

Public Participation, Political Representation and Accountability: the case of Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) in Harare Khayelitsha, in Cape Town

Jacob Cloete

This dissertation is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape

Supervisor: Prof Laurence Piper

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Keywords

Participation;
Representation;
Accountability;
Democracy;
Local Governance;
Urban upgrading;
Ward committees;
Violence prevention;
Khayelitsha;
Civil society;
Traditional leaders.



Abstract

Post-1994 the South African government has introduced a system of participatory democracy “within a base framework of constitutional and electoral democracy” (Fifteen Year Review, 2007, p. 18). The aim is to deepen the South African democracy at all levels of government. However, as local government is “the closest to the people” it is regarded by government as the most appropriate sphere to implement participatory democracy mechanisms. Pertaining to this, ward committees were introduced as the main participatory vehicle of local governance and in addition, the government has also implemented alternative instruments such as izimbizos and the integrated development planning (IDP) process to engage citizens in local governance. However, research so far indicates that participatory local governance in South Africa is weak and is not working optimally (Piper 2010, Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 2007). Given this, urgent reforms are needed for the South African local governance especially in terms of participation, representation and accountability.

At face value the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU), an infrastructure development project in the City of Cape Town, appears to be exactly the successful model of participation, representation and accountability that local government ought to be; hence the investigation of this thesis. For this investigation the researcher used a qualitative and an interpretative approach to make sense of the VPUU methodology. The researcher also made use of the case study approach to get greater insight into how the VPUU methodology specifically works in Harare Khayelitsha. The research found that the VPUU methodology does not encourage any real representation but rather a 'development trusteeship'. Piper (2012) initially argued that the VPUU's 'community participation model' is actually a form of representation that he terms 'development trusteeship'.

After closer inspection, the researcher found that while the VPUU's approach can be described as a form of 'development trusteeship' but even here representation is closer to a form of co-optation designed to assimilate community leaders in such a way it legitimates the project. In terms of representation it found that the VPUU local leadership structure – called the Safe Nodal Area Committee (SNAC) - do not represent the community as leaders were co-opted and the community has no power over the election or the co-optation of SNAC members. The researcher also found that the form of participation practised is pseudo-participation in that it is merely a necessity for ratifying decisions that has been already taken. In addition, both the project and the councillor are using 'political gatekeeping' to regulate the flow of information to the community at large. Lastly, the researcher also found that accountability flows upwards to the project as leaders are held accountable to the project and not to the community, and that it is difficult to gain access to information by external members of the public. From this it is clear that the measures in place are intended to legitimize the project rather than democratise the project.

Declaration

I declare that “Public Participation, Political Representation and Accountability: the case of Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) in Harare Khayelitsha, in Cape Town” is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university, and that all sources I have utilized or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Jacob Cloete

November 2012

Signed: _____



Dedication

In loving memory of my late Grandparents Dina and Jakob Hendriks.



Acknowledgements

First and foremost I have to acknowledge that I would have not been able to complete this thesis without the grace and mercy of Jesus Christ my Lord and Saviour. Thank you Jesus.

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Jacob Cloete
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


Table of Contents

Chapter 1 - Introduction	1
1. Introduction	1
1.1 Purpose of the Study	4
1.2 Delimitation of the Study.....	5
1.3 Problem Statement.....	6
1.4 Research Question	9
1.5 Rationale of the Study	10
1.6 Research Methodology	10
1.6.1 Research Methods.....	12
1.6.2 Data and Data Sources	13
1.6.3 Selection of Participants.....	13
1.6.4 Limitations of the Study.....	14
1.6.5 Research Ethics	16
1.7 Structure of the Thesis.....	17
Chapter 2 - Literature Review: A Theoretical Framework	21
2. Introduction	21
2.1 Democracy	22
2.2 Liberal Representative Democracy and Its Short-comings	24
2.3 Participatory Democracy.....	28
2.4 Public Participation	31
2.5 Political Representation	36
2.5.1 Origins of Political Representation	37
2.5.2 Models of Representation and the Process of Representation	39
2.5.3 Theory versus Practice	41
2.5.4 Civil Organisations and the reconfiguration of representation.....	42
2.5.5 A Framework for Analysis.....	43
2.6 Accountability.....	44
2.6.1 Accountability in Development Projects	47
2.6.2 The Components of Accountability in Development Projects	48
2.7 Conclusion	50
Chapter 3 - Participation, Representation and Accountability in South African Local Governance	52
3. Introduction	52
3.1 Public Participation as Conceptualise by the White Paper on Local Government 54	
3.1.1 Community Participation in Local Government.....	55
3.1.2 Ward Committees and Other Forms of Participation	58
3.1.3 Factors influencing community participation	63
3.2 Representation in South African Local Governance.....	64
3.2.1 Traditional Leadership	68
3.2.2 Ward Committees	70
3.2.3 Civil Society	71
3.2.4 Community Development Workers	74
3.2.5 Shortcomings of Representation at Local Governance.....	74
3.3 Accountability in South African Local Governance	76
3.3.1 Who has to account?.....	80

3.3.2	Mechanisms of Accountability at Local Governance	82
3.3.3	Shortcomings of Accountability in South African Local Governance	86
3.4	Conclusion	87
Chapter 4 - The Case of VPUU in Harare Khayelitsha, Cape Town		89
4.	Introduction	89
4.1	Background of the Khayelitsha Township.....	90
4.2	The Role of Civil Society in Khayelitsha’s Development	93
4.3	The Case of VPUU in Harare Khayelitsha.....	96
4.4	The VPUU Project Methodology and Principles	101
4.5	VPUUs Community Participation Model	102
4.6	Actual Forms of Participation in VPUU	106
4.7	Actual form of Representation: Safe Nodal Area Committee	108
4.8	Establishing a Frame of Reference.....	109
4.9	Representation: Establishing a SNAC – the Ideal Situation	110
4.10	Representation: Establishing a SNAC – In Practice	112
4.11	Participation.....	116
4.11.1	SNAC Meetings.....	116
4.11.2	Community Meetings	117
4.11.3	The Reference Group.....	122
4.12	Accountability	127
4.13	Community Contestations.....	131
4.14	‘Development Trustees’, Political Gatekeeping and Partisan Politics	135
4.14.1	‘Development Trusteeship’	136
4.14.2	Political Gatekeeping and Pseudo-Participation.....	140
4.14.3	Limited Access to Information	144
4.14.4	Partisan Politics and Community Contestations.....	145
4.15	Conclusion	147
Chapter 5: Lessons Learnt		149
5.1	Introduction	149
5.3	Weaknesses of Local Governance: Participation, Representation and Accountability	150
5.4	VPUU Outcomes.....	152
5.5	Recommendations	154
5.6	Concluding Remarks.....	155
Reference List		157
Appendix 1 – Informed Consent		180
Appendix 2 – Interview Schedule for Stakeholders		181
Appendix 3 – Interview Schedule for SNAC Members		182
Appendix 4 – SNAC Composition		183
Appendix 5 - Photos.....		183

LIST OF FIGURES

Diagram 2.5.2-1: Traditional Model	40
Diagram 2.5.2-2: Party Model	40
Diagram 2.5.2-3: The Process of Representation	41
Diagram 2.6.1-1: Accountability in Development projects	48
Graph 0-1: Number of Protest Marches	61
Diagram 4.5-1: John Turner's Housing Model	103

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
CDW	Community Development Worker
CDWP	Community Development Worker Programme
CoCT	City of Cape Town
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
EDD	Empowered Deliberative Democracy
HDA	Housing Development Agency
Idasa	Institute for Democracy in Africa
IDP	Integrated Development Planning
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KDF	Khayelitsha Development Forum
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
PR	Proportional Representation Electoral System
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SNA	Safe Node Area
SNAC	Safe Nodal Area Committee
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign
UN	United Nations
US	United States
VPUU	Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading

Chapter 1 - Introduction

1. Introduction

Apartheid denied the majority of South Africans participation and representation in the decision-making machinery of government. The dawn of democracy in 1994 promised South Africans the right to participate and to be represented in a government they elect. These rights, and others, were embedded in the South African Constitution of 1996, to protect citizens from any form of discrimination and to give life to the ideal of democratic government. Section 19 of the South African Constitution of 1996 ensures citizens are free to make political choices, to participate in the activities of political parties, and to stand for public office. Furthermore, section 152 of the 1996 Constitution states that local government must foster democratic and accountable government to local communities. This means local government must create ways through which they engage communities and *vice versa*. In addition to the constitutional framework for democracy, the government post-1994 introduced a system of participatory democracy aimed at deepening democracy at all levels of government. As a result, a number of Local Government Acts followed to provide a legal basis as to how communities must participate in local government.


It was through one such Act, the Municipal Structures Act of 1998, that ward committees were legalised as the 'space' for communities to engage their local municipal councils. Since the implementation of ward committees in 2001, various scholars (Piper 2010, Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 2007) have conducted

research on them. Findings indicate that ward committees and other participatory mechanisms of local governance are not responsive to the needs of local communities, as these structures tend not to represent the interest of communities. In addition, Jain (2010) argues that so-called 'service delivery' protest marches between elections are another indication of the ineffective nature of local municipal councils. Scholars have also argued that apart from the corruption and nepotism that plagued the South African local government, there is also a general lack of accountability to local communities (Piper 2010, Piper and von Lieres 2008, Mafunisa and Xaba 2008). This, therefore, raises issues of participation, representation and accountability at local governance.

Apart from the above mentioned issues, local government is also largely considered to be ineffective as suggested by the 2010/11 Auditor General's report. According to Heese and Allan (July 29, 2012) for the financial year 2010/11 only 13 or a mere 5 percent of the municipalities received an unqualified audit. It is also reported by the Auditor General that irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure increased from R6 billion in 2009/10 to more than R10 billion in 2010/11 (Heese and Allan, July 29, 2012). Given this poor management of funds and the general ineffectiveness of local government, the growing number of protest marches is understandable. Jain (2010, p. 31) reports that protest marches are mainly about: housing, water, electricity and sanitation. With regards to protest marches, the Municipal IQ (August 6, 2012) has reported a record 113 protest marches for 2012.

At face value the high number of protest marches might be seen to signal a systematic revolt against the ruling ANC. Conversely, Booysen (2007) found that leading up to the 2006 local government elections and after the elections, election turnout was maintained and support

for the ANC increased. She argues that protest and voting – or as she terms it the ‘brick and ballot’ – are to be understood not as contradictions but as ways that ANC supporters attempt to keep their preferred representatives accountable (*ibid.*). In an attempt to curb this crisis, the government developed policy documents such as *Project Consolidate in 2004* and in 2009 the *Local Government Turnaround Strategy*. However, these policies have proven to be ineffective as reflected by the Auditor General’s 2010/11 and 2009/10 reports. Evidently, local government appears ineffective and unable to respond adequately to the needs of local communities. Consequently, this research argues that local governance needs to be reformed in terms of representation, participation and accountability to enable it to be more responsive to the needs of local communities.



The necessity to reform South African local governance affirms the importance of exploring alternative governance practices such as those claimed in the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project. The VPUU might offer some solutions in this regard as they promised a model of local development that is more democratic and more effective than current local government. The VPUU was launched in 2005, as a cooperative agreement between the CoCT and the German Development Bank, to prevent crime through upgrading public spaces in Harare and Site C Khayelitsha. Crime in Khayelitsha is best contextualised by the historical underdevelopment of Khayelitsha during apartheid. Khayelitsha was established in the 1980s by the apartheid government to move black people out of the city to the Cape Flats. This was not only a deliberative attempt to enforce apartheid legislation but also a way of discriminating against black people. Due to Khayelitsha’s underdevelopment by the Apartheid government, Khayelitsha became one the biggest slums in South Africa with number of socio-economic problems that were crime related.

Since its inception in Harare Khayelitsha, the VPUU has had a number of successes in its attempts to reduce crime in Khayelitsha and they claim they achieved this by operating in a participatory way. In this regards, VPUU makes three claims: (1) VPUU successes are contributed to their community participation model (Graham and Krause, 2007); (2) they have “a representative leadership forum [which] aims to integrate the wealth of social capital in an area” (Krause, 2012, p. 3) and; (3) one of VPUU’s guiding principles is accountability (Krause, 2012, p. 3). This research, therefore, explored the forms of democratic practice (participation, representation and accountability) in the VPUU methodology. The aim was to explore whether the VPUU model could inform the current ineffective practices of local government in striving towards a more democratic and effective local governance.



1.1 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research was to explore and evaluate the forms of democratic practice in the VPUU methodology to assess whether the VPUU model could guide the reform of the current ineffective practices of local government in South Africa. To achieve this, the research used the first site of the VPUU project in Harare in Khayelitsha as a case study to investigate the VPUU project methodology in participation, representation and accountability terms.

The objectives of this study are:

- To outline the VPUU methodology;
- To describe the forms of representation, participation and accountability created by VPUU;
- To explore the practice of the VPUU in respect of these democratic values, and
- To assess implications of the VPUU model for local governance more generally.

