, Fung and Wright (2003:5) point out that "[a]n empowered participatory governance orientation is based on principles of bottom-up participation, starting with a pragmatic orientation to solve concrete problems while at the same time, seeking to foster deliberation in which participants listen to each other's position and generate group choices after due consideration". To substantiate

their observations, Fung and Wright (2003) developed a set of properties for empowered participatory governance that incorporate (i) a focus on devolution; (ii) co-ordination and supervision by a strong central body, to ensure quality and diffuse learning; and (iii) an attempt to harness state power, and a realisation of the importance of countervailing forms of power which help to open public spaces and ensure they are not captured by existing power holders (Gaventa, 2006:19).

As the democratic dimensions offered by Beetham (1994) did not escape criticism, Fung and Wright (2003:33), in turn, offer some criticisms of their own model; among other aspects, (i) the risk of elite domination or capture; (ii) the scope for decision-making being limited by external actors and conditions; (iii) newly-empowered institutions falling prey to rent-seeking behaviours; (iv) the risk that devolution may balkanise the polity; (v) the chance that participation may demand unrealistically high levels of popular commitment; and lastly, (vi) the difficulty in sustaining such experiments over a long period. Not surprisingly, many writers who have examined the emergence of new forms of governance have not been wholly convinced of the capacity of those forms to deliver outcomes that challenge current trajectories, or to provide for a sustainable future (Lawrence, 2004).

Therefore, while one might question the ability of rural citizens to become engaged participants in the new arrangements from a position of social disadvantage (Gray & Lawrence, 2001; 2004; Cheshire & Lawrence, 2004), one in which many in rural and regional areas experience social isolation, exclusion and deprivation, and where

environmental problems remain largely unsolved, others have embraced this change as representing a genuine attempt to give them a voice and to achieve action in development matters (Lawrence, 2004; AFFA, 1999). In summary, the three models of liberal democracy discussed (discursive/deliberative, participatory governance, and empowered participatory governance) are among many 'discussions' that concretise our theoretical understanding of democracy and how it has been conceptualised at a more practical level. The same discussions form a benchmark for gauging how the elites and grassroots understand democracy and citizen participation, especially in emerging democracies. It is important to point out that theoretically, the analysis of democracy as a concept (and in its practical application) is an exhaustive field, and not all the debates can be covered in this chapter. However, the same liberal democratic models described above serve as a foundation for understanding how some theorists have constructed and conceptualised democracy.

2.3 The emergence of democracy in Africa

Since the drive to democratise Africa is ongoing, it is essential for this dissertation to briefly touch on that phase of Africa's transition. The search for the meaning of democracy in Africa has been relatively short in terms of written analysis. Some scholars have seen democracy as a trophy handed to certain Africans after attaining their independence in the 1960s, while others have openly stated that the conceptualisation of democracy has not properly entered popular discourse in Africa, especially where languages do not contain direct a semantic equivalent (Ake,


2000; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998). To authenticate their observations, Rose et al (1998) note that in some cultural interpretations the word changes its meaning in translation, sometimes even signifying consensual constructs like community or unity. However, Bratton and Mattes (2001) argue that contrary to the theory of cultural interpretations, the standard liberal ideas of civil and political rights lie at the core of current African understandings of democracy.

In a study carried out by Bratton and Mattes (2001) from 1999 to 2000, in six selected countries of Africa (Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Namibia and Zambia), the authors report how the various Africans understood the meaning of democracy, in their own words. Firstly, with few exceptions, their survey respondents attached a *positive* value to democracy. For example, more than nine out of ten (92%) believed that democracy was a public 'good' that would make conditions 'better' in some way; fewer than 1% saw democracy as 'bad' in any way. This small minority thought that democratic reforms brought elite corruption, conflict among social interests, or 'confusion' in political life. The remainder (8%) saw democracy in neutral terms, usually as a 'change of government' or as 'civilian politics', without implying that a new regime would be any better or worse than its predecessor (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:109).

Secondly, their findings indicate that the respondents understood democracy in *procedural* as well as *substantive* terms. They point out that such findings run counter to much of the scholarly literature, which paints democratisation in Africa as a quest

for equal social and economic outcomes (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:109). They also noted that such portrayals are often accompanied by criticism, for instance that procedures such as constitutional reform and multiparty elections are mere formalities. Yet in defining democracy, their findings also illustrate that almost seven out of ten of our survey respondents (69%) refer to political procedures such as the protection of human rights, participation in decision-making, and voting in elections; while fewer than one in five (17%) refer to substantive outcomes like peace and unity, social and economic development, and equality and justice (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:109). Thus, when not prompted, the majority of Africans interviewed saw democratisation as a limited political process rather than as an expansive socioeconomic transformation (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:109). In addition, their findings indicated that more respondents associated democracy with *political* goods (such as peace, order, unity, equality, justice, and national independence, which together account for 11% of responses) than with *economic* goods (social and economic development, which accounts for just 5%). The 'peace or unity' responses are particularly interesting, since none of the countries in the sample (with the possible exception of Namibia) had employed democratic elections to implement a peace agreement (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:110).

Figure 2: The meaning of democracy in selected African countries



Source: Bratton and Mattes (2001)


Thirdly, their findings suggest that popular African conceptions of democracy are – perhaps unexpectedly – quite *liberal*. For instance, they point out that when open-ended responses were analysed, respondents had cited civil liberties and personal freedoms more frequently than any other meanings (34%) (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:110). They argue that this represents a conception of democracy based on individual rights, in marked contrast to the one-in-a-thousand respondents (0.1%) who made reference to group rights. They concluded that: “Africans do not perceive democracy and associated rights differently to people elsewhere... and to the extent that they claim such rights as a means of resisting repression at the hands of an authoritarian ruler, Africans are beginning to think more like citizens of a constitutional state than clients of a personal patron” (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:111). To wrap up their findings on the understanding of democracy, Bratton and Mattes observe that Africans speak of political freedoms in very general terms, referring to ‘freedom as a birthright’, ‘the right to everything’, and ‘control over one’s own life’

(Bratton & Mattes, 2001:111). This vague language – used by more than half (56%) of those who define democracy in terms of civil liberties – suggests that the popular conception of human rights remains highly undifferentiated (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:111). These findings may or may not be typical of other countries in Africa.

Notwithstanding Bratton and Mattes' (2001) study on Africans' understanding of democracy, the discussion on Africa's democratisation process is usually premised on four issues, namely (i) the relative roles of internal and external factors; (ii) historical and contemporary dynamics; (iii) structural and contingent factors; and (iv) economic and political dimensions.²⁶ These issues are discussed in the pages that follow, though not in the order shown here. Those who support the primacy of internal factors behind democratic transitions tend to stress the strength of domestic political protests and pro-democracy movements energised by the failures of development, the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, and the disintegration of the postcolonial state's legitimacy and capacity (Ake, 2000; Sorenson, 1993). Those who emphasise external forces point to the decisive impact of the end of the Cold War, the effects-by-example of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the imposition of structural adjustment programs and political conditions by Western bilateral and multilateral financial institutions; some have questioned the West's commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa, arguing that it is more rhetorical than real, and is motivated by donor interests rather than recipient needs (Mohamed Salih, 2005).

²⁶<http://science.jrank.org/pages/8962/Democracy-Africa-Explanations-Africa-s-Democratization.html> [Accessed on 19/04/2011]

In their article 'Former presidents in African politics', Southall, Simutanyi and Daniel (2006) not only illustrated that the colonial state itself has embedded traditions of political authoritarianism, but also exposed how African countries have limited cultural and national homogeneity, low levels of literacy and economic development, and lack a substantial middle class. These factors were considered to have conspired against the expansion of democracy. Some authors have gone further, suggesting that in the colonial era, political discourse excluded not only democracy, but even the idea of democracy (Museveni, 1992; Ake, 1993; 1996; 2000; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Rose et al, 1998). For instance, Museveni (1992) points out that after political independence, many African nationalist leaders continued the colonial legacy by turning against democracy; instead of transforming their countries in accordance with popular nationalist aspirations, they found themselves on a collision course with their people.




Given the overwhelming demand for structural transformation of the colonial system wherever it was found, the colonialists generally insisted that it was necessary to pursue development first, and that this would be better achieved by giving unquestioning support to leadership. However, Southall and Melber (2006) argue that some independence regimes made heroic and innovative efforts to promote both development and democracy, though the authors accept that via socialism and participatory one-partyism, the overwhelming majority were rapidly to fall victim to political and military authoritarianism. The same authors also point out that such ideals were driven by competition between (ethnic or ethnicising) elites

for control of the state machinery that deployed the major economic resources in society. In a way, their arguments are similar to those of Markowitz (1977) and Mohamed Salih (2001). While Africa's democratisation was influenced by developments elsewhere in the world, it was primarily rooted in the continent's long history of struggle against slavery, colonialism, and post-colonial misrule.

On the other hand, Mohamed Salih (2001) talks of Africa's own 'waves of democratization' (colonial, early independence, post-independence, and the 1990s). At the very least, the 1980s and 1990s (the era of democratisation) represented a period of struggle for the 'second independence' (the 'first independence' having been fought for in the 1950s and 1960s, the era of decolonisation) (Salih, 2001). Thus, African democratic struggles are linked to the rich reservoirs of earlier struggles against exploitation and oppression, both structurally and symbolically. Ake (2000) points out that Africa's former colonial masters, anxious for influence with new holders of power, gave tolerant support to criminalising political opposition. Bending to the necessities of the Cold War, the great powers ignored human rights violations and sought allies wherever they could. In summary, these factors helped to crystallise a climate of opinion in the West that was hostile to democracy in Africa, as recorded by Ake (1993; 1996; 2000) and Rose et al (1998).²⁷

²⁷ For instance, though human rights abuses in Africa became an issue in the United States during the Carter administration, democracy was hardly discussed.

Structural theorists, on the other hand, dwell on the conditions that have forestalled and facilitated (and might sustain or frustrate) democratisation. These include colonial legacies, levels of economic development and education, size of the middle classes, the nature and vibrancy of civil society, and impediments imposed by the global system (Soreson, 1993; Mohamed Salih, 2001; Lipset, 1963; Museveni, 1992). Predictions of the prospects for the democratic project in different countries and across the continent, whether positive or negative, are often based on how these 'democratic preconditions' were evaluated. To many commentators, from Western cynics and beleaguered African leaders to pessimistic intellectuals, the prospects of democracy in Africa are undermined by the enduring realities or legacies of underdevelopment (Museveni, 1992; Ake, 1993; 1996; Mazrui, 2001).



Thus, Ake (2000; 1993; 1996) shows how the aggressive emptiness of the Cold War was replaced by the mission of African democratisation. Democracy became an important item on the colonial agenda, and would later assist colonialists in establishing a hegemony in Africa. As a result this colonial change in attitude, coupled with the long struggle for democracy by the colonised, began to show results too striking and too prevalent to be ignored (Ake, 1993; 1996; 2000; Rose et al, 1998). Thereafter, popular opposition to military rule in some countries (for instance in Nigeria, Liberia, Benin Republic, Somalia and Mali) and the demise of apartheid in South Africa (Ake, 2000; 1993; 1996) accelerated the process. Noteworthy results elsewhere on the continent included modest gains for pluralism and multi-partyism in Niger, Togo, Madagascar, Gabon, Ivory Coast, New Guinea, Mozambique,

Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Congo; less welcome were the deepening crises of democratisation in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Cameroon, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe (Ake, 2000; 1993; 1996; Rose et al, 1998).

In the aftermath of these events, the colonialists' attitude towards democracy in Africa drew additional impetus from Africa's economic and strategic marginalisation. It is well known that the world economy reduced production of goods and services and shifted from material-intensive to knowledge-intensive industries, a trend which reduced the economic importance of economic producers (Ake, 2000). At the same time, advances in science and technology yielded an increasing number of synthetic products that were more flexible and more versatile than those traditionally exported by Africans (Ake, 2000; 1993; 1996). Such changes made Africa's primary economies far less relevant to the current economic needs of industrialised countries. In order to sustain their influence, the colonial powers adopted an attitude of calculated indifference to issues relating to human rights and democracy in Africa, in order to avoid jeopardising their economic and strategic interests and facilitate their quest for allies against communism (Ake, 2000; 1993; 1996). As geo-strategic concerns diminished, the West became more inclined to bring its African policies closer to its democratic and human rights commitments (Ake, 2000).

There is also considerable debate as to whether Africa's democratisation is attributable to economic or political factors. Those who take the economic approach

examine the role played by post-colonial development policy failures, and particularly the economic crises during the 'lost decade' of the 1980s. This approach states that policy failures were exacerbated by structural adjustment programmes imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and that these generated widespread opposition from various social groups, especially the pauperised middle and working classes, who spearheaded the democratic reform movements (see for example Mills, 2010; Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999; Dahl, 1999; Tobin, 1999; Boaventura, 2005). The political approach concentrates on the many political crises of the various postcolonial states, particularly their inability to forge nationhood specifically those embodied in ethnicity questions.

As Berman et al (2004) argue, that disenchantment with the performance of the postcolonial state was not only expressed in the growing number of demeaning epithets to describe the African state; it spawned the rapid growth of 'civil society' as the master concept around which the dynamics of politics were increasingly debated and the possibilities of African renewal were invested. The struggles for democracy in the 1980s and 1990s represented the latest instances of accelerated change in a long history of struggles for freedom - though exceptionally complex instances, often driven by unpredictable events and new social movements and visions, all anchored in the specific histories of the countries involved (Berman et al, 2004). In each country, social structures and national, regional and international forces converged unevenly and inconsistently, and economic and political crises reinforced each other, altering the terrain of state-civil society relationships (Berman et al, 2004).

Such structures of governance and claims of citizenship were oriented and geared towards the development of Africa.

However, there is a crucial question that has persisted: is Africa underdeveloped primarily because it is undemocratic? Or is Africa undemocratic primarily because it is underdeveloped? To get to grips with this question one needs to explore how development is understood, both as an endpoint and with regard to the policies and practices put in place to achieve it. Still, development as a concept remains elusive, and this chapter only briefly outlines some of the commonly-held beliefs about it (see for example Sachs, 1992; Sen, 1999; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992).²⁸ Some scholars naturally focus on issues such as resource flows, levels of economic diversification, domestic mobilisation of savings and investment, national productivity and per capita income as major indicators of development (Sen, 1999; Sachs, 1992; Mills, 2010; Taylor & Mackenzie, 1992; Toye, 1987; Kothari, 1988; Norgaard, 1992; Alvares, 1992; Pottier, 1992; Hobart 1993; Moser, 1993).

Yet high levels of performance in those areas are achieved only after other aspects of development have already taken place. In his recent book, *Why Africa is poor and what*

²⁸ The term 'development' is multi-dimensional, with numerous meanings and definitions (see for example Coetzee, 2001; Pieterse, 2001; Cypher & Diethz, 1997). Generally, the concept encompasses values such as empowerment, capacity-building, and an expanded role for women; as well as transparency, equity and sustainability, irrespective of class, race, colour and gender. According to Coetzee (2001), development infers a form of social change that will lead to progress, the process of enlarging people's choices, acquiring knowledge and having access to resources for a decent standard of living, and the process of moving from worse to better conditions.

Africans can do about it, Mills (2010) states that Africa is not poor because the world has denied the continent the market and financial means to compete. Nor is Africa's poverty solely a consequence of poor infrastructure or limited trade access, or because the necessary development and technical expertise is unavailable internationally. Controversially, Mills claims that the main reason Africans are poor is that their leaders have made that choice (Mills, 2010). To substantiate his claim, he demonstrates that countries can grow their economies and develop faster if leaders make sound decisions in the national interest (Mills, 2010:1).

Given the background to different conceptions and understandings of development described above, this dissertation borrows the notion of and contextualises development as proposed by Amartya Sen. In his book, *Development as freedom*, Sen (1999:3) proposes that development is the process of expanding the real freedom that people enjoy. He supports his argument by pointing that out that the removal of major sources of 'unfreedom' - such as poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over-activity of repressive states - will negatively affect development (Sen, 1999:3; see also Sen 1990; 1992; 1999; 2000; Comim et al, 2008). Sen (1992) in his book, *Inequality re-examined*, further illustrates the capability approach, and its link to development, by pointing out the central concepts: capability and functioning (Comim et al, 2008). Sen defines 'functionings' as the various things a person may value being or doing such as being adequately nourished and in good

health, avoiding escapable morbidity, being happy, having self-respect, and taking part in the life of a community (Sen, 1992:39).

However, Sen hastens to point out that there is no definitive list of basic functionings, because different sets will be relevant to different groups and be found in distinct settings (Sen, 2005:157-160). He defines a person's capability as the various combinations of functionings that the person can achieve (Sen, 1992:40). Therefore, a person's capability reflects his or her freedom to take real opportunities (Comim et al, 2008). Indeed, the capabilities and functionings of the individual can be very important as a means to expanding the freedoms enjoyed by members of society (Sen, 1999:3). These (alongside some other determinants, such as social and economic arrangements - for example, facilities for education and health care), as well as political and civil rights (such as the liberty to participate in public discussion and scrutiny) are the basic ingredients for development.

Therefore, 'democratic development' in this dissertation refers to the gradual unfolding process by which collectively-mandated choices are made by free individuals to harness socio-economic change. However, democracy and development in Africa do not come naturally, and a lot of effort is required to achieve them. Hence, the democratisation project should bestow freedoms on citizens, and a louder voice in debates over socio-economic development strategies. In summary, if democracy is to be both socially relevant and responsive in Africa, it should encourage socio-economic development; and such development ought to lay

down a structural configuration of power and distribution of resources that is conducive to sustainable democracy. The following section links the discussions on democracy, governance and development in Africa.

2.4 Linking democracy to governance and development debates in Africa

The previous section contextualised the conception of democracy in Africa from its earliest forms, and described a historical phase towards democratising development in Africa. This section examines the relationship between democracy and governance rhetoric, with an emphasis on Africa. Democracy in Africa has often been measured on standards of good governance, or the extent of citizen engagement in 'invited' and 'invented' spaces (Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall & Coelho, 2004; Grugel, 2008; Holston, 1995; Millstein, 2008; 2011; Miraftab & Shana, 2005; Miraftab, 2004). The World Bank and the IMF have played an instrumental role in strengthening advocacy for good governance in developing countries, especially in Africa (Pratchett & Wilson, 1996; Hyden, 1992; Stoker, 1998:34; Philips, 1991; 1996). The notion of governance contains aspects of decision-making, who should be involved in decision-making, and in what capacity (Graham & Plumtree, 2003). In the same vein, Hyden (1992) points out that governance is the conscious management of regime structures, with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm. Hyden (1992:5) also mentions that the concept of governance gained particular significance in African development literature in the late 1980s because of an increasing number of governance crises on the continent. These were the result of extensive personalisation of power, the denial of fundamental human rights,

widespread corruption and the prevalence of non-elected and unaccountable governments (Narayan et al, 2000:172).

It is worth reminding ourselves that the conventional use of the concept of 'governance' defines it as a synonym for 'government'. However, Stoker (1998:34) asserts that 'governance' signifies a change in the meaning of 'government', "a new process of governing or a changed condition of ordered rule or the new method by which society is governed", in contrast to "the formal institutional structure and location of authoritative decision making in the modern state". While these claims hold currency, Stoker (1998) points out that governance relates to the distribution of power, both internal and external to the state, the interdependence of governmental and non-governmental forces in meeting economic and social challenges, and collective action to solve tensions associated with shifts in the pattern of governing. In this view of governance, the emphasis is on the emerging system of self-governing networks with civil society, instead of old forms of managerial control, which were bureaucratic, top-down and centralised.

Scholars such as Pratchett and Wilson (1996) and Hyden (1992) have stated that governance symbolizes democracy, and enables the participation of people in decision-making; that is, through the sharing of power to the lowest level of government. The World Bank has commented on issues of governance by echoing its relevancy on development trajectory. For instance, at beginning of the year 2000, they supported good governance as a foundation for local economic development

(World Bank, 2000a). Following this precept, local governments are expected to market themselves for investment, and finance local projects through public-private partnerships.

From the above discussion, it is apparent that 'governance' is a highly contested concept; and indeed, its definition and application are not without problems (Alcantara, 1998). Since its appropriation into the development discourse in the late 1980s, 'governance' has become associated not only with its normative partner, 'good'; it is also highly politicised. Good governance has come to be associated with a set of technocratic variables pertaining to the functioning of a government (see for example Kaufmann et al, 2007; Eyasu, 2006; Huntington, 1997; Balogun, 1998; Chabal & Jean-Pascal, 1999; Dunn, 1986; Mohidden, 1997; Luyt, 2008; Rotberg, 2004a; 2004b; 2007). African governments have expressed their concern about the politicisation of governance, and the urgent need to define governance in a less prescriptive and technocratic manner. This dissertation looks at governance in terms of state-society relations and internal structures and processes within government as a principal organ of the state. Governance is instrumental in the improvement of socio-economic performance and outcomes. Currently there is urgent advocacy for the inclusion of local governments in governance (see Luyt, 2008; Eyasu, 2006; Balogun, 1998; Dunn, 1986).

The World Bank views local governments (cities and towns) as the frontline for development, and urbanisation as an opportunity to improve the lives of people

(World Bank 2000b:43-52). In this view, local government would remain the everyday face of the public sector, where essential public services are delivered to households and businesses, and where policy meets the people (World Bank, 2000b:43-52). In order to achieve these goals, the World Bank suggests four propositions: (i) the poor must be allowed to share public resources, have a decent quality of life (which ought to be provided through education, employment, and safety nets) – and the informal sector must also be assisted; (ii) local governments or cities must create opportunities for growth in employment, incomes and investment, so as to foster productive and competitive businesses of all sizes; (iii) good governance and management must prevail to lay the groundwork for inclusiveness, accountability, integrity and transparency; and (iv) the country must exhibit ‘bankability’, which calls for financial soundness in the treatment of revenues and expenditures in order to gain creditworthiness and permit access to markets (World Bank 2000b:63-67).

These propositions have been marketed by the World Bank as a model for good local governance, and presented to developing countries as ‘world-class’, to facilitate the demands of globalisation. Essentially, local communities or cities would become repositories for international economic and financial transactions (World Bank, 2000b:64). At the same time, local governments ought to be potential wealth-generating communities for the private sector through privatisation, infrastructural development and basic service provision. The World Bank (2000b:108) is of the view that governance promotes democracy. Hence, any sector promising democracy

should direct its efforts at establishing institutional mechanisms that would accelerate governance; such as through public participation, or inclusivity (see also Blair, 2000; UNDP, 2003; Makumbe, 1998; Mawhood, 1983:18; Kasfir, 1983:25; Smith, 1985; Work, 2002:5).

Bueek and Smith (2000), cited in Williams (2007:30), point out that public participation in institutions of local governance allows for the possibility of revitalising democracy. Such public participation, in Lister's (1997b) view (quoted by Williams, 2007:30) imparts to the individual participant a sense of agency and the conscious capacity to perform one's duty as a citizen, and also serves to instantiate the individual as an integral member of a specific community and society at large (Williams, 2007). This is similar to Sen's approach to capacitation and capability-building. Similarly, in 'The Social Contract' Rousseau emphasises that individual freedom relates to 'being one's own master' in a community where the individual is integrated into the community (Pateman, 1970:24). Note that Bueek and Smith's (2000) judgment on public participation in institutions of local governance does not entirely resonate with key aspects of taking governments closer to the people; but rather acts as a crucial tool for service delivery. In reality, local governments are there to fulfil service delivery (Robinson, 1998). Thompson (2007:97) reminds us that the success of public participation depends very much on the actual basis of the participatory process in question. The following section looks at citizen participation as a tool to accelerate development.

2.5 Citizen participation from a development perspective

The history of citizen participation can be traced from major sources, firstly in classical works of democratic theory such as Rousseau's *The Social Contract*, Mill's *Representative Government*, and *The Pluralist Theory of the State*, by Dahl. The participatory nature of democracy has been discussed by eminent scholars such as Dahl (1989), Rousseau (1964), Parry and Moyser (1994), Pateman (1970), Held (1990; 1993), Thompson (1976), Winch (1972), and many others (Nabulsi, 2003). Secondly, citizen participation can also be marked in the works of feminist theorists such as Young (1990a; 1990b), Phillips (1991), Mouffe (1993) and Lister (2003); and in the development discourse, for example in Thompson (2007), Kothari (2005), Roodt (2001), Cornwall and Coelho (2004), Castells (1996; 1997; 1998; 2001), Kabeer (2000), Lister (1997a), Fung and Wright (2003), Gaventa (2001), and IDS (2004). It is important to note the diversity of literature linked to citizen participation. However, the discussion in this chapter is chiefly limited to the assessment of citizen participatory processes in relation to the development discourse (see for example Hemson, 2007; Nyalunga, 2006; Piper & Deacon, 2008; Putu, 2006; Sithole et al, 2006; Smith, 2004). Different development discourses have proliferated since the since the term 'development' was first coined (Robino, 2009). Over time, some discourses prevail over others and become the 'mainstream' model of insight or, in Kuhn's (1962) words, the prevalent development 'paradigm'.

For instance, since the early 1990s more widespread discussions about development theory and practice have emerged. The demise of Soviet-style communism and the

shift away from more extreme neoliberal ideologies and enthusiasm for exclusively market-driven strategies has opened up a space for a more productive discussion (Robino, 2009). The current debate seems no longer to be centred on grand theories of social transformation, but on the degree and on more adequate forms of intervention (Allen & Thomas, 2000:7). Unfulfilled promises and dissatisfaction with previous development theories (modernisation, and dependency) have spurred a constructive debate that has enriched the development agenda (Booth, 1993).

According to Robino (2009:60), development theorists and practitioners have engaged in discussion as to whether the free market system can remedy the problems associated with global capitalism, and provide the proper degree and forms of intervention required (see for example Birdsall & De la Torre, 2001; Collier & Dollar, 2002; Fine, 2006; Giddens, 1998; 2000; Gore, 2000; Hildyard, 1998; Ocampo, 2004; Stiglitz, 1998; 2002; Wade, 1990).²⁹ In fact, debates within and about development theories have moved away from grand narratives towards more local, empirical and inductive approaches. This shift has in turn been accompanied by a parallel move in development practice towards participation and empowerment

²⁹ The 2008 financial crisis was a catalyst for the resurgence of a Keynesian approach to economic policy-making, and more radical variations; and policy recommendations shifting away from the neoliberal prescription of liberalisation and deregulation (see for example Robino, 2009). But as Wade (2008:3) warns, “there is a recurrent cycle of debate in the wake of financial crises, as an initial outpouring of radical proposals gives way to incremental muddling through, followed by resumption of normal business”.

(Robino, 2009:60).³⁰ Areas such as institution building, citizen participation, social movements, gender, human people-centred development, good governance and democratisation, to mention a few, have been brought to the centre of the international debate (Gaventa, 2001; Cornwall & Coelho, 2004; Thompson, 2007; Mahmud, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Leach, Scones & Wyne, 2005; Newell & Wheeler, 2006; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010; Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010; Gaventa & McGee, 2010; Gaventa & Tandon, 2010; Robino, 2009).

The (re)incorporation of these mechanisms and categories into mainstream development is an apparent recognition of the failures of the 'exclusively' market-led development strategies that gained strength during the 1980s (Robino, 2009:60). Although views differ widely as to the nature of the concrete measures involved, a growing consensus has emerged: On one hand, it is recognised that long-term development requires a more comprehensive approach, and policies that go well beyond macro structural adjustment (for example Stiglitz, 1998; 2002; World Bank, 1998); and on the other, there is acknowledgement of the importance of having a role for the state and other non-governmental development actors (for example Edigheji, 1999; 2003; Le Roux & Graff, 2001; Martinussen, 1997).

³⁰ Since the 1980s, citizen participation has become a buzzword associated with socio-political development, with varying, dynamic ideals that are essential to understanding the whole notion of participation.

During the 1990s,³¹ participation, people-centred development, good governance, decentralisation and local development emerged (or re-emerged, in many cases) as related concepts, and as 'key words' for the 'development industry' (Robino, 2009:61).³² These key words have filtered into major development institutions and government development policy documents, leading many authors to refer to a shift in the development paradigm. And while some argue that a 'second generation' of reforms should be implemented, for others, the fundamental problems associated with the 'Washington Consensus'-inspired policies are not being solved by new generations of reforms that leave the core fundamentals unchanged (Robino, 2009:61). In addition, participation and development debates are constituted and reproduced within a set of material relationships, activities and powers – social, cultural and geopolitical. Therefore, to comprehend the real power of participation in development, one cannot ignore the immediate context (either institutional, or more broadly, historical and geographical) within which texts are produced. In understanding participation, one is able to ground the abstract relationship of citizenship and its relation to development.³³ Here, I explore the different views on (and influencing factors for) citizen participation.


³¹ Issues of participation in development projects, decentralisation and local development can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, when these topics were already being discussed, and theoretical perspectives and practical approaches were developed.

³² These words are part of the dictionary of conventional wisdom behind development discourses, and are being adopted as the key issues of the (at least rhetorically) revised development consensus.

³³ As a reminder, note that the discussion presented is part of the overall objective of the chapter, which is to establish the extent to which participation practices are being implemented, the challenges encountered in the process, and the promises associated, in the context of emerging democracies.

2.5.1 The necessity for greater citizen engagement

There has been an increase in mobilisation and collective action in the developing states of the South (Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). The concept of collective action has been linked to the active involvement of every able-bodied citizen in community activities, or in development projects or programmes (IDS, 2004; Gaventa, 2002; 2004; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). In some emerging democracies, the advocacy for and mechanisms of promoting more active citizen engagement in the processes of governance have been established through the creation of new, decentralised institutions so as to harness a variety of participatory and consultative processes in national and global policy deliberations (see for example Kabeer, 2005; Cohen, 1995; Farrell, 2000; Fischer, 1993; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; King et al, 1998; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; 1987; Parsons, 1990; Rosenstraub, 1987; Thomas, 1995; Warren, 1999; Ziegenfuss, 2000; Zotti, 1991).



Rhetorically, at least, there has been increasing emphasis on using such mechanisms to support the inclusion of the poorest social groups – those who do not usually have sufficient resources (economic, educational and political) to influence the outcome of traditional policy processes. Gaventa³⁴ developed a set of propositions³⁵ that help to further develop understanding of citizenship and participation. His propositions include (i) relating people and institutions; (ii) working on the same side of the equation; (iii) re-conceptualising citizenship and participation; (iv) learning about

³⁴ See Gaventa, 2001.

³⁵ It is important to acknowledge that though the propositions referred to are outdated, they still hold currency, especially in explaining citizenship participation and democracy debates.

outcomes as we go along; (v) building conditions for success; and (vi) contesting the local in the era of globalisation (Gaventa, 2001).

In light of Gaventa's (2001) propositions, case studies from South Africa, Nigeria and India illustrate how some major infrastructural and extractive projects, undertaken in the name of the public good, can serve to adversely affect the rights and livelihoods of the poor and disadvantaged (Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). For example, participatory approaches have been scaled up from projects to policies; they inevitably enter the arena of governance, and we find that participation can only become effective as it engages with issues of institutional change. In addition, as concerns about good governance and state responsiveness grow, questions about how citizens engage and make demands on the state also come to the fore. Traditional forms of representation have been re-examined, and new, more direct and deliberative democratic mechanisms have proposed to enable citizens to play a more active part in decisions which affect their lives. Similarly, in the context of globalisation, questions have emerged on how participatory methods can be used to hold international development actors accountable.

Indeed, the questions of how citizens (especially the poor) can express voice with influence, and how institutional responsiveness can be ensured, have also become topical (see for example Kabeer, 2005; Cohen, 1995; Farrell, 2000; Fischer, 1993; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; King et al, 1998; Kweit & Kweit, 1981; 1987; Parsons, 1990; Rosenstraub, 1987; Thomas, 1995; Warren, 1999; Ziegenfuss, 2000; Zotti, 1991). These

concerns have been raised and debated, especially in some emerging democracies. The same debates also seek to elaborate how global governance and citizenship can be accounted (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004; Mahmud, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Leach, Scones & Wyne, 2005; Newell & Wheeler, 2006; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007; Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010; Gaventa & McGee, 2010; Gaventa & Tandon, 2010; Robino, 2009).

There have also been growing numbers of claims for universal global rights, such as those for women and children (Ahikire et al, 2002; Miraftab, 2004; Sithole et al, 2007; Greenberg & Mathoho, 2010). Such claims may shape or conflict with understandings of local rights and citizenship. The irony is that local actors may use global forums as arenas for action, which may be more effective than appeals to institutions of local governance (Edwards & Gaventa, 2001; Sinwell, 2009; 2010; Holston, 1995; Bucuss et al, 2007; Cornwall, 2002; Friedman, 2006; Grugel, 2008; Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). The challenge that remains is not only how to build participatory governance at differing levels, but also how to promote democratic accountability. The following section offers a discussion on citizen participation within 'invited' and 'invented' spaces as another dimension of participation in development discourse.

2.5.2 'Invited' and 'invented' spaces in the institutions of government

As the mechanisms for increased citizen engagement continue to proliferate at different levels of government, there has been advancement of the idea of (and even urgent calls for) citizen engagement in 'invited' spaces of local governance, and

'invented' spaces of civil society organisation and protest (Sinwell, 2009; 2010; Holston, 1995; Piper, 2010; Cornwall, 2002). These mutually interacting concepts ('invited' and 'invented' spaces of participation) are social spaces created by government to induce participation by communities, and have also stimulated more inclusive policies (Sinwell, 2009; 2010; Holston, 1995). With inspiration from Cornwall (2002), Miraftab (2004) offers an analytical distinction between 'invited' and 'invented' spaces of citizen participation. Miraftab (2004) states that invited spaces are defined as those occupied by grassroots and allied non-governmental organisations that are legitimised by donors and government interventions. Invented spaces are also occupied by the grassroots and claimed by their collective action, but are directly confronting the authorities and the status quo. While the actions of the former are geared mostly towards providing the poor with coping mechanisms and propositions for supporting the survival of their informal membership, the grassroots activity of the latter challenges the status quo in the hope of larger societal change and growing resistance to the dominant power relations (see also Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall & Coelho, 2004; Grugel, 2008; Holston, 1995; Millstein, 2008; 2011; Miraftab & Shana, 2005; Miraftab, 2004; Piper & Deacon, 2008; Piper & Nadvi, 2010; Piper & Von Lieres, 2011; Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011; Sinwell, 2009; 2010).

The advancement of the idea and of the need for such spaces of participation is the result of renewed concern over rights, power and various opinions about participation in governance (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004:1; Piper, 2010; Miraftab, 2004).


In fact, even greater attention has been focused on the institutions that mediate between communities, service providers and policy-makers (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004:1). The rationale has been to create greater opportunity for deliberative democracy, so that participation offers better decisions and better government. While there are countless examples of communities organising themselves in 'invited' and 'invented' spaces, more recently, community-based protests have come to the fore as key examples of engaging the state outside of formal opportunities for public participation (Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). By contrast, in some cases, the created spaces of participation have not stimulated inclusive participation. According to Friedman (2006), formal participation mechanisms created within the institution of the state do not engender participatory governance; partly because the participation processes do not allow for policy to be influenced in a qualitative manner, and partly because the voices of the poor (who would benefit most significantly from participating in government decision-making) are not heard. He goes on to note that 'perhaps the most significant indictment of structured participatory governance mechanisms is that they have not enabled the authorities to understand the needs of the poor' (Friedman 2006:11). He is supported by Millestein (2008 and 2011) who claim that invited spaces for participation are inadequate for channelling local grievances and complaints – and for including the voices of the urban poor in governance processes.

In his article titled 'Between the Community Hall and the City Hall: Five research questions on participation', Ballard (2008:180) proposes that perhaps the most

serious problem with invited spaces of participation, paradoxically, is that they may demobilise rather than mobilise. He then provides insight into the South African context by suggesting that invited participatory spaces may be used by the ANC to suppress dissent and mobilisation against its policy choices (Ballard, 2008:182). While such unintended, exclusive participatory realities continue to exist, one needs to take cognisance of factors that impede the participation of marginalised groups in processes of participation. For example, in terms of the involvement of women in formal invited spaces of engagement, Sithole, Todes and Williamson (2007) argue that while women's voices need to be heard and represented at all levels and in all types of development initiative, there are some considerations to note in terms of what influences their participation – for instance, in under-resourced communities the struggle for bread-and-butter issues can often take precedence over the need to have equitable representation of women in the relevant structures (Sithole et al, 2007). Water, fuel and food shortages are sometimes the immediate concerns for poor women; participation and equal representation have lower priority, which is an impediment to equitable representation and responsive governance (Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011).

These weaknesses in 'invited' and 'invented' spaces of participation suggest that transformation is needed within structures of participation. However, Sinwell (2009; 2010) reminds us that simply reforming the system will not lead to a qualitative or fundamental shift in the way these structures operate; and adds that reform is unlikely to change the development realities on the ground, or transform the power

dynamics that shape the nature and purpose of these spaces. Similarly, Friedman (2006:3) argues that 'citizen participation in government and in particular that of the poor is more likely, therefore, not when governments create formal mechanisms to ensure it but when they develop attitudes and institutions accessible to citizen action'. He further observes that lack of participation in formal structures by the poor is not due to their inability to represent themselves on these platforms. The problem lies with the capacities expected of participants in structured participation exercises: the ability to engage (usually in English) with technical issues, in settings where the degree of technical background expected, the ambience and the way in which meetings are run – these combine to make it very difficult for the poor to be heard, even if they happen to get to the table (Friedman, 2006:14).



Importantly, it must be remembered that the poor speak with multiple voices (Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). Therefore, if policy is to reflect grassroots preferences, their voices need to be heard: in conversation with each other in open democratic processes, in prioritisation, negotiation, trade-offs and compromise with those who command power and wealth (Friedman, 2006:14). While there is some level of consensus about the need to transform state-provided spaces of engagement to ensure more meaningful and inclusive public participation, there is less agreement about what exactly needs to be changed, and how best to achieve that. Also, while the emphasis is largely on 'fixing' or strengthening existing spaces, such as the ward committee system, much less attention is given to the need to expand the repertoire

of invited spaces, through initiatives such as participatory budgeting citizen scorecards and community-based planning, for example (Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011).

Perhaps even more importantly, the debate about the weaknesses of the 'invited' spaces and 'invented' spaces of participation is largely silent on the critical points listed by Friedman (2006): prioritisation, negotiation, trade-offs and compromise; the temptation to remove or minimise these tricky and complex characteristics and sidestep contestation is perhaps understandable, but not particularly helpful if the intention is to facilitate the expression of voice, particularly for those who are marginalised (Ramjee & Van Donk, 2011). Contestation within participation discourse also has its opponents, who claim that contestation is a tool used by global elites to continue to extend their hegemonic influences to less developed countries of the South. The following section unpacks some of the criticisms levelled against participatory development strategies.

2.6 Criticisms of participatory development strategies

Some scholars have offered critical commentary on the discourse of participatory development strategies (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Christens & Speer, 2006; Williams, 2005; Hickey & Giles, 2004; Mosse, 2001). For example, Cooke and Kothari (2001) challenge the widespread belief that participation is unequivocally good, and provide a detailed fieldwork analysis of the reasons participation ought not to be seen as a holistic, universal remedy leading to democratisation and good

governance.³⁶ They point out that the theoretical ideal of participation is often not to function as the tool for liberation and distribution of power that is sometimes rhetorically suggested (Cooke & Kothari, 2001:3; see also Mosse, 2001).³⁷ Indeed, efforts towards embracing participation are described as largely maintaining existing power relationships, though masking this situation behind the rhetoric and techniques of participation. This masking is an example of what Cooke and Kothari (2001:3) call 'the tyranny of participation'.

Cooke and Kothari (2001:7-8) identify three types of tyranny. Firstly, the dominance of multinational agencies and funders exists just beneath the rhetoric and practices of participation. This demonstrates the enduring decision-making control tyranny

³⁶ Their contributions were drawn from psychology, sociology and critical theory, and claim that in practice, participation is nowhere near as effective as is commonly believed.

