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Masters Thesis

Title: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A comparison of realist, liberal and constructivist views

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
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
Abstract

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, resulting from the dangers associated with the use of these weapons well visible during 1945, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and a nuclear arms race as seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During NPT Review Conferences, held every five years, the strength and integrity of this treaty is tested. Evident in NPT review conferences is the disagreement between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states over the role and importance placed on nuclear weapons and the slow pace of nuclear disarmament. The NPT has been in force for over 40 years; however the threat of nuclear weapons still exists. It then becomes necessary to understand what role the NPT plays in the international system, which differs depending on the theoretical lens used to interpret the NPT. A realist perspective of the NPT reveals that this treaty is an instrument used by dominant states to safeguard and legitimise their hold over nuclear weapons, while denying other states access to these weapons, instead protecting their allies through extended nuclear deterrence. A liberal perspective of the NPT highlights the moral influence of this treaty as an instrument for the benefit of the greater good, to shield humanity from the dangers of a nuclear explosion by delegitimizing nuclear weapons, key to shaping the perceptions of the decision makers of states regarding state security and nuclear weapons particularly. A constructivist interpretation of the NPT argues that this treaty is a social construction by states to impose a measure of order in their relations. At particular times in history, the NPT moves between a realist and liberal interpretation based on critical events that inform its direction. Social agents (decision makers of the state) through their thinking and ideas construct and give meaning to ″reality″ which is constantly negotiated. With that in mind, no interpretation of the NPT is fixed and for that reason, a constructivist conclusion seems ultimately applicable, namely that the NPT is what states make of it.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (also referred to as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) (NPT) entered into force in 1970 it has played an instrumental role in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and put forward the proposal of a world free from nuclear weapons, which have inspired the creation of regional treaties such as the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (also referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty) in Africa. The NPT can be described as a treaty interested in protecting the security of all states, and for that reason should be adopted universally. The world witnessed the destructive nature of these weapons on human beings and the environment when the United States used them against Japan in 1945 during World War II. Nuclear weapon tests have similarly made the destructive power of these weapons evident and resulted in a commonly held view that nuclear weapons might proliferate and fall into the wrong hands, threatening international peace and security. In fact, some argue that as long as nuclear weapons exist, they are a danger to the international community.

In 1953, under the Atoms for Peace program championed by the United States President, Dwight Eisenhower, nuclear information and technology were shared for peaceful civilian purposes. Nuclear technology and material have dual use capability; that is, they can be used for civilian purposes or diverted for the production of nuclear weapons. At this point, background of the nuclear fuel cycle will be necessary to distinguish between civilian and military nuclear programmes to shed light on at what point nuclear technology might lead to the development of nuclear weapons. The dual nature of nuclear technology heightens concerns around nuclear proliferation, as it was widely suspected India, Israel and Pakistan used the Atoms for Peace program to develop nuclear weapons.

The nuclear fuel cycle refers to the process in which nuclear fuel is manufactured to generate electricity. Uranium occurs naturally and has to be mined and processed in order to produce uranium oxide (yellow cake). Once uranium is refined in the nuclear research reactor, it will be used as fuel for the reactor. Through the use of gas centrifuges usually the concentration of uranium isotope 235 is enriched to increase its quality. Uranium enriched to 2-5%, referred to as low-enriched uranium is used for the generation of electricity. Uranium 235 can be further enriched to 90%, for both civilian and military purposes. Plutonium is a by-product of the highly enriched uranium fuel which is reprocessed to separate fuel from nuclear waste (IAEA, 2009, pp. 9-11, 16; Harvey, 2010, p. 9). Recognising the danger and devastation nuclear weapons inflict on human life and the environment, together with the nuclear proliferation risk of the dual use nature of nuclear technology, state actors such as Ireland, the United States and the Soviet Union proposed the creation of an international treaty that would limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1965, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) called for a more balanced treaty with a nuclear disarmament component. This led to the negotiation of the NPT, a treaty prioritised around, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, realising total nuclear disarmament and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear technology (Kerr, 2010, pp. 23-24).

After the negotiation of the NPT, it was open for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The NPT drafters made a distinction between nuclear weapon states; that is, those states that tested nuclear weapons by 1967; and non-nuclear weapon states, that is, those states that had not tested nuclear weapons by 1967 (Pande, 1995, p. 11). China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States are the five recognised nuclear weapon states under the NPT. All other states are considered non-nuclear weapon states and can only join the NPT as such. The NPT represented a bargain between member states to pursue the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their disarmament with the ultimate goal of promoting a world free from nuclear weapons.

Despite the NPT being in existence for over 40 years nuclear disarmament has been a slow process and nuclear weapon states continue to resist or undermine this objective. As long as nuclear weapons are in existence others will seek to gain them. Emelyanov (1982, p. 170) argues, since nuclear weapons have been developed statesmen and politicians looked at these weapons as having the ability to solve complicated world problems. From this point, it is argued that having nuclear weapons bestows states with strength and prevents others from confronting that state. This argument is in line with the view that nuclear weapons play a deterrent function in international relations by maintaining order. Associating value of prestige and power to nuclear weapons directly threatens the NPT.

The slow pace of nuclear disarmament only represents one commonly identified problem of the NPT. Others include double standards where nuclear weapon states shield allies such as India, Israel, and Pakistan from international pressure to join the NPT.

North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and its pursuit of nuclear weapons under this treaty is an issue not effectively addressed. Nuclear weapons continue to form a central role in military strategies, despite their use considered taboo. Another concern is the unwarranted view that the NPT bestows some states with the right to possess nuclear weapons.

NPT review conferences are convened every five years where member states negotiate the way forward for the NPT and tackle its challenges. An inability to cooperate between member states weakens the credibility of the NPT itself. Review conferences have been criticised as an arena of conflict and disagreement between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states respectively. In 1980, 1990 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences resulted in a failure where member states could not come to a consensus and develop a final document. A review conference seen as a failure has a detrimental impact on the NPT, review processes will determine the extent to which the treaty has realised its objects and goals. However, critical events occurring

before review conferences such as the India and Pakistan nuclear test in 1998 and North Korea's treaty withdrawal also influence the direction and strength of the NPT.

There have been a number of successful review conferences, which positively influenced the direction of the NPT and how this treaty is perceived by its member states. This study will mainly critically discuss and explain five NPT Review Conferences, namely, the first Review Conference in 1975, the 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 conference. The 1995 Review Conference witnessed the indefinite extension of the NPT. The 2005 Review Conference was marked by great controversy as a final document could not be decided and nuclear weapon states, in particular, the United States under the Bush Administration showed a disregard for the NPT by not approving the 13 practical steps in support of nuclear disarmament proposed at the 2000 Review Conference. The failure of the 2005 Review Conference contributed to a decline in the faith and legitimacy of the NPT among member states. Lastly, the 2010 Review Conference paved the way for a new sense of hope in the NPT by member states toward the treaty which came at a critical moment in time.

Very evident in the arena of nuclear weapons and disarmament member states disagree and conflict over how the NPT ought to be interpreted but at particular times in history member states cooperate and work together to realise mutual gains for the benefit of the international community.

According to the above background on the NPT, the following questions emerge: How is it possible to make sense of the NPT or its purpose and role in the international system? Does the NPT safeguard the interests of all its member states? Which direction and path has the NPT been placed on? Is the NPT directly subjected to the will of powerful states that can dictate its pace and core values? Or, does the NPT act as a form of governance in the international system by introducing a measure of order and stability? From this view, the NPT facilitates cooperation between states and thus introduces a measure of international order in this issue-area. This thesis aims to answer the questions posed above by looking respectively

through the lens of three theories of International Relations, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. These theoretical paradigms will offer a different interpretation of the NPT, each employed to critically analyse the role of the NPT in international relations.

Review conferences are practical illustrations of how member states relate to the NPT informing its strength and durability. Critical events in world politics occurring before review conferences also shed light on the significance of the NPT, how member states relate to it and how it effectively resolves and addresses challenges. For example, one of the reasons provided for the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. WMD includes three types of weapons; that is, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The realist, liberal and constructivist paradigms will be linked to these practical cases occurring before and during the NPT review conferences. With this in mind, the study provides a critical look at the NPT; describing the treaty from a realist, liberal and constructivist perspective. By explaining and understanding the NPT from these different view's light can be shed on why member states, in particular nuclear weapon states, have been slow to realise nuclear disarmament, and why others have forgone the nuclear weapons option, while some have chosen to remain outside of the NPT and in turn become nuclear armed themselves.

1.2 Research question and propositions

The purpose of this research is to investigate how the NPT impacts on the views of states regarding security, nuclear weapons and disarmament. The research question is: to what extent can the NPT restrain the system of self-help perceived to be intrinsic to the international system and inform state behaviour by setting standards and norms in the field of nuclear weapons and disarmament? This question is in response to the narrow realist view that "international anarchy" (or the absence of a

world government) results in a system where states are pre-determined to pursue their self-interest in a self-help way (Walt, 1998, pp. 37-38). From this view, it is assumed that international norms and rules associated with institutions and "regimes" have little influence over shaping state behaviour. Neoliberalist scholars argue that international regimes are, in fact, constructed by dominant powers, precisely to benefit their own interest and not as a matter of morality (or for the greater good of the international system as a whole). As such, without the presence of dominant powers, international regimes would have very little or no influence over states (Keohane, 1984, pp. 62-63).

The term institution will be applied to the NPT. An institution is a system of order, arranging human activity, through its norms, standards and rules. The NPT and its norms of non-proliferation and disarmament fit this interpretation of an institution. Simultaneously, due to the common thread between the term 'institution' and 'regime', the term regime will also be invoked and applied to the NPT, for example, the NPT regime. In this way, the researcher will only refer to one component of a regime, namely the NPT (treaty). Regimes refer to a combination of customary practices, treaties, and enforcement agencies that apply to a specific area of common interests. Thus, the nuclear non-proliferation regime consists of treaties, such as the NPT, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone treaties; enforcement agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and customary practices, such as the nuclear taboo and other non-proliferation norms.

Disregarding the role of an institution and regime (NPT) or arguing that they are merely tools conceived of by the powerful to pursue their interests to the detriment of the weak may amount to a presumptive negation of the role which institutions and regimes play (Ebaye, 2009, pp. 118-120). It also assumes that weaker states are "dupes" that are cheated into signing onto treaties as opposed to seeing treaties as an expression of politics defined as the negotiation of acceptable standards to the powerful and the weak. Another possible answer to the research question that

liberals would favour is that the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and as such facilitates cooperation and allows states to coordinate their policies to order relations between them (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 83).

The study will argue that neither the realists' preferred answer, nor the liberals' are sufficient to explain the role of the NPT in international relations. Rather, a constructivist response that provides an epistemologically alternative understanding of the international system and in particular, to the NPT should be pursued. Constructivism in International Relations acts as a bridge between realist and liberal theories that have come to dominate ways of viewing and interpreting the international system. It also recognises that treaties, like the NPT, are the embodiments of norms, rules and standards of behaviour that evolve over time and is therefore, what states make of them. No role (of treaties) is predetermined or inevitable, but the product of what actors operational in the issue-area (in this case nuclear weapon non-proliferation and disarmament) do.

1.3 Aims of the study
The aims of this research are therefore to:

- Provide a historical overview of the evolution of the NPT and how it fits into the non-proliferation regime.
- Investigate the challenges to and the successes of the NPT, highlighting the politics among nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT review conferences as instances where norms and standards of behaviour in this issue-area are negotiated, renegotiated and institutionalised.
- Broaden knowledge around international norms related to non-proliferation and the role they play to facilitate cooperation between states within an anarchical international system.
- Discuss the social realities states construct, which influence their identity, interests and the way they respond in international relations, especially in the area of nuclear weapons. Here, the impact of respective administrations of

states, for example, the Bush versus the Obama administration, on the perceptions of treaties will be highlighted.

▪ Contribute to the constructivist interpretation of international relations in the area of nuclear weapons.

1.4 Importance of the study

Since the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 its challenges became more apparent as the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states were also indefinitely institutionalised, giving non-nuclear weapon states little bargaining power over influencing this privileging of nuclear weapon states, which undermines this treaty. During the 2005 NPT Review Conference, it appeared that member states had lost faith in this treaty, as a final document could not be decided. In addition to this, the Bush administration showed a lack of support at this conference towards the '13 practical steps' that were agreed to during the 2000 Review Conference. He later signed the civil nuclear trade agreement with India even though it is not an NPT member state. This issue marked a concern for member states that this treaty was being violated and used to serve the narrow interests of certain states (Mockli, 2010, p. 75).

According to Johnson's article entitled, *Rethinking the NPT's role in security: 2010 and beyond* (2010b, pp. 430, 434), the NPT embodies norms and rules that has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons. Member states of the NPT gain access to the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which is an incentive not to go nuclear. However, there have been views perpetuated by nuclear weapon states to note that have negatively affected the NPT. For example, nuclear weapon states expressed that nuclear weapons are core to their national security and serve as a deterrent mechanism. Tony Blair, a former Prime Minster of the United Kingdom, in a 2007 discussion surrounding developing nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants for Britain expressed that "the non-proliferation treaty makes it absolutely clear that Britain has the right to possess nuclear weapons" (Johnson, 2010b, p. 434; Johnson,

2007, n.p.). These views undermine the NPT, and the confidence that non-nuclear weapon states have in the goal of this treaty to promote non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons.

There are more challenges that affect the strength and the integrity of the NPT. These challenges have been highlighted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. For example, the conflicts in the Middle East are perpetuated by the fear of nuclear weapons and hence the 1995 resolution of the Middle East suggested by Egypt in 1990 proposes creating a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East. Israel and Pakistan have not signed the NPT, and North Korea withdrew from the NPT and tested its nuclear weapons (Hubert, Broodryk & Stott, 2010, pp. 1-2). An inability to resolve these matters threaten the non-proliferation norm. If nuclear weapons and facilities are not properly safeguarded and verified by the IAEA, nuclear material may fall in the hands of rogue states and terrorist movements and be turned into WMD.

And yet, despite the major concerns that the NPT has faced, there still seems to be a sense that states cannot fathom an international order without the NPT (or an equivalent). The notion that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are important norms to be pursued, and the gains made during the 2010 NPT Review Conference contradict the realist notion of self-help in international relations. How treaties function to condition and restrain state perceptions and behaviour, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, remains an important topic of study. This is in no small way thanks to the ground made by social constructivism as an alternative to realist and liberal scholarship in International Relations. This study is theoretically important in that it aims to contribute to the constructivist interpretation of important issues in the discipline. It is also a topic of policy relevance as nuclear weapons and the right to civilian nuclear technology remain important to international security generally and South Africa's foreign policy in particular.

1.5 Research Design

The study will utilise a deductive approach to understand and explain whether the realist, liberal or constructivist perspective best explains the role of the NPT in the international system. It is necessary to explain the two different approaches used to begin the research process, namely deductive and inductive. The deductive approach is a research strategy that moves from a widely accepted theory, to the formulation of a hypothesis and then testing the hypothesis with specific data (phenomena). A theory is a widely accepted prediction which has been tested, while a hypothesis needs to be tested and proved. A deductive approach begins the research process with a theory and then develops a hypothesis, highlighting a relationship between two or more variables. Variable A (independent variable) has an impact and effect on variable B (dependent variable), this is the prediction. On the other hand, an inductive study or research accumulates specific data on an issue which in turn informs the selection of theory and lastly, the formation of a hypothesis. In contrast, a deductive study moves from theory, to the formation of a hypothesis and its application to data (Engel & Schutt, 2005, pp. 40-46). In this study, the research question was formulated, asking to what extent is the NPT able to restrain the system of self-help, through its norms and standards of behaviour. It was proposed that the three dominant theoretical International Relations paradigms (realism, liberalism and constructivism) provide different answers to this question, but constructivist lens provides a more accurate answer about the NPT's role. The next step is to test this proposition by applying it to the data (NPT review conferences and preceding events).

The study will mainly be a desktop study where primary and secondary sources will be analysed and interpreted without conducting interviews and drafting a questionnaire. A primary source of information is a first-hand account of a situation or event, including, speeches, interviews, diary entries and autobiographies. Secondary sources are an analysis or interpretation of an original source of

information, useful to broaden knowledge and explanation in more detail (Gravetter & Forzano, 2011, pp. 48-49).

The study will utilise primary sources, such as the official document of the NPT: Text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Resolution on the Middle East (1995), UN Resolution 2028 (XX) on Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (19 November 1965), the 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)), including the now famous speech made in Prague on 5 April 2009 by the United States President, Barack Obama, statements made during NPT review conferences by nuclear weapon states as well as official final documents of the review conferences (1975, 1995, 2000 and 2010). Secondary sources used for the theoretical framework include authors, such as Hans Morgenthau (1967), Niccolò Machiavelli (1515), Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer (realist scholars). Key liberal scholars include authors, such as Jean Rousseau (1762), John Locke (1823), Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. Influential scholars in constructivism include authors, such as Alexander Wendt (1992), Emmanuel Adler (2005) and Nicholas Onuf (1998). Secondary sources that contributed greatly to this study of the NPT include authors, such as David Fischer (1992), Regina Karp (1992), Joseph Pilat and Robert Pendley (1995), Susan Welsh (1995) Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke (2007), Mario Carranza (2006), Nina Tannenwald (2007), Thomas Doyle (2009) and Paul Kerr (2010).

1.6 Chapter outline

Chapter one has outlined the research problem, research question, aims of the study and research methodology.

Chapter two, the theoretical and conceptual framework, will set out a guide to the research by outlining concepts and theories from realism, liberalism and constructivism, which will in later chapters be applied to the NPT to understand the role of the treaty within the international system.

Chapter three provides a historical account (descriptive analysis) of the origin and evolution of the NPT and key debates that characterised its review conference.

Chapter four explores the realist argument that the NPT is an instrument that facilitates the interest of nuclear weapon states, by creating an order that is favourable to them. It will outline cases where member states have seemingly disregarded clauses of the NPT or applied them differently to their allies and foes.

Chapter five explores the liberal argument that the NPT facilitates cooperation between states. It thus explores treaties as instruments to improve the common good in international relations. The positive impact that the NPT has had on limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting the nuclear taboo will be highlighted.

Chapter six interprets the NPT from a constructivist point of view. Neither the realist nor the liberalist judgement of the NPT is inevitable. Rather, the NPT is what states make of it. There have been changes in the direction of the NPT over its life span and agents are responsible for these changes.

Chapter seven will summarise the argument, noting the main conclusions that can be drawn from the study and the theoretical and policy implications of these conclusions.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

International Relations is concerned with global order, how order emerges and is altered through the activities and actions of agents and structures that employ authority/power to influence and maintain their environment (McGowan & Nel, 2002, p. 11). The subject matter of International Relations ranges from human and national security, economic issues such as trade, environment, as well as gender issues. International actors are involved in a process of creating meaning to understand the world and their place in it and for this purpose construct treaties, regimes and institutions to order their environment, which is referred to as the international system.

The realm of world politics is made up of a variety of international actors, including state actors, such as sovereign territorial states and intergovernmental organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), and non-state actors, including non-governmental organisations such as Greenpeace, multinational corporations such as Microsoft and individuals such as Nelson Mandela, for example. All actors desire to impose a measure of order on the world to create a favourable environment so as to realise their political, economic or social interests.

Core theories from International Relations, such as realism and neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism and constructivism offer explanations of the international system, the role of state and non-state actors therein, what will influence international behaviour and interests and how actors safeguard those interests. Realist and liberal theories provide a different interpretation of the NPT and through constructivism, these different interpretations will be mediated and reconciled. Thus, it will be shown in this thesis how constructivism provides a sensible theoretical framework when juxtaposed with realism and liberalism to gauge the direction of the NPT, its role in the international system as a form of international governance and the equally

influential role individual agents can have on structures responsible for international governance, for example the non-proliferation regime.

This chapter will proceed to discuss the widely recognised and popular theories in International Relations, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. Classical realism will outline essential pillars of this theory, which informs modern realism with its state-centric perspective, unchanging view towards the anarchical international system perpetuating conflict and disagreement between states, and the supremacy of power measured by military and economic strength. Classical liberalism offers a more optimistic account of the international system, including non-state actors such as transnational corporations and individuals as influential agents in international relations and foreign policy. Liberals attribute a bigger role to morality than realists do and believe conflict and disagreement, and ultimately war is not an inevitable process. Constructivism, although agreeing with certain neoliberal assumptions will demonstrate how a purely realist or liberal study of international events and phenomena cannot shed enough light on the true nature of international relations.

2.2 Realism

This section will briefly discuss the evolution of realism in International Relations, beginning with a focus on classical realist scholars (including Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes) and then conclude with an account of neorealism as proposed by Kenneth Waltz. The mentioned scholars are regarded as prominent thinkers in realism, giving an account of the international system where states are seen as dominant actors. Next, the work of realist scholars will be compared and combined to find areas of consensus to provide a general view on realism.

Jackson and Sørensen (2003, p. 70) refer to the work of Thucydides, a Greek historian. The precise date of his birth is not known, but it is assumed that he was born around 454 and died in 395 B.C (Cawkwell, 1997, p. 1). For Thucydides, international relations was characterised "as the inevitable competitions and conflicts between" Greek city-

states (Hellas) and non-Greek empires such as Macedonia and Persia. In addition, there was an inherent sense of inequality between states, which was seen as a natural phenomenon. States were unequal in power capabilities (for example military strength) and this had an impact on the type of option's political rulers or decision makers of the state had at their disposal. Key to understanding and conducting international relations was the realisation of inequality between states. For this reason, Thucydides elaborates and proposes that rulers should act with 'caution', 'prudence' and 'foresight'. If states do not act accordingly they risk the security and survival of the state (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 70-72; Daddow, 2009, pp. 84-85).

The prime objective of decision makers of the state is to project the national interests of the state defined as military and economic strength beyond its sovereign borders, this activity is referred to as foreign policy. Foreign policy is thus also defined as the activities, actions and responses decision makers pursue on behalf of the state in reaction to the international system. The purpose of foreign policy is to realise the goals and objectives of the state. States achieve their goals and objectives through maintaining relations with other states to change and alter relations beyond their sovereign borders (Smith, Little & Shackleton, 1981, p. 15).

2.2.1 Classical Realism

When Thucydides' description of international inequality is taken into consideration then concepts of justice and fairness would be influenced by the nature of power between states. In Thucydides' work entitled, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, he discusses the period in history known as the Peloponnesian War where Athens wanted to conquer the Island of Melos which was ruled by Sparta, an enemy of Athens. Athens could have used its military might against Melos but sent its ambassadors to negotiate the surrender of Melos. Thucydides reports on the negotiation process between Athenians and Melians and refers to it as the Melian Dialogue (Donnelly, 2000, pp. 23-24; Nel, 2002, pp. 20-21). The Melian dialogue did

not represent a negotiation between equals, namely between Athens and Melos. Athens instructed Melos to surrender and join its empire despite Melos claiming neutrality. Melos requested of Athens to respect its neutrality and drew on concepts of fairness and justice. Melos was faced with the ultimatum of joining the Athenian empire peacefully or risk being invaded by force. However, Melos did not provoke or threaten Athens physically, and for that reason invading Melos would be unjust (Walzer, 2006, p. 10). Melos argued the use of violence by Athens would spark fear among other independent states and create concerns that they too would be attacked.

Fairness and justice were influenced and defined by power. Athens, a military strong empire could determine what was considered just or unjust based on its power position among other states. Hans Morgenthau said the most powerful states can shape the behaviour of other states. John Mearsheimer defines power as material resources which states have at their disposal, this power capability is linked to the ability of states to pursue its interests (D'Anieri, 2011, pp. 66-67). According to Thucydides (1972, p. 402) "...the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept". The moral arguments of Melos were of no use and ignored as Athens resorted to violence and war to coerce Melos into surrender. For the protection of the Athenian empire and its self-interest, Athenian generals argued; Melos needed to be conquered or else their citizens would view the empire as being weak for befriending a colony of its enemy Sparta (Thucydides, 1972, p. 402).

Thucydides' notion of international inequality is linked to the notion of a power configuration wherein states are placed into a hierarchy based on military and economic strength. For that reason, states can be categorised into small power, secondary power and great powers (Leith & Pretorius, 2009, p. 346).

The notion of international inequality and the power position of the state will be discussed further under the heading of neorealist system level of analysis. However, for now the three categories in which states can be divided and ranked according to their respective power positions will be discussed. The power position of the state is directly linked to the foreign policy choices it has at its disposal (Neack, 2003, p. 126). The concept of great power is described as a state in possession of military and economic strength, with universal interests and the political will to safeguard those interests. For example, after the Bretton Woods economic system was established the United States took on a leadership position of the liberal capitalist world. At this time, the United States displayed the qualities of a great power state, but it was also its will and capability to protect allies for example through its nuclear umbrella under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Neack, 2003, p. 136). NATO is a military alliance which was based on the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949 comprising of 28 governments from North America and Europe. NATO member states work together to realise mutual solutions to security concerns, which initially came from the Soviet Union. During the 1940s Western European states did not have sufficient conventional military strength in comparison to the Soviet Union, and to combat this discrepancy the United States deployed its nuclear weapons in Europe. In 1953, the United States began stationing its nuclear weapons in Europe to deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack on its allies (Bunn, 1992, p. 61).

Secondary powers are states such as Japan that may be considered a great power because of its economic strength, however, as a result of its Peace Constitution lacks military strength and thus cannot be ranked as a great power. Japan's Peace Constitution limits its military strength by introducing three measures to prevent the possession, production and use/introduction of nuclear weapons (Fuller, 2009, p. 21). The term secondary power is more inclusive by incorporating another term, namely middle power. States that fulfil the category of a middle power, such as Brazil, Canada (under Lloyd Axworthy as foreign affairs minister), South Africa, Sweden and so forth, view themselves as playing a middle power role in the international system

based on their identity. Middle powers are regarded as 'good global citizens' that direct resources towards peacekeeping, human rights and environmental protection (Gilboa, 2009, p. 23). For example, South Africa engages in building peace and security through the African Union on the African continent in places such as Darfur. This role is not inevitable, but a result of South Africa's self-image.

In the international system, all states may at some point be influenced by external actors. However, states ranked as small powers have limited choice and opportunity for making independent foreign policy. A defining feature of small powers is its exposure to external influence shaping both its domestic and foreign policy. For example, Guinea-Bissau, Kuwait, Lithuania, and Malawi are categorised as small powers. For realist scholars, the inability of small powers to have an impact on the international system leads them to disregard small powers as unimportant and virtually exclude them from study.

The above discussion of power configurations in the international system places the Melian dialogue into perspective and the ability of major powers to impose their will onto the weak. The outcome of the Melian Dialogue resulted in Athens conquering Melos which became its colony. Thucydides writes that justice is influenced by 'equality of power', that is, the strong can do as they desire given their military strength and the weak simply have to accept the will of the strong. This is a central realist assumption regarding the nature of international relations (Alker, 1988, p. 806; Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 72).

Another classical realist by the name of Niccolò Machiavelli, an Italian philosopher from Florence, further elaborates on foreign policy as a pursuit of interests through the application of coercive power. As Thucydides indicated, state security and survival are of utmost importance, Machiavelli also agrees with this point. In the pursuit of foreign policy, rulers or decision makers of the state have to be powerful like a lion and wise as a fox. "A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion, because the lion cannot

defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves" (Machiavelli, 1515, p. 84). As a lion the ruler will be feared and as a fox he/she will be able to realise when people are being deceptive and thus uncover the intentions of others (Benner, 2009, pp. 197-198). Machiavelli further explains that if leaders are unable to conduct international relations in this manner, they will be susceptible to the attack and influence of other states. Hence, moral codes of ethics are said to hinder state affairs, and in that regard should be neglected. In support of this statement, Machiavelli argues that the world is a dangerous place and when the opportunity arises rulers need to take advantage of and capitalise on them. It is at this point that a distinction between public conduct and private conduct is made and an inability to make this distinction will lead to the detriment of the people and the state (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 72-74).

For Machiavelli, leaders should not strive to become virtuous, as other leaders will not be bound to a moral code of conduct in their affairs. Rather, a leader, or as Machiavelli writes, a Prince, should appear to be "faithful", "bold and brave", "compassionate" and so forth but also need to be "cruel" and "avaricious" (Machiavelli, 1515, p. 72). Leaders thus need to be prudent and know when to use these characteristics as the world is a dangerous place rife with potential rivals and enemies who also desire to realise their national interests (Walker, 2006, p. 143). If a leader is regarded as being weak, it will lead to his/her detriment and the destruction of the state. According to Machiavelli (1515, p. 73), "... it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity." Thus, a good leader which is different from a good person needs to act with caution and prudence in their affairs. This reason is applicable domestically and internationally and failure to do so will lead to criticism from the people and make the state susceptible to foreign attacks.

A key assumption of realists is the negative view of human nature; human beings are only interested in their own well-being and survival. Thomas Hobbes, credited for his work in political philosophy, is no different from the classical realists discussed thus far. In his explanation of human nature, Hobbes′ conducts a thought experiment where he describes a condition without the existence of a sovereign state. Hobbes refers to this condition as the 'state of nature'. The state of nature refers to a natural condition where humankind is in constant danger and susceptible to the influence and power of others. Humankind is thus in a state of war and conflict, and, with no legal entity maintaining law and order, society will crumble (Hobbes, 1651, pp. 77-78). In such a world, trade could not take place; people could not travel, and no culture could develop among human beings. According to Hobbes (1651, p. 78) in the state of nature life would be ″... solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short″.

Hobbes proposes that human beings can only escape this condition (state of nature) through the creation of a sovereign state. Due to the collective sense of insecurity, where people fear the loss of their property and life, they join to create a sovereign and enter a 'social contract' with the state (Hobbes, 1651, pp. 105-106). ″...if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men″ (Hobbes, 1651, p. 103). Through the social contract, the sovereign state protects human beings from internal and foreign threats. It is at this point which Hobbes notes that as people form a social contract with the sovereign to protect them from the fears found in the state of nature another problem emerges, that is, international anarchy (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 74, 77-79; Riemer & Simon, 1997, pp. 89-90).

International anarchy is a condition that characterises the international system where peace cannot be guaranteed between states, because just as in Hobbes′s state of nature, there is no supra-national authority to appeal to when wronged. Without a world government of sorts, states remain the most important actors in the international system and will pursue their interests in a self-help way. Due to this

condition states engage in disputes and conflict, which are ultimately resolved by war (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 75; Walt, 1998, pp. 35, 37).

2.2.2 Neorealism and the system level analysis

There is a marked distinction between classical realists and neorealists. The difference is that classical realists have been concerned with human nature and provide a normative analysis of the international system. They emphasise that rational behaviour for a state leader is shrewdness to protect his/her state and increase its power in relation to others. While neorealist scholars such as Waltz ignore human nature and provide a more scientific approach to the workings of the international system by placing the focus on its structure and effects (system level analysis) (Walt, 1998, p. 31).

Kenneth Waltz became one of the influential scholars in International Relations during the course of his career. Waltz founded theories such as neorealism and structural realism. In Waltz's book entitled, *Man, the State and War* (1959), he utilises the levels of analysis tool in International Relations to understand the reasons for conflict and war between states. The levels of analysis tool in International Relations is attributed to Kenneth Waltz. The levels of analysis is divided into three lenses, namely, individual, state and system. From the individual level (first image), human nature is the source of conflict driven by the need for power (Waltz, 1959, pp. 16-18). The state level (second image) is focused on the characteristics of the state. That is, how political institutions (type of government) and "its modes of production and distribution" (economic institutions) determines whether states are peaceful or hostile (Singer, 1960, p. 457). The system level (third image) which is central to a discussion of power delves into the anarchical nature of the international system, lacking order and stability, causing state interests to clash with other states with the outcome of war (Waltz, 1959, p. 189). Waltz shifts the focus to the structure of the international system and the power capabilities of states therein. States are said to

conduct the same tasks, such as the collection of tax and conducting foreign policy. However, what make states unique are their capabilities. All states are equal only in the legal sense as they are regarded internationally as sovereign territories (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 84; Buzan, 2007, pp. 72-73).

The origin of state sovereignty stems from the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster signed in 1648 where sovereignty became officially institutionalised. This period was referred to as the Peace of Westphalia. Sovereign states have a clearly defined territory in which public bodies have the legal authority to make laws that apply to a community. There are two principles associated with sovereignty that emerged from Westphalia, namely non-intervention in domestic affairs of other states and mutual respect of territorial integrity since each state is sovereign (Holsti, 2006, pp. 20-23).

Domestic affairs or domestic policy refer to activities, decisions and laws occurring within the state conducted by a government that is applicable to its territory (country). The laws and regulations defined as domestic policy ranges from business, education, health care, social welfare and so forth. Sovereignty conveys the idea that states are equal, yet there is a hierarchy among states defined by their military and economic strength.

State sovereignty is the defining character of the state in the international system; on the other hand, state capabilities and power may be more pertinent. Placing the focus on the system level of analysis leads to the view that states can be characterised according to their power position in the international system.

Neack (2003, p. 128) provides a useful understanding on how to measure state power, "More powerful states, for instance, are those with larger, more industrialized national economies and larger, better equipped, better trained national militaries". As discussed earlier under classical realism, states can be characterised as great, middle or small powers according to their power position (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 85; Smith, Little & Shackleton, 1981, p. 15).

The power a state is said to possess within the international system determines its ability to realise its national interests. Waltz emphasizes that the position and power of the state will influence and determine its foreign policy choices. As a result of international anarchy, states have to rely on their own capability to protect their interests, and because of this 'fact' may use force to realise national interests as each state is its own judge (Neack, 2003, pp. 126-127). Power is of utmost importance for states because international anarchy creates a condition where states distrust each other's intension and become suspicious of its capability.

The balance of power is another useful concept in International Relations relating to how states cope with the anarchical nature of the international system. The balance of power is a system in which states form alliances with one another to promote equilibrium of power so that no one state dominates the international system (Waltz, 2000, p. 38). Hedley Bull (1977, pp. 94-95), prominent as a member of the so-called English School, advocates that the usefulness of the balance of power mechanism lies in its ability to promote international order and peace.