1.2 Delimitation of the Study

The scope of the study is local governance in South Africa and not the local government of South Africa. According to Memela, Mantjane, Nzo and Hoof (2008, p.1) “governance is not just about how a government and social organisations interact, and how they relate to citizens, but it concerns the state’s ability to serve citizens and other actors...” Local governance is therefore, the practice of governance at local level that involves a wider range of players than just government. One can also reason that local governance in South Africa extends beyond elected representatives like ward councillors, proportional representation (PR) councillors and ward committee members, and that it potentially includes other representatives of communities such as traditional leaders, civil society organisations and others stakeholders.

Furthermore, this study is limited to give insight on how local governance in the City of Cape Town operates, especially Khayelitsha. In addition to this, this study does not investigate all aspects of local governance but only those related to participation, representation and

accountability. Hence, in terms of democracy this study is limited to only the procedural dimensions of democracy (Diamond and Morlino, 2005)¹. Therefore, this research is about procedural democracy, and participatory local government in South Africa.

1.3 Problem Statement

The systematic discrimination against black² people during colonialism and apartheid has created the current service delivery backlog in South Africa. Colonialism and apartheid denied the majority of South Africans the right to elect a government that would serve everyone, and not only a racially-defined few. Since 1994, a number of laws were passed to allow all citizens and communities to participate in government's decision-making processes, of which the local government legislation is important. The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 encourages communities to participate in local government and this can take place through the ward councillor, the integrated development planning (IDP) process, and traditional leaders. However, the preferred mechanism of community participation by local government is ward committees.

Ward committees are supposed to be representative community forums of (usually) 10 elected representatives that make recommendations to ward councillors with regards to service delivery and the needs of communities. However, research on ward committees has

¹ Diamond and Morlino (2005) developed a framework for assessing the quality of democracy. For this they divided democracy into three dimensions namely: procedure, content or substantive and results (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. xi). It is the procedural dimension of democracy which focuses on participation, accountability and representation.

² Race is a contentious issue in South Africa and, therefore, this research uses the term race as a way to illustrate how South Africa was divided into different racial groups for discrimination purposes during apartheid. It was the Population Registration Act (no. 30 of 1950) that divided South Africa into different racial categories, and since 1994 race was used in

indicated that ward committees do not possess any real decision-making power, and that recommendations made by ward committees are side-lined by municipal councils (Piper 2010, Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 2007). Secondly, research also indicates that most ward committees are taken over by political parties to serve the interest of the political party, which raises issues of representation (Piper, 2010).

In this regard, Butler (2009) argues that the lack of accountability in South Africa needs to be understood in terms of the electoral system and the party system. He argues that the ANC's dominance at the polls in the past four elections and with no real opposition in parliament indicates that South Africa has become a dominant party system. This dominance of the ruling party, combined with the proportional representation (PR) electoral system at national and provincial level compromises accountability. This is because members of parliament are accountable to the party and not to voters. Taking Butler's (2009) argument into account it explains the duality in the ward councillors' role. At the local level councillors are chosen by a mixed electoral system which has features of both the single member district and the PR electoral systems. Ward councillors are directly elected by the community whilst PR councillors are elected from party list. However, even though ward councillors are directly elected their political future is still dependent on the political party. Thus, once ward councillors are elected, they are supposed to represent and account to everyone in their wards and simultaneously represent and account to political parties. Therefore, this raises a question about whose interest ward councillors are serving in municipal councils.

its original form to redress the injustice of the past. With this in mind, 'race' here is mere a reference point to explain how discrimination during apartheid worked.

Furthermore, Memela *et al* (2008) outline a number of shortcomings of accountability in South African local governance. Amongst other things, there is a poor flow of information between municipal council and citizens, a weak civil society that does not make full use of existing mechanisms of accountability (Heller 2009, Jagwanth 2003) and an absence of municipal mechanisms in place for citizens to review council decisions. Heller (2009, p. 15) also indicates that apart from these issues “[t]he privatization or out-sourcing of many government functions and increased reliance on consultants has virtually crowded out community structures.” Vital services and functions of civil society are therefore outsourced to external organisations that do not know local communities. The failing nature of participatory local governance (Piper 2010, Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus, Hemson, Hicks and Piper 2007), the general lack of accountability at all levels (Butler 2009, Schulz-Herzenberg 2009 and Brooks 2004), the dual nature of representation for the ward councillor and a weak civil society (Idasa 2012, Heller 2009 and Jagwanth 2003) all serve as indicators that local governance in South Africa needs to be reformed.

However, in 2005 VPUU was introduced as a way of preventing violence and reducing crime in Harare Khayelitsha. VPUU is a project within the CoCT and, so far, has claimed a number of successes. Since, its implementation in Harare the VPUU claims to have reduced crime in the site by 33 percent, and the murder rate in particular by 20 per cent (Ndenze, May 04, 2011). The VPUU is currently operating six areas in Khayelitsha namely: Harare; Kuyasa; Site C, TR Section; Site B; and BM Section (Plato, 2011). The CoCT also implemented the VPUU programme in Hanover Park, Lavender Hill and Mannenberg in 2011. The VPUU methodology in generally appears to yield better results in comparison to the local

governance participatory model seems to be the ideal case to investigate for alternative forms of participation, representation and accountability.

1.4 Research Question

The research was guided by the following research question: ***Is the VPUU methodology of community participation, representation and accountability a suitable model to reform the South African local governance model?***

In addition the research question, the research was also guided by theoretical and empirical sub-research question. These sub-research questions assisted the researcher to answer the main research question. The theoretical sub-research questions are:



- What is representation?
- What is participation?
- What is accountability?

The empirical sub-research questions are:

- How does participation, representation and accountability in the methodology of the VPUU project work?
- Will the VPUU methodology improve the current forms of decision-making in South African local governance?

1.5 Rationale of the Study


This study contributes to the growing literature on participatory democracy in South Africa (Piper 2010, Thompson and Conradie 2010, Butler 2009, Heller 2009, Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008, Buccus *et al* 2007 and Chanza and Piper 2006). Democracy for citizens means more than just free and fair elections - for the poor majority it is a vehicle through which they can improve their quality of life. However, democracy also bestows citizens with certain responsibilities such as participation and representation in the decision-making structures of government. Therefore, participation, representation and accountability are essential to improve the quality of South Africa's democracy. This study investigated how participatory local government works and how it can be improved in terms of participation, representation and accountability (procedural dimension of democracy).

1.6 Research Methodology

The methodology of this study was qualitative and interpretive. Neuman (1997, p. 421) explains that “[a] qualitative researcher analyses data by organizing it into categories on the basis of themes, concepts, or similar features.” The researcher categorised the data into different categories. This helped to make sense of the data and to examine the relationship of participation, representation and accountability in practice and in theory. The researcher compared, evaluated and synthesized the data with social theory. The aim of this research

was to make sense of the VPUU methodology in democratic terms and the qualitative method was the best approach to give the researcher the desired results. The qualitative approach, therefore, allowed the researcher to see how people experience democratic inclusion and, thus, the subjectivity of participants was an important indicator of the nature of the decision-making in VPUU.

According to Neuman (1997, p. 68) “the interpretive approach is the systematic analysis of socially meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive at understanding and interpretations of how people create and maintain their social worlds.” This is ideally what this research wanted to achieve. It wanted to understand how the people of Harare Khayelitsha perceive and experience the VPUU process. It also wanted to determine whether VPUU has added value to their lives.




The case study method enabled the researcher to make sense of the research question and how the VPUU methodology works in a particular case and in this case Harare Khayelitsha. According to Rule and John (2011, p.4) “[a] case study is ... a systematic and in-depth investigation of a particular instance in its context in order to generate knowledge.” There are generally three forms of case study namely, exploratory, explanatory and descriptive (Yin, 2003).

A descriptive case study presents a complete description of a phenomenon within its context. An exploratory case study often examines a phenomenon that has not been investigated before and lays the basis for further studies. An explanatory case study

attempts to explain what happens in a particular case or why it happens (Rule and John, 2011, p.8).

This research was an exploratory case study as it assessed the forms of democratic practice in the VPUU project in Harare Khayelitsha. In addition to this, the case study also narrowed the scope of the sub-research questions and this helped the researcher to unpack participation, representation and accountability in much greater depth. It also allowed the researcher to identify how the VPUU methodology works in practice.

1.6.1 Research Methods




The study used observations, informal interviews and in-depth interviews to collect data which enabled the researcher to answer the empirical sub-research questions. Neuman (1997) also indicated that these methods are the best to generate qualitative data. Informal interviews allowed the researcher to engage with participants when they most comfortable, and this provided the researcher the opportunity to verify information that were provided in the in-depth interviews. Most informal interviews took place at the Khayelitsha Development Forum's (KDF) head office and the newly build Harare library. Besides informal interviews, the researcher also made observations and took a number of photos at the site in Harare. The researcher kept a reflective journal of all informal interviews and observations. Finally, in-depth interviews were used to collect raw data which was analysed for the purpose of this research.

1.6.2 Data and Data Sources

There are two types of data sources. The first data source is secondary. According to Neuman (1997, p. 398) secondary data sources are found in books, articles, official reports, reference books and statistics. Secondary data for this research was collected from journal articles, government legislation, books online newspaper archives and official VPUU documentation (strategies, baseline surveys, annual reports, etc).


Furthermore, this research made use of primary data sources. According to Neuman (1997, p. 396) primary data sources can be letters, diaries, newspapers, movies, novels, and photographs. They are usually found in archives or in museums. Primary data sources for this study include interviews, observations, project documents and photos of the VPUU project in Harare Khayelitsha.



1.6.3 Selection of Participants

Participants were selected based on their level of involvement in the VPUU project and whether they were substantially acquainted with the work of VPUU in Harare Khayelitsha. The reason for this is that seniors in the project helped to design and implement the VPUU project in Khayelitsha and this means these participants experienced the VPUU's apparent democratic practices first hand and hence their selection.

The research sample comprised of 12 participants. A number of the participants re-scheduled the interviews and participant 5 in particular re-scheduled the interview repeatedly from January 2012 to May 2012. Moreover, the researcher interviewed two SNAC members, a ward councillor, two professors who are the leading scholars on participatory democracy in South Africa, the project leader of VPUU, and a Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) official, a KDF executive member, 3 Community Development Workers (CDWs) and a facilities manager in site C. These participants were the best choices as the councillor is representing Harare, the facilities manager in Site C was part of the initial process of establishing VPUU, KDF is VPUU's primary partner, the three community development workers were field workers of the initial VPUU baseline survey in Harare and the Safe Nodal Area Committees (SNACs) are VPUU structures which are tasked with the implementation of the project.



Furthermore, the researcher also conducted 6 informal interviews with people who are part of the project in Khayelitsha and others who are well informed about local governance. The aim of these informal interviews was to triangulate the VPUU data and to give greater insight into South African local governance. These participants were the KDF administrator, the librarian of the new Harare library, the chairperson of KDF, the ward councillor of ward 90 in Khayelitsha and a PR councillor of the West Coast District Municipality.

1.6.4 Limitations of the Study


The research was limited by money, time, language, race and 'political gatekeepers'. The biggest limitation was political gatekeepers and it affected the time and the money of the research.

In January 2011, the researcher and his supervisor had a meeting with the team leader of the VPUU, Mr Michael Krause, with regard to the research on VPUU in Harare. Mr Krause indicated his support for the research. In July 2011, the researcher's proposal was accepted and a copy of it was sent to Mr Krause. After reading the proposal, Mr Krause requested that the use of Monwabisi Park instead of Khayelitsha as a case study. The researcher declined given all the investment in background research into Khayelitsha. Mr Krause responded by indicating that if the researcher continued with Harare he (Krause) would not be able to assist the researcher as the research would not be beneficial to VPUU. After a discussion with the researcher's supervisor the researcher approached Mr Krause again and indicated his willingness to change the case study to Monwabisi Park but the researcher did not get any positive feedback with regards to this suggestion. This was near the end of 2011 and the researcher decided to continue with the original case study. In 2012, the researcher tried a number of times to set up meetings with VPUU employees but they always indicated that they need to speak to Mr Krause first and would get back to the researcher but this never happened. The VPUU seemed to be defensive³ about Harare as a case study and VPUU as a whole. Without the support of VPUU it was difficult at first to get participants for the research, although in time this obstacle was overcome.

³ The reader will notice that Mr Krause's defensiveness made sense in time because one of the key findings of this research is political gatekeeping which explains his defensive nature.

In addition to this, there were other factors that might have influenced participation in the research at first. These factors were language and race. Residents of Khayelitsha mainly speak isiXhosa and the researcher cannot speak the language. This meant that interviews were conducted in English. It was only after a meeting with the chairperson of the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF), Mr Michael Benu that more people were willing to participate in the research. Mr Benu, however, asked the researcher to consider Monwabisi Park as part of the Harare case study as residents of Khayelitsha see the two neighbourhoods as one.

Furthermore, the researcher did not have any transport of his own and, therefore, had to mainly make use of public transport and sometimes private transport. This limited the researcher's interaction with the Harare community.