³⁷ For example, Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) claim that at the local level, meanings and definitions of terms are assumed; yet these meanings and definitions are political in nature. Local participatory input is commonly reinterpreted by outside facilitators in light of project deliverables. As a result, elements of distortion are introduced by outsiders in the participatory processes. Not as obviously, locals are also implicated, especially when they collude in the distortions endemic in participatory processes. The authors further point out that local people learn about outside planning processes and learn how to manipulate planners for short-term, local gains. Such gains frequently come in the form of employment and financial compensation. Over time, the participatory process can be understood as a complex dialectic between outsiders and locals (or 'staff' and 'villagers') in which both negotiate to fit local payoffs that match external agendas (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). While on one level both gain from such a process, at another this dialectical negotiation obscures the way in which outsiders or participatory staff leverage and reinforce existing local power differentials and, essentially, use the resources at their disposal to feed a patronage system. As a result, participatory processes can work to reinforce the exclusion of women, the poor and the socially marginalised, rather than opening up channels for their voice (see also Christens & Speer, 2006).


held by agencies and funders. Secondly, the emphasis on participatory practices obscures many limitations and manipulations that suppress local power differentials; in fact, the authors point out that participatory practices sometimes contribute to the maintenance and exacerbation of local power differentials. This is a 'group level' tyranny, and addresses the well-known social psychological dynamics of group functioning, which are largely ignored in the participation literature. Thirdly, the dominance of the participatory method is a tyranny in itself; the overwhelming acceptance of participation (particularly the goals and values expressed) has limited dialogue, and has even limited the consideration of other methods for cultivating development.

Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) state further that participatory processes have been commingled with a constellation of terms (such as 'empowerment') that are uncritically accepted as always co-occurring with participation.³⁸ The authors argue that empowerment is simply a feeling or individual psychological state, rather than a phenomenon which exists in a community (Cooke & Kothari, 2001:5). Their argument continues that participation and empowerment have been reframed in such a way as to achieve a normative value, denoting initiative, responsibility, good citizenship, and vibrant economic activity. This has entrenched participatory methods; alternatives, such as expertise or leadership models, are not even

³⁸ Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) observe that the language of development work is cloaked in the rhetoric of empowerment, and participation has blended into this language to such a level that empowerment as systemic transformation does not exist.

contemplated. Such a dogmatic embrace of participation is yet another facet of tyranny (Cooke & Kothari, 2001).


Christens and Speer (2006), reviewing Cooke and Kothari (2001), add their voice to the criticism levelled against participatory development strategies. They state that the task of entering poor countries from rich ones, and working with people to 'develop' the country economically, politically, and socially, is inherently fraught with complexities (Christens & Speer, 2006:2). For example, they observe that many international agencies and funders justify participatory processes by touting the efficiency and productivity with which participatory methods advance; for instance, in saving 'transaction costs', in corporate parlance. Yet in doing so, top-down planning is maintained; this contradicts contemporary development rhetoric, which encourages the bottom-up approach (Christens & Speer, 2006:2).



The paradox of historically top-down organisations willingly succumbing to transformation by bottom-up processes raises questions, such as: how can local knowledge transform bureaucratic organisations? Certainly, one could suggest that local knowledge be understood as a product of the social relationships which developed it, rather than as a fixed commodity to be extracted. Practically, the participation of local people appears to lend credibility to decisions that have already been made by agencies and organisations outside the community. As a result, strong embracement of participation by multinationals has served their

interests, since participation itself has become a commodity that these organisations use to advance their corporate image (Christens & Speer, 2006:3).³⁹

Using a South African case, Williams (2005) demonstrates how bureaucratic elites, officials and councillors at local government level impose their own 'truncated' version and understanding of community participation on particular communities. Williams (2005) warns of the danger of communities losing control over the development process through party-driven motives and through interventions by 'experts'. While this study is by no means an exhaustive exploration, it highlights the complexity of establishing *a priori* whether any given participatory intervention is likely to be successful. In any assessment it is important to consider the conditions of political economy that could favour or hinder democracy and participatory spaces in achieving their objectives.




2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview democracy and participation, evaluating these concepts by reviewing their definitions, stated advantages, and objectives; and by assessing their utility as operational and policy tools. Despite the sea of

³⁹ See also Szell et al (2002), who argue that capital accumulation, while appearing 'amazingly impressive', in fact imposed a cruel and restless dynamism on society. They argue that society appears to have surrendered agency to globalisation through self-regulating financial and economic flows; while at the same time, seeking agency to curtail the impact of the very same forces. They are flummoxed by the question of whether society has the capacity to respond and shape the conditions of life in a system of global interactions, or whether society is in the process of 'shaping' what is out of its control. For example, could the participation discourse in reality be a takeover of local agendas?

conceptual uncertainty that engulfs both concepts, it is apparent that they have been embraced in legislature – and, to some extent, in practice – in the developing countries of the South. By definition, we have seen that democracy is a political concept, concerning the collectively binding decisions about the rules and policies of a group, association or society (Beetham, 1994). Democracy has also been characterised as relating to a situation in which there are free and fair elections, basic civil liberties are respected and protected, and the cabinet has effective power to govern (Dahl, 1956; Storm, 2008; Houtzager et al, 2007; Collier & Levitsky, 1997). The list of definitions goes on.



While operationalising the concepts of democracy and participation, and assessing the extent to which such practices are being implemented, the challenges faced during their implementation and the promises associated therewith, emphasis was laid on deliberative/discursive democracy, participation and participatory governance, and empowered participatory governance, as the major strands within liberal notions of democracy. We have noted that deliberative democracy (encapsulating the idea of decision-making by discussion among free and equal citizens) and its practical implementation are as old as democracy itself (Elster, 1998:1; Dryzek, 1990). Participation and participatory governance call for equal engagement with citizens in the state's process of governance so as to deepen democracy (Gaventa, 2006:15; Ackerman 2004:447), while empowered participatory governance (EPG) relies upon the commitment and capabilities of ordinary citizens

to make sensible decisions through reasoned deliberation (Gaventa, 2006; Fung & Wright, 2003).

After conceptualising the major selected liberal notions of democracy, the focus fell on democracy in Africa. Democracy is considered by some scholars to be a trophy handed to Africans after attaining their independence in the 1960s; while others state openly that the concept of democracy has not properly entered popular discourse in Africa (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998). In addition, Africa's democratisation has been premised on (i) the relative roles of internal and external factors; (ii) historical and contemporary dynamics; (iii) structural and contingent factors; and (iv) economic and political dimensions. Beyond these factors, it is apparent that Africa's democratisation was influenced by developments elsewhere in the world, primarily rooted in the continent's long history of struggle against slavery, colonialism, and postcolonial misrule.

Democracy in Africa has been weighed against standards of good governance promoted and supported by the World Bank and the IMF in developing countries, and especially in Africa (Hyden, 1992; Stoker 1998:34). Governance contains aspects of decision-making, who should be involved in decision-making, and in what capacity; in other words the conscious management of regime structures, with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm (Graham & Plumtree, 2003; Hyden, 1992). It was pointed out that any sector promising democracy should direct efforts at establishing institutional mechanisms that would accelerate governance,

such as through public participation or inclusivity (Blair, 2000; UNDP, 2003; Makumbe, 1998).


In linking democratic participation to the development discourse, it was pointed out that during the 1990s, participation and people-centred development emerged (or re-emerged, in many cases) as related concepts, and as 'key words' for the 'development industry'. The same key words subsequently filtered into the policy documents of major development institutions and governments. Debates on these key words are constituted and reproduced within a set of material relationships, activities and powers – social, cultural and geopolitical. Firstly, the necessity for greater citizen participation has been established through creation of new, decentralised institutions so as to harness a variety of participatory and consultative processes in national and global policy deliberations (Kabeer, 2005; Cohen, 1995; Farrell, 2000; Kathlene & Martin, 1991; King et al, 1998; Parsons, 1990; Rosenstraub, 1987; Warren, 1999; Ziegenfuss, 2000; Zotti, 1991).

Secondly, 'invited' and 'invented' spaces in the institutions of government have been created as a result of renewed concern with rights, power and opinions about participation in governance (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004:1; Piper, 2010; Miraftab, 2004). These spaces have not created an environment of all-inclusive participation; particularly not for women. For example, Sithole, Todes and Williamson (2007) argue that while women's voices need to be heard and represented at all levels and in all types of development initiatives, there are some considerations to take note of

in terms of what influences their participation. Therefore, simply reforming the system will not lead to a qualitative or fundamental shift in the way these structures operate. Reform is unlikely to change the development realities on the ground, or transform the power dynamics that shape the nature and purpose of these spaces.

We have also noted that contestation within the participation discourse has attracted more critics, who claim that participation is a tool used by global elites to continue extending their hegemonic influences to the less developed countries of the South (Cooke & Kothari (2001:7-8). Efforts at embracing participation are described as largely maintaining existing power relationships, while masking this power behind the rhetoric and techniques of participation. This masking allows what they call the tyranny of participation. Christens and Speer (2006) point out that the task of entering poor countries from rich ones and working with people to 'develop' their country economically, politically, and socially is inherently fraught with complexity. It must also be noted that many international agencies and funders justify participatory processes by pointing out the efficiency and productivity with which participatory methods advance, such as in saving 'transaction costs', in corporate parlance. Williams (2005) demonstrates how bureaucratic elites, officials and councillors at local government level impose their own 'truncated' version and understanding of community participation on particular communities. Establishing *a priori* whether any given participatory intervention is likely to be successful is a complex procedure.

From the issues discussed, it seems the relationship between democracy, participation and democratisation is not clear-cut. For some, democracy is regarded as a condition (necessary but insufficient) for local development and citizen participation. For others, some degree of participation is required for democracy to achieve its intended objectives of more efficient and responsive local government. Therefore, we can say that democracy and participation might have a 'symbiotic relationship', but the conception, definition and objectives of democracy are critical to this relationship. Widespread engagement with issues of participation and local governance creates enormous opportunities for re-defining and deepening the meanings of democracy, and for extending the rights of inclusive citizenship. At the same time, there are critical challenges in ensuring that the work promotes pro-poor and social justice outcomes.



Importantly, democracy and participation cannot be separated from the broader issues of political economy that contextualise the possibilities or the potential of participatory development to be transformative (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). The consequence is that any assessment of the relationship between democracy and citizen participation requires an examination of political economy dynamics. With greater recognition of civil society and increasing discussion on the issues of good governance, the concept of participation is shifting: from beneficiary participation in state-delivered programmes, to an understanding of participation as a means of holding the state accountable through new forms of governance that involve more direct state-civil society relations, under a partnership model. But as Pieterse (2002)

asks, what is the nature of this blend, what is gained and what is lost in this act of hybridisation? This approach allows us to understand the potential difficulties and opportunities that exist in the context of the new policy in Uganda. Clearly, Uganda's transformation path is characterised by an innovative combination of both strands of democratic development thinking, in the wake of neo-liberalism's demise as a hegemonic ideology. The paradigm of 'inclusive neo-liberalism' that currently characterises international development places particular emphasis on community-based responses to the (often structural) problems of poverty and exclusion (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010). Such approaches have become increasingly controversial: celebrated by optimists as the most empowering way forward for marginalised citizens on one hand, and on the other, derided by sceptics as an abrogation of responsibility by development trustees (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010). The next section of this dissertation deals with these issues. Chapter 3 turns to the emergence of democracy and citizen participation in Uganda, and digs deeper into the intricacies of this democracy in the context of citizen participation. It also takes into account deterrents to democracy and citizen participation.

CHAPTER 3
TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: UGANDA
UNDER NRM

3.1 Introduction

The demise of dictatorship in Uganda and the rebirth of participatory democracy brought about profound reforms. It is therefore crucial to examine the political context in which these democratic and citizen participation reforms emerged. As discussed in Chapter Two, there are critical questions that should be answered in any analysis of democratic practices: (i) what is the extent to which such practices are being implemented; (ii) what problems and challenges were faced during their implementation; and lastly (iii) what are the promises associated with the democracy and citizen participation project? To answer these, this dissertation examines the democratic trajectory of Uganda, from before independence through to post-independence Uganda. Mamdani (1997) and Golooba-Mutebi (2008) state that the policies of both colonial and post-colonial governments weakened the prospects for Ugandans to engage democratically in activities that influenced their wellbeing.⁴⁰ Moreover, successive post-independence dictatorial governments neither allowed citizen participation nor encouraged democracy to flourish (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008).

⁴⁰ Many studies on democracy and citizen participation, especially in emerging democracies of the South, tend not to capture historical aspects on participation; instead they shift the debate, focusing more on the post-Cold War period, failing to realise that each state has its unique history of how the culture of democracy and participation evolved, and also that events of the past continue to shape and influence the present. Therefore, the historical account of participation has deliberately been incorporated in this discussion, to demonstrate how the past continues to influence and shape democracy and participation in Uganda today.

Indeed, the political instabilities at the time encouraged centralisation of power as a means of suppressing dissent.⁴¹ So when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power, it inherited a situation from which liberal democratic ideals were absent. To substantiate these statements, this chapter explores elements of democracy and participation seen from pre- to post-independence Uganda.

The chapter is divided into two major parts. The first is a history of participation in Uganda (1861-1986). It (i) examines colonialism and its impact on citizen participation; (ii) highlights the implications of the Berlin Conference on citizen participation; (iii) discusses how colonial policies such as indirect rule impacted on participation, alongside the politics of ethnic division; (iv) demonstrates how the language policy in Uganda impacted negatively on citizen participation; (v) discusses how socio-economic inequalities impacted significantly on participation in Uganda, (vi) describes participation at the dawn of independence and beyond, dictatorship in its earliest forms, and participation in a failed state. The second part of the chapter is an account of the rebirth of democracy and participation in Uganda (1986-2011). This section (i) focuses on legislative provisions for citizen participation in Uganda; (ii) discusses participation via local governments; and lastly (iii) accounts for World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies on democracy and citizen participation, before discussing the obstacles to democracy and participation

⁴¹ While colonialism bequeathed the country a negative legacy – including a weak state apparatus, ethnic division, skewed development, elite polarisation and a narrow economic base – on the whole, post-colonial leaders have exacerbated rather than reversed these trends (see Golooba-Mutebi, 2008:1).

in Uganda. The history of participation in Uganda is included chiefly because the current state of affairs has largely been influenced by this historical trajectory (see for example Mamdani, 1997; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Davidson, 1969; Cyril, 1965).

3.2 A history of democracy and participation in Uganda

Discussions of democracy and citizen participation in Uganda feature prominently in the works of Karugire (*A Political History of Uganda*, 1980; *Roots of Instability in Uganda*, 1988); Mamdani (*Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*, 1976); Kabwegyere (*The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda*, 1995); and Ibingira (*The Forging of an African Nation: The Political and Constitutional Evolution of Uganda from Colonial Rule to Independence, 1894-1962, 1973*), among many others. These political historians offer their accounts of citizen participation in pre- and post-independence Uganda. Some of their observations suggest that many societies in today's Uganda had relatively simple political organisational structures before the advent of colonialism (Ingham, 1983; Jorgensen, 1981). The ruling culture was communal rather than individualistic, and even after the commencement of colonial rule, the clan continued to be the most effective unit of political and economic association (Apter, 1967; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Davidson, 1969; Cyril, 1965).

The political history of pre-colonial Uganda reveals that most societies that were later brought together under colonial rule to constitute Uganda had limited political goals and relatively simple political structures (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008; Davidson, 1969; Cyril, 1965; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Scholars such as Karugire (1980),

Kabwegyere (1995) and Mamdani (1997) record that the characterisation of political structures included personal relations being central, with diversity in social scale and organisation. Powerful kingdoms such as Buganda and Bunyoro had standing armies which were used for external expeditions and attacks on neighbouring communities (Dunbar, 1969). Such expeditions strengthened some kingdoms economically, while others were amalgamated to form Nkore, Busoga, and lastly Tooro, which seceded from Bunyoro Kingdom around 1830⁴² (Dunbar, 1969; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995).

By the time colonialism had given way to present-day Uganda, Gertzel (1976) observes that Buganda Kingdom was seen by the colonialists as the largest and strongest kingdom of all its neighbours (see also Harlow & Chilver, 1965; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). The king of Buganda (the *kabaka*) was considered supreme, and was not elected but inherited the throne. *Kabakaship* (kingship) was characterised by the politics of patronage, a situation that not only made the *kabaka* not accountable to his subordinates, but also gave him absolute power to control the entire land and all the activities in the kingdom (Kiwauka, 1971). The *kabaka* also had a free hand in appointing chiefs in some counties of the kingdom to whom he could then delegate duties (Kiwauka, 1971; Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997). The whole governing process was completely undemocratic.


⁴² Such societies were organised in small, segmented communities, with people bound by the same beliefs and ideals.

Buganda Kingdom's major political rival, Bunyoro Kingdom, also had a centralised political organisation (Kiwauka, 1971; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). Other kingdoms, such as Nkore, had looser systems of administration; while in Northern Uganda, power was vested in the elders (Atkinson, 1971; Karugire, 1980). Though the various political organisations in pre-colonial societies are relevant, it is also important to note that each community was bound by a common language, culture, kinship, and more importantly dialogue, which played a crucial role in the politics of the time (Ibingira, 1973; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997). Most communities were self-sufficient and there was little interaction with others (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Therefore, for most pre-colonial Ugandan societies, the system of governance and participation revolved around kings, elders and chiefs, and was essentially top-down in character, male-dominated and completely excluded the majority of the populace. The ordinary people had little say in their own governance; neither could they participate in the politics of the time. The chiefs were accountable to the kings, and the citizens were mere subjects (Mamdani, 1997).

3.2.1 Colonialism and citizen participation (1861-1884)

As in every other African country, the scrambling for and partition of Africa eventually reached inland Uganda, despite her central geographical position in the Great Lakes Region. When the dust settled, Uganda was declared a British protectorate (Low, 1965; Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997). The reasons for Britain's occupation of Uganda were more strategic than philanthropic, as the British needed access to the coast (and ultimately, to India)

from neighbouring Congo and the Sudan, where they had developed significant economic interests (Mamdani, 1997). British missionaries also wanted to spread Christianity, which the British later used to fulfil their strategic interest. During the same period, France had also sent a group of missionaries to Uganda. The presence of both Britain and France in Uganda created struggles for converts, which later resulted in religious wars (Ibingira, 1973; Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997; Low & Robert, 1960). Subsequently, the doings of colonial powers abroad started to influence local politics, as the French backed the Catholics while the British supported the Protestants, both with the intention of securing their place in key administrative posts (Ibingira, 1973; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). As a result, the missionaries laid strategies for influencing appointments to key political positions, to the exclusion of traditional leaders (Low & Robert, 1960; Karugire, 1980).



After strengthening their base in Uganda, the missionaries set off on a campaign to promote indigenous languages, which they thought would be a crucial tool for them in communicating their message (Low, 1965; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). They also embarked on campaign to translate the Bible into the local languages, the better to reach the illiterate majority (Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995). The missionaries' conviction was that through religious conversion, it would be easier to secure the local people's political allegiance (Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995). They shunned *Kiswahili*, which was taking root as the *lingua franca* in Kenya and Tanzania because of its close links with the rival Islamic faith (Kabwegyere,


1995). As a result, religious wars⁴³ in the 1880s and 1890s pitted Muslims against Christians (Ibingira, 1973; Karugire, 1980). But these wars were not only aimed at preserving one faith or the other, but also at gaining political control of Buganda (Kabwegyere, 1995).

The wars led to the deportation of the king into exile, and the subsequent installation of puppet kings; a situation that weakened Buganda and rendered it vulnerable to manipulation by colonialists. The chiefs and citizens became endorsees (or what William (2008) refers to as 'spectators') of pre-designed colonial policies, and the few that participated did so merely for symbolic purposes, since they were advancing the colonial agenda. Such acts replaced the altruism that citizens felt towards their kingdoms and leaders previously, a situation that dented patriotism and bred opportunism in latter political organisations in Uganda. It is from this period that the rise of opportunism over principle in the management of public affairs in Uganda can be traced.

⁴³ Wars resulted from religious differences between Catholics, Protestants and Muslims. Such wars were between those who were supporting the government of the time (led by *Kabaka* Mwanga and *Omukama* Kabalega) and those who were supporting the colonial forces. The Italian Roman Catholics and the English missionaries were against the existing order. These wars led to the execution of the so called 'Uganda martyrs'.

3.2.2 Berlin Conference and citizen participation⁴⁴ (1884-1885)


With the 'legal' establishment of colonial rule in Uganda, and through a combination of economic manoeuvres via the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEACO) (Low, 1965), the British embarked on signing agreements with some leaders of Uganda using a variety of tactics, including negotiation, but also by propping up embattled leaders against local adversaries and then extracting concessions from them (in Tooro), and through protracted battles (in Bunyoro) (Karugire 1980; Mutibwa, 1992; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). The 'legal' establishment of British rule had a far-reaching impact on the structure and functioning of Ugandan governance. For example, the French and British missionaries' struggle for power and influence, particularly in Buganda, weakened Buganda's political leadership (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Mamdani, 1997).



When the British achieved full control of Buganda, they signed flawed 'agreements' with Bugandan and other leaders to disenfranchise the locals, which later led to the weakening of the powers of local traditional leaders (Low, 1965; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). Some of the agreements were not all-inclusive in terms of participation; that is, either the leaders or ordinary Ugandans were excluded (Karugire 1980; Mutibwa, 1992; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Ugandans merely endorsed

⁴⁴ The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 regulated European colonisation and trade in Africa during the New Imperialism period, and coincided with Germany's sudden emergence as an imperial power. The conference ushered in a period of heightened colonial activity on the part of the European powers, while simultaneously eliminating most existing forms of African autonomy and self-governance.

agreements drawn up by British agents, co-operatives and some local leaders. Therefore by the time the British concretised their control of Buganda, all religious converts belonged not just to a faith, but to an accompanying political conviction. However, at grassroots level the basis for political association remained the clan, and religion was just the 'official excuse' (Karugire, 1980). Though publicly the British downplayed the ethnic factor and sought to link political affiliation to religious affiliation, ethnicity remained prominent in the period before Uganda's independence in 1962 (Karugire 1980; Mutibwa, 1992; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). On the other hand, Britain's divide and rule policy prevented people from forming a national party; parties were ethnic-based, though religious doctrines were intrinsically embedded.



3.2.3 Indirect rule and citizen participation (1899-1905)

When the British consolidated power in Uganda, they devised a means for ruling the country. At that time, the standard way was to sign agreements of disguised power sharing. Pratt (1960) points out that the Buganda Agreement of 1900, signed between the British and Buganda's *Kabaka* Chwa, was the most noteworthy agreement in the history of pre-independence Uganda. However, its principles undermined aspects of democracy. The agreement reduced the powers of the *kabaka*, who was a hereditary appointee, and maximised the powers of the British (Karugire, 1980; Chibita &

Fourie, 2007). Strangely, the agreement was drawn up in both Luganda⁴⁵ and English; however, the English version of the agreement became binding on both parties; though, as none of the Baganda signatories to the agreement had a strong command of English, they were rendered objects of administrative manipulation (Karugire 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1997). By using English as the common language in agreements such as the Buganda agreement of 1900 and the native Authority Ordinance of 1919, the British were able to concretise their 'indirect rule' system of administration, using local chiefs such as Semei Kakungulu.⁴⁶

Mamdani (1997) and Pratt (1960) point out that the appointment of Semei Kakungulu by the British was contrary to tradition, since chiefs were normally natives of the communities which they administered, and were appointed by local authorities. Kakungulu and his agents extended the centralised model of administration to some of the communities to which they were sent by British (Pratt, 1960; Low, 1965; Low & Robert, 1960). The British also gave the local chiefs and colonial administrators wide-ranging powers in maintaining law and order, preventing crimes, arresting offenders, prohibiting the carrying of arms, and conscripting free labour for public projects (Low, 1965; Low & Robert, 1960; Chibita

⁴⁵ Luganda is a local language spoken by the Baganda, the tribe or group of people that occupy the central region of Uganda, where the British established the administrative centre. At present, the region also doubles as the Kingdom of Buganda and the capital city of Uganda.

⁴⁶ For instance, they embarked (originally the role of the *kabaka*) on appointing Baganda chiefs to administer other parts of Uganda outside Buganda territory, largely under the supervision of Chief Semei Kakungulu. This not only disfranchised the citizens from electing their own leaders, but also caused resentment in communities where such leaders were installed (see Chibita & Fourie, 2007).

& Fourie, 2007; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). The chiefs ruled with an iron hand, a situation that created antipathy. The locals blamed the administrative system forced on them by the British-imposed chiefs wherever they were posted (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). Ultimately there was resistance from the populace, and a demand for greater participation in the political process.

3.2.4 Ethnic division and its impact on citizen participation (1906-1913)

The possibility of participation under British rule was problematic, considering Uganda's complex ethnic dynamics (Karugire, 1980; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Low, 1965; Low & Robert, 1960; Mamdani, 1997; Pratt, 1960). By 1918 the Uganda protectorate had taken shape and by 1921 all communities of Uganda were indirectly under colonial administration, governed by chiefs appointed by the British government (Low, 1965; Low & Robert, 1960; Mamdani, 1997; Pratt, 1960). By defining territorial boundaries, the British exploited Uganda's lack of ethnic homogeneity to establish an administrative system which encouraged competition rather than co-operation among the different regions and ethnic groups (Low, 1965; Low & Robert, 1960; Pratt, 1960). Because of the different ways in which the British had negotiated or forced their way into the different parts of Uganda, they failed to establish a common policy for administering the different districts they created as administrative units (Chibita & Fourie, 2007).

Kabwegyere (1995) observes that this state of affairs gave rise to mutual suspicion, uneven development and a tendency for the different districts to defend a separate

autonomy. The emphasis was placed on each district's vertical relationship with the centre, rather than on horizontal relationships between the districts (Kabwegyere, 1995). Scholars such as Kabwegyere (1995), Karugire (1980) and Mamdani (1976) have argued that the appointment of Baganda as agents of the British colonial administration enabled them to acquire wealth which they reinvested in Buganda. Social services and physical infrastructure in Buganda were (and are still) superior to those of all other regions (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Uganda's failure to coalesce around a strong unit such as Buganda made the local rather than national level the legitimate forum for political expression and identity (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Loyalty to the district (which often coincided with ethnic group) was enhanced by a number of other factors. For example, the localisation of social service provision (through decentralisation) intensified feelings of 'them' against 'us', a sentiment rooted in what Mamdani (1997) refers to as 'politically enforced ethnic pluralism', and which ensured that each ethnic group in the colony developed as a separate unit. The result was that the very foundation of these societies was uprooted, particularly by the establishment of a deliberative Lukiiko, a class of land-owners not dependent on the *kabaka*, and which also reduced the *kabaka's* traditional powers. In fact, the promulgation of the Local Government Act of 1949 to contain dissent marked the beginning of tribally-based administration in Uganda (Mamdani, 1997).

Among other results, the Local Government Act of 1949 empowered the British governor to establish a district council in any part of the colony. Efforts were made to draw boundaries so as to limit the population in each district to one tribe. This


was successful in most districts, except for West-Nile, Bukedi and Kigezi, which were already ethnically heterogeneous (Karugire (1980). District councils were also tribally based, and each district functioned independently – and, for the most part, oblivious of other units (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). This state of affairs was not wholly a happy accident on the part of the colonial administration; rather, efforts were made to stop district leaders from meeting with fellow district leaders from other communities, and leaders were regularly silenced (Ibingira, 1973; Karugire, 1980; Mamdani, 1996). The British were the only duly constituted participants in the politics of the time; Ugandans were mere spectators.

3.2.5 Language policy and citizen participation (1930-1940's)

As with ethnicity determining participation, the choice of what language to use was among the many controversies that surrounded the establishment of the East African Federation, which began as early as the 1930s. Chibita & Fourie (2007) points out that there was a move to promote *Kiswahili*⁴⁷ as the East African *lingua franca*, for economic and administrative expediency. Similarly, Kabwegyere (1995) observes that a high premium was placed on knowledge of *Kiswahili*, which was linked to both appointment and promotion in the civil service. However, the British were suspicious of *Kiswahili*, not only because it was linked to Islam and therefore contrary to the Anglicisation project that they were working on, but also because it had the potential to aid the spread of the Mau-Mau rebellion, which was gaining

⁴⁷ The *Kiswahili* language is spoken among various groups traditionally inhabiting the East African coastline. The language derives from centuries of contact between Arabic-speaking traders and the many different Bantu-speaking peoples of the area.

ground in neighbouring Kenya (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995; Karugire, 1980). So the British were against the idea of Uganda's common language being *Kiswahili*, *Luganda*, or any of the vernaculars, and recognised only the English language. By making English the *de facto* national language, Chibita and Fourie (2007) point out, the British were able to proscribe national debate. English served to unify the emerging elite and the colonialists in addition to serving administrative purposes, but was inaccessible to the majority of Ugandans. Most Ugandans at grassroots level remained separated from government (and each other) by English, but there was intense Anglicisation at the elite level; all the vernacular languages were left to continue serving their respective ethnic communities. This arrangement contributed to the growth of insular nationalism (Chibita & Fourie, 2007).



Indeed, insular nationalism in Uganda was a product of the colonial language policy and the general policy of separate development. Prior to Uganda's independence, each ethnic group deliberated individually and addressed its own, narrow needs (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Karugire (1980) points out that communication flowed vertically, from the district councils to the colonial government, and to the Colonial Office in London. As a result, there was little chance for the formation of ethnically comprehensive political parties with a national character (Mutibwa, 1992). In fact, people in their separate ethnic groupings were content with this type of power arrangement at the district level. Therefore, the first political parties that were formed in the run-up to the first national elections in 1961, such as the Bataka Party (BP), the Uganda African Farmers Union (UAFU), the Democratic Party (DP) and the


Kabaka Yekka (KY) were characterised by a parochial outlook based on ethnic origin, religion or a combination of these (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Karugire, 1980).

3.2.6 Socio-economic inequalities and participation (1940-1950's)

During British rule in Uganda, the distribution of socio-economic infrastructure and essential services (schools, hospitals, roads) was uneven. Chibita and Fourie (2007) assert that the British cultivated social inequalities between Uganda's various ethnic groups through selective allocation of essential services such as transportation and education, and of other forms of infrastructure development. Karugire (1980) argues that the establishment of major industries in Buganda created the need for migrant wage labour from other parts of the country, such as Kigezi and West-Nile. This resulted in a highly multilingual Buganda, a situation that still prevails. Other scholars such as Kabwegyere (1995) and Mutibwa (1992) report that during the colonial period, Northern Uganda remained a source of wage labour and recruitment for the army. Karugire (1980) says that in Ankole (Western Uganda), the British favoured the Bahima (pastoralists) with education opportunities linked to employment and promotion in the much-coveted civil service. As a result, by the 1940s the majority Bairu (agriculturalists) of Ankole constituted yet another disgruntled group (Karugire, 1980).

Furthermore, Karugire (1980) and Kabwegyere (1995) assert that even as the opportunities to participate in governance arose in Uganda (particularly in the period leading up to the first elections in 1961), the majority of Ugandans, who did

not have a Western (formal) education, were relegated to the position of spectators rather than active participants. Socio-economic inequality was also disseminated, according to religious affiliation. For instance, Karugire (1980), Kabwegyere (1995) and Chibita and Fourie (2007) observe that education and training for leadership during colonial times was the preserve of Protestant and Catholic schools. As a result, Muslim children had limited opportunities to be enrolled in a school at the time. Not only was the education system lop-sided, it also largely determined who was most likely to be appointed to key positions in local government (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). The impact of this education policy was that many Muslims took up artisanship, for lack of alternatives. Chibita and Fourie (2007) claim that some of these inequalities left behind by the colonialists have not been fully redressed.



The impact of Western cultural values on the participation introduced by British rule resulted in cultural changes that disturbed the political stability in the period leading up to Uganda's independence. For instance, formal education created a gap between those who were able to access it and those who were not (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Leaders of political parties that were formed in the 1950s in preparation for the first national elections had the advantage of Western education (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). But some traditionalists were dissatisfied with how religions were luring young people away from their traditional beliefs and ways of life. Conversion often came with opportunities for formal Western education, which lent the converts the courage to challenge traditional authority (Karugire, 1980). Karugire (1980) also observes that a wide gap was created between

the 'educated' and the 'uneducated'. Western education and values effectively disenfranchised those who did not get that education. The result was that the uneducated populace took little part in the events leading up to independence. According to Chabita and Fourie (2007), the discontent caused by the differences between educated and uneducated played itself out in repeated cases of civil disturbance between the 1940s and the 1960s.

In pre-independence Uganda, Buganda remained a key influence in Uganda's politics (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). Buganda's protest at the establishment of an East African Federation, which Buganda saw as a further loss of autonomy, led to the British exiling Kabaka Mutesa II in 1953 (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). In protest, Buganda refused to participate in any further plans for Uganda's independence until Mutesa II was returned and its other conditions were met (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). Mutesa II was returned to Buganda in 1955; however, his powers were reduced on condition that the Lukiiko (Buganda's parliament) be made more participatory (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976).

Nearer independence, in 1962, Buganda and the British were involved in a series of negotiations to make the Mengo administration (Buganda Kingdom Headquarters) more powerful and discourage the formation of any political party with a national character (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). Karugire (1980) asserts that Bugandan leadership wanted to secure independence from the British

before the rest of Uganda was declared independent, and hence resorted to various subversive activities to this end. The colonial administration in turn abandoned dialogue and banned any political organisation which it considered disruptive of the 'public peace' (Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). Eventually Buganda forced the British to make some concessions, thereby further consolidating Buganda's already dominant position. As Karugire (1980) puts it, as Uganda approached independence in 1962, it was 'a house divided against its normal self'

3.2.7 Participation at the dawn of independence and beyond (1962-1967)

At independence, Uganda was polarised along political, ethnic, racial, religious and economic lines (Gooloba-Mutebi, 2008; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Some scholars (Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976) observe that such divisions were reflected in the nature of political parties and alliances that were formed, in recruitment to the civil service and the military, in the control of the economy and in unequal access to social services. For instance, Karugire (1988) claims that Uganda was an artificial country, the sections of which possessed nothing in common, since even their history throughout the colonial period did not appear to be a shared one; and Parliament (after independence) was no more than a gathering of local government delegations bargaining for their respective regions (see also Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mutibwa, 1992; Mamdani, 1997). Between 1964 and 1967, tensions in Uganda's national politics intensified; and not only did politics continue to be played along ethnic lines, but also the army, which increasingly became a key player in politics. Tensions between the national government and the

Mengo government came to a climax in 1966 in what was called the 'Buganda crisis' (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mutibwa, 1992; Mamdani, 1997). During this crisis, the national army besieged the Buganda palace and took over the premises of key institutions of the Buganda government. *Kabaka* Mutesa II was sent into exile in London once again, and the Prime Minister (Milton Obote) was suspended; later, the constitution was abrogated (Karugire, 1980; 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani 1997). A new constitution was ushered in, with Milton Obote as president (replacing *Kabaka* Mutesa II, who had played only a ceremonial role as president since independence). Kingdoms were abolished, and Uganda was declared a republic (Karugire, 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976).

During the same period, laws such as the Preventive Detention Act were used to silence opposition in Buganda, and later in the rest of the country (Karugire, 1980; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). This was justified as necessary for 'national consolidation'. After the 'Buganda crisis' of 1966/67 there was a significant reduction in the power of the civil rights enshrined in the independence constitution of 1962 (Karugire, 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). The 'state of emergency' which was declared in Buganda in 1966 opened the way for arbitrary arrests and imprisonment without trial in the 'national interest' (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Obote declared Uganda a one-party state, and the independence of key institutions such as the public service, the judiciary, the police and the army were systematically eroded (Karugire, 1988; Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1976). Many experienced functionaries left the civil service because of the government's increasingly dictatorial stance, and the level of

participation in the political process that had characterised the pre-independence period diminished, as people began to fear for their safety. Karugire (1988) explains that the electoral system became 'a meaningless pretence in which nobody had any confidence whatsoever, and it ceased to be the basis of selecting popular government at all levels' as dictatorial tendencies became more overt.

3.2.7.1 Dictatorship in its earliest form (1967-1970)

According to Hansen and Michael (1988) there was barely hope of nurturing a culture of participation in public debate in Uganda between 1967 and 1970 (see also Kyemba, 1977; Karugire, 1980; Kabwegyere, 1995). For historical reasons, the first parliament (which would have provided the forum for national dialogue about the future of Uganda) was weak. In fact, Karugire (1998) argues that the apart from a handful of secondary school teachers and (to a far lesser extent) a few professionals such as lawyers and doctors, Uganda's first parliament was full of people who were barely literate, and possessed little understanding of the management of complex public affairs. Meanwhile, the depoliticisation of civil society (particularly trade unions and co-operatives), that had begun in colonial times to contain opposition, continued; because post-independence leaders lacked the mandate needed to feel secure in their positions (see Golooba-Mutebi, 2008; Bazaara, 2003; Okoth, 1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya, 1997; Bazaara & Barya, 1999).

Consequently, national leadership gradually became dominated by individuals who had little impact on solving post-colonial political problems. Uganda's politics

during that period were characterised by manipulation, opportunism, intrigue and infighting, which later intensified conflicts in local government (Mamdani, 1976; Bazaara 2003; Okoth 1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya 1997; Bazaara & Barya, 1999). These conflicts were often related to the fact that Government had tampered with the independence of appointment boards, while corruption and nepotism had become institutionalised (Mamdani, 1976). Consequently, the chiefs of areas were inept, and did not receive the respect that would have been derived from their traditional institutions (Karugire 1988; Golooba-Mutebi, 2004; Chibita & Fourie, 2007). With political parties having been banned in 1967, and all other forms of association closely monitored, it became difficult for a strong civil society to develop (Okoth, 1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya, 1997; Bazaara & Barya, 1999). In an effort to contain the opposition, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) enacted laws in line with the new, dictatorial stance taken following the abrogation of the constitution in 1966 and the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill (1966 sec. 29), which had provision for a life sentence for incitement against chiefs appointed by the government (Okoth, 1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya 1997; Bazaara & Barya, 1999).

The police and army became increasingly involved in administration, the executive interfered freely to secure support for itself at district level, and the urban authorities were no longer elected but appointed by the appropriate ministries (Mamdani, 1976; Okoth 1996; Oloka-Onyango & Barya, 1997). Public confidence in these institutions was greatly undermined and since the avenues of citizen engagement were closed, apathy set in, and most of the public bodies collapsed (Karugire, 1988; Mamdani,

1976). The military, dominated by people from one region (the North), and largely illiterate due to the inequitable distribution of education opportunities during the colonial era, became influential in the management of the state. The army was easy to manipulate, and was used to support an increasingly unpopular government, considering that the top leadership of the UPC came from Northern Uganda (Karugire, 1988; Mamdani, 1976). Hence, under Obote the military also became a key player in Ugandan politics. By 1971, there was no visible culture of ordinary Ugandans participating in debate relating to governance through any fora, as a result of domination by elites who were pro-UPC government (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). With more army and police visible in public administration, the UPC government was eventually ousted by Idi Amin on 25 January 1971.

3.2.7.2 Citizen participation in a collapsed state (1971-1986)

This period was the reign of terror when Idi Amin was at the helm of leadership (Kyemba, 1977). During this time there was no pretence of democracy (Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995; Karugire, 1988). The Suspension of Political Activities Act (1971) summarises the extent to which participation in any form of political debate was proscribed during Amin's reign. The Act (among others) prohibited the organisation of, or participation in, any public meeting or procession for propagating or imparting political ideas or information; the formation of political parties; and wearing, uttering or displaying any party name, symbols or other paraphernalia (Kabwegyere, 1995; Karugire, 1988). While there were some 'rules' against engaging in public debate, these remained unwritten until 1972. However,

following an attempt to oust him by a military take-over, Amin abolished parliament, as well as district and urban councils, the two remaining spaces where ordinary Ugandans were still able to participate in their own governance, albeit through representatives. Henceforth, Amin made himself the executive, legislature and judiciary (Kabwegyere, 1995; Karugire, 1988). He reorganised local government and, at the regional level, appointed governors, who were mostly military men. Local chiefs were mostly chosen from military ranks (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). Amin's reign came to an end in 1979 when he tried invading the neighbouring state of Tanzania, with the intention of annexing a part of Tanzanian territory to Uganda.

By the end of the Amin's dictatorship, his policies had devastated the economy, and the political instability that set in following his departure ensured that economic hardship would continue for some time. For instance, between 1979 and 1985, three governments came and went in quick succession (Karugire, 1980; 1988). At the time of Amin's departure the government consisted of a military commission, an organ of the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF), which apparently worked under a Presidential Commission of three eminent civilians. Accordingly, the Military Commission (headed by Paulo Muwanga) organised presidential and parliamentary elections in 1980, and engineered the return to power of Obote (Karugire, 1980; 1988). Obote II was constrained by guerrilla movements that were dissatisfied with the political conditions of the time, and eventually started operating and mobilising around the capital city (Chibita & Fourie, 2007). The Obote II government's response to increasing opposition was not dialogue, but violent suppression. It was

considered risky to engage in any political party activity (Karugire, 1980; 1988). The National Resistance Movement (political party) together with National Resistance Army became a major threat to the sitting governments between 1981 and 1986.