However, Waltz argues that even though the balance of power is a natural response in relation to international anarchy to create order, it only breeds more insecurity. According to Buzan (2007, p. 141), the balance of power reinforces and maintains international anarchy, "... and the two are effectively opposite sides of the same coin". An example of the balance of power can be traced to the period referred to as the Cold War when the international system was characterised by bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union. The problem of the balance of power is that it may lead to arms races in the two poles' effort to balance each other's power and thus more insecurity. The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in such a nuclear arms race dialectically informed by the security dilemma existing between the two superpowers, in turn increasing the probability of a nuclear war (Bull, 1977, p. 95; Papp, 1984, p. 29).

2.2.3 Key realist assumptions

Hans Morgenthau, was a classical realist and a prominent academic thinker in International Relations, but also served as a consultant for the United States Department Policy and Planning Staff when it was headed by George F. Kennan. In his written work entitled, *Politics Among Nations* Morgenthau (1967) maps out six principles, which are the basis of realism in International Relations. Morgenthau's six principles of political realism serve as a connecting bridge between classical realists and neorealists.

For Morgenthau, politics, just like society was shaped and governed by objective laws. Here realism serves to offer a rational account or theory on the objective laws which govern politics. Realism comprises of a set of facts, which is bestowed with meaning through the use of reason and logic. Human nature as described by realists is unchanging and constant; this is the starting point of this theory, which is a central law of politics. By understanding the objective laws of politics realists are able to examine a foreign policy issue and determine which alternatives the state will choose to best remedy the problem (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 4; Elias & Sutch, 2007, p. 48). Human nature is self-interested, and this logic is also applicable to how states will conduct its affairs and respond to other states.

The "concept of interest defined in terms of power" facilitate realists to comprehend international relations and the role of the state therein (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 5). This logic sets politics apart from other areas such as economics. Interest defined as power guides the actions of the decision makers of the state; this fact informs realists and enables them to predict the future and understand past actions or policies conducted by the state. All leaders are concerned with state interests defined as power making the foreign policy decision making process rational. For this reason, a study of the personality or motivations of leaders of the state is inconsequential and will not shed light on future foreign policy decisions.

Based on the above discussion all states pursue their interests defined as power. Morgenthau and other realists believe this is a universal principle which governs state interaction. These interests include state survival and improving its economic position. The concept of power relates to the resources at the disposal of the state used to dominate over others; such as the use of physical violence or coercion and also psychological techniques to control the mind of others. Psychological techniques relate to the intangible resource used to change the behaviour of another actor through persuasion. Another reoccurring phenomenon in international relations is the balance of power. All states will continually be concerned with its power in relation to others. Realists are inclined to argue the balance of power produces stability and brings order to the world (Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 8-9; Elias & Sutch, 2007, p. 54).

Morgenthau affirms that moral principles cannot be universally applicable to political issues. Individuals can decide to act according to moral standards, but the state has to act on the basis of its interests, which is to protect its survival and safeguard the well-being of its citizens. When faced with a foreign policy issue, the decision makers of the state have to exercise prudence and analyse the consequences of alternative policy to remedy a given problem (Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 9-10; Rapoport, 1995, p. 227). Political decisions cannot be limited by moral principles; decisions made by the state have to yield the most advantageous outcome.

Morgenthau's political realism rejects the claim that moral ambitions of states can be brought in accordance with objective laws, which govern politics. When decision makers of the state claim political action have a moral basis, this does not provide an effective manner to judge political action and its consequences. For example, American President, Woodrow Wilson utilised a moral argument in support of his decision to conduct war with Germany in World War I. By using the concept of interest defined as power effectively serves to judge the decisions of all states and

when conducted in this manner the interests and policy of other states will be respected (Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 10-11; Blacker & Duffy, 1976, p. 29).

Morgenthau′s final principle of realism relates to the autonomy of the political sphere from other schools of thought or standards. The political realist ″...thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of conformity of action with moral principles″ (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 11).

2.3 Liberalism

Liberalism in International Relations offers a more optimistic account of the international system by highlighting the significance of non-state actors, what factors influence the decision making apparatus of the state besides power and how cooperation is possible between states within an anarchical world. Moravcsik (1992, p. 3) points out that realist scholars such as Machiavelli and Hobbes view "...liberal claims not as realistic generalization about human behaviour, but as normative ideals of peace and cooperation, which they label as idealist, legalist, moralist, reductionist or utopian". There is a close connection between liberalism and idealism where liberalism has been guided and influenced by idealism as a theory. Liberalism and idealism have been used interchangeably, to clarify; idealism is a philosophy commenting on the limitations of the state and its power while liberalism is an International Relations theory (Nel, 2002, p. 30).

Due to the different strands of liberalism, the researcher will include key arguments of liberalism and idealism in order to effectively critique and challenge realist assumptions. Classical liberals such as Rousseau and Locke are philosophers commenting on government while political liberal scholars such as Susan Strange discuss the declining influence of the state and the increasing influence of transnational corporations over the global economy. Neoliberal scholars, including

Keohane (1988) and Nye (1993), advocate that institutions and regimes are a mechanism to facilitate cooperation between states.

2.3.1 Human nature

Liberal scholars have been more inclined to view human nature from a positive standpoint, unlike pessimistic views of human nature by traditional realists. This positive view is related to the potential of human reason and capability.

Human capability is visible in technological innovation, which has created new ways for humankind to control nature. For example, during the 18th century, the Industrial Revolution marked a fundamental change in human history (Mokyr, 1985, p. 1). Liberals understood that human beings could also be self-interested. However, when working together human beings could establish and realise important gains. This reason and capability were said to have both domestic and international ramifications. Here, it is assumed that 'human reason' may aid in the reduction of conflict and war between states which realists regard as an inevitable process (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 106).

Idealists affirm this optimistic view of human nature, which has been discussed by scholars such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762). Idealists affirmed conflict, and war could be overcome through the formation of international law and organisations. Idealists are concerned with normative principles and are interested in how the world ought to be instead of how it is (Ethridge & Handelman, 2008, p. 535). Rousseau was a political philosopher who wrote extensively on the nature of humankind and how human freedom could be protected. Rousseau criticised the argument about human nature as selfish and wicked. For Rousseau, humankind is naturally good but was corrupted by society. Human beings are born free and independent. Even though humankind is free naturally they are dependent on others for their survival, but it is also through social interaction that the individual learns more about itself, for example, through the family unit (Rousseau, 1762, pp. 2-3). John Locke, an English

philosopher, in his written work entitled, *Two Treaties of Government* discusses the state of nature just as Hobbes has done. Locke argues that, in the state of nature human beings are born with perfect freedom and have a duty to take care of and respect the rights, property and well-being of others. Thus, the state of nature is governed by laws of nature. Locke thus affirms the intrinsic goodness of humankind and its duty towards others (Locke, 1823, pp. 106-107).

2.3.2 Challenging the importance of the state

Liberals have accused realists of placing too much importance on the state and in this regard limits international relations to relations between states. Liberal actor-centred theories support the idea that the state is not necessarily the most important actor in international relations and argue that state interests are not solely influenced by international anarchy.

From this view, it can be argued that non-state actors also play a role in international relations and have an impact on the foreign policy decision making process which realist scholars indicate are "... a source of disruption of state authority and power" (Vincent, 2002, p. 148). Foreign policy is no longer the exclusive realm of the state as there are a variety of domestic groups within the state with their own identity, interest and beliefs all trying to impact on the type of interests states represent in the international system. Domestic actors or groups also referred to as societal interest groups, include religious groups, non-governmental organisations, business associations, trade unions and so forth (Panke & Risse, 2007, pp. 92-93).

Huntington (1973, p. 334) argued that Keohane and Nye (both liberal scholars) have used the term transnational in a broader and more inclusive sense. When they refer to transnational activities, these include all affairs and activities occurring beyond the state which do not involve governmental agents. Transnational activities can include international trade and international travel for example. This sense of interconnectedness between individuals and groups in a pluralistic world can

possibly avert tension and conflict between them as they interact and are affected by each other (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 110-111).

Susan Strange was a British academic that played an influential role in the field of the International Political Economy. Strange argues that, due to globalisation and the increasing presence and significance of transnational corporations the authority and power of the state have been on the decline. Globalisation refers to the worldwide phenomena where decisions, activities and events from one part of the world have a direct bearing on distant regions. As a result of this, state power is on the decline over the market and global economy. In this fashion, transnational corporations have played a greater role and influence over the market which needs to be scrutinised and evaluated (Strange, 2004, pp. 219-221). The term markets refer to the system of supply and demand of goods and services.

Transnational corporations include businesses such as Shell, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, General Motors and so forth whose activities, including the production and selling of goods are not bound by state boundaries (D'Anieri, 2011, p. 354). There have been debates concerning the effects transnational corporations have on government power; for these corporations extract resources and may dictate domestic policy and influence economic or environmental policy to suit their interests (D'Anieri, 2011, p. 335).

Transnational corporations can access loans from banks; provide access to technology, employment and access to foreign markets to boost the economic strength of the nation (Strange, 1995, n.p.; Leander, 2001, p. 116).

Domestic actors, groups and organisations do not necessarily displace the role of the state, but to exclude their influence and activities is to present an incomplete understanding and analysis of the international system and the variety of actors therein.

2.3.3 Interdependence and multilateralism

A sense of mutual dependence between states and non-state actors has been intensified by the process of globalisation. Globalisation is also linked to the term 'global village'; as a result of technology in the form of transport and communication the world is becoming more interconnected (McGrew, 2005, pp. 20-22). In addition, globalisation has expanded political, economic and social activities to the point where domestic developments have international ramification (McGrew, 2005, pp. 21-23). For example, in 2001 the Federal Reserve (Central Bank of the United States) lowered interest rate to 3% and since then reduced it to 1% in order to stimulate economic growth. This meant that citizens from lower income brackets or citizens with a poor credit history could access loans easily. Banks made money easily available at low rates and people would take loans out against their home (property). The use of property to secure loan agreements had detrimental implications when the interest rate rose to 5%, between 2004 and 2006 (BBC News, 2009). With the increase in interest rates, citizens were falling behind on their loan payments; banks could then legally take possession of their homes, housing prices depreciated, and as a result banks tightened access to loans. The mortgage crisis affected the payment of loans creating a condition where banks were losing large sums of money, and in order to handle the debt crisis they sold debt to global banks (BBC News, 2009). Economic losses in the mortgage market affected investor confidence in banks, and because the banking system is internationally linked this crisis spilled over to Europe for example. Global banks tightened their credit access as they lost confidence in each other, and with the shortage of money flowing into banks this situation was further worsened (Scott, 2008, n.p.). The decline in global economic activity resulted in many citizens losing their homes and jobs and many companies could no longer sustain themselves economically requiring government intervention into the economy. Also, the 2007 recession in the United States affected the global trade in

goods and services. At this time, the demand for imported goods and services to the United States declined, affecting the exports of many states (Pettinger, 2009, n.p.).

Liberals are inclined to argue that interdependency can promote a sense of order and cooperation in the international system, and in this way may reduce conflict and war between states. According to Milner (1991, pp. 82-83) "The assumption that interdependence implies harmony or cooperation is widespread". However, Milner cautions that interdependency is, firstly, not in conflict with international anarchy and secondly, does not necessary say anything about the level of order or the intensity of war. The presence of interdependency does not necessarily mean state interests are in harmony with others, and for this reason power continues to be a factor in relations between states (Milner, 1991, p. 83).

When the term idealist is invoked scholars such as Woodrow Wilson come to mind. Woodrow Wilson was a professor of jurisprudence and political economy at the University of Princeton and in 1913 he was elected as the 28th president of the United States. President Wilson foresaw a world where states can cooperate instead of waging war (Elliot & Ali, 1984, p. 79).

In 1918, in Congress, Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points speech contributing towards his vision of a peaceful world. Wilson's peace program echoed in the Fourteen Points emerged before the end of World War I. Wilson noted in his speech, "What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression" (quoted in Copland, Lamm & Mckenna, 1999, p. 362). The Fourteen Point's speech gained criticism but what came out of it was the desire to establish the League of Nations, an effort to institutionalise a sense of interdependence through multilateralism that continues to this day to be a liberal pursuit. The League of Nations was spearheaded by Wilson, as an international

body (organisation) to prevent disputes and war between states to ensure a peaceful world (Ethridge & Handelman, 2008, p. 536). The League of Nations acted as a forum where states could work together and reconcile differences between them. However, the refusal of the United States Senate to support the League of Nations dealt a blow to this organisation. The League of Nations, although established to bring about peace in the world was not able to prevent World War II.

2.3.4 Neoliberalism and liberal institutionalism

Neoliberal scholars such as Robert Keohane (1988), Joseph Nye (1993) and Robert Axelrod (1986), unlike classical liberals place their focus on system level factors. Neoliberals investigate the influence international institutions have over shaping state perception and behaviour. Here, international institutions provide rules and norms central to ordering state to state relations, acting as a source of cooperation and governance within an anarchical international system. Instead of institutions acting to benefit the greater good, neorealists argue that, institutions safeguard the self-interests of dominant states that are responsible for their existence. This section will discuss the role of international institutions, their purpose and briefly discuss problems associated with them.

2.3.4.1 Institutions: creating international governance within anarchy

In an anarchical international system cooperation between states may be hard to promote, but this does not mean that efforts to create order are futile. The absence of a world government does not mean a lack of global governance. Governance can be understood as how a particular environment is ordered and administered (Nel, 2002, p. 9). International institutions and regimes act as forms of governance and order relations between states. Stephen D. Krasner, a professor of International Relations at Stanford University, provides a useful and inclusive definition of regimes. According to Krasner (1982, p. 185), "Regimes can be defined as a set of implicit or

explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations". Norms and principles are standards of behaviour, giving meaning to the regime by prescribing how individuals representing the state should respond to an issue. Regimes and institutions are constructed to maintain a system of behaviour needed to facilitate cooperation, which is an ongoing process (Krasner, 1982, pp. 186-188).

Keohane notes the confusion around the term international institution and its interchangeable use with international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation, the International Labour Organisation and so forth. Rather, an institution "may refer to a general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized" (Keohane, 1988, p. 382). The term institution refers to a pattern of behaviour or a system of order, arranging human activity. Institutional patterns and arrangements set rules and standards by prescribing human behaviour and shaping expectations (Keohane, 1988, p. 382). Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, offer a definition of an institution but also separated it from a norm. Norms refer to a single set of standards of behaviour whereas institutions refer to a collection of norms that are interrelated (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). The NPT and its norms of non-proliferation and disarmament suit this definition of an institution.

The notion of an international norm will be discussed in more detail in this chapter under the heading of constructivism.

2.3.4.2 Functions of international institutions

Neoliberal scholars, such as Robert Keohane (1988) and Robert Axelrod (1986) are interested in the role that international institutions and organisations play in the international system, in particular, their influence in shaping state behaviour and promoting cooperation among them. Keohane explains that cooperation between states is affected by what he terms 'collective action problems' (Martin, 2007, p. 111).

'Collective action problems' infer that cooperation is impeded by the fact that bargaining within a multilateral forum between states may not yield tangible results. Furthermore, based on the logic of international anarchy trust between states will be questionable; states may be weary of each other's intensions. This will undoubtedly affect cooperation between them (Haggard, Levy, Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, 1993, p. 175). It is expected that member states act in good faith and uphold their obligations under agreements. However, the nature and the strength of prohibitions in place would determine the strength of an institution and its support from member states.

Neoliberal scholars are inclined to believe that international institutions and organisations hold an important position in international relations due to their functions. International organisations serve as forums where member states can negotiate issues and resolve conflicts between them. The discussion on international institutions can be related to non-proliferation and disarmament. The NPT as a treaty and international organisation gives rise to the NPT review conferences (multilateral forums). The NPT review conferences are where member states negotiate and evaluate the standard of the NPT.

There are various reasons why states conflict and engage in war with one other. One reason may be because states keep secrets from each other. For this reason organisations also provide a space for member states to share information and learn about the concerns and interests of others and in this way minimise tension between them. John Ikenberry, a professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, makes a crucial point that institutions act as contracts between states, setting in place rights and rules that is expected from member states to govern their interactions (Ikenberry, 2006, p. 134). The NPT is a legal contract between member states, but it is the rules and norms of non-proliferation and disarmament, which create consistency as all member states are influenced by this order which shapes expectations and behaviour. States can monitor each other's level of compliance towards the institution, in turn promoting transparency and accountability between

states that build confidence and counter insecurity inherent in an anarchical system (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 117, 120).

2.3.4.3 Incentives for cooperation

Neoliberal scholars differ in their perspective from earlier liberal views discussed. Neoliberals agree with realists that the state is the most important actor in the international system and is also a rational actor.

The rational actor perspective in International Relations is associated with realism, used to explain how foreign policy decisions are made. When leaders are faced with a foreign policy decision, they have to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine what gains will be achieved as a result of their decision and what shortcomings may result. A 'rational' foreign policy decision is thus based on the maximum relative gains achieved with minimal cost (Neack, 2003, pp. 44-45; Martin, 2007, pp. 112-113).

Axelrod and Keohane (1985, p. 226) have argued that world politics is not fixed. At particular times in history, war is experienced while at other times cooperation occurs. Cooperation in the international system is depended on the nature of an issue. However, there is also a material aspect or payoff related to institutions. With that said, for Axelrod and Keohane (1985, pp. 232-233) it is easier for states to cooperate on economic matters than around security concerns. Economic cooperation links states closely together, and they have to assume that their relationship will not be fixed to a certain period. Defecting from an agreement or institutions will result in future negative economic consequences. An example of economic cooperation can be seen in the establishment of the Bretton Woods economic system.

The Bretton Woods economic system emerged in 1944, comprising of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. It was the United States that was tasked with maintaining the capitalistic system through

the Bretton Woods economic system central to rebuild Japan and Western European after World War II and stabilising international currencies. The United States benefited from this system, through access to foreign markets (Leysens & Thompson, 2002, pp. 77-80).

After World War II, weaker states may have preferred to belong to an institutional order because of perceived gains. The ability to access financial loans through the Bretton Woods economic system and the regulation of monetary policy made belonging to this order desirable.

2.3.4.4 Neorealist critique of liberal institutionalism

As earlier discussed, there are areas of agreement between neoliberal and neorealist' scholars, but there are also significant differences. For neorealists order in the international system is based on a balance of power or hegemony. The concept of hegemony refers to a dominant state that exerts its political, economic and cultural power over other states. As a result, order is not imposed or created by institutions; rather, it is the dominant state(s) that influence institutions. The neorealist' scholar, John Mearsheimer, supports this view and argues that institutions have very little or no influence over shaping state interests and conduct as dominant powers create institutions, which embody their own self-interests (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 7).

In Mearsheimer's critique of liberal institutionalism he refers to NATO as an example. Mearsheimer indicates that without the threat of the Soviet Union, cooperation between NATO and the European community would breakdown. Mearsheimer was of the view that the fall of the Soviet Union would reduce the usefulness of NATO, and thus the Eastern European states would in turn become suspicious of each other, fuelling conflicts and war between them (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 52; Keohane & Martin, 2010, p. 63). However, the assumption of Measheimer was flawed as NATO continues to survive and expand. Waltz's answer as to why NATO has not ceased to

exist is because the United States wanted NATO to survive and expand (Waltz, 2000, p. 25).

Waltz also argues that Keohane and Martin, although they attempt to disagree and criticise realism, are actually in support of it. For Waltz, international institutions are constructed to serve the interest of those that brought them into existence (Waltz, 2000, p. 21). Strong states use institutions to create a favourable environment for them that serve their interests. Thus, the strength of an institution depends largely on the intensions of those that bring them into existence. This view supports the idea that dominant powers have a direct impact on the life and strength of an institution (Waltz, 2000, p. 24). Ikenberry elaborates further on this argument. He poses the question: why would a hegemonic state limit its own power through the creation of an institution? If a hegemonic state calculates that its dominant position will be short lived, then there is an incentive to build an institution which will create favourable patterns of cooperation with other states that persist even as power balances shift (Ikenberry, 2006, p. 136). Neorealist scholars such as Mearsheimer do not explicitly articulate that cooperation is impossible. In Mearsheimer's (1995, p. 9) article entitled, *The False Promise of International Institutions*, he proposed that cooperation may be possible, but it cannot undo a realist world of international anarchy where conflicts and security competition between states is the order of the day, and which no amount of cooperation can overcome. In this way, cooperation is a short lived phenomenon. Anarchy does not mean disorder or chaos; rather, it is an 'ordering principle', itself indicating that states are the highest entities in the international system due to the lack of a world government (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 10).

Neorealists assert that cooperation will be hindered by international anarchy, which leads states to question the activities, behaviour and capabilities of other states. However, when institutions do emerge, this is solely based on the desire of great powers or hegemonic states to benefit their self-interests.

2.4 Constructivism

The neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought in International Relations were for some time regarded as the mainstream accounts of the international system. Despite their significance, these theories are not without their shortcomings. E. H. Carr explicitly stated in his book entitled, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, the centrality of a realist and a liberal view in International Relations to remedy the shortcomings of each discipline. According to Carr (1939, p. 10) "...there is a stage where realism is the necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, just as in other periods utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism. Immature thought is predominantly purposive and utopian. Thought which rejects purpose altogether is the thought of old age. Mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis. Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place". Constructivism, it will be argued here, acts as a bridge between the realist and liberal theories to reconcile their differences. In this way, a more holistic view of the international system can be obtained, indicating which other factors have a bearing on state interests and interaction other than international anarchy and power.

2.4.1 The role of ideas in the international system

Unlike realists and liberals who place an emphasis on material factors, such as military and economic power, constructivists argue that ideas play a significant role in international relations. It should not be inferred that constructivism neglects the role of power; rather, ideas influence how states come to define their interests and respond to other actors. Alexander Wendt, a central scholar in social constructivism argues that, the social world (or 'reality') comprises of a set of ideas and beliefs that structure and give meaning to relations (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Human beings are involved in a process of making sense of the world. This process of meaning-making

that human beings impose on the world through their intellect, and ideas are ways to order the world, guide their activities, and maintain relations between them (Adler, 2005, p. 92). A group of people in a particular space of time have in possession beliefs and ideas about themselves, the sovereign nations they form part of and their historical, religious and cultural aspects, which set them apart from others (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 255).

According to Jackson and Sørensen (2003, p. 254), "The social world is a world of human consciousness of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of language and discourses, of signals, and understanding among human beings, especially groups of human beings, such as states and nations". The social world and political world with their laws, rules and institutions are different from nature as they have been invented through human consciousness. For example, nuclear weapons are physical entities, which have brought much devastation to the world as seen in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. However, the ideas behind these weapons are also particularly dangerous, such as the association of prestige and power to nuclear weapons, which may lead others who desire this level of status to believe they can only do so by obtaining nuclear weapons. It is the ideas behind the formation of physical entities that influence how they are viewed, used and experienced by others (Onuf, 1998, pp. 61, 74).

2.4.2 The role of norms in international relations

Ideas establish and define what is considered to be appropriate forms of behaviour, and over time ideas become norms. Simultaneously, norms influence ideas, and for that reason constructivists place their focus on the role of norms in international relations.

According to Legro (1997, p. 33), "International relations theorists have in recent years shown an interest in international norms and rules not equated since the interwar period." For realists, such as E. H. Carr who assumed the first Woodrow

Wilson Chair of International Relations at the University of Aberystwyth in 1936, institutions and norms have relatively little influence over shaping the behaviour of states in an anarchical international system, because "power ultimately trumps all other considerations…" (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 143). This argument is problematic and misleading, for it assumes that international anarchy is the only factor capable of influencing the interests of states and thus determines how states pursue international relations.

The question emerges, what is a norm and what role do norms play in international relations? Florini (1996, p. 364) defines a norm as a standard of behaviour which prescribes how members of society ought to conduct themselves. Norms represent appropriate forms of behaviour that is not limited to an individual actor but are shared among different actors. For example, the non-proliferation norm is not related to one state but applies to all states that form part of the NPT, namely nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states (Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 171). Thus, the influence of a norm in the international system is dependent on whether it has a distinctive character of legitimacy, which is representative of its level of support.

By prescribing appropriate forms of behaviour, norms are useful to states to bring more order to the international system. According to Florini (1996, p. 365) "Norms arise because they are "needed" to bring about cooperation in a mixed-motive setting or game with multiple equilibria". Neoliberalists are more optimistic in their support of international cooperation and see norms as having a significant impact on state to state relations. For neorealists anarchy remains the driving force behind change in international relations. However, neorealists support the idea that norms have a limited influence on state behaviour as the distribution of power is responsible for how states conduct their affairs.

Neorealist scholars warn that there is always a risk that states may cheat when it comes to norm adherence, so those states that abide by norms limit their own behaviour, but cannot be sure that other states will also do the same (Jackson &

Sørensen, 2007, p. 173; Bradford, 2001, p. 656). However, it can be argued that states that seek to maintain economic relations, for example, need to develop and maintain common rules between them to reduce conflict, which can negatively affect their economic well-being (Buzan, 1993, p. 334).

A deeper understanding of norms has been put forward by Legro (1997, p. 33) who warns that norms often have competing and conflicting commands and requirements. The notion of 'self-help' as inferred by realists from international anarchy is an example of a standard of behaviour which has been put forward by realists of how states need to act. Self-help and cooperation are competing processes. Hence, the desired end of cooperation may be limited by those that advocate self-help. Another significant factor influencing the strength of a norm is its durability, which depends on the consensus around the issue and the prohibitions in place to deal with those that deviate from the desired forms of behaviour (Legro, 1997, pp. 33-35). When there is a high level of consensus around a norm, it will become institutionalised and established as a law governing an organisation or a system (for example, the norm of non-proliferation, which forms part of the non-proliferation regime) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901).

2.4.3 Challenging self-help views of international anarchy

Constructivism has been greatly influenced by Alexander Wendt. Wendt made a significant contribution to constructivism by challenging the assumption that international anarchy (as a force) is responsible for conflict and war between states. Also, Wendt challenged the neorealist and neoliberal view that states are rational and unitary actors. For Wendt, self-help is not necessarily a rational response to international anarchy. It is at this point that Wendt proposes to build a bridge between the neoliberal and neorealist school of thought (Wendt, 1992, p. 394).

As previously argued, constructivism places the emphasis on the role of ideas in the international system. For realist' scholars, anarchy is the driving force behind why

states act in self-help ways. Wendt critiques this view and argues that, self-help and power politics are not basic or necessary responses under anarchy. Anarchy, that is, the lack of a world government is a fact, but drawing negative conclusions from anarchy is simply an idea that has dominated the international system, and is not necessarily a true depiction of reality (Wendt, 1992, pp. 394-395).

Since the social world is an invention of human intellect and ideas, so too are perceptions created of the 'inevitable' outcomes of anarchy. Anarchy may affect state security, but it does not predetermine the nature of state interaction (that is, whether relations will be conflictual or cooperative). From this statement, it can be inferred that how states perceive the world determines how they will respond to phenomena and to other states. Following this logic, the way states perceive the international system and construct their identity will influence state behaviour and interests (Little & Smith, 2006 p. 392).

States that regard themselves as middle powers define their identity and interests by this category. Middle powers favour multilateral solutions to international problems and work through structures such as the New Agenda Coalition to influence nuclear-related matters (non-proliferation and disarmament) (Flemes, 2007, p. 8; International Business Publications, 2007, p. 135). This middle power role describes the identity of states, and influences how they perceive/respond to other states and phenomena. There is thus a link between state identity and interests. That is, the way state identity is constructed will influence what type of interests states will pursue and the way they relate to their environment (Wendt, 1992, pp. 398-399).

Those that subscribe to the self-help logic are inclined to view security as an individual process or responsibility. Wendt argues further that state security can be seen as a collective process, this is possible under anarchy. This challenges the realist assumption that states will continue to engage in conflict due to anarchy. Self-help is a social construction which has over time come to be seen as real or factually based. The security dilemma between the United States and the Soviet Union during the

Cuban Missile Crisis for example was not a natural process; it occurred through interaction, internalising the activities of the other, constructing perceptions and then acting upon them. Self-help, just like state sovereignty, exists because states recognise it and practice it. New ideas can overcome old systems of thinking as the social and political world is a social construction and not an unchanging fact (Wendt, 1992, pp. 407-410, 412-413).

In chapter six, a constructivist view of the NPT will be explored, namely that the NPT is a social construction, created through the ideas and beliefs of states.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented a theoretical framework that will guide the study. The three dominant paradigms in International Relations have been discussed; namely, realism, liberalism and constructivism, offering a different interpretation of the international system but also complementing each other. Thus, they indicate which factors influence how states perceive and pursue their interests as well as respond to others. On closer inspection, the assumptions of these theoretical paradigms can be placed into five major categories for the purpose of comparing and contrasting them. The five major categories are, the central actor(s) in international relations, the role of anarchy, the role of power, the role of morality, and lastly whether change is possible in the international system or whether continuity prevails. These are the major issues discussed in each theoretical paradigm. Realists argue that the state is the most important actor in the international system and within an anarchical system; power is the only feature that can influence international outcomes. From this argument, anarchy condemns states to conflict and engaging in war and because anarchy is permanent, continuity prevails in international politics. For liberal scholars, states are not the most important actors, transnational and multinational corporations have an influence over the affairs and interests the state projects. Liberals see anarchy as a fact but argue that cooperation between states is possible through international

institutions and organisations. Power is not the only influential factor in the world; morality also guides state decisions, for example the decision to end the slave trade and because people are innovative and learn from their mistakes, progress is possible in international relations. For constructivists, ideas play a prominent role in how states view the world and respond to it. So who the main actors are, the norms that determine behaviour and whether change or continuity prevails are a function of the interplay between agents and structures that constitute the reality of international politics.

Core concepts and theories of International Relations will be applied to the NPT. The researcher proposes to provide a critical analysis of the NPT, its purpose and ability to combat insecurity in an anarchical world by interpreting this treaty from a realist (chapter four), liberal (chapter five) and constructivist (chapter six) perspective. Such a critical analysis will reveal whether the NPT is a realist instrument used by strong states to facilitate their self-interests or a liberal instrument working to the benefit of the international community at large, or whether its meaning can change as the thinking and ideas of states change (as constructivist would hold).

The next chapter highlights the evolution of the NPT since it was first proposed and when it finally entered into force. This chapter offers a descriptive account of the NPT, noting key review conferences and critical events preceding these conferences, which have impacted on the NPT's direction and strength.

Chapter 3: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

3.1 Introduction

Any discussion of the NPT will be incomplete without providing background on the introductory process of this treaty. This chapter will proceed by explaining the origin of the NPT; that is, when the idea of an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons was first proposed, how the treaty was negotiated and the tensions between member states that arose and became embedded in the treaty. Thus, the chapter will not only discuss the origin of the NPT, but also shed light on its subsequent evolution as measured by the review conferences. In particular, this analysis will reveal the areas of disagreement between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states that continue to persist, affecting the integrity and strength of this treaty and its goal of promoting a world free from nuclear weapons.

3.2 The origin of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The origin of the NPT stems from a proposal made by Frank Aiken, an Irish Minster for External Affairs in 1958. In the 13th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting, Frank Aiken proposed a draft resolution calling nuclear weapon states not to proliferate nuclear weapons to states not in possession of them (Pande, 1995, p. 3; Fischer, 1992, p. 5 and Mozley, 1998, p. 142). Ireland played an influential role in shaping non-proliferation discussions by describing the problems surrounding nuclear weapons and how to address them (Sinnott, 1995, pp. 59-60). This state argued that a universal test ban treaty was not sufficient in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and that it would also be in the self-interests of nuclear weapon states to support its proposal of a non-proliferation treaty. In 1957, when the IAEA came into existence with the responsibility of inspecting nuclear facilities and power plants to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers, it was already clear that stronger mechanisms needed to be in effect to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1953, United States President Dwight Eisenhower championed the idea among

other nuclear supplier states that nuclear information and technology for peaceful civilian purposes be shared (Firmage, 1969, pp. 714-715). This decision came in the form of the Atoms for Peace program. In return for gaining access to nuclear material and technology states should forgo the nuclear weapons option (Wastler, 2010, p. 203). In 1957, the IAEA emerged from the Atoms for Peace program to facilitate the peaceful application of atomic energy and prevented the diversion of nuclear material (Bunn, 2003, p. 1; Firmage, 1969, p. 715). At this time, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were the only states in possession of nuclear weapons. It was argued that the Atoms for Peace program led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states such as India, Israel and Pakistan, because it provided access to dual-use technology that was diverted by these countries to their military programmes (Kroenig, 2010, pp. 157-159). To prevent this from happening stronger verification measures were put in place to ensure that states do not direct civilian nuclear technology to weapons programmes.

In an effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons Ireland made a proposal to the UNGA that the UN Disarmament Committee should be created to develop means through which nuclear proliferation could be forestalled. More specifically, it proposed that the number of nuclear weapon states should be limited through the creation of an international treaty. Initially, among those that disagreed with the Irish proposal was the United States as it came to the conclusion that other states would not reject nuclear weapons while the United States continued to be in possession of them (Pande, 1995, p. 4; Emelyanov, 1982, p. 170).

Discussions on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons continued throughout the late 1950s. However, it was only in 1961 that serious and more earnest discussions emerged around this issue within the UNGA based on the Irish proposal. In December 1961, the UNGA adopted Resolution 1665 (XVI) calling for the nuclear weapon states not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states and in turn, non-nuclear weapon states not to produce nor accept nuclear weapons.

Resolution 1665 (XVI) was vital to nuclear arms control initiatives as it called for all states to make a concerted effort to realise the conclusion of an international agreement in support of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (UN, 1961b, pp. 5-6; Pande, 1995, pp. 3-4).

Shortly thereafter, the United States and the Soviet Union (also known as the Union for Soviet Socialist Republics or by the abbreviation, USSR) made a joint statement concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament, forwarded it to the UNGA and proposed an appropriate body to be convened where these matters could be discussed. In 1961, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was formed by the UNGA based on Resolution 1722 (XVI) and opened for discussion in 1962 (Neidle, 1963, pp. 46-47). This Committee was a multilateral forum in which negotiations could take place and was tasked with the responsibility to develop a joint statement among its members that would lay a foundation of agreed principles for the establishment of the NPT (UN, 1961a, p. 7; Pande, 1995, p. 5). The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee included Western states, such as Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the United States, and the Soviet Bloc, including Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. It also included so-called NAM states, for example, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic (Zarate, 2007, p. 8).