1.6.5 Research Ethics

This research was guided by the following principles: (1) privacy; (2) anonymity; (3) confidentiality (Neuman, 1997, p. 452); (4) truthfulness; and (5) voluntary participation. It is the researcher's intent to protect all participants' privacy, anonymity and confidentiality. According to Neuman (1997, p. 452) researchers can protect the privacy of respondents by not disclosing a subject's identity after data is gathered. Confidentiality on the other hand "means that information may have names attached to it, but the researcher holds it in confidence or keeps it secret from the public" (Neuman, 1997, p. 453).

In addition to this, the researcher used a written informed consent for all participants that were interviewed (see *Appendix 1*). The researcher had informed participants of their right to refuse to participate in the research and to withdraw their participation at any stage of the research. This is in accordance with the UWC Research Ethics Committee requirements and the *Human Science Research Council's Code of Research Ethics* (<http://www.hsrc.ac.za/Page-168.phtml>). In addition to this, the researcher explained to the participants that their identity would be protected at all times unless express permission was granted. Ten of the participants requested anonymity but allowed their professions to be mentioned. The participants that are anonymous did not provide the researcher with reasons as to why they would like to be anonymous. In chapter four the researcher will refer to these participants as Participant 1 (P1), Participant 2 (P2), etc.

Furthermore, according to Neuman (1997, p. 450) “[a] researcher is responsible for protecting subjects from increased risk of arrest.” In this research the researcher did not deal with classified or sensitive information that might have been harmful to participants and the public. However, given mister Krause defensive nature the researcher is intending to protect the identities of the eight participants who requested anonymity as he does not want the research to be harmful to the participants.

1.7 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provided a general introduction to the research problem and the research methodology. The main argument of chapter one is

that urgent reforms are needed for the South African local governance especially in terms of participation, representation and accountability. At face value the VPUU methodology appears to be a very successful model of participation, representation and accountability and hence the investigation. The aim of the research is to investigate the VPUU methodology to see whether some features can be used to reform the South African model of local governance. Furthermore, Chapter one outlines the methodological approach of the study and in this regard the methodology of the research is purely qualitative and interpretive to make sense of a deeply value-laded research question.

Chapter two establishes a theoretical framework by providing a brief discussion as to what democracy is and the different forms of democracy. It then interrogates the notion of a democratic deficit in current liberal representative democracy before unpacking the concepts of participation, representation and accountability. It is currently argued that in both developing and advanced democracies, participation, representation and accountability need to be strengthened to do away with democratic deficits. The aim of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework to assess the VPUU methodology with regards to representation, participation and accountability.


Chapter three offers a critical insight into the particular shortcomings of local governance in South Africa. Since 1994 the government of South Africa have introduced a system of participatory democracy with the aim to enhance the constitutional and electoral democracy (Fifteen Year Review, 2007). In this regard, through legislation and policies they introduced a number of mechanisms to take the ideals of participatory democracy forward and most of these mechanisms were implemented at local governance. Most prominent amongst these mechanisms are ward committees, CDWs and the IDP. In theory participatory democracy is

more than just participation and extent to measures of representation and accountability. In this regard, the critique in chapter three is twofold. Firstly, the focus by both government and research has been on participation and has somewhat ignored representation and accountability. Given this, the chapter not only investigates the participatory mechanisms of local government but show the reader how accountability and representations are neglected in both practice and research. Secondly, this chapter illustrates how these participatory mechanisms are failing or are not working.

Chapter four introduces and analyses the case study, namely the VPUU infrastructure development project in Harare Khayelitsha. According to Piper (2012) the decision-making process central to the VPUU methodology applied is anti-majoritarian, consociational and anti-partisan. This can be seen as an attempt to ward off the various forms of local capture that plague local governance, as noted in chapter three. However, the VPUU solution is not so much about community participation but about building community buy-in through a form of representation by civil society organisation in VPUU processes designed such that CSO representatives are held accountable to the VPUU project goals rather than the project being held accountable to the CSOs or the larger community. Further these project goals are consistent with the larger mainstream development approach. Piper (2012) argues that the VPUU's 'community participation' is actually a form of representation that he terms 'development trusteeship'.

After closer inspection, the researcher found that while the VPUU's approach can be described as a form of 'development trusteeship' but even here representation is closer to a form of co-option designed to legitimate the project by projecting community buy-in and clearing out rival 'gatekeepers'. In terms of representation it found that the VPUU structure

– SNAC do not represent the community as leaders were co-opted and the community has no power over the election or the co-option of SNAC members. In addition to this, the researcher also found that the form of participation practised is pseudo-participation in that it is merely a necessity for ratifying decisions that has been already taken. In addition, both the project leader and the councillor are using ‘political gatekeeping’ to regulate the flow of information to the community at large. Lastly, the researcher also found that accountability flows upwards to the project as leaders are held accountable to the project and not to the community, and that it is difficult to gain access to information by external members of the public. From this it clear that the measure in place is to legitimize the project rather than anything else.



Chapter five is the final chapter of this thesis and focuses on lessons that can be learned from this research. Based the finding of chapter three and four the researcher makes a number of recommendations. Key suggestions include the following: (1) further empirical research is needed to find ways to enhance and reform local governance in South Africa; (2) proposed empirical research must investigate cases where participation, representation and accountability are successful and to see whether it can be used to reform the current local government system; (3) local Government legislation must extent measures of accountability to traditional authorities and ward committees because the current system do have any measures of accountability for them.

Chapter 2 - Literature Review: A Theoretical Framework

2. Introduction

Democracy for many people seems to be the solution for their socio-economic and socio-political problems, and even though it is currently the system of governance that is used by most countries in the world, it does not mean that it has not flaws. Democracies of the Global North are currently experiencing declining patterns of political participation and democracies of the Global South are trapped between the demands of external donors and the demands of their citizens (Gaventa, 2006). This, however, does not discourage non-democracies to strive towards democracy. In the late 20th century there was a third wave of democracy and now in the 21st century there is the 'arab spring'. The 'arab spring' currently has scholars of political studies on the edges of their seats because citizens of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya brought down their tyrannical regimes to bring about democracy. This new development has awakened new debates on democracy (Gaventa, 2006).

South Africa like many other emerging democracies in the global South is not without any challenges. The aim of this chapter is therefore to provide a theoretical framework for the study. This framework will be used in Chapter four to assess the VPUU methodology. To establish such a framework this chapter have mainly two parts. The first part is a discussion on democracy and focuses on the different types of democracy. Apart from the different types of democracy it discusses the shortcomings of the liberal representative democracy. These shortcomings can be related to the quality of democracy. Diamond and Morlino

(2005) developed a framework for assessing the quality of democracy. For this they divided democracy into three dimensions namely: (1) the procedural dimension; (2) the content or substantive dimension and; (3) the results dimension (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. xi). The second part of this chapter focusses on the procedural dimension of democracy which is participation, accountability and representation. This will include the definitions, meanings and practices of participation, representation and accountability, and through this it want to establish a framework to assess the procedural aspects of the VPUU methodology.

2.1 Democracy

Today's liberal representative democracy is completely different from that of the ancient Greek city-states from which it derives the name. For the majority of democratic scholars the origins of democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece. However, the truth is that the form of democracy in the ancient Greek city-states is the earliest form democracy that scholars know a lot about. Among the ancient Greek city-states, the democracy of Athens "was the most stable and long-lived, and the best documented" (Arblaster, 1987, p. 14). Arblaster also argues that the Greeks did not invent the concept of democracy, the concept was devised "to describe an evolving reality – the kind of city-state in which the citizen body did actually govern itself" (Arblaster, 1987, p.14). This is evident if one takes a closer look at the word democracy. The word democracy comes from the Greek words *demos* (meaning 'the common people') and *kratia* (meaning 'power' or 'rule') (O'Neil, 2007, p.135). So, it was the "ordinary" man that ruled.

The central feature of this kind of democracy was “the direct personal participation of the citizen body in the government of the city” (Arblaster, 1987, p.18). One has to note that citizenship in the Greek city-states was very different from today’s notion of citizenship. According to Naila Kabeer (2002, p. 3) only men with the material means were counted as citizens whilst women and slaves were denied citizenship. Therefore, it would have not qualified as a full democracy in today’s terms. Furthermore, there were two key institutions through which democratic rule occurred. The first institution was the assembly or the *Ecclesia* which every citizen was entitled to attend and was tasked to take final decisions with regards to policy. This institution was also sovereign and composed of all the citizens. It is argued that there were never more than 50 000 citizens in a Greek city – state, and a quorum of 6000 were needed for decisions on citizen rights (Arblaster, 1987, p.18). The second institution was the council that was composed of 500 citizens and took office for a year. The council was responsible for the day-to-day running of the city-state (Arblaster, 1987, p.19). Therefore, one can make the case that democracy during the Greek city-states was a form of direct democracy because citizens participated directly in making key policy decision and law-making of the state.

One needs to note that this evolution was not a smooth transition. After the Greek city-state’s democracy somewhat lapsed and made its re-appearance in England during the Magna Carta nearly 1000 years later. In political history the Magna Carta signals the rise of political representatives in government. According to O’Neil (2007, p. 137-8) the origins of the modern democracy can be traced back to 1215 C.E. in England, when nobles forced King John to sign the Magna Carta that laid the foundations for an early legislature. After the Magna Carta the separation of power with checks and balances came about in the United

States (US). These checks and balances are a fundamental part of today's liberal democracies. But today's liberal representative democracy is much more sophisticated than the notion of political representatives and the separation of powers.


2.2 Liberal Representative Democracy and Its Short-comings

According to O'Neil (2007, p.135) "[l]iberal democracies are rooted in the ideology of liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights and freedoms." A liberal democracy must put individual freedom and equality first. The question democratic theorists are trying to solve is what is the appropriate form of government for a society of free and equal citizens (Piper, personal communication, August 27, 2010). Liberal democratic theorists have justified a set of institutions that makes liberal democracies feasible. According to Dahl (1998, pp. 85 - 86) the political institutions of modern representative democracy are: elected officials, free, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of information, associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship. In a liberal representative democracy, one elects representatives that will ensure that one's freedoms are protected and that one is treated equally in terms of the law. Moreover, if representatives are not accountable there will be an opportunity to replace them in regular free and fair elections (Schumpeter, 1976).

Even though liberal democracy is the type of democracy preferred by the majority of democratic states, it is not without its flaws. Many scholars believe that liberal democracy is in trouble because there are many concerns about the quality and the substance of liberal

democracy. Some scholars have noticed a number of democratic deficits or shortcomings from the democratic ideal. Democratic deficits include the declining patterns of political participation and the concern that special interests that are taking over political processes (Gaventa, 2006, p. 9). Gaventa (*ibid.*) notices that in the US citizens are treated like customers, who communicate to elites through opinion polls and electronic market research processes. Indeed, this notion of consumer democracy is increasingly common across the West.

Contrary to the West, in Africa a different pattern is visible:



democratic states are trapped between the demands by external donors for economic liberalisation by one on the one hand, and the needs of political majorities on the other. As a result the 'good governance' discourse has presided over the creation of what might be called exclusionary democracies, which allow for political competition, but cannot incorporate or respond to the demands of the majority in any meaningful way ... where the voices of the poor are frequently overruled by the demands of external donors (Gaventa, 2006, p. 10).

Democratic deficits, therefore, are not a phenomenon of the North but are also happening in the South.

Furthermore, Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2000, pp. 22 – 23) have identified four types of democratic deficits that are visible in the North and in the South. The first deficit is hollow citizenship, which means that citizens do not enjoy equal rights and entitlements. For

example, the South African Constitution in terms of section 3 provides for common citizenship and in terms of section 9 that everyone is equal before the law. But these rights can only be enforced and exercised if a citizen has the money to pay for private legal services. Therefore, even though the law advocates that citizens are equal, it does not mean they are enjoying the same benefits and privileges as wealthier citizens.

Second is the lack of vertical accountability, which is the inability of citizens to hold political elites accountable. South Africa lacks vertical accountability partly because they use the PR electoral system. According to Reynolds (1999) the closed list proportional PR electoral system is not good for accountability. The reason for this is that voters in most cases are not aware who the representatives are they are voting for and this makes it difficult for voters to hold representatives accountable. In addition, representatives chosen by the closed-list PR electoral system are accountable to the party and not to the voters as they are trying to secure their political future. Over and above the electoral system the dominance of the ANC also perpetuates this particular situation (Butler, 2009). With the lack of any real electoral competition real authority shifts away from the Constitution to the ruling party which held serious concerns with regards to accountability (Brooks, 2004). Therefore, in South Africa under-performing MP's can be chosen over and over again, despite being unpopular.

The third deficit is weak horizontal accountability between the judiciary, the executive and the legislature. These three arms of government are usually weakened through patronage, corruption, etc. The researcher is of the view that checks and balances in South Africa have been respected so far but it does not mean that it is without any weakness. If one considers

Thabo Mbeki's removal in 2008 as the president of South Africa it becomes apparent that parliament has become the mouthpiece and rubber stamp of the ruling party. This show that parliament has no real authority which can be contributed to South Africa's status as a dominant party state and the PR electoral system (Butler 2009, Schulz-Herzenberg 2009 and Brooks 2004).