As a result, there was intensified chaos, cruelty, looting, rape and murder as these armed groups sometimes victimised people to settle personal scores, or in order to loot their property (Karugire, 1980; 1988). This period, characterised by weakening central administrative control, the decimation of civil society, the weakening of the judiciary and the economy, and fears of spying and counter-spying, continued under the Obote II government (Karugire, 1980; 1988; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995). During the same period, many Ugandans began to abandon their town jobs, homes and property for the safety of the rural communities (Karugire, 1985; Mutibwa, 1992). Obote, in an attempt to contain the chaotic situation, made a series of tactical blunders, most of which were prompted by the need to punish one ethnic group and appease another. Chibita and Fourie (2007) observe that this state of affairs culminated in a mutiny that saw Obote's overthrow in 1985. The military state of emergency led by General Tito Okello Lutwa (who took over from Obote) presided over a year of chaos, as numerous rebel groups terrorised the population in their attempt to seize power. This was the situation when Museveni's NRA/NRM overthrew the government of Tito Okello through a *coup d'état* in January 1986.

3.3 Rebirth of democracy and citizen participation (1986-2011)

When the NRM surreptitiously staged a guerrilla war against the dictatorial government in the early part of the 1980s, their strategy of action in case they assumed power was laid down in the Ten Point Programme (Karugire, 1888; Chibita & Fourie, 2007; Kabwegyere, 1995). The first point of the Ten Point Programme advocated real democracy. Following their takeover, the NRA/NRM established a far-reaching transformation with regard to opportunities for citizens to participate in their own governance. Such provisions allowed all Ugandan adults - especially those that were previously marginalised, such as women, the youth and the disabled - to participate in governance (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008; Nsibambi, 1998; Mamdani, 1997; 1989; Golooba-Mutebi, 2004). Under a form of 'no-party democracy' known as the Movement System, the NRM introduced popular participation as a key element of all its policies (Carbone, 2004; Mamdani, 1997; 1998; Golooba-Mutebi, 2004). The NRM further instituted a system of popularly-elected Local Councils (LCs), initially referred to Resistance Councils (RCs).⁴⁸ The system consisted of five tiers (from RC1 to RC5), which for the first time in Uganda's history gave communities at village level the power not only to choose but also to recall their representative, if he or she did not perform to their satisfaction.

The Resistance Councils, according to Mamdani (1997), had their limitations, as they did not take due cognisance of entrenched socio-economic differences in their organisation. Chibita and Fourie (2007) point out that eligibility for public office was

⁴⁸ According to John and Putzel (2005), under the NRM regime, sustaining participatory democracy remained a key political and ideological goal, similar to other populist experiences, including Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Jerry Rawlings in Ghana.

based on 'individual merit' and residence, but not on differentiated working conditions. The RCs tended not to build capacity among those classes that were genuinely interested in reform, but rather provided opportunities for the socially well-placed to consolidate their positions through dominating these positions of leadership. Indeed, the system came to be dominated by the more prosperous members of rural communities (Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1998). However, in order to conciliate the multiple political forces at play, at both grassroots and national levels, the NRM established a broad-based government at the national level comprised of groups of people who belonged to different political parties but were willing to embrace the new, 'no-party democracy' philosophy espoused by the NRM (Chibita and Fourie, 2007).




The NRM, fearful of endangering their hold on power by allowing politicians at the national level to access potential voters at the village level, limited direct elections to the RC1 tier (Kabwegyere, 1995; Mamdani, 1989). All subsequent elections up to district level were by electoral college. In a way, this diluted the participatory nature of the RC system. There was a push from the local and international communities to restore 'real' participation – a situation that contributed to the restoration of the traditional kingdoms, which Obote had abolished in 1967. However, part of the process of restoring the kingdoms was a pact made between cultural leaders and the government that the cultural leaders would not engage in partisan politics. This seemed meaningless to some traditional leaders (especially *Kabaka* Mutebi II), who would prefer full, unhindered influence over their territory in relation to local

governance. These differences between the central government and some of the kingdoms (especially in Buganda) remain an ongoing source of tension.⁴⁹

3.3.1 Legislative provisions for citizens' participation

In Uganda, the idea of democracy and real citizen participation was popularised by the current NRM government, after reinstating constitutionalism. Citizen participation attained significance in the constitution and other legislative documents, and it was placed at the very heart of the system of local government. Section II of the Constitution of Uganda (1995) highlights the democratic principles stipulated, which include:

- 
- (i) the state shall be based on democratic principles which empower and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance; (ii) all the people of Uganda shall have access to leadership positions at all levels, subject to the Constitution; (iii) the state shall be guided by the principle of decentralisation and devolution of governmental functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs; (iv) the composition of government shall be broadly

⁴⁹ See *The Daily Monitor*, 12 September 2009 Kayunga Crisis: Uganda government stands accused of stoking tribal flames between the Baganda (the largest ethnic group in Uganda) and a tiny section of the Banyala, one of its sub-groups. This has led to running battles between the police and youth groups culminating in full blown riots on Thursday night that led to 10 people dying. The Baganda claim that the Uganda government's strategy is to have complete political control over the land and minerals includes the weakening or usurpation of the claims made by native communities.


representative of the national character and social diversity of the country; (v) all political and civic associations aspiring to manage and direct public affairs shall conform to democratic principles in their internal organisations and practice; and (vi) civic organisations shall retain their autonomy in pursuit of their declared objectives (Constitution of Uganda, 1995).⁵⁰

Considering the huge emphasis placed on democratic principles as well as the role of citizen development, the constitution further stipulated mechanisms through which the democratic principles such as citizen participation in development would be realised. These were clearly illustrated in Article 176, as well as the Local Government Act of 1997. Article 176 Section 1 states that the local government system in Uganda shall be based on the district as a unit under which there shall be such lower local governments and administrative units as Parliament may provide by law. Article 176 Section 2 spells out the principle that will apply to the local government system:

(i) the system shall be such as to ensure that functions, powers and responsibilities are devolved and transferred from the Government to local government units in a co-ordinated manner; (ii) decentralisation shall be a principle applying to all levels of local government, and in particular, from higher to lower local government units to ensure

⁵⁰ See also Article 1 of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995

peoples' participation and democratic control in decision making; (iii) the system shall be such as to ensure the full realisation of democratic governance at all local government levels; (iv) there shall be established for each local government unit a sound financial base with reliable sources of revenue; (v) appropriate measures shall be taken to enable local government units to plan, initiate and execute policies in respect of all matters affecting the people within their jurisdictions; (vi) persons in the service of local government shall be employed by the local governments; and lastly, (vii) the local governments shall oversee the performance of persons employed by the Government to provide services in their communities and to monitor the provision of Government services or the implementation of projects in their communities.



Article 176 Section 3 further stipulates that the system of local government shall be based on democratically elected councils on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in accordance with Article 181 Section 4, which observes that the local government councils shall be elected every four years. Article 177 Section 1 lays down guidelines for local government which indicate that Uganda shall be divided into the districts. Article 177 Section 2 stipulates that the districts referred to in Clause 1 of Article 177 shall be taken to have been divided into the lower local government units which existed immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss how the government of Uganda has interpreted its

constitutional enactments to deepen and facilitate real citizen participation and bring people closer to the government after the rebirth of participation and the democratic dispensation (1986-present).

3.3.2 Deepening democracy through local governments

The enactment of the Local Government Act of 1997 brought with it various changes (Fumihiko, 1998). There was a transition from Resistance Councils (RCs)⁵¹ to Local Councils (LCs)⁵² which signified an end to the legacies of the guerrilla war. The legislature of the National Resistance Council (NRC) was renamed Parliament and the LC5 tier became the supreme political organ at the local government or district level (Anthony, 1995; 1998). The LC5 Chairperson, who is the political head of the Council, formed the executive wing together with the core members (councillors) of the local governments. The councillors acted as secretaries of sector committees, such as finance and administration, production and extension services, education and sports, health and environment, and works and technical services. The Council became a legislative forum where all elected councillors served as representatives of

⁵¹ Under the RC system, RC1 leaders were elected by universal suffrage of adults by lining up behind the candidates. This form of direct election did not apply to the upper level elections. As a result, as the Councils moved from grassroots to higher levels up the hierarchy, the degree of directly reflected public views was reduced.

⁵² In the current LC system, the range for direct election has enlarged significantly (Anthony, 1995; 1998; Fumihiko, 1998). In addition, the secret ballot is a more common method of voting – with the exception of the selection of women representatives, still achieved by lining up behind the candidates. Most important is that the election of LC5 Chairperson – equivalent to the governor in many other countries – is now a secret ballot of universal adult suffrage.

the people (Fumihiko, 1998). The technical staff are under the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), who heads the civil service and implements the policy decisions of the Council (Anthony, 1995; 1998; Fumihiko, 1998).

Another important development that came with the LCs is that the representation of women improved significantly. While the minimum requirement for female representation in the RC system was only one out of nine councillors, with LCs it became at least one-third of the entire group of representatives (Fumihiko, 1998). In the RC system, councillors discharged their responsibilities totally voluntarily, without any official remuneration; the core members of the LC are now paid full salaries at LC1 and LC5 levels. This undoubtedly contributed significantly to the improvement of work incentives for councillors. In addition, the NRM, conscious of its historical mission, decided to establish a commission of enquiry to investigate how best decentralisation or local governments could effectively function. The 1987 Uganda Commission of inquiry into local governance and the subsequent 1989 Mamdani Commission suggested that the adoption of a decentralisation policy would (i) move public services closer to the people; (ii) reduce tedious administrative and bureaucratic procedures; (iii) make services suitable to local needs and conditions; (iv) improve accountability by implementing close local scrutiny; and (v) contribute to the process of capacity building of local institutions (Uganda, 1987; Mamdani, 1989; Fumihiko, 1998).⁵³

⁵³See World Bank, 1998; Gershberg, 1998

The commission of inquiry reports on the possible approaches to decentralisation ranged between two extremes. One end of the scale was deconcentration, by which administrative duties may be shifted from central government to local governments without necessarily transferring autonomy; the other was devolution, which would usually be accompanied by increased autonomy of local governments (Uganda, 1987; Mamdani, 1989). After considering various options, the Uganda Commission (1987) recommended that the Resistance Councils (RCs) should not be states or NRM organs, but “democratic organs of the people” in order to establish “effective, viable and representative Local Authorities” (Uganda, 1987). This was a practical attempt to adopt a middle way between the two extremes of superficial deconcentration and full devolution (Fumihiko, 1998). Subsequently, an understanding was reached between these extremes; the first thirteen districts were decentralised in 1993. During the same period, the Local Government Statute of 1993 was passed. This statute provided a firm legal basis for the earlier practices of the RC system, and rationalised the complex line of authority caused by the five-tiered hierarchy (Fumihiko, 1998). It also made it clear that public servants were answerable to their respective RCs.

The enactment of the Local Government Act of 1997 meant devolution of power, and autonomy over all development programmes and projects handed over to local governments. NAADS, for example, was to be implemented through decentralisation in order to achieve its intended target. Other government macro-economic development policies such as the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP),

spearheaded by the World Bank and the IMF, were also to be implemented through decentralisation, by means of micro-economic programmes promoting more cost-effective allocation of essential services, particularly health, education, agricultural production, feeder roads, and safe drinking water (PEAP, 1998; UNDP, 1997). In addition, in 1992 the government of Uganda established a Decentralisation Secretariat, the objectives of which (among others) were to vigorously advance decentralisation by providing resources and technical support to various parties.

The Decentralisation Secretariat became a semi-autonomous organisation of the Ministry of Local Government, which provides training programmes to various stakeholders: civil servants, councillors and concerned citizens (Fumihiko, 1998). In addition, the Secretariat prepares and issues various manuals and guide books to enable councillors and administrators to manage various duties. With the support of donors, especially the United Nations Development Programme and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Secretariat has performed satisfactory work so far, despite a lack of financial resources and manpower (Decentralisation Secretariat, 1996; 1998; Fumihiko, 1998). This shortfall in finances has enabled the government of Uganda to embrace the liberal democratic reforms that were driven by western superpowers alongside the multinational development agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF. While such reforms are ongoing, it is important for this dissertation to discuss briefly how development agencies advocated democracy and citizen participation in Uganda, before the discussion on the major stumbling blocks to democracy and citizen participation. The next section

discusses the role of development agencies and their policies in Uganda's transition towards development and democratisation.

3.3.3 World Bank and IMF policies on democracy and citizen participation

Since the late 1980s the Ugandan economy has enjoyed a period of high uninterrupted growth, broadly attributable to peace, reasonable taxes, tolerable administration of justice, and funding from development agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF (Collier and Reinikka, 2001; World Bank, 2000a; 1998; 2004). Of course, this can partly be attributed to economic reforms, but the lessening of armed conflict, the move towards democracy and better institutions have all played a role. The ratio of government spending to GDP in Uganda has been trending upwards since the late 1980s, when the government adopted IMF- and World Bank-supported reform programs in earnest, and has shown signs of plateauing only since around 2000 (World Bank, 2000a; 2000b; IMF, 2006). The World Bank (as the main financial supporter of development in emerging democracies⁵⁴ of the South), among others, took on the obligation of finding remedies for poverty-stricken countries in the process of realising the Millennium Development goals.⁵⁵ The World Bank has admitted that despite the huge sums of money being directed to developing countries, poverty and inequality are actually increasing.⁵⁶ Besides this startling admission, the World Development Report 1999/2000 states that development is believed to have multiple goals and processes that go beyond economics to address

⁵⁴See World Bank. Undated

⁵⁵ See IDA and IFC, 2000.

⁵⁶ See World Bank OED and IMF IEO 2004.


societal issues in a holistic fashion (World Bank, 2000a).⁵⁷ The report also points out that given a stable macro-economy, there are some other elements required for successful development, including (among others) an emphasis on beneficiary participation; responsiveness to gender concerns; government ownership of projects; the role of social capital; and networks of trust and association (World Bank, 2000a). The World Bank claims that an improvement in participation gender-wise reinforces the development agenda, especially for the voiceless and for individuals with low levels of education. Furthermore, citizen participation has a trickle-down effect on poverty reduction, and contributes enormously to the quality of life of the population (World Bank, 2000a). The World Bank is also aware that discrimination against participation impairs development. Therefore, in order to offer equal opportunities for participation, the World Bank advocates allowing civil society to participate freely in shaping and implementing national anti-poverty strategies (see also IDS Bulletin, 2004).

In Uganda, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)⁵⁸ were considered for the new anti-poverty framework announced late in the 1990s; the processes for creating the PRSPs were to be all-inclusive (IDS, 2004; World Bank, 2000a). The World Bank's focus on PRSPs was mainly to identify a participatory manner in which poverty reduction outcomes could be achieved for a country. At the same time, they would use key public actions – policy changes, institutional reforms, programmes, and

⁵⁷ See World Bank OED 2004.

⁵⁸ .MoFPED 2000d


projects – which were needed to achieve the desired outcomes (World Bank, 2000a). In some respects, the PRSPs became an ‘achievement’ for some of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Uganda. However, these ‘achievements’ posed contentious questions: (i) While full participation by all stakeholders was encouraged in drafting the PRSPs, how would it be achieved at grassroots level, especially in communities where literacy levels are low? (ii) How would both parties (donor and beneficiary) reach a consensus (given the contradictions between demands and expectations of the PRSPs) that would result in better actual strategies being employed? For the PRSP strategy – with its ambitious objectives – to succeed in building effective participation, these questions needed to be given thorough consideration before the ratification of PRSPs by Uganda or other beneficiary countries. In the process, the World Bank developed a citizens’ participation course manual, for roll-out in member countries (World Bank, 2003).



As the World Bank made PRSPs more participatory, the IMF introduced their Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) in Uganda. The ROSC data module contained, among other data, (i) national accounts; (ii) the consumer price index (CPI); (iii) government finance statistics (GFS); and (iv) the balance of payments (BOP). Within the available budget, the emerging democracy’s authorities could produce macroeconomic statistics, with a strong emphasis on co-ordination across statistics, aimed at removing possible differences (IMF Country Report, 2006). The critical users of ROSC included government officials, as well as economic analysts and statisticians (within and outside of government) who constituted the

actors who demonstrate the performance of economies and influence attitudes on investment. The ROSC system also enhanced performance budgeting through improved financial planning, management and monitoring of all government finances, and comparative performance of programmes; there was also increased accountability.

The design features of ROSC support good governance, and have the downstream function of supporting service delivery. The introduction of ROSC had the potential to improve local governance in the following ways:



(i) the budget would be linked to service delivery, thereby ensuring efficiency and performance; (ii) public administration in general would be transformed, both qualitatively and quantitatively; and (iii) the impact of public goods and services expenditures on the GDP of the country would be accurately measured. In implementing the ROSC initiatives the IMF envisaged that participation would be feasible for all citizens. Citizens' participation was then assumed a function of efficiency, transparency and accountability.⁵⁹

However, the World Bank and the IMF have not escaped criticism, in Uganda and elsewhere in the world. For instance, Jones and Hardstaff (2005) demonstrate how the IMF and the World Bank have taken power away from people. Apparently their

⁵⁹ IMF & IEO 2004.

PRSPs for HIPC are imported rather than home-grown, and are accepted under pressure as a means to obtain debt relief; and as a result, often they do not succeed, thus obstructing democracy and citizen engagement (see also G-24 Secretariat, 2003; Villaroman, 2009; Hardstaff, 2003; Buira, 2003; Vreeland, 2007; Levinsohn, 2003).⁶⁰ It's from this point of view that the following section discusses some major deterrents to democracy and citizen participation in Uganda before the conclusion of the chapter.


3.4 Deterrents to democracy and citizen participation

The process of democratisation and citizenship in Uganda has encountered setbacks that have discouraged actual participation. Indeed, in some cases citizens have become what Williams (2008) calls 'mere endorsees' of pre-designed government programmes, and participation has been reduced to a useless but necessary appendage, required by the various laws and policies operating at both local and national government level. Informed discussions and rational debates on the merits and demerits of specific planning programmes are barely noticeable, yet participation features prominently as a key component of planning programmes, at national and local levels (Williams, 2008). This section discusses major deterrents to real citizen participation after the rebirth of participatory democracy.

⁶⁰ See also Jones and Hardstaff's (2005) analysis of 42 countries where PRSPs have been developed and implemented since 1999. They list six commonly occurring limitations on 'country-ownership' of PRSPs: (i) lack of input on economic policy; (ii) lack of parliamentary involvement; (iii) the speed of the process; (iv) the quality of citizen involvement; (v) donor imposition of the process; and (vi) donor imposition of policies.

3.4.1 The militarisation of politics⁶¹ and resultant fear⁶²

When Uganda was handed over by the colonialists at the dawn of independence in 1962, the period that followed was characterised by a series of political instabilities. Indeed, instability was a constant until the late 1970s, when political anarchy was at its peak. Undeniably, authoritarianism, dictatorship and oppression of the masses, as well as violation of human rights, were key characteristics of Uganda at the time. Such a state of affairs instilled fear in the masses regarding engagement with the state. Participation was barely noticeable. Even with the rebirth of participatory politics ushered in by the NRM government, echoes of fear continued to be heard, and actual participation only became visible during the elections; and yet, during the same electoral exercise, those in support of the opposition were still threatened and constantly reminded of how the current government restored peace (Oleru et al, 2005).



⁶¹ See *The Independent*, 5 May 2011. 'How Besigye entered CMI's kill zone'; see also *The Independent*, 10 May 2011. 'Opposition leaders arrested over a rally in Kampala'; and *The Observer*, 27 April 2011, in which Oloka-Onyango points out that Museveni's victory lies in the highly-militarised context within which politics and governance in Uganda are executed. He further observes that "we know that after five years of civil war (1981 to 1986), and twenty-plus years of insurgency in the north of the country, Uganda has virtually never been free from conflict. Unsurprisingly, the idea of peace and security occupy a very significant position within the national psyche".

⁶² See *The Observer*, 27 April 2011. While Oloka-Onyango was making a presentation at the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU), post-election in 2011, he pointed out that "the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) is not well known for exercising restraint when dealing with civilian insurrection or politically-motivated opposition...In fact, when the red berets and the green uniforms come out on the streets you know that there will be correspondingly higher casualties. That is why we should condemn the increased militarisation of the political context"

This situation has contributed to a reluctance among citizens to exercise their constitutionally enshrined liberties, thereby weakening their participation in democratic processes.⁶³ In fact, the current government took advantage of the past to consolidate their stay in power, and some leaders in the higher echelons have often repeated how the NRM government restored democracy and ousted the dictatorial governments.⁶⁴ Such messages not only remind the masses of the brutality of previous governments; they also concretise fear and discourage active political participation. In some cases, those who participate are linked to rebellious groups that pose a threat to national security. For instance, those in opposition have been subjected to humiliation, and others have been tortured during election campaigns.⁶⁵

3.4.2 Political Patronage and Impunity

In Uganda, there has been general lack of political commitment on the side of the central government towards effective devolution of powers, which is evident in the continued influence and interference in the functioning of local government units.

Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) point out that the growing political culture is one of

⁶³ See *The Daily Monitor*, 9 May 2011, 'Uganda must probe unarmed protestor deaths: Human Rights Watch'. See also *The Daily Monitor*, 9 May 2011, 'Police block DP rally at Kololo, ask for State House clearance first'. See also *The Independent*, 29 April 2011, 'The failures of Uganda's democracy'.

⁶⁴ See *The Observer*, 27 April 2011, in which Oloka-Onyango claims that there is no democratic country in the world that relies on their military. He cites the notoriety of the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), and paramilitary shadow militias such as the Black Mamba; and the PGB and the many generals who have invaded political life. He further points out that the UPDF should be removed from directly involving itself in politics, as is normally the case in a functioning multiparty system.

⁶⁵ This was also confirmed by the European Union Election Observer Mission in Uganda, February 2011.

polarisation, where central government politicians not only interfere in local elections, but also frustrate local communities that do not subscribe to views of the ruling party (see also Olum, 2004:4). For example, during election campaigns, by law local leaders are required to be non-partisan and elected on individual merit; however, central government officials openly campaign for some candidates seen as sympathisers to the government (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). In addition, senior politicians continue, unchecked, to influence local government activities, such as by the controversial 'tenderpreneurship' process (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008; Francis & James, 2003; Olum, 2004). Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) claim further that though the Constitution of Uganda, 1995, Article 180 Section 1 makes the district council the highest political authority in its area of jurisdiction, and the district council chairperson its political head, on many occasions the official from the President's office rescinds district council decisions. Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) cite a situation in 2004 and 2005 in which the payment of fees and levies to Kampala City Council (KCC) by motorists (popularly known as *Boda-Boda*) and market vendors was cancelled by presidential aides. Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) also report that a major development plan passed by KCC to modernise *Naguru* estates was halted in 2003.

Similarly, in 2002, the central government wanted four districts to dismiss their Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs), allegedly for mismanaging funds entrusted to them to help run elections. The district councils refused, arguing that they could not interdict their CAOs concerning functions and funds that were outside their jurisdiction. As a result, there was a standoff between central government and the

local governments, and central government instructed the Department of Finance to withhold transfer of funds to those districts. Subsequently, the districts were forced to make the CAOs resign (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). In another case, in 2005, central government successfully pushed for several constitutional amendments to enable them to exercise more control over LGUs, among them the right to appoint CAOs, who were previously appointed by the district service commissions. The constitutional amendment Article 188 section 2 now requires that CAOs be appointed and dismissed by the Public Service Commission. Such cases of patronage are not only setbacks for citizen participation, but also weaken their independence and ability to make meaningful decisions, as expected by the electorate.

3.4.3 Corruption and electoral commission misconduct

As is the case elsewhere in the developing world, citizen participation in Uganda has been severely strained by electoral misconduct perpetuated by the government of the time.⁶⁶ The latest non-Ugandan examples can be found in Kenya (KANU vs ODM), and in Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF vs MDC). In Uganda, the presidential results of 2006 were contested in court on the grounds that there were irregularities, including (among others) bribery of voters, harassment of opposition supporters, and the use of state machinery during the electoral campaign. Paradoxically, given such

⁶⁶ Results released by the Electoral Commission for the 2011 presidential elections: of 13 954 129 registered voters, only 8 272 760 voted, representing 59.28%. A total of 5.6m of registered voters (40%) didn't turn up to vote. Political analysts have argued that voters who did not cast their ballot are largely those who are frustrated with the President but feel that their vote will not count. This is attributed to Museveni's dogmatic rhetoric and the ever-dominating NRM propaganda that "Museveni can never be defeated through ballot" (see *The Monitor*, 7 July 2011).

alarming irregularities, the Uganda Electoral Commission was influenced by the NRM to declare it the winner.⁶⁷ Such activities of treachery (influence and peddling) and interfering with the independence of the Electoral Commission only serve to suffocate local citizen participation, according to Kakumba and Nsingo (2008), as well as facilitating the alienation of the citizens from a sense of ownership of people's power.⁶⁸ This cannot be overemphasised; as Mamdani (1996, cited by Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008) argues, "in Africa, the patrimonial state continues to perpetuate the rule over subjects rather than a rule by citizens". In a political environment where the local government system is characterised by devious and opportunistic leaders, it is certainly difficult for the grassroots to exercise their rights as enshrined in the constitution.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ See *The Independent*, 24 February 2011, 'Why Museveni won and Besigye lost and what could be done'. Mweda argues that "we should have expected government to employ more violence, intimidation and outright vote rigging than in the past. Instead these ills have been less used. But money has played an important role: Museveni spent more than US\$350m on this campaign using largely the public purse (through official government programmes conveniently deployed during the campaigns) but supplemented by private contributions. This figure is almost half the money Barack Obama spent to win elections in the US in 2008, in a country with a GDP of \$14 trillion. Given that Uganda's GDP is \$15 billion i.e. 0.1 percent of US GDP, this is an unprecedented record".

⁶⁸ See *The Daily Monitor*, 8 March 2011, 'Why 5 million Ugandans stayed away from polls'.

⁶⁹ See the preliminary findings by the European Union Election Observer Mission in Uganda, February 2011, which state that the Kampala-based Human Rights Network for Journalists has noted an increasing number of cases of harassment of journalists in the campaigns. On 7 February 2011, the owners of Radio Rhino and Voice of Lango, two Lira District-based radio stations, were summoned for interrogation by both the District Police Commander and the Resident District Commissioner, for having hosted civil society activists seeking to expose and condemn allegations of government corruption. On 9 February 2011 soldiers belonging to the Army's Special Forces Group (SFG) allegedly assaulted a *Daily Monitor* journalist in Sembabule District as he attempted to take pictures of them stopping Rwemiyaga County MP Theodore Sekikubo from erecting a campaign poster. On 10

3.4.4 Local government conflicts and elitism


Ever since Uganda's independence, local conflicts have become a common characteristic of some local governments. In recent times, such conflicts have to some extent propelled the formation of new districts.⁷⁰ According to Kakumba and Nsingo (2008), conflicts between various levels of local administration have been identified. For instance, there is resentment from the villages and parishes, on one hand, against the sub-counties and districts, on the other, over the failure of the latter to include them in decision-making processes; and their failure to remit a portion of the revenues collected to the villages and parishes that are entitled to it (Francis & James, 2003). In addition, the interface between politicians and civil servants has exhibited conflicts of roles and interests, factionalism, confrontation, intimidation and power struggles (Sabiti, 1998; Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008).

Such conflict arises out of differences in policy approaches. Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) acknowledge that while politicians seek to please their constituents at all costs, to retain political support, technocrats (the civil servants) are concerned about adequacy of process and frugality of resource use; hence the danger of conflict between the role players. To authenticate these phenomena, there are reported cases of politicians harassing civil servants over their alleged frustration of the politicians'

February 2011, a Masaka-based NTV correspondent was detained by the SFG for filming a scuffle involving Rwemiyaga area Member of Parliament Theodore Sekikubo, ahead of President Museveni's campaign rally.

⁷⁰ Evidence of this is from a discussion with the current director of Local Government, who pointed out that the differences in some districts have made it difficult for effective services delivery in practice. He observed that in many cases the differences are ethnically driven.


development projects (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008; Kakumba, 2003). While such conflicts continue to occur, local government councillors and civil servants have become powerful by making decisions beneficial to them relating to planning, allocation of resources, and awarding of tenders and contracts for projects (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). It has become common for some members of the public to sponsor campaigns for local government representatives in anticipation of material favours, often in the form of preferential treatment. Olum (2004) points out that in rural communities, local councillors are increasingly being drawn from 'well-to-do' households, and give inducements to the poor in the form of household goods in order to be elected. This has created an elite segment whose interests preclude the majority poor.



In fact, some of the elected representatives and officials at rural sub-county level and lower parish and village units perform only to the advantage of the local elite. Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) and Francis and James (2003) observe that district plans rarely incorporate the priorities of lower local councils; and when this is done, the plans are not necessarily adhered to, as the top politicians in their council committees at district level often create so-called 'hot priorities' and urgent projects which have to be financed from time to time. These authors state that performance is ritualised, with little citizen involvement, owing to a lack of resources, and monopolisation by local elites.

3.4.5 Insufficient pecuniary aptitude

To some extent, misappropriation of resources has crippled local government's ability to function. As a result, the weak financial position of most LGUs not only reduces their capacity to integrate the local community into development projects, but affects responsiveness to community needs (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). The situation is exacerbated by a low tax base, and the continuous control of sufficient sources of revenue by central government (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). Francis and James' (2003) analysis of the budgets of several districts in 2002 revealed that they could only collect an average of 7% of their budgets locally. At the same time, division of existing districts and the creation of new districts continue to overburden central government resources, which are insufficient and come as conditional grants.⁷¹



Such financial setbacks leave local governments as mere agents of advocacy for citizen participation, rather than being key players in accelerating broad-based citizen participation. The result is that the LGUs become representatives of higher-level structures, and not of the local citizenry. For example, Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) make reference to central government and donors often being interested in establishing new facilities such as schools and health units, and officiating at opening ceremonies. Contrarily, Onyach-Olaa (2003) believes that it might be

⁷¹Conditional grants accounts for over 80% of central government transfers and support is earmarked for specific national programmes at local units. The unconditional grant is largely spent on general management and administration, and there is therefore little (if no) room for local governments to use these resources for their own development priorities.

suitable for a local government to improve on the quality of the existing facilities, given that a new school would require desks, textbooks and teachers' salaries; and a new health unit would require drugs, staff salaries and hospital beds, all of which burden the recipient LGUs. Though the high level of central transfers to the districts may not necessarily mean lack of local autonomy, Kakumba and Nsingo (2008) argue that the conditions usually attached to these transfers can undermine genuine local decision making and citizen participation.

3.4.6 Uneven social stratification and lack of accountability

Uganda is characterised by uneven social classes. The poorest of the poor⁷² occupy the rural communities, and they comprise 80% of the entire population⁷³ (Appleton 2001; Jean-Yves et al, 2006; Di John & Putzel, 2005). The relatively wealthy occupy semi-urban centres, especially district trading centres. The wealthy, in the minority, stay mainly in the capital city of Kampala and the surrounding municipal areas. The weak socio-economic position of the rural people prevents them from enjoying meaningful participation. The poor, in many cases, are unemployed, with low levels of education. They are obstructed by poor infrastructure and lack of means of communication, which is a deterrent to their civic competence (Appleton 2001; Jean-

⁷² This group of Ugandans relies heavily on subsistence farming and their agricultural produce raises little income and in many cases, they are exploited by middlemen (Kakumba and Nsingo, 2008 and Jean-Yves, et al, 2006). However, those that make attempts to take their produce to urban markets, face a number of prohibitive local farmer taxes from the district administration agents, who sometimes, use high-handed means.

⁷³ The discussions on poverty in Uganda shows that people are mainly poor because of their inability to satisfy a range of basic human needs that stems from powerlessness, social exclusion, ignorance and lack of knowledge, as well as shortage of material resources.

Yves et al, 2006; Di John & Putzel, 2005). In addition, Ngaka (2006) points out that literacy is a critical catalyst in unleashing people's creativity and building the personal confidence and assertiveness necessary for effective participation in development initiatives. He points out that in a country like Uganda, where over 80% of the people stay in rural areas and 30-40% of the adult population (most of them women) are illiterate, it is unlikely that the rural population will participate in development programmes, due to their limited literacy abilities (Ngaka, 2006). In fact, the rural poor have become vulnerable to the dubious NGOs present in almost every rural district. For instance, NGOs are increasingly being accused of collusion with local bureaucrats to represent elitist preferences. Their relationship with LGUs has been characterised by mistrust, conflicts, poor communication and information sharing, and lack of transparency (Rugambwa, 2004:43). While such absurd characteristics are easily visible, accountability – the key principle of good governance – remains ignored. Public functionaries (elected office bearers and appointed officials) are reluctant to give a satisfactory explanation to the public (tax payers) of the local government expenditure (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). While citizens regularly elect their own local leaders, these officials remain effectively detached from the electorate once they are in office.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ This has been attributed chiefly to failure by local authorities to mobilise the people, poor information flow and civic incompetence to interact. There are also reported cases of endemic corruption in LGUs arising from weak systems and values (see for example Nsibambi, 1998; Nsubuga, 2004; Kakumba, 2003; Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). This means that even the meagre resources at the disposal of LGUs are squandered, thereby posing a serious deterrent to service delivery and development.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed democracy and citizen participation in Uganda dating from pre-colonial to post-independence times. It described the impact of colonialism on democracy and citizen participation, as well as the major political, economic and cultural forces in Uganda's history that have influenced the capacity of Ugandans to participate in their own governance through public debate. The chapter also presented a discussion on how nebulous colonial policies constrained democracy and citizen participation at the time of the pre- and post-independence governments, alongside structural factors such as poverty, an illiterate majority of people in rural Uganda, and language barriers (see Golooba-Mutebi, 2008). The chapter also acknowledges how the formation of a public sphere with a national character has been rendered difficult; first by the nature and philosophy of indirect rule, and later by the factionalism and chaos that characterised post-independence governments. Yet despite the rebirth of participatory politics and even after multiparty dispensation, certain elements continue to impede citizen participation; notably, trepidation left by past governments, political patronage and impunity, corruption and electoral commission misconduct, repetitive local government disagreements, elite capture, insufficient pecuniary aptitude, lack of accountability and transparency, and lastly, uneven social stratification, among others (see also Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010). In addition, the chapter also took note of the fact that the power and influence of Ugandans over their government improved under the NRM, but mechanisms for holding local leaders accountable remained [and

remain] weak, largely due to the current government's efforts to cling to power, which tended to limit the impact of the process of democratisation.

In précis, this chapter demonstrated how the democracy and citizen participation exercise in post-independence Uganda has remained deficient, a situation Williams (2008) refers to as 'spectator politics', "where ordinary people become mere endorsees of pre-designed government programmes and objects of administrative manipulation while state functionaries ensconce themselves as bureaucratic experts summoned to ensure a better life for all". Examples are the egocentric elites who have weakened the central government budget reserves in the process of facilitating the creation of new districts; the conflicts within local governments between the politicians and the district administrators; the elites of the district who, without consulting stakeholders, advance their own agendas and neglect the actual participatory mechanisms that the decentralisation policy calls for; and lastly, political patronage resulting from multiparty politics, where local government put party issues above national cause, and divert resources meant for development to facilitating party activities in return for more support from the ruling party, thus impairing democracy and citizen participation.

While the chapter acknowledges that colonial policies constrained democracy and citizen participation during Uganda's pre- and post-independence period, the chapter also notes that with the rebirth of participatory politics and the multiparty dispensation, citizen participation has been encapsulated in legislative provisions

through local governments and is supported by multinational organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. The chapter also shows that even with the embracing of liberal democratic ideals, certain elements continue to deter democracy and citizen participation. However, what is not clear is whether that embracing of ideals in Uganda, especially in the government-initiated programmes, matches the elite and grassroots understanding and conceptualisation of democracy and citizen participation as development mechanisms, prescribed from the development perspective. Therefore, such ambiguous status quo must be verified, and in this dissertation this is done utilising the prototype of the NAADS programme.

As previously hinted at, the NAADS is an innovative public-private extension service delivery approach, with the goal of increasing market-oriented agricultural production by empowering farmers to demand and control agricultural advisory services. The NAADS programme was established by the Government of Uganda (GoU) to boost participation and increase agriculture productivity. The programme is participatory in nature, as it embraces liberal democratic ideals such as citizen participation. The utilization of the NAADS programme assists in generating new knowledge on elites and grassroots conceptions of participation, in relation to their rights and their actual daily-lived experiences in spaces of engagement aimed at development. This helps to link the debate on democratisation in the South to democratic development or the possibility thereof. The dissertation thus links democratic principles such as citizen participation to the NAADS programme. Chapter 4 introduces an agricultural extension service prototype NAADS, as an

example of a national development programme born in an emerging democracy in which citizen participation is ostensibly a key priority. Thereafter, Chapters 5 and 6 respectively analyse both elites and grassroots perceptions of democracy and citizen participation, using their experiences with the NAADS as a development programme purporting to support democratic ideals.



CHAPTER 4

THE NAADS PROTOTYPE: THE AGRICULTURE EXTENSION SERVICES

(AES) NEXUS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter accounted for democracy and citizen participation in Uganda from a historical perspective. It presented the reasons that citizen participation has remained deficient, even though the legislative provisions of the government stipulates full citizen engagement in all development programmes through decentralisation. This chapter addresses the third objective of the dissertation by providing a view into the National Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS) programme, as an example of a national programme in an emerging democracy where citizen participation is a key priority. The NAADS programme is a sub-component of the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), the key objective of which is to increase agricultural productivity and reduce the levels of rural poverty to a level below 28% by 2014. As a case study the NAADS programme helps to link participation to development, because of its ostensibly participatory nature. This chapter tackles the NAADS programme at national level.

However, it should be explicitly noted that the NAADS prototype is used mainly to establish the NAADS programme's official status as an example of a participatory development programme aimed at alleviating poverty; and also to assess the popular perceptions of elites and grassroots on NAADS in relation to participatory development. This chapter is a preface to Chapters 5 and 6, analysing and

illustrating findings from interviews carried out with elites and grassroots on their popular perceptions of democracy and citizen participation, particularly from their experiences with NAADS.⁷⁵ The main reason Bushenyi district was selected as the site of the case study is that agriculture is the main economic activity, and there are many small-scale producers engaged in the production of a wide range of crops, with the aim of increasing household income and food security and thus enhancing socio-economic development. Other reasons are that Bushenyi district is comparatively more successful than other districts, and the researcher is familiar with most of areas where the programme has been implemented. In addition, the present model of development at local government level in Uganda is premised on the primacy of local citizen participation, defined as the organised effort by communities to increase control over resources and regulative institutions. Perhaps optimistically, development trustees and others consider the Bushenyi case to be 'best practice' by Ugandan standards⁷⁶ (see for example Brock et al, 2003).

⁷⁵Bushenyi district has become one of the major participants in NAADS in Uganda, after joining the programme in the 2002/3 financial year. It should be noted that at the time Bushenyi joined the programme, it was geographically larger than it is currently, as the four (now independent) districts of Sheema, Ruhinda, Rubirizi and Buhweju have since been detached.

⁷⁶ In addition, Bushenyi provides a particularly interesting context in which to explore these debates, not least because it has become a standard-bearer for inclusive neo-liberalism; in fact, regional inequalities within Uganda have become increasingly apparent. For instance, Northern Uganda remains largely impoverished despite the huge sums of money pumped in through the World Bank-funded Northern Uganda Social Action Fund.

The chapter commences by historicising the development of Agriculture Extension Services (AES) as a nexus of citizen participation in Uganda as part of ongoing development reforms. Thereafter, the chapter introduces the NAADS programme, which was adopted by the government of Uganda in 2001/2 and subsequently established in various districts. In the context of the NAADS programme, the chapter accounts for relatable principles, the programme's organisation and coordination, and lastly, relevant components and activities. The overall aim of NAADS was to enhance rural livelihoods by increasing agricultural productivity and profitability, mainly through shifting from low-value staples to higher-valued commodities, with the overall objective of empowering farmers. As a reminder, it is imperative to point out that the NAADS programme case study sheds light on the current policy optimism encouraged by development practitioners and development agencies such as the World Bank and IMF – the notion that participation encourages citizens to communicate their preferences, demands, interests, needs, and collective problems and aspirations in relation to those in charge of public policy (Chambers, 1983; 1992; 1994a; b; c; 1997; Guijt & Shah, 1998; World Bank, 1994). The accompanying assumption is that effective and democratic participation leads to better development practices, although this is contested by analysts such as Coelho and Favareto (2010).