The NAM is a group of 118 member states that is mobilised around promoting the interests and needs of the developing states. The origin of this movement was based on the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference which convened in Bandung, Indonesia and was officially launched in 1961. Member states, as a result of common concerns, have mobilised around and in support of ending colonialism/neo-colonialism, self-determination and promoting reform of the global order dominated by the West (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006; The Non-Aligned Movement, 2001). Non-Alignment can be termed as a position emanating from the period referred to as the Cold War.

The Cold War period gave rise to a bipolar international system. Bipolarity in the international system was accompanied by hostility and rivalry, most notably manifesting in the form of a nuclear arms race between the West (United States) and the East (Soviet Union) and their respective allies. States were either allies of the United States or the Soviet Union, but Non-Aligned states chose not to align themselves with any major power bloc. With the end of the Cold War, NAM continues to play a role in global affairs, in particular supporting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (United States Department of Defense, 2010, pp. vii-viii, 3).

Once again, in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union made draft treaties "for the General and Complete Disarmament…" of nuclear weapons and presented it to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (Pande, 1995, p. 5). However, draft treaties submitted by these states placed an emphasis on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons while not encouraging disarmament of their own nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union wanted to get the nuclear weapons of the United States off the territory of Central Europe and West Germany. In contrast, the United States and its allies wanted to place nuclear weapons in Central Europe to deter and balance superior Soviet Union forces (Carranza, 2006, p. 493; Sagan, 1997, p. 78).

The year 1962 was characterised by the Cuban Missile Crisis, resulting from an unstable relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two superpowers of the Cold War era engaged in a nuclear arms race, with the United States holding nuclear superiority by being in possession of more nuclear weapons. Fearing an attack by the United States, the Soviet Union installed missiles in Cuba that became a Soviet ally after the communist revolution under Fidel Castro. Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba thus had the potential of carrying nuclear weapons that could reach the United States. The then United States President, John F. Kennedy, consulted his advisers who proposed a military blockade of Cuba. The tensions of war were rising and created a condition where Kennedy and the Soviet Union

President, Nikita Khrushchev, saw the importance of developing mechanisms to minimise a possible nuclear war (Schlesinger, 1996, pp. 25-26). It could be argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis brought home to the leaders of both superpowers the danger of nuclear escalation when they pass these weapons on to their allies. This realisation laid the foundation for a more earnest discussion by the superpowers on a non-proliferation treaty, but also set the stage for the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states.

In 1963, the Soviet Union and the United States showed hostility towards measures discussed by non-aligned states in the UNGA to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Soviet Union criticised a plan by Western states and in particular, representatives of the United States that wanted to ensure that any non-proliferation treaty would not affect NATO from gaining access to nuclear weapons. For the Soviet Union, this ran contrary to the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Pande, 1995, pp. 6-7; Emelyanov, 1982, p. 170).

3.3 Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Principles and obstacles

In a 1964 session of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, the United States proposed a non-proliferation treaty drawing its origin from the Irish Resolution of 1958 and in 1965 drafted a full treaty concerning preventing nuclear weapon states from proliferating nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring them (Ford, 2007, p. 959). Positive strides were also made by non-nuclear weapon states towards this end. During discussions at an Organization for African Unity (OAU) Summit in Cairo, in July 1964, and the Second Conference of the non-aligned states in October 1964, an agreement was reached and supported. Both conferences supported a treaty that would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and their acquisition (Cisse, 1980, pp. 93-94; Ford, 2007, p. 959 and UN, 1965, p. 7). United States officials acknowledged the dangers that nuclear weapons posed to all states.

However, for many non-nuclear weapon states the concern was not over nuclear weapons being used against them by those who were in possession of them but rather nuclear weapons proliferating to neighbours in their region (Carranza, 2006, p. 493).

According to Mishra (2008, p. 5), there are two dominant perspectives that explain the origin of the NPT. The first is a Western view indicating that the origin of the NPT stems from a concern by the United States over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The second is a 'developing nations' perspective' and holds that non-nuclear weapon states were equally concerned over the spread of nuclear weapons and supported nuclear disarmament. For example, India as a non-nuclear weapon state at the time was an instrumental agent in supporting non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament (Dougherty, 1966, pp. 19, 21; Mishra, 2008, pp. 5-6). The proposal for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons during the late 1950s and early 1960s came from developing states (non-nuclear weapon states) rather than nuclear weapon states (Pande, 1995, p. 5).

The disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States soon changed, and their focus on non-proliferation was realigned based on the nuclear explosion by China in 1964. This also had an impact on the position of India. India expressed that nuclear weapon states should not transfer weapons or technology to non-nuclear weapon states, and that nuclear weapons should not be used against non-nuclear weapon states (Pande, 1995, p. 6; Zarate, 2007, p. 9). As instructed by the UNGA the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee prioritised non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in an effort to develop an international treaty (UN, 1965, p. 8). It was then that Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and the UAR (Egypt) all forming part of the non-aligned states "...submitted a memorandum to the General Assembly setting out their joint views on the non-proliferation question" (Pande, 1995, p. 8). This memorandum was instrumental as it paved the way for the NPT by laying down its core principles.

November 1965 marked a prominent time towards the effort of reaching an international treaty on non-proliferation. Based on the memorandum submitted to the UNGA by the eight Non-Aligned members, Resolution 2028 (XX) on Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was officially adopted (Mishra, 2008, p. 6; UN, 1965, pp. 7-8). It stated that five principles would guide the formation of an international treaty, namely:

- The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;
- The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;
- The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament;
- There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;
- Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Negotiations progressed and in 1966 India and non-aligned states argued for arms limitation and security assurances to be included in the NPT. In spite of this, the United States and the Soviet Union did not make any reference or support this initiative in their draft treaties. Their reasoning for the lack of support concerning reducing nuclear stockpiles and making security assurances was based on the notion that these measures may prevent an agreement on the NPT. They deemed these demands "unnecessary, imprudent and complicating", risking a delay of the treaty (Pande, 1995, p. 10; Graham, 2008, p. 51). As a result, the draft treaties by the United States and the Soviet Union was criticised by India. At this point, India requested a more balanced treaty that was non-discriminatory against non-nuclear weapon states. From this view, all states and not only non-nuclear weapon states should be expected to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. In addition, reductions in

nuclear stockpiles must be legally enforced. India's position was also supported by Sweden that proposed a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a treaty to be introduced with the goal of ending the production of fissile material which can be used to make nuclear weapons (Graham, 2008, pp. 48-49; Pande, 1995, p. 10). Tensions between non-nuclear and nuclear weapon states were clearly visible and influenced the process of negotiations.

It became apparent to non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapon states would not support the introduction of a limitation on nuclear arms in the NPT. Non-aligned states and also some Western states, such as Canada and Italy proposed that there be a separate article which requires nuclear weapon states to stop the arms race and eventually reduce their nuclear stockpile (Graham, 2008, pp. 49-50). It appeared that the proposals made by non-aligned states and others had an impact on subsequent draft treaties submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union, as both submitted identical drafts to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (Pande, 1995, p. 11).

The draft treaties of the United States and the Soviet Union generated much debate and also criticism from many states. It was essential for an international treaty on non-proliferation to be established; however, the question of benefits or incentives for joining such a treaty needed to materialise. Many non-nuclear weapon states had hoped that in return for renouncing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon states would promote nuclear disarmament, would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against them, and would aid the advancement of peaceful nuclear technology. Brazil and India noted the discriminatory nature of the NPT and as a concession expected that nuclear weapon states should not manufacture any new nuclear weapons, referred to as 'vertical proliferation' (Goldschmidt, 1980, p. 73).

Italy and Switzerland did not support a treaty that had an unlimited lifespan; they argued that the treaty should have a fixed period. It was decided that the lifespan of this treaty would be for 25 years (Johnson, 2010b, pp. 438-439). A treaty with an

unlimited duration would affect negotiations on nuclear disarmament by instituting the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, relieving nuclear weapon states of the pressure to disarm (Pilat, 1995, p. 34). Britain proposed a review conference which formed part of the draft treaty. A review conference would be convened every five years to monitor the progress the NPT has made and discuss its future (Pande, 1995, pp. 13, 15; Sinnott, 1995, p. 65). The United States and the Soviet Union once again submitted revised draft treaties on 18 January 1968. The new draft included what is known as Article III of the NPT, namely to place all nuclear facilities of non-nuclear weapon states under IAEA safeguards. IAEA safeguards refer to a system that includes a range of different technical and protective measures to verify and determine the nature of states' nuclear material and activities. This is a key mechanism to verify that peaceful nuclear material is not diverted to military purposes (IAEA, 2011, n.p.; IAEA, 2002b, p. 13).

Furthermore, a concession for non-nuclear weapon states for not 'going nuclear', that is, getting nuclear weapons, was access to nuclear technology used for peaceful purposes, inscribed as Article IV in the NPT. There were thus back and forth negotiations over the terms of this treaty between non-nuclear and nuclear weapon states before its conclusion.

3.4 The Conclusion of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The next negotiation session convened on 24 April 1968 in the UNGA. During this session, 23 non-nuclear weapon states including Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cyprus, India, Jordon, Nigeria, South Africa and many others criticised the March 1968 draft treaty for its weak arms limitation and disarmament conditions. These two mentioned provisions were included to address the discriminatory nature of the NPT by requiring nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and eventually disarm completely (Pande, 1995, pp. 15-16). An important critique came from 18 non-nuclear weapon states, namely Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Dahomey (the

African country now known as Benin), El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Japan, Peru, Rwanda and South Africa. Article VI was criticised on the grounds that it was "vague, subjective, insufficiently compelling and merely an expression of intention to undertake negotiations in good faith which, in the previous 20 years, had not resulted in significant arms limitation and disarmament agreements" (Pande, 1995, p. 16). Subsequently, based on a proposal made by Yugoslavia on arms limitation and disarmament, an amendment was made to the preamble of the joint revised draft treaty of the United States and the Soviet Union to include the wording "to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament". This amendment was supported by the UNGA and was added to Resolution 2373 (XXII) on 12 June 1968 (UN, 1975, p. 2; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011, n.p.).

The outcome of negotiations resulted in 59 states, including the United States and the Soviet Union, signing the NPT, open for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970 (Clemens, 2004, p. 227; Mishra, 2008, p. 7 and Pande, 1995, p. 17).

Though the NPT was put into effect and ratified by many states, there was still a sense of uncertainty around its principles, based on the many critiques by non-nuclear weapon states during its negotiation process. The disputes and disagreements discussed should not be seen in a vacuum as they continue to play a role in non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations ever since. These differences have not been successfully resolved, and disarmament of nuclear weapons remains a contested area of international politics. This introductory section of the NPT serves as a guide to understand the roots of current debates between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The origin of the NPT is also the source of its challenges: to realise a world free from nuclear weapons greater commitment is needed by nuclear weapon states towards disarmament. From the outset, this commitment has been relegated to the realm of the idealistic as opposed to an imaginable goal,

bringing one of the key themes that this thesis aims to explore to light: juxtaposing an idealist and realist interpretation of the NPT.

The next section will briefly outline the review conferences that took place since the NPT came into effect. The chapter will focus on the first Review Conference that convened in 1975, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the 2000 and the 2005 conferences which were regarded by many states as failures, and lastly, the 2010 Review Conference. An analysis of these five conferences respectively provides an understanding of the current status of the NPT as it manifested during the 2010 Review Conference, a source of data that will be drawn on in subsequent chapters.

3.5 The first Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Under Article VIII.3 of the NPT, every five years, an NPT review conference will be convened and the first of which would be in Geneva, Switzerland. Review conferences are useful to interpret the NPT, monitor its strengths and weaknesses and an opportunity for member states and civil society organisations to make recommendations and amendments to improve the treaty's status (Rauf, 2000, p. 8). The main purpose of the NPT review conferences is to develop a final document where member states can agree on the direction of the NPT (Shaker, 2010, p. 3). According to Stoiber (2003, p. 127), states perceived the final document of the NPT differently. Some may argue that agreements emanating from NPT review conferences are legally binding while others regard them as non-binding, and therefore, discardable. Nevertheless, Stoiber (2003, p. 127) argues that a final document is important because "at least, such language could be taken to express a concrete statement of the parties on the interpretation of the treaty, unless and until revised or repudiated in a similar consensus document."

In May 1975, the membership of the NPT increased to 91 states (Choubey, 2009, p. 19). In spite of the declaration at this conference that all member states had adhered to their NPT obligations, there remained challenges to the treaty (Emelyanov, 1982,

p. 172). Non-nuclear weapon states voiced their concern that too much emphasis was placed on their obligations under the NPT, while their rights and the obligations of nuclear weapon states had not been properly implemented. This discussion related to the 'inalienable right' of non-nuclear weapon states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and the nuclear weapon states obligation under Article VI and the Preamble of the NPT to disarm (Sukovit, 1982, p. 216; Dhanapala & Rydell, 2005, pp. 17-18.).

3.5.1 Unfulfilled promises and commitments by nuclear weapon states

In response to the lack of support by nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states attempted to add protocols to the NPT. The first proposal was in support of a 'comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons'. Protocol two was in response to reducing the number of weapons in the nuclear arsenals possessed by nuclear weapon states. Proposal three involved an assurance by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons (Barkenbus, 1980, p. 38; Boutwell, 2010, p. 6).

The nuclear weapon states largely ignored these proposals and refused to support them. The United States and the Soviet Union made mention of the Strategic Arms and Limitation (SALT) talks as part of their commitment to the NPT. The SALT talks refer to a series of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union which occurred between 1969 and lasted until May 1972, with the aim of developing agreements to reduce their offensive nuclear weapon stockpiles. The outcome of talks resulted in the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons both on land and in submarines (Graham & LaVera, 2003, p. 309; Halloran, 2009, pp. 126-127 and UN, 1975, p. 7). SALT was regarded by these states as their exclusive area of negotiations which non-nuclear weapon states should not interfere with (Epstein, 1975, p. 46).

Other agreements signed between the United States and Russia included the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In 1991, START I was signed to reduce the amount of strategic delivery vehicles including intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers and sea-launched ballistic missiles of the United States and Russia to 1600 (Taylor, 2010, p. 3; United States Department of Defense, 2010, p. 21). However, on 5 December 2009, START 1 expired leading to the negotiation of New START, signed on 8 April 2010 and entering into force on 5 February 2011 (The Daily Maverick, 2010).

At the 1975 Review Conference, nuclear weapon states were more interested in strengthening IAEA security measures of nuclear materials to prevent theft and diversion from peaceful uses. A proposal to create 'multilateral nuclear fuel cycle centers' (as opposed to allowing non-nuclear weapon states mastering the nuclear fuel cycle individually) was floated by nuclear weapon states to alleviate the risk that nuclear material would be stolen or diverted to military purposes (Epstein, 1975, p. 47). In Epstein's elaboration on this matter, it is indicated that non-nuclear weapon states would have been willing to accept restrains and controls only if the nuclear weapon states were more committed to their obligations under the NPT. This initiative did not materialise due to the lack of political will on this issue (Shaker, 2007, p. 1).

3.5.2 Vague and conditional commitments

To the disappointment of non-nuclear weapon states, arms control and disarmament remained vague and unachieved. Non-nuclear weapon states felt deceived but remained committed to the NPT. In particular, Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles from Mexico criticised the power of the United States and the Soviet Union who undermined the role and needs of non-nuclear weapon states and used the NPT to serve their own ends, thus placing themselves above other member states. Ambassador Robles made three proposals, the first proposal called for nuclear

weapon states to negotiate a CTBT, the second included halting nuclear testing on a temporary basis, and the third demanded a stop to the further production of nuclear weapons (Power, 1986, pp. 481-482). These proposals were blocked by the United States. In an effort to develop a consensus and prevent the failure of this conference, former Swedish President, Inga Thorsson and chair of the Review Conference, urged nuclear weapon states to demonstrate more support towards their treaty obligations. A final document was established as a result of the proposals made by Ambassador Robles, yet the conference ended without producing any real results (Epstein, 1975, pp. 47-48). Nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states despite quarrels "agreed late in the meeting to a declaration written in language tilted in favour of the pro-CTBT forces" (Power, 1986, p. 482).

At this time, important states, such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa remained outside the NPT (Emelyanov, 1982, p. 172). Brazilian and Argentinean relations since their independence in the 1800s have been characterised by rivalry and competition. In 1825 these states entered armed conflict which perpetuated a sense of mistrust and hostility toward each other. This rivalry and hostility were visible in the nuclear field concerning technology and development and was also the reason for their reluctance to accede to the NPT (Carasales, 1995, pp. 39-40).

Israel's reason for not acceding to the NPT is based on its geographical position and its sense of vulnerability within the Middle East. Israeli officials argue that Israel is best safeguarded through its military force, which is believed to include nuclear weapons (which Israel has never admitted or denied – also referred to as a policy of deliberate nuclear ambivalence). This reasoning for remaining outside the NPT was also employed by apartheid South Africa. It was the pursuit of nuclear weapons that kept these two states outside the NPT (Steinberg, 2000, p. 175).

India and Pakistan have continued to criticise the NPT for its discriminatory practices against non-nuclear weapon states. In particular, they have criticised the fact that

disarmament in the NPT is not regarded as an obligation by nuclear weapon states and for that reason remain outside this treaty (Fidler & Ganguly 2010, n.p.). A fundamental problem was the conduct of nuclear weapon states and support shown towards the NPT that was not convincing enough to draw those outside the treaty in and may have further entrenched the view of the discriminatory nature of this treaty.

Returning to the discussion of negative security assurances, that is, the assurance by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, it was only in 1978 in the UNGA that nuclear weapon states such as the United States declared a non-use policy of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. This declaration came out of the need to protect the security interest of non-nuclear weapon states. The non-use policy echoed that "the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack" (Pilat, 2005, p. 160; Bunn, 1997, p. 6). This promise was made under the leadership of United States President Jimmy Carter. Although it was considered to be a Negative Security Assurance, it included exceptions that non-nuclear weapon states did not agree with. This matter finally came to a conclusion before the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the topic of the next section.

3.6 The impact of events preceding the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

An analysis of the 1995 Review Conference is pivotal, not only to explain what changes had been implemented since the first review process in 1975, but also because the NPT's 25 year duration had expired. The end of this period thus marked a three-way fork in the NPT's future: indefinite extension, another fixed duration or re-negotiation of the treaty in another form.

For the purposes of the discussion here the following questions can be posed at this juncture: Was the NPT any closer to its realisation of a world free from nuclear weapons? Has the conflicts between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states been bridged or transformed and what impact has this treaty had on non-member states? Before these questions are answered, there have been two cases specifically where NPT member states were found to be in non-compliance, namely in Iraq and North Korea. These cases significantly impacted on the outcome of the 1995 Review Conference and thus warrant investigation.

3.6.1 Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme

Writing ahead of the 1995 Review Conference, Pilat and Pendley (1995, p. 47) argued that despite the wide level of support towards the NPT by its 160 member states, the treaty remained susceptible to criticism. When the standard of the NPT is reviewed, they argued that it would be the political, legal and technological matters occurring before the review conference that will take priority during discussions.

For that reason, Pilat and Pendley (1995, p. 48) noted the many changes since the fourth NPT Review Conference in 1990 that would impact on the strength and integrity of the treaty. With this in mind, the first major challenge to the NPT by a member state concerns the covert nuclear weapons programme of Iraq. It was believed that since the 1980s Iraq had been in non-compliance with its NPT obligations. An analysis of Iraq's history may shed light and provide the context for understanding the period leading up to its nuclear ambitions. This will also provide an understanding of the Gulf War.

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. This period in history was referred to as the Gulf War. There have been many discussions on this matter; however, the reasons for the invasion are based on two central points, namely, nationalist and Pan Arab elements. Key to note is the artificial creation of the borders of Iraq and Kuwait respectively. In 1920, the San Remo conference divided Arab Middle East territories

formally part of the Ottoman Empire between Britain and France. As a result, in 1921, Iraq was officially made up of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra under British influence. A British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, in 1922 set the boundaries of Iraq and Kuwait, which became the source of conflicts over access to resources such as oil (Bennis & Moushabeck, 1991, p. 50).

Iraq, under the leadership of President Saddam Hussein, was concerned with the unfairly distributed wealth that resulted from artificial boundaries created by Western powers (Bin, Hill & Jones, 1998, p. 2). "These included: historical and territorial claims that Iraq had over Kuwait; Kuwait's refusal to lease two strategic lands to Iraq; Iraq's anger over Kuwait's pumping of huge quantities of oil from the Rumaila field which lies underneath both countries…" (Bahbah, 1991, p. 50).

In an attempt to end the invasion and ensure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait a UN based coalition force of 34 states including Egypt, United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia led by the United States launched an attack on Iraq. Iraq was a former ally of the Soviet Union which the United States was hostile towards, but the Soviet Union did not oppose a UN coalition. The UN Security Council and the Arab League made resolutions calling for an end to the war and Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. An attack by the United States followed and was justified in addition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by pointing to Iraq's use of biological and chemical weapons and its suspected nuclear weapons programme (Gordon, 2011, n.p.).

In 1991, after the Gulf War an IAEA inspection exposed Iraq's enrichment of uranium and its nuclear weapons ambitions. It was then that the UN and the IAEA attempted to understand how this secret nuclear weapons programme was conducted. It was revealed that Iraq drew on the support of Europe, North America and Asian states to provide it with infrastructure such as electrical supply and power equipment (Albright & Hibbs, 1992, p. 27). Iraq poured billions into its nuclear weapons quest and divided equipment orders to mislead export controls and made use of middlemen to disguise the destination of imported materials. Iraq was also cautious in assuring its

Western suppliers that the materials and products it imported were for peaceful civilian purposes.

The materials or components which Iraq received were not controlled and Iraq used this to get around Western export controls. Export controls prevent certain products and information from being exported and traded. For example, a government may be concerned about the destination of a certain product and for that reason ban its trade. For the United States export controls are seen as essential to stop nuclear weapons' proliferation and thus to protect national security (Albright & Hibbs, 1992, p. 28).

On 12 January 1992, the IAEA accused Iraqi Foreign Ministry officials of not declaring large purchases of materials and components from Germany to supply its gas centrifuge program. In a meeting convened at Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, officials of the centrifuge program in Iraq supplied IAEA officials with information concerning their activities. In this report, "The Iraqis acknowledged that they had imported German materials and components-and added that they had acquired 100 tons of margining steel and other raw materials needed to manufacture centrifuge components" (Albright & Hibbs, 1992, p. 29).

In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 687, "...Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research..." The IAEA and the UN Special Commission was tasked with inspecting Iraq's nuclear weapons programme, placing it under exclusive control and destroying it (UN Security Council, 1991, p. 6).

3.6.2 Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

After the Gulf War, UN inspectors in 1991 learned of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapon programme despite regular inspections conducted by the IAEA. Much criticism was directed at the NPT and IAEA safeguards. It can be argued that this

development threatened the non-proliferation regime and damaged its credibility and currency as an arms control instrument (Pilat & Pendley, 1995, pp. 51-52). An inability to detect Iraq's nuclear weapon ambitions demonstrated the weakness of IAEA safeguards and the need to strengthen its ability to detect nuclear material that has not been declared and diverted from peaceful to military purposes.

In 1991, the IAEA proceeded to modify its safeguards system. Thus, in 1993, the Board of Governors called for the Director General to develop proposals for strengthening safeguards. The secretariat of the agency was tasked with developing a safeguard program. In 1995, the Board of Governors supported measures to strengthen the IAEA and the Director General could then put these measures into effect. Certain measures required legal authority, and a special committee of the Board of Governors were tasked with developing a model to gain authority (IAEA, 2005, pp. 4-5). The outcome of discussions resulted in the formation of a Model Additional Protocol to the NPT, approved on 15 May 1997 and published as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

"Under an Additional Protocol (based on INFCIRC/540 (corr.)), which is the key to the strengthened safeguards system, a State is required to provide the IAEA with broader information covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle-related activities, including research and development, uranium mining and nuclear waste. States must also grant the Agency broader access rights and enable it to use the most advanced verification technologies" (IAEA, 2002a, n.p.). States forming part of Comprehensive Safeguards with the IAEA are expected to subject themselves to short-notice inspections and all sectors of nuclear sites are to be accessible to inspectors (IAEA, 2002a, n.p.; Behrens, 2006, p. 4). In addition, the manufacturing and export of nuclear-related technologies will be monitored, and inspectors could then also collect environmental samples from all nuclear-related sites to verify that nuclear material have not been diverted to military purposes.

The Iraq clandestine nuclear weapons programme was successfully stopped and destroyed. However, the same could not be said for North Korea. The second case of non-compliance to the NPT was North Korea. North Korea pursued a nuclear weapons option, and in 2003 become the first state to withdraw from the NPT, largely an unresolved issue.

3.6.3 North Korea's clandestine nuclear weapons programme and treaty withdrawal

In the 1950s, the Soviet Union aided North Korea in the production of a nuclear research reactor and later in 1973 supplied fuel for this reactor. A Soviet IRT-2m research reactor was built and in 1974 Korean specialist modified this reactor, which operated similar to that of the Soviet Union. The reactor had a capacity to produce eight megawatt and a fuel enrichment of 80 percent. In 1986, United States satellites revealed a new power plant in North Korea which separated plutonium from spent fuel in the nuclear reactor. In addition to this development, a 50 megawatts nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and a 200 megawatts reactor at Taechon were built. This increased concerns around the nuclear programme of North Korea (Nikitin, 2009, pp. 1-2; Arms Control Association, 2010).

In 1988 a significant development occurred in the UNGA where the South Korean President, Roh Tae Woo, called for discussions between South and North Korea on security matters (Kim, 1997, p. 261). The division of Korea stems from the 1945 allied victory by Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union over Japan that was the former colonial power of Korea. In an attempt to end the war with Japan the United States and Britain requested that the Soviet Union attack Japanese forces. When the United States invaded Korea, it occupied the South while the Soviet Union occupied the North. These two territories become two separate republics and the boundary that separated them was referred to as the 38th parallel (Millett, 1998, pp. 299-300).

A Trusteeship plan was set up to enable the United States and the Soviet to control each territory respectively for a temporary period. The superpowers were supposed to coordinate their activities and aid Korea in its political, economic and social stability and ultimately realise a unified Korea (Matraym, 2004, p. 60). Problems emerged when rivalry between the superpowers affected the negotiation and cooperation process which led the Soviet Union in the North to create a communist government under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, who headed the cabinet as a premier and the ruling authority of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was formed in 1948. On the other hand, the United States was involved in the creation of a democratic government with a capitalist market framework in the South where Syngman Rhee was elected President of the Republic of Korea. The United States and the Soviet Union were the cause of the division of Korea into South and North Korea respectively (Matraym, 2004, p. 58).

Korea was thus divided into two territories each with its own political and economic ideology. Each side voiced that they represented all Koreans and wanted control over the entire Korean peninsula (Matraym, 2004, p. 60). This tension resulted in the escalation of armed conflict and war between North and South Korea, referred to as the Korean War, which started in 1950 (Matraym, 2004, pp. 76, 79-81; Perry, 2006, pp. 78-81). Technically, the Korean War did not end, what took place was a ceasefire among warring groups. On 27 July 1953, China, North Korea, South Korea and the United States signed the Korean War Armistice Agreement issuing a ceasefire where no group was required to surrender. Based on the Armistice Agreement a new border (demilitarised zone) was marked between North and South Korea and how to handle political prisoners were discussed (Stueck, 1995, pp. 211-212).

In September 1990, the dialogue between North and South Korea that the South requested occurred. The talks produced a positive outcome in the form of two agreements, namely the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges,

and Cooperation and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Niksch, 2005, p. 10).

The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was signed in 1991 and brought into effect on 19 February 1992. The Joint Declaration agreement between North and South Korea prohibited each state from possessing nuclear weapons or nuclear facilities capable of reprocessing plutonium and enriching uranium. A nuclear inspection system also had to come into effect to monitor this process. As a result, North Korea, on 30 January 1992, signed an IAEA safeguard agreement required under the NPT when it acceded to the treaty in 1985 (Niksch, 2005, p. 10; Manyin, 2003, p. 3). The call for an inspection regime to monitor the denuclearization process came in the form of a Joint Nuclear Control Commission mandated with the task of developing the inspection regime.

On 4 May 1992, North Korea submitted its nuclear material report to the IAEA. Upon inspection of the report, the IAEA noted discrepancies in this initial report submitted by North Korea in September 1992 and asked for clarification on the amount of reprocessed plutonium. In a nuclear reactor spent fuel can be separated to make plutonium. The danger is that plutonium can be used to supply fuel for a nuclear reactor but can also be used to make nuclear weapons if further enriched. As a result of discrepancies the IAEA requested a special inspection in February 1993, however, was denied entry to North Korea's nuclear sites. The IAEA announced that it was unable to verify whether nuclear technology was being used for peaceful purposes or diverted to making nuclear weapons. It was also widely believed by IAEA inspectors that two nuclear facilities in North Korea were storing nuclear waste, which they were refused entry to (Larkin, 2008, pp. 35-36; Niksch, 2003, p. 3).

To the surprise of the international community, on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT (Larkin, 2008, p. 31). According to Article X of the NPT, member states have the right to withdraw from the NPT "...if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized

the supreme interest of its country" (Kerr, 2010, p. 26). The withdrawal announcement led to talks between the United States and North Korea in June 1993. In a Joint Statement, North Korea and the United States agreed on a Korean peninsula free from nuclear weapons, not to threaten the other with nuclear weapons and that North Korea would subject itself to IAEA safeguards. On 19 May 1994, the IAEA announced North Korea's removal of spent fuel from its five-megawatt nuclear reactor. Concerns arose from the fact that spent fuel can be reprocessed for making nuclear weapons (Arms Control Association, 2010; Niksch, 2005, pp. 11-19). Shortly after this, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the IAEA which led to another round of talks between North Korea and the United States.

In an attempt to contain the nuclear issue of North Korea, the so-called Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea was proposed on 14 October 1994. The Agreed Framework had the aim of replacing graphic moderated reactors and facilities with a light-water reactor power plant in North Korea. The United States envisioned an international consortium for sponsoring and supplying the light-water reactor project. In return, North Korea would have had to freeze its graphic moderated reactors and facilities and eventually dismantle them (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, 2009, pp. 1-2; Larkin, 2008, p. 32). North Korea's treaty withdrawal sparked bilateral negotiations between itself and the United States. This led North Korea to retract its decision to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 (Chaffee, 2003, n.p.).

Both the Iraq and the North Korean cases highlight an inherent structural weakness within the NPT, namely that non-nuclear weapon states may use their entitlement to civilian nuclear technology to pursue military programmes and then withdraw from the NPT. Although the NPT provided verification measures to prevent this diversion, they clearly were not sufficient in the two cases discussed above.

3.7 End of the Cold War

Despite the Iraq and North Korean cases, the NPT may be said to have gained more currency from the end of the Cold War (1991) that preceded the 1995 Review Conference.

According to Thomas (1995, p. 93), the end of the Cold War halted the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons (not pursuing increased nuclear stockpiles) between the United States and Russia (formally part of the Soviet Union). The Cold War ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union due to its economic stagnation, which led to the independence of 15 states formally part of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the hostile bipolar order that characterised the Cold War while signalling and entrenching the military dominance of the United States (Thomas, 1995, pp. 91-94).

Linked to South Africa's transition from apartheid (which was in turn linked to the end of the Cold War), South Africa dismantled its nuclear arsenal and joined the NPT in 1991. Since the 1980s the apartheid regime had been on the brink of collapse based on domestic and international pressure. Economic sanctions and export controls were also placed on nuclear-related trade by the United States (Pabian, 1995, p. 10). In 1990, South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons programme which was also influenced by dialogue between itself and three existing nuclear weapon states (the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) (Pabian, 1995, p. 9).

South Africa's nuclear weapons and security position was largely influenced by its international isolation which in turn related to its policy of apartheid. The nuclear weapons of South Africa were envisioned to protect its sovereignty from external invasion by major powers, such as the Soviet Union and maintain domestic order. South Africa used the threat of the Soviet Union to justify its banning of political parties such as the African National Congress and the South African Communist

Party. As soon as regional and international tension diminished so did the need for possessing nuclear weapons, making it harder for nuclear weapon advocates to justify nuclear weapons (UN, 1991, pp. 5, 14, 36-37).

Furthermore, at this time, the former Soviet Union states, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, gave up their nuclear weapons (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 6; Harvey, 2010, p. 1). Argentina and Brazil shortly after entered a bilateral agreement to put their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and in 1993 Argentina ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and joined the NPT in 1995. The Treaty of Tlatelolco established a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America and in the Caribbean. As a result, in 1994 Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and eventually joined the NPT in 1998 (Gwertzman, 2010, n.p.; Clemens, 2004, p. 227). There were visible strides achieved by the NPT manifesting in several states now accepting non-proliferation as the norm, signalling in turn the start of realising the NPT's universal nature.

3.7.1 Voices against indefinite extension

The 1995 Review Conference was a critical time when member states had to decide whether this treaty should be extended indefinitely or be granted another fixed period (Simpson, 1994, pp. 30-31). The United States directed a great deal of resources towards the indefinite extension of the NPT and prioritised this as a foreign policy goal. However, many non-nuclear weapon states, such as Egypt, Indonesia and Mexico did not support this decision. Thus, there was much controversy around this issue, which affected the outcome of this conference (Steinberg, 1996, p. 20).

During the review process, various proposals were put forward, including a deadline to disarm nuclear weapons, universality of this treaty, security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, the need to resolve the matter of North Korea and Iraq clandestine programmes and Israel's accession to the NPT. Discussion on the indefinite extension of the NPT was affected and influenced by Israel's non-membership to this treaty. For this reason, it is necessary to reflect on the events

leading to Egypt's stance towards Israel and its lack of support towards the indefinite extension of the NPT.