The last deficit is international accountability dilemmas, which means that the policy space of national governments is shrinking, especially as regards macro-economic policy. South Africa as a developing state is experiencing tremendous pressure from the international community to act in a certain way. For South Africa to be accepted in the international environment it must adhere to the rules of the game and in this case a neoliberal economic framework. If South Africa does not adhere to neoliberal standards it will not be accepted as a player in the international system, and suffer adverse economic consequences in terms of its rating for trade and investment. South Africa's policies, therefore, must be of such a nature that it adheres to international standards. Institutions and rating agencies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund, Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch Group (IMF) have a great impact on South African policy. Therefore, decisions taken at international level by states do not necessarily have the approval of citizens but in most cases affects citizens.

These deficits, therefore, indicate that liberal democracies are experiencing problems with accountability, representation and participation. Given these concerns in both the North and the global South, a number of scholars have argued for a more participatory form of democracy (Gaventa 2006, Cornwall 2002, Bohman 1998 and Cohen 1996).

2.3 Participatory Democracy

As used in most contemporary political thought, participatory democracy is seen as way of making existing liberal representative democracies more participatory. It also does not necessarily refer to a direct democratic system similar to that as ancient Greece but rather imagines a series of institutions and practices that complement the hegemonic representative system. Many types of participatory approaches have been conceptualized but the most well-known in the west is the deliberative democratic approach. Deliberative democracy made its appearance as a way to encourage more participation in the liberal democratic model. According to Bohman (1998, p. 402) “any conception of deliberative democracy ‘is organised around the ideal of political justification’ requiring free public reasoning of equals citizens.” In addition, Cohen (1996, pp. 99 – 100) argues that in a deliberative democracy “outcomes are democratic legitimate if and only if they could be object of a free and reasoned agreement amongst equals.” From both scholars one sees that in a deliberative democracy public reasoning and consensus amongst citizens over policy issues is the key. According to Bohman (1998, p. 408) “deliberation is indeed superior to other methods and principles of resolving conflict”, [this means that] citizens stand a better chance of resolving some of their moral disagreement” through deliberation. Many conflicts exist in the state because of previous exclusions. These exclusions bring to the fore the notion of marginalisation. The project of deliberative democracy must give voice to those that was previously excluded from the decision-making process and once again raises issues of participation and representation. However, like many other theories the normative theoretical account of deliberative democracy was explored empirical to test whether it would be successful in practice.

Hence, Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright have researched five cases where participation is successful and sustainable. These cases are: (1) functionally specific neighbourhood councils in Chicago, United States; (2) labour market transparency and skill formation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; (3) stakeholder ecosystem governance under the US Endangered Species Act; (4) participatory city budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil; and (5) village governance in India: West Bengal and Kerala. Their aim was to develop a model for participation that is inclusive and responsive to the needs of the poor. Their model is called 'empowered deliberative democracy' (EDD). They have designed a set of principles and a set of institutional features that can be used to strengthen participation between authorities and its citizens.

The principles of EDD are the following: (a) practical orientation; (b) bottom-up participation; and (c) deliberative solution generation (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 18). The principle of 'practical orientation' requires a "focus on practical problems such as providing public safety, training workers, caring for ecosystems, or constructing sensible municipal budgets" (*ibid.*). The second principle, 'bottom-up participation', expects of "ordinary citizens and officials in the field – to apply their knowledge, intelligence, and interest to the formulation of solutions" (*ibid.*). They do not mean that experts do not have a role to play but that experts rather do not enjoy exclusive power to make important decisions. The third principle, 'deliberative solution generation', require of participants to listen to each other's positions and generate group choices after due consideration. Fung and Wright further explain that an important feature of genuine deliberation is that participants find reasons that they can accept in collective actions (Fung & Wright, 2001, p.19). The generated solutions must be considered fair by everyone and accepted by everyone. According to Fung

& Wright (*ibid.*) “[c]hoices will be fair if groups adopt reasonable proposals rather than those that garner the greatest self-interested support or political influence.” Solutions must be, therefore, geared towards the common good of society.

The institutional design features of EDD are: (1) devolution of power; (2) centralized supervision and coordination; and (3) state centred, not voluntaristic. The first institutional design feature “entails the administrative and political devolution of power to local action units” (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 21). These units “are not merely advisory, but rather creatures of a transformed state endowed with substantial public authority” (*ibid.*). The devolution of power will help with the implementation and decision-making processes of public policy. This will also ensure that lower levels are taken seriously with regards to decision-making. The second design feature, ‘centralized supervision and coordination’, ensures that local units do not operate as autonomous, atomized sites of decision making (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 22). “The rigidity of [autonomy] leads it too often to disrespect local circumstance and intelligence and as a result it has a hard time learning from experience” (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 23). The institutional design feature, ‘state centred and not voluntaristic’, wants to “colonize state power and transform formal governance institutions” (*ibid.*). This design property “seeks to transform the mechanisms of state power into permanently mobilized deliberative – democratic, grassroots forms” (*ibid.*). There are many cases in practice where citizens and pressure groups temporarily have the power to force authority to implement decisions that will serve their interest. On the contrary, EDD is a transformative “attempt to [institutionalize] the on-going participation of ordinary citizens” (*ibid.*).

It is important to note that there are generally problems with accountability, participation and representation in liberal democracies across the globe. The deliberative democracy model was an attempt by democratic theorist (Bohman 1998 and Cohen 1996) to deepen the liberal representative democracy in terms of participation. The EDD approach by Fung and Wright (2001) was therefore a notable attempt to design a model which encourages sustainable participation in communities. The second part of this chapter discusses the procedural dimensions of democracy which are participation, representation and accountability (Diamond and Morlino, 2005). Through this it does not only establish a framework to assess the South African local governance and the VPUU methodology but it also answers the theoretical sub-research questions.

2.4 Public Participation



Participation is a fairly complex concept. In its simplest form participation means to take part in an activity, but if the word 'participation' is merged with the words 'public', 'political' and 'community', then it takes on many different dimensions. All three of these concepts of participation (public participation, political participation and community participation) refer to specific types of participation. For example, community participation might refer to how a community would take part in the decision-making processes of local governance, or in a non-governmental project. Political participation, on the other hand, refers to the participation of citizens in government, and that is mostly through electing political leaders and/or taking part in shaping and implementing policy (Birch, 1993, p.80). Public participation arguably encapsulates both community participation and political participation,

because the term 'public' refers to all the spaces regulated by the state, whether this is the municipal council or the community hall (The Routledge Dictionary of Politics, 2003).

Furthermore, participation as a practice has a set criteria which practitioners on a daily basis use. According to Midgley (1986, p.25)

participation requires the voluntary and democratic involvement of people in (a) contributing to the development effort, (b) sharing equitably in the benefits derived therefrom and (c) decision-making in respect of setting goals, formulating policies and planning and implementing economic and social development programmes.

However, one need to note that there is a difference between authentic participation and pseudo-participation. According to (Midgley, 1986, p.26) authentic participation will involve all three criteria that were set above but pseudo-participation will limit community involvement to implementation or to ratify decisions already taken by external bodies. In this regard Midgley (1986, p.26) indicates that "the involvement of the population in implementation can hardly be considered to be community participation unless there is at least some degree of sharing of decisions with the community." Authentic participation of communities is therefore the ideal type of participation to strive for.

However, "[c]ommunity participation is said to be achieved when programmes which are desired and utilized by the community are effectively sustained by them after all external support has been phased out" (Midgley, 1986, p.27). This, therefore, means that the aim of participation especially community participation is to be sustainable and on-going. Given

this, participation can be defined as an on-going activity by which citizens or communities shape and implement public policy in a sustainable manner.

Furthermore, according to Richard Ballard (2008, p. 168) participation as a method can be used for two major kinds of political purposes: (1) it can be used as an information gathering exercise which better informs officials about the needs of citizens, and (2) a way of engaging the government on the best ways of meeting social needs. In addition to the purpose of participation, there are also “spaces” of participation. According to Lefebvre in Cornwall, (2002, p. 6) “space is a social product ... it is not simply ... a neutral container waiting to be filled, but is a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control.” In this Cornwall (2002), Gaventa (2006) and Ballard (2008) have identified “invited”, “invented” and “closed” spaces of participation. Given this, neither invited nor invented spaces would be neutral because each type of space has a certain agenda to represent. In ‘closed spaces’ “decisions are made by a set of actors behind closed doors, without any pretence of broadening the boundaries for inclusion ... closed spaces may seek to restore legitimacy by creating invited space” (Gaventa, 2006, p. 35).

According to Ballard (2008, p. 180) inviting participation might allow an authority to claim that there should be no need for anyone to operate outside of those invited spaces because it has established its moral authority as a supporter of participation, it can demand to know why it would be necessary to operate outside of those forums it has established for the purpose of participation. Furthermore “the invited kind ... is conducted on the state’s terms rather than the terms of the community” (Ballard, 2008, p.181). This shows that invited spaces do not necessarily serve the needs of citizens.

According to Gaventa (2006, p. 27) invented spaces “are claimed by less powerful actors from or against the power holders, or created more autonomously by them.” Invented spaces might present in different forms such as by formal invitation, by formal right, by creating non-state institutions, by creating civil society organisations (CSOs) or by collective transitory action (such as protests or land occupations) (Gaventa *ibid.*). Given the latter discussion on participation, it is important to note that in South Africa ‘invented’ spaces most of the time presents itself in some sort of protest. Power holders assert that protests and social movements have no value in the democratic dispensation because it might be threat to the states legitimacy (Ballard, 2008). According to Habermas in Cornwall (2002, p.4) developing an autonomous public sphere outside the domain of the state is a precondition for citizen engagement that does not simply serve to legitimate the existing political system. The criticism here is that legitimizing the state does not necessarily mean that the state is delivering most needed services.

Apart from the ‘spaces’ of participation power also play a crucial role in shaping participation. According to Cornwall (2002, p. 8) one needs to look at what the public sphere comes to represent and how it is constituted to recognise the role of power. This means that one need to look at whose interest is being served and how participation in decision-making is structured. Essential questions to ask are: who makes the decisions (an elected few?) and who is benefitting? To clarify these questions Cornwall (*ibid.*) argues that power relations pervade any space of participation. Spaces made available by the powerful may be discursively bounded to permit only limited citizen influence, colonizing interaction and stifling dissent. She also makes this point: spaces, in which citizens are invited to participate

as well as those they create for themselves, are never neutral. The one party that deploys the most power in any particular space usually will have their interests best served.

Another dimension to participation is the arena in which it takes place. Gaventa (2006, p. 36) argues that there are three arenas of participation namely: the global, the national and the local environments. According to Gaventa (*ibid.*) some scholars argue that participatory practices must begin at the local level while others believe that power is shifting towards globalised actors and, therefore, struggles for participation must start at that level. The reality, however, is that participatory practices must be at all levels because “[p]oor people are excluded from participation in governance. State institutions are often neither responsive nor accountable to the poor ...” (Marayan in Gaventa, 2006, p. 26). In most cases the poor want to participate in the governance processes to ensure that governments respond to their needs but they need to be empowered. One, therefore, notices many new forms of inclusion by the poor: “ranging from provisions for participatory planning at the local government level in India and the Philippines, to participatory budgeting and participatory health councils in Brazil, to citizen monitoring committees in Bolivia, to forms of public referenda and citizen consultation in Europe” (Gaventa, 2006, p. 31).

In summary, participation is a practice that requires the voluntary and democratic involvement of people (Midgley, 1986). It is also a method used for information gathering or engaging government on best ways of meeting social needs (Ballard, 2008). Participation also has different ‘space’ and different arenas where participation takes place (Cornwall, 2002 and Gaventa, 2006). Lastly, power also plays a crucial role in participation as it will determine whose interests will be served (Cornwall, 2002). This particular framework helps

to identify the shortcomings of local governance in Chapter three and is used to assess the VPUU methodology in chapter four.

2.5 Political Representation

Consider the following example as a means to illustrate the complex nature of representation. A B.Com class consisting of 280 students has to elect a class representative that will represent the class at the faculty board. The students in the class nominated three students (student X, student Y and student Z) for election and only one can be the representative. The results of the voting process were as follow: student X – 93 votes, student Y – 93 votes and student Z 94 votes. This means that student Z was elected as class representative based on a simple majority. The election of Z leaves one with a number of questions. Firstly, does Z represent the supporters of X and Y also or is Z only representing his/her supporters? Secondly, if Z is representing the whole class does he/she take the mandate from the class or does he/she act independently. Thirdly, how would Z account to the class and is it necessary for him/her to account? Fourthly, would the election of the class representative encourage students to participate in student governance? To answer these questions it is necessary to start with the origins of representation and see how this concept has developed over time to its modern conception.

2.5.1 Origins of Political Representation

The concept of representation can be traced back as far as the ancient Roman Empire. Pitkin (1972, p. 2) argues that the “concept of representation, particular of human beings representing other human beings, is essentially a modern one.” The “ancient Greeks had no corresponding word” (Pitkin, 1972, pp. 2/3), the Romans, however, had the word *repraesentare*, from which our own ‘representation’ derives by way of old French. But it was not before the parliamentary system emerge in England that the literal meaning was attached to the word in a political context. Pitkin (1972, p. 3) explains – “neither the concept nor the institutions to which it was applied were linked with elections or democracy nor was representation considered a matter of right.” In England the king’s council seems to have begun as a matter of royal convenience and need rather through elections. This was more of a duty and was reluctantly performed by nobles and as time passed parliamentary representation in England was used to further local interests (Pitkin, 1972, p.3). By the seventeenth century the right to elect a Member of Parliament could be claimed by poor men.