Another assumption is that citizen participation in programmes denotes elevated levels of ownership, which yield development and also promote good governance (Guijt, 1998; World Bank, 1994). Yet in Chapter 2, there is evidence from some

authors to show that participation is often not functioning as the tool for liberation and distribution of power (and better, more sustainable and egalitarian development policies) that its rhetoric suggests. Instead, participatory processes have been commingled with a constellation of terms (such as 'empowerment') that are uncritically accepted as co-occurring with participation (Cook & Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2001; Christens & Speers, 2006). In light of such supportive, yet ambiguous views, the following sections focus on the Agricultural Extension Services (AES) juxtaposed with citizen participation in the NAADS programme.

4.2 The history of AES in relation to citizen participation

The history of financing of agriculture extension services in Uganda dates back to the early years of the 19th century, when the first African agricultural research stations were established and new cash crops introduced (Kidd, 2001; Semana, 2002).⁷⁷ During colonialism, the AES and research stations were mainly to serve the interests of the then-British Protectorate (Semana, 2002; Bukenya, 2010). From the early days of colonialism up until the mid-1950s, the national extension service focused on the promotion of export crops, and adopted a coercive approach, in which sanctions and punishments were enforced through local chiefs (Bukenya, 2010). However, in the 1960s that approach was replaced by an emphasis on inducing progressive farmers to adopt commodity approaches (Bukenya, 2010). In this period, extension services concentrated on providing technical knowledge and


⁷⁷ See also for example Bukenya (2010), who points out that in Uganda, Agricultural Extension Services have been organised, managed and provided to farmers through the public extension system.

advice, together with support in terms of inputs and credit, to selected larger-scale farmers. This effort, it was hoped, would have a demonstration and multiplier effect in the general farming population (Byekwaso et al, 2004).

The government extension service of the 1960s is generally considered to have functioned well (Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Kidd, 2001; Opio-odongo, 1996). However, this progress could not be sustained, due to political turmoil and economic decline during the 1970s and 1980s (Brock et al, 2002). The near-collapse of the formal sector of the economy provided an early opportunity for Community-Based Organisation (CBO) and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) initiatives to encroach on territory traditionally controlled by conventional agricultural service delivery organisations (Di John & Putzel, 2005; Opio-odongo, 1996). This was also a period in which farmer organisations such as cooperatives broadened the scope of their services to members, including (among others) training and input supply (Opio-odongo, 1996). Public research and extension systems only resumed in the early 1990s (Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Bukenya, 2010).

During the 1990s, after nearly two decades of almost-collapsed formal research and extension systems, the government of Uganda (in partnership with the World Bank) initiated a process to rebuild formal sector research and extension services in the country (Bukenya, 2010). These two systems were to remain separate entities administratively (Hall & Yoganand, 2004). On the side of research, in 1992 this process saw the creation by an Act of Parliament of a public research agency; the

National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO), which has since spearheaded agricultural research in the country.⁷⁸ Until 1991 the delivery of public extension was achieved through parallel extension services in different government ministerial departments (Bukenya, 2010). Extension was thus characterised by duplication, conflict and confusion (Semana, 2002). In order to address these shortcomings, a new government policy sought 'unification' of the service in 1990, leading to the creation of a new Agriculture Ministry (Semana, 2002). This involved a merger of two previous ministries, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Animal Industry and Fisheries - a recommendation by the Group B-a Task Force on the improvement of agricultural extension in Uganda, with financial support from the World Bank. Specifically, unification of the service was intended to rationalise and integrate the use of scarce resources, while also being aimed at professionalising extension education through learning and teaching (Semana, 2002; Bukenya, 2010).



As part of this effort, the World Bank funded the Agricultural Extension Project (AEP), which began in 1992 and was implemented until 1998 (MoAAIF, 1998a; 1998b). The AEP aimed at improving the organisation and management of extension services in Uganda. According to Bukenya (2010), attempts were made to move from centralised planning of extension programmes towards a more bottom-up process; to ensure a single line of command, and regular staff and farmer training activities,

⁷⁸ The National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) is the apex body for guidance and coordination of all agricultural research activities in the national agricultural research system in Uganda. NARO is a Public Institution established by an Act of Parliament enacted on 21 November 2005.

with farmer training achieved via scheduled staff visits; and to emphasise strengthening the research-extension linkage through involving relevant stakeholders. Apart from a few adaptations, the AEP was modelled on the basic principles of the Training and Visit (T&V) extension system, which from 1987 became the predominant mode of public extension in Uganda (see Bukenya, 2010). It was a variant of an approach that had already been widely criticised (Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Kidd, 2001).

The main distinguishing features of the AEP concerned the extension approach it adopted. In line with the mission of the newly-created Agriculture Ministry (MoAAIF), the AEP used a Unified Extension Approach (UEP). The unified approach to service provision was deemed to be best suited to addressing farmer extension needs in a more holistic manner. This approach required that a single Field Extension Worker (FEW) handled all aspects of three key agricultural sub-sectors under the mandate of the country's Agriculture Ministry, namely crops, livestock and fisheries production (MoAAIF, 1998; Friis-Hansen & Kisauzi, 2004). According to Bukenya (2010), this was intended to avoid sending conflicting messages to farmers through different extension agents working separately on crops, livestock, and fisheries.

The Field Extension Workers' (FEW) area of jurisdiction (operationally, a parish) was re-defined and renamed a 'circle', and consisted of 250-500 farm families (Kidd, 2001). In keeping with the principle of promoting partnership and participation

through dialogue, this approach embraced the systematic clientele consultation methodology of involving beneficiaries in problem identification (MoAAIF, 1998a; 1998b). This was achieved through the group approach. The contact groups comprised selected farmers among those in direct contact with FEW (MoAAIF, 1998a). These groups also served as a means for FEW to reach other farmers in their areas (Bukenya, 2010; Kidd, 2001). Together with pre-season planning workshops for agricultural activities, clientele consultation was intended as a bottom-up planning process, thereby improving the relevance of the services (Bukenya, 2010).

Semana (2002) argues that this kind of 'participatory' approach was also seen as a way of tapping into farmers' indigenous knowledge, in a process that apparently involved working closely with research. Also, this period saw a revival of the educational approach to extension, involving appropriate training methods (Semana, 2002). Efforts to improve extension at field level also included the introduction of the Graduate Specialist Scheme by Central Government, which required local governments to recruit a graduate agricultural officer in each sub-county (Kidd, 2001). These officers were each provided with a motor-cycle for field operations. There was a new emphasis on Subject Matter Specialists (SMSs) in areas such as agronomy and crop protection. These SMSs were supposed to provide technical backup to the FEWs, hand in hand with research and technology development activities. The scheme was overtaken by events, since plans to transform the public extension service into a NAADS-type extension system via the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) were already at an advanced stage. In

these new plans, agricultural extension was seen as a critical factor in modernising Ugandan agriculture, an aspiration now gaining increased policy emphasis (MoAAIF, 1998b).

According to Bukenya (2010), policy attention shifted from increasing agricultural production (with no direct link to market trends) to a market-oriented approach, including emphasis on post-harvest handling of agricultural produce. The marketing objective was seen as a springboard for commercialising the agricultural sector. Extension was seen as a way of linking the researcher, the farmer, the input supplier and the policy-maker (Bukenya, 2010). By 1998, Uganda's Agriculture Ministry (MoAAIF) had identified some of the cardinal roles extension could play towards efforts to modernise agriculture in the country. Bukenya (2010) reports that extension was tasked with participation in technology generation and transfer, and with programme development and implementation – albeit, this time, with specific emphasis on fostering stakeholder interactions in technology generation and transfer activities, bottom-up planning, and systematic monitoring and evaluation of extension activities (see also MoAAIF, 1998b). Besides these established tasks, extension was also now expected to provide advice and technical guidance on extension interventions and methodology, to steer human resource development and management efforts, and to initiate human and social capital development at farmer level (Bukenya, 2010).⁷⁹

⁷⁹ A mid-term evaluation of the AEP reported some visible achievements, especially regarding farmer awareness and adoption of recommended practices and technologies. It also revealed some

In order to ensure greater inclusion of beneficiaries in extension planning and implementation, Bukenya (2010) notes, the new approach of Village Level Participatory Approach (VLPA) was incorporated into the project in August 1997. Uganda's version of VLPA was based on the Village Participation in Rural Development model seen to have been successful in a number of West African countries (see World Bank, 1998; Chabeauf et al, 2004). VLPA aimed to support bottom-up planning through stimulating self-development processes within communities, and improved delivery of extension services, with the overall objective of involving the rural population in planning and implementation of local activities (World Bank, 2000; MoAAIF, 1998b). Because of its bottom-up approach and self-development aims it was anticipated that VLPA would provide the foundation for a demand-driven extension service (MoAAIF, 1998b). Unfortunately the VLPA initiative was short-lived, and World Bank funding for the AEP ceased towards the end of 1998 (Bukenya, 2010).


Notwithstanding some achievements, chiefly related to mobilising communities and giving farmers the opportunity to determine the extension agenda, the overall objective of empowering the rural population for self-development was never

shortcomings in the systemic consultation strategy and the approach generally (see MAAIF, 1998a, 1998b). The report noted: inadequate involvement of farmers in extension programme development (i.e. limited to problem identification only), limited coverage of the farming population (i.e. concentration on members of contact groups, while these groups failed fully to deliver a multiplier effect), and the narrow scope of farm-level problems addressed (i.e. primarily focused on production-related problems).

realised (Bukonya, 2010; World Bank, 1998; 2000). A key issue – unresolved by the VLPA experience – was “how grassroots organisations can be empowered to gain effective control over their front line extension staff” (World Bank, 1998). Addressing this issue was seen as the key to a genuinely demand-driven extension. Nor was demand generated during the process ever accompanied by the development of appropriate systems to address farmers’ need for high-quality advisory services, inputs, and credit and marketing facilities, thereby leaving farmers’ expectations largely unmet, and resulting in widespread frustration (World Bank, 2000). This raised an important participatory intervention issue: the need to differentiate between the relevance of a service (associated with target-group involvement in needs identification, through the use of Participatory Rural Appraisal-type tools) and the responsiveness of a service to the needs of the target group (Bukonya, 2010). The VLPA experience also provided a litmus test for a multi-sectoral approach to agricultural and rural development planning, as coordinated by the district agricultural production department. Real difficulties became apparent regarding coordination and cooperation between the staff of the different sector line departments (World Bank, 2000; 1998).

Ostensibly, the evaluation of the AEP pointed to several deficiencies in the service delivery performance of T&V-style public extension systems. Key areas of concern were the limited farmer coverage, the heavily centralised and bureaucratic administrative system, and the efficiency and sustainability of the funding (Byekwaso et al, 2004; MoAAIF, 1998a; 1998b), as well as inadequate technical

support to field staff, who also lacked the necessary facilitation skills to deliver training with practical impact (Bukenya 2010). AEP did not adequately put farmer demand at the centre of service provision, in part because of too narrow a focus on agriculture (MoAAIF, 1998b), and because of a lack of tangible new technologies resulting from research (Bukenya, 2010). Indeed, this was the time of mounting criticism from and disillusionment of donor agencies concerning the traditional public extension services, usually modelled around the T&V system (Bukenya, 2010). Committed to a policy of decentralisation, the government embraced proposals to break up the previously centrally-controlled agricultural extension service and reorganise it into a series of District Extension Services, in the hope of addressing existing shortcomings.



Farrington et al (2002) and Kidd (2001) explain that decentralisation meant devolving decision-making power to lower levels, and a substantial transfer of political, financial and planning responsibility to local governments. The intention was to promote popular participation and the empowerment of local people in development planning and decision-making (Kidd, 2001). The process of decentralising the extension service was completed in 1997. Agricultural extension services increasingly became the responsibility of District Local Governments (DLGs). This implied that from then on, the decision to make (or not to make) a budget allocation to extension belonged to the District Councils; that is, to a group of representatives elected by the rural population in their respective districts (World Bank, 1998). Around this time, the GoU (with World Bank support) launched the

Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) to devolve budgets and test alternative ways to deliver rural services (World Bank, 2002). Besides increased participation of local stakeholders, it was hoped that decentralisation of extension services would lead to improvements in service management (World Bank, 1998). Bukenya (2010) notes that there were some achievements in these areas, particularly regarding stakeholder and beneficiary involvement (see also Najjingo-Mangheni et al, 1999).

In fact, Uganda is recognised for having implemented the most radical experimentation in decentralised extension of all the countries surveyed in a recent study (Farrington et al, 2002). But decentralising extension was not without complications. At the local or community level, for instance, the government's intention to promote popular participation was apparently often misunderstood, and seen as the abandonment of rural areas by the centre (Farrington et al, 2002). At the institutional and operational level, on the other hand, decentralisation of extension services had some negative impact on extension training and field performance (Semana, 2002; Bukenya, 2010). These negative impacts were linked to the undesirable effects of other radical policy reforms, such as liberalisation, privatisation, down-sizing and retrenchment (Bukenya, 2010). In most instances, districts lacked the capacity not only to steer extension, but also to develop staff and provide logistical support for field operations. Combined with reduced recognition and reward for staff performance, such difficulties led to a drastic downturn in staff

morale, and ultimately to reduction in contact between staff and farmers (Bukenya, 2010).

During the late 1990s there was growing formal involvement of NGOs with other players in the system (Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Kidd, 2001). Pluralism in agricultural extension became a reality (Kidd, 2001), as donor-funded NGO projects in agriculture and rural development mushroomed. The same period witnessed a closer working relationship between NGOs and local government departments – extension in particular (Bukenya 2010). There were several cases of NGOs contracting public extension agents to deliver services in their programme areas (Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Friis-Hansen & Kisauzi, 2004; Kidd, 2001; Anderson & Van Crowder, 2000). These arrangements added to the salaries of the extension agents involved, while also providing them with operational support (Anderson & Van Crowder, 2000).⁸⁰

This situation shows that such collaboration was not without challenges and/or constraints (Bukenya, 2010). These related to inadequate financial capacity on the part of the local government department, varying levels of staff facilitation and motivation, dissatisfaction with NGO project allowances, and differences in work ethic and attitudes to work (Najjingo-Mangheni et al, 1999). The period was characterised by a range of extension approaches, including the farmer field school,

⁸⁰ A typical example was that between a CARE Agricultural Innovations Project and two Local Governments (Bushenyi and Ntungamo districts)

and various strategies of farmer involvement, especially through group-based approaches (Bukenya, 2010). The overview above shows that over the years there have been several attempts to improve the country's public agricultural extension service. These involved a gradual shift, from conventional extension approaches – based on the diffusion of innovation and Transfer of Technology (ToT) models (typically of the T&V extension type) – to approaches that embrace pluralism and participation of local-level stakeholders and target beneficiaries of services (Bukenya, 2010).

Decentralisation of national extension services has been a central element in this shift, albeit accompanied by challenges and/or constraints. In fact, Bahigwa et al (2005) have shown that (over-) confidence in decentralisation as a mechanism for poverty reduction is misplaced in the current political context of Uganda. In terms of objectives and in spite of the reforms embraced in the 1990s, the role of extension has continued to be viewed primarily as that of 'technology transfer', almost exclusively focused on improving farm-level production activities (see also Bukenya, 2010; Sulaiman & Hall, 2002; 2005). Institutionally, in spite of the reorganisation of both the research and the extension systems, the broad hierarchical features of both research (technology development and testing) and extension (technology transfer) have remained largely unaltered (see also Hall & Yoganand, 2004; Hall & Nahdy, 1999; Bukenya, 2010).


The same can also be said of the relationship between extension and the farmer, in which accountability and relevance remained weakly developed (Yoganand, 2004; Hall & Nahdy, 1999). In the case of extension, for instance, T&V-based extension approaches were not particularly interactive with farmers, or responsive to their needs, being constrained by the largely one-way transfer of pre-designed extension messages and technology packages (Bukenya, 2010). Hence, farmers generally remained passive recipients of a service not particularly responsive to the needs of resource-constrained farmers such as women and the youth. The situation was exacerbated by existing marketing and physical infrastructural constraints (Opio-odongo, 1996). In the context of research, on the other hand, there is a tendency to blame the extension service (unfairly) for having failed to 'sell' technologies, even when such technologies were irrelevant to the socioeconomic circumstances of potential users (Opio-odongo, 1996). In respect of future strategies to 'modernise' Uganda's agriculture in order to address widespread rural poverty, Opio-odongo (1996) notes the need for the agricultural service agencies to understand why those who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods continue to live in poverty, as a point of departure for further policies and strategies (NAADS, 2000; MoFPED, 2000c; 2002; Mijumbi & Okidi, 2001; Wright et al, 1999; Bukenya, 2010).

In fact, increasing productivity, ensuring sustainable use of natural resources, and reducing poverty have remained key challenges (Benin et al, 2007). The high levels of poverty in rural areas have been attributed to (among other reasons): (i) poor access to markets, due to inadequate infrastructure; (ii) low levels of education,

which impairs rapid technological change; and (iii) the prevalence of small-scale farming on very small land holdings, coupled with inadequate access to advice, finance and modern farming equipment (Appleton, 2001; Brock et al, 2002; Di John & Putzel, 2005). Agricultural productivity has stagnated or declined for most farmers, and declining soil fertility is perceived to be one of the major causes (Nkonya et al, 2004; 2005a; 2005b; Deininger & Okidi, 2001; MoAAIF and MoFPED, 2000). The sporadic occurrence of security incidents and unrest in some parts of Uganda (the North) left the government's budget skewed more towards defence than to agriculture, the backbone of the economy (Appleton, 2001; Collier & Reinikka, 2001; GoU, 2001). This situation has lowered the government's ability to facilitate investment in poor small households, since Uganda relies heavily on subsistence agriculture production (Wright et al, 1999). The government's failure to devise means of engaging citizens effectively in meaningful economic activities, coupled with the increasing rate of urban migration and the general effect of ill health, particularly of HIV/AIDS, has further hindered economic productivity (Nkusu, 2004; Putzel, 2003; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002).

Recognizing the importance of a multi-sectoral approach to reducing mass poverty, the Government of Uganda developed policies; notably (among others) the Medium Term Competitive Strategy (MTCS), from which macro-economic policy in the form of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was developed. The major objective of PEAP was to assist in reducing mass poverty and in raising smallholder-farmer household incomes, thus improving the quality of life of the vast majority of the

population. The primary strategy was to increase earnings from productive employment (including self-employment), with active participation by all stakeholders in economic decision-making. The PEAP was strongly supported by the donor community, whose influence led to Uganda being selected as one of the first beneficiaries of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative for debt forgiveness, with debt relief of some US\$347 million in 1998 and US\$656 million in 2000 (MoFPED, 2000d; NAADS, 2000; IMF, 1999). Uganda began directing resources from debt relief through the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) for social development, with particular focus on rural transformation and modernisation of agriculture (MoFPED, 2004; NAADS, 2000).




Given this boost to resources, agricultural growth in Uganda rose steadily (over 4% per annum), with increased expansion of areas under cultivation; and the gains from the government policy of liberalisation of the economy led to substantial growth for some farmers (NAADS, 2000). Though expansion was observed in the agriculture sector, the resulting challenge was that the sector's expansion created greater scarcity of land for meeting the demands of the ever-increasing population (Benin et al, 2007). Therefore, Uganda had to look for other sources of growth for the agricultural sector if rural development was to be realised. Through various 'consultations' in search of alternative strategies for meeting the challenges of rural poverty, in the agriculture sector in particular, two possible sources of growth attracted immediate consideration. Firstly, there was the need for an increase in land and labour productivity; and secondly, the need for a shift in production patterns,

from low-value staples to higher-value commodities. At the same time, developing countries of the South were exposed to an increasingly fashionable international policy discourse on modernising their economies (Sulaiman & Hall, 2002). As a result, the GoU formulated a Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), the key objectives of which were directed at increasing agricultural productivity and profitability, and shifting from low-value staples to higher-valued commodities (Oleru et al, 2005).

The PMA aimed to transform Uganda's 'low-input/low-output' agriculture into a modern, science-based, market-oriented agriculture,⁸¹ capable of sustaining growth in the sector and raising the incomes of rural families (DANIDA, 2005). To achieve this required better access to improved technologies, modern inputs and knowledge, in order to shift production patterns from low-value staples to higher-value commodities (Pasipanodya, 2010a; 2010b; Sabiiti et al, 2010). The intention was expand upon the tradition of partial market-orientation, by helping farmers to produce a variety of products with higher value for commercialisation, so as to increase their household incomes and food security (Ngaka, 2006). Some of the measures necessary to pursue this strategy were similar or complementary to those required for raising productivity. The farmers were to acquire knowledge on how to produce and market higher-value crops through improving access to the required inputs, as well as through the provision of reliable outlets for such products (Ngaka,

⁸¹ See The Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries Uganda. 2002. The impact of HIV/AIDS on agricultural production and mainstreaming HIV/AIDS messages into agricultural extension in Uganda.

2006). However, PMA recognised other interventions outside agriculture that were needed to catalyse the agricultural transformation process: (i) increasing the efficiency of service delivery by deepening decentralisation; (ii) promoting the private sector's role as the main engine of economic growth; (iii) developing markets to address food security, as opposed to emphasising self-sufficiency; (iv) enhancing and strengthening public participation in development processes; (v) promoting gender equity; (vi) developing markets and distribution chains for modern inputs and farm products; (vii) improving rural and agricultural education; (viii) having clear property rights to land, in order to encourage investment and efficient use of natural resources; and lastly (ix) developing rural infrastructure (see Bukenya, 2010:36; NAADS, 2001).⁸²



These interventions subsequently became government's key obligations, over and above creating a conducive policy environment for all the multi-sectoral interventions that would lead to the realisation of development objectives. There was also an urgent need to incorporate the private sector into the implementation of these interventions, for robust efficacy (Ngaka, 2006; DANIDA, 2005; Pasipanodya, 2010a; 2010b; Sabiiti et al, 2010). It is notable that the PMA demanded the private sector get involved in activities and programmes such as research and extension, previously exclusively in the public sector domain. In 2000/1, various government departments, ministries, academics and donors designed the National Agriculture Advisory Services (NAADS) programme.

⁸² See MoAAIF, 2010.

4.3 The NAADS Programme

The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) programme of Uganda is an innovative public/private extension service delivery approach, with the goal of increasing market-oriented agricultural production by empowering farmers to demand and control agricultural advisory services (Benin et al, 2007; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000). NAADS became operational in 2001, promoting the development of farmer organisations and empowering them to procure advisory services, manage linkages with marketing partners, and conduct demand-driven monitoring and evaluation (M&E)⁸³ of the advisory services and their impacts (Benin et al, 2007).⁸⁴

To achieve this goal, the programme ensured that farmers applied improved husbandry and management practices, and identified and solved their technical and marketing problems using appropriate and modern knowledge and technologies. Some of these principles are particularly relevant to the purpose of this dissertation.⁸⁵ These include poverty targeting,⁸⁶ participation and farmer

⁸³ Under monitoring and evaluation, records on delivery were to be benchmarked against inputs and the resultant achievement of output. The basic measurement period would be a semester. The logical framework would be drawn up so as to set out the inputs, the expected outputs and the main monitoring and evaluation (M&E) indicators that would be used. Monitoring would be concerned with programme performance in delivery of individual services and supplies; timing and co-ordination of activities; and impact, as set out in the logical framework and cost tables (see NAADS, 2000).

⁸⁴ The first phase of NAADS (2001/2 to 2007/8) cost US\$108 million – 80% from donors and 20% from government and farmers. The cost of the second phase (2010/1) is projected at 120 billion Ush (Uganda shillings) – 77% from the government and 23% from donors (Rwakabamba, 2011).

⁸⁵ These principles were geared to the transformation of long-established attitudes, structures and practices hitherto used in the public management of the agricultural sector.

empowerment. In particular, it was intended that the planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluation of advisory services would shift to farmers, with local governments playing a predominantly facilitatory role (MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000; Benin et al, 2007; NAADS Secretariat, 2000).⁸⁷ The following section discusses the principles of the NAADS programme.

4.3.1 Poverty targeting

The principle of poverty targeting recognizes that poor farmers (especially women) constitute the majority of the farming population (see for example Brock et al, 2003; Ngaka, 2006; Bugembe et al, 2005; Jean-Yves, 2006; Appleton, 2001; Kayiizi-Mugerwa, 2002; Kyesimire, 1996). Formulated specifically to address what is seen as one of the underlying causes of poverty in Uganda – lack of access to agricultural information, knowledge and technology – the agricultural services under NAADS were intended to target poor farmers primarily (Bukonya, 2010). The poverty-targeting aims of NAADS (and government policy more generally) recognise the gender-based nature of poverty in Uganda, a recognition that is indicated in the intention of NAADS to make all its interventions gender-sensitive and gender-focused. It also recognizes the need to uplift both men and women, though understandably, greater attention is paid to women.

⁸⁶ The NAADS programme targets the economically-active poor – those with limited physical and financial assets, skills and knowledge, rather than destitute or large-scale farmers – through farmers' forums based on specific profitable enterprises.

⁸⁷ This intention was embedded in the NAADS strategic framework, anchored in the PMA.

In addition, other categories of the poor – notably the youth, and people with disabilities – were also acknowledged to be less socially connected, and more effort was required on the part of programme staff to reach them (see for example NAADS, 2001). For this reason, these groups (also including women) are commonly referred to as ‘special interest groups’. Overall, through this principle, NAADS seeks to ensure the inclusion of all of its target group within its processes and practices. Yet NAADS also recognises the difficulty it is likely to face in trying to involve (and directly benefit) people with few or no assets (notably, land for farming), and that these groups might therefore require some kind of ‘social safety-net’ intervention.

In this respect, NAADS sees greater benefit in targeting and benefiting the ‘economically-active poor’: poor farmers who have some limited assets, skills and knowledge with which to create a livelihood (Appleton, 2001; Bukenya, 2010). This is the category of farmers generally described as ‘subsistence farmers’, and considered by policy to constitute the majority of country’s largely rural-based farmers (Nkusa, 2004; Ngaka, 2006). In its intention to target the poor, as promoted by Uganda’s current national development framework, PEAP-NAADS assumes a clear relationship between poverty and the social/gender position of its target group (MoAAIF, 2000).

4.3.2 Fostering participation

The core constraint to participation, especially for rural farmers, has been the communication gap between the farmers and the development workers (Ramírez,

2005; NAADS, 2000). Consequently, many approaches were developed and applied for bringing the disparate voices of farmers into the rural development process. For instance, the provision of agricultural extension and other agricultural support services became the responsibility of local governments in 1997, as per the Local Government (LG) Act (Livingstone & Charlton, 2001; Benin et al, 2007). Yet several challenges to *all-inclusive* participation remain. For example, the proportion of district budgets allocated to agricultural production and marketing in three districts studied by Francis and James (2003) was 3% or less; while at the sub-county level, the proportions are even smaller. Extension agents surveyed in Tororo district felt that decentralisation had negative impacts on their ability to provide extension services (Enyipu et al, 2002). More generally, lack of funds and equipment to facilitate the work of extension agents is a common complaint at local government level, as is the programme's failure to involve beneficiaries as main stakeholders during its planning phase (Sserunkuuma et al, 2001)

A host of authors have accepted the principle that if development initiatives are to lead to lasting results, they ought to involve beneficiaries actively in identifying needs and setting priorities, formulating plans, and monitoring and evaluating outputs and outcomes (Fung & Wright, 2003; Gaventa, 2001; IDS Bulletin, 2004; World Bank, 2000a; IMF, 2006). In addition, participatory processes offer learning platforms for all involved. In fact, those implementing such programmes acquire better understanding of and insights into the vast wealth of what farmers know; and farmers gain confidence in the collective power they can wield to steer development

process in the direction of their choice, through substantive processes of participation (Francis & James, 2003).

While the NAADS programme was not intended to be prescriptive on approach and methodology for participation, it embodied the principle in all its processes (OPM, 2005; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000). This was aimed at creating an environment for the evolution of appropriate participatory approaches, given the unique and diverse conditions faced by farmers in Uganda. Hence, the principle of participation aimed to make sure that all stakeholders (with the emphasis on beneficiaries) were involved in the programme implementation processes.

4.3.3 Farmer empowerment

Through the principle of farmer empowerment, NAADS embraced participation – purportedly to empower the recipients of its services. In line with this intention, NAADS policy promises include a commitment to actively involve all categories of farmers in identifying agricultural advisory service needs, setting priorities, formulating plans, and monitoring and evaluating outputs and outcomes. It is hoped that by this involvement, farmers will acquire the necessary skills and capacity to articulate demands and manage the NAADS process (Bukonya, 2010). The empowerment principle, on the other hand, intends that farmers are to be enabled to control structures and processes that transform their natural resource assets into desired outcomes. This is to be achieved by assisting farmers to organise and create institutions through which they can act collectively and have their voices heard

within a deepened, decentralised decision-making process (Bukonya, 2010). Besides increased responsibility for the planning of services to be delivered by NAADS, farmers and their respective local governments are expected to make financial contributions towards service delivery through a matching grant arrangement. Contributing to the cost of services, popularly referred to as 'co-funding', is intended to stimulate farmer and local ownership of the NAADS programme.

According to the NAADS policy framework, farmers will no longer be seen as mere beneficiaries, but more as users and clients of a service. It is hoped that this will enhance the capacity of the farmers to demand research and agricultural advisory services, and to access information and resources to influence policies that affect them; and hence, have control over the services delivered through NAADS. Farmer participation and empowerment are at the core of a strategy to develop a farmer-owned and demand-driven extension service process (see NAADS, 2001; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000; Bukonya, 2010).

Yet delivering a demand-driven service presents an important challenge for NAADS, as well as for farmers. Farmers must not only be able and willing to articulate their needs, but should be allowed to do so. Equally, NAADS should not only be able to provide for the needs expressed by the farmers, but must also exercise the necessary flexibility to remain responsive (and hence relevant) to the needs of its target group in general, and the needs of specific sub-groups within that target group. It is in this regard that this study concerns itself first and foremost with


what it is that NAADS provides to its clients and the material aspect of the NAADS extension package; in particular, bearing in mind the resource-constrained situation of rural Uganda. While noting the relevant principles, it is equally important to understand how the programme is organised, managed and coordinated practically. The following section fleshes out the details.

4.4 The NAADS institutional structure

In order for the programme to be implemented, NAADS was officially constituted as a semi-autonomous public agency within the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, and created by an Act of Parliament: the NAADS Act 2001 (GoU, 2007).⁸⁸ This Act stipulates the major institutions within NAADS and their respective roles. At the national level, MoAAIF has the national oversight of NAADS (GoU, 2007). NAADS has a Board of Directors, an autonomous body constituted under the MoAAIF and charged with coordination and guiding programme policy and strategy, working together with other government bodies (GoU, 2007). In day-to-day management of NAADS business the Board is supported by a NAADS Secretariat, which provides policy guidance and operational support as well as ongoing evaluation and national-level planning.

⁸⁸ As provided for in the Act, NAADS was established to replace the old extension system and to spearhead the promotion of market-oriented agriculture, and to provide for other matters related or incidental to farming. Unlike the old extension systems, the NAADS approach is to provide market-oriented services by contracting service providers based at sub-county level and controlled by farmers.

At the operational level, NAADS administrative and coordination structures are integrated into the local government system, in accordance with the existing decentralised administration and service delivery framework (GoU, 2007; Bukenya, 2010). The respective Local Government Councils at district and sub-county level (LC5 and LC3 respectively) have the responsibility of political oversight for the programme (MoAAIF, 2000; Nahdy, 2004), especially with regard to the use of public funds. This is ordinarily achieved through joint stakeholder programme monitoring and reviews. Besides the political oversight role, the district and sub-county local governments are also expected to contribute 5% towards their respective annual NAADS budgets.



However, from a technical and administrative point of view the overall responsibility for programme management and coordination in the district falls to the offices of the heads of civil administration at the district and sub-county levels, namely the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and the Sub-county Administrative Officer (SAO) respectively (Rwakakamba, 2011; GoU, 2007). Within the NAADS set-up, however, day-to-day programme coordination is the responsibility of the district-based District NAADS Coordinator (DNC) and the locally-based Sub-county NAADS Coordinator (SNC) (Bukenya, 2010). These two work hand-in-hand, on a day-to-day basis, with their respective heads of Civil Administration and the (district and sub-county) farmer forums, to coordinate the implementation of programme activities (NAADS, 2000). In executing day-to-day responsibilities the DNC reports directly to the CAO, while the SNC reports to the SAO (GoU, 2007). In

this regard they are expected to work closely with the farmer forums, as well as with the staff of the relevant departments at the respective levels. District-level staff especially are occasionally involved in technical audits of goods and services contracted under NAADS, and in monitoring and evaluation activities (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2000).

At the sub-county level, involvement of other technical staff besides the SAO and the sub-accountant varies according to availability and capacity. Often, however, community development officers or assistants have participated in farmer-institution developmental activities, usually working together with the staff of the participating NGOs (GoU, 2007). As noted earlier, the NAADS Act provided for the creation of farmer institutions which are the core institutions in the NAADS, charged with the responsibility of implementing the NAADS programme (NAADS, 2000). At the time of the inception of NAADS, two farmer institutions were put in place, namely the Grassroots Farmer Groups (GFG) and the Sub-county Farmer Forums (SFF).

The grassroots farmer groups are recognised as the basic farmer institutions under NAADS (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2000). Being avenues for farmer participation and empowerment, the farmer groups have a crucial responsibility to implement NAADS programmatic ideas. They are also primary clients of the advisory services (Nahdy, 2004; MoAAIF, 2000). To be registered under NAADS (and become NAADS-affiliated), a farmer group is required to meet a number of criteria. These

initially included (would-be) members sharing common farming interests to do with a particular enterprise; having an Executive and a Constitution (specifying, especially, the objectives of the group, and a clear leadership structure); and the payment of a registration fee (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2000).

In addition, in the course of participation in NAADS, groups are required to make contributions towards the collective cofounding obligation of farmer groups of 2% of the total sub-county NAADS budget (Rwakabamba, 2011). The contribution by individual farmer groups averages 10 000 to 30 000 Ush (Uganda shillings) per group per annum, but the actual amount varies according to the amount of money the sub-county has received from NAADS, and the number of groups formed.⁸⁹ The farmer forums, which represent farmer groups at sub-county, district and national level, hold most power under the NAADS Act. They are major points for interaction between farmers, service providers, government officials, and the wider stakeholder community. The way in which farmer forums relate to the various levels of government is seen as a core control mechanism for the NAADS programme (Farrington et al, 2002; Kidd, 2001).

A SFF is (presently) made up of two representatives from each registered farmer group. These representatives should meet twice a year to plan and review progress in NAADS implementation (See Bukenya, 2010; NAADS, 2000). The forum should

⁸⁹ Approximately US\$6 to US\$18; although there is no officially-recommended size for a NAADS-affiliated farmer group, such a group usually consists of more than 10 and fewer than 30 members.

have an elected chairperson, and two committees (an Executive Committee and a Procurement Committee), whose members are elected in a general assembly of the SFF (NAADS, 2000). Most of the powers of the forum reside in these two committees, the specific and distinct roles of which are spelled out in the NAADS Act. Although the NAADS guidelines require that at least one-third of the positions on the two committees are to be filled by women, in practice this requirement seems to have been applied more strictly in respect of membership on the Procurement Committee (see Bukenya, 2010). Membership of this committee also requires a minimum educational attainment of Senior Four (an Ordinary Level secondary certificate). Although all elected positions are voluntary, members have since received a token allowance for attending scheduled meetings, and for participating in programme monitoring and other related work. With NAADS founded on an interface with farmer groups at sub-county level, the sub-county is (institutionally) the most critical level for implementation (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; Ramirez, 2005).

4.5 NAADS programme components and activities

Since the launch of NAADS in 2001, its activities have been implemented through earmarked programme components (Bukenya, 2010).⁹⁰ Generally, NAADS activities

⁹⁰ The components include: (i) Advisory and information services to farmers (initial allocation from total budget: 65%), with generic output: appropriate advice and information made available to differentiated categories of farmers, in a cost-effective manner; (ii) Technology development and linkages with the markets (initial allocation from total budget: 6%), with generic output: appropriate technologies available to meet identified farmer needs; (iii) Quality assurance - regulation and


focus mainly on organising and strengthening farmer institutions, contracting private service providers to implement group/community-level training and demonstration activities, provision of inputs through technology promotion and/or multiplication ('technology development'), and planning, monitoring, regulation and capacity-building at various levels (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; Bukenya, 2010).

This dissertation concentrates specifically on some of the activities of two NAADS components, namely the advisory and information services and technology development, and linkages with market components. These are, respectively, the components via which farmers' needs for advisory and information services and needs for technology-related inputs are addressed, in line with farmer enterprise interests. The same components are also relevant to the overall objective of this dissertation, which deals with issues of citizen engagement. The relevant activities under each of the selected components are discussed in the following section.

technical auditing of the service providers (initial allocation from total budget: 1%), with generic output: quality of advice and information provided by service providers assured; (iv) Private sector institutional development (initial allocation from total budget: 3%), with generic output: capacity of private sector service providers to meet the identified farmer advice and information needs, sustainably enhanced; and (v) Programme management and monitoring (initial allocation from total budget: 15%), with generic output: appropriate institutional structures and capacity developed at all implementation levels to operate NAADS effectively (see for example MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; Bukenya, 2010).

4.5.1 Advisory and information services component

In this component, the NAADS facilitates activities related directly to provision of services to farmers. These activities include farmer orientation and mobilisation, farmer group and forum formation, participatory planning (for enterprise selection and needs identification), contracting advisory and technology-related services, and monitoring of NAADS activities (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; GoU, 2007; Bukenya, 2010). As noted earlier, the key principles behind these activities are farmer empowerment and participation. Farmers, in collaboration with their respective sub-county administrations, contract agricultural advisors to deliver priority services using funds sourced through a matching intra-governmental fiscal transfer mechanism from the national and district governments (Kidd, 2001; GoU, 2007; Bukenya, 2010).



4.5.1.1 Farmer group and farmer forum formation


Often preceded by farmer orientation and mobilisation activities, the farmer group and farmer forum formation activities involve capacity building intended to assist farmers in organising themselves to demand agricultural advisory and other services, and to monitor their own performance and that of the service providers (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). These activities, commonly referred to as 'farmer institutional development', are seen as providing mechanisms for mobilising farmers to acquire basic attitudes and capacities that will enable them to appreciate NAADS principles and procedures; and ultimately, effectively to control NAADS (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). The main areas of capacity building in this regard include

training farmers in skills related to institutional development (group dynamics, leadership, conflict resolution, constitutionalism and democratic methods of work in the groups, and business and market orientation), as well as facilitating key programme activities such as participatory planning, as specified in periodically-issued NAADS guidelines (see Bukenya, 2010; Rwakakamba, 2011; MoAAIF, 2000).

The farmer institutional development activities are supposed to be facilitated by participating NGOs, who enter into collaboration with the sub-county NAADS administration on signing a memorandum of understanding specifying the terms of engagement (NAADS, 2001). In principle, it is preferred that for an NGO to qualify to participate in this arrangement, it must be operating in a given sub-county at the time it first shows interest. This requirement is based on thinking outlined in the NAADS master document (MoAAIF, 2000) justifying the involvement of NGOs in implementing NAADS activities, on the basis of (for example) their expertise in mobilising local communities and implementing participatory approaches. An NGO already operating in an area is presumed to be familiar with the situation in the local communities (see also Bukenya, 2010).

4.5.1.2 Participatory planning,⁹¹ enterprise selection⁹² and needs identification

The selection of enterprises is a stepwise process in which farmers (in their respective parishes) are guided to choose enterprises that have a competitive advantage, including market potential and low risk. The NAADS philosophy is to incorporate the principle of participation in all its processes and activities at various levels, including planning. It is important to note that in line with its commercialisation strategy for modernising the country's agriculture, NAADS adopted a commodity-focused or 'enterprise' approach as the basis for generating and meeting farmers' advisory and technology services needs (see MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). Since the enterprise approach is based on the idea of promoting 'farming as business', directing advisory and technology services to priority enterprises in each sub-county is a key feature of NAADS operations (see also Byekwaso et al, 2004).