In 1991, a significant development occurred at the Madrid conference to begin the Middle East peace process, which included government officials from Cairo, Jerusalem and Washington. This conference led to the formation of the Arms Control and Regional Security Multilateral Framework designed with the purpose of addressing regional issues between Israel and the Arab world, extending to North Africa, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. It was suspected that Israel was in possession of nuclear weapons and did not subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection (Ziabari, 2010, n.p.). In 1990, Egypt proposed a Middle East Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction. Egypt put pressure on Israel to place its nuclear policy on the agenda. However, Israel did not want to discuss its nuclear policies despite Egypt's insistence that it was necessary and was linked to the establishment of regional peace and stability (Steinberg, 1996, p. 18).

Upon visiting Israel in August 1994, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amre Moussa urged Israel to sign the NPT. Moussa noted that the nuclear capability of Israel was threatening to Egypt. By the time of the Review and Extension Conference in 1995 the position of Egypt towards Israel remained unchanged (Steinberg, 1996, pp. 18-19; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994, pp. 3-4).

3.7.2 The 1995 Review and Extension Conference

On 19 April 1995, the Review and Extension Conference opened in New York and was attended by 175 member states. Nuclear weapon states such as Britain, France and the United States supported the indefinite extension of the NPT without any limitations or conditions. However, this outcome for the NPT was not widely supported, especially not by non-aligned states.

During deliberations at the review process of the NPT a group of 14 non-aligned states directed by Indonesia did not support a treaty with an unlimited lifespan.

Indonesia proposed a rolling fixed period of 25 years. This would provide the opportunity to monitor the NPT and act as a source of pressure on nuclear weapon states to disarm. Extending the NPT indefinitely would affect the leverage that non-nuclear weapon states had over nuclear weapon states. From this argument, the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states would be institutionalised and thus keeping the discriminatory nature of this treaty intact (Epstein, 1995, p. 27; Leith & Pretorius, 2009, p. 350; Steinberg, 1996, pp. 20-21 and Kerr, 2010, pp. 4-5). Non-aligned states supported a CTBT, legal security assurances, disarmament of nuclear weapons and bringing India, Israel and Pakistan into the NPT.

The inability to resolve the matter around Israel's nuclear capability resulted in Egypt not supporting the indefinite extension of the NPT along with Arab states, such as Syria (Steinberg, 1996, pp. 20-21). Egypt proposed that the conference should be suspended until this matter was resolved, which was also supported by Syria. The extension of the NPT was thus linked to Israel's accession to this treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.

During discussions, member states made draft proposals in support of the indefinite extension of the NPT. South Africa drafted its own principles in support of the indefinite extension of the NPT and gained the support of some non-aligned states, weakening the proposal made by Egypt to link the extension to Israel (Rauf & Johnson, 1995, pp. 29, 31).

The United States did not want a split vote and saw the importance of arriving at a consensus in support of the indefinite extension of the NPT. It became necessary for the United States to make a compromise with Egypt so as not to isolate Israel during discussions. However, this compromise failed to materialise (Steinberg, 1996, p. 23). Matters were further complicated by Egypt's desire to have Israel accede to the NPT before the treaty could be indefinitely extended.

There were a number of non-aligned states who criticised South Africa for its support of the indefinite extension of the NPT. South Africa proposed principles of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which lay the foundation for a successful NPT Review Conference. The South African proposal included: strengthening the review process of the NPT, access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a fissile material cut-off treaty, the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones and so forth. The 'consensus package' put forward by South Africa gained the support of non-aligned states not without criticism, but also gained support from nuclear weapon states such as the United States. Non-Aligned states voiced concern over the lack of support for nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon states, and thus influencing their decision not to support the NPT's indefinite extension (Shelton, 2000, pp. 20-21). Israel was not explicitly linked to the Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, but the Middle East Resolution was a step toward establishing peace in this region (Steinberg, 1996, p. 24).

3.7.3 The outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

After the NPT was extended indefinitely a document was adopted by the conference on strengthening the review process of this treaty, and it developed principles and objectives that would pave the way for non-proliferation and disarmament. This document was divided into three decisions, entitled: "Decision 1: Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty, Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Decision 3: Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (Rauf, 2000a, p. 6).

Based on these three decisions member states agreed that in 1997 a Preparatory Committee would conduct meetings once a year every three years prior to the review process. Preparatory Committees provide ways and consider principles and objectives that will enable the NPT to be fully implemented. The Preparatory Committee would also be tasked with providing recommendations to the Review

Conference – they thus have an important agenda-setting role (Harvey, 2010, p. 37; Rauf, 2000b, pp. 147-148).

Based on Decision 2, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, all states that are outside the NPT were called to sign and ratify it. The importance of signing international safeguard agreements with the IAEA was noted. With regards to non-proliferation, all efforts needed to be directed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and by extension to prevent nuclear war. This should be achieved without affecting the inalienable right of NPT members to use nuclear technology peacefully. Nuclear weapon states at this conference reaffirmed their commitment to Article VI "to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament" (UN, 1995, p. 2). Two of these measures were preventing nuclear weapon testing and stopping the production of more fissile material.

It was the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament to complete the CTBT "no later than 1996" and to conclude an agreement on a treaty that would ban the production of fissile nuclear material used to make nuclear weapons. The CTBT requires all states that sign not to conduct test explosions of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (Feldman, 1997, p. 163).

Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones marked an important area of agreement at this Review Conference. It was stated that the development of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone should take priority in regions experiencing tensions, with specific reference to the Middle East. This resolution was in response to the conflict, tension and civil wars that plague the Middle East. Creating a Middle East free from nuclear weapons would contribute to regional peace and security (Rauf, 2000b, p. 149).

In accordance with Article X paragraph 2 of the NPT, a majority of member states had to decide whether this treaty would be extended indefinitely or granted a fixed period. Though all demands by member states were not achieved the outcome of

the conference was deemed successful as the NPT was indefinitely extended (Rauf, 2000b, p. 148). Nuclear weapon states received their desired outcome and to some extent, so did the non-aligned states through the efforts of South Africa, who drafted a proposal for the indefinite extension of the NPT that called for the review process to be strengthened, the conclusion of the CTBT by 1996, as well as noted the need for commitment by nuclear weapon states towards nuclear disarmament. South Africa's proposal was accepted and created a point where states could find common ground and agree on the way forward for the NPT (Leith & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 350-351).

3.8 The 2000 Review Conference

In April 2000, the sixth NPT Review Conference was convened with a low sense of expectation by member states. Based on the problems and tensions encountered before the Review Conference, including the nuclear test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998, the United States Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT and Washington's intended missile-defence plans that would have been in breach of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, left the NPT in a weakened state with not much hope for the Review Conference (Gillis, 2009, pp. 29-30).

The desire of India and Pakistan to become nuclear weapon states has largely been influenced by their rival history, territorial disputes and regional tensions in South Asia.

In 1947, after India received its independence its former colonial power Britain divided India into two separate states. The two states were divided along religious and ethnic lines. India comprised mainly of a Hindu population while Pakistan was predominantly Muslim. Since independence these two states have been in conflict as a result of their ethnic and religious differences. The roots of conflict are based in territorial claims over boundaries as a result of the 1947 partition of India. In particular, Jammu and Kashmir was a contested area resulting in armed conflicts, for

example, the first Kashmir crisis of 1947 (Sprecher & Park, 2003, p. 160). Each state desired to expand their territory and engaged in military conflict to realise their objective. In order to ensure that no state gains the advantage both India and Pakistan developed conventional and nuclear weapons capability (Sprecher & Park, 2003, pp. 158-159).

In May 1998, India and Pakistan respectively conducted a nuclear test, both of which were condemned by the UN Security Council Resolution 1172. UN Security Council Resolution 1172 states: "that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security" (UN Security Council, 1998, p. 1). This document reaffirms that the nuclear test by India and Pakistan threatened the non-proliferation regime (non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and also increased the risk of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. In accordance with Resolution 1172 India and Pakistan were called upon to cease all nuclear tests and enter dialogue to find solutions to the long-standing tensions between them (UN Security Council, 1998, pp. 1-2).

These two cases posed a challenge to the NPT, highlighting that some states still remained outside this treaty and needed to be brought within its scope. Moreover, their tests exposed a structural difficulty in the NPT's binary treatment of states as nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states based on whether states had tested by 1967. India and Pakistan were now clearly de facto nuclear weapon states, but according to the NPT's classification system, they remained de jure non-nuclear weapon states. Even though India and Pakistan remain outside the NPT their nuclear tests thus impacted on the NPT and influenced discussions at the 2000 Review Conference.

Abdallah Baali from Algeria was elected as the President of this Review Conference and proposed that the conference should include two subsidiary bodies (Rauf, 2000a, p. 4). In this way, a Main Committee 1 would discuss disarmament and security assurances while the Main Committee 2 focused on regional issues. General debates

in this conference revolved around issues such as the lack of commitment towards the NPT by Iraq and North Korea, the threat that Israel's nuclear weapons programme posed to regional peace in the Middle East, and the unwillingness of the United States to ratify the CTBT (Kurosawa, 2000, pp. 1, 9-10).

In Main Committee 1, the five recognised nuclear weapon states issued a joint statement where they supported the indefinite extension of the NPT and officially agreed and indicated that they are committed to the results and the decisions that came out of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Another issue brought before Main Committee 1 concerned the 'modernisation of nuclear weapon systems', as nuclear weapon states continued to test and improve nuclear systems, which Switzerland described as being in opposition to the CTBT. South Africa made the nuclear weapon states aware of their commitments to the CTBT as discussed in the Conference on Disarmament. The nuclear weapon states expected more praise for their support of Article VI while non-aligned states made reference to the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and its declaration of the inhumane nature of nuclear weapons. The endorsement of this declaration would significantly contribute to nuclear disarmament. However, this proposal was blocked by nuclear weapon states (Johnson, 2000, n.p; Rauf, 2000c, n.p.).

3.8.1 Security Assurances

Calls from non-nuclear weapon states for nuclear weapon states to commit towards negative security assurances were made in Main Committee 1. The non-aligned states, in particular, Indonesia, argued that a legal treaty specifying negative security assurances be integrated into the NPT. China also urged fellow nuclear weapon states to commit to negative security assurances without any conditions attached. This initiative was also echoed by Switzerland, and in its proposal articulated that negative security assurances should not be linked to chemical or biological weapons as was previously done by the United States. A legally binding treaty would represent

an important measure in support of Article VI by nuclear weapon states. Other discussions included the Middle East Resolution, safeguards and nuclear energy (Johnson, 2000, n.p.; Dhanapala & Rydell, 2005, p. 123).

3.8.2 The efforts of the New Agenda Coalition in support of disarmament

The Review Conference ended on 20 May with a sense of relief as a final document was achieved. It was a long fought battle to reach a positive outcome for the NPT, considering the difficult time this conference was held at. This conference successfully developed a final document with nuclear weapon states showing more support towards disarmament than what was seen in previous years. Through the efforts of the so-called New Agenda Coalition nuclear weapon states had to specify their intensions towards the NPT as their compliance was called into question.

The New Agenda Coalition was established in Dublin in 1998 by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden (Duarte, 2008, p. 1). The New Agenda Coalition continues to play a role in multilateral forums in the arena of non-proliferation and disarmament. Nuclear disarmament has been a particular focal point of the New Agenda Coalition where they have emphasised that non-nuclear weapon states remain committed to the NPT while nuclear weapon states have not been fully committed towards their disarmament obligation, this argument was expressed in the 1999 Preparatory Committee. The New Agenda Coalition affirmed that nuclear weapon states need to be transparent about their nuclear weapons and committed to nuclear disarmament (Joyner, 2011, p. 73). In this way, the reduction of nuclear weapons can instil confidence in the non-nuclear weapon states that a nuclear weapons-free world is an aspiring ideal. The New Agenda Coalition thus serves as a bridge between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. Concerning the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, the New Agenda Coalition has been particularly influential in persuading nuclear weapon states in making a joint statement (Kerr, 2010, p. 5). The nuclear five, namely China, France, Russia, the

United Kingdom and the United States have made a joint statement indicating that they will uphold their obligations to the NPT. In addition, the New Agenda Coalition was successful in having the 13 steps integrated into the final document of the NPT (Bunn, 1999, p. 4; Murphy, 2004, pp. 214-215).

3.8.3 The 13 steps in support of nuclear disarmament

Based on the concerns that the obligations of the nuclear weapon states to the NPT were vague, the 13 steps provided clarity and detailed their commitment. The 13 steps along with the CTBT represent practical steps agreed between member states of the NPT to set in motion nuclear disarmament under Article VI. It may be argued that the 13 steps are useful to place pressure on nuclear weapon states to seriously consider nuclear disarmament (Larkin, 2008, pp. 220-221; Müller, 2005a, p. 35).

The 13 steps were negotiated between the five nuclear weapon states and the New Agenda Coalition and form part of a consensus final document of the 2000 Review Conference (Estabrooks & Regehr, 2003, p. 5). The 13 steps urgently call for the signature and ratification of the CTBT (1), an agreed delay on nuclear test explosions (2), reaching the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty (3). In some cases plutonium or highly enriched uranium has been recycled from dismantled nuclear weapons to improve or build new nuclear weapons (Johnson, 2000, n.p.; Buongiorno & Godsberg, 2010, n.p.). To avoid the occurrence of nuclear weapons being manufactured in this way, once fissile materials are no longer used for military purposes they should be placed under inspection of the IAEA or another international verification body.

Step 4 calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body within the UN Conference on Disarmament to deal specifically with nuclear disarmament. The principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament (5), nuclear weapon states should be explicit about their commitment to total nuclear disarmament (6). The entry into force of START II and START III (7), establish a Trilateral Initiative between the United

States, Russia and the IAEA (8), support the unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons, transparency of nuclear arsenals and reducing the role nuclear weapons feature in security policy (9). Place fissile material no longer used for military purposes under IAEA verification (10), reaffirm the general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons remain a vital objective (11), nuclear weapon states should submit regular reports on their implementation of the NPT (12), and lastly, additional verification capabilities need to be established to ensure compliance toward nuclear disarmament agreements (13) (Middle Power Initiative, 2003, pp. 4-19).

This positive outcome was short lived as in the upcoming 2005 Review Conference this consensus regarding the NPT and its future were to be severely challenged by nuclear weapon states.

3.9 The 2005 Review Conference

In May 2005, member states convened for the seventh NPT Review Conference. This was indeed a troubling time as the United States announced it would no longer be bound to the proceedings and decisions of the 1995 and 2000 review processes. In addition, in the run-up to this conference, the Preparatory Committee of the NPT, tasked with the responsibility of developing an agenda for the conference, could not realise its task. Declining support towards disarmament by any one of the important states acting as leaders of the non-proliferation regime may affect the NPT and hinder discussions (Zanders, 2010, pp. 2-3; Harvey, 2010, p. 37).

On 11 September 2001, an attack was launched against the United States sparking its so-called "War on Terror" campaign directed at terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda and rogue states believed to have sponsored them, such as Iraq. Four commercial passenger jet planes were believed to have been hijacked by Al Qaeda, two of which were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, killing thousands of people. A third plane crashed into the Pentagon, and a fourth plane initially targeted at Washington DC crashed in Pennsylvania (Purpura,

2007, p. 359). The September 11 attack on the United States soil increased its insecurity and gave birth to its pre-emptive war doctrine under the Bush administration (Mockli, 2010, p. 73).

In September 2002, the pre-emptive war doctrine formed part of the National Security Strategy document of the United States. The United States thus linked pre-emption and prevention together. Pre-emption refers to when a possible adversary's use of weapons of mass destruction is impending, thus requiring the use of military action in self-defence. Prevention includes a range of strategies to stop a state from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (Litwak, 2003, p. 17). There was an international consensus around using military might to overcome terrorist organisations but not in relation to states breaking international laws. Iraq had been in non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions since the end of the Gulf War (Litwak, 2003, p. 16). The pre-emption doctrine linked terrorism and non-proliferation in that rogue states may aid terrorist organisations in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 31). Thus, the Bush administration made a direct (albeit it tenuous) link between nuclear weapons, Al-Qaeda and Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein.

In 2003, the United States-led war against Iraq was based on non-proliferation objectives. Iraq was accused of being in possession of weapons of mass destruction. The pre-emptive doctrine gained much criticism as the IAEA official tasked with proving that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons programme, Hans Blix, could not confirm it. Despite Blix's conclusions, the United States-led invasion of Iraq occurred without UN Security Council backing (Blix, 2008, pp. 199, 201, 204). Although the United States was supported by some allies, for example, the United Kingdom, it was still seen as a unilateral decision to go to war with Iraq, which had implications for the 2005 Review Conference. It suggested a disregard of the NPT by the United States. The Review Conference is a multilateral forum that requires the cooperation of states to function. However, under the Bush administration, the United States had

placed itself above the treaty which it had originally spearheaded (Malone & Khong, 2003, pp. 5-6). This set the tone for the 2005 Review Conference and was to a great extent responsible for its failure.

Müller (2005a, p. 35) refers to the 2005 Review Conference as 'disastrous' and as having a deteriorated mood where member states could not even decide on the agenda for discussion. An international treaty is only as strong as the level of support showed by its member states. Since compliance to the treaty was in question a review process regarded as disastrous might have a grave effect on the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states voiced their concern that too much emphasis had been placed on their obligations. However, the activities or expectations of the nuclear weapon states under the NPT were vague, which had already been said in previous Review Conferences (Müller, 2005a, p. 35). Since the 1995 Review Conference, momentum had increased towards disarmament in the form of the CTBT and in 2000 more support was shown towards this end through the 13 steps. With this in mind, further positive strides made towards Article VI of the NPT could have created a more balanced and equal treaty (Boutwell, 2010, p. 2).

3.9.1 The breakdown and failure of the 2005 Review Conference

Non-compliance towards the NPT during its 2005 review process came from the United States' unwillingness to support the proceedings that emerged during the 2000 review process. Tension between NPT member states revolved around whether the 2000 Review Conference results should act as a standard to judge NPT compliance. The term 'manoeuvring' is useful to understand the conduct of nuclear weapon states and their attempt to undermine Article VI during this time. During negotiations, states, such as the United States and France, were guilty of trying to prevent a discussion on the results of the 2000 Review Conference (Boutwell, 2010, p. 10). Nuclear weapon states' lack of commitment towards Article VI reached a low point. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was welcomed at the 2000 Review

Conference as an important instrument for building international stability, was disregarded by the United States' pursuit of missile-defence (Müller, 2005a, p. 39).

Before explaining what the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty entailed a definition of a missile needs to be provided. "A missile is a self-propelled, guided or unguided projectile designed to deliver a weapon or other payloads" (Gillis, 2009, p. 43). Missiles are powered by jet engines but differ in range distance. There are short-range missiles such as tactical ballistic missiles and long-range missiles such as intercontinental ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles can be launched from the ground, from a ship and underwater (Gillis, 2009, p. 43). The danger surrounding missiles is that they have the potential to carry nuclear weapons over long distances. States that build missile-defence systems (also called an anti-ballistic missile system) such as the United States, Russia and China argue that this is to combat missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction referring, in particular, to rogue states such as Iran and North Korea in the case of the United States (Gillis, 2009, pp. 44-45, 47).

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a bilateral agreement signed between the United States and the Soviet Union on 26 May 1972 and entered into effect on 3 October 1972. This was an attempt to reduce the anti-ballistic sites and missile systems of each state respectively (Arbatov, 2008, pp. 106-107). An anti-ballistic missile system is a missile-defence system that has the ability to intercept, stop and destroy any incoming ballistic missile. Regardless of the importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a symbol of arms control and reduction the United States under the leadership of George W. Bush in 2001 officially withdrew from this treaty. George W. Bush argued that this treaty hinders the United States from protecting and defending itself against the ballistic missile attacks of rogue states and terrorists (Doyle, 2009, p. 142; Arms Control Association, 2003). In addition, the Bush administration announced that it would no longer support the CTBT, nor ratify it. In 1995 when the NPT was indefinitely extended, part of the package included the CTBT. Taken off the

agenda were negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty which the United States refused to support as well.

States without nuclear weapons came to the harsh realisation during these negotiations that those with nuclear weapons may not be willing to give them up. This point is further strengthened by Müller (2005a, p. 40), "In 2005, it became clear that NWS are set on keeping their nuclear weapons and regard them as legitimate elements of their military postures". Under the Bush administration, the United States made it clear that it would deploy its nuclear weapons against rogue states and against biological and chemical weapons. The fact that nuclear weapons have been officially part of the military posture of the nuclear weapon states is proof that their military officials and politicians regard nuclear weapons as legitimate.

3.10 The build-up to the 2010 Review Conference

After the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, there were fears and concerns that the NPT was losing its legitimacy among member states and therefore its ability to contribute to trust among these states in this area that is so key to international security. As a result, great expectations and importance were placed on the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference.

The period preceding the Review Conference were influenced by the trade in nuclear-related technology between the United States and India. On 1 October 2008, Washington formally approved a peaceful nuclear-cooperation deal between the United States and India (Bajori 2010, n.p). The problem with this agreement is that India is in possession of nuclear weapons; however, it is not a member of the NPT and has not subjected its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. The United States-India deal was thus in direct violation of the NPT; risking watering down the security regime and affecting the goal of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament (Zanders, 2010, p. 8). This agreement also revealed the preferential treatment to India unlike in the cases of Iran or Iraq.

Review Conferences are impacted by the events preceding them but the recurring problems that were not successfully resolved at previous conferences also influence discussions and proceedings. They include the 1995 resolution of the Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. India, Pakistan and Israel have still not joined the NPT, and North Korea withdrew from the NPT and tested nuclear weapons (Hubert, Broodryk & Stott, 2010, pp. 1-2). An inability to resolve these matters threaten the non-proliferation norm and thus the future of the NPT. Despite the challenges to the NPT, there was an optimistic view in the air at the eighth NPT Review Conference.

Rebecca Johnson, director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, argued that 2010 marked a period in which the "international environment" was more favourable to deal with nuclear-related issues (Johnson, 2010a, p. 8). This favourable environment could be attributed to the initiatives and work done by the Obama administration. On 5 April 2009, United States President Barack Obama delivered his now famous speech in Prague. The significance of this speech lay in the support the United States expressed towards disarmament and the realisation of a world free from nuclear weapons (Smith, 2010, p. 71). Obama added in his speech, "So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same" (Obama, 2009). This served to revitalise the commitment of the United States towards the NPT and hope for a successful Review Conference. Under the leadership of Obama, the nuclear posture of the United States changed, indicating that it will no longer retaliate with its nuclear weapons against biological, chemical or conventional attacks (Sanger & Baker, 2010, n.p.). New START was signed between the United States and Russia signalling their renewed support towards nuclear disarmament (Johnson, 2010a, p. 2). These initiatives were geared towards making the May 2010 NPT Review Conference a success after the failure of the previous conference in 2005 to produce a final document. A successful NPT

Review Conference provides hope and a sense of confidence in the NPT and its ability to realise a nuclear weapons-free world.

3.10.1 The 2010 Review Conference

In May 2010, the eighth NPT Review Conference was hosted at the UN in New York. Negotiations at the Review Conference began with member states making general statements and commenting on the NPT. For the purpose of delegating work, Main Committee 1 and Subsidiary Body 1 were tasked with discussing nuclear disarmament. Main Committee 2 focused on non-proliferation measures and Subsidiary Body 2 worked on regional issues with reference to the Middle East. Main Committee 3′s area of focus was peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and Subsidiary Body 3 focused on improving the review process and the issue of treaty withdrawal (Müller, 2010, p. 8). The problem was that none of these bodies could develop a consensus report.

At that point, the Review Conference president, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan of the Philippines, used documents supplied by committee chairs and requested that member states discuss this in open consultation, which then formed part of a conference draft report. Another group of approximately 15 delegates deliberated on recommendations to the NPT.

Member states agreed "to a forward-looking action plan covering nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear energy, as well as the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East" (Acheson, 2010, n.p.). Iran attempted to block this consensus on an 'action plan' forming part of the 2010 NPT final document. However, Iran did not obtain the support of fellow non-aligned states, and on the final day of negotiations, a final document was obtained consensually (Müller, 2010, p. 8). Since 2002, Iran has been in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards under the NPT. Iran has not been transparent about its nuclear activities, which created the perception that it may be

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pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme. Iran has been suspected of the enrichment of uranium, which is "closer to levels needed for making weapons-grade material -- uranium refined to 90 percent purity" (Hafezi, 2010, n.p.). In May 2010, Brazil and Turkey concluded a nuclear fuel agreement with Iran to overcome the view by Western states that Iran was developing the ability to enrich uranium to weapons' grade. Brazil and Turkey's intervention did not stop the UN Security Council from launching a fourth round of sanctions on Iran for punishment of its alleged nuclear programme (Mac Farquhar, 2010, n.p.).

3.10.2 Concluding the 2010 Review Conference

The final document included the proceedings of the Review Conference, the views of the president on deliberation among member states and recommendations put forward (Albright & Stricker, 2010, p. 1). The nuclear weapon states have reaffirmed their commitment towards total nuclear disarmament at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The conference concluded where nuclear weapon states have appeared to make some concessions to show that they remain committed to this treaty. A conference has been proposed for 2014 to discuss practical steps to realise disarmament. In 2012, the UN Secretary-General and others will convene a regional conference for the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (UN, 2010, pp. 21, 29-30; Krieger, 2010, n.p). The UN Secretary-General, along with Britain, Russia and the United States were tasked with appointing a host government to facilitate preparations towards this conference (Johnson, 2010a, p. 5). In the area of disarmament and nuclear safeguards not much has been achieved besides reaffirming what had been put forward in the 2000 review process such as the importance of ratifying the CTBT. Disarmament proposals and reducing the importance of nuclear weapons in military doctrines came from groups such as the non-aligned states.

The usefulness of nuclear deterrence and the modernisation of nuclear weapons were criticised by the non-aligned states (Johnson, 2010a, p. 6). Iran criticised nuclear weapon states, in particular, the United States and France, for blocking disarmament steps and a time-bound framework to realize nuclear disarmament (Johnson, 2010a, p. 5). These states did not want to be bound by a legal time frame for complete disarmament (Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, 2010, n.p). Other critiques came from states such as Switzerland over the tactical nuclear weapons installed in Europe through NATO. It was argued that these weapons are no longer useful in Europe. Initially, they existed to strengthen the United States and European military ties and relations during the Cold War to deter and counter the threat of the Soviet Union (Müller, 2010, p. 9; Arms Control Association, 2006, n.p.). In the final document of the NPT, the nuclear weapon states are only encouraged to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states implicitly (Müller, 2010, p. 10).

The United States-India deal did not feature explicitly, although, the final document states that for nuclear export to occur states must have "full scope safeguards" (Müller, 2010, p. 10). As was noted above, the Additional Protocol of the IAEA gives the IAEA more rights and enables it to use more advance technology to verify states′ nuclear activities. The conference mentioned the Additional Protocol as a recommendation but did not explicitly indicate that it will be the standard for all nuclear exports (Johnson, 2010a, p. 7; Albright & Stricker, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, Western states wanted to strengthen export controls so that states could coordinate policies under the guidelines of the NSG. However, NAM argued that export control steps prevented them from accessing advanced technology and would also affect their sovereignty (Müller, 2010, pp. 7, 16). With India exempted from the rules of the NSG many member states question the fairness of this decision. The lack of support towards the time frame for nuclear disarmament also played a role in hindering the negotiation process and thus caused conflict between member states (Kerr, 2010, p. 13). Disagreement between nuclear weapon states and the non-aligned states

prevented the realisation of valuable and key steps that would have strengthen the pillars of the NPT, namely non-proliferation and disarmament.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference can be deemed a success as a final document was obtained and cooperation among member states were achieved despite the damage done to the treaty by the 2005 Review Conference. However, more political will is required from nuclear weapon states regarding nuclear disarmament; this will lead to further cooperation among member states. Visible achievements toward nuclear disarmament may be met with increased support by the non-aligned states toward non-proliferation initiatives such as the Additional Protocol. A strengthened and durable NPT can only result once members make tangible accomplishments to show their commitment to this treaty.

3.11 Conclusion

The NPT can be considered as a bargain between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. This bargain has benefits such as the right and the provision to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes granted to NPT members and in particular, non-nuclear weapon states. In turn, non-nuclear weapon states should be committed to non-proliferation. On the other hand, nuclear weapon states should not aid non-nuclear weapon states in the production/development of nuclear weapons and in turn have an obligation under Article VI to disarm their own nuclear weapons. In this way, a bargain such as the one encompassed by the NPT has in place obligations and rules acting to influence the behaviour of member states. The breakdown of this bargain occurred during the 2005 Review Conference.

Disagreement and conflict between member states of the NPT led to a deadlock in negotiations. To the dismay of many member states, the 2005 Review Conference was a complete failure, unable to produce a final document which also affected the standard and the quality of the NPT and the faith of member states in this treaty (Boutwell, 2010, p. 10). One conclusion to be drawn from the outcomes of these

review conferences is that nuclear weapon states are not committed to their end of the bargain as written up in Article VI of this treaty and that non-nuclear weapon states were duped when they signed onto the NPT. Another way to interpret the review conferences suggests the intense awareness by member states that nuclear weapons breed insecurity and a world free from them is in the interest of all states, hence the need to ensure a successful outcome of the review conferences.

Despite the major concerns that the NPT has faced, there still seems to be a sense that states cannot fathom an international order without the NPT (or an equivalent). The notion that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are important norms to be pursued, and the gains made during the 2010 NPT Review Conference contradict the realist notion of self-help in international relations. How treaties function to condition and restrain state perceptions and behaviour, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, remains an important topic of study.

The next chapter will provide a realist view of the NPT as an instrument that serves the interests of nuclear weapon states by creating an order that is favourable to them by preventing others from becoming future nuclear weapon states.

Chapter 4: A realist perspective of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

4.1 Introduction

This chapter serves to provide a realist view of the NPT. In International Relations, there are debates over the role treaties play in the international system and whether norms and standards of behaviour echoed in regimes and institutions influence the behaviour of states. As was noted in chapter two both realist and liberal scholars make convincing arguments. It thus becomes necessary to delve into the positions of respective states (as represented by their officials) on this issue. For example, Indian officials often argue that the NPT is an instrument used by the strong to maintain the nuclear order in their favour. India's position with respect to the NPT can be explained in the context of its officials' realist worldview. Deconstructing views which may hinder the success of this treaty, especially by delving into the role that respective states' leaders and officials see treaties, institutions and regimes play in the international system becomes a significant task that sheds light on the problems the NPT has experienced.

In this chapter, the realist theoretical paradigm will be used as a lens to analyse the views of states to the NPT. Review conferences discussed in chapter three, namely those held in 1975, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 will be used as practical cases to examine the realist notion that treaties forming part of institutions and regimes do not have much influence over the behaviour of states, and that they only serve the interests of the powerful, in this instance, nuclear weapon states, as opposed to the weak, or in this case, non-nuclear weapon states.

4.2 The utility of nuclear weapons

Since the NPT was formulated complete nuclear disarmament remains an ideal but not a practice. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union spent huge amounts of money on building nuclear weapons, but was this rational

behaviour? Despite concerted efforts by the international community nuclear weapons remain in existence, and the NPT even makes a distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, and since the treaty was extended indefinitely this distinction has been institutionalised. The NPT has thus fixed the Cold War position of the nuclear powers and created an order that serves their interests. How can these matters be understood? Key to a realist understanding of the NPT is the role and function that nuclear weapons are perceived to serve in the international system.

4.2.1 Nuclear weapons protect national security

The huge amounts of money that was spent on building nuclear weapons and increased stockpiles during the Cold War could have been spent on social development projects in the United States and in the Soviet Union. In a 1995 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on Nuclear Weapons entitled "The Real Cost", it is stated that during 1946, the United States spent 25 billion in dollars on infrastructure alone, including reactors, uranium-enrichment plants, chemical separator facilities and laboratories (Schwartz, 1995, p. 34). On the question of whether this is rational behaviour, realist scholars such as Morgenthau and Waltz argue that states are in fact rational actors. From this view, states are rational agents acting in a selfish and self-help way only to maximise their own interests, hence, states are "sensible and calculative" (Nel, 2002, p. 27). For the United States, nuclear weapons have served a host of functions. Not only have nuclear weapons been explicitly linked to protecting its security from conventional and nuclear attacks but also protects its allies through its nuclear umbrella referred to as extended deterrence. President Obama stated the importance of reducing the role nuclear weapons play in its national security strategy (Jackson, 2010, n.p.). Under the Bush administration, nuclear weapons were envisioned to be used against rogue states and terrorist organisations.

In an anarchical world, states cannot trust each other and have to assume the worst about the intentions of others. For classical realist scholars, such as Machiavelli, state survival is of utmost importance, because if leaders are not wise, they will surely lose their state. It is impossible to escape the condition of insecurity, and this leads state leaders to pursue military power (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 75; Walt, 1998, pp. 35, 37). Even though states are considered equal because of sovereignty, states are distinguishable according to their power capabilities. Neack (2003, p. 128) provides a useful understanding of power as measured by a state's level of industrialisation and economic strength, accompanied by a well trained and large military. A strong military force is pertinent to the survival of a state and hence serves its national interests. States have to be ready to dispel an adversary to protect its interests. Nuclear weapons, as a result of their massively destructive power, have been viewed as the ultimate weapon to safeguard national security.