Furthermore, the American Revolution added substantively to the concept of representation through “rallying [the] cry ... taxation without representation is tyranny” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 3). And so was it turned into a right of man. “This representation came to mean popular representation, and to be linked with the idea of self-government ... And that is how it became embodied in our institutions” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 3). For Pitkin (1972, p. 9) “representation ... means the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact.” This explanation of representation reflects “a

paradox, and thus a fundamental dualism is built into the meaning of representation” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 9). On the one hand there is the autonomy of the representative that needs to be considered because the representative needs power to make certain decisions. And on the other hand the representative’s genuine commitment to the interest of the represented which one can refer to as his/her representativeness (Lavalle, Houtzager and Castello, 2005). It is this paradox that the majority of scholars on representation are trying to engage and this has caused a vast amount of literature that tried to explain this dualism.

Many authors (Plotke 1997, Mansbridge 2003, Dovi 2006) refer to Pitkin’s work on representation as the most comprehensive. Pitkin was the first person to categorise the concept of representation into four categories namely: formalistic representation, descriptive representation, symbolic representation and substantive representation. According to Pitkin (1972, p. 39) the formalistic view of representation views “a representative [as] someone who has been authorised to act.” The word authorization here explains this form of representation. Authorisation focuses on the means by which representatives obtain his or her standing, status, position or office (Dovi, 2006). For example, one will look at the institutional arrangements of representation, the mechanisms that brought the representative in power.

Furthermore, the second categorisation is the descriptive view or representation. Representatives are elected because they resemble a certain feature of a certain group but as a representative it does not necessarily mean that he or she will act on behalf of the interests of the group that elected him or her. For example, people from the same race may want a representative of their race to represent them or people from the same gender may

want someone of their gender to represent them. Here the emphasis is on the appearance and on the description of the representative or to the extent to which a representative resembles those being represented (Dovi, 2006).

The third category of representation is symbolic representation. Here the focus is not on the “authorisation” neither the “outer appearance” of the representative but on what the representative ‘stands for’ (Pitkin, 1972). For example, a person can be elected because he or she is against racism and inequality. The representative is elected as a symbol for non-racialism and equality. The last category of representation is substantive representation. Here representation is an activity. The focus is “what the representative does and how he does it” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 143). For example, if a representative is elected because he or she made certain policy promises during the elections, the representative in this case will be assessed to which extent he or she meets his or her promises. According to Dovi (2006) the question that needs to be asked is whether the representative advances the policy preferences that serve the interest of the represented.

2.5.2 Models of Representation and the Process of Representation

Lavalle *et al* (2005) argues that there are mainly two models of representation that has been used by governments. The first is the parliamentary model of representation where people elect representatives and parliament represents the people. In this model there is a direct relationship between the representative and the represented (see Diagram 1)



Diagram 2.5.2-1: Traditional Model

The second is the Party Model of representation. In this model the party play a mediation role to ensure that the mandate of the people is on the parliamentary agenda (see Diagram 2).



Diagram 2.5.2-2: Party Model

Even this model has shortcomings especially if the party appoints the members of parliament (MPs). In this case the party becomes the decision-maker and also decides who must represent or not and not necessarily the electorate.

The researcher, conceptualises the process of representation as follow: an electorate elects representatives through certain mechanisms under certain condition to perform a specific mandate in government and are held to account on a regular basis as one cannot discuss representation without discussing accountability.




Diagram 2.5.2-3: The Process of Representation

2.5.3 Theory versus Practice

It is important to note that Pitkin’s work is conceptual and theoretical and can apply across contexts. Jane Mansbridge (2003) researched the actual practice of representation in the United States of America (USA) and found four types of representation. These forms of representation are: (1) promissory; (2) anticipatory; (3) gyroscopic; and (4) surrogacy. Promissory representation is regarded as the traditional model of representation which focuses on the idea that during campaigns representatives makes promises to constituents whom they then keep or fails to keep (Mansbridge, 2003, p.515). Dovi (2006) argues that promissory representation strongly resembles Pitkin’s discussion of formalistic representation. Representatives are, therefore, authorised to represent and would account to account to those who elected them.

Mansbridge’s second form of representation is anticipatory representation. In this form of representation “the voter looks back to the past behaviour of a representative in deciding [on] how to vote in the next election” (Mansbridge, 2003, p.516). Here the “representatives focus on what they think their constituents will reward in the next election and not what

they promised during the campaign of the previous election” (Dovi, 2006). The third form of representation that Mansbridge conceptualize is gyroscopic representation. Mansbridge explains that:

In all versions of gyroscopic representation, the voters affect political outcomes not by affecting the behaviours of the representatives ... but by selecting and placing in the political system representatives whose behaviour is to some degree predictable in advance based on their observable characteristics (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 521).

The last form of representation is surrogate representation which “occurs when a legislator represents constituents outside of their districts” (Dovi, 2006). According to Mansbridge (2003, p.522) a surrogate representative “has no electoral relationship – [and] is, a representative in another district.” If one considers the work of both Pitkin and Mansbridge one can conclude that there are differences between practice and theory, hence, the work of Mansbridge brings something significant to the fore. She demonstrated that there are a gap between the theoretical and the actual practice of representation. This therefore implies that there might be ‘new’ forms of practical representation.

2.5.4 Civil Organisations and the reconfiguration of representation

Recently, there was a debate on the reconfiguration of representation and unlike in the past it looked at the role civil organisations play in reconfiguring the notion of representation (Manin 1997 and Lavallo *et al* 2005). The ‘reconfiguration’ debate is a theoretical debate

between two groups of scholars. The group first argues for the party model of representation and the group second argues for the return of the charismatic national leaders. Lavalle *et al* (2005) criticism of the 'reconfiguration' of representation debate is that it excludes the role of civil organisations. They believe that civil organisations represent society in matters of budget and might even play a mediation role similar to that of the political party.

During the past decade the role of civil organisations as representatives of society has been examined by a number of scholars (Lavalle *et al*, 2005, p. 8). And it raises a number of questions: (1) who does civil organisations represent? (2) How do civil organisations stay accountable and to whom do they account? (3) Are there specific mechanisms designed for civil organisations? And (4) what criteria do researchers use to see whether civil organisations are representative or not? These are important questions to ask but it will not be answered in this research.

2.5.5 A Framework for Analysis

Given the work of Pitkin (1972), Plotke (1997), Mansbridge (2003), Lavalle *et al* (2005) and Dovi 2006 one can establish the following framework. Plotke (1997, p.28) conceptualizes a number of elements for representation. (i) non-identity – a particular person represents people in general; (ii) contextual – represent some in certain geographic areas; (iii) recognition – relationship is based on a social understanding; (iv) authorisation – one's representative is authorize to vote on legislation; (v) truthful depictions; and (vi) decisions

taken is binding – outcomes of voting process is binding on everyone. Furthermore, Suzanne Dovi (2006) argues that political representation on any account will exhibit four components: (1) some party that is representing (the representative, an organisation, movement, state agency, etc.); (2) some party that is being represented (the constituent, the clients, etc.); (3) something that is being represented (opinions, perspectives, interests, etc.); and (4) a setting within which the activity of representation is taking place (the political context). In addition to this, representatives can be either delegates or trustees. “Representatives who are delegates simply follow the expressed preferences of their constituents ... Trustees are representatives who follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue” (Dovi, 2006, n.p.). It is however difficult to be both at once.

2.6 Accountability



Pitkin (1972, p. 57) argues that “[i]n genuine representation, the representative must eventually be held accountable so that he will be responsive to the needs and claims of his constituents, to the obligation implicit in his position.” If one consider this statement, it is possible to identify a number of key ingredients for accountability. Firstly, “the representative must be responsible to the represented” (Pitkin, 1972, p. 55). Representatives have to see that the needs of the represented are met. Secondly, what the representative say and does must be in line with the needs and desires of their constituents. Therefore, he or she must be responsive to what his or her constituents need. Thirdly, if the representative does not adhere to the mandate of the represented, she or he must be removed from office. Therefore, there must be certain mechanisms that will enforce

accountability, and the most common mechanism of accountability is regular free and fair elections. Lastly, according to Pitkin (1972, p. 55) “being a representative means precisely having new and special obligations.” Obligation here refers to the actions of the representative by which he or she is morally or legally bound. For Mansbridge, the basis on which someone is authorised will inform the basis on which they are held accountable (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 516).

Given this, one is able to provide a workable definition of accountability that can be utilised for this study. According to Memela *et al* (p.3, 2008) “[accountability is] the extent to which political actors are seen to be acting responsibly and responsively to their constituents and the way information is made available to enable the constituency to hold the political actors directly accountable.”



At a practical level there are two opposing views with regards to accountability. The one view is about how the representative spends public money. According to Moncrieffe (1998, p. 388) accountability is a contract between the state and the public, which means the political representatives in government will be held accountable for their actions through periodic elections. Goetz and O’Brien (1998) have a different conception of accountability, for them a government is accountable when it is able to address the needs of the poor. Here the focus is on how public money is spent, the spending might be transparent, but if it is misguided it means that government is not accountable.

Furthermore, accountability is the responsibility of three groups of stakeholders in a democratic society. Firstly, there is the government who is “responsible for implementing

policies and strategies that enhance democratic objective and reduce oppression” (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). Secondly, there are public officials that are “answerable to the government and to the electorate for how policies are administrated” (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). The last group is, interest groups, factions and citizens, and they “are accountable to each other and to the agreed policy objectives” (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). Therefore, accountability it is not only the responsibility of the government, but everyone’s in a democratic society.

There are also ways to measure political accountability. The traditional way of measuring accountability is to look at the openness and transparency of managing public expenditure (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). In addition to this, there is another way of measuring accountability, and it is to look at “the extent to which the government provided timely information and opportunities for deliberation and debate” (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393). There are also ‘checks and balances’ in a democratic society. These checks and balances generally refer to the separation of powers between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive. Checks and balances in most cases are enshrined in the Constitutions of states to prevent one arm acquiring more power than others. Lastly, accountability can also be measured by looking at the effectiveness of government’s monitoring and evaluation component (Moncrieffe, 1998, p. 393).

Moreover, there are also certain values to accountability, according to Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) “[t]here is a fundamental inseparability of accountability, transparency and trust.” From this it is possible to identify two values which are central to the concept of accountability: transparency and trust. Transparency refers to how information and taxes of

the public are handled. This means that information government and public money must freely accessible and open to public scrutiny. Trust on the other hand refers to the level of confidence stakeholders have in one another's agenda.

However, apart from the values of accountability, and the ways to measure accountability, there are also constraints to accountability. Moncrieffe (1998, pp. 399-400) mentions the following three constraints: political culture, institutions and power relations. Political culture in a democratising country such as South Africa is of such a nature that citizens distrust 'invited' spaces to participation, and therefore in most cases citizens opt for violent protest marches to voice their concern, as it in the past under apartheid it was the only available mechanism of engaging the state.



2.6.1 Accountability in Development Projects

Accountability in development projects is rather complex. Most development aid is from donors agencies that impose certain requirements for financial accountability on NGOs. According to Cronin and O'Regan (2002, p.5) in development projects accountability in most cases are directed upwards rather than downwards. This is because accountability in development works has been referred to in the domain of finance, which infer that it neglects measures of accountability towards the community. In development projects "[a]ccountability exists between peer groups and operates at many levels" (Cronin and O'Regan, 2002, p. 6). The diagram below illustrates the complexity of accountability and the multiple stakeholders that are involved to ensure accountability in development projects. It

shows that upwardly NGOs responsible for the development is accountable to trustees, donors and host governments and downwardly to partners, staff and communities.




Diagram 2.6.1-1: Accountability in Development projects

2.6.2 The Components of Accountability in Development Projects

According to Cronin and O’Regan (2002, pp. 10 -13) accountability comprises of four main stages namely:

- (i) *Responsibility*

The first stage focuses on the agreement of clear roles and responsibilities of the organisation, with compliance to agreed standards. Responsibility refers to the “clarity of roles and responsibilities for all concerned” (ibid). A Memorandum of

Understanding or Code of Good Practices is use in practice to ensure stakeholders take responsibility for the project. Taking action for which an organisation is responsible, and evaluating that action

(ii) *Action and Evaluation*

To ensure accountability it is necessary to monitor the process and evaluating the difference between the plans and the results of the project. Furthermore, financial accountability is also necessary which is to ensure that taxpayer, donor and government funds are not misused.

(iii) *Reporting*

Reporting must be based on factual and balanced information. Annual reports are good instruments but in most cases it is not accessible to the broader communities. The best is to encourage a two-way reporting system.