After the capacity building activities (described above) farmers – as members of groups within their respective communities – engage in a participatory planning process, which is likewise facilitated by the staff of the participating NGO. Essentially, this process is a series of exercises, during which farmers collectively select priority enterprises and identify the related constraints (actual and/or

⁹¹ It is mandatory for planning processes to be participatory, and plans are generated through group discussions (PRA-led) as well as through consensus building and collaborative learning approaches.

⁹² An enterprise here refers to any farming and/or production activity in the area of crop and livestock production (including related processing activities) which enables farmers to earn an income from their produce.

perceived). Enterprise selection describes the process through which the farmers (as farmer groups and farmer forums) prioritise enterprises based on guidelines issued by the NAAD Secretariat – the NAADS criteria for enterprise selection (see MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). The guidelines specify both the number of enterprises allowed and the relevant parameters to be considered in their selection. With the exception of the second year of NAADS implementation (2002/03), the maximum number of enterprises supported with NAADS funds in a sub-county has been three.

These guidelines are meant to ensure that the participatory planning processes take NAADS principles and objectives into consideration at every level, and thus provide some kind of ‘standardisation’ for these processes. The enterprises identified by participants (usually through ‘majority vote’) are subjected to weighted criteria in a ranking exercise. On the basis of greater weight given to the ‘profitability’ and ‘marketability’ of an enterprise, the NAADS criteria favour commercially viable enterprises; notwithstanding the attention still to be paid to the level of cost and risk involved. The participatory planning process begins in a community meeting, which brings together the farmer groups in the respective parishes to express their preferred choice of enterprises (see MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). The outcomes are carried forward and concluded at sub-county level. Here, in a meeting which brings together the farmer forum leadership (and often a cross-section of farmer forum representatives) and the technical and administrative staff of the sub-county, the participants come up with the final list of priority enterprises for the sub-county. In principle, qualification for a particular enterprise to remain on the final list depends

very much on its sub-county-wide rating, as per the outcome of the process at the parish level.⁹³

The farmers' participatory planning activities follow the NAADS annual planning cycle and are in line with the broader local government, decentralised, bottom-up planning framework. With the enterprise selection process repeated on an annual basis, the sub-counties can choose the same or new enterprises each year. This potentially allows some flexibility, and the possibility of broadening the scope of the enterprises (and hence farmer groups) that would, over time, benefit from NAADS services (see Bukenya, 2010).

4.5.2 Technology development and market linkages component

Technology development and enhancing linkages with markets are key aspects of the commercialisation strategy for transforming the agricultural sector (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). In this regard, NAADS emphasises the need for the increased availability and use of productivity-enhancing technologies by farmers. To realise this, NAADS has the intention of building the capacity of farmers, to enable them to

⁹³ However, Bukenya (2010) notes that decisions in this regard would at times be influenced by certain administrative and practical considerations. The constraints identified earlier (at the parish level) in respect of enterprises selected from the sub-county priority list, are subjected to further scrutiny. It is here that such constraints are passed for translation into agricultural advisory and/or technology service needs, which form the basis for the advisory service contracts and related technology 'development' contracts. Although the earlier documents refer to technology-related activities as technology 'development', in practice these activities are meant to demonstrate an improvement based on existing practices. For example, this might involve the introduction of a new animal breed or crop variety, with related management and agronomic practices.

drive the process of technology generation and development based on their expressed needs (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001). As noted earlier, the technology needs of farmers are identified (together with their advisory services needs) in respect of the priority enterprises. The technology development contracts are likewise developed by the sub-counties, and issued to qualifying service providers for implementation.

NAADs policies envisage that meeting farmers' technology needs may require technology development, or testing and adaptation of available options. Technology development involves creating awareness about a new technology, and increasing farmers' access and capacity to use and adapt it (see MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; Bukenya, 2010). The aim is to create demand for and increase adoption of the promoted technologies. This aim is seen as best achieved if effective linkages are established between farmers, advisors, and researchers, as well as with relevant markets. Accordingly, under this component NAADS has allocated funds to support the establishment of Technology Development Sites (TDSs) at various levels, namely the farmer group, sub-county and district levels.

Two kinds of technology development activities are identified in this regard: on-farm, and strategic technology development.⁹⁴ The on-farm TDSs, to be hosted within a farmer group, are considered focal points for technology multiplication

⁹⁴ Technology Development Sites (TDSs) would also be focal points for technology multiplication, demonstrations, training and dissemination (see for example NAADS, 2000).

and/or demonstration, as well as serving as sites for practical training (Bukenya, 2010; Gou, 2007; NAADS, 2001). In principle the TDSs are hosted within farmer groups and are deemed to belong to the groups. It is therefore the responsibility of members to maintain the TDS. However, a host farmer within the group (usually the land owner) is presumed to have overall responsibility for day-to-day management of the site. NAADS support for TDSs is limited to advice and basic technology packages, paid for through technology development contracts. Decisions regarding disposal of produce are also the responsibility of group members themselves (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001).

4.5.3 Approach to funding⁹⁵ and delivery of (agricultural) services

Funding and delivery of agricultural services under NAADS is based on new mechanisms for financing and delivery of extension services, in which responsibility and involvement are gradually shifted from the public sector to the private sector. In NAADS this shift in funding is anticipated to be a gradual process, whereas the shift in service delivery is to be more immediate, albeit still phased (MoAAIF, 2000;

⁹⁵ At the inception of the programme, several donors indicated their financial commitment to the programme for periods of one to seven years, with further commitments to be confirmed by December 2000. Some of the donors who showed commitment to funding the programme included DANIDA, DFID, EC and many others. The World Bank would finance US\$45 million of the programme, and this funding would be included in the national government contribution to the programme. This accounted for approximately 46% of the total national government programme funding. In addition, a combination of World Bank contributions and an IFAD loan of US\$17.5 million implies that other donors would be contributing US\$23.8 million (NAADS, 2000). Each year the programme secretariat would submit the annual work programme and financial plans for the following year to the World Bank, including commitments from the other stakeholders to ensure adequate and timely counterpart funding (NAADS, 2000).

MoFPED, 2000; Kidd, 2001; Bahigwa et al, 2005; Nahdy, 2004). The government will provide firm commitments on the feasibility of achieving the planned financing targets. Expenditure savings with NAADS from reduced recurrent wage costs at the district level will be used to assist in meeting these funding requirements.⁹⁶ Importantly, the level of contribution will vary depending on the type of farmer, with subsistence farmers making only a small contribution, while the market-oriented and commercial farmers contribute a larger percentage (NAADS, 2000).

4.5.3.1 Funding

The NAADS design proposes a budget for the NAADS programme raised under a co-funding arrangement (Rwakakamba, 2011). The relevant funds are expected to come from central government, local government (at district and sub-county level) and via contributions from development partners and farmers (MoAAIF, 2000; Nahdy, 2004). Under the initial arrangements government and farmers are expected to provide 20% of the total NAADS budget, and development partners 80%. Central government agencies share 8%, and district and sub-county local governments will each contribute 5%. Farmers will contribute 2% (Rwakakamba, 2011). The donor funding is to be pooled and passed through the government's general budget (the 'common basket') in the Finance Ministry (MoFPED). It will then be periodically disbursed to districts and subsequently to sub-counties (MoAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001; Nahdy 2004; Bukenya 2010; Rwakakamba, 2011). NAADS envisages that

⁹⁶ Assumptions derived from an econometric analysis indicate that farm households participating in NAADS activities would have increased farm returns, and the capacity to contribute to the cost of the services.

within a 25-year period, public financing for the advisory service will be reduced to 50%, with the rest expected to come from contributions by farmers (MoAAIF, 2000). Up to 77% of NAADS money is earmarked for the sub-counties, the bulk of which is pay for advisory services to farmers (Nahdy, 2004; Rwakakamba, 2011). The high share of NAADS funding that goes to the sub-county administrations is intended to support implementation at lower levels, in line with government's decentralisation policy (Nahdy, 2004). Moreover, allocation of NAADS funds to sub-county administrations, who work together with farmers for (and make contracts with) the private service agencies, reflects a partial reversal of the flow of funds, a mechanism that is considered to strengthen the accountability of the service agents to their clients (Bukenya, 2010; Kidd, 2001:21).

4.5.3.2 Services delivery

NAADS has adopted a radical approach to the development of advisory services that goes beyond 'business as usual,' particularly in regard to the type of advice sought and the role of different actors (Kidd, 2001:18). NAADS particularly intends to expand the content of the advice to beyond the 'traditional advice on productivity enhancing technologies and soil conservation', to include marketing, storage and agro-processing information (Kidd, 2001:18). This is in accordance with the aim of changing the mode and goal of farming from subsistence to a market orientation (NAADS, 2004a). As already noted, farmers are to gain increased responsibility for planning the services they need, including monitoring and evaluation of contracts. They are to become clients for a service, rather than mere beneficiaries of charity,

thus shaping a demand-driven and farmer-led advisory service (MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000; NAADS, 2004c:7). The ability of farmers to articulate their needs and make effective demands for advisory services (and, implicitly, for government funds) will depend very much upon their ability to organise themselves in groups (NAADS 2004b; Bahigwa et al, 2005).

Service provision is to be ensured mainly through contractual arrangements with private sector providers or agencies, a strategy intended to increase relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of service provision (see Bukenya, 2010; Nahdy, 2004). The awarding of service contracts is (in principle) by means of competitive mechanisms, based on needs expressed by farmers through their representatives in the farmer forums (NAADS, 2004c; Bukenya, 2010; MoAAIF, 2000; Kidd, 2001; Nahdy, 2004). Offering farmers a chance to buy advisory and research services from any organisations of their choosing is viewed as a key novelty of the NAADS approach (Hall & Yoganand, 2004). The (private) service providers may be individuals, small groups of advisors, professionals, professional companies, parastatals, academic institutions or commercial companies. They may also be companies or individuals active in agricultural trading, input supply, produce marketing, processing or manufacturing (Nahdy, 2004). Civil society organisations (CSOs) are also expected to play a strong role in NAADS activities, through partnerships and letters of agreement (Bukenya, 2010).

NAADS implementation started in certain selected, 'trailblazing' districts. At commencement in 2001/2 Uganda had 56 districts, with the NAADS trailblazing period planned to last for two years. Since then, NAADS has been rolled out to cover all 79 districts in the country at the end of the first phase (2007/8). This rapid expansion of coverage, often cited as an important indicator of NAADS progress, has at times raised concerns about the somewhat haphazard manner in which NAADS has grown - apparently contrary to the original plan. This has been attributed to political pressure as well as to adjustment in the initial criteria for district participation in NAADS. For example, Bukenya (2010) notes that the initial criteria for selection of NAADS trailblazing districts emphasised regional representation and compliance with the Local Government Development Plan. Besides political pressure from members of parliament to have their own constituencies benefit from NAADS, sections of the donor community were concerned about the possible exclusion of the poorer districts obviously disadvantaged by the Local Government Development Plan compliance requirement, which emphasised certain capacities largely absent in poorer districts. This reportedly led to some adjustment in the earlier criteria, and the inclusion of a poverty index.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided the reader with an entry point to the NAADS programme. The chapter summarised AES history in relation to citizen participation, as these pertain to development-oriented reforms within the agricultural sector of the public

service in Uganda. It also discussed the circumstances under which the NAADS programme was adopted, and drew attention to relevant principles employed; and then described programme organisation, management and coordination. Thereafter, the chapter evaluated the programme components and activities. The components include (i) advisory services and information services (that is, farmer group and farmer forum formation and participatory planning, enterprise selection, and needs identification); (ii) technology development and market linkage; and lastly, (iii) the approach to funding and delivery of funds was also given attention.

This chapter also emphasised that agricultural extension services (and NAADS in particular) are aimed at alleviating poverty among Ugandan farmers through the commercialisation of agriculture. The programme has been described in normative terms (that is, in terms of how it is organised and how it is supposed to work). In the following two chapters the actual utilisation of the NAADS prototype will be analysed, via its impact on a representative group of elites and some at grassroots level. As discussed in the introduction, the aim of this chapter was mainly to introduce the NAADS programme's official status as an example of a participatory development programme aimed at alleviating poverty. The following chapter focuses on the elite's perceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme, and analyses the type of participation in relation to its impact on alleviating poverty.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYZING THE PERCEPTIONS OF ELITES ON DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE NAADS PROGRAMME

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the historical and developmental context of NAADS and how this led to the structure of the NAADS programme. It commenced by historicising the Agricultural Extension Services (AES) in relation to citizen participation. The chapter examined why NAADS was adopted; and more importantly, how it was implemented in various districts of Uganda. The chapter that follows is a qualitative analysis of the views of elites⁹⁷ on participation in the NAADS programme. The analysis is done in line with Objective Four of this thesis, which seeks to analyse the elite's perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in relation to the purportedly democratic development initiative of NAADS in Uganda as an emerging democracy.

As discussed previously, if development initiatives are to lead to lasting results, they ought to involve beneficiaries actively in identifying needs, formulating plans, setting priorities and monitoring and evaluating outputs and outcomes (Fung & Wright, 2003; Gaventa, 2001; IDS, 2004; World Bank, 2000a; IMF, 2006). As a result, there is a need to analyse whether this impact has been achieved, since the history of Agriculture Extension Services (AES) in relation to participation reminds us that

⁹⁷ Elite perceptions, in this case, resulted from interviewing respondents in a non-standardised, individualised manner which involved face-to-face questioning of the respondents, as suggested by Johnson and Reynolds (2005).

during colonialism, the AES served the interests of the British Protectorate (see for example Semana, 2002; Bukenya, 2010). According to Bukenya (2010) the emergence of the Village Level Participatory Approach (VLPA) hardly stimulated bottom-up planning and self-development processes; they were short-lived, despite the VLPA. This chapter determines whether or not this is the case with NAADS.

The adoption of the NAADS programme also came with the difficulty of involving and directly benefiting people with few or no assets. The programme preferred to involve those people considered 'economically active poor'. According to Bukenya (2010) the economically active poor are farmers who have some limited assets, skills and knowledge to create a livelihood. The problem with this policy is that the majority are the 'less economically active poor' (see Appleton, 2001). This *modus operandi* of the NAADS programme has generated controversy concerning levels of engagement in programme implementation since its inception in the 2001/2 financial year⁹⁸ (Rwakakamba, 2011). Some sections of the public in Uganda expressed their concerns through the media, often asking whether the programme had achieved its participatory objectives, and if participation in the programme had translated into empowerment for the beneficiaries.⁹⁹ Others state that NAADS has

⁹⁸ See *The Daily Monitor* '25 December 2009 Eight NAADS Officials Arrested', also *The New Vision* 6 October 2009 'Sh355m NAADS Funds Recovered', also *The Daily Monitor* 2 June 2009. 'Minister to Arrest NAADS Officials',

⁹⁹ According to the European Union Election Observer Mission in Uganda for the 2011 General Elections, most NRM candidates use government projects such as NAADS and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) as tools to persuade voters to vote for the NRM, should they wish to benefit from such projects.

barely served its purpose; instead, they argue, it has empowered a few farmers whose farms are used as demonstration centres, but has neglected the masses, failing to embrace and deepen an all-inclusive approach (see for example Rwakakamba, 2011).


These popular sentiments, then, justify a core question asked by this dissertation; that is, whether an upsurge in advocacy for all-inclusiveness in development in countries of the South has a direct correlation to 'recipients' actually receiving such development prescriptions. Therefore, this chapter seeks to establish the perspectives of the elites to these apparent contradictions in NAADS. Before discussing these perceptions, it is necessary to revisit the methodology employed to gather and interpret information. Qualitatively, several formal elite¹⁰⁰ interviews were carried out with members of parliament, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MoAAIF) officials, NAADS secretariat officials, representatives of major political parties (NRM and FDC), and lastly, district and sub-county officials (see Figure 3 below). It should be noted that this categorisation of elites for interviews was in line with the programme's institutional structure,¹⁰¹ with the exception of the political party representatives. The programme has been created and run through a semi-autonomous public agency within the Ministry of

¹⁰⁰ Many studies refer to elites as persons who are powerful and with considerable influence on collective decisions of central importance (Woods, 1998). This dissertation borrows from Dahl (1958:2), who considers elites as individuals within a specific political system who exercise power or influence over other actors in the system to some degree.

¹⁰¹ See Section 4.4 of this dissertation for the detailed institutional structure of the NAADS programme.

Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries. It was created by an act of parliament, developed at national level, and executed through a decentralised framework (see GoU, 2007). Some of the groups of interviewees¹⁰² selected contributed to the planning and eventual implementation of the programme. The other categories were incorporated to increase the credibility and validity of the results (see for example Altrichter et al, 1996; Babbie & Mouton, 2001; Bless & Higson-Smith, 2000; Cohen & Manion, 1986; Davids et al, 2005; Denzin, 1978; Mouton, 2001; Wood, 2001b).

Figure 3 Groups of elites interviewed



A set of uniform questions (variables) were grouped into thematic categories and discursively posed to elites. These questions were aimed at establishing (i) whether the government of Uganda, in its pursuit for micro-economic development intervention, had constructed a programme that involved people in its making and

¹⁰² See Figure 5.1.

implementation;¹⁰³ (ii) how government achieved clarity and transparency on the structure and functions of the NAADS programme; (iii) what course the government took to promote effective participation; and (iv) what the challenges and barriers are that hinder effective participation in the NAADS programme.¹⁰⁴ These were the core variables used to analyse the elite's perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in NAADS. Below the core variables was a set of dependencies that guided the interview sessions with the elites.¹⁰⁵ Note that the controversy surrounding the overall functioning of the NAADS programmes does not allow the researcher to name the elites who participated in the interviews. For the purpose of confidentiality, their views are collectively discussed. Figure 4 below shows the data transformations.



¹⁰³ 'Participation', used in this context, reflects the narrow conception found in Robinson (1994), as described in Chapter 2. Participation takes place when people get involved in policy decisions and activities that affect their daily lives. The focus here is more on formal practices (such as planning, implementation and attending village meetings) than on informal ones (such as protests and demonstrations).

¹⁰⁴ See Figure 5.2.

¹⁰⁵ See Appendix A

Figure 4 Data transformations

VARIABLE	TYPE OF TRANSFORMATION
Consultation /Citizen Participation	In pursuit of a micro-economic development intervention, did the government construct a programme that involved people (beneficiaries) in the making and implementation thereof?
Government Transparency	How did the government achieve clarity and transparency on the structure and functions of the NAADS programme?
Government Strategy	What course did the government take to promote effective participation?
Challenges	What are the challenges and barriers that hinder effective participation in the NAADS programme?

This concludes the section on the methodology employed. The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows: the first data to be presented is the views of government officials who participated in the study. This is followed by the views of the political party representatives who were interviewed. The last section of the chapter discusses the views of the Bushenyi district leaders.

Certain issues concerning the nature and scope of this chapter must be brought to the reader's attention. **Firstly**, this chapter acknowledges NAADS as an example of a participatory development initiative aimed at alleviating poverty, and it assesses the elites' popular perceptions in relation to participatory development. **Secondly**, for reasons of confidentiality the respondents' details are not divulged; the chapter refers only to the type of official. **Thirdly**, the information attained from interviews is not fully representative of all the elites linked to the NAADS; however, the views

given may help us to understand the general perceptions of elites on participation in the programme, at both national and local levels.

5.2 Views from government officials

Government officials interviewed included two members of parliament from Bushenyi District (referred to as MP-01 and MP-02 in the dissertation), three officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries, and 10 officials from the NAADS secretariat in Kampala. Government officials were included in this dissertation for a number of reasons. All government programmes are centrally planned and implemented by the appropriate ministry in a decentralised manner (see GoU, 2007). The MPs in this case were included because they play a crucial role in planning for government development programmes through various development committees at national level. The Ministry of Agriculture officials, on the other hand, were interviewed mainly because NAADS is a sub-component of the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture, which is an important branch of MoAAIF. Lastly, officials from the NAADS secretariat were included chiefly because they oversee the activities of the entire programme, at national level. All the selected officials' roles are stipulated in the NAADS Act of 2001 (see for example Benin et al, 2007; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000; GoU, 2007). The following section discusses findings relating to the perceptions of government officials concerning citizen participation in relation to NAADS.

5.2.1 Perceptions of the members of parliament (MPs)¹⁰⁶

The two MPs interviewed stated that the NAADS programme was one of many programmes that the government established for promoting development through participatory processes at grassroots level (see also NAADS, 2001). They explained that when the government created the new system of local government based on local councils (LCs), one of its main goals was to involve people in decision-making processes. Therefore, the existence of LCs was a landmark victory for participation. The councillors would forward the proceedings of LC meetings to their MPs, who in turn take the people's views to parliament. The MPs pointed out that there was wide consultation with people before the establishment of the NAADS programme (MP-01,14/07/2009; MP-02, 20/07/2009).

When asked whether the people had the opportunity to influence the plans and priorities of government, the MPs replied that people were responsive and enthusiastic during the consultation processes. In addition, they claimed that during the initial phases of the programme, they (the MPs) were tasked with going to their constituencies and sensitising people about the NAADS programme and what it stood for; and the people's input during these sessions was were profound. One of the MPs observed:

¹⁰⁶ For reasons of confidentiality, government officials who participated in this research are not identified; their responses will be edited, and expressed verbatim where possible.

“...the people influence government decisions to a relatively great extent... current Uganda is not like how it was between mid-1960s and early 1980s, when people barely influenced and participated in government programmes as stakeholders; therefore, the progress of NAADS is a clear experiment of peoples contribution towards national development.” (MP-01,14/07/2009)

In response to the question of government transparency, the MPs were hesitant to answer; for two reasons. Firstly, they seemed uncertain of the extent of government transparency in the initial phases of the programme. Secondly, the programme began when they were not yet representatives in parliament. However, they argued that the government had been transparent, especially in their advocacy for citizen participation, and also in marketing the NAADS programme. They gave an example: the ‘Prosperity for All’ (PFA)¹⁰⁷ process, also known as ‘*Bonna-Bagagawale*’. This was a government initiative aimed at deepening Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) interventions at community and household level. Such initiatives were adopted to address structural bottlenecks in production and marketing (see Nabbumba, 2008). The MPs stated that the government had made sure that the programme was implemented at the district level, and with sub-counties being implementation centres (see also NAADS Act, 2001). This was seen as a clear demonstration that the

¹⁰⁷ Prosperity For All was about wealth creation for all through market-led production, as a means of improving human development. The initiative represented the operationalisation of the ruling party’s Presidential Manifesto of 2006, which had as its slogan ‘Prosperity for All’, and which focused on promoting agricultural modernisation, export growth and industrialisation. Implementation began in the 2006/7 financial year.

government had implemented the programme transparently, so as to realise its objectives. They state further that the President consistently carried out campaigns throughout the country to sensitise the population and encourage participation in the NAADS programme, and in some cases success had been achieved. Asked how the people felt towards the programme, the MPs had mixed opinions. For example, MP-01 observed:

“The people at that grassroots complained that the officials at the district and Sub-county had allowed those already with resources to participate more, hence neglecting the poorest of the poor... even those who participated have complained that they were being offered low quality agricultural inputs; a contradiction to what NAADS was established to solve.” (MP-01, 14/07/2009)

The other Member of Parliament (MP-02) noted:

“...the people were satisfied, especially those who participated in the programme... the programme is constantly criticised;¹⁰⁸ such is a clear indication that the people have the liberty to critique development programmes which in the long run would translate into efficiency and development... the NAADS programme has been criticised because of

¹⁰⁸ See The New Vision 15th July 2010: NAADS programme under review. The article highlights how President Yoweri Museveni halted the release of the NAADS funds over mismanagement.

mismanagement, corruption, elite-driven and the failure to deliver on its promised objectives on national level.”¹⁰⁹ (MP-02, 20/07/2009)

In addition, the MPs were optimistic about decentralisation policy and its emphasis on full citizen participation. They pointed out that not only did the policy encourage participation in local government, it also made people stakeholders in development activities at local level (see also Anthony, 1995; 1998; Nsubuga, 2004; Rugambwa, 2004; Sabiti, 1998; Soren, 1996; Tukahebwa, 1998). The MPs observations should perhaps be benchmarked against their impressions of previous dictatorial regimes, in which participation was totally absent. However, neither MP commented on whether participation was all-inclusive and whether everybody (regardless of their social and economic standing) participated equally (see Appendix A). However, both MPs agreed that there has been some distorted information disseminated about the programme; something they attributed to district technocrats’ failure to sensitise the masses about the programme’s objective (MP-01,14/07/2009; MP-02, 20/07/2009). One of the MPs observed that:

“Besides low levels of sensitisation, there are cultural issues that have proved a hindrance to participation; for instance, interested women are not supported by their husbands to participate in the programme.” (MP-02, 20/07/2009)¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ See also The Daily Monitor 10th August 2010: President accuses Jinja NAADS officers of failing programme. The Daily Monitor 8th May 2011: Budaka farmers up against NAADS fraud.

¹¹⁰ Though the MPs made such claims, evidence from the district analytical report indicates that women have been participating.

In light of these remarks, Rwakakamba (2011) and Oleru et al (2005) remind us that there are power struggles within families, and that society hinders equitable development across genders. Both MPs agreed that there was a need for more sensitisation about the benefits of the programme as described in the NAADS strategic framework (MP-01, 14/07/2009; MP-02, 20/07/2009).

Overall, it was clear that the MPs were satisfied with the progress of citizen participation in the NAADS programme. Their views suggest that government did involve people in decision-making and implementation, thus enabling the promotion of people's power. The MPs also endorsed the process of implementation and decentralisation, and further indicated that the rural communities they represented seemed satisfied with such developments. However, the MPs did not clearly highlight the extent of inclusiveness of participation, especially with regard to gender. For example, they were how asked to explain how the NAADS programme had addressed the issues of gender, whether there are social cultural barriers that hinder women's participation, and whether the NAADS programme had achieved its objectives (if any) in terms of addressing gender issues (see Appendix A). Not only did the MPs fail to point out how gender issues would be incorporated effectively into development programmes, they did not suggest alternative strategies on how citizen participation would be strengthened.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ This is in line with negative publicity on how decentralisation programmes have been held hostage by district elites countrywide, neglecting the poor.

5.2.2 Perceptions of the officials from MoAAIF¹¹²

The responses from the MoAAIF officials resonated with those made by the MPs to the same questions. The three MoAAIF officials interviewed explained that the entire programme design – up to its final implementation – was a collaborative effort with all the stakeholders, including the foreign stakeholders (donors) who co-funded the programme (see also NAADS Act, 2001; NAADS, 2001; GoU, 2007; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000). The MoAAIF officials stated that all the stakeholders were consulted as the donors had proposed; that is, with the emphasis on beneficiaries. The donors emphasised a participatory approach to development, and significant emphasis was laid on the programme being all-inclusive at both design and implementation stages (see also NAADS Report, 2001). The officials observed that the shift from subsistence production to commercialised agriculture was seen from a technist perspective as the only option for boosting rural growth, since Uganda relies heavily on agriculture (see also Oleru et al, 2005; NAADS Act, 2001; NAADS, 2000). Therefore, there was a need to change the general trend from producing for consumption and selling the surplus to a situation in which large farms would be established for commercial production. The MoAAIF officials noted that this necessitated a programme to incorporate all the stakeholders in the implementation – especially the beneficiaries – in order for all to have a sense of ownership in the programme (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009; MoAAIF-02, 08/07/2009; MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009). One official from the ministry observed that:

¹¹² This category of respondents was selected because they oversee all the national practicalities of agricultural development in Uganda.


“stakeholders participation was imbedded in the strategic planning of the NAADS programme... grassroots inclusion in the programme was not merely a result of need for technical support but also a key strategic aspect for the establishment of the programme.” (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009).

On the issue of transparency, the MoAAIF officials were also supportive of the government openness to the entire NAADS programme. The MoAAIF officials argued that as they were the leading stakeholders in the programme, it was their obligation to make sure that the beneficiaries became part of the programme, from initiation through to implementation (see NAADS Act, 2001). The MoAAIF also gave guidelines on how the programme should run at district level, a responsibility they claim to continue to carry out today (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009; MoAAIF-02, 08/07/2009; MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009)¹¹³ (see also NAADS Report, 2001; NAADS, 2004b; MoAAIF, 2000; MoFPED, 2000). However, when asked to explain the degree of beneficiary participation during the design of the programme at the national level, the MoAAIF officials’ responses were not conclusive. They argued that more consultations were done, mainly with expert planners and technists. This suggests

¹¹³ They pointed out that all-inclusive engagement in a country like Uganda, where the majority of the people live in rural areas, services would be a solution to the current development challenges. The officials claimed that citizen engagement in NAADS was the only way through which rural development can be transformed. They did not refer to other dynamics such as low levels of education, as suggested by Ngaka (2006), or poverty, put forward by Brock et al (2003), Nkusa (2004) and Allen (2002). Their failure to realise that in some areas of the country district technocrats have usurped development expertise while beneficiaries remain mere recipients suggests a denial of extant realities (see Rwakakamba, 2011).

that they neglected indigenous knowledge, substituting with technocrats' ideas instead (Rwakakamba, 2011). Indeed, one of the officials pointed out that:

“...it was difficult to identify which farmer would be involved in the programme, since farmers at the local levels differ significantly in terms of their production output and experience... at the same time they had a problem with financing farmers' representatives to attend meetings, as the exercise would put a burden on the already strained budget for the programme; and as a result, the quality of all-inclusive participation was compromised.” MoAAIF-02, 08/07/2009)



Regarding challenges in implementation, MoAAIF responses suggested that the NAADS programme was not without challenges (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009; MoAAIF-02, 08/07/2009; MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009). The MoAAIF officials observed that from a technist perspective an obstacle was the inefficiency of untrained personnel, who could not easily interpret and translate the objectives of the programme. This observation by MoAAIF is shared by Francis and James (2003), Enyipu et al (2002), Sserunkuuma et al (2001), Benin et al (2007), Rwakakamba (2011) and Bukenya (2010), who report that sub-counties lacked the funds to support Community-Based Facilitators (CBFs), whose role it is to mobilise and train farmers for monitoring Technology Development Sites (TDSs). The MoAAIF officials also said that the programme has suffered from negative publicity from some sections of

society, especially by way of opposition from development activists and media¹¹⁴ who considered NAADS to be another failed government programme – citing a complete lack of monitoring, or evaluation of mechanisms for monitoring progress (MoAAIF-01, 06/07/2009; MoAAIF-02, 08/07/2009; MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009). One official stated:

“...some opinion polls suggest that the programme was imported by the government without establishing whether it would be embraced by the beneficiaries of whom the majority are subsistence illiterates rendering difficulty in its embracement” (MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009)

In summary, the interviews with MoAAIF officials suggest that in their view the government constructed a programme that involved all stakeholders in decision-making and implementation. This was achieved through decentralising the programme to district and later sub-county level. The MoAAIF officials also viewed government as having a transparent decentralisation policy, and further indicated that the grassroots were satisfied with this situation. However, the MoAAIF officials also pointed out that some sections of the public, especially the media and development activists, were cynical about participation in the NAADS programme. For example, one official observed:

¹¹⁴ On two occasions NAADS has been suspended by the president, citing corruption and mismanagement of the NAADS fund. This has contributed to the negative publicity surrounding the programme.

“the cynicism from the public about the functionality of the NAADS is partly a result of reported cases of abuse of office and resources by NAADS officials in some districts... this, indeed, has actually made the NAADS programme appear like a failed programme.” (MoAAIF-03, 10/07/2009).

5.2.3 Perceptions of NAADS Secretariat Officials (NSOs)¹¹⁵

As previously mentioned, the NAADS Secretariat was established for the day-to-day management of NAADS business, providing policy guidance and operational support. The NAADS Secretariat offices are located in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. With assistance from one senior official at the Secretariat, the researcher was able to identify four other officials who had sufficient knowledge about the programme. The NSOs' observations of the government's efforts to encourage citizen participation in the NAADS programme were more or less the same as those made by the MoAAIF officials. The NSOs were of the view that the entire programme, from design to final implementation, was an all-inclusive exercise with all the stakeholders, as required by the NAADS Act of 2001 (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). The NSOs pointed out that they were tasked with identifying possible stakeholders from the district, so as to get their input. The district representatives would then assist them in selecting farmer representatives to attend national meetings, making the whole process all-inclusive (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009).

¹¹⁵ These were incorporated purposely because they co-ordinate and oversee all activities of NAADS Programmes on a national level (See, NAADS Act 2001).

When asked to comment on how the government achieved clarity and transparency on the structure and functions of the NAADS programme, the NSOs fully acknowledged the government's transparency in terms of implementing the NAADS programme. Indeed, remarks were made (by officials at different levels) in support of government's efforts to make the NAADS programme participatory (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). For example, one official observed:

“our commitment as major stakeholder was to be as much transparent as possible... that is, incorporating all stakeholders and mainly beneficiaries of the programme at all phases, vertically and horizontally... we were to offer strategic guidelines for the proper functioning of the entire programme nationally.” (NSO-01, 23/07/2009).

In fact, the NSOs collectively observed that their aim was to incorporate local knowledge, as it had been proven (in theory) in other parts of the world that citizen participation reconciles all development aspects into one domain (see King et al, 1998). The NSOs claimed that because of full government support and continuous publicity, the programme was made part of ordinary people's lives. The NSOs also indicated that the programme was initially run in only seven districts, and attracted wide citizen participation in those pilot areas (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). According to the NSOs, the high levels of


participation paved the way for the programme to extend its coverage to other parts of the country. Indeed, Bukenya (2010) and Rwakakamba (2011) observe that by 2008 the programme had extended its services to 79 districts.

Furthermore, the NSOs pointed out that when the government adopted their decentralisation policy in 1997, it became mandatory that government micro-economic development interventions be executed through decentralisation (Local Government Act, 1997). Services were to be brought closer to the people. The NSOs stated that it became a priority that the NAADS programme ensured that services were taken closer to the people, and in this case the districts were the main focus. Later, the sub-counties would be the sites where the programme would be implemented. The NSOs were entirely optimistic about the positive effects of decentralisation on people's participation. One of the officials, when asked to comment on what people said about the course the government took in adopting and establishing the NAADS programmes, observed: "Not only did NAADS encourage and increase participation; ...it also made people stakeholders in development activities at the local level" (NSO-02, 28/07/2009).

The NSOs were also keen to put on record that participation will only be fully effective when there is all-inclusive participation by all the stakeholders, and enough resources to run the programme efficiently. Some NSOs cited the recent incongruities in some districts, where programme facilitators have acted in a

contrary manner to what the programme stipulates, ignoring the guidelines as spelled out in the NAADS Act (2001) and the NAADS Report of 2000.¹¹⁶

When asked whether the NAADS programme had encountered challenges to all-inclusive participation, the officials did not hesitate to point out some major problems, from technical to logistical issues. More emphasis was put on the technical challenges faced by the programme; though the NSOs acknowledged that the logistical challenges cannot be underestimated. For example, one official commented that:



“...we are faced with problem of [a lack of] fully trained Community Based Facilitators (CBFs), as well as Parish Coordinator Committees (PCCs), in many districts where the programme is being implemented... there is also shortage of staff at some of the newly-created rural district headquarters, to oversee the programme implementation in sub-counties.” (NSO-03, 31/07/2009).

The NSOs also noted that most districts where the programme was being implemented lacked the financial resources to facilitate the availability of Community Based Facilitators and Parish Coordinator Committees to farmers (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009). In addition, the money allocated to some districts was not enough to meet the requirements of the willing

¹¹⁶ For example in October 2007 the NAADS programme was suspended by the president following irregularities within the procurement of NAADS inputs and the rampant corruption at the district and Sub-county that had marred the whole programme in the many parts of the country.


participants in the programme, and funds allocated to some districts did not reach the beneficiaries, as a result of corruption and mismanagement. The NSOs pointed out that in some areas, most of the funds are spent on ensuring the meetings and training of Community Based Facilitators and Parish Coordinator Committees.

These views are supported by recent media reports that in some districts (such as Apac, Alero and Anaka), NAADS officials have been arrested because of mismanagement and corruption. Moreover, the NSOs reported that some people were awarded tenders to purchase high quality agricultural inputs for the programme, but purchased low quality inputs. In a nutshell, the NSOs acknowledged some degree of participation in the programme; however, they were keen to point out that corruption and mismanagement at local levels has hindered all-inclusive participation in the NAADS programme (NSO-01, 23/07/2009; NSO-02, 28/07/2009; NSO-03, 31/07/2009).

5.3 Views from political representatives

This section presents findings from interviews with representatives of two major political parties: the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and the National Resistance Movement. Ten officials from each party were interviewed, all serving in various capacities at their district offices, and they were included in order to understand how they relate democracy and citizen participation to the NAADS programme. In some cases the views presented were obtained through discussions with two or three representatives; in others they are the testimony of individuals.

It should be noted that there are various political parties in the country; the reason for choosing these two political parties in particular is that the FDC is the strongest opposition party, while the NRM is the ruling party. The selected parties offer a strong basis for comparison. As a reminder, when the current government (the NRM) came to power, it introduced a single party movement system, and the entire population was assumed to be in that movement (Carbone, 2004). Since the advent of the multiparty dispensation, various political parties have been recognised and allowed to contest various leadership positions.¹¹⁷ The inclusion of political party representatives was sparked by the fact the NRM claims credit for establishing the NAADS programme. Opposing this view, the FDC claims that the NRM is using a national programme to facilitate its own political agenda. The following sections present some of the responses of the political party representatives who participated in the interviews.



5.3.1 Perceptions from the FDC

Uganda's history of political instability only changed after 1986, when the current government came to power¹¹⁸ (Hansen & Michael, 1988; Ingham, 1983; Mamdani,

¹¹⁷The National Resistance Movement (NRM) is a party like any other under the current multi-party system, but holds a dominant position in comparison to other parties. Some critics claim that its dominance is based on voter manipulation, use of state resources to entrench its agenda, and use of the military to suppress those in opposition. See for example the Daily Monitor, 23 May 2011


¹¹⁸ It should be noted that political instability has surfaced in Uganda once more; for instance, police brutality against 'Walk to Work' protesters. In addition, there has been mismanagement of funds; for example, The Weekly Observer, 22 May 2008: 'CHOGM Scandal'; The East African, 14 September 2008: 'Uganda NSSF Scandal threatens to split NRM'; The New Vision, 3 June 2007: 'Idolising GAVI suspects is double scandal'; The New Vision, 5 May 2000: 'Prosecute Valley Dam Culprits'.

1976). The NRM single-party movement gave way to multi-partyism. The FDC party was born of this development, and its aim was to bring change. In the preamble of their constitution, the FDC claims that: “whereas poverty, ignorance, disease has afflicted the people of Uganda... they are committed to eradicating conditions which give rise to political instability and building a social-economic and political order which benefits all the people of Uganda”. These impressive intentions were to be achieved through: (i) uniting and facilitating reconciliation among the people of Uganda;¹¹⁹ (ii) achieving sustainable peace, development, and a culture of dialogue, compromise, tolerance and good governance; (iii) eliminating inequalities created by mismanagement of public affairs by anyone;¹²⁰ (iv) fighting poverty, ignorance, disease, and all forms of discrimination; (v) establishing and maintaining good relationships between Uganda and her neighbours, and promoting sub-regional and regional integration efforts; (vi) acting as a platform for promoting democracy, good governance, constitutionalism and the rule of law; (vii) enhancing integrity, transparency, and accountability in the management of public affairs; (viii) strengthening the institutions of government and promoting the principle of separation of powers and democracy; and lastly, (ix) pursuing constitutional, non-partisan and professional management of the public service, the army, the prison service, the police and other security organs.

¹¹⁹ For example, for the past two decades the northern part of Uganda has faced political instability from the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group that has led to many people in the region ending up in Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs), and also caused the loss of many lives.

¹²⁰ The gap between rich and poor is very wide. See for example the Daily Monitor, 23 May 2011 ‘In Uganda, demonstrators, police, soldiers share same fate.’