Realists hold that a balance of power is a way to combat international anarchy. Balance of power can be defined as "a system in which no single actor is dominant" (D'Anieri, 2011, p. 30). In this system, no individual state can dominate the international system as groups and units of states will combine their efforts and align their policy to prevent the emergence of a hegemon (Sheehan, 1996, p. 76). An example of a balance of power is the emergence of the Anglo-American-Soviet alliance to prevent the rise and domination of Nazi Germany over Europe (van Uhm & Schoenmaker, 2012, p. 322). According to Waltz (2000, p. 38) "Balancing is a strategy for survival, a way of attempting to maintain a state's autonomous way of life". However, realists recognise that the pursuit of security through balancing power may well result in the so-called security dilemma and arms races that actually create more insecurity. In the nuclear weapons realm, this leads to the prediction that if state A decides to build a nuclear arsenal as an ultimate weapon to guard their security, its rival (say, State B) will feel insecure and respond by trying to balance State A's power by also acquiring nuclear weapons. State B's nuclear weapons may in turn threaten State C or introduce suspicion into a region where tension exists,

leading to a chain of nuclear proliferation. In fact, realists predicted in the 1950s that there would be proliferation to the nth degree - this was referred to as the nth country problem. For example, the United States President, John F. Kennedy warned that by 1975 the number of nuclear weapon states may increase to 15 to 20 (new nuclear proliferators) (Yudin, 2009, p. 4).

It is not difficult to see how security concerns led to a chain of proliferation in the past. The Manhattan research project began in 1939 at the height of World War II. It led to the development of the first atomic bomb in the United States after Germany was suspected of developing an atomic bomb. Later, the United States used these bombs to get Japan to surrender unconditionally (Hackel, 1992, p. 70). After the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States, the Soviet Union invested more funds and energy in its own nuclear weapons programme. The use of the atomic bomb by the United States raised the concern in the Soviet Union about a possible United States attack given the two states' ideological rivalry. In the case of the United Kingdom and France, the decision to go nuclear was based on the increasing threat of the Soviet Union. Also, the United Kingdom and France no longer felt secured under the nuclear umbrella offered by the United States through NATO, and pursued their own nuclear weapon capability (Sagan, 1997, p. 58). China's decision to go nuclear was influenced by concerns over a possible nuclear attack by the United States after the Korean War, as well as diverging Sino-Soviet relations that resulted in China denouncing the Soviet version of Marxism in 1961. The Chinese nuclear weapons programme in turn had an impact on India's decision to conduct a nuclear weapons test in 1974. In 1914, the British integrated the Arunachal Pradesh region into India, which China regarded as part of its territory. In 1962, as a result of this territorial dispute, India and China went to war (Guo, 2007, pp. 51-52). India's long-standing rival, Pakistan, built close ties with China. In 1998 India tested nuclear weapons again. Shortly after India's nuclear test, Pakistan followed suit to balance India's power and to deter India (Sagan, 1997, p. 59). This is the nature and effect of the balance of power logic, with the outcome of an arms race and nuclear

proliferation as seen in the domino effect of states obtaining nuclear weapons to achieve security vis-à-vis their rivals.

4.2.2 Nuclear weapons as a deterrent mechanism

According to Kacowicz et al (2000, p. 14), the long-standing peace between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be attributed to nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union had the capability to destroy each other, but did not. Policy makers in the United States and in the Soviet Union as well as realist scholars inferred that the value of nuclear weapons does not lie in its physical use but in its ability to deter and threaten an adversary. Both the United States and the Soviet Union realised that if either used nuclear weapons, the other will retaliate in the same manner (Kennedy, 1969, pp. 86-88). The use of nuclear weapons will ensure the destruction of each state respectively. It would be a rational decision for leaders to avoid any action that will escalate tension between itself and another nuclear weapon state. This rule or principle that maintains nuclear stability is referred to as mutually assured destruction. The logic of mutually assured destruction is that there is no way any state can win a nuclear war, as each state would receive damage equal to the other. This recognition deters a nuclear attack by any state on another. More specially, any benefit perceived to be achieved through the use of nuclear weapons will be superseded by its cost (Neack, 2003, pp. 51-52). It could be argued that this logic also characterised the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a short period in history, which began on 16 October 1962 when the United States learned of the Soviet Union missiles in Cuba. It ended on 28 October 1962 when the Soviet Union agreed to the withdrawal of its missiles (Weldes, 1999, p. 38). The stationing of nuclear weapons in Cuba relates to the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961 under the leadership of Fidel Castro, the revolutionary, that overthrew the Fulgencio Batista government. Under the Castro government Cuba became a socialist one-party state. The Bay of Pigs translated from the Spanish name

Bahia de Cochinos, the area wherein the invasion of Cuba took place. The United States, under the leadership of President John F. Kennedy, supported Cuban exiles who were in opposition to Castro. However, after the Bay of Pigs incident, the United States was embarrassed as the Cuban exiles were captured by Castro's army (Hammond, 1969, pp. 157-158). This increased Castro's fears of another United States attack on Cuba. Stationing missiles in Cuba by the Soviet Union was thus in response to an increasing United States threat to Cuba's socialist regime and the need to counter Western domination (Weldes, 1999, p. 39; Belkin & Blight, 1991, p. 732).

During the Cuban Missile Crisis nuclear weapons were not intended for physical use, but were useful to threaten the United States and prevent it from invading Cuba. This point is supported by a statement by Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union at the time, when he said: "My comrades in the leadership and I realized that our friend Fidel totally failed to understand our purpose. We had installed the missiles not for the purpose of attacking the U.S. but to keep the U.S. from attacking Cuba" (Khrushchev, 1990, n.p). Realists argue that nuclear deterrence prevented the use of nuclear weapons during this time, and it is for that reason that Waltz encouraged the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He maintained that these weapons played a positive role during the Cold War in preventing the superpowers from going to war (Waltz, 2008, pp. 384-385, 392, 396).

It was the dangers associated with a nuclear war and the logic of mutually assured destruction, which facilitated cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union agreed to remove its nuclear weapons in Cuba with the condition that the United States removed its missiles from Turkey (Allison, 1971, p. 136; Kennedy, 1969, p. 89). The dangers of a nuclear war led the United States and the Soviet Union to reconsider the nuclear arms race. Relations between these states began to improve, leading to the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which prevents nuclear testing on land and

underwater (Belkin & Blight, 1991, p. 733). Miscalculation and time constraints could have had grave consequences for the United States and the Soviet Union. On 26 October 1962, Nikita Khrushchev sent a message to President Kennedy informing him Soviet missiles would be removed from Cuba on condition that the United States does not attack Cuba. It took Kennedy 12 hours to decode Khrushchev's message. This delay in response by the United States could have been interpreted as an indication of war on Cuba. Establishing a direct line of communication between these two leaders could significantly overcome miscalculation between them. In June 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct line of Communication. As a result, a teletype device was installed between Washington and Moscow to send and receive printed messages between them (Sterling, 2008, p. 221).

Nuclear weapons under the doctrine of mutually assured destruction formed an important dimension of the bipolar nature of the international system during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union could balance power with the other, creating a sense of stability. Here, a bipolar system is preferred by realists, such as Waltz, who argue that, fewer wars result in such a system as opposed to a system wherein one state dominates and dictates the affairs of other states. The two superpowers were able to restrain their allies and manage crises so as to prevent disputes between them from escalating and risking an unwinnable nuclear war (Nel, 2002, p. 30).

4.2.3 Nuclear weapons: Symbol of power and status

Although the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons are well documented from the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and nuclear tests, on closer inspection, their utility is not just related to their physically destructive ability. Nuclear weapons have meaning and value that extend beyond their physical use. This section will refer to the nuclear ambitions of France, and the role that nuclear weapons play in the

interest of this state. Associating value and prestige to nuclear weapons influence ideas and perceptions of the role these weapons should play in the international system.

An historical background of France represents an interesting case to understand the meaning and value associated with nuclear weapons. France's quest for nuclear weapons is partly based on its history of being invaded by Germany on three different occasions. Germany invaded France in 1870, 1914 and in 1940. The cost of the war effort and the increasing need to build a military force had great ramification on the wealth of France (Finer, 1960, p. 205). The 1940 German invasion by Hitler left France humiliated and disproved the belief that France had a powerful military in Europe.

In France, under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle the Fourth Republic was founded in 1958 and in 1959 de Gaulle served as its president. For de Gaulle, the invasion of France created the need to protect its sovereignty and independence. France during this time formed part of NATO and was thus protected by the nuclear guarantee of the United States. However, de Gaulle was not convinced by this nuclear guarantee. This view was influenced by the fact that the Soviet Union were in possession of ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. Further, the United States did not aid France in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and in the Suez crisis, in 1956. These events led de Gaulle to question the commitment of the United States in protecting the security interests of France (Tertrais, 2004, pp. 56-58).

After World War II, European states were beginning to rebuild and recover their economies. The United States leadership was no longer necessary and deteriorated over time. This was attributed to the fact that once the Soviet Union gained the atomic bomb the United States' monopoly on nuclear weapons began to fade, thus affecting its nuclear guarantee. For de Gaulle France was forced to protect its own national security, which was best served through the development and possession of nuclear weapons. "For him, the bomb was an instrument of self-determination, a

means to exist by ourselves and, in case of drama, to choose our direction by ourselves" (Tertrais, 2004, p. 58). France was determined to protect its national security, through nuclear deterrence and regain its major power status in the international system. This was to be achieved through the possession of nuclear weapons and guided its nuclear policy starting in the 1950s (Tertrais, 2004, p. 56).

It was argued that nuclear weapons would be of great benefit to France for its scientific, technological and industrial development reasons. Atomic power was used for civilian purposes and was a marker of modernity and prestige. France considered the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as great powers and desired to return to its status that had deteriorated after World War II. Nuclear weapons were perceived as a political tool for France to be involved in great power deliberations. Being in possession of nuclear weapons was associated with prestige, and France assumed that through these weapons, it could exercise real institutional power, especially since France was not at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The Yalta conference was a wartime meeting which began in February 1945 between President Franklin D. Roosevelt (United States), Prime Minister Winston Churchill (United Kingdom) and General Secretary Joseph Stalin (Soviet Union). The purpose of this conference was to discuss the recovery of Europe after World War II. The Potsdam conference followed in July 1945 (Van Dijk, 2008, pp. 968-969). These views are still prevalent today and influence the way states (non-nuclear and nuclear) perceive nuclear weapons.

India is another state that has associated prestige and power with nuclear weapons. India's decision to conduct a nuclear weapons test was largely viewed as a response to regional tensions, more especially China and Pakistan. On closer inspection, India's possession of nuclear weapons is closely associated with its desire to be classified as a great power. In 1993, a Bharatiya Janata Party spokesman said, "Nuclear weapons will give us prestige, power, standing" (Perkovich, 1998, p. 16). By being in possession of nuclear weapons, India believed this would prove to the international community

that it deserves the status of a great power and should be taken seriously on the international stage. This is evident in India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Dillon, 2007, p. 15; Deshingkar, 1996, p. 41). The link between possessing nuclear weapons and exercising great international influence is not surprising. India is aware of the fact that the five nuclear weapon states of the NPT are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. India's bid to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council was also endorsed by the United States President Obama. President Obama voiced, "I look forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member" (BBC News, 2010). India will use this permanent seat to promote peace and stability beyond its region to deal with security concerns in Afghanistan and its rival Pakistan (The Express Tribune, 2010).

Perceptions rightly or wrongly associated with nuclear weapons as the ultimate source of security, markers of modernity, and status and prestige make nuclear weapons attractive to other states and in turn became a threat to non-proliferation, fuelling the nuclear ambitions of states.

4.2.4 Challenging the "nuclear taboo" norm

At the time when nuclear weapons were used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War II it was viewed as a legitimate weapon of war. Shortly after its use its development and usefulness were criticised. This came in the form of the UN and its distinction between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. The UN defined nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction based on its destructive, indiscriminate and disproportional power but also the radiation effects it caused to the Japanese population and the fear and disgust that were associated with its use. This led to the formation of the so-called "nuclear taboo", an international norm holding that nuclear weapons should not be used again in any war situation. This

norm became essential to delegitimize nuclear weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament (Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 362-363).

Realists are critical of the role of norms in the international system and question whether norms even exist. From this view, norms have no impact on influencing the behaviour of states because power ultimately influences what states can or cannot do. Thus, norms "are simply a function of power and interest and thus produce no independent analytical leverage" (Tannenwald, 2007, p. 4). Realists account for the non-use of nuclear weapons by arguing that it is rational decision making (Allison, 1971, pp. 12-13). Decision makers of the state conduct a cost-benefit analysis when faced with a demand, and since the use of nuclear weapons lacks any material benefit its use would not be rational (Ogilvie-White, 1996, pp. 44-45). Norms are only stating what decision makers already know, namely that the use of nuclear weapons have no material benefits. "In this view- a hyperrealist argument- norms, if there are any, are simply frosting on the cake" (Tannenwald, 2007, p. 39). Hence, norms prohibit behaviour that states did not want to pursue in the first place and for this reason are relatively weak.

4.3 Promoting non-proliferation and not disarmament

The introduction of the NPT was significant for nuclear arms control and disarmament. A closer look at the events surrounding its introduction suggests that the NPT was to a great extent a product of great powers pursuing their interests in this realm.

In 1956-1957, the United States and the Soviet Union both shared the concern of nuclear proliferation to states that they were allied to. The United States feared that states such as Germany, Italy and Japan would become nuclear based on the threat of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union feared the proliferation of nuclear weapons to China, on the one hand, and to Germany through NATO on the other. The spread of nuclear weapons diminished the control of superpowers over

their allies and risked the escalation of tension between them, a point that the Cuban Missile Crisis brought home (Tertrais, 2005, p. 1). At this time the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were the only nuclear powers and preventing others from gaining these weapons was seen to be in their interest.

On 28 October 1962, in a statement made by the United States President, Kennedy declared, in response to a letter received from Khrushchev, that the missile crisis was over. At this time, Kennedy pointed out the need for the United States and the Soviet Union to work together to make progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (Kennedy, 1969, pp. 183-184). This view supports the notion that nuclear weapons facilitated cooperation between the dominant powers of the Cold War due to the logic of mutually assured destruction. The risk that not all states would abide by this logic if they had nuclear weapons and actually use them, led the superpowers to cooperate to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to states other than themselves, which in turn, explain the drive of the major powers to negotiate and universalise the NPT.

This drive was also motivated by the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. In 1963, after the Cuban Missile Crisis the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed on the Partial Test Ban Treaty, banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space (Johnson, 2009, p. 2). This treaty was only honoured for a year, and later member states did not want to remain committed to it. The Chinese test brought home the realisation that more states may find a way to develop nuclear weapons and thus contributed to the alignment of the focus of the United States and the Soviet Union to find a way to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the light of this, the NPT would address the concerns of the superpowers and create an order that would facilitate their interests.

Although realists argue that international anarchy is the only factor capable of influencing state behaviour an international treaty can emerge but only when superpowers (great powers) desire to establish it (Carranza, 2007, p. 493). In 1966,

the non-aligned states argued for arms limitation and security assurances to be included in the NPT. However, the United States and the Soviet Union refused to support these proposals, arguing that they would prevent agreement on the NPT and delay its implementation (Pande, 1995, p. 10). Already at this time, nuclear weapon states were clearly not in favour of nuclear disarmament. The draft treaties submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee by the United States, and the Soviet Union lacked a disarmament clause, which many non-nuclear weapon states had hoped for in return for their commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons.

With this background in mind the NPT should be seen as an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. These states came close to engaging in nuclear warfare but did not. It should be understood that alliances between states, as well as treaties can serve to the benefit of states by limiting the actions and behaviour of other states (Sonalp, 2009, p. 15). The signing and ratification of the NPT by the United States and the Soviet Union created an assurance that the other would not proliferate by aiding non-nuclear weapon states in the production of nuclear weapons. The support for non-proliferation was in the interest of the superpowers as it prevented others from gaining the bomb while the superpowers could maintain their monopoly over these weapons. After all, nuclear weapons served a deterrent function during the Cold War so why would the superpowers decide to abandon or dismantle them. The dismantling of nuclear weapon does not represent rational thinking (Allison, 1971, p. 12; Tagma, 2010, p. 165).

In a 1995 Preparatory Committee meeting, the United States Ambassador, Graham Thomas, said, "While the NPT reflects the reality that five nuclear-weapon states existed in 1968, it does not legitimize the permanent possession of nuclear weapons" (Graham, 1994, n.p.). The NPT recognised that five nuclear weapon states existed before 1967, but the treaty did not legitimise their status or act as a justification for developing new nuclear weapons. In 1995, the indefinite extension of the NPT was linked to the 'principles and objectives on nuclear non-proliferation and

disarmament' where nuclear weapon states are called to reduce and disarm their nuclear weapons; this legal requirement is enshrined in Article VI of the NPT (Graham, 1998, p. 25). The NPT, firstly, acts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states and secondly calls nuclear weapon states to stop a nuclear arms race and to disarm their nuclear arsenals. The NPT bestows rights and obligation on both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states (Albright & O'Neill, 1995, p. 25). However, it is this distinction in the NPT which leads nuclear weapon states to assume the treaty legitimises their status as a nuclear weapon state and in turn support their possession of nuclear weapons indefinitely (Athanasopulos, 2000, p. 47). Nuclear weapon states such as the United Kingdom have argued that the NPT legitimises their status as nuclear weapon states and allows them to hold onto nuclear weapons. The inability to link nuclear disarmament to non-proliferation significantly hampers the strength of the NPT. In fact, nuclear weapon states such as the United States and China view nuclear weapons as an essential component to protect their security interests by deterring possible attacks (Brooks, 2008, p. 73; Guoliang, 2008, pp. 174, 184).

When non-nuclear weapon states signed and ratified the NPT, the category of nuclear weapon states was not seen as a permanent arrangement. Article VI of the NPT was a measure to make the treaty more equal and eventually the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states would be removed (Miller, 2007, pp. 50-51). The dispute over nuclear disarmament and its slow pace by nuclear weapon states has been linked to the wording of Article VI of the NPT. "In fact, while Article VI is often invoked, it may be that it is rarely read, because the text of the treaty is far more vague and conditional than the common understanding of it. As written, the text of the treaty requires not nuclear disarmament but the pursuit of negotiation, not disarmament but 'effective measures relating to...nuclear disarmament" (Miller, 2007, p. 51).

4.4 The created 'order' of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

As discussed in chapter three, the evolution of the NPT evident in review conferences highlight the areas of disagreement between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states relating to their commitments and rights and the increasing need to integrate non-members into this treaty. The NPT has created a system of order surrounding nuclear-related matters by attempting to influence state behaviour through its rules, standards and norms. At this juncture, two questions emerge. That is, what impact or effect did the order created by the NPT have on the behaviour of member states, and does the order created by the NPT benefit some states more than others and if so how? Closely linked to these two questions is the manner in which dominant states interpret and relate to the NPT, in particular, how their activities and actions benefit certain states.

4.4.1 Japan, Germany and South Korea's accession to the NPT

During the Cold War, the United States placed its nuclear weapons in Europe and in Asia. The United States thus extended a nuclear deterrent to its allies and partners against states in their region with nuclear weapons, or who may be pursuing nuclear weapons (United States Department of Defense, 2010, pp. 31-32). According to the International Security Advisory Board (2007, p. 23) "There is clear evidence in diplomatic channels that U.S. assurances to include the nuclear umbrella have been, and continue to be, the single most important reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons".

In Japan, talks over the ratification of the NPT took place in the National Diet of Japan, that is, Japan's bicameral legislature (comprising of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors). From 17 December 1974 until 24 May 1976, NPT ratification talks convened (Endicott, 1977, p. 275). Japan's ratification of the NPT gained much criticism. Geneda Minoru, an elected member of the House of

Councillors for the Liberal Democratic Party, voiced concern over placing Japan's security interests in the hands of the United States. In this way, the concern was raised, if Japan's nuclear weapon option should be closed or remain open. Japan delayed ratification of the NPT as it was assumed this treaty gave the United States the right to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely. Another concern was Japan's fear that the NPT may prevent it from developing peaceful nuclear technology (Endicott, 1977, pp. 275-277; Hughes, 2004, p. 199). In response to these concerns, Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi said, "...if the U.S.-Japan security arrangement were to lose its validity, then the entire question of Japan's security would have to be restudied in the light of changed circumstance" (Endicott, 1977, p. 281).

In August 1975, in a joint announcement, the United States President, Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Miki Takeo agreed that the nuclear deterrence offered by the United States contributed greatly to Japan's security. Furthermore, President Gerald Ford reassured Prime Minister Miki Takeo of the United States' pledge under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to protect Japan against nuclear and conventional attacks (Watanabe, 1997, p. 353). Japan's decision to ratify the NPT was largely influenced by the nuclear umbrella of the United States. The non-nuclear stance of Japan may not necessarily be attributed to the NPT; as Japan would remain non-nuclear as long as the extended nuclear deterrence was credible. It can be argued that the NPT alone did not instil enough confidence in Japan that its security could be protected without nuclear weapons. As Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi expressed, the credibility of the United States' nuclear umbrella will determine whether Japan should reconsider its security situation. Commitment to the NPT could be described as weak and conditional as long as Japan's security was safeguarded by the United States which this treaty could not ensure (Endicott, 1977, pp. 282, 292).

In Germany, ratification of the NPT was a controversial issue and for that reason this process was delayed. In 1958, the Free Democrats proposed a nuclear weapons-free Germany, but this view was not widely supported. On the other hand, the Christian

Social Union of Bavaria and some members of the Christian Democrats opposed the NPT. In 1966, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Christian Social Union of Bavaria and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany formed a coalition government (Grand Coalition). As a result of their distinct views of the NPT, reaching an agreement was hard. It was only in 1969, when Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany under the Brandt government signed the NPT. Under the Brandt government it was indicated that, the NPT should not affect its access and right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Also, it was expected that Germany would continue to enjoy security protection under the nuclear umbrella of the United States (Hofhansel, 1996, pp. 129-130; Mackby & Slocombe, 2004, pp. 199-200). In 1955, the United States stationed nuclear weapons in Germany under NATO's nuclear sharing policy (Maettig, 2008, n.p.).

On 2 May 1975, Germany finally ratified the NPT and included a declaration detailing their expectations of this treaty. Germany "reaffirmed its expectation that the treaty would be a milestone on the way toward disarmament and international detente and that nuclear weapon states would intensify their efforts to comply with article 6 of the treaty (on nuclear disarmament); -underlined that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany continued to be ensured by NATO..." (Mackby & Slocombe, 2004, pp. 200-201). According to Müller (2003, p. 14), the United States had to place considerable pressure on Germany to ratify the NPT, and reaffirmed its 'nuclear security guarantee' through NATO to ensure Germany remained non-nuclear. Being a member of the NPT enabled Germany to gain access to the right to research and develop nuclear technology for civilian purposes and even though Germany technically forswore nuclear weapons, their security interests were protected by NATO. This raises a concern, as non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT should not be in possession of nuclear weapons on their territory. However, in recent years, discussion over NATO's deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany has been critically examined. In Germany, both citizens and politicians are calling for the

removal of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, as these weapons are no longer relevant (Snyder & van der Zeijden, 2011, pp. 4-13).

South Korea is another state protected under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States in South Korea was not made public. The stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea compensated for the reduction of the United States' forces that assisted and supported South Korean soldiers during the Korean War and after the signing of the Armistice agreement. In the 1950s, as a result of the Korean War, the United States suffered a financial deficit. The United States had to reduce its forces and financial aid to South Korea to resolve its financial deficit. However, the reduction in aid and military assistance was not supported by the South Korean President Syngman Rhee. President Syngman Rhee was committed to the reunification of Korea and would use force to realise this end (Heo & Roehrig, 2010, p. 159). Fear over the possibility that South Korea might provoke North Korea could have influenced the United States' decision to station its nuclear weapons in South Korea (Jae-Bong, 2009, n.p.). For the United States, its nuclear weapons in South Korea served to deter a North Korean attack (Nam, 2009, p. 163). In 1975, Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger publically announced that the United States had deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea "and would use them if it was faced with serious aggression likely to result in defeat in any area of very great importance to the US in Asia...including Korea" (Nam, 2009, p. 88).

South Korea signed the NPT in 1968 but only ratified the treaty in 1975. The late ratification by South Korea may be based on North Korea and China's refusal to sign the NPT and Japan's delayed ratification (Solingen, 2007, p. 85). Yet again, the nuclear guarantee offered by the United States to a large extent influenced its decision to ratify the NPT after seven years. "Indeed, South Korea's statement accompanying ratification clarified that NPT membership would be contingent on robust U.S. security commitments. Park's statements merely two months after

ratification reiterated that South Korea would need its own deterrent if U.S. guarantees were removed" (Solingen, 2007, p. 85). Park Chung-hee was the President of South Korea from 1961 up until 1979. In 1991, the United States President, George H. W. Bush began the process of removing its nuclear weapons from South Korea. The United States hoped the removal of nuclear weapons would lead North Korea to discard its nuclear ambitions, on the one hand, and on the other hand, that Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev would also initiate nuclear disarmament (Heo & Roehrig, 2010, p. 164)

In recent years, discussions have emerged in South Korea over the possibility of pursuing its own nuclear weapon capability. Conservative politicians and the media argue that South Korea should reconsider its non-nuclear status. The economic hardships in the United States and its declining global influence sparked discussion in South Korea about the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons on its territory or whether it should pursue its own nuclear deterrent (Weitz, 2011, n.p.). North Korea continues to make gestures in support of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula but lack commitment towards realising this end (Dae-joong, 2011, n.p.). According to Dae-joong (2011, n.p.), it is only through South Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons that negotiations between North and South Korea will produce results. These comments should not lead to the assumption of an emerging nuclear South Korea, rather that the nuclear guarantee of the United States may no longer be sufficient, intensifying a sense of insecurity and concern over the realisation of a nuclear weapons-free Korea.

The mentioned cases of Japan, Germany and South Korea are examples of states that are covered under the nuclear guarantee of the United States. The only difference is Japan, and South Korea no longer have tactical nuclear weapons of the United States on their territory. On the other hand, Germany no longer wants tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. It has been assumed and argued that the increasing normative strength of the NPT was responsible for the decision of states to forgo nuclear weapons (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 78). According to Kutchesfahani

(2010, p. 10), it was rather the nuclear guarantee of the United States that played a significant role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Realist scholars point to the limited role institutions play in shaping state behaviour, this argument is well applicable to the NPT. In this context, remaining a non-nuclear weapon state were not influenced by the NPT directly. Commitment towards the norm of non-proliferation was based on the benefits that some states enjoyed; that is, the protection of the nuclear guarantee of the United States (Kutchesfahani, 2010, p. 12). This so-called benefit and privilege were not extended to all non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT. For Japan, Germany and South Korea, belonging to the NPT was a convenient arrangement; they gained access to nuclear technology but also are protected under the United State's pledge to protect them from conventional and nuclear weapon attacks. Preventing nuclear proliferation to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Turkey and other European states was the desired outcome, but the method employed to change this behaviour and in turn shape and change their sense of insecurity was not achieved through the NPT. "Without this guarantee, and without subsequent ratification of the NPT, this norm against nuclear weapons proliferation might not have been as strong as it is today" (Kutchesfahani, 2010, p. 10). This point brings into question the strength of the NPT and the reason why states have ratified it. Without the nuclear guarantee, non-nuclear weapon states may reconsider their non-nuclear status (Taylor, 2010, p. 6).

Sovereignty infers that all states are equal; however, realists argue that states differ in their capability and power. Under the NPT not all states are equal as some benefited more from this order, and this inherent inequality may be responsible for distrust among them. In a 1993 statement, Japanese Foreign Minister, Kabun Muto said that "if North Korea develops nuclear weapons and that becomes a threat to Japan, first there is the nuclear umbrella of the United States upon which we can rely. But if it comes down to a crunch, possessing the will that 'we can do it ourselves' is important" (Schoff, 2009, p. 2). This quote highlights the fact that despite having ratified the NPT in 1976, Japan considered keeping its option to develop nuclear

weapons open. What is evident is that being under the NPT does not necessarily mean states will forgo their quest for nuclear weapons. Rather, if regional disputes intensify, for example in the case of North Korea, or if confidence in the nuclear guarantee of the United States decline this may create sufficient conditions for Japan and other states to withdraw from the NPT, pursue a nuclear weapons programme and obtain nuclear weapons. The NPT may not be sufficient to influence state's decision to forgo nuclear weapons or even disarm; as regional tensions, perceived external threats and a changing international system may drive states to produce nuclear weapons to ensure the safety of their security interests (Kurosawa, 1997, pp. 9, 11-12).

It is not only certain non-nuclear weapon states as mentioned previously that benefited from the order of the NPT fashioned by dominant states. Non-members of this treaty also benefited from this order, for example, India and Israel.

4.4.2 The nuclear trade between the United States and India: undermining Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The NSG was established in 1975 and comprises of 46 nuclear supplier states.[1] The nuclear supplier states have coordinated their export controls to regulate the trade in nuclear-related materials and technology to non-nuclear weapon states. The NSG is another key component of the non-proliferation regime and in its 'guidelines' describe the rules for nuclear trade (Arms Control Association, 2006). The NSG guidelines administer and manage trade of nuclear material and technology to

[1] NSG members includes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. Nuclear Suppliers Group, see: http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/03-member.htm

prevent misuse and the development of nuclear weapons. For example, the NSG imposes restrictions on the trade of nuclear technology with states that do not adhere to the NPT or have not signed IAEA safeguards (Wastler, 2010, pp. 201, 205).

On 6 September 2008, the NSG formally approved an exemption to its rule that only allows nuclear trade to non-nuclear weapon states if they have signed a comprehensive IAEA safeguard agreement with the IAEA. This was done under pressure from the United States that announced its intentions to normalise trade with India in 2005. India is not a member of the NPT and has a nuclear weapons programme. However, under the NPT India is classified as a non-nuclear weapon state and the United States would thus not have been allowed to engage in nuclear trade with India unless the NSG exempted India from the need for comprehensive safeguards.

Under the Atoms for Peace program, India misused nuclear technology and in 1974 conducted a nuclear test explosion. In 1975, the NSG was formed based on India's nuclear test and through its guidelines prevented states such as Israel and Pakistan from gaining access to the benefits of nuclear trade (Schaffer, 2009, pp. 91-92). The problem with the nuclear agreement between the United States and India is that it lifted a 30-year-old ban by the NSG on transferring nuclear material to India (Wastler, 2010, p. 202). NSG member states could have blocked the nuclear cooperation deal with India but chose not to. On the one hand, states such as Australia, Ireland and New Zealand initially disagreed with the decision to exempt India from NSG rules. On the other hand, France and Russia had a vested economic interest in exempting India from the NSG rule (Wastler, 2010, p. 205). Proponents of the nuclear agreement argued that it served to bring India closer to the non-proliferation regime and strengthened United States and Indian relations. Under the nuclear agreement, India was required to formally pledge to suspend nuclear testing and to subject its civilian nuclear facilities and non-military facilities to IAEA inspection (Wastler, 2010, p. 210).

The United States and India nuclear agreement gives American companies the ability to sell nuclear fuel, technology and reactors to India (CNN, 2008). France has also commenced a similar agreement to provide India with the world's largest nuclear reactor of 1,650 megawatt (BBC, 2008). Other states outside the NPT may also appeal for this type of cooperation and states within the NPT may question their membership. Through the nuclear deal with the United States, India enjoys the benefits of being a nuclear power while also receiving benefits associated with member states of the NPT (Srivastava, 2007, n.p.).

However, for many non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT, this agreement represented a violation to their interest. According to Article IV of the NPT, non-nuclear weapon member states to this treaty have the inalienable right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. India was afforded this benefit or right even though it remains outside the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT have forgone the option of going nuclear and in this way gained access to nuclear technology; this forms part of the grand bargain between member states of the NPT (Scott, 2010, p. 3). Access to peaceful nuclear technology is the exclusive right of non-nuclear weapon states (Wastler, 2010, p. 209).

The George W. Bush administration saw building closer links with India as having a strategic purpose to counterbalance China as a rising power (Sevastopulo, 2008, n.p.). The United States and Chinese relations have been filled with inconsistency and uncertainty.

After China denounced the Soviet Union in the 1960s the United States under President Richard Nixon moved from a relationship of confrontation with China to peace and reconciliation (Goh, 2005, p. 112). In recent years, relations between China and the United States have been characterised by hostility and tension. The economic rise of China has been viewed with suspicion and fear, especially from the United States. In 2010 China had an economic grown rate of 9.7% (BBC, 2011). China is a communist state with a rising economy and a real contender for the role of

superpower. There have been fears in the United States that China may challenge the position of the United States as a global leader. China may use its power and position to reshape international institutions in its favour; mostly, it is the distinct culture and ideology of China, which is threatening to the United States (Hsiao & Lin, 2009, p. 42; Xia, 2008, n.p.). China also has the world's largest army, but it is the United States' trade deficit with China that prevents it from pushing for reforms in China. The United States has a trade deficit with China of $133, 412.6 billion in goods and services based on 2011 foreign trade statistics (United States Census Bureau, 2011, n.p.). These factors make the United States unsure on how to deal with China; that is, whether to embrace China or regard it as a foe (De Vore, 2011, n.p.).

The nuclear trade with India shows a disregard for rules and the watering down of the NPT. Balancing power and economic benefits gained through nuclear cooperation trumps non-proliferation efforts as national interests take precedence (Cohen, 2006, p. 93). Here double standards are evident in the case of India where it receives benefits for being allied to the United States while states such as Iran or North Korea that are not allies of the United States, experience more pressure for their nuclear activities (Bajoria, 2010, n.p.).

The Indian case points to the concern by non-aligned states that export controls are used as a foreign policy tool by industrialised countries to punish their rivals and repay their allies, rather than being implemented to ensure the principle of non-proliferation (Müller, 2010, p. 7).

4.5 Historic links between the United States and Israel

The United States has supported Israel since its formation in 1948 after World War II and the holocaust. During World War II, Nazi Germany under the leadership of Adolf Hitler was responsible for the mass murder and genocide of approximately six million European Jews. On 29 November 1947, the UNGA agreed to partition Palestine to form an independent Israeli state. An independent Israel set its state boundaries and

reclaimed more land than what was initially agreed under the UNGA Partition Plan. Israel thus encroached on Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip occupied by Egypt, and the West Bank occupied by Jordan. Egypt, Syria and Iraq proceeded to attack Israel on the same day as its independence. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war of independence, thousands of Palestinians fled their homes or was expelled and took refuge in neighbouring regions such as Jordan and Syria. The encroachment of Palestinians′ rights was a central issue influencing Israeli and Arab relations. In order to house the Jewish immigrant population Israel exploited water from the river that separates Israel and Jordan without gaining agreement from Arabs which angered the Arab world (Gat, 2005, p. 613; Grey, 1994, p. 220).