(iv) *Responsiveness*

Responsiveness refers to responding to and complying with agreed standards of performance and the views and needs of their stakeholders. Responsiveness also means to encourage greater participation from primary stakeholders. Furthermore, it is also necessary for Aid actors to respond to primary. "Power relations within the aid process should therefore be carefully analysed" (Cronin and O'Regan, 2002, p.13).

In summary, when representatives are elected they are expected to fulfil a particular mandate given by their constituents. These representatives must be held accountable if they are non-performing. Central to accountability are values of transparency and trust. If the representative does not adhere to the mandate or do not respect these values voters

must have the opportunity to sanction the representative. In addition, accountability in development projects tends to be upwards toward to the sponsor of the project as well as horizontal to partners. These insights will prove critical in our forthcoming analysis. Considering this it, it provides a framework to assess the VPUU methodology and local governance in South Africa.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that the liberal representative democracy evolved over a long period of time. Central to liberal democracies are the liberal values of individual freedom and equality. However, even though liberal democratic institutions are the preferred choice of the majority of states around the world, they are not without their flaws. Gaventa (2006) and Luckham *et al* (2000) have indicated that liberal democracies in the global North and the global South are experiencing a number of democratic deficits. Since these deficits became visible, democratic theorists have tried to deepen liberal democracies by making it more participatory. One notable attempt was that by Fung and Wright (2001) with EDD. The aim of EDD is to ensure sustainable participation by communities in the decision-making of government.

Furthermore, there generally seem to be problems with participation, representation and accountability in democracies in both the global North and the global South. Given this, this chapter took a closer look at these concepts. Participation generally refers to how citizens participate in the decision-making structures of the state. Representation refers to elected

representatives who represent the interest of their constituencies in governance. Accountability refers to ways in which these representatives are held responsible for the decisions they take on behalf of citizens. The discussion on participation, representation and accountability allowed the researcher to establish a framework to assess the South African look governance and the VPUU methodology. The next chapter focuses on the South African system of local governance in terms of participation, representation and accountability.



Chapter 3 – Participation, Representation and Accountability in South African Local Governance

3. Introduction

The previous chapter indicated that democracies in the global North and the global South are experiencing democratic deficits. South Africa as a developing country in the global South is no different to those democracies. In order to sustain and deepen South Africa's young democracy, it is imperative that it has strong mechanisms of participation, representation and accountability. Post 1994, the South African government introduced a system of participatory democracy "within a base framework of constitutional and electoral democracy" (Fifteen Year Review, 2007, p. 18). The aim is to deepen the South African democracy at all levels of government and seeing that local government is the closest to the people, it is their responsibility to ensure participatory democracy is practised by citizens. Thus, at the local level participatory democracy is extended by a number of policies of which the White Paper on Local Government of 1998, the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act of 2000 are the most notable. According to the Fifteen Year Review (2007, pp. 7/8):

[s]uccessive policies and laws have helped deepen participatory democracy. The mechanisms include mandatory community consultation in formulating municipal integrated development plan (IDPs), izimbizo (executive interaction with

communities around services and development), ward committees, Thusong Service Centres (previously multi-purpose community centres [MPPCs]) and community development workers (CDWs).

According to Aragonés and Sánchez-Pagés (2004, p.2) “[p]articipatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both Direct and Representative Democracy: Citizens have the ultimate power to decide on policy and politicians assume the role of policy implementation.” Given this explanation, forms of public participation, representations and accountability are enhanced and reformed to respond to the aims of participatory democracy. It is worthy to note that South Africa has through legislation and policy began to strengthen forms of public participation but neglected representation and accountability dimensions of deepening democracy. The aim of this chapter is therefore twofold. Firstly, it provides a policy framework with regards to public participation, representation and accountability, and the secondly it investigates these forms in practice. In doing so, it draws on policy documents, government reports and empirical research conducted on the South African local governance.

Additionally, this chapter will indicate that although a substantial literature exists on public participation in local governance, a relatively smaller amount been published on representation and accountability. In addition to this, this chapter will highlight the major weaknesses in terms of participation, representation and accountability in local governance. This indicates a need to reform and enhance the current forms of participation, representation and accountability to strengthen participatory democracy in local government.

3.1 Public Participation as Conceptualise by the White Paper on Local Government

As indicated in Chapter one, numerous scholars believe that the local governance mechanisms for participation such as ward committees and IDP forums are malfunctioning. The South African Constitution provides the basis for participation at local government. According to Section 152 of the South African Constitution, services must be provided in a democratic manner. The local governance system must be accountable and it must also encourage participation of local communities and organisations in matters of local municipalities. This laid the foundation for the White Paper on Local Government of 1998.

The White Paper on Local Government (WPLG) of 1998 provides a good frame of reference for participation in local governance. According to the WPLG, it is the responsibility of municipalities to adopt inclusive approaches to foster community participation. This must include strategies aimed at removing obstacles to, and actively encouraging the participation of marginalised groups in the local municipality. The WPLG also mention levels of participation. According to the WPLG of 1998, there are four levels of participation in municipal affairs. The first is as voters. It is important that municipalities constantly make citizens aware of the need to vote. This can be done through civic education programmes, ward-level activities to continuously connect elected leaders and their constituencies and active electoral campaigning around clear policy choices that affect the lives of citizens.

The second level is as participants in the policy process. At this level municipalities should develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in policy initiation and formulation, and the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation municipalities can also use the following approaches: forums initiated within or outside local government; structured stakeholder involvement in certain council committees; participatory budgeting initiatives and focus group participatory action research conducted (WPLG of 1998). The third level is focused at the consumer and end-user level. As consumers, the main contact of citizens with local government is through the consumption of municipal services. So, it is here that municipalities need to begin to build relationships with citizens and communities. It is therefore important for municipalities to apply the Batho Pele principles as set out by the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele) of 1997 to achieve this. The fourth level is as partners in resource mobilisation. Partnerships are vital to promote emerging businesses, non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations (WPLG of 1998). From this, it is apparent that the WPLG set the tone as to how public participation at community level must take place. The local government acts guided by the WPLG institutionalises community participation in local governance.

3.1.1 Community Participation in Local Government

The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act of 2000 borrows heavily from the White Paper on Local Government to institutionalise public participation in the South African local government. According to section 72 (3) of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 “the object of a ward committee is to

enhance participatory democracy in local government.” Participatory democracy here must be seen as a project rather than an actual democratic system; the aim is to make the existing representative model more participatory as highlighted by section 16 of the Municipal Systems Act. Furthermore, the aim of participatory democracy is to give voice to the marginalised and those that were previously excluded from the decision-making processes. Consequently, in a participatory democracy all citizens are actively involved in all of the important decisions of government. Firstly, Municipalities are mandated to encourage, and create conditions for local communities to participate in the affairs of the municipality. Municipalities must come up with ways to include the community in the IDP process, in the performance management process, in the budgeting process and in strategic decisions relating to the provision of municipal services (Section 16). Participating in the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) process and the budgeting process was proposed by the WPLG of 1998. The second responsibility of municipalities is to build the capacity of local communities to enable them to participate in the affairs of their municipalities (Section 16 (1) (b) (i)). A third responsibility is to use its resources and annually allocate funds in its budget to encourage community participation and to build the capacity of the community to participate in the affairs of the municipality.

The Municipal Structures Act proposes various mechanism, processes and procedures for community participation. Mechanisms include ward committees, councillors, petitions, complaints, public meetings, consultative sessions and advisory committees (Section 17). Chief among these mechanisms is the ward committee. Ward committees were first mentioned by the WPLG. Ward committees were first proposed for Metropolitan municipalities only. The WPLG proposed two types of metropolitan government, namely: a

metropolitan government with Metropolitan Substructures, or a metropolitan government with Ward Committees. In addition, the WPLG proposed that Ward Committees are area-based committees whose boundaries coincide with ward boundaries. Ward Committees have no original power and duties, rather their power and duties must be delegated by the Metropolitan Council. The extent of their power must be advisory. The Paper also proposed that the metro council establishes a ward committee for each ward and that it must be chaired by the Ward councillor. Furthermore, the role of Ward Committees “is the facilitation of local community participation in decisions which affect the local community ... [and] the articulation of local community interest” (The White Paper on Local Government of 1998, p. 55). Therefore, if one considers their lack of *‘original’* power, their advisory role in council and their role to facilitate local community participation, it is clear ward committees were conceptualised to legitimise decisions of local governance. Furthermore, the roles, duties and functions of Ward Committees in the Municipal Structures Act are almost exactly the same as it was conceptualised in the White Paper. The difference is that the Municipal Structures Act legalised Ward Committees as the preferred mechanism of community participation in local governance.

As illustrated below, so far research indicates that citizens are not actively involved in ward committee and that ward committees do not encourage the majority of citizens to participate in it. From government’s framework one notices that they identified the following mechanism of participation: ward committees, the IDP process, public meetings and the budgetary process. But apart from these mechanisms there are other forms of public participation at the local level. The following section discusses what research indicates thus far in terms of these mechanisms of participation.

3.1.2 Ward Committees and Other Forms of Participation

As mentioned in Chapter Two, 'spaces' are not neutral because it is constructed to serve a particular interest (Cornwall 2002 and Gaventa 2006). A ward committee is an 'invited' space that is created to serve the interest of the state because it has to consist of ten members with the ward councillors as the chairperson. With the ward councillor in control of the agenda, he or she can dictate the terms of engaging the community. In addition, research on ward committees indicates that most ward committees experience the following problems:

- No clear role in local governance;
- No real power to influence the municipal council;
- Representivity, functionality and politicisation;
- Have limited resources to function properly; and
- Tensions between ward councillors and ward committee members as some of them have aspirations to become ward councillors themselves (Buccus and Hicks 2008, Smith and Visser 2009, and Piper 2010).

These problems hamper optimal community participation in the decision-making structures of the municipality. It is evident from the manner in which ward committees are structured that the political elites want to control the how, when, what and where the community must participate. The failure of the ward committees as the primary mechanism of community participation is a potential reasons for citizens preferring delivery 'service protest' marches

over 'invited spaces' (Nleya, Thompson, Tapscott, Piper and Essau, 2011). Apart from ward committees there are other forms of public participation that have been employed at local government level.

Research conducted by Buccus *et al* (2007) identifies four forms of public participation at local governance level. These are the following: public consultations; organisation driven participation; legalised participation; and participation through third parties. Firstly, public consultations usually take place through *Imbizo's*, public meetings, community workshops and stakeholders summits. According to Mathagu (2010, p. 4) "[t]he word 'imbizo' is a Zulu term meaning the gathering of the subjects of the Kings." However, as late "imbizos" is a concept first introduced by former president Thabo Mbeki as a way of bring national and provincial government closer to the people. According to Smith (2007, p. 23) "[i]mbizo would appear to be geared as forums enabling government to communicate its programmes and plans, and for citizens to raise problems and concerns." However, this particular mechanism of participation is very irregular and is not formally institutionalised (Buccus *et al*, 2008).

Secondly, the difference between organisational driven participation and legalised participation is that organisational driven participation is an innovative institutional driven form of participation and is not prescribe by the Local Government Acts. Organisational driven participation on the other hand uses mechanisms that are institutionalised but usually focus on a particular process, for example IDP forums. IDP forums however is not formally recognised in terms of the Local Government Acts but can be created by municipalities in terms of the Municipal Systems Act (Buccus *et al*, 2008). In terms of section

29 of the Municipal Systems Act it states the following with regards to public participation in the IDP process:


- the community must be consulted on its development needs and priorities
- the local community must participate in the drafting of the integrated development plan; and
- organs of state, including traditional authorities, and other role players must be consulted on the drafting of the IDP.

According to Smith (2007, p.21) IDP representative forums may include the councillors, traditional leaders, ward committee members, head of departments, civil society organisations, resource people or advisors and community representatives. However, IDP Forums strictly focus on the IDP process and not all municipalities have these forums.

One needs to bear in mind that there are 'invited' and 'invented' spaces of public participation (Cornwall, 2002). Therefore, one can classify these four types of public participation as 'invited' spaces. In 'invited' spaces the state determines the terms and conditions through which communities can engage municipal councils. However, citizens also 'invent' spaces to engage local government on issues of service delivery.

A protest march is a form of an 'invented' space. Communities prefer this mechanism of participation because it is where they can demonstrate power and control the agenda (Ballard, 2008). Service delivery protest marches are a common mechanism of public participation in the local governance system and seem to be the preferred type of participation for the majority of citizens. The majority of these protest marches get good media coverage and this usually forces municipalities to respond faster to the demands of

citizens (Jain 2010 and Booysen 2007).



Graph 0-1: Number of Protest Marches⁴


The graph indicates that since 2009 there has been a drastic increase in the number of service delivery protest marches at municipality level. The graph indicates that half way through 2012 a record number of protest marches were recorded (Municipal IQ, July 2012).