The FDC representatives were asked if the current government had constructed a programme (NAADS) that involved people in decision-making and implementation. Their responses were very different from the responses from the MPs, MoAAIF and the NSOs. The FDC representatives claimed that overall, the programme gives more support to NRM supporters, and encourages their participation more than it does that of opposition members (FDC-01, 06/08/2009; FDC-02, 03, 05/08/2009). The FDC representatives cited examples of the President conducting countrywide tours, visiting farmers who are participating in the programme – but, they said, in most cases the farms he visits are those of NRM supporters. The FDC representatives claimed that anyone wanting to benefit from and participate in the NAADS programme needs to support NRM. One of the respondents observed that:



“NAADS programme has failed to meet the people’s demands at the grassroots, due to the poor design which only benefits the elites, who work as coordinators and end up mismanaging and abusing the entire project... the middle men and the few elite have positioned themselves to suffocate the poor farmers and the youth who need the services.” (FDC-01, 06/08/2009)

These comments contradict the observations made by the government officials. When asked if the programme involved people in its creation and implementation, they acknowledged that participation in the programme had occurred, though they claimed it was selective. For instance, one respondent claimed that:


“...from the district to sub-counties, those in opposition are in many cases sidelined... there is a lot of intrigue and corrupt officials in the NAADS programme who have embezzled government resources meant for national development” (FDC-02, 05/08/ 2009).

These views, if correct, discredit the claimed efficiency of the NAADS programme; they also call for further investigation, as this is a national programme meant to benefit all citizens, regardless of their political affiliation (see NAADS Act, 2001).

When the FDC respondents were asked to comment on government transparency regarding the roll-out of the programme, and people’s perceptions of it, they claimed that the programme was implemented transparently, but was not open to all the rural farmers that had supposedly been targeted. They claimed that few who participated in the programme were impressed with the programme, but those who were not in the programme were dissatisfied, especially when excluded on the basis of their political affiliation.¹²¹ The FDC respondents were unanimous in stating that FDC supporters in rural areas are dissatisfied and often barred from participating in national programmes (FDC-01, 06/08/2009; FDC-02, 03, 05/08/2009).

¹²¹ NAADS has featured prominently on President Museveni's agenda, especially on his countrywide tours promoting Prosperity-for-All. In most of the areas visited people are critical of the programme, saying the funds have benefited only local government officials.

While some FDC representatives were supportive of government's establishment of the programme and of the mechanisms through which the programme was to be implemented, they still had concerns over the logistics of how the extension services benefits are being transferred from local governments to beneficiaries. The FDC representatives proposed a depoliticisation of national development programmes such as NAADS from political party agendas. Some of the FDC officials also pointed out that effective participation cannot take place when there is a high level of illiteracy among the grassroots. The FDC representatives suggested that the government should first eliminate inequalities created by mismanagement of public affairs, and sensitise the people on how to hold their leaders accountable (FDC-01,06/08/2009; FDC-02, 03, 05/08/2009)



In the opinion of the FDC representatives, participation has been 'captured' by the elites. The FDC claim that the elite's ideas are sold to the vulnerable poor, who end up supporting them vehemently without questioning their validity. This elite capture has been documented in the literature on participation, in Uganda and elsewhere, in the emerging democracies of the South (Francis & James, 2003; Ngaka, 2006). For example, Uganda has failed to devise and develop effective means through which citizen participation can be intrinsically embedded in national development programmes at the micro level. One of the FDC respondents said: "...when we try to advocate for effective participation in national development


programme, we are labelled as saboteurs of development by the ruling party.”
(FDC-03, 05/08/2009).¹²²

The FDC representatives also noted some complex issues hindering effective participation not only in the national development programmes, but also in actively partisan participation politics. From a national perspective, the most important are disunity between various ethnic tribes, and the current government’s failure to reconcile such development obstacles, juxtaposed with achieving sustainable peace¹²³ and a culture of dialogue and good governance. The FDC representatives stated that the government has failed to eliminate the gross inequalities created by mismanagement of public affairs and corruption that has become commonplace in the public sphere. Furthermore, corruption has caused discontent, especially among those who feel the government has not done enough to assist the poor, and has instead created “haves and have-nots”. The ‘haves’ have praised the government, while the ‘have nots’ have remained voiceless on national matters – especially those living in the rural areas of the country, such as Bushenyi.

¹²² Indeed, the President has proposed a bill that would deny bail to those considered economic saboteurs. See The Sunday Vision, 2 August 2011 ‘What Does The Proposed Amendment To Scrap Bail Mean For Uganda?’ See also The New Vision, 22 September 2011 ‘Museveni re-assures Ugandans on state of economy.’

¹²³ These observations were contextualised and linked to the political instability that has characterised the Northern part of Uganda for the past two decades (the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict); as well as some parts of Western Uganda, where the Allied Democratic Forces had staged their bases.

In summary, the FDC representatives' opinion was that participation has been hindered by poverty, ignorance, and partisan politics on the part of government. They blamed the NRM government for failure to provide basic services (especially to rural communities where the majority still live below the poverty line), and argued that even in the NAADS programme there are elements of discrimination, especially in relation to political affiliation. The FDC officials further observed that the avenues of participation created by the current government have been held hostage by morally deficient leaders at the local level (often referred to as 'elites') who are not accountable for their decisions. They suggested that for effective participation aimed at national development, there is need for strengthening institutions of government and promoting the principle of separation of powers, and for pursuing constitutional, non-partisan and professional management of the national programmes.



5.3.2 Perceptions from the NRM

The NRM brands itself as a broad-based, inclusive, democratic, non-sectarian, multi-ideological, multi-interest and progressive mass organisation Enshrined in their constitution is the NRM's ideal of transforming Uganda from a poor peasant society into a modern, industrial, united and prosperous society (Ngaka, 2006). The NRM party liberated Uganda from cyclic misery orchestrated by tyrannical leaders after her independence.¹²⁴ The party also restored constitutionalism and the rule of law in Uganda. When the movement came to power in 1986, it was believed that Uganda

¹²⁴ <http://www.nrm.ug/details.php?catId=3> [Accessed 23 February 2010].

was not ready for multi-party politics (Carbone, 2004). However, because of internal and external pressure exerted on the government, multi-partyism became unavoidable. Voting was restored and the previously dis-enfranchised people of Uganda (such as women, youth, disabled and the workers)¹²⁵ were empowered. In addition to empowering the masses through voting and decentralising the provision of services up to village level,¹²⁶ the party also allowed opposition elements to engage in the activities of the state, generating dialogue which led to some sort of political maturity. However, the NRM has recently been criticised for harassing the opposition, and displaying politically intolerant behaviour which, in essence, has infringed on freedom of speech and left democracy hanging by a thread.¹²⁷

Firstly, the representatives of the NRM noted that the party seeks to transform Uganda from a poor peasant society into a modern, industrial, united and prosperous society. They claim that this can only be attained through full cooperation with all the stakeholders in the development arena, and this is the reason the NAADS programme was made all-inclusive. The NRM representatives acknowledged that citizen participation in NAADS programme was a cornerstone of development. However, their interpretation of who should participate was ambiguous and unclear. Unsurprisingly, when asked if the government had constructed a programme that involved people in creation and implementation of

¹²⁵ <http://www.nrm.ug/details.php?catId=3> [Accessed 23 February 2010].

¹²⁶ See the Decentralization Policy and Resistance Councils which later turned to Local Councils.


¹²⁷ See The Daily Monitor, 23 May 2011, 'In Uganda, Demonstrators, Police, and Soldiers share same fate'

the programme, their responses were very supportive of the government's strategy. They pointed out that citizen participation in all aspects of government had been reinstated by the NRM. Their ideas of citizen participation are supported by authors such as Museveni (1992), Mamdani (1997), Anthony (1998) and Apter (1995). Indeed, the NRM representatives said that people have influenced various policy enactments. They cited the decentralisation policy, established as a result of widespread consultation with the masses. They further pointed out that the decentralisation policy was to act as an engine that would propel participation at local level. Therefore, they claimed that citizen participation in the NAADS programme was only one instance among many in which citizen participation is a key priority. The belief held by the majority of the NRM respondents interviewed is that all the programmes established by the government have involved people in their creation and implementation, ultimately promoting people's power (NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009).

To the question of government transparency, the NRM representatives responded that people were satisfied with what the government was doing in involving them in development activities (NRM-04, 05, 30/07/2009). The respondents seem to have benchmarked the current government against previous, dictatorial regimes, under which participation was minimal, if not completely lacking.¹²⁸ They state that through decentralisation, local councils have been able to draft plans and

¹²⁸ The "invited" or "created" spaces of participation in previous regimes were not underutilized but also in many cases for symbolic purposes.

programmes for their local economic development. They also said that through local councils, grassroots views are easily represented at the district council assemblies (NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009). They also stated that the government has been transparent in all its programmes; for example *Entadikwa* (Starting Capital), *Bonna-bagawale* (Prosperity for All), Universal Primary Education (UPE), Universal Secondary Education (USE) and the NAADS programme, to mention but a few.¹²⁹ However, they claimed that some of these well-intentioned programmes had been victims of negative media publicity, as some sections of society had failed to grasp their ideological nature. Nonetheless, in their opinion the majority of the people in the country were satisfied with the current government's openness, in contrast with previous regimes.




When asked what people say about the course that government took towards being transparent about decentralisation, the NRM representatives (unlike their opposition counterparts) said that their party is guided by the ideals enshrined in their constitution; that is, it is an inclusive, democratic, non-sectarian, multi-ideological, multi-interest and progressive mass organisation. The NRM representatives claimed that transparency and effective participation is encouraged and promoted in development activities (NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009). In an attempt to substantiate his views on the course the government took in terms of transparency, one NRM

¹²⁹ Most of these programmes have encountered severe critics from the various section of the society. Some have pointed out that these programmes have not been all inclusive in terms of participation, while others mention they have been top-down disguised as bottom-up in their conceptualization and implementation.

representative gave an incisive analysis of how the NRM government created spaces for effective participation. He observed:

“...when the current government was still in the bush fighting for the liberation of Uganda in the early 80s, they established Resistance Councils (RCs)... these councils later became the centres of people’s will... the representatives were elected by the people;¹³⁰ the lower RCs were for solving simple issues at the grassroots [level], while the upper councils would handle development aspects in the area... however, with time, these were transformed into Local Councils (LCs), and with the adoption of decentralisation policy, the guidelines for participation were amended... this ultimately led to full participation as evidenced currently.” (NRM-01, 29/07/2009)



These observations suggest that the NRM representatives are convinced that government-devised decentralisation as the only mechanism through which effective participation could be achieved.

Fourthly, on the challenges to participation, the NRM representatives stated that participation in NAADS programmes has been crippled by a multiplicity of factors, most notably corruption (NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009). They pointed out that President suspended the programme in October 2007, under corruption-related

¹³⁰ The voting process was that candidates were nominated, and people would show their support by queuing behind the candidate of their choice.


circumstances. Furthermore, the NAADS programme has faced the challenge of lack of sufficient technical staff to support and monitor the progress of participation and overall functioning of the programmes at local level (NRM-04, 05, 30/07/2009). This has had immense impact on effective participation, as those in charge of the programme at local level have often abused government resources meant for local farmers – resulting in resentment, and abandonment of the programme and other development activities.¹³¹

In agreement with the opposition (FDC) officials, the NRM representatives also claimed that participation has been hindered by poverty (NRM-04, 05, 30/07/2009). They observed that the majority of people who occupy the rural parts of country are illiterate peasants, who cannot easily interpret the government information available. As a result, it is difficult for them to participate. In turn, they claimed that the opposition spreads biased propaganda about government programmes, taking advantage of an illiterate electorate who then refuse to participate in some of the national programmes (NRM-04, 05, 30/07/2009; NRM-01, 02, 03, 29/07/2009). In summary, it is therefore evident that the respondents from the FDC and the NRM blame each other for ineffective participation in government programmes in certain respects. However, if their differences were reconciled, perhaps effective participation would result; and translate into socio-economic development, especially in the rural communities of Uganda.

¹³¹ Even worse, in some cases the local people have alleged that the list of beneficiaries includes deceased persons. This prompted the President to order security personnel to verify the authenticity of the list of beneficiaries of the NAADS programme.

5.4 Views from Bushenyi District Leaders (BDL)¹³²

This section makes up the last part of the qualitative analysis of interviews. The previous categories of interviews were positioned at the national level, with the exception of those of the political parties. However, some of the observations made by interviewees were directly linked to what is happening at the local level. This section presents the interviews carried out with elites, categorised as Bushenyi District Leaders (BDL). The BDL interviewed were asked questions linked to data transformations, as illustrated in Figure 4. The BDL interviewed at this level included three District Councillors (DCs), and four representatives from the sub-counties (SCRs)¹³³. The last set of interviews was with three Bushenyi District Technocrats (BDT) serving in various capacities at district headquarters. These leaders are partly responsible for overseeing the smooth implementation at the NAADS programme at the local level.



5.4.1 Perceptions of District Councillors (DCs)

The DCs were included in the interviews mainly because they participate in communal development activities and in lower local government councils, and monitor service delivery in national priority programme areas. Their views were deemed pertinent because they act as intermediaries between local governments and

¹³² This section was incorporated in the qualitative analysis mainly because of the specificity of this dissertation. The views herein are from councillors, sub-county chiefs, and district technocrats from Bushenyi District.

¹³³ Two of each were from the counties of Igara East (Bumbaire and Kyabugimbi) and Igara West (Kyamuhunga and Nyabubaare).

the grassroots. Moreover, they serve on various committees for local economic development within various sectors, as designed and prioritised by the district and the in-line ministry. Like the previous interviewees, the DCs were asked if the government, in pursuit of micro-economic development, had consulted all the stakeholders in designing the NAADS programme. The DCs' view was that most of the government programmes are inclusive of all stakeholders (BDL-01, 02, 03, DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). The DCs pointed out that their existence is a result of government endeavours to extend participation to local levels. The DCs stated that they represent people's views at various district committees; and in the process, the views of ordinary citizens are represented. When asked if the government had constructed a programme that involved people in creation and implementation, they pointed out that they were a result of the government's decentralisation policy (BDL-01, 02, 03, DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). When asked if citizen participation in programmes empowers rural farmers, the DCs were supportive of the government programmes. For example, one DC interviewed observed that participation in the NAADS programmes had transformed some subsistence farmers into commercial producers, and their incomes have increased dramatically (BDL/DC-01, 04/08/2009). Another councillor said:

“...a farmer from the area he represents has not only been economically empowered through participation in the NAADS programmes, he has created jobs for people who work on his farms... and ultimately, their standards of living have changed from abject poverty to a situation where they can afford

some of the basic essential needs such as food, shelter and clothing.”¹³⁴
(BDL/DC-01, 04/08/2009)

Secondly, most of the DCs interviewed were admiring of the government’s transparency, and said that the people they represent were impressed by the current government’s efforts at responsiveness, in contrast to those of the previous government. The DCs observed that (unlike previous, autocratic governments) the current government has created spaces for participation, as clearly stipulated by the Constitution of Uganda and the Local Government Act. Indeed, all three DCs reminisced about the wide-ranging consultation that took place before the constitution was adopted. This was aimed at promoting ‘people’s power’ and rule of law (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). The DCs went further, saying that when the decentralisation policy was adopted, it was a turning point for the government; it was then that they began to relinquish power to the ordinary citizen. Initially the people were sceptical about government efforts, unsurprisingly considering that Uganda had a military government before creating the space for electing representatives (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). The DCs argued that acts such as the election of constituent assembly (CA) delegates back in 1995 restored confidence among the people, and they began to realise that the NRM government was far more

¹³⁴ To be exact, these claims were recurring from various councillors and also collectively hinted on the need for sensitisation of the rural masses which was the main challenge to development.

transparent than the previous governments (see for example Anthony, 1995; 1998).¹³⁵ Though two of the DCs gave the government credit for transparency, one was sceptical about how the current multi-partyism trend is evolving. According to him, government effort is directed more at increasing political party support than on service delivery (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009).

Thirdly, the DCs stated that the people they represent were satisfied with the course the government had taken in promoting transparency through decentralisation. The DCs believe the people had significant influence on policy decisions in local councils, especially on the particular issues affecting their welfare. In their opinion, the people had a strong influence on law and order, security and even education (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). The fact that the DCs concede that people significantly influenced policy decisions means that the current Ugandan government differs from previous governments. Indeed, the contrast emphasises the uniqueness of Uganda's circumstances as an emerging democracy.

However, these responses from the DCs should not lead the reader to believe that the government has been as transparent as has been claimed. Their observations seem to be located within the commonly held wisdom that individuals with access to a variety of resources – especially financial resources – are expected to engage more in political activities than those with fewer resources. Previous research in Uganda

¹³⁵ However, it should be noted that recently the NRM government has been accused of being dictatorial, and President Museveni has been criticised for being autocratic. See for example The Daily Monitor, 3 September 2011, 'Museveni is Autocratic – Nagenda.

has drawn attention to this. For example, Devas and Grant (2003) argue that it is mainly affluent citizens who participate, and consequently wield substantial influence. Therefore, as far as democratic openness is concerned, one must view it as at least problematic that certain minority groups of people in society have captured a larger share of political influence than others – possibly even the majority share.¹³⁶

Lastly, the DCs stated that in some cases, the NAADS guidelines have been flouted and resources have been misappropriated. For example, they observed that procurement exhibited the highest number of irregularities at district level (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009). These events have not only reduced the rate of participation in the programme, but have also created losses of money that could have been recycled to other farmers, and increased participation. The DCs pointed out that rampant corruption prevails in other government initiatives in Uganda, and the NAADS programme is no exception. One of the councillors observed

“...in fact, we are looking at another government programme characterised by mismanagement and corruption ... nothing unusual about it; but what is striking about the NAADS programme is that government has taken too long to look into issues bogging down the performance of the programme, which is supposed to improve produce revenue; not forgetting that the economy is driven by the agriculture sector.” (BDL/DC-03, 04/08/2009).

¹³⁶ For example, if it is mainly rich and highly educated men who take part in democratic processes, then one cannot claim a successful case of democratic citizen engagement.

The councillors also stated that recently the president publicly berated corrupt officials and commissioned an inquiry into the programme in different parts of the country, sending a signal that frustrating the programme will not be tolerated (BDL/DC-01, 02, 03, 04/08/2009).¹³⁷ These observations show that the NAADS programme is not effectively manned currently. If the challenges facing NAADS are not handled expeditiously, citizen participation will remain at the pre-take-off stage of development.

5.4.2 Perceptions of the Sub-County Representatives (SCRs)

As previously noted in the account of the NAADS institutional structure, the programme is implemented at the sub-county level (See NAADS, 2001b; Pasipanodya, 2010a; 2010b; Allen, 2002). At sub-county level, the NAADS programme establishes Sub-County Farmer Forums (SCFFs) and Farmer Field Schools (FFSs) through which it reaches its objectives. The SCFFs are created by programme beneficiaries. The Community Based Facilitators and Parish Coordinator Committees (PCCs) assist the SCFF members with interpreting NAADS programme implementation guidelines. As the NAADS implementation is unfolding, it is

¹³⁷ The Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU) state that though the first phase (2001/2 to 2007/8) had an estimated cost of US\$108 million, there is hardly any tangible result to show for the period. Agriculture – the leading employing sector – is still bedevilled by subsistence production, causing the majority of the population to live impoverished lives. After seven years of implementation the programme is yet to show significant results; 31% of the population are living below the poverty line, and the majority are involved in subsistence farming. NAADS is still the most suitable and quickest antidote to this problem, if only it could be implemented properly.

essential to establish how the SCRs view this process, since they are part of lower local government councils through which national development priority programmes are implemented. The following sections discuss SCR perceptions on democracy and citizen participation in relation to the NAADS programme.

Firstly, the SCRs were asked if there was consultation and participation by potential beneficiaries before the adoption and implementation of the NAADS programme. This was aimed at establishing the SCRs' familiarity with the NAADS programme. Indeed, the SCRs demonstrated vast knowledge of the programme's functionality. The SCRs noted that the FFSs create graduates who later became driving forces in establishing farmer forums. They pointed out that the establishment of the NAADS programme was strongly influenced by high levels of poverty in many rural areas of the country, including Bushenyi (see Appendix E; Brock et al, 2002; Nkusu, 2004). The SCRs also observed that the nationwide NAADS programme had been hurriedly formed, with an external impetus; and that mobilisation through local government leaders appealed to the progressive elites, while the poorer sections of the population (female-headed households, the disabled and the elderly, among others) were perceived to be excluded (by way of both social exclusion and self-exclusion) (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009; Bugembe et al, 2005; Ngaka, 2006).


From these claims one may hypothesise that together, the combination of farmer empowerment through experiential learning in FFS groups, and subsequent

enhanced opportunities for access to demand-driven advisory services in NAADS groups, would be instrumental in reversing the high levels of poverty. The responses from the SCRs suggest that farmers were able to shift out of their poverty-stricken condition through their membership of FFS/NAADS groups. The SCRs also claimed that the people were empowered, given that FFS/NAADS group members differed significantly from non-group members in terms of well-being. The SCRs pointed out that the government was keen on adopting programmes such as NAADS that would assist in elevating the rural communities from poverty, and empower them socio-economically (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009).

Secondly, the SCRs indicated that the government had been transparent, and that citizens were satisfied with how it had emphasised participation in implementing programmes such as NAADS. The SCRs cited examples such as the FFSs, where recruitment was done on the basis of interest in learning new skills – among a range of different types of farmers, including many poor farmers; and the response to these calls was significant. To the SCRs, that was a clear indication that the people were supportive and acknowledged the transparency of the government (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009). In addition, the SCRs revealed that the FFS groups experienced high turnover of members initially, with up to half the members leaving the group within the first year. The members leaving the groups became farmers, and their participation was viewed as a process of empowerment for the poor, who otherwise would have been unemployed and unable to extricate themselves from the cycle of poverty (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009). To

substantiate their claims, the SCRs indicated that some farmers have remained members of FFSs out of an interest in learning and a willingness to invest time and effort in carrying out joint activities in programmes that the government has made available to them (BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009).

Thirdly, the SCRs reported that the NAADS programme had been used as an example of government efforts to decentralise development programmes. Using the metaphor of an open market, one SCR whose analysis caught the researcher's attention observed that:



“...in an open market situation, farmers’ need articulations are expressions of what farmers perceive as important to improving their livelihood, while farmers’ effective demands are an expression of the needs that farmers are willing to pay for.” (BDL/SCR-01, 06/08/2009).

This SCR pointed out that the farmers’ needs articulations under the NAADS programme differ from those of the free market in at least two ways. The demand-driven advisory services as implemented in NAADS are intended to separate the functions of demand articulation from those of finance. Farmers who are members of NAADS groups are only required to pay a symbolic fee to participate in the needs articulation process and receive advisory services. The membership in Bushenyi District is Ush2000 per year (US\$1.20). For the country as a whole, farmers’ contributions amount to some 2% of the NAADS programme’s total costs, while the

other 98% is financed by the state and external loans and grants (see also Bukenya, 2010; Rwakakamba, 2011; NAADS Report, 2000). It is clear that the low user fee influences farmers' engagement with identifying and articulating needs, which is a clear manifestation of responsiveness (BDL/SCR-01, 06/08/2009).

The SCR continued his analysis by explaining that the NAADS rules and procedures set limits, and direct how farmers' perceived needs are expressed and translated into demands for advisory services. The NAADS operational manual seems to set the rules for how the priority process is carried out and which criteria are to be used. Neither the processes involved in farmers' needs articulation nor how these needs are translated into service provision contracts under the NAADS is adequately understood. Initial studies in Bushenyi District indicate room for improvement and a need for change. This sort of information was made available to people; however, there was a concern that in many cases, those in deep rural areas do not get sufficient information (BDL/SCR-01, 06/08/2009).

The last observation from the SCRs relates to challenges. The SCRs were also asked if the NAADS programme had encountered any challenges. Their responses were similar to those of previous interviewees. The SCRs stated that the programme had indeed encountered challenges, most notably a lack of sufficient funds for facilitating farmer's needs and training Community Based Facilitators (CBFs). In addition, they complained that the funds available are spent on facilitating technical and logistical aspects of the programme (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04,

06/08/2009). They stated that beneficiary needs end up not being met as a result of these financial constraints. Furthermore, they were of the opinion that a Farmer Forum is an organisational unit at which farmers ought to be comfortable in articulating their perceived needs; yet they had observed that some farmers seem to have little ownership over the process of transforming the perceived needs into a few selected enterprises (BDL/SCR-01, 02, 05/08/2009; BDL/SCR-03, 04, 06/08/2009). According to the SCRs, farmers in forums are frustrated over the lengthy enterprise priority process (the whole process of need identification and enterprise selection takes six months), especially as the enterprises for which they receive advisory services are only rarely similar to those for which they articulated needs. This has not only been a challenge to the programme but also a constraint to participation. Overall, the SCRs acknowledged that there had been participation in the NAADS programmes. However, they pointed out that for a programme to be effectively transformative, priority should be given to addressing farmers' needs – especially in the selection of the enterprises that farmers get involved in.

5.4.3 Perceptions from the Bushenyi District Technocrats (BDTs)¹³⁸

This section offers views from the Bushenyi District Technocrats (BDTs). The BDTs were interviewed together at the district headquarters, and were included in the study for two reasons. Firstly, the NAADS programme in the district falls under 'production', so the insights of the district production officers were thought to be

¹³⁸ In this section, technocrats refer to individuals of the district who were interviewed that is, the district production officer, district NAADS coordinator and district population officer.


relevant. Secondly, the coordinator of the NAADS oversees all the activities of the programmes at the district level; therefore, his ideas on the overall functionality of the programme were pertinent. The district population officer is part of the district planning committee and therefore takes part in development planning interventions in the district, which is the reason he was interviewed. These technocrats were asked for their insights on the extent of citizen participation in the NAADS programme. The following section presents their perceptions.

Firstly, the BDTs believed strongly in the government's effort to construct a programme that involved people in creation and implementation. They argued that most of the government's micro-economic programmes were informed by the demands of the people. Making reference to the NAADS, they observed that the programme had empowered farmers in many respects. Notably, (i) the programme led to the establishment of Farmer Interest Groups at different levels; (ii) a number of advisory services were established to assist with problem analysis and enterprise selection, with contracts signed with private service providers;¹³⁹ and lastly, (iii) the zoning strategy was launched as a complementary programme to NAADS. (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009).

¹³⁹ Currently, 879 farmers are visiting the Technology Development Sites and accessing advisory services from them.

Unequivocally, the technocrats held strong opinions on the government's efforts to create a programme that would promote people's power. The district NAADS coordinator observed

“...that after the collapse of the Agricultural Extension Service (AES) between the 1970s and the 1980s, there was a vacuum on who should provide advisory services to Uganda... (considering that fact that rural Uganda is characterised by subsistence farming) ...with the emergence of NAADS, I have no doubt that at least the previous services offered by AES have resurfaced.” (BDL/BDT-01, 03/08/2009).¹⁴⁰



Similar observations were made by the other technocrats, all in support of the government's strategy and showing clearly that the programmes have contributed greatly to the alleviation of poverty. For instance, the district production officer commented that programme participants' livelihoods had increased (BDL/BDT-02, 03/08/2009). The above observation from the BDT – if not for the purpose of siding with the government and creating a good impression of their work – suggests that the NAADS programme was participatory.¹⁴¹

When asked to elaborate on government transparency and what people say about the NAADS Programme, there was some controversy. The BDTs claimed that there

¹⁴⁰ See also Bukenya (2010).


¹⁴¹ However, these opinions should not be accepted without reservation, unless measured against those of the programme beneficiaries, presented in Chapter 6.

was limited teamwork between the technical people and the political leaders of Bushenyi District (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). This hampered all-inclusive participation in the NAADS programme. In addition, some underlying issues from the government's side were mentioned: the challenges of getting farmers to match the grants given, mainly because they are still poor; a reduction in tax collected, since the government scrapped graduated tax; and lack of qualified service providers to undertake advisory services. As a result, all-inclusive participation was compromised (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009).

Furthermore, the BDTs reported that some PMA components have not been implemented, despite being critical to the success of the NAADS programmes, especially rural finance, agro-marketing, and processing. The BDTs pointed out that farmers lack the credit to acquire technologies necessary for improved agriculture productivity, which further compromises all-inclusive participation (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). According to the BDTs this has not only led to frustration and hindered the participation of the farmers and local leaders, but has also stalled actual transformation in the lives of the poorest of the poor in the district. In short, the technocrats proposed that the government should speedily implement the remaining PMA components.¹⁴²


¹⁴² See also Nabbumba (2008) for the other components of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP).

Thirdly, the BDT were satisfied by the steps the government took to establish and later support the NAADS programme. They observed that the NAADS programme is highly appreciated by the farmers and other stakeholders, especially in the rural areas of the district, where it has taken root (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). The BDTs also referred to the current statistics of farmer participation in the programmes, which they claimed were a clear indication that the NAADS programme is doing well in Bushenyi District, with lessons and good practices emerging. They saw this as a reflection of the good working relationship between all the key NAADS stakeholders, and of the significance of decentralisation to development (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009).



The BDTs further observed that there was a very good working relationship between the technical staff and the political leaders, especially when it came to promoting transparency through effective participation (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). The inference was made that the NAADS programme has had an impact on farmers, which is evidenced by improved farming practices and increased productivity. The BDTs also pointed out that the NAADS programme through decentralisation performed well across boundaries, especially with gender issues (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). For example, women, who were previously excluded from development programmes, have become active members of the farmer forums (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009). This has provided them with opportunities for generating income. Overall, the BDTs seemed satisfied with the extent of participation in the NAADS programme.

Like the elites interviewed previously, the BDTs conceded that the NAADS programme is not without challenges. They offered details of a number of challenges facing the programme. Firstly, misunderstanding and lack of appreciation by the political leaders regarding the policy design of the NAADS programme. The BDTs say that political leaders strongly believe that the NAADS programme should go beyond the advisory, to the extent of giving support to the farmers in the form of funding or small grants in order to be able to apply the knowledge and skills acquired (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009).¹⁴³ Yet this is not in line with the NAADS programme design.¹⁴⁴



Secondly, the BDTs pointed out that there was no monitoring framework for measuring the impact of the NAADS programme. They felt that the monitoring of the NAADS programme was currently weak, without performance indicators and external supervision. In addition, there is a lack of sufficient funds to facilitate logistical and technical issues for the smooth running of the programme. The final challenge that the BDTs mentioned was the reluctance of political leaders in promoting participation and assisting in the monitoring of the NAADS programme (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009).

¹⁴³Political leaders felt that the social economic impact of the programme is minimal compared to the resources that are allocated.

¹⁴⁴ Such is made even worse with the absence of other Plan for Modernization of Agriculture components.

In light of these challenges, the BDTs were supportive of government endeavours to establish a programme that would empower citizens. However, they were also critical of the government for their failure to implement the other components of the NAADS programme. The BDTs proposed that for effective promotion of participation in the NAADS programme, the stakeholders ought to: (i) provide clear guidelines for the involvement and participation of political leaders; (ii) release funds to the district timeously to prevent delays in the implementation of planned activities; and lastly (iii) promote continuous dialogue and interaction between all stakeholders on the democratic progress of the NAADS programme (BDL/BDT-01, 02, 03, 03/08/2009).



5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has offered a qualitative report of information obtained from various individuals categorised as elites, from national to local level. The opening section of the chapter offered a brief description of the methodological orientation that the chapter took in order to arrive at the findings discussed. A set of uniform variables were grouped into thematic categories and discursively posed to elites. The questions were aimed at analysing the elites' perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in a purportedly democratic development initiative (NAADS) in Uganda, as an emerging democracy. The analysis in this chapter was done through engaging with the responses of three categories of respondent, who were assumed to have sufficient knowledge of the NAADS programme adoption and subsequent implementation: (i) Government officials (MPs from Bushenyi, MoAAIF officials and

NAADS secretariat officials); (ii) Political party (FDC and NRM) leaders and Bushenyi District leaders (district councillors, sub-county representatives and district technocrats).

The responses from government officials (MPs, MoAAIF and NSOs) present a compelling picture. The government officials were satisfied with the progress of citizen participation in the NAADS programme. Their views suggest that the government did involve people in decision-making and implementation, thus promoting people's power; they also supported the government transparency concerning participatory development, and indicated that the people were satisfied as well. However, the government officials failed to explain the extent of the programme's inclusivity, and how marginal groups would be incorporated effectively in the development programmes. The government officials were reluctant to propose alternative strategies on how all-inclusive participation could be strengthened. From their views, two subjective opinions are made. The first is that most of the government officials did not want to be critical of the NAADS programme; they claimed to have supported it fully, from design to implementation. The second is that they seemed convinced that the government had encouraged participation in the programme and that this had contributed to socio-economic development. It must be noted that some government officials believe that the grassroots need to be sensitised to development programmes, though they never stated whose responsibility this would be. Finally, some government officials were keen to point out that although the programme had been rolled out effectively in


some districts, it is still faced with the challenge of mismanagement at the district level. In turn, this mismanagement has impacted negatively on all-inclusive participation.

The political party representatives, on the other hand, presented mixed reactions to the questions posed. The FDC respondents were critical of NAADS, but the NRM respondents appeared to have fully embraced the NAADS programme ideology. In summary, the FDC representatives stated that participation has been hindered by poverty, ignorance, and politically partisan participation. They pointed out elements of discrimination to participation in the programme with regard to political affiliation. Some FDC respondents claimed that the avenues of participation created by the current government have been held hostage by morally deficient and non-accountable leaders at the local level (councillors and other district officials), often referred to as elites. They suggested that for effective participation aimed at national development to take place, there is a need for strengthening the institutions of government and promoting the principle of separation of powers, as well as for constitutional, non-partisan and professional management of the national programmes. On the other hand, some of the NRM respondents blamed the opposition for spreading negative propaganda that sabotages government programmes by taking advantage of illiterate grassroots, who in the end refuse to participate in some of the national programmes. However, the representatives of each political party blamed the other party for ineffective participation in the NAADS programme. If their differences could be settled, perhaps effective

participation would translate into socio-economic development, especially in the rural communities of Uganda.

The Bushenyi District leaders also presented multiple views. For instance, the district councillors declared that participation in the programmes had been obstructed by mismanagement and corruption, which has marred the NAADS programme. Recently the president publicly berated corrupt officials for frustrating the programme, and commissioned an inquiry into the programme in different parts of the country. This means that the NAADS programme is currently not effectively manned. The sub-county representatives stated that NAADS should be an organisational unit through which farmers can comfortably articulate their perceived needs, but they seem to have little ownership over the process of transforming perceived needs into a few selected enterprises. Some SCRs observed that the farmers were frustrated by the lengthy enterprise priority process by which they receive advisory services. This has not only been a challenge; it is also a constraint to participation. The Bushenyi District technocrats, on the other hand, were critical of the government's failure to implement the other components of the NAADS programme. They suggested that for effective participation to take precedence, NAADS should provide clear guidelines for the participation of political leaders, release funds to the district timeously to enable the implementation of planned activities, and promote continuous dialogue and interactions between the NAADS secretariat and the district stakeholders.

In the final analysis, the overriding impression from the majority of the elites interviewed is that they acknowledge that there is citizen participation in the NAADS programme.¹⁴⁵ However, their acknowledgment seems to be sieved through a range of predefined ideological categories, under the guise of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. They seemed to be more concerned with getting the NAADS programme right, as required by the NAADS Act (2001) and conceptualised in the NAADS Report (2000), rather than with creating ties with the grassroots or promoting participatory development and empowering grassroots communities. This would create an opportunity to engage with the grassroots and establish how they perceive democracy and citizen participation in the purportedly democratic development initiative of NAADS, specifically in the Bushenyi district of Uganda. The following chapter quantitatively explores this tentative finding.



¹⁴⁵ Some of the elites pointed out that participation indicates elevated levels of ownership among the participants, and has also yielded development.

CHAPTER 6

GRASSROOTS PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND CITIZEN

PARTICIPATION IN THE NAADS PROGRAMME

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter analysed elites' perceptions of participation in the NAADS programme in relation to its impact on alleviating poverty. This chapter quantitatively analyses grassroots perceptions of democracy and participation, using NAADS as an example of a participatory development programme. In this chapter, the word 'grassroots' is used to refer to underprivileged respondents from each of the selected sub-counties of Bushenyi. Throughout the chapter these respondents are categorised as NAADS Participants (NPs) and Non-NAADS Participants (N-NPs). The beginning of the chapter explains why Bushenyi District was selected as a case study area, and why the NAADS programme in particular was chosen. Thereafter, the discussion focuses on the methodology employed, covering how: (i) the objectives of the chapter were formulated; (ii) the selection of the survey and sample were designed; and (iii) how the data was collected and analysed using SPSS®; and the results are presented using the analytical framework. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks.

6.2 Description of Bushenyi

Bushenyi district is located in the south-western part of Uganda, and comprises two counties - Igara East and Igara West - and seven sub-counties; that is, Kyabugimbi, Kakaju, Kyamuhunga, Nyabubaare, Bushenyi-Ishaka Town Council, Bumbeire and

Kyeizooba.¹⁴⁶ The district has a total population of 246 400.¹⁴⁷ It is fairly well endowed with natural resources, and has relatively low poverty levels among its residents in semi-urban areas, but high levels of poverty in rural areas.¹⁴⁸ The economy of the district is based largely on subsistence agriculture, and provides direct employment to 86.7% of the population. Bushenyi district implemented the NAADS programme in the 2002/3 financial year, to assist the farming community in moving from low to high agricultural productivity. The empirical analysis of grassroots understandings of citizen participation was done using a survey instrument that was developed and deployed in five selected sub-counties of the district¹⁴⁹. The following sections set the methodological orientation of the process.

6.3 Survey methodology

While it may appear that conducting a survey is a simple procedure of asking questions and then compiling the answers to produce statistics, there are procedures and formulas to be followed if the results are to yield accurate and meaningful information (Statistics Canada, 2003; Fink, 2009; Yin, 2009; Groves, 1989; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Lyberg et al, 1997; Walsh, 2009). According to Fink (2009:1), surveys are used to collect information from or about people, to describe, compare, or explain

¹⁴⁶ See the map of Bushenyi for the geographical detail.

¹⁴⁷ Bushenyi's population is anticipated to reach 251 400 by 2012 (see Appendix C).

¹⁴⁸ See Appendix E for causes and effects of poverty on the population of Bushenyi District.

¹⁴⁹ The selected sub-counties included Kyabugimbi, Kyamuhunga, Kyeizooba, Bumbeire and Nyabubaare.

their knowledge, feelings, values and behaviour. In this case, self-administered questionnaires were used.


6.3.1 Formulation of the objective

As previously noted, the broad objective of the chapter is to quantitatively analyse grassroots perceptions on democracy and participation. This analysis is done through interrogating grassroots communities (both NPs and N-NPs) on their perceptions of generic forms of democracy and participation; participation in relation to the NAADS programme; and lastly, the impact of NAADS on the socio-economic realities of participants, in Bushenyi and in a broader context. The most important task in a survey is to formulate the statement of objectives (Statistics Canada, 2003). The objectives not only illustrate the survey's broad information needs, but also the operational definitions to be used, the specific topics to be addressed and the analysis plan (Groves, 1989; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Lyberg et al, 1997).

6.3.2 Selection of a survey and sample design

Sampling in a survey can be divided into two categories: random and non-random samples (Cochran, 1977; Des Raj, 1972; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Särndal et al, 1992; Satin & Shastry, 1993; Lessler & Kalsbeek, 1992; Fuller, 1987; Gosselin et al, 1978; Fink, 2009). In this research, non-random sampling was preferred as a survey method because it provided a fast, easy and inexpensive way of selecting units from the population (Cochran, 1977; Des Raj, 1972; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Statistics Canada, 2003) Figure 5 describes the sources of data.

Figure 5: Sources of data



NPs = NAADS Participants

N-NPs = Non-NAADS Participants

The research is based on a sample size of 311 respondents from Bushenyi district, as illustrated in Figure 5 above. These respondents included both NPs and N-NPs. The respondents were selected from the two counties of Bushenyi, Igara East and Igara West. From the two counties, a choice was made to select three sub-counties from Igara East and two sub-counties from Igara West. An equal number of respondents was selected from each of the selected sub-counties. The actual sample size in each of the sub-counties ranges from 60 to 66 respondents. Half of the respondents in each sub-county were NPs while the other half were N-NPs. The inclusion of N-NPs was premised on the need to be able to analyse the impact of NAADS through a comparison of perceptions of NPs and N-NPs. In order to get results of sufficient depth to allow comparison of the categories of respondents' perceptions, the

researcher thought it pertinent to include many questions on participation generally. This was done chiefly to establish NP and N-NP attitudes to generic forms of democracy and participation, as background to their involvement (or lack thereof) in NAADS.