The Six Day War of 1967 intensified relations between the United States and Israel. On 5 June 1967, Israel used its air force to launch a surprise attack on Egypt and Syria. In a decisive victory for Israel, it claimed control over the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria. Before the Six Day War President Nasser of Egypt lashed out against Israel for its abuse of Palestinian rights. Nasser also employed rhetoric calling for the destruction of the Israeli state (Gat, 2005, p. 608). Nasser did not want to go to war with Israel. Instead, he lashed out against Israel as proof that he was committed towards Pan-Arab elements desiring the freedom of Palestine (Gat, 2005, p. 609). The involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was evident, and it feared Israel would attack its ally Syria. As a precautionary measure the Soviet Union warned Egypt of this development. Israel was not planning on attacking Syria though. The Soviet Union wanted Nasser to deter Israel from attacking Syria but did not expect Nasser to provoke a war (Tal, 2000, pp. 136-137).

The increasing presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East led the United States under President Richard Nixon to support Israel and balance power through strengthening its military influence and position to deter Arabs from conducting a war that would escalate in war between the superpowers (Stephens, 2006, p. 27). For

the United States, Israel represented an ally to the fight against communism in the Middle East during the Cold War.

During the 1980s relations between the United States and Israel were labelled by President Ronald Reagan as a security partnership, but in actual fact many argue that Israel dictates the foreign policy of the United States on the Middle East, which may have negative implications. President Ronald Reagan argued that ongoing United States support for Israel was a moral obligation in support of the pledge of the Jewish people and in accordance with the national interests of the United States (Thomas, 2007, p. 56).

Israel finds itself in a hostile region with emanating threats from states, such as Egypt, Syria, Iran and so forth. However, security threats to Israel also came in the form of terrorist organisations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Since 1985, the United States provided Israel with $3 billion per annum in economic and military aid, which has increased since (Mark, 2004, p. 2). A former Senator of the United States, J. William Fulbright, cautioned in 1974 that the Jewish lobby "can just about tell the president what to do when it comes to Israel. Its influence in Congress is pervasive and, I think profoundly harmful – to us and ultimately to Israel itself" (Thomas, 2007, p. 51). Israel perceives itself as in a precarious and hostile position within the Middle East and as a result requires security assurances and protection, which largely come from the United States.

4.5.1 Jewish lobby in the United States

The Jewish lobby in the United States comprises of Christian Americans, Jewish Americans, religious organisations, such as the John Hagee Ministries, and groups, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The Jewish lobby has a pro-Israeli stance, seeking to influence American foreign and public policy in support of Israel. AIPAC has a 100 000 membership base and works with both Democrats and Republican political leaders to strengthen relations between the United States and

Israel. AIPAC was successful in a number of areas, for example, in obtaining foreign aid for Israel from America, passing legislation that places tougher sanctions on Iran for its nuclear programme and acquiring security assistance to maintain and strengthen Israeli military position to overcome its adversaries (United States, 2011, pp. 26-27). There are roughly six million Jews in America that occupy key electoral college states, leading presidential candidates to support and promote the agenda of Israel. The Jewish lobby seeks to influence public opinion, academics and business groups. Media outlets and various Jewish lobbies link Israeli security concerns to American interests. Here American policy and activity in the Middle East, for example, deploying military troops to limit the influence of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah is not necessarily in the interest of America. The boundary of where Israeli security concerns begin and where American interest's end is yet to be clearly specified. Often, it is perceived the interest of Israel and that of the United States are identical, but on closer inspection they are not (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, n.p.).

This favourable treatment towards Israel and long standing support has ramifications in the nuclear realm and ongoing efforts to bring nuclear Israel into the NPT and conduct its nuclear activities in a transparent manner.

4.5.2 Ignoring Israel's nuclear status and non-NPT membership

Calls for Israel to join the NPT have occurred since the treaty came into force. Arab states, in particular Egypt, demanded Israel to end its nuclear ambiguity as Israel does not deny nor admit that it is in possession of nuclear weapons. On 29 July 2004, the Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon said, "Israel faces existential threat, and it must be able to defend itself by preserving its deterrent capability" (Larkin, 2008, p. 23).

In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a nuclear technician who worked at the Dimona power plant in Israel obtained evidence of Israel's nuclear arsenal and presented it to the Sunday Times in London where upon it was published. The Sunday Times published

that Israel was in possession of approximately 150 to 200 nuclear weapons produced in its underground plutonium separation facility (Diehl & Moltz, 2008, p. 203). Upon Vanunu's stay in Rome, he was kidnapped and brought to trial in Israel and imprisoned for revealing the truth of Israel's nuclear power and its possession of nuclear weapons (Larkin, 2008, p. 24). This shows the extent to which Israel was willing to conceal its nuclear activities and prevent leakage of critical information.

Arab states have for many years requested IAEA inspection of Israel's nuclear facilities, but Western States have been more interested in addressing Iran's nuclear programme. On 28 May 2003, Arab states met in Vienna to attend the Arab League Office. The meeting at Vienna produced a memo and letter that were sent to the IAEA. Arab states requested IAEA inspections in Israel, but the request has been blocked by the United States. It is the influence of the United States on the Board of Governors of the IAEA blocking Arab demands that the IAEA criticise Israel's nuclear arsenal (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, n.p.; Perelman, 2003, n.p.).

At the 1995 Review Conference, Egypt voiced the urgency for Israel to join the NPT as Israel's nuclear status poses a threat to Egypt's interest and a threat to the rest of the Middle East. For this reason, Egypt and other Arab states attempted to link Israel's accession to the NPT with the NPT's indefinite extension, but failed to achieve this outcome (Steinberg, 1996, p, 21). All states of the Middle East have signed and ratified the NPT, except Israel. The 1995 Resolution of the Middle East calling for a nuclear weapons-free zone in this region is directly linked to Israel's nuclear weapons. Ignoring a nuclear Israel is a risk to regional and international peace and security. In the 47th regular session of the IAEA it warned Israel's possession of nuclear weapons could spark a nuclear arms race (IAEA, 2003, p. 2). Since 1970, President Richard Nixon stopped inspection of Israel's nuclear facilities, and this perpetuated Israel's nuclear ambiguity. In the 1960s, Israel formally pledged that it would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East and Nixon was advised not to force Israel the issue further (Cohen & Burr, 2006, p. 24).

Richard Nixon was of the view that as long as Israel protected its nuclear weapons and did not test it, in other words, keeping it a secret, the United States could live with a nuclear Israel. This point is strengthened by the fact that in 1970 inspections of Israel's nuclear facility, Dimona, was stopped and in a 1975 congressional hearing, the State Department refused to accept Central Intelligence Agency information that Israel had the bomb (Cohen & Burr, 2006, p. 29).

States such as Iran that are regarded as possible nuclear proliferators are subjected to sanctions and international criticism while India, Israel and Pakistan are allies of the United States, more recently with reference to its war on terror, but their nuclear arsenals are not met in the United States with the same discomfort as in the case of Iran (Johnson, 2004, p. 11). These double standards have implications for the integrity of the NPT, especially how the treaty is perceived by those outside it and member states that remain committed to its rules and practices.

With the above discussion in mind, non-nuclear weapon states use the NPT to highlight double standards conducted by member states relating to how this treaty is interpreted (Haq, 2006, p. 26). Israel remains outside the NPT and is also in possession of nuclear weapons while Iran is a member state without nuclear weapons, but more pressure is directed at Iran. Egypt and Turkey have highlighted this discrepancy and in such a way call nuclear weapon states to account for their actions and reservations for certain states (Landau, 2010, p. 44). By publically voicing double standards, non-nuclear weapon states place pressure on nuclear weapon states to be impartial and consistent in their application of the NPT.

Favourable treatment for some under the NPT waters down the value of this treaty leading to the assumption that dominant powers that have crafted the NPT and established its rules have the ability to directly influence how it is interpreted and practiced. This position highlights the neorealist view, namely that dominant powers construct institutions to serve their self-interests and will deviate from its rules and regulations when it no longer serves its interests. With reference to Susan Strange on

the Bretton Woods economic system, the NPT is thus inconsistent by its inability to promote order and combat international anarchy.

4.6 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: A practical illustration of the realist view

As discussed in chapter three, the review conferences of the NPT present opportunities to re-examine the strengths and the shortcomings of this treaty. In this way, the level of commitment of member states toward this treaty can also be revealed and understood. The actions of member states preceding and during the NPT review conferences serve as practical illustrations of their support or rejection of its grand bargain. The interpretation that the NPT is a realist instrument used by dominant powers to obtain their interests can be tested by critically revisiting what transpired before and during review conferences. This section will focus on the actions, conduct and behaviour of the five nuclear weapon states during the NPT review processes with reference to non-proliferation, the right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and nuclear disarmament.

4.6.1 The 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

The 2005 NPT Review Conference stands out as a prime example illustrating the realist nature of this treaty. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference resulted in the CTBT and the 13 practical steps in support of nuclear disarmament agreed between the New Agenda Coalition and the nuclear weapon states introduce a measure to make the treaty more balanced. However, the failure of the 2005 Review Conference to even establish an agenda, let alone progress on the controversial matters surrounding the treaty, reversed the gains made in 1995. The blame for this failure should be shared between the United States and Egypt. The United States under the Bush administration reversed its commitment to the 13 steps and returned to an interpretation of the NPT that assumes the five nuclear weapon states has the right to have nuclear weapons. Egypt, on the other hand, did not want to lose the

momentum achieved based on the 1995 and 2000 results and thus pressed to move forward from these agreements. Egypt was frustrated by the Bush administration and its lack of support towards the disarmament measures (Müller, 2005b, p. 13).

Müller attributes one reason for the stalemate at the 2005 conference to national interests (Müller, 2005b, p. 4). In 2001, the Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had its roots in the terrorist's attack of the United States on 11 September 2001. To justify the withdrawal, the then Press Secretary of the White House, Lawrence Fleischer argued that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prevents the United States from safeguarding its security against a ballistic missile attack (Fitzmaurice & Elias, 2005, p. 186) Also, when considering the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, the 2005 Review Conference was headed for failure as the major player of the non-proliferation regime, namely the United States undermined the value of the NPT to pursue its own national interests.

During the 2005 Review Conference, the Bush administration was explicit in its lack of support towards disarmament, gaining criticism largely from the non-aligned states. France hid behind the United States during proceeding and effectively blocked discussion of the consensus emerged from the 1995 and 2000 (13 practical steps on disarmament) review conference (Müller, 2005b, p. 10). To add further insult to injury, former United States President, George W. Bush commented that the results of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences represented political statements but was not legally binding (Larkin, 2008, pp. 217-218). On the other hand, the United Kingdom, being a close ally of the United States did not criticise or openly challenge the United States' response to the NPT and was careful not to isolate the United States (Johnson, 2005, p. 24). In a statement made by Ambassador John Freeman of the United Kingdom, the NPT is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and the United Kingdom is fully committed to its non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. However, John Freeman further stated, "let me say at the outset: we

recognize the need for balanced implementation of the Treaty and we support progress in all its areas, as our record demonstrates. However, we believe that progress in non-proliferation is important in its own right" (Joyner, 2011, p. 43). Taken in this manner, it seems as if the central pillar of the NPT is non-proliferation and disarmament appears to be less important. Interpreting the NPT in a narrow manner is a constant concern highlighted by non-nuclear weapon states, as this disproportionate emphasis removes the binding link between non-proliferation and disarmament.

The five nuclear weapon states argue that the NPT is central to maintaining international security but their activity and behaviour disprove this claim. By attempting to almost delink non-proliferation from disarmament nuclear weapon states are in fact proving that dominant states have great influence over institutions, and can deviate from its rules. Dominant states, through their position and narrow interpretation of the NPT have safeguarded their own nuclear weapons by arguing that nuclear proliferation to others, such as rogue states is more pertinent than nuclear disarmament. In this way, the NPT is viewed as legitimising nuclear weapons for some, as nuclear weapon states would argue that they are rational and responsible nuclear states while others cannot be trusted (Daley, 2010, pp. 19-20). In turn, nuclear weapon states place themselves above the NPT based on their behaviour and actions, for example using non-proliferation to further and justify their national interests (United States-led invasion of Iraq). Moreover, as the United Kingdom argued, the NPT gives them the right to have nuclear weapons. These actions and behaviour explicitly state that the rules of the NPT do not apply to the five nuclear weapon states, that is, "do as we say, not as we do" (Burroughs, 2007, p. 37).

4.6.2 The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Based on the dismal outcome of the 2005 Review Conference greater resources, effort and political will were directed at ensuring a successful Review Conference in 2010. Both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states saw the urgency of developing a positive outcome. At this Review Conference, a final document was established and concessions by both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states were achieved, but stronger language could have been used concerning non-proliferation and disarmament, for example nuclear weapon states were merely encouraged to establish negative security assurances while the Additional Protocol of the IAEA did not serve as a verification standard for all states (Johnson, 2010a, p. 7).

States participated in the conference in their individual capacity as well as within certain groupings, such as the European Union or NAM. The European Union's position at the Review Conference was delivered by its foreign minister, Catherine Ashton. The European Union brought key proposals forward and placed it on the negotiation table to form part of Committee reports and in the final declaration. Under the European Union, the following proposals were put forward: the Middle East Resolution, treaty withdrawal, IAEA verification and the CTBT. However, the efforts of the European Union were weakened by two nuclear weapon states, namely France and the United Kingdom – the two European states that have nuclear weapons (Müller, 2010, p. 11).

The delegation of France and the United Kingdom were not willing to reduce the role nuclear weapons played in their military doctrines. Germany, Norway and Switzerland were in support of addressing sub-strategic nuclear weapons. It was argued that sub-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons under NATO placed on European territory should be removed. It was mainly Poland preferring to keep these nuclear weapons as they acted as a deterrent against Russia.

NAM criticised nuclear weapon states for planning to modernise their nuclear weapons, and thus failing to honour their NPT obligations (Johnson, 2010a, p. 4). Both France and the United Kingdom favour the right to modernise their nuclear arsenals, which are ageing. However, modernisation of nuclear weapons suggested that these states were not going to disarm any time soon, but are instead re-investing money in nuclear weapons, which they continue to see as central to their national security strategies. This makes a mockery of the disarmament clause of the NPT. In 2006, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair suggested the renewal of trident nuclear weapons. Trident is a submarine based missile system capable of carrying nuclear weapons. This is in direct violation of the NPT (vertical proliferation), instead of reducing nuclear weapons; the United Kingdom plans to modernise and increase the trident based nuclear weapons and maintain its nuclear deterrence. "Mr Blair said it would be "unwise and dangerous" for Britain to unilaterally give up its nuclear deterrent" (Tempest, 2006, n.p.). This comment points to the centrality of nuclear weapons. According to Tertrais (2007, p. 252), in 2006, French President, Jacques Chirac stated, "In light of the concerns of the present and the uncertainties of the future, nuclear deterrence remains the fundamental guarantee of our security..."

China, as in the case of France, did not welcome or support any disarmament measures. China has an explicit no-first-use nuclear weapons policy which is in stark contrast from other nuclear weapon states. However, China blocked stronger language on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (Müller, 2010, p. 13). In an April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States issued it would begin the negotiation process of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; this would strengthen and reinforce the non-proliferation regime. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was endorsed by the Conference on Disarmament and President Barack Obama supported such a treaty with verification measures (United States Department of Defense, 2010, p. 13). China's decision to block stronger language on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is linked to its position among the rest of the five nuclear states and its future security

interests. China fears that it may be at a disadvantage if it supported a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons' purposes, as the United States and Russia have large stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium (fissile material) for weapons' purposes. China is also concerned over the United States and Russian missile-defence systems and may modernise its own nuclear weapons to maintain a balance of power among the five nuclear states (Kurosawa, 2005, p. 25; Hibbs, 2011, n.p.). "In response, China recently issued a strong public objection, saying that such defenses could render China's small arsenal of strategic missiles "completely ineffective" and leave China open to blackmail" (Gronlund, Liu & Wright, 1995, n.p.). By supporting a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons' purposes China may risk its security and be at a disadvantage as other nuclear weapon states can use existing fissile material to increase their nuclear weapons.

It seems though that nuclear weapon states prefer not to be put under the microscope when it comes to their obligations under the NPT and instead choose to focus on the non-proliferation obligations of non-nuclear weapon states. Although Cold War thinking around nuclear weapons persists, now the threat of rogue states and terrorist organisations are also used to justify the existence of nuclear weapons. This only serves to negate the nuclear weapon states' commitment under the NPT, in particular, towards nuclear disarmament (Larkin, 2008, p. 218).

The NPT as an institution has a limited impact on shaping and influencing the behaviour of member states through its norms and standards. The limited influence of the NPT is not only evident in the behaviour of member states, but also in the reason why some states have decided to forgo the nuclear weapon option. North Korea used the treaty to conduct a clandestine nuclear programme and developed nuclear weapons. Iran, another member state is suspected of being a possible nuclear proliferator by the further enrichment of uranium. Member states thus use the treaty to pursue their nuclear weapon ambitions. In the same breath, the five

nuclear weapon states use the NPT to serve their self-interests. This is evident in their activities to direct attention away from disarmament, using the threat of non-proliferation to hold onto nuclear weapons indefinitely, condemning foes while shielding allies from criticism such as Israel, and bending its rules as in the case of India for an economic benefit.

A further point that Jo and Gartzke (2007, p. 179) make is that those states without nuclear weapons that join the NPT do so because they have planned not to obtain nuclear weapons. Following this line of argument, the NPT as an institution does not change or influence state behaviour. For example, in the case of South Africa, once its security was guaranteed after the collapse of the Soviet Union it joined the NPT. The NPT did not change South Africa's behaviour or thinking around nuclear weapons. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a major threat to South Africa, and the improvement of regional conflicts between Namibia, controlled by South Africa and Angola, the process of nuclear disarmament became possible. Domestically, the threat of a communist-led overthrow of the apartheid regime supported by the Soviet Union had diminished. However, some argue that the apartheid government feared what a South Africa led by the African National Congress may do with the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capability. This fear of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the African National Congress once South Africa made its regime transition was widely supported by the United States (Levite, 2004, p. 103; Purkitt, Burgess & Liberman, 2002, p. 187). "...the United States, which feared the consequences of South Africa's long-range ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the new South African government led by the African National Congress (and by extension possibly the communist regimes with which it was allied, such as Cuba) or nationalist white extremist groups" (Levite, 2004, p. 103-104).

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter provided an interpretation of the NPT through a realist lens. As such it argued that the formation of the NPT reflects the interests of its main architects, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its indefinite extension, the NPT protects the nuclear weapons and legitimises their possession by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. This treaty was designed for combating non-proliferation and not disarmament, while allies of the five nuclear states, such as India enjoy NPT benefits. On the other hand, Israel and Pakistan, both Western allies are not harassed and pressured over their possession of nuclear weapons, such as Iran and North Korea. The rules of the treaty have been bent or overlooked in support of national interests and increasing efforts are directed at clinging onto nuclear weapons for an indefinite period. The introductory process of the treaty, the guiding intention behind its formation by its main architects, the conduct of the five nuclear states preceding and during the NPT Review Conferences affirm the realist view of this treaty.

The next chapter will provide a liberal perspective of the NPT that institutions and regimes promote order and cooperation in an anarchical world and have the ability to influence the behaviour and interests of states, concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament.

Chapter 5: A Liberal perspective of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

5.1 Introduction

This chapter serves to provide a liberal view of the NPT. Liberal scholars are inclined to offer a more optimistic account of the international system and the position of states therein. In spite of this, the liberal and realist assumptions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Liberal scholars concur with realist regarding international anarchy; nevertheless, they affirm that institutions and regimes act as a form of governance, reducing insecurity found in an anarchical world.

The question can be posed: in a world where nuclear weapons are a central component of the military doctrines of powerful states, can the NPT change this reality by delegitimizing and stigmatising nuclear weapons? The liberal and neoliberal theoretical paradigm will be applied to the NPT. Utilising the liberal paradigm to understand the NPT reveals its normative strength, its increasing currency and ability to influence positively and shape the views of states regarding security, nuclear weapons and disarmament through norms and standards. Regimes and institutions are not the problem; rather, it is how nuclear weapon states have viewed, interpreted and practiced the rules and principles of this treaty.

5.2 Challenging the rationality of nuclear weapons

For long it has been argued that the usefulness of nuclear weapons lay in their ability to deter a nuclear war. Based on the logic of mutually assured destruction the use of nuclear weapons would ensure the destruction of each state respectively. This point was put forward to explain why nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War and more particularly during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, scholars such as Tannenwald (2007, p. i) emphasise the non-use of nuclear weapons did not relate to their deterrent utility as realists advocate.

The extent of resources which industrialised states such as the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have invested to produce nuclear weapons is not clear. These weapons require considerable funds and resources, infrastructure, production facilities, raw materials as well as a skilled labour force of scientists, technicians, engineers and so forth. Directing financial resources toward making a nuclear device or warhead represents only one element of a nuclear weapons programme. Significant amounts of capital are spent on delivery vehicles and systems capable of transporting nuclear weapons such as bomber aircrafts as well as missile systems, including tactical ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to Olson (2010, p. 12), it is estimated that the United States spends $20 billion per annum to maintain and operate its strategic and tactical nuclear delivery vehicles. Furthermore, in the financial year of 2008, the United States spent nearly $9.2 billion on its missile-defence system (national missile-defence, theatre missile-defence and national and theatre missile-defence) (Schwartz & Choubey, 2009, p. 27). For this reason, the option to go nuclear is not necessarily a rational decision based on the great economic expenditure required. In this way, nuclear weapon-related cost may act as an economic barrier preventing states from going nuclear. Besides the economic cost, nuclear weapons cannot be used based on their mutually destructive capability, which realist scholars are aware of, however states continue to allocate huge amounts of money in their defence budgets for nuclear weapon-related programmes.

The centrality of nuclear weapons is not shared by many non-nuclear weapon states, as their security is protected without nuclear weapons. States such as Germany, Japan and Switzerland viewed the access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes initially implemented through the 1953 Atoms for Peace program and then formally guaranteed by the NPT as a valuable package, in exchange forgoing the nuclear weapons option (Hackel, 1992, pp. 58-59). Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa and the Ukraine have willingly removed nuclear weapons from their territory while Argentina and Brazil among many others have forgone the nuclear weapons option.

This should prove nuclear weapons are not necessarily the only or most rational means available to safeguard national interests. Realists assume nuclear weapons best serve the protection of national interests when, in fact, security can be protected and guaranteed without them. The fact that non-nuclear weapon states' security is protected without the possession of nuclear weapons should attest to this fact. The establishment of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, which will be discussed below in relation to the NPT, works on the principle of mutually assured abstinence from nuclear weapons as opposed to mutually assured destruction to secure their member states. The nuclear arms race during the Cold War brought the world close to a nuclear war. It can be argued that nuclear weapons, in fact, heighten insecurity, for example Israel worries that Iran may become nuclear and threaten its security interests, while Iran may well be engaging in a nuclear weapons programme because of Israel's nuclear weapons. Perceived gains of being in possession of nuclear weapons are limited by their security cost, namely the escalation of nuclear weapons regionally and in turn more insecurity experienced by that state which first introduced them, and the potential danger of their use (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 79).

5.3 The nuclear taboo

Warfare raises significant ethical questions, but it is the massively destructive nature of nuclear weapons, and their lethal effect on human life and the environment that serves as a compelling argument in support of nuclear disarmament (Smith, 1996, p. 85). Since August 1945, when nuclear weapons were first used against Japan, nuclear weapons generated debates about their overkill potential and destructive nature; they breach two established laws of war, namely the proportionate and discriminate application of organised violence against the enemy. Over time a nuclear taboo emerged to challenge and oppose the use of nuclear weapons, and in that way to delegitimized these weapons. For the neoliberal scholar, Keohane, norms are

standards of behaviour "defined in terms of rights and obligations" (Keohane, 1984, p. 57). Another definition of norms distinguishes it from rules and principles. Norms are then not only standards of behaviour but are also morally binding. The nuclear taboo originated from the destruction inflicted on human beings due to nuclear weapons, making their use a moral issue.

Prior to a discussion on the nuclear taboo as such, it needs to be defined what precisely is meant by the notion of a taboo as a taboo and a norm share similar attributes. According to Tannenwald (2007, p. 10), "A taboo typically refers to ritual avoidance, something that is not done, not said, or not touched". Viewed in this fashion, a taboo places a ban on certain forms of behaviour, refers to danger and to violate it would result in undesirable consequences. The term taboo usually invokes religious connotations and imagery of what is considered sacred or profane. A taboo raises questions of morality and prescribes appropriate forms of behaviour just as norms do. It is argued that, when the idea of a taboo is invoked it has a unique level of influence over participants on how they perceive and respond to the world. A taboo is noted as a specific type of norm, which becomes more robust and linked to notions of "unthinkable" and "taken-for-granted" (Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 11, 13).

Since 1945, there has been a shift in attitudes regarding nuclear weapons in diplomatic statements made in the UN and echoed in the UNGA resolutions. The purpose of the nuclear taboo has been to counteract the value, and the sense of prestige associated with nuclear weapons as the ultimate weapon and to delegitimize its use. Explicitly, the nuclear taboo opposes the first-use of nuclear weapons. It is largely through the moral disapproval that the use of nuclear weapons has been prevented (Tannenwald, 2007, pp. 8-9). This view is in direct contrast to the realist claim of the deterrent role nuclear weapons facilitated during the Cold War. Realists affirm the non-use norm simply supports what states already knew, that is, nuclear weapons should not be used, because their use will trigger an assured nuclear response (the power gained from these weapons is thus balanced). In the

case of the nuclear taboo, it did not simply emerge as a rational decision to prevent mutual annihilation, but took time to develop and had a moral element to it. Nuclear weapons were not always viewed with disapproval or sparked criticism. It was only after World War II, as the nuclear arms race took shape and the effects of nuclear testing became known that these ideas emerged and were promoted by social and activist groups for the abolition of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 2007, p. 21).

The next section will investigate the impact of international norms and rules on the international system, in particular, how states relate to and use them.

5.4 A moral case in support of non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons

Liberal scholars are inclined to believe that states can cooperate in an anarchical system and will do this not just because it is in their interest to do so, but because of the moral value of cooperation. From a liberal point of view, treaties, such as the NPT, are an expression of states' pursuit of the common good. Through the NPT, the international community is thus instituting commonly agreed upon rules for the collective security of humanity given the destructive nature of nuclear weapons. For liberals, treaties, integrated into regimes, represent a form of global governance (as the UN does and its predecessor, the League of Nations, did).

The NPT has both moral and legal implications that contribute to what Hedley Bull (1977) referred to as the "anarchical society", that is, a sense of order amidst international anarchy. Carr (1939, p. 147) discussed the idea of an international community which is bound by a sense of moral obligation towards each other. International treaties are useful in that they may maintain relations between states and bring order to the international system. However, what gives an international treaty, such as the NPT its moral nature is the fact that member states agree to protect humankind from the dangers and effects of a nuclear war (Doyle, 2009, p. 137). A treaty should not be upheld simply because it is in the self-interests of states

to do so, but rather because it represents appropriate forms of behaviour, morally binding states to pursue the common good (Carr, 1939, pp. 169-172).

On 27 August 2010, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) made a statement at the 19th World Congress International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War where it outlined why nuclear weapons should be illegal. The ICRC is a humanitarian organisation primarily geared towards the prevention of human suffering from armed conflict. It was argued that nuclear war brings much devastation to the world and continues to affect human beings and the environment through long term radiation effects (Beerli, 2010, p. 1). This argument corresponds with the view of the International Court of Justice in a 1996 statement that the principles of international humanitarian law are applicable to nuclear weapons. This point indicates that nuclear weapons are in violation of the concept of international humanitarian law and for that reason is illegal (Beerli, 2010, pp. 2-3). International humanitarian law refers to appropriate and inappropriate conduct when engaging in a war and conflict situation (rules of war), and is usually divided into two sets of law, namely the Geneva and Hague law. For example, the Hague law is based on the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, which specifies that weapons that cause unnecessary suffering should not be used (Mackintosh, 2000, p. 4). Nuclear weapons fall into this category.

Activist scholars such as Rebecca Johnson (2010c, n.p.) advocate for the stigmatisation of nuclear weapons as inhuman, which is for liberal scholars, a necessary condition and a step in the right direction to ban their use and existence.

Liberals point to the moral value of the NPT, and the arguments presented by the ICRC and the International Court of Justice are essentially supporting evidence of why nuclear weapons should not be used and why disarmament is necessary. From what has been discussed thus far it should not be interpreted that liberals argue the NPT is not an instrument to pursue the self-interests of states. A liberal view not only holds that the NPT comes from a moral imperative to protect humanity, but also that

states can realise their security interests by adhering to the treaty. Nuclear weapons threaten state security (a central national interest of all states) and the NPT is a way to decrease insecurity through global governance.

5.5 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: order and global governance

Before the NPT came into effect in 1970 the non-proliferation norm did not have a significant platform on which to stand. The NPT activated the non-proliferation norm, bestowing it with strength and influence in the international system (Rublee, 2009, p. 48). The NPT is a significant international instrument and arms control mechanism needed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and promote disarmament (Harvey, 2010, p. 21). Both realist and liberal scholars acknowledge the dangers of an anarchical international system as a reality, except for liberals this does not mean that states cannot cooperate and reach mutual gains. With that said, there is a lack of global government but not a lack of global governance.

Adler and Barnett (1998, p. 3) invoke the term "community" where states share common norms, values and symbols, which provide a social identity. From this view, states governed by a particular order form a community at the international level and for those operating within this framework, it produces a measure of stability and peace (for example the NPT). For some the end of the Cold War brought much uncertainty to the world as it represented a shift from a stable order (bipolarity) for realist scholars. Since then policy makers have been grappling to develop a more ordered world (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 4). The functionality of this community requires international governance; that is, the maintenance and regulation of state policy and activities. Governance draws on global, regional and national actors to combine their efforts for the management of a certain area, in this case nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is the political and security activity which demands maintenance; and states forming part of this framework can be referred to as a security community (Wilkinson, 2002, p. 2).

The term security community was coined by Karl Deutsch in 1957 (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 145). A security community is a phenomenon wherein states abide by norms and institutions reflecting collective security. Within the security community, states renounce the use of military force. It is envisioned when states can identify positively with others the "…security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all" (Mearsheimer, 1998, p. 370). The danger of this is that it may lead to utopian thinking and thus straying from reality. According to Wilkinson (2002, p. 1), "Global governance is variously treated as fad, an oxymoron, or it is dismissed out of hand". Realist' scholars are primarily interested in states as central actors attributing little influence on the part of non-state actors and institutions in impacting world politics. Rather, Wilkinson (2002, p. 2), insists that global governance exists albeit as an incomplete process and an emerging phenomenon.

The notion of security communities (like that of norms) is cited and further developed by constructivist scholars but the term governance and the assumption of state cooperation within an anarchical international system fits the liberal paradigm. This serves to connect the liberal and constructivist paradigm. Based on the earlier discussion on governance and community, the NPT represents a form of governance to order and stabilise relations between states within this community and ultimately contributing to collective security. Norms are necessary to regulate and constrain the behaviour of states and therefore key to promoting cooperation among them, but also necessary to establish order within an anarchical international system generally. Gouldner (1960, p. 161) argues that norms encompass an element of reciprocity or duty from those that practice it. Here, nuclear weapon states have the responsibility not to proliferate nuclear weapons or deploy them on the battlefield and also to promote their disarmament. By the same token, non-nuclear weapon states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons nor become nuclear themselves and in turn can access the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful civilian purposes. This represents the grand bargain of the NPT, bestowing states with rights but also

responsibilities or duties in a reciprocal system; and in this way, bringing order to the nuclear realm.

However, governance in the international system can only result if member states are willing to cooperate, to share information, and be transparent about nuclear activities as well as distribute benefits equally under the NPT.

For member states of the NPT belonging to this treaty it is useful to promote the common good, but also safeguards their self-interests (security). In a world where a global government is lacking the NPT needs to promote cooperation among states. For this to occur the thinking that nuclear weapons are of value to bestow prestige ought to be deconstructed and ultimately reinterpreted; in this manner, the NPT facilitates the creation of a new order conducive to non-proliferation and disarmament (Karp, 1992, p. 6). Nevertheless, the order of the NPT clashes with the strategic value of nuclear weapons. The strategic value of nuclear weapons as a source of state security has dominated the thinking of policy makers and academics in the international system. According to Booth and Wheeler (1992, p. 24), "Nuclear weapons had been irrevocably invented, and they created their own reality". Thus, it appears as if the world had to accommodate nuclear weapons and learn to live with them. Realist scholars would then affirm that, anarchy justified the existence of these weapons which could not be altered (Karp, 1992, p. 19). Is it then possible for the NPT to deconstruct assumptions surrounding nuclear weapons, which have dominated the international system since its inception?

Karp affirms the significance of developing alternative thinking on how state security can be safeguarded. Nuclear deterrence represents but one way of countering anarchy or protecting state security. However, Karp warns "...the task of thinking about security without nuclear weapons-let alone exploring how it could be achieved-is far from simple" (Karp, 1992, pp. 5-6).

The challenge of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime is to combat the inherent system of self-help dominating how states perceive and respond to the international system, in particular, influencing views on non-proliferation and disarmament. For liberal thinkers, the presence and dangers of nuclear weapons are a reality and hence cannot be disinvested. Consequently, these weapons must be physically eliminated and plans for integrating them into military strategies must be rebuffed (Booth & Wheeler, 1992, p. 28). The NPT thus challenged the strategic role of nuclear weapons, which dominated thinking in the international system. To subvert realists' notions that nuclear deterrence present security, the NPT had to replace the logic of mutual assured destruction with its own order and measure of stability.

The following sections will investigate the normative force of the NPT and the impact this treaty had on the international system, in particular, how it shaped state behaviour and interests in the nuclear realm.