As mentioned in Chapter one, Jain (p.31, 2010) reported that the top four reasons communities protesting are housing, water, electricity and sanitation. This indicates that communities are frustrated with the rate service delivery and will opt for protest marches rather than using the structures put in place by government in place. In addition, the nature of most of these protest marches is violent. According to Karamoko and Jain (2011, p. 10) “[v]iolent protests have been defined ... as those protests where some of the participants have engaged in physical acts that either cause immediate harm to some person, or are substantively likely to result in such harm.” It has also been reported of “instances where rocks are thrown at passing motorists, tires are burned to blockade roads, and other similar acts ...” (*ibid.*). However, it is important to note that “labelling a protest as violent fails to

distinguish between protests that were initially violent, from those that became violent after aggressive responses by police” (Karamoko and Jain, 2011, p.11). Therefore, the nature of the protest marches might be dependent on the response from the state.

Furthermore, Karamoko and Jain (2011, p.17) identified a trend with regards to the size of community protest marches. “In 2007, roughly 26% of protests were large protests, while in 2008 and 2009 roughly 32% were large protests. In 2010, approximately 38% of protests were large protests, and [until June] 2011 43% of protests have been large protests.” Moreover, participation in community protests marches in informal settlements are suspected to be higher to that of formal settlements. Research, conducted by Nleya (2011, p. 11) in Khayelitsha found that “that participation in protests is relatively higher in informal settlements than in formal settlements with attendance rates of 50 per cent in informal settlements and 36 per cent in formal settlements.”




This serves as an indication that “community protests are an expected consequence of systematic failures in the provision of basic services to the poverty-stricken members of South African society” (Karamoko and Jain, 2011, p. 33). Protest marches are indeed a worrying trend for South Africa’s democracy if one consider the nature, the size and the frequency of these protest marches. This holds the potential to escalate beyond the control of the state, and with serious economic implications.

⁴ Source: Municipal IQ: Municipal Hotspots Monitor

3.1.3 Factors influencing community participation

Netswera (2008, pp. 513-521) found four factors that influence community participation in South Africa. These four factors are the following: income and living standards; accessibility of the municipality; trust in municipal institutions; and satisfaction with municipal services delivery. Netswera (2008, p. 514) argues that “income levels ... are a better determinant of household participation in the municipality.” This, however, have to be considered with the other three factors. To this end, he argues that local government is supposed to “be the most accessible sphere of government to local communities through the ward committee system” (Netswera, 2008, p. 515).



Netswera (2008) uses the ward committee as a means to test whether a municipality is accessible or not. He found “that the worse-off townships ... are more likely to participate in ward committees than the well-off townships” (Netswera, 2008, p. 516). This simply means that the poorer communities will use the ward committees to access the municipality whereas richer communities would not. Netswera also argues that trust in municipal institutions often influence a community’s participation. Therefore, if a community trusts the local municipal institutions they will participate more. He found that people trust the church, the media, fellow community members and the police more than they trust local government. He also found that local government on the other hand is trusted more than both political parties and municipal councillors (Netswera, 2008, p. 518). Lastly, he did not found any conclusive evidence that level of satisfaction of communities with regards to service delivery affect community participation.

In summary, local government wants participation to take place via ward committees, IDP forums and public meetings. Local government has also resorted to other forms of participation such as the *Imbizo* to encourage community participation. However, most municipalities do not have effective ward committees or IDP forums. Netswera (2008) found that communities do not trust local government, political parties and municipal councillors as much as they trust the media, the church and following community members. This, therefore, might be an explanation why protest marches are the preferred mechanisms to engage local government. This, clearly, shows that reforms are needed for participation in local governance.

3.2 Representation in South African Local Governance



There is limited research conducted on representation in South African local governance or at least as extensively as on community participation. In terms of representation, communities are represented by politicians, civil society, traditional leaders and other interest groups. In South Africa the most common way of representing the community is through elected officials in government. The Constitution of South Africa of 1996 (sections 46 (1) (d) and 105 (1) (d)) requires national and provincial representatives to be chosen through a proportional representation electoral system. This system allows political parties to choose representatives when elections take place (Reynolds, 1999). Communities do not have much of a choice to elect political representatives because it is ultimately the responsibility of the political party to decide who they want as their representatives.

At the local level political representatives are chosen by a mixed electoral system. Section 157 (2) (a) and (b) of the South African Constitution states representatives to a Municipal Council must be elected through a system of proportional representation and ward representation. Representatives elected through the PR system must be elected from party lists (Constitution, section 157 (2) (a)). Therefore, there are two types of representatives at the local level. The Municipal Structures Act (Schedule 1 Part 1) recognises two ways of representing the ward. The first is through the councillor and the second is through the ward committee. Section 73 (2) (a) states that a ward committee must consist of a ward councillor who represents the ward in a municipal council. The act makes it clear that ward councillor will be the only person in the municipal council to represent the ward. It also set specific guidelines as to how ward councillors and PR councillors are elected. Ward councillors are directly elected whilst PR councillors are elected from party lists. Therefore, ward councillors represents their ward and PR councillors represents their party. In representation terms this would mean that ward councillors must represent the interests of the community in municipal councils and PR councillors must represent the interest of political parties in municipal councils.

In addition to this, the act also recognises that the ward committee plays a representative role and it also set a certain framework as to how a representative ward committee will look like. Section 73 wants the equitable representation of women as well for a diversity of interests to be represented in this regard the Act also “seeks to ensure that fifty percent of the candidates are women and that women and men candidates are evenly distributed through the list” (Municipal Structures Act, Schedule 1 Part 1). Representation here is very


descriptive (see Pitkin 1972) where the description of the candidate is central to the notion of representation.

Further, for many years in South Africa women were under represented in local councils but post-1994, women representatives at local municipalities have increased mainly due to the ANC's quota system. The ANC was the first political party in South Africa that committed itself to a quota system for women in Parliament. It all started with the participation of the ANC Women's League during the constitutional negotiations. Upon the ANC's formation in 1912, women were not allowed to participate as members. This led to the formulation of the Bantu Women's League (BWL). The BWL represented, contributed and articulated the concerns of African women. In the 1920's, the ANC accepted the BWL as a branch of the ANC and in 1944 women were bestowed ANC membership. In 1948 the ANC Women's League was officially formed.



As the struggle against the apartheid regime intensified, women became increasingly involved in the armed struggle. A large number of women joined Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Evidently, both women and men contributed to the struggle against apartheid and therefore, during the constitutional negotiations the ANC Women League initiated the Women's National Coalition. The Women's National Coalition consisted of over a 100 women's organisations and groups throughout the country tasked to draw up a charter for Women's rights (Myakayaka-Manzini, 2003, pp. 1-2).

It was also during this period that the ANC Women's League deepened their understanding of the structural and complex nature of gender oppression. At the 1991 ANC Conference in Kimberley, the ANC Women's League decided to push for the constitutional recognition of 30 percent female representation in ANC decision-making structures. The motion was rejected at the 1991 ANC conference mainly because branch and provincial candidates argued they did not have the mandate to support such a motion (Myakayaka-Manzini, 2003, pp. 2-3). After the conference, this decision drew significant bad press for the ANC. Moreover; the ANC Women's League started strategically aligning themselves with leaders such as Mandela to support their agenda for a quota system for women (Preece, n.d.). The ANC Women's League preserved and initiated a debate on a quota system in all structures of the ANC. This approach finally paid off as the ANC decided on a one-third quota for women in the national and provincial decision-making structures of the ANC (Myakayaka-Manzini, 2003, p. 3) prior to the 1994 election.



Since 1994, the number of women in politics has grown and women's power has increased. . This is attributed to the ANC adopting the principle of parity at their 2007 conference. According to the ANC President, Jacob Zuma:

the ANC have to congratulate the ANC Women's League on its efforts to assert the voice and right of women in ANC decision-making processes. [The] Constitution [had] been unanimously amended to increase the women quota in [the] structures, from 30 to 50 percent (Jacob Zuma, 20 December 2007).

So far the only other political party that has committed itself to a women's quota and parity is the Congress of the People (COPE). Based on the ANC's history in supporting women and their quota system it is clear that the ANC encourages equal political representation in government. However, having more women in parliament or in municipalities does not mean there are more women activists in these structures. So far, to a certain extent, the ANC quota system yielded positive results especially in terms of the number of women in legislatures. According to Morna and Mbadlanyana (p.4, 2011) since 1995 to 2006 women representation in local municipality councils has increased but has seen a decrease in the 2011 elections. According to the authors, in 1995 there was 19 percent, in 2000 29 percent, in 2006 40 percent and 2011 38 percent of women in local municipality councils. Apart from councillors, representation also takes place via traditional leaders, ward committees, civil society and CDWs. The next sections will discuss this in more detail.



3.2.1 Traditional Leadership

Communities can also be represented by traditional leaders at the local level. The South African Constitution states that national legislation may provide a role for traditional leaders as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. In this regard, it was the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 that first made provision for how traditional leaders have to represent their customary communities. According to the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (section 81 (1), traditional leaders have the right to "participate in the proceedings of a municipal council." The Act however puts a limitation to the number of traditional leaders that can participate in a municipal council. According to section 81 (2) (b) of the

Municipal Structures Act “[t]he number of traditional leaders that may participate in the proceedings of a municipal council may not exceed 20 percent of the total number of councilors in that council ...” Moreover, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 41 of 2003 restrict traditional leaders to district and metropolitan municipalities. According to Section 17 (3) (a) of the Act states that the “functions of a local house of traditional leaders are to advise the district municipality or the metropolitan municipality on matters pertaining to customary law, traditional leadership and traditional communities ...”


There is current debate regarding the relevance of traditional leadership in a democratic South Africa. According to Sithole (2009, p. 41) there are two schools of thought on the relevance of traditional leaders; the first one is democratic pragmatism and the second is a school of organic democracy. Democratic pragmatists argue that traditional leadership does not give everyone a chance to be elected. Further, they also see it as a system that favours men via patriarchy and therefore it is detrimental to women’s rights in rural areas. In addition to this, they also make the case that traditional leadership was re-inserted because of political trade-offs between the government and traditional leadership for purposes of facilitating national and local elections (Sithole, 2009, pp. 41-44).

The organic democracy argument on the other hand argues that traditional leadership is a unique system of democracy that has been there before colonialism and apartheid. Adding to this, “organic democracy proponents believe that traditional leadership offers unique attributes of leadership that fulfil specific social and governance needs of people as communities (Sithole, 2009, p. 45). Furthermore, organic democrats also see traditional

leadership serving a unique purpose in communities which people are entitled to. In addition, Cele (2011) identifies a contestation between municipal councillors and traditional leaders. According to Cele (2011, p. 10):

Many traditional leaders are arguing that their powers to govern local matters have been taken by the municipal councillors. Consistent with its commitment to democratic government, the Constitution assigns to local government many of the service delivery responsibilities that chiefs assume are theirs.

This might explain why the *Status of Local Government in South Africa* reported that, “in ... municipalities with traditional leaders in their areas of jurisdiction, many have reported a poor working relationship between themselves and the traditional leaders (Department Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, 2009, p.17).



3.2.2 Ward Committees

Communities can also be represented by ward committees. According to section 73 (2) of the Municipal Structures Act a ward committee must consist of the ward councillor and 10 other people from the community. Ward committees are representative structures of the community to deliberate on community issues. Resolutions made by the ward committee will be given to ward councillor who in turn will table these resolutions in the municipal council.

With regards to representation, research indicates that ward committees are not as representative as they ought to be to be (Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008 and Chanza and Piper 2006). Smith and Visser (2009, p, 56) found that ward committees are not inclusive and that “the process of representation in most of the cases appears to be structurally inadequate.” Piper and Deacon (2008) reported that ward councillors have a direct hand in deciding on the ward committee members and came across cases in the Msunduzi Municipality where the ward committee and the political party branch is the same structure. In addition, Chanza and Piper (2006) found that the youth was inadequately represented on ward committees in the Msunduzi Municipality. This indicates that representative nature of ward committees is questionable.

3.2.3 Civil Society



Civil society can also represent the community (Lavalle *et al*, 2005) but civil society in South Africa has become too weak to fulfil this function. This weakens civil society at local governance level started with the transformation of the post-apartheid state. During apartheid civil society had common goal and that was to bring down apartheid. However, “[o]ne of the most difficult issues facing civil society in post-apartheid South Africa is how to maintain the delicate balance between support for the new Government while maintaining sufficient independence from it” (Jagwanth, 2003, p.13). This situation worsen post-1994 after many of the leaders of civil society was co-opted into government, as it weakened the leadership of civil society.

Furthermore, post-1994:

[t]he political terms of engagement for civil society have eroded as a result of the ANC's increasingly centralized and dirigist style of politics. Since coming to power, the ANC has sought to consolidate its electorally dominant position by asserting its right, as the agent of the — National Democratic Revolution — to demand political subordination of mass organizations (Heller, 2009, p.25).

The South Africa National Civic Organisation (SANCO) is considered to be part of this National Democratic Revolution. SANCO was established in 1992 and are largely perceived as an ANC-based organisation (Thompson and Conradie 2010 and Zuern 2006). In addition to this, one also notices that “[t]he state still transacts significantly with civil society, but does so in a highly selective and controlled manner. Across a wide range of sectors, the preferred mode of intermediation has become partnerships with professionalized NGOs that carry out contracted services” (Heller, 2009, p. 24). Therefore, it is no surprise that civil society at community level is forgotten or none existent.