From the list of farmer forums in each of the selected sub-counties, the researcher selected five. In each forum (with the help of the forum chairperson), the researcher was able to identify five or six members (NPs) to whom self-administered questionnaires were given. The total number of respondents (NPs) from all the farmer forums was 155. N-NPs were selected by issuing the questionnaire to any persons above 18 years of age in each of the areas where farmer forums were selected. The total number of N-NPs was 156. During interviews, for questions that required clarification, NPs and N-NPs were assisted through personal contact with research assistants.

6.3.3 Data collection, analysis and presentation of results

For this research, data collection involved filling in the questionnaire. Data editing and imputation was purposely done to check for missing, invalid or inconsistent entries, pointing to data records that were potentially in error. Data was captured in SPSS® computer software. After resolving all the errors that emerged, the data was ready for analysis. Data analysis was carried out using the descriptive statistics function in SPSS® to derive frequency statistics relating to the target variables.

Many authors state that data analysis is one of the most crucial steps of a survey, since the quality of the analysis can substantially affect the usefulness of the whole survey (Cochran, 1977; Des Raj, 1972; Moser & Kalton, 1971; Lessler & Kalsbeek, 1992; Fuller, 1987; Gosselin et al, 1978). However, data analysis may be restricted to the survey data alone, or it may compare the survey's estimates with results obtained from other surveys or data sources. The data in this research is summarised and illustrated in Figures and Tables in the chapter. As previously noted, the questionnaire (see Appendix B) was designed (among other reasons) to demonstrate grassroots understanding of democracy and citizen participation in using the NAADS programme. To that end, the data presented below relates to the following themes: (i) grassroots popular perceptions on generic forms of democracy and citizen participation; (ii) participation in relation to the NAADS programme; and lastly (iii) the impact of NAADS on material reality for NPs in Bushenyi and in a broader context. As a reminder, it should be noted that in some sections results are disaggregated to show the statistical differential effect among the NP and N-NP response intervals.

6.4 Grassroots popular perceptions on generic forms of participation


This section covers grassroots popular perceptions of generic forms of democracy and participation. These forms of democracy and participation are measured by what people reveal about what they do and how they see themselves, their communities and their citizenship. The questions in this section were based on attitudes to democracy and rights, and the practice of these, which reflects notions of

citizenship. There are also questions about political agency, which refer to what people do as citizens. From this collation of questions it is possible to build a picture of political attitudes and practices which will tell us a lot about the grassroots and their understanding of citizenship.

6.4.1 Exploring grassroots perceptions of citizenship

In terms of citizenship, there are two questions that shed light on a respondent's views, for both NPs and N-NPs. The first question concerns levels of political awareness or interest, testing whether respondents are interested in news about politics and more specifically their involvement in political party politics. The second question concerns attitudes towards political rights and democracy, and extracts what respondents say they do to advance their rights. Regarding levels of political awareness, it is clear from Figure 6 below that there are high levels of interest in political life generally, although there is also a marked difference between how various respondents get information. The results indicate that most of the respondents (N-NPs 96%; NPs 92%; average 94%) get news from a radio every day, as well as (N-NPs 99%; NPs 100%; average 99.5%) from newspapers, once or twice a week or on a daily basis. There is little variation between the NPs and N-NPs in terms of political awareness, based on their desire for access to information from radio and print media.

Figure 6: Frequency in following the news¹⁵⁰




Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

Regarding the respondents' involvement in party politics, the results suggest that neither NPs (71%) nor N-NPs (65%) feel close to any political party (average 68%), as illustrated in Figure 7 below. However, a small fraction of the respondents (NPs 20%; N-NPs 18%) claimed that they were close to a particular political party. In addition, fewer than 30% (both NPs and N-NPs) refused to answer. The overall impression from the respondent's attitudes is of a population that doesn't feel attached to political parties.

¹⁵⁰ How often do you get news from the following sources?

Figure 7: Closeness to political parties¹⁵¹




Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

Concerning attitudes towards political rights and agency (freedom), as illustrated in Figure 8, the vast majority of respondents believe that they don't have these rights in Uganda - and ought to have them. Indeed, in terms of assessing the supply of rights - that is, whether they exist in society - the respondents make very similar assessments. However, differences begin to emerge with regard to the demand for rights - whether Ugandans ought to have these rights and to what extent. Here, the respondents "strongly agree" that citizens should be more active in questioning their leaders, as opposed to showing more respect for authority (see Figure 9). But the majority of respondents "strongly agree[d]" that the government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority. However, they also agreed that people should be able to speak their

¹⁵¹ Do you feel close to any political party?

minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views might be. This suggests that the respondents believe in democracy.

Figure 8: Perceptions of levels of freedom¹⁵²




Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

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¹⁵² Are you free in terms of free expression, free association with others, and are you free to make a choice in voting?

Figure 9: Are we free versus should we be free¹⁵³




Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

In terms of respondents' perceptions of agency, the levels of participation in the formal, invited spaces of local governance – such as religious groups, school governing bodies, and (more broadly) other community groups – was dramatically low (see Figure 10). The majority were inactive members or not active at all, and a minority were active members. A striking aspect is that participation in school governing bodies was slightly higher than for the other two groups.

¹⁵³ Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society you would like to have in this country. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or 2 (interviewer: probe for strength of opinion: do you agree or disagree strongly?)

Figure 10: Roles in a Community¹⁵⁴




Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

Regarding the 'invented spaces' of community meetings and protests, reported participation rates in community meetings were slightly higher than equal (Figure 11), with over 60% of both NPs and N-NPs having attended a community meeting. Reported rates of participation in protest were extremely and consistently low across the board. The majority indicated that they had never attended a demonstration or protest march, but they would if they had a chance. An insignificant number (< 25% for both NPs and N-NPs) said they would never attend a demonstration or protest. It is possible that this result can be attributed to how the government has always reacted to protesters in the central region of Uganda.

¹⁵⁴ Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, active member, inactive member, or not a member?

Figure 11: Attendance at community meetings or participation in protests¹⁵⁵




Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

In respect of participation in the 2006 national elections, the majority of the respondents in both cases participated (see Figure 12). However, a minor fraction (< 25%) in each category did not vote, for various reasons: they decided not to, they could not find the polling station, they were prevented from voting, they did not have time to vote, they were not registered, they did not vote for some other reason, or they didn't remember the reason. The picture that emerges is of a community that values the relevance of voting participation in a democratic process.

¹⁵⁵ Here is a list of things that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you personally have done this thing during the past year. If not, would you do it if you had a chance?

Figure 12: 2006 Elections¹⁵⁶




Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

Concerning collective participation in local government, the responses indicate that the majority of the respondents are not very likely to get together with other groups of people and make local councillors listen to matters of importance (see Figure 13). This seems to suggest a population that does not participate in public life. The results also suggest that councillors are not close to the electorate, and seldom engage with them on matters of importance. This signals either that the councillors have usurped power or that the electorate has lost faith in them when it comes to solving matters of importance at the local level.

¹⁵⁶ With regard to the most recent elections (2006), which statement is true for you?

Figure 13: Perceptions on collective participation¹⁵⁷



Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

6.5 Participation in relation to NAADS Programme

This section of the chapter explores the grassroots perceptions of participation in relation to the NAADS programme. The section commences by exploring grassroots perceptions (of both NPs and N-NPs) of: (i) how interested the grassroots are in the NAADS programme; (ii) whether NAADS was popular at the local level; (iii) whether the NAADS programme has embraced its all-inclusive mandate; and (iv) the NAADS officials' competency and efficacy. These sub-themes were selected to explore grassroots perceptions of participation in the NAADS programme. Note that in some sections data is disaggregated, to show the statistical variations between the response intervals of NPs and N-NPs. The researcher presents data from both categories unless a question pertains to one category only; for example, the specific


¹⁵⁷ In your opinion, how likely is it that you and other groups of people could get together and make local councillors listen to matters of importance?

aspects of how NAADS affects farmers in the programme, which would not be applicable to N-NPs. However, this varies in terms of the nature of the questions and variables used to probe respondents' views.

6.5.1 Interest in the NAADS Programme

One of the questionnaire questions asked respondents if they were interested in the NAADS programme. This was intended to establish whether N-NPs wanted to participate to any degree, and also to find out how much NPs valued the programme. As illustrated in Figure 14, the results indicate general willingness to participate in the NAADS programme by both NPs and N-NPs. Indeed, results show that 71% of N-NPs were "very interested", compared to 67% of NPs. There was an average of 32 % of both NPs and N-NPs who were "somewhat interested" in the NAADS Programme. This result suggests that all the respondents were interested in the NAADS programme to a degree. What is also interesting is that again, the N-NPs were more interested than the NPs. At the same time, none of the respondents indicated that they had never been interested in the programme. This suggests a community willing to be part of a participatory development programme.

Figure 14: Interest in the NAADS Programme¹⁵⁸



Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

6.5.2 NAADS Programme's popularity at local level


After establishing a respondent's interest in NAADS, the next step was to press for whether the NAADS programme was popular at local levels. The questions on popularity established how often (if ever) the respondent or any family member had talked about NAADS, seen a NAADS official or attended a NAADS Meeting. The results indicate a minor variation in responses between NPs and N-NPs. Figure 15 below indicates that the majority of both N-NPs (72%) and NPs (70%) had "several times" heard a family member talk about the NAADS programme. Only 28% of N-NPs and 30% of NPs reported that they had heard a family member talk about NAADS "just once or twice", a slight variation. These results clearly indicate that the majority of respondents had at least heard of the NAADS programme. However, the

¹⁵⁸ How interested would you say you are in the NAADS programme?

question did not capture whether the respondents were familiar with what the guiding principles and the overall objectives of the NAADS programme are, nor whether the programme is perceived predominantly negatively, or positively.

Concerning the visibility of NAADS officials to communities, the results show little variation in terms of responses between N-NPs and NPs. The majority of the respondents (63% N-NPs, and 57% NPs) indicated that they had seen a NAADS official “just once or twice”. There is a slight variation; that is, 36% N-NPs and 42% NPs claimed to have seen NAADS officials “several times”, while 1% of each category claimed “never” to have seen NAADS officials. This result suggests that NAADS officials’ presence was felt at local levels to some extent. Responses (as illustrated in Figure 15 below) indicate that family members had attended NAADS meetings “several times” or “just once or twice”. Again, though it is clear that family members of both NPs and N-NPs had attended NAADS meetings, the question doesn’t capture whether those who attended meetings contributed to the deliberations or if they were there for representational purposes only.

Figure 15 Interaction with NAADS programmes¹⁵⁹



Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

6.5.3 NAADS programme and its all-inclusive participatory mandate


After establishing the grassroots perceptions on NAADS popularity the next step was to explore their perceptions on its all-inclusive participatory mandate. The questions in this category sought to establish the extent to which the NAADS programme embraces certain aspects relatable to participatory development practices. These practices included: (i) how the programme was made known to ordinary people; (ii) whether the people were consulted before decisions were made; (iii) if the programme provided effective ways on how to handle complaints; and (iv) if equal distribution of resources (see Figure 16). This section only probed the views of NPs, because the variables used were directly linked to participation in the

¹⁵⁹ Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family talked about NAADS, seen a NAADS official, or attended a NAADS meeting?

programme. Although the N-NPs were also interviewed using the same variables, their views are considered insignificant; and as a result, not reported on in this section. The research probed grassroots perceptions on how the NAADS programme was made known to ordinary people.

The results presented in Figure 16 indicate that 58% of NPs felt that the programme was “very badly” made known to the ordinary person, while 33% claimed that the programme was “fairly badly” made known to ordinary people. Similar variables were also used to gauge whether NAADS programme had consulted members before making decisions. According to the results, 63% claimed that the programme consulted members “very badly” before making decisions on programme matters. Yet in the previous chapter the elites indicated that the programme was all-inclusive and consulted all members, including beneficiaries. Concerning the programme’s processes for handling the complaints of rural farmers, 68% claimed that the programme dealt with complaints “very or fairly badly”. Lastly, on whether or not the NAADS programme guaranteed equal distribution of resources, the respondents indicated dissatisfaction. The majority of NPs claimed that the programme was guaranteed equal distribution of resources “very or fairly badly”.

Figure 16 The NAADS programme and its all-inclusive participatory mandate¹⁶⁰



Source: Own data, 18/07/2010


6.5.5 Perceptions on NAADS officials' competency and efficacy

The ability to execute participatory developmental programmes is a key ingredient for socio-economic development. However, this exercise requires individuals well-versed in contemporary developmental practices. As a result, it was imperative to ascertain the NPs' opinions of the NAADS officials' competency and efficiency at sub-county level. The conclusions reached were premised on whether the NPs had confidence in those who were in charge of the programme. The results (in Figure 17) show that 54% of NPs claimed that the NAADS officials at sub-county level were "fairly qualified", while 16% of NPs claimed that they were "fairly unqualified". In addition, 30% of NPs indicated that they were unfamiliar with the education levels of NAADS officials at sub-county level. In terms of NPs' perceptions of NAADS officials' experience of managing public services programmes, 10% thought officials

¹⁶⁰ How well do you think the NAADS programme is practising the following procedures? Or haven't you heard enough to have an opinion?

were “fairly qualified”, 36% claimed that they were “fairly unqualified”, and 34% said they didn’t know. Concerning perceptions of officials’ honesty in managing public funds, 28% of respondents claimed that officials were “fairly unqualified”, a significant number (51%) said they were “very unqualified”, and 8% claimed that they “did not know”.

Figure 17 NAADS officials’ qualifications¹⁶¹



Source: Own data, 18/07/2010

6.6 Assessing the impact of participation in the NAADS Programme

This section concludes the themes established to explore grassroots perceptions of democracy and citizen participation. It uses the data from the Bushenyi district NAADS quarterly reports, data from Benin et al (2007) on farmer groups, and a

¹⁶¹ Looking at the group of NAADS officials who are presently serving at district and sub-county level, how qualified do you think they are to do their jobs? Please rate them according to the following types of qualifications. Or haven’t you heard enough to have an opinion?

household survey. The intention was to establish whether participation in NAADS has improved the socio-economic reality of participants, in Bushenyi and elsewhere in Uganda. This section discusses what NAADS in Bushenyi has achieved, in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies for the sub-counties. Thereafter, the discussion focuses on the wider achievements of NAADS, using data from Benin et al (2007) to illustrate the impact of NAADS in terms of effective inclusion of stakeholders. Changes in crop yield, household income, assets, and food and nutritional security are examined, between the time of NAADS' commencement in 2000, and 2004, after implementation in some districts. The following section discusses how the NAADS programme has strengthened farmer forums (participating groups), mobilised resources, and procured equipment and supplies for farmers in all the sub-counties of the district.




Table 1 Procurement of equipment and supplies in sub-counties

	Sub-county	Equipment and supplies	Farmers ' Forums	Progre ss
1	Kyeizooba	3 houses, 2 drenching syringes, 1 spray pump, 16 female goats, 600 chicks, 2 100 kg poultry feed, 24 drinkers, 24 feeding troughs, 500 kg pig feed, 400 kg poultry drugs, 50 kg NPK fertilizers.	36	Items supplied.
2	Kyamuhunga	140 Goats worth, 4 200 Coffee seedlings, 1 605 Chicks, 2 000 tea seedlings, Poultry feed 70 kgs NUVITA, 50 Piglets (large white breed), NPK fertilisers 19 bags, Herbicides Round Up brand 55 l, Honey refract meter, Settling tank 100 kg capacity worth, Packing jars and seals 500 g, 120 g, 60 g, worth, 50 Air-tight buckets and 5 000 labels.	85	Items supplied.
3	Bushenyi - Ishaka	4,970kgs of Piggery sow, Supported 6 Piggery demo farmers, 9 goat demo farmers, 9 banana demo farmers.	15	Items supplied.
4	Nyabubare	Mulch and Manure, poultry feeds for 700 1-month-old chicks, 56 Bags of feeds for grower and layers worth, 28 Water vessels, 28 Feeding troughs, 10 Goats, 14 Forked hoes, 7 and Spray pumps.	18	Items supplied.
3	Bumbaire	Pig housing 5 units worth, 78.5 Bags of pig feeds, 35 Tags for pig identification, Large white pigs, 14 Bottles of acaricides and dewormers, 4 Units for goats housing worth, Goats' identification, 14 Bottles of acaricides		Items supplied.

		and dewormers, Goat feeds, 35 Local goats, 28 Bags of banana fertilizers, 14 Forked, 42,000 Bundles of mulches, and 14 Harvesting gears.		
6	Kakanju	12 demo farms of coffee, 12 demo farms of goats, 12 demo farms of banana.		Items supplied.
7	Kyabugimbi	Coffee demonstration farmers were supported with 16 lorries of mulch, 16 lorries of Farm Yard Manure, 16 bags of fertilizers, 16 wheel barrows, 16 pruning saw, 16 Secateurs, 16 spades, 400 coffee seedlings, 112 goats given to 16 farmers, Banana farmers were supported with 16 lorries of mulch, 16 lorries of Farm Yard Manure, 16 bags of fertilizers, 16 wheel barrows.		Items supplied.

Adapted from: NAADS (2009) 

Table 1 above contains evidence that equipment and supplies distributed to farmers may perhaps increase production, and as such would improve the material (socio-economic) reality of NPs as opposed to those who are N-NPs. Secondly, appropriate advice and information has been made available to different categories of farmers. The selection of the demo farmers¹⁶² has been completed in all the sub-counties (see NAADS, 2009). There has been provision of a research interface and provision of market information, which certainly acts as a catalyst in improving the material reality of a farmer's existence. In addition,

¹⁶² Demo farmers are those members, at the local level, who allow their farms to be used as demonstration centres, for the rest of the members to copy and learn how to implement the technologies that they receive from the NAADS programme.

farmers have been sensitised to form higher-level farmer organisations that can market their produce effectively (NAADS, 2009).

This support given to the NPs has enabled them to determine how much to produce, and also how to avoid the losses that come with price fluctuation and the vagaries of the weather. In addition, farmer-prioritised enterprises have been developed and linked to the market. Priority-training needs on selected enterprises have also been met by extension workers. For example, enterprise development and market linkages at district and sub-county level have resulted in NAADS support for a fishing enterprise started by the sub-counties of Kakanju, Kyeizooba and Bumbaire using the district budget for technology development (See NAADS, 2009). One way or another, all this suggests that NAADS has improved the socio-economic reality of selected farmers.

While there is evidence of improved socio-economic reality for NPs in the Bushenyi district, it is also relevant to examine how the NAADS programme has performed elsewhere in Uganda (see the Map of Uganda and NAADS-participating districts). The impact in terms of performance is illustrated using data from Benin et al (2007). Among other things, the data illustrates how participation in NAADS has contributed to changes in crop yield, household income, assets, and food and nutrition. This data is taken from farmer groups and a household survey, which the researchers carried out using a two-stage stratified random sampling. The data from Benin et al (2007) is based on the NAADS rollout phases, namely the 2001/2 and 2002/3 financial years.

6.6.1 Change in crop yields

Table 2 shows the change in reported yields of major crops between 2000 and 2004. In most cases there were no significant differences in the yields or changes in yield between the three groups. The exceptions were the sorghum yield, which was significantly higher in NAADS sub-counties in 2002/3 than in non-NAADS sub-counties in 2004, and the change in yield of Irish potatoes - yields were significantly greater in the 2001/2 NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties than in the 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties. Yields of most crops reported had increased in 2004 from their levels in 2000 (see Benin et al, 2007). The exception is coffee, the yield of which dropped in the NAADS sub-counties but increased in the non-NAADS sub-counties. This drop in coffee yield is probably due in part to the sharp decline in coffee's international and domestic price, which reduced farmers' incentive to invest labour and inputs in coffee production. From the data, it is evident that participation did improve the socio-economic reality of farmers somewhat, although it is interesting to note how well non-NAADS farmers did in the same time period.




Table 2 Change in crop yields

Change between 2000 and 2004	NAADS Sub-counties		Non-NAADS Sub-counties
	2001/2	2002/3	
Groundnuts (n=288)			
% change	425.77	402.16	433.11
Test of Change	57.00	7.90	-5.7
Maize(n=478)			
% change	699.18	551.87	835.17
Test of Change	33.80	24.30	27.30
Banana(n=424)			
% change	5942.19	3689.34	3323.03
Test of Change	-4.70	500.30	55.30
Sorghum(n=212)			
% change	448.77	442.53	388.92
Test of Change	76.80	5.20	34.80
Sweet Potato (n=409)			
% change	1760.86	1609.04	1391.88
Test of Change	18.00	-4.90	7.30
Cassava (n=525)			
% change	1243.61	1550.68	4340.43
Test of Change	45.90	1.0	-9.40
Beans (n=562)			
% change	572.22	386.71	721.01
Test of Change	66.10	12.90	17.20
Coffee (n=121)			
% change	515.45	1357.23	2090.45
Test of Change	-27.80	-28.60	81.30
Irish Potatoes (n=112)			
% change	1003.28	606.57	1368.51
Test of Change	260.00	29.40	285.40
Statistics are corrected for stratification weighing and clustering sample. Test (at 5% level) mean significant difference between 2001/2 NAADS sub-counties and 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties			

Adapted from Benin et al (2007:37)

6.6.2 Change in incomes

Concerning change in incomes, from the data in Table 3, roughly one-fourth to one-third of the households tested perceived that their farm income had increased between 2000 and 2004 (either moderately or significantly), a quarter of the farmers perceived that their farm incomes had decreased, and the rest felt there was no significant change in their income. The non-NAADS sub-counties reported the largest share of households that felt their farm income either did not change or decreased, while the 2001/2 NAADS sub-counties reported the largest share of households that felt their farm income had increased (Benin et al, 2007). These perceptions are consistent with the high rate of adoption of new equipment and supplies among NAADS farmers, all of which is expected to cause higher farm income if other factors are kept constant. Non-farm income was perceived to have increased for about one-third of the households, while about half of the households reported no significant change, and about 12% reported slight to significant reduction. There was little difference in the changes in non-farm income across the three sub-groups.

Table 3 Change in crop, livestock and non-farm income, and wealth

Income	NAADS Sub-Counties		Non-NAADS Sub-Counties
	2001/2	2002/3	
Crop income			
Increased significantly	13.6	9.6	13.1
Increased moderately	17.2	19.0	9.0
No change	44.1	46.3	48.9
Decreased moderately	6.3	14.2	17.2
Decreased significantly	18.8	10.9	11.8
Livestock Income			
Increased significantly	6.4	4.0	9.2
Increased moderately	21.7	21.1	15.1
No change	59.8	58.2	63.1
Decreased moderately	2.8	8.1	7.7
Decreased significantly	9.3	8.7	5.0
Non-farm Income			
Increased significantly	11.2	15.0	15.0
Increased moderately	25.4	22.6	24.2
No change	46.0	51.4	53.9
Decreased moderately	6.3	1.6	1.0
Decreased significantly	11.2	9.3	6.2
Wealth			
Increased significantly	7.9	9.9	4.8
Increased moderately	36.6	3.6	27.7
No change	17.4	12.0	12.1
Decreased moderately	12.1	17.5	25.3
Decreased significantly	26.0	25.1	30.1
Statistics are corrected for stratification weighing and clustering sample			


Adapted from Benin et al (2007:39)

According to Benin et al (2007), perceptions of farm income were verified by estimating the actual household farm income, which accounts for the largest share of household income (Benin et al, 2007; Nkonya et al, 2004; UBOS, 2003). There was a significant decrease in estimated farm income between 2000 and 2004 in the non-NAADS and 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties, with the declines averaging 32% in the non-NAADS sub-counties and 28% in the 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties. According to data from Benin et al (2007), the average decline in the 2001/2 NAADS sub-counties was 15%, but was not statistically significant. Statistical tests show that the decline in farm income was greatest in the non-NAADS sub-counties, followed by the 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties. The 2001/2 NAADS sub-counties performed best in terms of changes in both crop and livestock income. Benin et al (2007) point out that the presence of NAADS (especially in the trailblazing districts) and the adoption of the new enterprises and technologies that it promoted apparently helped farm households in NAADS sub-counties to avoid the severe income decline that affected most rural areas after 2000.

6.6.3 Change in assets

According to Benin et al (2007), despite declining farm incomes, households in all groups increased their ownership of assets on average between 2000 and 2004, and the differences across sub-groups in asset accumulation were not statistically significant. Benin et al (2007:38) point out that over 42% of households reported that their wealth had increased, and only 15% reported no change in wealth since 2000. The group that reported the greatest share of households perceiving an increase in

wealth was the 2002/3 NAADS sub-counties. The non-NAADS sub-counties reported the smallest share of households who perceived that the value of their assets had increased (Benin et al, 2007:38). Given that farm incomes reportedly declined among most groups between 2000 and 2004, it is surprising that households in all groups were able to increase their ownership of assets (Benin et al, 2007:38). Perhaps increasing non-farm incomes among many households helped to offset declining farm incomes, and allowed them to invest in asset accumulation (Benin et al, 2007). Whether and how households were able to invest in assets if their farm incomes were declining cannot definitively be explained, since information on levels of non-farm income was not collected; this would require further study using other data.



6.6.4 Change in food and nutrition security

According to Benin et al (2007:42), the pattern of perceptions of change in food security (access to food) and nutrition (quantity and quality of food) are similar. About 38% of all households felt that their food security and nutrition in 2004 had improved since 2000, but about a quarter did not perceive any change in food security (Benin et al, 2007). As is the case with perception of change in income (and perhaps for the same reasons), the non-NAADS households reported the lowest percentage of households perceiving an improvement in food security and nutrition. Therefore, there is some evidence to show that participation in the NAADS programme did improve the material reality of farmers in other districts, and also in Bushenyi.

Table 4 Food and nutrition security

Income	NAADS Sub-counties		Non-NAADS Sub-counties
	2001/2	2002/3	
Food security			
Improved significantly	7.7	12.4	4.6
Improved moderately	30.5	32.8	20.4
No change	15.1	8.8	9.3
Worsened moderately	10.7	17.6	23.9
Worsened significantly	36.0	28.4	41.8
Human nutrition			
Improved significantly	6.6	8.2	4.8
Improved moderately	33.0	32.9	25.5
No change	24.4	24.3	22.8
Worsened moderately	9.4	1.6	23.1
Worsened significantly	26.6	18.2	24.1
Statistics are corrected for stratification weighing and clustering sample			

Adapted from Benin et al (2007:42)

6.7 Conclusion

From the above discussion, a picture can be drawn of grassroots popular perceptions on generic forms of democracy and citizen participation, their perception on participation in relation to the NAADS programme, and the impact of NAADS on the material reality of NPs in Bushenyi and elsewhere in Uganda. Concerning generic forms of democracy and participation, the results show communities that share similar views in terms of political awareness, based on elevated levels of

interest in political life generally.¹⁶³ The majority of the NPs and N-NPs agreed that they did not feel close to any political party.¹⁶⁴ When it came to political rights and agency (freedom to choose or act), the majority of the respondents (NPs and N-NPs) claimed that they did not have full rights,¹⁶⁵ and that they ought to have them.¹⁶⁶ In terms of respondents' perceptions of agency, the levels of participation in both the formal, invited spaces of local governance were low. The majority of both NPs and N-NPs were either not members or inactive members, while a small fraction were elected officials.¹⁶⁷

With reference to participation in the invented spaces of community meetings and protests, the responses were slightly higher,¹⁶⁸ with both NPs and N-NPs claiming they had "never attended" a demonstration or protest march, but would if they had a chance. Another significant proportion claimed that they had attended meetings. This suggests that both NPs and N-NPs had engaged in community activities. In respect of the 2006 Uganda general elections, the majority of the respondents (both NPs and N-NPs) had participated¹⁶⁹. Only a small fraction did not vote. This result suggests a population that values voting as a form of democratic participation. Yet when it came to collective participation, the majority of respondents (both NPs and

¹⁶³ See Figure 6.

¹⁶⁴ See Figure 7.

¹⁶⁵ See Figure 8.

¹⁶⁶ See Figure 9.

¹⁶⁷ See Figure 10.

¹⁶⁸ See Figure 11.

¹⁶⁹ See Figure 12.

N-NPs) said that they were “not likely” to mobilise with others and make councillors listen to matters of national importance¹⁷⁰. This result suggests a population that selectively engages in participatory processes.

With regard to participation in relation to the NAADS programme, most of the respondents were “very interested” in the programme.¹⁷¹ In addition, a small proportion were “somewhat interested” in the programme. On whether respondents were familiar with the NAADS programme at local level, the results indicate minor variations in responses between NPs and N-NPs. The majority of both N-NPs and NPs (or family members) had talked “several times” about the NAADS programme. The same response ratings occurred when the respondents were asked to point out whether they had seen any NAADS officials. The majority in this case indicated that they had seen a NAADS official “just once or twice”. This shows that the NAADS officials were present, but were not that visible at local level. Concerning family members attending NAADS meetings, the responses show high percentages of respondents (or family members of respondents) having attended meetings “several times” or “once or twice”. This shows that even N-NPs do attend NAADS meetings. The picture that emerges is of a grassroots that is “very interested” and familiar with the NAADS programme.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ See Figure 13

¹⁷¹ See Figure 14.

¹⁷² See Figure 15.

Regarding the NAADS programme and its all-inclusive participatory mandate, the responses reported on were only from NPs. The results (presented in Figure 12) show that 58% of NPs felt that the programme was “very badly” made known to the ordinary person, while 33% claimed that the programme was “fairly badly” made known. On whether the NAADS programme had consulted members before making decisions, 63% of NPs claimed that the programme consulted members “very badly” before making decisions on NAADS matters. Yet the elites (in the previous chapter) had indicated that programme was all-inclusive and consulted all members, including beneficiaries. As to the programme’s efforts to provide ways to handle the complaints of rural farmers, 68% of NPs claimed that the programme handled complaints from rural farmers “very or fairly badly”. The same was true in terms of NAADS attempting to guarantee equal distribution of resources. The majority of the NPs were dissatisfied in this regard; most felt that NAADS has not embraced its all-inclusive participatory mandate at the local level in terms of the distribution of resources.

Regarding grassroots participants’ perceptions of NAADS officials’ competency and efficacy, 54% of NPs claimed that NAADS officials were “fairly qualified”, while 16% of NPs claimed that NAADS officials at the sub-county level were “fairly unqualified”. In addition, 30% of NPs indicated that they were unfamiliar with NAADS officials at the sub-county level of education. In terms of the NPs perceptions of NAADS officials’ experience in managing public services programmes, the results indicate 10% thought officials were “fairly qualified”, while

36% claimed they were “fairly unqualified”, and 34% said they didn’t know. Concerning perceptions of officials’ honesty in managing public funds, 28% of respondents claimed that officials were “fairly unqualified”, a significant number (51%) said they were “very unqualified”, and 8% claimed that they “did not know”. The picture that emerges suggests that NPs doubt the competency and efficacy of NAADS officials to deliver on their mandate.

The last section of the chapter dealt with the impact of the NAADS programme in terms of increasing the socio-economic prosperity of participants. The results show that there has been procurement of equipment and supplies by farmers in various sub-counties in the Bushenyi district.¹⁷³ Similarly, there are significant differences between NPs and N-NPs in terms of crop yield, household income, assets, and food and nutrition. It appears that participation in the NAADS programme had substantial positive impact on those who participated. For instance, the provision of advisory services to farmers has enabled NPs to adopt new crops (vanilla, groundnuts, maize, and beans) and livestock enterprises (goats and pigs). In addition, there has been the adoption and use of modern agricultural production practices such as improved crop and livestock varieties, fertilisers, and disease and pest control measures. This has substantially increased farmers’ income, increased their assets and caused change in their food and nutrition; hence, improving NPs’ material reality.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ See Table 1.

¹⁷⁴ See Tables 3, 4 and 5.

In conclusion, the analysis expands on the theme of the chapter: “Grassroots perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in the NAADS programme”. The picture that emerges from the data is of grassroots communities that share similar basic patterns of understanding citizenship. Firstly, there is evidence of willingness to participate in the NAADS programme, but also a perception that the programme has been top-down, disguised as bottom-up. This can be partly attributed to a failure to popularise the programme at local level. Secondly, there is also evidence to show that NPs were rarely consulted in making decisions, and there are no substantive official mechanisms or processes for handling the complaints of participating farmers. Such aspects are major obstructions to participatory development. Thirdly, though there is evidence of improvement in the material reality of farmers after participating in the NAADS programme elsewhere, based on the data of Benin et al (2007), this is inconclusive in relation to Bushenyi, particularly in attitudinal terms. The NPs’ belief in NAADS efficacy in Bushenyi was low. In fact, the majority of the NPs believed that NAADS officials were only “fairly qualified” and “very unqualified” in terms of their competency and efficacy. Yet despite this doubtfulness, the NPs participated in anticipation of the programme improving their material reality. Therefore, participatory development as officially described by NAADS remains somewhat rhetorical compared to how it has been implemented in Bushenyi.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Introduction

While the number of studies on democracy and citizen participation has been on the increase over the years in the developing countries of the south, the exact meanings of these concepts remain fraught with ambiguity. Citizen mobilisation has been described as an active process of ongoing engagement and action that is important not only for articulating citizens' "voices", but also for citizen agency and influence (see Gaventa, 2004; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). This understanding of democracy and citizen participation points to a process of active involvement of the people in the planning process, the communication of their preferences, demands, interests and needs, and collective addressing of problems and aspirations in relation to those in charge of democratic development policies (Kathlene & Martin, 1991; King et al, 1998; Parsons, 1990; Rosenstraub, 1987; Thomas, 1995; Warren, 1999; Ziegenfuss, 2000; Zotti, 1991). Yet for many - and particularly in the rural areas - citizen participation has proved problematic, as it is often tied to the implementation of development projects conceptualised and spearheaded by outsiders, rather than being spontaneous and indigenous. The research presented here shows that in Uganda, the advocates of participatory extension approaches have provided little insight as to how to go about resolving the contradictions and paradoxes that participation reveals when introduced into systems with long histories of rigid, top-down decision-making.

Uganda's experience has been dominated largely by officials who avoid being held to account; elite capture of the decentralisation process; and lack of information being made available to the constituents; despite often concerted (though sometimes indifferent) efforts by the post-1986 regime, which has endeavoured to promote participatory democracy and democratic development policies. As an example of the latter, the NRM government introduced the NAADS participatory development programme to expand coverage and improve agricultural performance in rural areas. The government aimed to boost citizen participation by introducing Agricultural Extension Services (AES). Yet citizen participation in the AES (through NAADS) remains barely visible – especially in Bushenyi – despite the huge sums of money pumped into the NAADS programme for citizen engagement. The manner in which democratic development can be understood in the light of the research presented in the empirical chapters is discussed below, in relation to the objectives of the dissertation as set out in the first chapter.

7.2 Exploring citizen participation in democratic development

This dissertation set out to investigate a central premise; namely, that citizen participation in Uganda – aside from the process of voting, and (in some rare instances) protests – has thus far remained relatively indiscernible in relation to development policies. In participatory development programmes such as NAADS, the objectives of which prioritise inclusiveness in rural communities, there is a formalistic constitutional enactment that calls for all-inclusive citizen engagement. The research objectives were to generate information on how the elites and

grassroots understand democracy and participation in participatory development programmes. The concluding findings are measured against the major objective of this dissertation, which is to analyse elite and grassroots understandings of citizen participation within prescribed democratic development mechanisms (such as the agricultural extension service prototype) which formed part of the NAADS programme in Uganda. To achieve the above objectives, the dissertation:

- 1) develops an analytical framework, using selected discussions on the liberal perspectives of democracy and citizen participation as these are incorporated into development strategies designed by government;
- 2) analyses the literature on democracy and citizen participation in Uganda as an emerging democracy;
- 3) introduces NAADS, an agricultural extension service prototype, as a national programme born in an emerging democracy where citizen participation is ostensibly a key priority;
- 4) and finally, analyses both elite and grassroots perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in purportedly democratic development initiatives, drawing on case study research incorporating both quantitative and qualitative interviews.

7.3 Evidence and inferences


The results derived from pursuing the above objectives are summarised below. Before drawing inferences from these objectives, there are three clarifications relating to this dissertation that must be spelled out. Firstly, there are various, differing intellectual debates in contemporary academia on democracy and citizen participation, although the concepts are conceptually intertwined, and resonate profoundly with the issues of accountability and good governance (Saul, 1994; Dahl 1956; 1989). Secondly, the ethos of participatory development policies calls for a new working relationship between local governments and communities (see Robino, 2009). The ability of local government to deliver satisfactorily to communities requires competent, efficient, transparent and accountable planning. Thirdly, borrowing from international experience, a culture of participation and a participative environment ought to be canonised, especially at local government level; and all stakeholders must play a leading role (Mohan & Stokke, 2005; Phillips & Edwards, 2000). This requires the capacity to assist in deepening participation in rural areas, often neglected in development matters. The following sections present further findings linked to the major objectives of the dissertation.

7.3.1 Overview of democracy and citizen participation

Chapter two of this dissertation discussed democracy and citizen participation, and their relationship with development. The chapter reviewed their definitions, stated advantages and objectives, and assessed their utility as operational and policy tools. In a sea of conceptual uncertainty, it nevertheless became apparent that the concepts

have been embraced in legislation – and, to some extent, in practice – in the developing countries of the South.

The literature cited in the discussion on democracy defines democracy as a political concept, concerning the collectively binding decisions about the rules and policies of a group, association or society (Beetham, 1994). It distinguishes between democracy in various situations: where there are free and fair elections; where basic civil liberties are respected and protected; and where the cabinet has effective power to govern (see Dahl, 1956; Storm, 2008; Koelble & Lipuma, 2008; Houtzager et al, 2007; Collier & Levitsky, 1997).




In an attempt to operationalise the concepts of democracy and citizen participation and assess the extent to which they are understood and implemented, emphasis was laid on deliberative democracy, participation and participatory governance, and empowered participatory governance as the major strands within liberal notions of democracy (Beetham, 1994; Dryzek, 1990; Collier & Levitsky, 1997). The idea of deliberative democracy encapsulates decision-making by discussion among free and equal citizens (Elster, 1998:1). Participation and participatory governance calls for equal engagement with citizens in the process of governance with the state, so as to deepen democracy (Gaventa, 2006:15). Empowered participatory governance (EPG) relies upon the commitment and capabilities of ordinary citizens to make sensible decisions through reasoned deliberation (Fung & Wright, 2003, as alluded to by Gaventa, 2006).

Chapter two also investigated how such democratic development practices have been idealised in Africa. For example, democracy in Africa has been equated with a trophy handed to the Africans after attaining their independence in the 1960s, and its conceptualisation has not properly entered popular discourse (Ake, 2000). However, democratic sympathisers have argued that Africa is in fact democratic (Bratton & Mattes, 2001). Democracy in Africa has been weighed against standards of good governance promoted and supported by the World Bank and the IMF (Pratchett & Wilson, 1996; Hyden, 1992; Stoker, 1998:34). The good governance template (as linked to democracy) contained aspects of decision-making - who should be involved in decision-making, and in what capacity; in other words, the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm (Hyden, 1992). The underlying justification was that any developmental sector linked to grassroots communities should direct their efforts at establishing institutional mechanisms that would accelerate participatory governance; which, in turn, would promote development (see Luyt, 2008; Eyasu, 2006; Balogun, 1998; Dunn, 1986).

Indeed, during the 1990s, participatory development took centre stage (Robino, 2009). This period witnessed the emergence of 'people-centred development', which filtered into major development institutions and governments' development policy documents (Robino, 2009). Debates were constituted and reproduced within a set of material relationships and activities at social, cultural and geopolitical level. For example, the necessity for greater citizen participation was established through the

creation of new, decentralised institutions, so as to harness a variety of participatory and consultative processes in national and global policy deliberations (Gaventa, 2004; Piper, 2010; Mirafab, 2004). Regardless of the existence of 'invited' spaces created by institutions of government, and invented spaces created by citizens themselves, all-inclusive participation has barely been encouraged; especially for marginalised community groups (Friedman, 2006; Millestein, 2008; 2011). However, Sinwell (2009; 2010) argues that simply reforming the system will not lead to a qualitative or fundamental shift in the way these structures operate, and that reform is unlikely to change the development realities on the ground, or transform the power dynamics that shape the nature and purpose of these spaces. Sithole et al (2007) point out that in under-resourced communities, the struggle for bread-and-butter issues takes precedence over equitable representation.