5.5.1 The normative force and the achievements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Realist scholars question the relevance of norms and even whether they exist. According to Persbo (2012, p. 2), the non-proliferation norm of the NPT played a key role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation norm along with the nuclear taboo is a barrier against nuclear proliferation by condemning the spread, production and use of nuclear weapons. The NPT is an arms control instrument, tasked with limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, realise nuclear disarmament and finally to arrive at a nuclear weapon-free world. The NPT and the non-proliferation norm should not be underestimated as a factor explaining why states decide to remain non-nuclear. Evans and Kawaguchi (2009, p. 78) argue that states may support the NPT because it is the 'right thing to do'. Acting in good faith toward the NPT should not be underestimated as the NPT enjoys strong normative force, because its member states acknowledge "...nuclear weapons are simply wrong:

their acquisition is forbidden, their use taboo, and their indefinite continued possession unacceptable" (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 78). Endorsing and practicing non-proliferation is what it means to be a good global citizen within the international system (Persbo, 2012, p. 3; Kutchesfahani, 2010, p. 9). Since South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons it became a responsible member of the non-proliferation regime. Non-proliferation is thus responsible state behaviour, and, in a world where nuclear weapons are a threat to regional and international peace and security, forswearing nuclear weapons is a commitment to being a "good international nuclear citizen" (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 79). The strong normative force of the NPT is manifested in its large membership of 189 states, visible proof of its ongoing strength and support.

The NPT with its almost universal nature is distinct from other arms control and disarmament agreements (Zanders, 2010, p. 5). As more states accede to the NPT, it made it harder for those outside to justify their inability to join and ratify this treaty. Furthermore, the non-proliferation norm and the nuclear taboo exert additional pressure for those outside the NPT. In 1992, France and China, states that had tested nuclear weapons before 1967, acceded to the NPT. Argentina and Brazil, states with nuclear weapon capability ratified the NPT in 1995 and 1998 respectively. South Africa, the first state that willingly disarmed its nuclear weapons and acceded to the NPT in 1991, set an example for other states, in particular, nuclear weapon states, demonstrating that the possession of nuclear weapons will not necessarily protect and enhance state security. After the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme was detected and dismantled. The achievements of the NPT and its strong normative force increase its currency within the international system as an arms control instrument (Grand, 2010, p. 14).

The NPT rewards states for their non-nuclear commitment. Article IV of the NPT encourages the peaceful application of nuclear technology and, through the IAEA, nuclear cooperation in the form of the transfer of nuclear knowledge and technology

for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon states can take place. Nuclear technology and material have many significant uses other than producing nuclear weapons. In particular, developing states have benefited from its peaceful application, in the energy sector (nuclear power), agricultural sector (improving crop production and killing bacteria) and in the health sector (treating cancer through radiation therapy) (UN, 2010, pp. 7-8; Hubert, Broodryk & Stott, 2010, p. 9).

The NPT welcomes the formation of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. Under Article VII, the NPT encourages the formation of regional treaties to ensure and commit states to remain non-nuclear. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones enhance the protection of regional and international peace and security, and also strengthen the non-proliferation regime (UN, 2010, p. 15). There has been many treaties that have emerged, which use the NPT as a base in the formation of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, for example the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa) and so forth (Harvey, 2010, p. 28). In July 1964, at an OAU Summit, a declaration was adopted calling for the Denuclearization of Africa. In 1995, the final text in preparation of an African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone was completed. In 1996 the Pelindaba Treaty was opened for signature and entered into force in July 2009. The name Pelindaba was taken from South Africa's main nuclear research centre and the area where its nuclear weapons were produced (Stott, 2009, n.p.). The Pelindaba Treaty, sometimes applying the exact language of the NPT, bans the production, testing and stationing of nuclear weapons on the Africa continent. It prohibits nuclear research with the goal of developing nuclear weapons and requires nuclear weapon states to make negative security assurances to members of this treaty. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones is a useful step in realising a world free from nuclear weapons, and visible proof of the currency of the NPT among its member states and the centrality of this treaty in the international system.

Under the NPT, cooperation is facilitated between member states in the nuclear realm as they are bound, shaped and socialised by the same norms, rules and institutions. Being exposed to norms of non-proliferation and disarmament, and understanding the moral imperative of this treaty creates a system of familiarity and continuity among member states. This system of order created by the NPT also serves as a negotiating forum where member states can negotiate and resolve tensions between them, evident in NPT review conferences. The rules and rights under this treaty govern state interaction and introduce a measure of stability (Ikenberry, 2006, p. 134). When member states act in good faith towards their NPT obligations this creates continuity in the system, and creates a condition where states do not necessarily have to be suspicious of the intentions of others. The NPT may not necessarily completely overcome the anarchical nature of the international system but this should not lead to the perception that it cannot minimise insecurity produced by international anarchy.

5.6 The impact of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on outsiders

With its membership of 189 states, the NPT gained a unique level of normative strength as an international instrument of arms control. However, this was not always the case. When the NPT was opened for signature, its members were few and its influence was not sufficiently felt at the time. The question can thus be posed whether the NPT impacted on the decisions of states that initially chose to remain outside the NPT, but later joined the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Here the cases of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa shed light on how this treaty impacted on the domestic affairs of some states to either forgo the nuclear option or as in the case of South Africa to dismantle its own nuclear weapons voluntarily. In addition, for states still outside the NPT, such as India and Israel, it will be shown how this treaty has impacted on their behaviour, and how states relate to their nuclear weapons and to the international system. Such an analysis is useful to illustrate three liberal viewpoints about the NPT, namely, firstly, that nuclear weapons are not the rational

pursuit that realists hold and that state security can be protected without them. Secondly, that the NPT has set norms for state behaviour generally in this area, even if they are outside the NPT. And, thirdly, that domestic factors and sub-national actors' impact on a state's nuclear position and should thus be included in an analysis of nuclear policy. Unlike neorealism holds, states are not unitary actors, and their nuclear status is not just a function of the system level.

In particular, the democratic peace theory model, a prominent theme discussed among liberal scholars, will illustrate how a democratic culture, with its diverse domestic actors (interest groups, opposition parties and citizens) impact on how democracies conduct their domestic and foreign policy.

5.6.1 Argentina and Brazil's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Based on chapter four and the current chapter five of the thesis, realist and liberal scholars respectively provided different reasons why states join the NPT and remain compliant to it. The liberal perspective of the NPT brings a broader understanding to factors influencing the nuclear decisions of states by opening the "black box" of policy-making. Unlike neorealists that negate domestic factors because their focus is on the system level of analysis, liberal scholars include sub-national actors in their multi-centric model of international relations. In this section, the nuclear decision making process will be explored with reference to Argentina and Brazil to gain greater insight as to why they acceded to the NPT and act in compliance.

In the 1980s the political climate in Brazil changed as it began its democratic transition, paving the way for a transformation in its nuclear posture of transparency and forgoing the nuclear option. Public opinion at this time was in support of non-proliferation, a view that was also supported by the decision makers of the state. In the early 1990s, the Argentinean President, Carlos Menem and the Brazilian President, Fernando Collor de Mello cooperated through a series of agreements to

resolve their nuclear rivalry. In 1988, the Brazilian Congress formally banned all non-peaceful nuclear activities and in 1991 Argentina and Brazil entered an agreement (Common System of Accounting and Control) to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. In July 1991, the Brazilian-Argentinean Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials were created to monitor and inspect nuclear sites and materials (Morrison, 2006, n.p.; Carasales, 1995, p. 42). In the same year, both states signed IAEA safeguard agreements.

Argentina and Brazil experienced a nuclear rivalry in the past which could have led to the development of nuclear weapons among them. Both Argentina and Brazil had uranium-enrichment capability. In 1994 it was Argentina that took the first step to accede to the NPT and Brazil followed in 1998 (Carasales, 1995, p. 44).

This change regarding nuclear weapons was attributed to the return to civilian leadership in Argentina and Brazil. There are a number of reasons why these states joined the NPT. The NPT has its own level of influence over states' decision to forswear nuclear weapons and/or remain non-nuclear. However, Argentina and Brazil's decision to ratify the NPT and forswear the nuclear option has its roots in their democratic culture (as proposed by democratic peace theorists). Immanuel Kant, an 18th century German philosopher, discusses how lasting peace can occur in the world, in his essay entitled, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosphical Sketch* (1795). Kant proposes that all states should be ruled by a Republican constitution, where the rights of citizenship are respected. In a state ruled by a Republican constitution, citizens would refrain from supporting war, due to the violence it incurs, and in such a way lasting peace would result (Kant, 1917, pp. 119-120). Kant's philosophy of perpetual peace foreshadowed modern ideas that would form part of the democratic peace theory in Political Science, by scholars, such as Michael Doyle (2009), a prominent theorist of democratic peace, Bruce Russett (1994) and Spencer Weart (1993).

For democratic peace theorists, democracies do not go to war with other democracies. This premise is guided by the idea that democracies share common institutions and norms, which encourage the resolution of disputes peacefully instead of waging war with each other (Long & Grillot, 2000, p. 26). The political elites are socialised according to democratic values of freedom of speech, tolerance of cultural diversity (cosmopolitan), transparency and accountability in political affairs, respect for the rule of law (separation of power of the executive, legislature and the judiciary) to avoid the abuse of power and the infringement of human rights (Rosato, 2003, p. 586). Thus, a democratic culture domestically is projected internationally, and when decision makers of the state encounter tensions with other democracies they will search for solutions equally accepted by both (D'Anieri, 2011, p. 121; Rosato, 2003, p. 587). Democratization in Argentina and Brazil may have led decision makers to embark on a path of cooperation instead of hostility and conflict, which could have escalated. This common democratic culture among them instilled trust and consistency in their relations, minimising insecurity and mistrust, and opening the way for negotiation. The Common System of Accounting and Control agreement, signing of IAEA safeguards and the ratification of the NPT further strengthened and encouraged trust and confidence in the other, all facilitated by their common democratic culture. Argentina and Brazil projected their democratic culture onto their foreign policy which in turn influenced their decisions to sign and ratify the NPT. Under the NPT, these states were committed to using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only, and committed to remaining non-nuclear. Argentina and Brazil's NPT ratification highlight the favouring of negotiation over the use of force to deter or threaten the other (through nuclear weapons) to resolve tension between them. From a liberal perspective, the democratic peace theory provides an explanation why Argentina and Brazil joined the NPT and also why they remain non-nuclear. Taken in this way, the NPT is a liberal instrument to encourage cooperation, peace, multilateralism and stability among states.

By the same token, the NPT may have influenced the perceptions of these states regarding nuclear weapons based on their cost. Argentina and Brazil were aware of the dangers of military nuclear competition. If either state was committed to a nuclear weapons programme this may have sparked regional tensions and conflict in Latin America as a whole (Redick, Carasales & Wrobel, 1995, p. 385). The NPT challenged the utility of nuclear weapons and in such a way increased its cost by making it a foreign policy issue. Thus, decision makers had to consider the international ramification of their nuclear weapons′ pursuit (Walsh, 2005, p. 43). Through the ratification of the NPT Argentina and Brazil were formally linked to the non-proliferation regime creating further confidence in each other′s commitment towards non-proliferation. In this fashion, the NPT consolidated the bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil creating confidence in each other and by the international community as a dedicated member of the non-proliferation regime. Argentina and Brazil also desired to display support toward non-proliferation proving to the international community they were dedicated members of the non-proliferation regime. For Udum (2007, p. 59) being a non-nuclear weapon state has become an accepted norm in the international community, a token of ″good international citizenship″. In this way, Argentina and Brazil aspired to gain the confidence of the international community regarding their new image and ongoing support for non-proliferation and disarmament (Goldschmidt, 2009, p. 2; Feldman, 2011, n.p.). In turn, international confidence in Argentina and Brazil as well as in the NPT increased, moving it one step closer towards universality.

Both Argentina and Brazil joined the NPT because they desired to play an active role in international peace and security. Brazil and Argentina have worked together and cooperated in the nuclear field, promoting trust and openness, thus serving as a model for other states. Acceding to the NPT reveals structures of transparency are capable and have the ability to curb suspicions between rivals creating a condition

where they viewed the other as good neighbours. Argentina and Brazil also ratified the treaty of Tlatelolco and the CTBT (Albright & Lampreia, 1998, n.p.).

5.6.2 South Africa's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

South Africa, before it acceded to the NPT was isolated internationally for its apartheid policies and governance but also due to its possession of nuclear weapons. South Africa practiced apartheid, which was a legal system of rule that divided people according to a racial category affecting social, political and economic life. As a result, South Africa was sanctioned (trade sanctions and arms embargoes) to bring an end to apartheid and dismantle its nuclear weapons (Solingen, 1994, p. 13). Trade sanctions against South Africa made it harder to finance its nuclear program. The UN proposed South Africa's international status could improve once it acceded to the NPT and allow IAEA safeguards (UN, 1991, p. 14).

International concern around South Africa's apartheid policies and its nuclear weapons programme were growing. In 1977, South Africa's seat on the IAEA Board of Governors was removed, effectively preventing it from participating in IAEA deliberations. In 1980, the United States terminated nuclear commerce with South Africa. In addition, in 1986 France refused to authorise a new nuclear agreement with South Africa (UN, 1991, pp. 8-9). International pressure steadily increased against South Africa, which played a role in its decision to disarm its nuclear weapons.

When President F. W. De Klerk was elected in 1989 as South Africa's new President, he began to introduce political reforms paving the way for a democratic transition. South Africa's nuclear weapons programme posed an obstacle to it rejoining the international community. On 10 July 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT and since then showed an ongoing support towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (Albright, 1994b, p. 46). South Africa was one of the few states to

remain outside the NPT despite the significance placed on non-proliferation by member states. It is possible to argue that the NPT gained more currency before South Africa's accession. States such as, Mozambique (1990), Tanzania (1991) and Zambia (1991) ratified the NPT before South Africa, and after the Gulf War, Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme was detected and dismantled. The increasing members to the NPT and detection of Iraq's treaty violation strengthened the non-proliferation regime, and together with the increasing currency and strong normative force of the NPT (nuclear taboo) among member states it may have made it harder for South Africa to justify its exclusion, and in this way contributed to its NPT accession.

When South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons, this was the first step toward the process of democratisation. As part of its democratisation process, South Africa unbanned the African National Congress on 2 February 1990. South Africa was willing to compromise and reach a resolution peacefully and to improve its international status, through disarming its nuclear weapons and joining the NPT. De Klerk noted the retention of nuclear weapons made South Africa look suspicious. Disarming its nuclear weapons and beginning the process of democratisation was key to changing South Africa's international image to that of a trust worthy and responsible state. South Africa's behaviour revealed an awareness of international expectations (for example non-proliferation) and democratic norms, such as transparency in affairs and favouring the resolution of disputes peacefully. During the Cold War, South Africa used its nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip to persuade the United States to defend its security interests (Long & Grillot, 2000, p. 27). However, under the leadership of De Klerk, disarmament of nuclear weapons and joining the NPT would ensure its reintegration into the international community. South Africa viewed itself as a Western ally, and in order to be integrated into the Western community (that represents liberal democracies) it had to denuclearise and remain non-nuclear (Long & Grillot, 2000, p. 36).

For De Klerk, South Africa's possession of nuclear weapons would affect his goal of negotiating a democratic constitution based on non-racialism. In his personal capacity, De Klerk was not enthusiastic about a nuclear South Africa. In fact, De Klerk disliked and held views of discomfort for nuclear weapons (Heald, 2010, p. 267). Here, De Klerk's non-nuclear stance may have been influenced by the nuclear taboo, forbidding its acquisition and prohibiting its use, a key norm linked to the NPT. In 1989, De Klerk appointed a working group of the Armaments Corporation of South Africa and the Atomic Energy Commission officials to develop a timetable for dismantling its nuclear weapons programme, and when South Africa could join the NPT and sign IAEA safeguards (de Villiers, Jardine & Reiss, 1993, p. 103). According to Heald (2010, p. 267), De Klerk was committed to the process of democratisation. For De Klerk, states should remain committed to their agreements and act in good faith. In his personal capacity and as the national leader of the state, De Klerk was a central agent in the nuclear disarmament process based on his anti-nuclear stance (Kaper, 2008, p. 135).

The nuclear question in South Africa was framed around creating a positive image of South Africa to the international community. Relinquishing nuclear weapons was linked to a sense of obligation to the international community. A moral value was attached to why South Africa joined the NPT; this may also be linked to De Klerk's personal dislike for nuclear weapons (Heald, 2010, pp. 195, 266-268). However, realists question the so-called moral reason for South Africa's decision to give up its nuclear weapons; as South Africa was pressured by the United States (Albright, 1994a, n.p.). As discussed in chapter four, the United States feared that nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of the African National Congress and its transfer to Western enemies, such as Cuba, Libya and Iran (Pabian, 1995, p. 10). These fears were unfounded as the African National Congress could have reversed De Klerk's nuclear disarmament decision, but did not.

In 1994, when the African National Congress won South Africa's first democratic election, there were also concerns regarding its ongoing support towards non-proliferation. The African National Congress long supported non-proliferation and disarmament as it represented an essential component of its identity. South Africa's post-1994 support for non-proliferation and disarmament can be traced to the 1950s as it forged relationships with the World Peace Council, and as a result the African National Congress was influenced by its peace and disarmament agenda (Purkitt & Burgess, 2005, p. 183). The World Peace Council is a non-governmental organisation with the objective of peace, disarmament and global security (World Peace Council, 2010, n.p.). The African National Congress along with NAM in the 1960s called for a nuclear weapons-free zone in places such as Europe and Latin America.

South Africa enjoys a unique position in the international community, and its recognition in the disarmament community paved the way for both its terms filling a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This illustration sheds light on South African's on-going support towards the NPT and its use of international mechanisms to champion non-proliferation in groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda Coalition. In this fashion, South Africa and other non-nuclear weapon states can realise greater gains because of its nuclear position and status.

It is clear from the analysis that as liberal scholars predict, South Africa's nuclear position is influenced by a normative stance towards the immorality of nuclear weapons, as well as a belief in international institutions (multilateralism) as vehicles for international cooperation and governance in an anarchical international order. Again, this is not to say that South Africa's national interest did not benefit from its position.

5.6.3 India, Pakistan and Israel: Remaining outsiders

India, Israel and Pakistan remain outside of the NPT. Although these states remain outside the treaty, the NPT has a measure of influence over their behaviour and how they relate to nuclear weapons and the international community. Pakistan lacks a clean non-proliferation record. Abdul Quadeer Khan, the nuclear scientist who is regarded as the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, aided Iran in the development of nuclear facilities capable of enriching uranium through gas centrifuges (Zarif, 2009, n.p.). In 2004, it was revealed that sensitive nuclear information was given to Libya, Iran and North Korea also through Khan's network (Ahmed, 2010, n.p.). Israel also has a tainted proliferation record for cooperating with South Africa in nuclear and military matters (de Villiers, Jardine & Reiss, 1993, p. 103). At this time, it is not possible to do a detailed analysis on each state listed above due to the word limitation of this thesis and for that reason focus will only be placed on India and Israel.

Arab states have demanded that Israel accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities and material under international safeguards (Steinberg, 1996, pp. 17-18). What Israel and Arab states have in common is the formation of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East. However, they differ on how this goal is to be realised. For Arab states, Israel is the only state in the Middle East that remains outside the NPT (Charnysh, 2009, p. 3). The security interests of Arab states are linked to Israel's accession to the NPT and the goal of a nuclear weapons-free zone. Israel, on the other hand, argues that the establishment of the nuclear weapons-free zone can only be realised once there is peace in the Middle East (Levite, 2010, p. 160). Israel's Middle Eastern neighbours have been hostile to Israel since its formation as a state. Iran directly threatens the security of Israel where it calls for the elimination and destruction of Israel and states, such as Lebanon, is accused of supporting organisations responsible for terrorist acts in Israel, such as Hezbollah (Yoong, 2006,

n.p.). This sentiment serves as a justification for Israel's need for a nuclear deterrent. Israel has actually voiced its support for the NPT, but indicates this treaty has not been effective in rooting out nuclear proliferation, with reference to North Korea and possibly Iran. Israel has a general distrust concerning external security guarantees and their ability to protect and safeguard security interests (Levite, 2010, pp. 161-162).

Nuclear ambiguity practiced by Israel and the inability of dominant powers and allies of Israel such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States to place sufficient pressure on its nuclear status spark much international criticism (Welsh, 1995, p. 10). Although Israel's nuclear weapons are a controversial issue, since the 1960s Israel proclaimed that it would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East (Ami, 2009, p. 1; Cohen & Burr, 2006, p. 26). This point links to the widely accepted international norm that nuclear weapons should not be used based on its destructive consequences – the nuclear taboo. Not only has Israel voiced that it will not introduce nuclear weapons, but it has also not tested its nuclear weapons. On 22 September 1979, a "double flash of light" in the South Atlantic was detected by the Vela satellite of the United States. It was speculated that a nuclear test took place in a joint effort by Israel and South Africa, but this development was not confirmed (Charnysh, 2009, p. 2). Important to note, this does not mean that Israel is any closer to signing the NPT; rather the purpose here is to show that the NPT and the non-proliferation and disarmament norms that it promotes shape international perceptions of nuclear weapons even for those outside this treaty. The need that Israeli officials feel to hide the country's nuclear weapons programme although it is not an NPT member suggest that there is a strong measure of unacceptability attached to the possession of nuclear weapons, which Israel is clearly aware of.

India has been highly critical of the NPT even before it came into existence. During the introductory process of the NPT India was instrumental in shaping its principles through NAM. For India, the problem surrounding the NPT was its discriminatory

nature and its inability to stop vertical proliferation. The controversial nuclear trade agreement between the United States and India was encouraged based on India's good non-proliferation record (Hosure, 2010, p. 442).

In 2006 the United States Congress passed the Hyde Act to normalise nuclear trade with India. For nuclear cooperation to take place India had to satisfy a few conditions as specified by a 2005 United States Congress statement. India was required to separate military and civilian nuclear facilities and place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, leading to the acceptance of the IAEA Additional Protocol. India and the United States would cooperate to conclude a multilateral treaty in the form of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty for weapons' purpose. India was prohibited from exporting enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that lacked this technology. Moreover, India was requested to join efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and subject itself to NSG guidelines. Conditions were attached to nuclear cooperation, proving the strength of non-proliferation norms which India practices despite being outside the NPT (Pretorius, 2011, pp. 86-88).

India implements tight controls over its nuclear material and nuclear information, preventing states or actors with ill intensions to gain access to these resources (Perkovich, 2010, p. 23). India "...has been scrupulous in ensuring that its weapons' material and technology are guarded against commercial or illicit export to other countries" (World Nuclear Association, 2009, n.p.). Non-proliferation is central to the NPT as states with nuclear weapons should not enable or aid others in becoming future nuclear weapon states. Maintaining a lock on key nuclear information and technology is fundamental; this is what India practices. Moreover, since India tested nuclear weapons in 1998 it practices a non-first use policy of nuclear weapons. A non-first use policy is a negative security assurance (Feiveson & Hogendoorn, 2003, p. 3). India has thus been practicing central components of the NPT, although not all of them.

This case shows despite the centrality of national interests that states can still cooperate and reach agreement in ways that serve the common good. Criticism regarding the nuclear sharing agreement with India is that the United States should have required more concessions from India, for example, signing the CTBT. This agreement opened the way for improved United States and Indian relations previously at a stalemate. Moreover, the agreement enabled ways to link India to the non-proliferation regime.

5.7 Conclusion

Despite the many challenges and shortcomings of the NPT, it generally serves the common interests of its member states, namely to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons. For this reason, the NPT is an important international instrument for the international community. A world without the NPT can scarcely be imaged by states. A world without the NPT may be filled with more uncertainty, more dangers and also impacting on sharing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The fact that almost all states have joined the NPT and are abiding by their obligations and benefitting from the NPT is proof that the treaty is working. The liberal perspective of the NPT highlights the moral role and influence this treaty holds, explaining why states were against and renounced nuclear weapons, leading to their ratification of the NPT and continued non-nuclear commitment.

Although more efforts are needed in support of nuclear disarmament if the grand bargain between member states is not to be undermined, the strength and the currency of the NPT is well visible. It holds both legal and moral implications and paves the way for cooperation between states to combat the anarchical nature of the international system (Dewit, 1987, p. 171). Key to the functioning of this treaty and the non-proliferation regime in general is the on-going support of member states and the ability to overcome deadlocks in relations as seen during the review conferences, which can water down the influence of this treaty.

Breakdown in the NPT review conferences does not mean the treaty will fail. Self-interests (expressed as claims to sovereignty) sometimes come head to head with what is considered to be in the common good of all states in this issue-area, but the focus of member states so far has come to be aligned within parameters that have ensured the survival of the NPT. Although this chapter has not drawn specifically on the NPT Review Conference to illustrate the liberal perspective, the point was evident in the 2010 Review Conference when the United States President, Barack Obama, made significant gestures to right the damage that the Bush administration caused at the 2005 Review Conference. Obama changed the nuclear posture of America, signed New START and in his Prague speech affirmed America will remain committed to nuclear disarmament. Under the Bush administration, its compliance to the NPT was questionable, but since the breakdown of the 2005 conference, it seems that even the nuclear weapon states have realised the importance of making concessions and demonstrating their ongoing support towards the NPT. There seems to be recognition that a lack of commitment from their side will hinder the grand bargain and affect cooperation between member states. Nuclear weapon states see the importance of maintaining compliance to the NPT as non-proliferation is in their interest and for this to occur, they need to cooperate under the NPT in a regime which bestows its members with benefits but also with obligations.

The next chapter interprets the NPT from a constructivist perspective incorporating the significance of ideas, agents and institutions and their role in influencing state behaviour and perceptions. The point above on how to interpret the actions and conduct of member states during the NPT review conferences will be given more weight in the constructivist chapter.

Chapter 6: A constructivist perspective of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

6.1 Introduction

Chapter four (a realist interpretation of the NPT) and chapter five (a liberal interpretation of the NPT) each produced credible, but seemingly incommensurable, interpretations of the NPT. Through the realist lens, nuclear weapons are a symbol of power and prestige, but most effectively serve to protect the security interests of states. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons promoted stability and peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. The utility of nuclear weapons lay in its ability to deter states from engaging in war, based on the logic of mutually assured destruction. In this fashion, the possession of nuclear weapons are necessary, and for this reason dominant states have established the NPT to protect their interests, that is, preventing other states from going nuclear (non-proliferation) and in turn to protect their own nuclear weapons indefinitely.

Through the liberal lens, the decision to develop nuclear weapons is not rational decision making. Under the NPT, the security interests of non-nuclear weapon states are protected without nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons inflict unacceptable damage and for this reason possession thereof is criticised and prohibited, through the nuclear taboo. The NPT has a moral role. That is, to protect humanity from the dangers of nuclear weapons by limiting its proliferation, and instead encourage states to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In this way, the NPT is a key international instrument, for nuclear cooperation, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and creating stability between states by building confidence in each other, which both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states agree upon. Juxtaposing these views offer a different perspective of the NPT and thus provide greater insight into this treaty, but at the same time it is impossible to measure which view is a clearer and more convincing perspective of the NPT. It is as if at this point, the

analysis has reached the same deadlock that E. H. Carr reached in his analysis of international politics in his book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*.

This chapter aims to provide a way to overcome this deadlock by interpreting the NPT from a constructivist perspective.

6.2 Self-help is not inevitable under anarchy

Both neorealist and neoliberal scholars place an emphasis on anarchy and the central role states play in such a system as a unitary actor. For both scholars, cooperation is possible in the international system but will encounter obstacles (Keohane, 1984, p. 62; Keohane & Martin, 2010, p. 70). Taken from this point of view, neorealist and neoliberal scholars disagree on relative and absolute gains attained through cooperation. Neorealists are guided by relative gains; that is, through cooperation the benefits gained will be compared to the benefits other member states acquire. This may lead states to question their acceptance to a system where they are perceived as losers based on the nature of benefits received in relation to others. A prime question emerges, why do states act in self-interested ways under an institution or regime? Realists argue that the anarchical nature of the international system condemns states to act in self-help ways even at the expense of reaching common benefits or interest (Russett, Risse-Kappen & Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 216). Is self-help then a natural response to international anarchy or required under this system? For constructivists, self-help is an institution created under anarchy but is not a natural (inevitable) response to anarchy. According to Wendt (1992, p. 399), "An institution is a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests".

International anarchy does not necessarily determine how states will conduct their affairs. Rather, the process of identity and interest formation has a direct impact on how states conduct their behaviour and relate to others in the international system (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Constructivists agree international anarchy (the absence of a world government) is a fact but negative conclusions drawn from anarchy (self-help)

represents an idea or belief (worldview) that is not a true depiction of reality (Wendt, 1992, pp. 394-395). That is, states do not have to mistrust the intentions of others. Threats are socially constructed; this could occur when decisions are based on speculation or based on conceptions of 'worst-case scenarios' instead of learning through interaction (Wendt, 1992, pp. 404-405). Self-help like sovereignty exists because states have internalised and practice self-help. Over time ideas are taken for granted and as a result seen as fact, natural or inevitable. Thus, self-help is a notion and practice that gives meaning to the world and helps states to understand their place in it and how to relate to others. However, it is only one possible notion among many that could provide the same function. A major problem with self-help is the assumption that security is an individual process. When, in effect, collective security is equally possible as pursued in an international or security community brought about by mechanisms, such as the NPT and the non-proliferation regime more generally.

6.3 The role of ideas in the international system: utility of nuclear weapons

Human beings are involved in a process of "meaning making" to order their environment and make sense of the world (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). The social and political world as well as rules and institutions are an invention of human consciousness. Neorealists place an emphasis on material forces such as military power and how that will impact on the pursuit of state interests. The maximisation of security from this view is central to safeguarding the national interests of states (Hobson, 2000, p. 7; Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 7). For this purpose, nuclear weapons are perceived as the ultimate weapon to safeguard national interests. Nuclear weapons are physical objects with overwhelming destructive capability so evident during 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

As it was noted in chapter four, in France, under the leadership of de Gaulle, nuclear weapons served to bolster its power and enabled France to reach its great-power status. Here nuclear weapons are a symbol of strength, prowess and modernity (Van Dijk, 2008, pp. 968-969). Ideas and beliefs of prestige and power associated with

being in possession of nuclear weapons are widespread and may contribute to the proliferation of these weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a nuclear arms race due to the perception that the 'other' represented a threat to their security interests. The United States perceived itself as the leader of the 'free world', with its liberal economic market and the champion of freedom and democracy. The United States assumed winning the Cold War bestowed it with the moral duty to bring order to the world (Weldes, 1999, pp. 40-42). The United States′ identity was constructed in opposition to the Soviet Union which, was a one-party state ruled by the Communist Party. Under the Communist Party, key human rights were denied, such as the right to assembly and freedom of speech. States of the Soviet Union were governed by a socialist economic system, which favoured public ownership over state enterprises. As a result of their ideological differences, a security threat was constructed to justify the possession of nuclear weapons. However, once the Cold War ended, and the ideological threat was removed it was assumed that the need for nuclear weapons would also cease. This development did not occur; the superpowers did not give up their nuclear weapons and use arguments that rogue states and terrorist may gain access to nuclear weapons as their justification for holding onto their own nuclear weapons. Weldes (1999, p. 40) argues that threats are not necessary real; they are constructed. That is, nuclear weapon states use the idea of nuclear terrorism to justify their possession of nuclear weapons.

Neoliberals advocate that regimes and institutions are key to shaping the behaviour and interests of states. How states perceive the international system has a direct impact on how they will respond to international phenomena. Where security is perceived as an individual task, cooperation would be prevented or undermined, but when security is perceived as collective responsibility cooperation is enhanced. Cooperation may then facilitate the process of changing state identity and interests (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 57). For neoliberal scholars, regimes address common concerns such as non-proliferation and serve to provide information on the activities of

member states; thus, confidence-building mechanisms (Søndenaa, 2008, p. 26). From the constructivist perspective, member states of the NPT form a security community which can potentially reshape security views on nuclear weapons and disarmament. Regimes and institutions are based on shared meanings produced through state interaction; however, they do not only place constraints on states they also shape identity and interests.

The reconciliation process between France and Germany is a useful case to illustrate the above point. The European Union is a political and economic community of 27 states, responsible for creating stability, peace, economic prosperity and improving living standards of its member states. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) represented early efforts after World War II to facilitate European integration; the European Union traces its origin from the ECSC. France and Germany fought three wars in which millions of citizens died, effectively entrenching conflict and hostilities where reconciliation looked almost impossible between them. It was only in 1951 through the formation of ECSC that reconciliation between them took place. Once the Paris Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands the ECSC was formed. Steel and coal were key components for warfare and placing them under an independent High Authority became necessary. In the Preamble of the Paris Treaty, warfare divided Europe and through the ECSC, European integration and stability in relations were possible (Riley, 1998, pp. 85-86). This was the first step in reconciling differences between France and Germany and forging a European identity to make war between them almost unthinkable. Thus, state interests are not objective or unable to change. State leaders make choices and work hard to change perceptions that in turn shape and change state behaviour about who or what is perceived as threatening.

6.4 Governance and order created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

In chapter five of the thesis, the NPT was referred to as a form of international governance; this discussion will be furthered through the constructivist lens. Regimes for neoliberals are a central platform for exchanging information and committing member states to legal obligations, which is hard to realise in an anarchical world. Regimes are useful in its ability to address and solve collective issues, which impact on state interests and survival, for example nuclear non-proliferation (Søndenaa, 2008, p. 26; Richardson, 1993, pp. 158-161). After the Cold War policy makers have been fundamentally interested in and grappled with how to develop a more stable and ordered international system. For the purpose of overcoming the anarchical nature of the international system state activity and policy have to be maintained and regulated (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 4). Hence, the NPT acts as a form of international governance by regulating state activity and policy for those within this security community, and for it to function effectively cooperation and transparency in nuclear affairs have to be practiced. Buzan (1993, p. 330) uses the term 'international society' to refer to a group of independent political units (states) which have consented to rules and institutions to maintain relations between them. Also, in this international society states recognise that this system benefits their common interests and see the purpose of maintaining it.