Adversaries of participation point out that participatory rhetoric has been used as a tool by global elites to continue to extend their hegemonic influences to the less developed countries of the South (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Christens & Speer, 2006). Furthermore, they state that efforts at embracing participation are largely for maintaining existing power relationships, and are merely masked in the rhetoric and techniques of participation. They argue that the task of entering developing countries of the South and working with people to develop a country economically, politically, and socially is inherently fraught with complexities (Cooke & Kothari, 2001:3). In fact, some participatory development advocates justify these processes by noting the efficiency and productivity with which participatory methods advance,

such as in saving 'transaction costs', in corporate parlance (Christens & Speer, 2006). Many of them seem to be usurped bureaucratic elites who, according to Williams (2005), have imposed their own truncated version and understanding of participation on particular communities.

The relationship between democracy, participation and democratisation is not clear. For some, democracy is regarded as a necessary condition for local development and citizen participation. For others, some degree of participation is required for democracy to achieve its intended objectives of more efficient and responsive local government. Therefore democracy and participation have a symbiotic relationship, but the conception, definition and objectives of democracy are critical to this relationship. The widespread engagement with issues of participation and local governance that occurs creates enormous opportunity for re-defining and deepening the meanings of democracy, and for extending the rights of inclusive citizenship. At the same time, there are critical challenges in ensuring that the work done promotes pro-poor outcomes and social justice.

Democracy and participation cannot be separated from the broader issues of political economy that contextualise the possibilities of transformative participatory development (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). The consequence is that any assessment of the relationship between democracy and citizen participation requires an examination of political economy dynamics. With greater recognition of civil society and increasing discussion about good governance, the concept of participation is shifting; from


beneficiary participation in state-delivered programmes, to an understanding of participation as a means of holding the state accountable through new forms of governance that involve more direct state/civil society relations, under a partnership model.

However, the question that Pieterse (2002) poses is: what is the nature of this blend – what is gained and what is lost in this act of hybridisation? Uganda’s transformation path is characterised by an innovative combination of both strands of democratic development thinking, in the wake of neo-liberalism’s demise as a hegemonic ideology. These approaches have become increasingly controversial: celebrated by optimists as the most empowering way forward for marginal citizens, on one hand, and derided as an abrogation of responsibility by sceptics on the other (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010). While these approaches remain controversial on the international scene, the following section demonstrates how such democratic controversies have been dealt with in Uganda.

7.3.2 Democracy and citizen participation in Uganda

Chapter three provides an overview of democracy and citizen participation in Uganda, from pre-colonial to post-independence times. It demonstrates how nebulous colonial policies constrained democracy and citizen participation during the rule of pre- and post-independence governments, alongside structural factors such as poverty and illiteracy among the majority (Mamdani, 1997). The formation of a public sphere with a national character has been made difficult; first by the

nature and philosophy of indirect rule, and later by the factionalism and chaos that characterised post-independence governments (Golloba-Mutebi, 2008). Yet with the rebirth of participatory politics, and even after the multi-party dispensation, certain elements continue to impede citizen participation. These elements include citizen trepidation (a hangover from past governments); political patronage and impunity; corruption and electoral commission misconduct; repetitive local government disagreements; elite capture; insufficient pecuniary aptitude; lack of accountability and transparency; and lastly, uneven social stratification (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008; Francis & James, 2003; Olum, 2004). It is notable that the average Ugandan citizen's power and influence over the government improved under the NRM. Yet the mechanisms for holding local leaders accountable remained weak, largely due to the centralisation of power by government.



As an illustration of this last point, critics have pointed to how egocentric elites have weakened the central government budget reserves in the process of facilitating the creation of new districts (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008). There are conflicts in local government between politicians and district administrators (Kakumba, 2003). The elites at district level have usurped other powers, thus suffocating the actual participatory development that the decentralisation policy calls for. Lastly, political patronage resulting from multi-party politics – in which local government put party issues above the national cause, and diverted resources meant for development towards facilitating party activities – has impaired the whole notion of democracy and citizen participation (Kakumba & Nsingo, 2008).

While it is evident that colonial policies constrained democracy and citizen participation in pre- and post-independence Uganda, the rebirth of participatory politics and the multi-party dispensation paved the way for participatory development initiatives. Participatory democracy is built in to the legislative provisions of government in Uganda. These provisions are part of the requirements of multinational organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF for deepening democracy (Collier & Reinikka, 2001; World Bank, 1998; 2000a; 2004). Yet according to Sabiti (1998) and Kakumba and Nsingo (2008), there are elements that continue to deter democracy and citizen participation. Consequently, it is not clear whether the democratic development policies espoused by the government of Uganda match elite and grassroots understanding and conceptualisation of democracy and citizen participation. Such ambiguity requires ongoing investigation, and the analysis of the impact of NAADS further adds to empirical investigations to establish the links between policies espousing better development through participation, and the daily socio-economic realities of communities.

7.3.3 The NAADS prototype

Chapter four gave an overview of the NAADS programme. The chapter shows that the NAADS programme is an innovative public/private extension service (AES) delivery programme that was established by the GoU to boost citizen participation. Participation was aimed at increasing agricultural productivity, so as to liberate rural citizens from the shackles of poverty. On paper, the programme is participatory in nature and embraces liberal democratic ideals. The chapter covered AES history in

relation to citizen participation and the circumstances under which the NAADS programme was adopted. The discussion further drew attention to relevant principles, and programme organisation, management and coordination. Thereafter, the chapter evaluated the programme components and activities.

The components include: (i) advisory services and information services (that is, farmer group and farmer forum formation and participatory planning, enterprise selection and needs identification); (ii) technology development and market linkage; and lastly (iii) the approach to funding and delivery of funds was also given attention. The programme is described in normative terms (that is, in terms of how it is organised and is supposed to work). The discussion aimed to provide a background to the interview material on elite perceptions of citizen participation in the NAADS programme, and their assessment of the type of participation employed in relation to its impact on alleviating poverty.

7.3.4 Elite conceptions of democracy and citizen participation

Chapter five discussed the qualitative narrative of information obtained from various individuals categorised as elites, from national down to local level. The chapter listed questions constructed around a set of uniform variables that were grouped into thematic categories and discursively posed to elites. These questions were aimed at analysing the elites' perceptions of democracy and citizen participation in the purportedly democratic NAADS development initiative. The results presented in the chapter were from three categories of respondent who were

assumed to have sufficient knowledge of the NAADS programme, namely (i) government officials (two MPs from Bushenyi, three MoAAIF officials and five NAADS secretariat officials); (ii) political party representatives (five FDC and five NRM); and (iii) Bushenyi district leaders (three district councillors, four sub-county representatives and three district technocrats).

The responses from government officials present a compelling picture. The government officials were satisfied with the progress of citizen participation in the NAADS programme. Their views suggest that the government involved people in decision-making and implementation, thus enabling the promotion of people's power. Government officials also supported the notion of government transparency in participatory development; and further, were of the opinion that the communities involved were satisfied. However, the government officials failed to highlight the extent of the inclusivity (or the lack of it), and could not say how marginal groups would be effectively incorporated in the development programmes. The government officials were reluctant to propose alternative strategies on how all-inclusive participation would be strengthened.

From their views, two deductions are made. The first is that most of the government officials were not critical of the NAADS programme; they seemed to have been firmly in support of it from design to implementation. Secondly, government officials are convinced that government had encouraged participation in the programme, and that it has contributed to socio-economic development. While these

opinions remain subjective, it must be noted that some government officials believed that the grassroots needed to be sensitised about development programmes. Some government officials did note that although the NAADS programme had been rolled out effectively in some districts, it is faced with the challenge of mismanagement, at district level, that has impacted negatively on all-inclusive participation. Gaventa (2001) reminds us that there is renewed need for relating people and institutions, building conditions for success, and contesting the local in an era of globalisation.

Political party representatives had mixed reactions to NAADS, with the FDC being critical, while the NRM respondents were more sympathetic, and embraced the NAADS programme ideology. The FDC representatives stated that participation has been hindered by poverty, ignorance, and politically partisan participation. They also pointed to elements of discrimination with regard to political affiliation affecting participation in the programme. Some FDC respondents observed that the avenues of participation created by the current government have been held hostage by morally deficient and non-accountable leaders at the local level. They suggested that for effective participation aimed at national development, there is a need for strengthening institutions of government and promoting the principle of separation of powers, and for pursuing constitutional, non-partisan and professional management of national programmes. The NRM respondents, on the other hand, blamed the opposition for spreading negative propaganda that sabotages government programmes by taking advantage of illiterate grassroots, who in the end refuse to participate. Both political parties' representatives placed culpability on each

other for ineffective participation in the NAADS programme. Yet if their differences were reconciled, perhaps effective participation would translate into socio-economic development, especially in the rural communities of Uganda.

The Bushenyi district leaders presented multiple divergent views. For instance, the District Councillors stated that participation in the NAADS programmes has been obstructed by mismanagement and corruption. Some sub-county representatives observed that farmers are frustrated by the lengthy enterprise priority process by which they receive advisory services. This has not only been a challenge to NAADS, but also a constraint to participation. The Bushenyi district technocrats were critical of the government's failure to implement the other components of the NAADS programme. They suggested that for effective participation to take precedence, NAADS should provide clear guidelines for the participation of political leaders; timely release of funds to the district, to enable timely implementation of planned activities; and lastly, continuous dialogue and interaction between the NAADS secretariat and district stakeholders.

The overriding impression from the majority of the elites interviewed was their acceptance that there had been citizen participation in the NAADS programme. However, their acknowledgment seemed to be filtered through a range of pre-defined ideological lenses, under the guise of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. The elites seemed to be more concerned with getting the NAADS programme right, as required by the NAADS Act (2001) and conceptualised in the

NAADS Report (2000), rather than creating ties with the grassroots with a view to promoting participatory development and empowering grassroots communities. This created an opportunity to engage with the grassroots, and to establish how they perceive democracy and citizen participation in the purportedly democratic development initiatives of NAADS.

7.3.5 Grassroots perceptions on democracy and citizen participation


Chapter six provided a background to grassroots (underprivileged respondents) perceptions on democracy and participation, and linked this to an evaluation of NAADS as an example of a participatory development programme. The grassroots interviewees comprised of 155 NAADS Participants (NPs) and 156 Non-NAADS Participants (N-NPs). The results are presented in terms of grassroots' popular perceptions of generic forms of democracy and citizen participation, and their perceptions on participation in relation to the NAADS programme and the impact of NAADS on the material (socio-economic) realities of NPs in Bushenyi and elsewhere in Uganda. Concerning generic forms of democracy and participation, the results show a community that shares similar views in terms of political awareness, based on elevated levels of interests in political life generally. The majority of the NPs and N-NPs agreed that they did not feel close to any political party. When it came to political rights and agency (freedom), the majority of the respondents (NPs and N-NPs) claimed that they had never had full rights, but that they ought to have them. In terms of respondents' perceptions of agency, more broadly, the levels of participation in both the formal, invited spaces of local governance was low. The

majority of NPs and N-NPS were either not members of NAADS, or were inactive members; only a small fraction were active members.

With reference to participation in invented spaces of community meeting and protests, the responses were slightly higher, with both NPs and N-NPs claiming they had “never” attended a demonstration or protest march, but would if they had a chance. Another significant proportion claimed that they had attended community meetings. This signals that both NPs and N-NPs had engaged in community activities. In respect of the 2006 Ugandan general elections, the majority of both NP and N-NP respondents had participated, while only a small fraction did not vote. This indicates a population that values voting as a form of participation. Yet when it came to collective participation, most respondents (both NP and N-NP) said that they are ‘not likely’ to mobilise with others and make councillors listen to matters of national importance. This suggests a population that engages selectively in participatory process.


Concerning participation in relation to the NAADS programme, most respondents were not only “very interested” in the programme, but also familiar with it, and knew who the NAADS officials were. Furthermore, the respondents (including N-NPs) indicated that they or their family members had attended NAADS meetings. This suggests willingness to participate and familiarity with the NAADS programme. Regarding the NAADS programme and its all-inclusive participatory mandate, the responses reported on were only from NPs. Most of the NPs felt that

the programme was “very badly” made known to the ordinary person. On consultation by the NAADS programme, the majority also indicated that the programme consulted members “very badly” before making decisions on programme matters. Yet the elites (described in the previous chapter) had indicated that the programme was all-inclusive and consulted all members, including beneficiaries. Regarding the programme’s efforts at providing ways for handling complaints, the majority also indicated that the programme “very or fairly badly” provided ways of dealing with the complaints of participating rural farmers. The same was true of programme efforts at guaranteeing equal distribution of resources. These results suggest that the NPs were dissatisfied, and that the NAADS programme had not embraced its all-inclusive participatory mandate at the local level.



As to grassroots (mainly NP) perceptions of NAADS officials’ competency and efficacy, the majority stated that the officials are either “fairly unqualified” or “very unqualified” in terms of levels of education, experience at managing public services programmes, and honesty in managing public funds. The picture that emerges from the above results suggests that the NPs doubted the competency and efficacy of the NAADS officials to deliver on their mandate. Yet the literature cited calls for collaboration with institutions that mediate between communities, service providers and policymakers (Cornwall & Coelho, 2004:1; Piper, 2010; Miraftab, 2004).

On the impact of participation in the NAADS programme, the results show that there has been procurement of equipment and supplies for farmers in various sub-counties of the Bushenyi district. There are also significant differences between NPs and N-NPs in terms of crop yield, household income, assets, and food and nutrition. These results suggest that participation in the NAADS programme has substantial positive impact on those who participate. The provision of advisory services to farmers has enabled NPs to adopt new crops and livestock enterprises. The adoption and use of modern agricultural production practices such as improved crop and livestock varieties, fertilisers, and disease and pest control measures substantially increased the farmers' income, grown their assets and changed their food and nutrition; hence, improving the NPs' material reality.



The situation that emerges from this data is of grassroots communities that share similar basic understandings of citizenship, and who value participatory spaces. There is evidence of willingness to participate in the NAADS programme, but also a perception that the programme has been top-down, but disguised as bottom-up. This can be partly attributed to a failure to popularise the programme at local level. There is also evidence to show that NPs were rarely consulted in making decisions, and there are no substantive official mechanisms or processes for handling the complaints of participating farmers. Such aspects are major obstructions to participatory development. Though there is evidence of improvement in the material reality of farmers after participating in the NAADs programme elsewhere, based on data from Benin et al (2007), this is inconclusive in relation to Bushenyi, particularly

in attitudinal terms. Therefore, the creation of new, decentralised institutions, with the aim of boosting participatory and consultative processes, has not necessarily translated to all-inclusive participation in democratic development arenas, as the literature suggests (see for example Kabeer, 2005; Cohen, 1995; Farrell, 2000; Ziegenfuss, 2000). Hence, participatory development as applied in the NAADS programme remains somewhat rhetorical compared to how it has been officially implemented in Bushenyi.

7.4 Concluding discussion

While the current consensus on citizens' participation entails the active involvement of the people in the planning process, and the communication of collective problems to those in charge of democratic development policies, the evidence from this research regarding this issue in Uganda remains inconclusive. However, participatory politics and representative democracy have become topical, and the developing countries of the South have attempted to encourage inclusivity in democratic development policies such as that of NAADS, especially in rural poor communities such as those of the Bushenyi district. But these developments have not necessarily resulted in meaningful participation by the poor. Exclusionary tendencies linked to political party affiliation, the elites' failure to sensitise the rural communities about development programmes, poverty, insufficient knowledge of constitutional entitlements, fear emanating from a long history of dictatorship, and corruption at institutional level have proved detrimental to democracy and citizen participation.

Indeed, the majority who occupy rural areas are in many cases not active participants; rather they are mere recipients of government's pre-designed programmes, and their presence in some cases is for symbolic purposes. Friedman (2006:3) reminds us that citizen participation in government is not when governments create formal mechanisms to ensure it, but when they develop attitudes and institutions accessible to citizen action. Friedman (2006:14) further observes that the lack of participation of the poor in formal structures is not due to the inability of the poor to represent themselves on these platforms; in fact, inability to participate lies in the capacities expected of participants in structured participation exercises. Their inability to engage with technical issues makes the forums in which the voices of the poor are to be heard even more difficult, even if their issues do get to the table. Friedman (2006:14) points out that if policy is to reflect grassroots preferences, their voices need to be heard, in conversation with each other, in open, democratic processes with those who command power and wealth. In conclusion: democracy and citizen participation have been acclaimed for bringing participatory development policies to an end. However, just as other bold claims have been discounted in the past, so too it must be realised that democratic development and citizen participation, like many other discourses, contain within them their own limits.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Appendix A Elite questionnaire

**An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and Democratic
Development Policies: A Case Study of the National Agricultural Advisory
Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda
(June-August 2009)**

Dear Participant



This questionnaire forms part of research being undertaken towards award of degree Doctoral of Philosophy (PhD) in Public Administration at the University of the Western Cape located in Bellville Cape Town, Republic of South Africa. The title of the thesis is **“An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and Democratic Development Policies: A Case Study of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda”**. This study does not represent the government or any political party. The dissertation aims at assessing the views of individuals considered by the researcher as elites on their perception of democracy and citizen participation with emphasis on the NAADS Programme. The information obtained will be used to ascertain the extent citizen participation in the programme.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERED AS ELITES IN THIS STUDY

Please note that your insightful response is crucial to my efforts in understanding the extent of participation within the NAADS programme especially how it offers opportunity by creating an environment that will help low income earners in particular rural farmers in improving their social economic conditions

Thank you in advance for your effort.

- 1) Can you briefly highlight why the government established the NAADS programme?
- 2) Were people (beneficiaries) consulted before the programme was established?
- 3) Which groups of people were consulted before establishment of the programme?
- 4) How has the programme fared in terms of citizen involvement
- 5) What course did the government take to promote effective participation
- 6) Does the participation in NAADS programme improve their quality of life?
- 7) What impact does NAADS Programme have on the lives of rural farmers?
Give full details.
- 8) The NAADS Programme seems to have been a subject of severe criticism (that it has not addressed the concerns of the poorest of the poor) What is your view?

- 9) Does participation in the NAADS programme reduce vulnerability to poverty? If yes; how?
- 10) What are the strengths and weaknesses of NAADS Programme so far?
- 11) What are the biggest obstacles to rural farmers benefiting from NAADS Programme initiatives?
- 12) How has the NAADS programme addressed the issues of Gender in relation to participation
- 13) What are the social and cultural barriers to women participation in NAADS Programme?
- 14) Have NAADS programme achieved it's her objectives if so how in terms of addressing gender issues if any?
- 15) What lessons and experiences have so far been learnt ever since the inception of the NAADS programme?
- 16) To what extent has NAADS Programme empowered the poor people in rural areas?
- 17) What has been the response of none participants towards the NAADS programme?
- 18) What are the major factors that prevent rural people from participating in the NAADS Programme?
- 19) In which way has the NAADS Programme led to economic empowerment of rural people?
- 20) Do you think that having citizen participate in the programme design would have a positive impact?

21) What are the challenges facing NAADS Programme in Uganda?

22) Is there any other important information about the programme that you think can be a contribution to my research that I should know?

End



Appendix B: Grassroots questionnaire

**An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and Democratic
Development Policies: A Case Study of the National Agricultural Advisory
Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda
(June-August 2010)**

Dear Participant



This questionnaire forms part of research being undertaken towards award of degree Doctoral of Philosophy (PhD) in Public Administration at the University of the Western Cape. The title of the thesis is **“An Appraisal of the Nexus between Citizen Participation and Democratic Development Policies: A Case Study of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) Programme in Bushenyi District Uganda”**. This study does not represent the government or any political party. The study aims at establishing grassroots (NAADS participants) understanding of democracy and citizen participation. The target are any adults (18 years and above) participating in any NAADS Farmer Forums Participants must be residents in the selected sub-counties of Kyabugimbi, Kyamuhunga, Kyeizooba, Bumbeire and Nyabubaare in Bushenyi District. Personal information will be kept confidential.

***The Person Must Give Their Consent. If Consent Is Secured, Proceed As Follows:**

Respondent No.			
Interviewer No.			
Data Entry No.			

	County	Sub-County	Code
1	Igara East	Kyeizooba	100
2	Igara West	Kyamuhunga	101
3	Igara West	Nyabubare	102
4	Igara East	Bumbaire	103
5	Igara East	Kyabugimbi	104

BEGIN INTERVIEW

DEMOGRAPHIC/ AREA DATA

Lets begin by recording a few facts about yourself

1. How old are you

--	--	--	--

2. Respondents Gender

Male

1

Female

2

3. Are you the head of household?

No

Yes

Don't know

0

1

9

4. Are you a member of the NAADS programme?

No

Yes

Don't know

0

1

9

5. Which Ugandan language do you speak at home?

Runyankore

101

Rukiiga

102

Rutoro

103

Luganda

104

Other (Specify)

6. What is your highest standard of education completed [Code from answer. Do not read options]

No formal education

1

Informal schooling

2

Some Primary schooling

3

Primary completed

4

Some secondary schooling

5

Secondary/high School Completed

6

Some University

7

University Completed

8

Post graduate	9
Don't Know	99

7. How often do you use; [Read out options]						
	Daily	A few times a week	A few times a month	Less than once a month	Never	Don't know
A. Mobile phone	4	3	2	1	0	9
B. A computer	4	3	2	1	0	9
C. The internet	4	3	2	1	0	9

8. Which of the following do you personally own?			
	No	yes	Don't know
A. Radio	0	1	9
B. Television	0	1	9
C. Motor Vehicle, car motor cycle	0	1	9

9. How often do you get news from the following sources [Read out options]						
	Never	Less than once a month	A few times a month	A few times a week	Everyday	Don't know
A. Radio	0	1	2	3	4	9
B. Television	0	1	2	3	4	9
C. Newspapers	0	1	2	3	4	9

10. Do you feel close to any political party?	
No (does NOT feel close to ANY party)	
Yes (feels close to a party)	
Refused to answer	
Does not know [Don't read]	

11. In this country, how free are you : [Read out options]					
	Not at all free	Not very free	Somewh at free	Complete ly free	Don't know
A. To say what you think	1	2	3	4	9
B. To join any organisation you want	1	2	3	4	9
C. To choose who you vote for without feeling pressured	1	2	3	4	9

12. Do you have a job that pays cash income? Is it full time or part time? Are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?	
No (not looking)	1
No (looking)	2
Yes part time (not looking)	3
Yes part time (looking)	4
Yes full time (not looking)	5
Yes full time (looking)	6
Don't know	9

13. Which of the following type's best describes the main dwelling unit that this household occupies?	
Permanent house (Brick / cement structure)	1
Semi-permanent house	2
Temporary House (Mud & wattle house)	3
Informal dwelling not in back yard e.g. informal settlement	4
Other-specify	Post code

ECONOMY & PARTICIPATION

Let's discuss economic conditions.						
14. In general how would you describe: (Read out response)						
	Very Good	Fairly Good	Neither Bad or Good	Fairly Bad	Very Bad	Don't know
A. The present economic conditions of this country	5	4	3	2	1	9
B. Your living conditions	5	4	3	2	1	9

15. In general, how would you compare your living conditions with those of other Ugandans	
Much Worse	1
Worse	2
Same	3
Better	4
Much Better	5
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	

16. When you are together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss development matters: [Read out options]	
Frequently	2
Occasionally	1
Never	0
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	9

Let's talk for a moment about the kind of society you would like to have in this country. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or 2 [interviewer: probe for strength of opinion: do you agree or agree strongly?]			
16.			
Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning actions of leaders		Statement 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority	
Agree very strongly with statement 1 1	Agree with statement 1 2	Agree with statement 2 3	Agree very strongly with statement 2 4

Agree with neither	5
Don't know [do not read]	9

17			
Statement 1: Government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority		Statement 2: People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.	
Agree very strongly with statement 1 1	Agree with statement 1 2	Agree with statement 2 3	Agree very strongly with statement 2 4
Agree with neither		5	
Don't know [do not read]		9	

Let's turn to your role in the community.					
18. Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, active member, inactive member, or not a member?					
	Official	Active member	Inactive member	Not a member	Don't Know
A. religious group (e.g. church, mosque)	3	2	1	0	9
B. School Governing Body	3	2	1	0	9
C. Some other community association or community group	3	2	1	0	9

19. Here is a list of things that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you personally, have done any of these things during the past year. [If yes read options 2-4]. If not would you do this if you had a chance? [for no read options 0 and 1]						
	Yes			No		Don't know
	Often	Several times	Once or twice	Would do if had a chance	Would never do this	
A. Attended community meeting	4	3	2	1	0	9
B. Attended demonstration or protest march	4	3	2	1	0	9

20. With regard to the most recent, 2006 elections, which statement is true for you? [read out options]	
You voted in last election	1
You decided not to vote	2
You could not find the polling station	3
You were prevented from voting	4
You did not have time to vote	5
You did not vote for some other reason	6
You were not registered	7
Don't know/Can't remember	9

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make [read out options]					
	Not at all	Not very likely	Somewhat likely	Very likely	Don't Know
A. Your ward councillor listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community	1	2	3	4	9

22. The last time you contacted the ward councillor, did you go:				
	Alone	with a group	Not applicable (did not contact ward councillor)	Don't know
Alone or in a group	1	2	7	9
	Never	Only once	A few times Often	Don't know
To discuss personal or community problems	1	2	7	9

Let's talk for a moment about the role of political parties and media in monitoring government. Choose statement 1 or 2 [interviewer: probe for strength of opinion: do you agree or agree strongly?]			
23.			
Statement 1: opposition parties should regularly examine and criticise government policies and actions		Statement 2: opposition parties should concentrate on cooperating with government and helping it develop the country	
Agree very strongly with statement 1 1	Agree with statement 1 1 2	Agree with statement 2 2 3	Agree very strongly with statement 2 4
Agree with neither			5
Don't know [do not read]			9

24			
Statement 1: The media should constantly investigate and report on corruption and the mistakes of government.		Statement 2: Too much reporting of negative things like corruption only harms the country.	
Agree very strongly with statement 1 1	Agree with statement 1 1 2	Agree with statement 2 2 3	Agree very strongly with statement 2 4
Agree with neither			5
Don't know [do not read]			9

25. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree? [interviewer: probe strength of opinion]						
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
A. The courts have the right to make decisions that people	1	2	3	4	5	9

always abide by.						
B. The police always have the right to make people obey the law	1	2	3	4	5	9

26. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you had enough about them to say? [read out options]

	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Don't Know
The President	0	1	2	3	9
National Assembly (MP's)	0	1	2	3	9
NRM	0	1	2	3	9
Opposition Political Parties	0	1	2	3	9
The Police	0	1	2	3	9
The Courts of Law	0	1	2	3	9
Ward Committees	0	1	2	3	9
School Governing Boards	0	1	2	3	9

27. How many of the following are involved in corruption? read out options]

	None	Some of them	Most of them	All of them	Don't Know
President and officials in his office	0	1	2	3	9
National Assembly	0	1	2	3	9
NAADS officials at sub-county	0	1	2	3	9
District officials	0	1	2	3	9
Police	0	1	2	3	9
Judges and Magistrates	0	1	2	3	9

28. In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to district or NAADS officials in order to:

	No experience	Never	Once or twice	A few times	Often	Don't know
A. To be part of the government programme such as NAADS?	7	0	1	2	3	9
C. To be given a contract to supply agriculture products to farmers?	7	0	1	2	3	9

29. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? [Do not read options. Code from response. Accept up to 3 answers. If respondent offers more than three ask 'which three of these are the most important?' if respondent offers one or two answers ask 'Anything else?'

	1 st response	2 nd response	3 rd response
Economics			
Management of the economy	1	1	1
Wages, incomes, and salaries	2	2	2
Unemployment	3	3	3

Poverty / destitutions	4	4	4
Rates and taxes	5	5	5
Loans / credit	6	6	6
Food/ Agriculture			
Farming / Agriculture	7	7	7
Agricultural Marketing	8	8	8
Food shortages & famine	9	9	9
Drought	10	10	10
Land	11	11	11
Infrastructure			
Transport	12	12	12
Communications	13	13	13
Roads	14	14	14
Government services			
Education	15	15	15
Housing	16	16	16
Electricity	17	17	17
Water Supply	18	18	18
Orphans / Street Children	19	19	19
Services other	20	20	20
Health			
Health	21	21	21
HIV/Aids	22	22	22
Sickness or Disease	23	23	23
Lack of medicine	24	24	24
Governance			
Crime and Security	25	25	25
Corruption	26	26	26
Political Violence	27	27	27
Discrimination /inequality	28	28	28
Gender & Women's issues	29	29	29
Democracy/political rights	30	30	30
Other responses			
Other (i.e. some other problem)	31	31	31
Nothing /no problems	32	32	32
No further reply	33	33	33
Don't know	34	34	34

30. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?					
	Very badly	Fairly badly	Fairly well	Very well	Don't know
A. Developing programmes to help the poor	1	2	3	4	9
B. Improving living standards of the poor	1	2	3	4	9
C. Creating jobs	1	2	3	4	9
D. Narrowing gap between rich and poor	1	2	3	4	9
E. Assisting rural subsistence farmers	1	2	3	4	9
F. Improving basic Health services	1	2	3	4	9
G. Addressing Educational needs	1	2	3	4	9

H. Providing water and sanitation services	1	2	3	4	9
I. Fighting corruption in government	1	2	3	4	9
J. Combating HIV/AIDS	1	2	3	4	9
K. Maintaining roads and bridges	1	2	3	4	9
L. Providing a reliable supply of electricity	1	2	3	4	9
M. empowering women	1	2	3	4	9

NAADS PROGRAMME

31. How interested would you say you are in NAADS programme [Read out options]	
Very interested	3
Somewhat interested	2
Not very interested	1
Not at all interested	0
Don't know [Do not read]	9

32. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family [Read out options]						
	Never	Just once or twice	Several times	Many times	Always	Don't know
A. Talked about NAADS programme?	0	1	2	3	4	9
B. Seen officials from NAADS?	0	1	2	3	4	9
C. Attended NAADS meeting	0	1	2	3	4	9

33. How much time does NAADS representatives spend time meeting people in this sub-county? [read out options]						
	Almost all the time	At least weekly	At least once a month	At least once a year	Never	Don't know
	4	3	2	1	0	9

34. How well do you think NAADS programme is practising the following procedures? Or haven't you heard enough to have an opinion? [interviewer: probe strength of opinion]					
	Very badly	Fairly badly	Fairly well	Very well	Don't know
A. Making the programmes of work known to ordinary people	1	2	3	4	9
B. Providing citizens with information about the NAADS budget and expenditures	1	2	3	4	9
C. Allowing citizens like yourself to participate	1	2	3	4	9
D. Consulting others about NAADS before making decisions	1	2	3	4	9
E. Providing effective ways of to handle complaints of rural farmers	1	2	3	4	9
F. Guaranteeing equal distribution of NAADS resources	1	2	3	4	9

35. When there are problems with how NAADS Programme is run in your community,

how much can an ordinary person do to improve the situation [read out options]				
Nothing	A small amount	Some	A great deal	Don't know [don't read]
1	2	3	4	9

36. If you yourself have seen problems in how NAADS Programme is run in you community, how often, if at all, did you do any of the following: [read out options] [If respondents saw no problems, use code 7 =not applicable]						
	Never	Once or twice	Several times	Many times	Not seen problems	Don't know/
A. Discuss the problem with other people in your community	0	1	2	3	7	9
B. Join with others in your community to address a problem	0	1	2	3	7	9
C. Discuss problems with other community or religious leaders	0	1	2	3	7	9
D. Write a letter to a newspaper or call a radio show?	0	1	2	3	7	9
E. Make a complaint to local government officials, for example by going in person	0	1	2	3	7	9

37. Looking at the group of NAADS Officials who are presently serving on district and sub-county, how qualified do you think they are to do their jobs? Please rate them according to the following types of qualifications. Or haven't you heard enough to have an opinion? [interviewer: read out option]					
	Very qualified	Fairly qualified	Fairly unqualified	Very unqualified	Don't know
A. Their level of education	4	3	2	1	9
B. The extent that they care about the community	4	3	2	1	9
C. Their experience at managing public service programs	4	3	2	1	9
D. Their honesty in handling public funds	4	3	2	1	9

38. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? [Interviewer probe strength of answer]					
	Strongly disapprove	Disapprove	approve	Strongly approve	Don't know
A. NAADS District representatives	1	2	3	4	9
B. NAADS sub-county representatives	1	2	3	4	9
C Local council councillors	1	2	3	4	9

39. How easy or difficult is it for an ordinary person to have their voice heard by NAADS officials	
Very easy	4
Somewhat easy	3
Somewhat difficult	2

Very difficult	1
Don't know [Don't read]	9

Lets turn to your views on NAADS Programme					
40. How much do you trust each of the following people? [Read out options]					
	Not at all	Just a little	I trust them somewhat	I trust them a lot	Don't know
A. NAADS Programme facilitators	1	2	3	4	9
B. District officials and councilors	1	2	3	4	9
C. Other Ugandans	1	2	3	4	9

THANK YOU VERY MUCH; YOUR ANSWERS HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL

END INTERVIEW

DON'T FORGET TO COMPLETE NEXT SECTION

THE SUBSEQUENT QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED BY INTERVIEWER AFTER THE INTERVIEW IS CONCLUDED

What was the respondents' attitude toward you during the interview?			
S/he was	friendly	In between	hostile
S/he was	Interested	In between	Bored
S/he was	Cooperative	In between	Uncooperative
S/he was	Patient	In between	Impatient
S/he was	At ease	In between	Suspicious
S/he was	honest	In between	misleading

Interviewers comments if any:

Interviewer: I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions received during training. All respondents recorded here are those of the respondent who was chosen by the appropriate selection method.

Interviewer Signature _____

Appendix C: Bushenyi District administrative units updated on 14th June 2010

sn	County Name	sn	Sub County Name	No. of Parishes	No. of Villages
1	Igara County East		Bumbaire	4	51
			BITC	6	31
			[i]Central Division		
			[ii]Ishaka Division	5	20
			[iii]Nyakabirizi Division	4	23
			Ibaare [from Bumbaire]	4	33
			Kyabugimbi	4	44
			Kyeizooba	8	85
		Ruhumuro [from Kyabugimbi]	5	41	
	Total			40	328
2	Igara County West		Bitooma [from Kyamuhunga]	6	34
			Kakanju	5	49
			Kyamuhunga	7	73
			Nyabubare	6	81
	Total			24	237
	Total Bushenyi			64	565

Sn	Item	2010
	No. of Counties	2
	No. of Sub-Counties	7
	No. of Town Councils	1
	No. of parishes [+wards]	64
	No. of villages [+ cells]	565

Appendix D: Bushenyi District population projections for 2010-2012

Sub-county/ Parish	2010			2011			2012		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Bumbaire	16,800	19,000	35,800	17,100	19,400	36,500	17,500	19,700	37,200
Bumbaire	2,400	2,600	5,000	2,400	2,700	5,100	2,500	2,700	5,200
Bushenyi Town Council	13,100	13,200	26,300	13,400	13,400	26,800	13,700	13,700	27,400
Ward I	3,600	3,500	7,100	3,600	3,600	7,200	3,700	3,700	7,400
Ward II	2,800	2,900	5,700	2,900	2,900	5,800	3,000	3,000	6,000
Ward III	4,500	4,500	9,000	4,600	4,500	9,100	4,700	4,600	9,300
Ward IV	2,200	2,300	4,500	2,300	2,400	4,700	2,300	2,400	4,700
Kakanju	13,300	14,000	27,300	13,600	14,200	27,800	13,900	14,500	28,400
Kabaare	2,400	2,500	4,900	2,400	2,600	5,000	2,500	2,600	5,100
Kakanju	2,500	2,600	5,100	2,500	2,600	5,100	2,600	2,600	5,200
Katunga	2,800	3,100	5,900	2,900	3,100	6,000	3,000	3,200	6,200
Kitojo	1,300	1,400	2,700	1,300	1,400	2,700	1,300	1,500	2,800
Mazinga	2,200	2,200	4,400	2,300	2,200	4,500	2,300	2,300	4,600
Rushinya	2,100	2,200	4,300	2,200	2,300	4,500	2,200	2,300	4,500
Kyabugimbi	17,300	18,700	36,000	17,700	19,000	36,700	18,100	19,300	37,400
Bijengye	1,800	1,800	3,600	1,800	1,800	3,600	1,800	1,800	3,600
Bugaara	2,300	2,500	4,800	2,300	2,500	4,800	2,400	2,600	5,000
Kajunju	3,200	3,700	6,900	3,300	3,800	7,100	3,400	3,900	7,300
Katikamwe	2,600	2,800	5,400	2,600	2,800	5,400	2,700	2,900	5,600

Kyeigombe	1,600	1,800	3,400	1,700	1,900	3,600	1,700	1,900	3,600
Nyeibingo	2,100	2,300	4,400	2,200	2,300	4,500	2,200	2,300	4,500
Buhumuro	2,600	2,700	5,300	2,700	2,800	5,500	2,800	2,800	5,600
Rwenjeru	1,000	1,100	2,100	1,100	1,100	2,200	1,100	1,100	2,200
Kyamuhunga	22,400	23,300	45,700	22,900	23,800	46,700	23,400	24,200	47,600
Bitooma	3,500	3,700	7,200	3,600	3,800	7,400	3,700	3,900	7,600
Kabingo	4,000	4,200	8,200	4,000	4,300	8,300	4,100	4,400	8,500
Kyamuhunga	2,700	2,900	5,600	2,800	2,900	5,700	2,800	3,000	5,800
Mashonga	4,800	4,800	9,600	4,900	4,900	9,800	5,100	4,900	10,000
Nshumi	2,300	2,400	4,700	2,400	2,400	4,800	2,400	2,400	4,800
Nyanga	2,900	3,100	6,000	3,000	3,200	6,200	3,000	3,300	6,300
Swazi	2,200	2,200	4,400	2,200	2,300	4,500	2,300	2,300	4,600

Appendix E: Bushenyi district poverty analysis

Poverty Issues	Underlying Cause (s)	Effect(s)
Small land holdings	Culture of land inheritance Population pressure Polygamy Large family sizes	Decline in soil fertility Low productivity Low production and low incomes Land disputes
Low access to public goods	Cultural beliefs and apathy Negative attitudes towards service providers Un equitable distribution Poor road network High cost of access Low Levels of education Inadequate information and ignorance	High morbidity and mortality rates Under utilisation of available services Low productivity High illiteracy levels
High population growth rate	High total fertility Polygamy Low levels of education Early marriages and teenage pregnancies Low contraceptive use [Low CPR] Cultural and religious beliefs Sex preference	Un employment and under employment Unequal distribution of assets Domestic violence High maternal and infant mortality rates. Low savings, low investments and low incomes High dependency rate Low productivity and low production Child labour
Cultural bias about ownership of social capital	Lack of gender awareness Low levels of education Culture and tradition Ignorance on importance of social capital External influence eroding extended family support systems [People more individualistic and centred on nuclear families]	Domestic violence Child labour Un even distribution of resources Delayed decision making and interventions
Poor access to credit and savings	Lack of collateral security Inaccessible financial system Poor information system High interest rates for credit and high costs of saving Poor saving culture	Poor capital formation Low investment opportunity People remain poor

	Selective financing by Financial institutions	
Dominance of subsistence means of production [77.1% of the households]	Inappropriate skills Land fragmentation Inadequate of capital Culture and tradition	Low productivity and low production Low household incomes Low savings and investments Soil exhaustion Poor tax base
Inappropriate education career	Colonial mode of training Limited career guidance Inappropriate education curriculum	Lack of competitiveness in global labour market More Job seekers than Job makers
Environmental degradation	Unsustainable farming practices Population pressure Deforestation High demand for wood fuel and charcoal for cooking [98.5%] Poor enforcement of bye-laws Limited awareness	Natural resource degradation/depletion Low land productivity Poor quality and reduced quantity of water Unpredictable climatic patterns Reduced agricultural production
Corruption and moral degeneration	Greed/moral decay Imbalance between earnings and cost of living Limited to fighting corruption	Poor service delivery Failure to meet planned targets Increased crime rate
Poor governance /leadership	Limited exposure and experience Limited patriotism at all levels Inadequate knowledge and skills Corruption Inconsistent government policies Political pressure	Communities limited participation in development initiatives Loss of opportunities Poor progress follow up Inequitable distribution of resources

Sources: Bushenyi District Participatory Poverty Assessment Process Report 2000