A fundamental difference between constructivists and neoliberals lay in the emphasis that they respectively put on material and ideal interests to explain human conduct. Constructivists believe that "...in the social and interpreted world in which (as they see it) we live, only ideas matter and can be studied" (Adler, 2005, p. 91). In constructivism, ideas are central and determine the interests states pursue and how they respond to others. Due to the centrality of ideas in constructivism, the social world or reality is made up of a set of ideas and beliefs. Taken from this point, regimes and institutions are a product of human consciousness and ideas and not

necessary factually based (Adler, 2005, p. 92; Olssen, 1996, p. 278). The NPT is a regime, invented and devised by human consciousness; this order is a social construction which has become widespread and over time seen as fact. International relations are made up of these "social facts" that human beings have agreed on.

The increasing problem of nuclear proliferation linked to the destructive effects of a nuclear explosion required the emergence of an international treaty. It also has to be noted the emergence of the NPT was linked to the Soviet Union and the United States' concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons to small states as well as preventing allies from going nuclear and using these weapons on each other (Allison, 1971, p. 209). Collective understandings or shared meanings are visible in norms, standards and rules of the NPT; mainly helping to explain why the world is in a particular state and how people should employ their "material, abilities and power" (Adler, 2005, p. 92). Member states are bound to the NPT through its rules and standards, and it is expected they act in good faith towards their obligations (Setear, 1997, pp. 22-23).

Regimes and institutions facilitate in providing new ways of viewing 'the self' (or own state) as well as 'the other' (or other states). Through regimes, new identities emerge as well as interests according to social norms and rules. Regimes and institutions do not only limit behaviour, *they realign state interests to appropriate standards of behaviour* (Søndenaa, 2008, p. 27). To overcome self-help perceptions of the international system, a change in the consciousness, identity and definition of state interests need to take place. Government officials act as the representatives of the state, referred to as its decision makers. It is this group that should be the targets for change. This process of change can be facilitated through the NPT which embodies norms such as non-proliferation and disarmament. Norms inform member states of how they ought to behave (Carranza, 2006, pp. 498-499).

The next section draws on the example of Egypt and how the NPT has influenced its nuclear decision making process, indirectly or directly contributing to its decision to forgo the nuclear weapons option.

6.4.1 Egypt's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

There are a number of factors, which influenced Egypt's decision to forgo its nuclear weapons option and join the NPT. President Anwar Sadat envisioned a peaceful and prosperous Egypt and for this goal to occur a peaceful relationship between itself and Israel had to transpire as well as drawing closer and aligning itself with the United States.

During 1965 and 1967 Egypt was believed to have contacted China and the Soviet Union respectively to acquire nuclear weapons. Egypt approached China and also India for access to sensitive nuclear technology but was not successful in this regard (Gregory, 1995, p. 21; Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 187). Egypt's quest for nuclear weapons at this time was linked to Israel's development of nuclear weapons. Rublee (2009, p. 147) puts the argument forward that the international climate was not conducive for Egypt to pursue a nuclear weapons programme. Egypt's nuclear weapons programme was hindered by its inability to acquire technology capable of producing and reprocessing plutonium and the lack of support from nuclear weapon states concerning this goal (Gregory, 1995, p. 24; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 18). This is, however, not an insurmountable factor to curb Egypt's nuclear ambitions if the extent of the nuclear programmes of states, such as Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel are considered.

In 1981, Egypt finally ratified the NPT, and in 1982 placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspection (Gregory, 1995, p. 22; Power, 1986, p. 484). Before its accession to the NPT, the decision makers of the state and especially President Sadat acknowledged the cost for remaining outside the treaty and benefits of being a

member state. Egypt largely believed its possession of nuclear weapons would undermine its bid to obtain economic aid and conventional weaponry from the United States. Since 1978, the United States provided Egypt with foreign aid worth $2 billion per annum. Egypt also enjoys military cooperation in the form of military training programs with the United States. It is for this reason that Egypt did not want to jeopardise its relationship with the United States (Das, 2008, pp. 18-19). Egypt's nuclear weapons programme was traded for a relationship with the United States because of its standing in the non-proliferation regime and the centrality of the NPT as its policy to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Rublee, 2009, pp. 140, 147).

Through the NPT, Egypt could pursue its broader interest of placing pressure on Israel and this country's nuclear ambiguity as well as improve its regional standing. As a member state of the NPT, Egypt gained diplomatic rewards, which too enabled it to engage Israel on its nuclear ambiguity and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 20). This was clearly visible in the 1995 Review Conference when Egypt under the leadership of President Hosni Mubarak linked Israel's accession to the indefinite extension of the NPT (Stein, 1997, p. 64). It is argued that the benefits of being a non-nuclear weapon state superseded status and prestige associated with being in possession of nuclear weapons (Rublee, 2009, p. 147).

Very evident in the Egyptian case was the change in perception towards security (Morris & Loh, 2011, n.p.). Interest at this time devalued the nuclear weapons option, but mainly it was the change in security perspective by Sadat that impacted on the nuclear decision making process. Sadat envisioned a different future for Egypt, one that did not involve nuclear weapons. This change in perspective regarding security by the national leadership highlights the importance of ideas and how it impacts and influences the identity of states as well as its interest (Rublee, 2009, p. 147).

For constructivists, the decision to give up the nuclear weapons ambition was based on a change in the thinking about state interests by the political elite (Rublee, 2009,

p. 140). The NPT influenced the nuclear decision making process in the case of Egypt. Remaining outside the NPT as well as having a nuclear weapons programme threatened the economic and political development of Egypt. It would have been far too costly to remain outside the NPT (Rublee, 2009, p. 146). Decision makers of the state in Egypt were faced with international pressures as well as domestic pressures linked to its energy shortage. The above argument may simply look like a neorealist or neoliberal argument that Egypt objectively calculated the costs and benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons and rationally came to the conclusion that its interests would be better served by forgoing nuclear weapons and joining the NPT. However, there is more at stake here. Integrating the NPT into the nuclear decision making process changed the interests of Egypt. Through the NPT, Egyptian perceptions of security transformed and upon acceding to the treaty, it embraced a new identity of supporting non-proliferation and disarmament. There were perceived benefits linked to being an NPT member. Thus, the NPT contributed to create a reality "out there" in which Egypt could reconstruct its identity and interests in such a way that giving up its nuclear weapon ambition was a 'rational' way to secure Egypt (Einhorn, 2004, pp. 51-52). As such, the NPT enabled the removal of Egypt's desire to counter Israel with its own nuclear weapons and made the option of engaging Israel through multilateral forums more acceptable than through mutual assured destruction.

This transformation in Egypt's identity, interests, and indeed in what it perceived as a rational way to obtain security is clear in its ongoing support toward non-proliferation and disarmament. Egypt forms part of the New Agenda Coalition and as a result uses this forum to push for nuclear disarmament and to balance Israel's nuclear capability instead of relying on a nuclear deterrent (Einhorn, 2004, p. 54). Egypt's active role in the New Agenda Coalition is also proof of its ongoing support of non-proliferation (Johnson, 2010a, pp. 1-2). Realists may argue that Egypt simply joined the NPT and uses it as a political tool to embarrass Israel and in such a way bolster its position and credibility in the Arab world – notions that confirm a realist view of the NPT (Rublee, 2009, p. 143). However, by acting in support of non-

proliferation and disarmament agents participate in what is called "performative actions", which validates shared norms and common rules about how states should conduct affairs. Egypt's joining the NPT can be interpreted as participating in the social construction of a nuclear reality as scripted in the NPT.

6.5 Deconstructing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences

As it has been repeatedly argued in this thesis, NPT review conferences are central forums to discuss and reconcile the challenges and strength of the treaty. Review conferences review past events, but also have to be forward looking; in this sense, officials can learn from the past to set achievable goals for the future (Johnson, 2010a, p. 4; Samad, 2010, n.p.). Critical events occurring before the review conference impact on issues discussed and negotiated between member states. For example, after the Gulf War, it was revealed Iraq had been pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme. This was a major challenge to the NPT as it suggested cheating by a member state. Realists would argue that cheating is expected, because states engage in self-help behaviour and will abuse international institutions to serve their interests, even if it means cheating. The perception that states do not take the NPT seriously, in turn, may justify other states' cheating. For example, the lack of support for nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon states influences perceptions and may contribute to a loss of faith in the NPT by non-nuclear weapon member states.

In chapter three (evolution of the NPT), review conferences provided an opportunity to review the standard, goals, challenges and the way forward for the NPT among its member states. A general observation of NPT review conferences is that they reveal the areas of disagreement among member states; that is, over its non-proliferation and disarmament principles. Rather, on closer inspection, NPT review conferences represent spaces where actors engage in the politics of meaning making. With this in mind, in the review conferences actors interpret and negotiate how the NPT should

be viewed and in turn how nuclear weapons should be perceived. However, over time certain ideas and interests take precedence. Eckersley (2008) argues that, social agents (states) use international forums as a platform to disseminate their views in order to shape a dominant way of perceiving a particular issue among member states. In this context, Eckersley demonstrates that the previous notion (dominant thinking) of, for example, economic growth and environmental protection being compatible may not necessarily be the case as they are in conflict with each other (Eckersley, 2008, p. 24). This argument is particularly useful to understand the NPT review conferences as spaces of making meaning and internalising dominant views of thinking about the NPT and nuclear weapons. NPT review conferences have been used by nuclear weapon states to create common sense understandings of their nuclear weapons as legitimate and other states as too 'irresponsible' to have nuclear weapons, and thus creating an understanding of the NPT as legitimising and legalising their nuclear weapons.

At the 2005 Review Conference, Ambassador John Freeman made a statement on behalf of the United Kingdom; he indicated that some states have taken advantage of the peaceful application of nuclear technology under the NPT and developed their own clandestine nuclear weapons programme. This is a challenge to all states of the NPT. In addition, John Freeman said, "...non-proliferation is important in its own right", however, non-proliferation and disarmament are explicitly linked (Joyner, 2011, p. 43). Ambassador Freedman discussed the danger that non-state actors (terrorist) may gain access to weapons of mass destruction (Freeman, 2005, pp. 1-2). Moreover, in a statement made by the United States representative, Ambassador Norman Wulf to the Preparatory Committee of the NPT in 2002, this sentiment is reiterated, "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a primary source of global instability and danger... We must work together to reinforce the NPT's prohibition on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We must demand strict compliance with its terms and support rigorous verification and enforcement measures" (Wulf, 2002, p. 2). Ambassador Wulf also notes the dangers of non-

proliferation and the concern that terrorist groups may capitalise and access weapons grade nuclear material from new proliferators.

These statements highlight the disproportionate emphasis by nuclear weapon states of non-proliferation while neglecting nuclear disarmament. Non-proliferation is a threat to international peace and security, but so is the possession of nuclear weapons by the so-called five legitimate states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States). Nuclear weapons in general are threatening, heightening concerns of uncertainty and insecurity regardless of its possession by North Korea or the United States; no state has a legitimate right to hold nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation and nuclear terrorism are by no means inconsequential; however, the idea that rogue states and terrorist groups may gain access to nuclear weapons have been constructed by nuclear weapon states in such a way to justify their possession of nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons by rogue states is constructed as threatening given their irresponsibility and unsecure nuclear facilities that may be susceptible to terrorist influence. All states of the NPT are expected to uphold their treaty obligations. However, it is increasingly visible how nuclear weapon states select certain principles, which are given more prominence by their representatives (Eckersley, 2008, p. 25).

The two preceding paragraphs are instances where a common understanding is spread among member states in review conferences that the five so-called nuclear weapon states have a right to possess nuclear weapons, because other actors may have or obtain them and that this is somehow legitimised by the NPT.

The agency of non-nuclear weapon states at review conferences is also well visible. In fact, non-nuclear weapon states use NPT review conferences as a space to contest dominant modes of viewing the NPT, that is, that the possession and use of nuclear weapons are widely criticised and condemned and their continued possession by nuclear weapon states of the treaty is a threat to international peace and security.

Until nuclear weapons are totally dismantled and disarmed the world is not safe, as its possible use still lurks.

As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the realist and the liberal view of the NPT produce credible interpretations of this treaty, but the problem emerges of how to reconcile these interpretations. The realist and liberal interpretation of the NPT when brought together provide a more holistic view of this treaty in the international system and show the direction this treaty has moved towards, which has been shaped and influenced by review conferences and by their preceding events.

6.6 Is the NPT a realist or a liberal instrument?

By examining the realist and liberal interpretations of the NPT it is clear each perspective has its merits. Both realist and liberal interpretations of the NPT are sound, providing a different viewpoint on the treaty to understand its position and purpose in the international system. Hence, taken together, these interpretations facilitate an understanding and give meaning to the NPT in a holistic manner. The interpretation held by the decision makers of states inform state behaviour and action. In the case of India, it largely believed the NPT represented an instrument only working to the benefit of nuclear weapon states and to the detriment of non-nuclear weapon states (realist interpretation). India strongly argued for an end to the discriminatory nature of the NPT as disarmament was not considered to be an obligation for nuclear weapon states (Goldschmidt, 1980, p. 73). These arguments caused India to remain outside the NPT. In contrast, for states such as South Africa, the NPT represents a fundamental element of its identity based on its support towards non-proliferation and disarmament already visible in the African National Congress before it obtained government power in 1994 (liberal interpretation) (Purkitt & Burgess, 2005, p. 183).

To reconcile the realist and liberal interpretations of the NPT the imaginary of a swinging pendulum will be invoked to make sense of the treaty amidst the different

interpretations thereof. A pendulum is a rod or a weight fixed to a certain point, but has the ability to swing freely from right to left. The position of the pendulum changes regularly as the forces of gravity alters its momentum and direction. This analogy of the pendulum suits the different interpretations of the NPT and helps to place them into perspective.

When looking at the constructed reality of the NPT, it seems the pendulum (NPT) swings in the margin between a realist (right) and liberal (left) interpretation at particular times in history, but is always caught before it reaches extremes that could lead to its ultimate failure. As it was noted in chapter three, North Korea pursued its nuclear weapon ambitions under the NPT and developed nuclear weapons. Furthermore, after the Gulf War, the IAEA brought Iraq's nuclear weapon ambitions to light. These two cases affirm the realist interpretation of the NPT. Here, member states advanced their self-interests at the expense of the NPT and used the treaty to pursue their nuclear ambitions. Taken from this view, these events would have great ramification for the NPT and its upcoming Review Conference in 1995. However, the 1995 Review Conference was a success, developing a final document supporting the Resolution of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. South Africa's proposal calling for the conclusion of the CTBT to be facilitated by the Conference on Disarmament, which was linked to the indefinite extension of the NPT created hope for its future (Taylor, 2010, p. 23; Leith & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 350-351).

Member states could cooperate and ensure the indefinite extension of the NPT despite disagreement over this issue and efforts by Egypt to stall the Review Conference if Israel did not accede to the NPT. Internal divisions and preceding events did not deter a positive outcome of the NPT Review Conference, and member states could negotiate the way forward for this treaty.

The build-up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference was further hindered and threatened by the United States Senate's inability to ratify the CTBT in 1999 (Mölling,

2010, p. 57). Ratification of the CTBT by the United States would have further strengthened the NPT indicating a renewed commitment to this treaty.

In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted a nuclear test. Despite being non-member states this development directly threatened the NPT, a treaty hard-pressed to curb the development of nuclear weapons, prevent its testing and realise a world free from them (UN Security Council, 1998, p. 1). Pakistan largely takes its cue from India, and at times mirrors India's defence posture. It is also the frustration with nuclear weapon states and how the NPT is interpreted by them, which are the source of conflict and disagreement during review conferences.

Once again, critical events did not forestall the Review Conference in 2000 or lead to its failure. In fact, the NPT was a success, resulting in a final document and the conclusion of the widely welcomed 13 practical steps in support of nuclear disarmament hailed as a breakthrough mapping out the steps to eliminate nuclear weapons and realise a world free from them (Doyle, 2009, p. 139). In 2005, the grand bargain of the NPT was threatened and the conference was unable to produce any real results. The pre-emptive war doctrine of the United States and its declaration of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the axis of evil paved the way for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Threats and challenges posed to the NPT at this time was significant, almost a forecast of what was to occur during its 2005 Review Conference. At this time, the centrality of nuclear weapons in military doctrines were well visible, plans to modernise nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom were put forward, and disarmament agreements negotiated between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states during the 1995 and 2000 review conferences were blocked by nuclear weapon states.

Acting in disregard of the NPT by its nuclear weapon states negatively impact on this treaty, and the faith member states have in it. Although these developments are worrying, which calls into question the compliance of states to the NPT this should not lead to the assumption of a meaningless treaty or one that will cease to be

significant. Challenges to the NPT influence and shape its direction, but positive strides made between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states also impact on its perception and direction. At particular times in history disagreements are bridged and overcome signalling and intention to work together and remain committed towards the NPT.

As indicated earlier, the NPT also moves between a liberal interpretation. Despite the institutionalisation of the distinction between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, member states do cooperate and work together to realise shared gains ultimately to the well-being of the NPT and the international community. For example, the Resolution of a Middle East Free from Nuclear Weapons, the conclusion of the CTBT and the 13 practical steps in support of nuclear disarmament, represents areas of agreement between member states. The unilateral decision by states to disarm their nuclear weapons such as that of South Africa, and forswear nuclear weapons as in the case of Argentina and Brazil strengthen the NPT and highlight its liberal position and role within the international system.

According to Kubálková (1998, p. 26), E. H. Carr in his book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* indicated that realists and liberals were locked in a great debate. It was assumed that realists and liberals held contradictory ideas, and for this reason are in tension. Instead, realists and liberals are in a relationship and are as a result explicitly linked and shaped by each other. Kubálková (1998, p. 30) offers a revisionist view of E. H. Carr, who was widely acknowledged as a prominent realist scholar, but rather offered a way to reconcile the tension between realists and liberals. From this argument, the realist and liberal interpretation of the NPT are not necessarily right or wrong; it is not an either or scenario. Taken together they highlight how the NPT has evolved as influenced by critical events preceding and during NPT review conferences as a result of social agents. At a particular time in history, nuclear weapons were largely seen as bestowing those that possessed it with prestige, status and power, and nuclear weapons were viewed as legitimate weapons to wage war.

Through the development of the nuclear taboo nuclear weapons were criticised and delegitimized as an immoral weapon. These interpretations (realist and liberal) are influenced and shaped by each other but also show how ideas or knowledge has spread to influence how physical entities or reality is perceived and understood (Kubálková, 1998, p. 31). It is impossible to have realism without liberalism; if one is removed the other will be affected. "Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place" (Kubálková, 1998, p. 32).

New ideas will replace old systems of behaviour and perception as reality is continually negotiated by social agents. The 1995 and 2000 Review Conference gave rise to tangible successes, positively shaping the way of the NPT. In 2005, due to disagreements and tension between member states significant ground was lost, and the treaty regressed. During 2005, nuclear weapon states may have felt their possession of nuclear weapons was threatened, this may explain their behaviour at the conference. The NPT moved too far to the right (realist) creating the need for member states to cooperate, reiterate their commitment to the NPT and at the 2010 Review Conference ensure a successful outcome. Taken in this way, the pendulum (NPT) swings from right to left and when it moves to the extremes agents and critical events will influence its direction. This shift in how the NPT is viewed will continue to occur as meaning is always negotiated over time. In Political Science, unlike in natural science, there are no objective facts as it is a discipline focused on human behaviour and facts are arrived through social negotiation (Kubálková, 1998, p. 33).

In this way, the NPT is not necessarily a realist or liberal instrument, as each state and its decision makers have their own view of the NPT and respond to it accordingly. At this point, it is possible to argue that the NPT is what states make of it. With that in mind, there is no set direction for the NPT; the treaty will continue to move between these interpretations (realist and liberal) as ideas and beliefs as well as interests change.

6.7 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is what states make of it

Under the leadership of President George W. Bush, the nuclear weapons of the United States acted as a deterrent against those that threatened the United States with weapons of mass destruction and conventional military force. Since then the Obama administration has changed America's nuclear strategy (The Guardian, 2010). The change in national leadership in the United States and the worldview of Obama has an impact on the NPT and the way forward. In 2009, when President Obama delivered his now famous speech in Prague this signalled a renewed commitment by the United States toward nuclear disarmament. President Obama reaffirmed his commitment to a world free from nuclear weapons, to end Cold War thinking and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy (De Santana, 2009, p. 340). On 8 April 2010, New START was signed between Russia and the United States, a symbolic gesture offering hope in the NPT and also in the non-proliferation regime. These gestures produced enough momentum towards a successful NPT Review Conference convened in 2010 (Zanders, 2010, pp. 7-8; The Daily Maverick, 2010).

According to Johnson (2010a, p. 8), 2010 marked a period in which the "international environment" was more favourable to deal with nuclear-related issues. In May 2010, at the NPT Review Conference, nuclear weapon states have appeared to make some concessions to show that they remain committed to this treaty. This outcome proves the point that when the treaty moves to the extremes, it gets brought back by member states to ensure its existence and prevent its failure or disappearance.

Thus, the meaning of the NPT fluctuates and changes according to the time and based on the level of commitment shown by its member states. With the 2010 Review Conference in mind, both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states view the NPT as a central instrument in the international system to introduce a measure of stability and order. The ongoing support of member states for the NPT

and the centrality of ensuring a successful 2010 Review Conference and the development of a final document show how significant this treaty is. Despite the challenges of the NPT member states could cooperate and ensure the existence of this treaty. New life has been breathed into the NPT by nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, and they are of the view that it is better to work within the treaty than to work outside of it. The outcome is that both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states see the NPT as serving and protecting their mutual security interests. This point is echoed in a statement made by the European Union in 2005, the NPT is "...an irreplaceable, legally binding instrument for maintaining and reinforcing international peace, security and stability" (Johnson, 2005, pp. 25-26).

The NPT, from a constructivist view can be termed both a realist, and a liberal instrument based on the zeitgeist (sprit of the times) and the level of commitment shown by member states at particular times in history (Kegley & Blanton, 2010, pp. 213-214). As specified by Rebecca Johnson, 2010 marked a period in history that was more conductive to discussing and dealing with nuclear-related issues. Here, the spirit of the times and thinking around nuclear weapons and disarmament has been influenced by key agents such as President Obama. The NPT is ultimately what states make of it. If states regard this treaty as an indispensable component to the realisation of their mutual interests, they will continue to support it, as they have done. Agents will continue to shape regimes and structures according to their perceived interests, and this is true for the NPT. Consequently, during the introductory process of the NPT, it represented a realist instrument to maintain a favourable nuclear order for the United States and the Soviet Union by safeguarding their nuclear weapons and effectively preventing other states from gaining this level of military power (holding a monopoly over nuclear weapons). Thus, it would be in the interests of dominant powers to maintain the status quo (Carranza, 2006, p. 493). Even so, over time more and more states began to associate themselves with this treaty, increasing its currency as an international instrument. Non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT are not forced into signing this treaty. The normative principles

embodied within the NPT such as the norm of disarmament can be used by non-nuclear weapon states to criticise nuclear weapon states and remind them of their commitment to dismantle their nuclear weapons under Article VI (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2009, p. 78).

There is a host of agents influencing the direction of the NPT; hence challenging the assumption of a treaty largely benefiting nuclear weapon states (dominant powers) only.

The NPT is impacted and shaped by ideas of key agents such as the United States President Obama, non-nuclear weapon states through groups, such as the New Agenda Coalition as well as non-governmental organisations, such as the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, the Institute for Security Studies, and various activist groups, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom, to name but a few. There is a wide range of actors all seeking to influence and impose their meaning onto the NPT. Powerful agents may set the tone of the NPT and influence its position, but the regime or structure also has a life of its own, which is not solely dependent on dominant powers and exercise influence over member states. This statement is proven by the fact that nuclear weapon states were committed towards a successful 2010 Review Conference based on their perception of the treaty and its position in the international system. The NPT is a source of international governance and cooperation and agreement between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. In this regard, since member states cannot fathom a world without the NPT it should be clear that this treaty embodies perceptions that exercise influence over states and how they view security even though at particular times some member states disregard its principles and standards.

In turn, the NPT's ability to restrain the system of self-help and inform state behaviour through its norms and standards in the field of nuclear weapons and

disarmament depends on whether member states desire the treaty to play this role. The level of support and compliance shown by member states towards the NPT will ultimately influence the strength and direction of this treaty. Whether the treaty is a realist or a liberal instrument will ultimately be decided by states (and their view of the nuclear order, itself influenced by the NPT). States will decide through their constructed lenses what role the NPT should play in the international system and confirm this through their behaviour and activities. It is their shared experiences, and the meanings associated to phenomena that will determine the position and level of importance associated to the NPT. For this reason, the NPT is what states make of it.

6.8 Conclusion

At particular times in history, the NPT moves from a realist to a liberal perspective. With that in mind, the NPT is both a realist, and a liberal instrument based on the perceptions of international actors and how they relate towards this treaty.

Ultimately, states will determine the level of importance associated to the NPT which is based on their practices and commitment to this treaty. Thus, the NPT is what states make of it. Critical events occurring before review conferences largely influence its direction and perception but also the activities and behaviour of member states within this multilateral forum will directly impact on the NPT itself, negatively or positively. Nevertheless, before the NPT moves to extremes where its existence is threatened it gets brought back to a position where both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states can agree on the way forward for this treaty. A constructivist view of the NPT reveals that the ideas and thinking of states regarding the NPT will have a great impact on its role and position in the international system, but that these ideas are themselves also impacted by the structure that the NPT has brought to the nuclear order.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This chapter will provide a summary of the core arguments of the thesis in an attempt to answer in the final analysis the question that the thesis aimed to answer, namely to what extent can the NPT restrain the system of self-help under international anarchy by using respectively a realist, liberal and constructivist lens to interpret the NPT.

The NPT has played an instrumental role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and proposed a world free from these weapons since it entered into force. The NPT with its rules and standards of behaviour requires member states to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and for the five nuclear weapon states to eventually disarm their existing nuclear arsenals. Another component of the NPT is the sharing of nuclear technology and material for peaceful civilian purposes. These three components of the NPT represent a grand bargain between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. An inability by member states to uphold their treaty obligations affects the confidence states have in this treaty, thus serving as a justification for non-members to remain outside this treaty and ultimately affecting the goal of the NPT, that is, to realise a world free from nuclear weapons.

A central problem concerning the NPT is how it should be interpreted and implemented. The interpretation and implementation of the NPT is a contested arena among nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. This is made evident in NPT review conferences. With this in mind, to answer the research question, that is, to what extent can the NPT restrain the system of self-help through its standards and norms in the field of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament, it is necessary to delve into how member states and non-member states alike have perceived, internalised and responded to the NPT. Through the application of the three International Relations theories namely, realism, liberalism and constructivism

light can be shed on how states perceive the NPT and also what role this treaty serves in the international system.

NPT review conferences represented practical cases highlighting how member states perceive and relate to the NPT, by highlighting double standards, favouring of certain NPT components (for example arguing non-proliferation should take precedence over disarmament). Offering a realist, liberal and constructivist view of the NPT proffered explanations for why nuclear weapon states have been slow to disarm their nuclear weapons, why some states have forgone the nuclear weapons option (for example Argentina and Brazil) and why some states choose to remain outside the NPT and become nuclear states themselves (for example, India, Israel and North Korea). As it was argued in chapter six (a constructivist perspective of the NPT) the NPT is what states make of it, that is, states, through their behaviour and activity will determine the role and standard of the NPT in the international system (whether it will be instrumental to non-proliferation and disarmament efforts or not). The phrase, 'the NPT is what states make of it', points to the different perceptions that exist among states and its decision making apparatus regarding this treaty. For that reason, offering an alternative to a realist view of the NPT by contrasting it with a liberal and a constructivist perspective was cardinal to the research project.

Despite the widely accepted view among states that nuclear weapons inflict unacceptable damage and for that reason their development and use are taboo, nuclear weapons hold a prominent role in military doctrines. For some states (the nuclear five, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan), nuclear weapons bestow prestige, status and power and serve to protect their national interests through a nuclear deterrent. Realist scholars argue that the utility of nuclear weapons were evident during the Cold War ensuring peace and stability between the superpowers. The Cold War ideological threat has been replaced by the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and also to terrorist organisations; this serves as

a justification for nuclear weapon states to hold onto their nuclear weapons indefinitely.

It became evident at NPT review conferences that nuclear weapons hold a prominent role in the international system as attention was constantly shifted away from nuclear disarmament and more emphasis was placed on the nuclear threat posed by terrorist organisations and rogue states (for example in the 2005 NPT Review Conference). When the NPT was negotiated in the 1960s calls for a disarmament clause was not widely supported by the United States and the Soviet Union. The above point is further strengthened by a statement made by Tony Blair in 2007, that the NPT gives Britain the right to hold nuclear weapons, for that reason nuclear disarmament is not seen as a priority for the five nuclear weapon states. These examples represent instances where dominant states have imposed and shaped thinking around the NPT and nuclear weapons, compromising the goal of a nuclear weapons free world.

The idea that nuclear weapons safeguard national security (sovereignty) is at logger heads with norms of non-proliferation and disarmament. It is at this point where liberal scholars offer an alternative to the limited role realist have associated to norms and international institutions, with specific reference to the NPT.

Scholars such as Tannenwald (2007, pp. 362-363) have highlighted the significance of the nuclear taboo and its role in delegitimizing nuclear weapons, combating perceptions of prestige and power associated with these weapons. In this way, the moral standing of the NPT through the nuclear taboo served as a method to challenge the utility of nuclear weapons. The nuclear taboo describes the destructive nature of a nuclear explosion or war and for this reason portrays its use as a threat to humanity. Nuclear weapons are inhumane according to the International Court of Justice and the ICRC, and for that reason should be banned. Hence, remaining non-nuclear is a moral imperative. Stigmatising nuclear weapons as inhumane goes a long way to deconstruct and discredit value and meaning associated with them as a source of power, prestige and status. Non-nuclear weapon states in full compliance

with the NPT prove nuclear weapons need not necessarily be required to safeguard national security. Security can be protected without nuclear weapons; in fact, nuclear weapons create more uncertainty and insecurity. This humanitarian approach regarding nuclear weapons reveals the moral imperative of this treaty but the NPT also has legal implications.

Under the NPT, member states are governed by the same rules and norms creating a sense of continuity in the international system on how states should conduct their activities. Verification systems such as the IAEA safeguards enable member states to monitor each other's compliance toward using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, taken together with the NSG, sensitive nuclear technology is safeguarded through export controls, and by verifying member states' commitment toward IAEA safeguards, trust is established that nuclear technology is not used for military purposes, hence protecting international security.

The NPT has imposed a certain measure of order (governance) in the international system and thus combats or reduces the institution of self-help. International anarchy (the absence of a world government) is a reality, but through international institutions and regimes insecurity can be addressed and improved through structures (NPT) geared towards cooperation. Norms and standards of non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons challenge self-help and views of prestige and power associated with nuclear weapons. In chapter five (liberal view of the NPT) and chapter six (a constructivist perspective of the NPT), Argentina, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa were used to demonstrate how this treaty influenced and shaped the nuclear decision making process. Hence, emphasising the idea that the NPT, through its norms and standards of behaviour has the ability to influence and shape perceptions on security, nuclear weapons and disarmament. Even though states may join the NPT to advance self-interests as in the case of Egypt to use the treaty against Israel, once the treaty is ratified, they are committed to its rules and standards increasing the barrier of non-proliferation. When states act in non-

compliance with the NPT, it results in sanction, international pressure and condemnation and intervention by the UN Security Council.

Through ratification of the NPT, trust between member states is strengthened, creating a condition where member states can view each other as friends instead of foes. Identities and interests are transformed, for example, through the New Agenda Coalition Egypt played a meaningful role in nuclear disarmament. In this way, so-called permanent fixtures such as ideas of power and prestige associated with nuclear weapons are capable of being transformed; offering hope and the possibility of arriving at a nuclear weapons free world. According to Karp (1992, p. 7), "...permanent fixtures of the international system can be changed, that mankind is not condemned to perpetuate structural conditions".

Through a critical analysis of the NPT, that is, from a realist and a liberal perspective it was revealed how this treaty has evolved and was shaped by key agents throughout its history. As noted in chapter six (a constructivist perspective of the NPT), both the realist and liberal interpretation of the NPT are sound and offer a different and holistic perspective of the NPT. With the swinging pendulum image of the NPT in mind state views regarding this treaty, security, nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament are not fixed, they are able to change. In this way, the NPT is not a realist or liberal instrument; it is what states make of it. On the other hand, it can be said that states cannot envision a future without the NPT in it, thus this treaty holds a unique role and level of influence in the international system. This statement is proven by the fact that when it appeared the NPT was on the decline since its 2005 Review Conference, states, through their action and behaviour instilled hope in this treaty and ensured a successful 2010 Review Conference. As both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike seek to shape dominant ways of viewing the NPT at review conferences it should not be forgotten that the NPT has a life of its own.

On closer inspection of the NPT this institution has a life of its own, able to influence its member states and non-member states. The cases of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, India and Israel to an extent highlight the influence the NPT has over state perceptions regarding nuclear weapons. As new ideas surface and perceptions change new commitment would be shown towards the NPT. However, this does not mean that the NPT is without its challenges and obstacles.

Disarmament of nuclear weapons remains a stumbling block at NPT review conferences, calling into question the commitment of nuclear weapon states toward this treaty. By the same token, non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT cannot use this treaty to promote their nuclear weapon ambitions, in the case of Iraq, North Korea and currently suspected by Iran. Nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states are equally responsible for the standard of the NPT and have to reaffirm and remain committed members of this treaty.

Nevertheless, the NPT is distinguished from other treaties as being the only international instrument to commit nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament. In such a way, non-nuclear weapon states can use the treaty to place pressure on nuclear weapon states to disarm. What is evident is a renewed level of commitment by nuclear weapon states toward the NPT and efforts to arrive at a more balanced treaty. Thus, for now the NPT has been brought closer to the liberal interpretation where member states can work together and agree on the way forward.

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
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