Due to the selective nature of the state, it has created a two tier system of civil society in South Africa: a subaltern civil society and organised civil society. According to Heller (2009, p. 24)


[s]ubaltern civil society in South Africa has also become estranged from political society, but through a different process. Civil society has become deeply bifurcated between an organized civil society that effectively engages the state and a subaltern civil society that is institutionally disconnected from the state and political society.

Business groups, professionalized NGOs, the middle class beneficiaries of South Africa's —Black Economic Empowerment policies, and organized [labour] continue to be well positioned to engage the state. But subaltern civil society, and especially the urban poor, has more or less been side lined from the political process in South Africa.

Therefore, civil society is poorly represented, if represented at all in municipalities, not least because the importance of civil society representation is not recognised by the Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act. Ironically, the White Paper on Local Government, on which the abovementioned acts are supposedly based, recognises the importance of civil society representation in local government. The White Paper states that municipalities amongst other must build social conditions favourable to development through working in open partnerships with community-based organisation or civil society. It is noticeable that the White Paper stresses a partnership which means equal say in the matters of local government but this does not seem to be the case in practice. According to Ranchod (2007, p. 21) “[l]ocal governments in South Africa have not adequately begun to tap into this social capital [working with civil society] for the advantage of society at large.” It must be said that there are cases where there are some sort of partnerships between municipalities and civil society, most notable of these is the ‘partnership’ between the KDF and the City of Cape Town. However, even the partnership between KDF and the City of Cape Town is selective and it reiterates the argument of Heller (2009).

3.2.4 Community Development Workers

Communities can also be represented through third parties. Common third parties at local governance level are community development workers (CDWs), councillors and traditional leaders. The community development workers programme (CDWP) was announced by former President Thabo Mbeki in his state of the nation address in 2003. According to Baatjies and Hintsa (2005, p.10), the CDWP is an effort to deepen democracy at local level and is intended to give citizens direct access to government services. It will involve all three spheres of government. The primary role of CDWs is to assist the government with the removal of its service delivery backlog and strengthen the contact between the government and the people (Hlabane, 18 November 2005).




3.2.5 Shortcomings of Representation at Local Governance

The first shortcoming of representation at local governance is the visibility of municipal councillors and ward committee members. According to Booysen (2007, p. 28) '[a]cross all demographic ... and ascribed-status groups, municipal councillors and ward committee members were virtually invisible to 80 percent of South Africa's metropolitan and urban population.'" The report on the *Status of Local Government in South Africa* (2009) provides a possible explanation for this because "the number of people per ward and the geographic size of the wards is a factor that influences democratic representation and participation" (Department Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, 2009, p.14). According to the report, the number of people per ward ranges between 6000 in the Northern Cape and

24 000 in Gauteng (Department Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, 2009, p.14).

Secondly, it is also reported that many ward councillors do not attend ward committee meetings even though they are the chairpersons (Department Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, 2009, p.15). The reason for this might be because of contestations between the ward councillor and members of the ward committee. A case study on ward committee conducted in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality reported that ward committee members were not functioning well with their respective ward councillor on policy matters (Raga and Taylor, 2005, p. 249). This is problematic because both ward committee members and ward councillors are representatives of the community and if they are not working together on policy matters there will not be an agreement on how to develop communities.



Thirdly, Smith (2007, p. 12) pointed out that the “quality of representation through elected councillors” is another shortcoming. Smith (2007, p. 12) explain that “this has to do with the kind of individuals who political parties nominate to become ward councillors.” Smith (2007) make the case that individual political parties perceive as good candidates might not have the capabilities and abilities to be a councillor. Once again it proves that the current electoral system and the nature of the party system give political parties too much power to decide who is fit to represent the community and through this limits and disenable the power communities have over representatives. Furthermore, 40 percent of councillors in district councils are directly elected by communities. Smith (2007, p. 13) indicates that “representation of community interests on district councils appears to be weak and poorly

defined.” This is mainly because there are no mechanisms in place for district councils to receive input from communities (Smith, 2007).

Fourthly, even though traditional leadership represent their communities and their interests at district municipality level, it must be noted that the under representation of women amongst traditional leadership cannot be ignored. According to Ramjee, van Donk, GGLN and Isandla Institute (2011, p.21) “unbalanced representivity and inequitable power relationships make it important to consider the extent to which traditional leaders fairly and equitable represent the voices of all members of their community.”

The final shortcoming is the level of representivity of the ward committees. As outlined above, ward communities in many cases are not representative of the broader community and this poses a challenge for inclusive decision-making (Smith and Visser, 2009). Considering these shortcomings, it is clear that local governance need to be reformed in terms of representation.

3.3 Accountability in South African Local Governance

Accountability in South Africa is mainly affected by the party system and the electoral system. South Africa can be classified as a one-party dominant system based on three reasons. Firstly, the ANC’s dominance in all of the elections so far. Secondly, “the ANC possesses a self-conception that fits the dominant party mould in key respects” (Butler, 2009, p.2). It “conceives of itself as a national liberation movement that represents a project

which transcends class, region and race” (Butler, 2009, p. 2). Thirdly, “scholars have drawn on the histories of one party states across post-independence Africa ... to speculate about a likely deepening of ANC domination” (Butler, 2009, p. 2).

Furthermore, South Africa also uses the closed party list PR electoral system. Reynolds (1999, p. 92) states that “[t]he government and elected members of parliament must be accountable to their constituents to the highest degree possible.” He argues that “[t]he level of influence a voter has over his or her representative depends on both geographical constituency size and the level of choice between candidates as opposed to parties” will influence accountability. Schulz-Herzenberg (2009, p.1) argues that “[r]egular elections provide an important accountability mechanism by allowing citizens to decide whether or not to extend a government’s tenure.” Therefore, the electoral system is one of the mechanisms to keep representatives accountable. Furthermore, “[f]or elections to act as an effective accountability mechanism, voters must be willing to sanction incumbent by looking at their past performance and punish poor governance by withdrawing their support” (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009, p.2). But this is not the case in South Africa.

It is worthy to note that accountability is an inherent problem of the PR electoral system. According to Meadowcroft (1990, p.3) the PR “gives immense power to the political parties to determine which candidates get elected – ... the system encourages conformity to the party in order to secure an electable place on the list.” If one takes this into account a one-party dominant system will perpetuate this situation which means that accountability will be compromised. Therefore, assessing accountability at any level of governance in South Africa

one needs to take these two variables (electoral system and the party system) into consideration. According to Idasa (2012, p.7):

[a] disjuncture seems to currently exist in South Africa between the rhetoric of political parties around election times on the one hand and, on the other, the absence of participation and accountability in periods between elections. This challenge is to some extent the result of South Africa's proportional representation electoral system in conjuncture with single party election dominance.


Brooks (2004, p. 122) argues that the lack of a strong political and parliamentary opposition raises concerns about citizens can ensure government remains accountable to its them. Increased parliamentary power creates the risk of shifting of real authority away from the constitution to the ruling party and with the assurance of electoral dominance, it poses a significant threat to government accountability and responsiveness to the needs of citizens (Brooks, 2004, pp. 143/144).

Furthermore, at local governance level the Constitution of South Africa establish the basis for accountability. Section 152 (a) states that local communities must be provided with democratic and accountable government. It was the White Paper on Local Government that discussed accountability in much more detail. The White Paper defines accountability as "being willing to account for one's decisions and actions". It goes further to explain that "[d]evelopmental local government requires a political leadership which creates opportunities to account to the community over and above regular elections." The White Paper creates ward committees in this regard. It states that "[w]ell-functioning Ward

Committees will provide every metropolitan resident with a local point of access to municipal government and strengthen the accountability of ward councillors to local residents.” Ward committees was, therefore, partly created to make ward councillors more accountable to communities. In this regard it, states that “[t]he establishment of ward communities should go hand in hand with strengthening support to ward councillors and building accountable and effective leadership.”

It was the Municipal Systems Act that created institutionalised features for accountability. The Municipal Systems Act makes it the responsibility of the municipal council and the municipal manager. According to section 4 (2)(b) “[t]he council of a municipality within the municipality’s financial and administrative capacity and having regard to practical consideration, has the duty to provide, without favour or prejudice, democratic and accountable government.” In addition to this, section 51 (i) states “[a] municipality must within its administrative and financial capacity establish and organise its administration in a manner that would enable the municipality to hold the municipal manager accountable for the overall performance of the administration.” Furthermore, the *Code of Conduct for Councillors* also ensures that councillors uphold accountability. According to the Preamble of the *Code of Conduct for Councillors*, “[c]ouncillors are elected to represent local communities on municipal councils, to ensure that municipalities have structured mechanisms of accountability to local communities ...” This is, therefore, how accountability ideally have to work especially given the legal framework.

Further, the WPLG encourages municipalities to establish partnerships with civil society especially community-based organisations (CBOs), as the White Paper see civil society as fundamental to the realisation of developmental local government. As aforementioned, local government legislation does not recognise this partnership that was advocated by the White Paper. The closest the Municipal Structures Act and Municipal Systems Act gets to recognising community organisation and civil society is for consultation purposes. According to section 19 (3) of the Municipal Structures Act “[a] municipal council must develop mechanisms to consult the community and community organisations in performing its functions and exercising its powers.” In addition, section 17 (2) (d) states the municipality must provide for “consultative sessions with locally recognised community organisations.” It is evident that local government is uninterested in a partnership with local community organisations or civil society. This essentially begs the question of accountability at local government level.




3.3.1 Who has to account?

From the previous section it is clear that local government legislation (the Local Government Acts) in terms of accountability solely focus on the elected political office bearers and the municipal manager as chief financial officer. This, therefore, suggests a shortcoming in how accountability was conceptualized in local government legislation. It is also important to extend measures of accountability to traditional leaders and ward committees as they are representatives of the community. One can make the case that traditional leaders are leaders whose subjects must follow but that would not be democratic, and this raises the

relevance of traditional leaders in a democracy. Any representative needs to be held accountable for the decisions or the lack of decisions he or she makes when in office.

In addition, Mdoda (2011, p.78) argues that “the position held by traditional authorities within a democratic system where they are entitled to salaries, as public officer-bearer, but are unwilling to be subjected to accountability requirements similar to those that apply to other public servants in general.” In addition to this, Bailey (2011, p. 76) reported that Impendle traditional leaders are not attending council meetings. Given that succession in traditional authorities is hereditary, it is imperative for traditional leaders to attend council meetings as that is the only place where they would have to account.



Furthermore, even though there are no measures in place to hold ward committees accountable, the *Code of Conduct for Ward Committees* obliges ward committees to account to local communities. The *Code of Conduct for Ward Committees* (n.d, p. 3) states that “members are accountable to the ward community that they serve.” Piper and Deacon (2008) found that partisan ward committees accountable to the political party whose interest they represent. In addition, Smith and Visser (2009, p. 62) found in their study of six ward communities in 3 municipalities that “[w]ard committees should be accountable for their activities to the communities they represent and not only to councillors or municipalities.” This is a clear indicate accountability measures for ward committees must be extended to ward committees and traditional leaders.

3.3.2 Mechanisms of Accountability at Local Governance

Given the contextualisation of accountability in the previous section, the Community Law Centre has outlined and discussed four mechanism of accountability used at South African local government level namely: elections; open council meetings; report-back by councillors; and formal complaint, appeal and petition procedures (Community Law Centre, 2008, p.10). Notably, these mechanisms are merely designed for the elected office bearers.

Firstly, meetings of a municipal council and those of its committees are open to the public, including the media. The council or committee may not exclude the public, including the media, except when it is reasonable to do so having regard to the nature of the business being transacted. It is up to the municipal council to specify the circumstances in which the council or such committee may close a meeting. Moreover, a municipal council or committee of the council may not exclude the public, including the media, when considering or voting on any of the following matters:

- A draft by-law in the council
- A budget tabled in the council
- The municipality's draft integrated development plan, or any amendment of the plan, tabled in the council
- The municipality's draft performance management system or any amendment of the system, tabled in the council (Section 17, Municipal Systems Act).

Elections are the second mechanism of accountability. Regarding this, councillors are elected through a system of proportional representation and first-past-the-post onto municipal councils. The White Paper on Local Government explains the reason for this in more detail.

While a proportional representation system is most favourable in terms of gender representivity, the increased accountability offered by the ward component should not be lost. The enhanced accountability will result from strengthening the role of ward councillors will benefit all groups within the community, including women (White Paper on Local Government, 1998).

If one considers this it becomes clear that “PR councillors are not ... directly accountable to constituencies ...” (Community Law Centre, 2008, p.11). In addition this, all district councillors are not directly linked to a constituency. According to the Community Law Centre (2008, p. 11) “[s]ixty percent of district councillors are directly elected by the constituent local councils while the rest are directly elected through proportional party representation list.” Apart from this, Smith (2007, p. 14) argues that district municipalities are more likely to be accountable to the National Government than to local communities. The reason for this is that “[u]nlike local municipalities, which derive an average of 85% of their income from local sources, district municipalities are largely ... dependent on national financial transfers” (Smith, 2007, p. 14).

Furthermore, it does not mean that ward councillors are more accountable than PR councillors. The Community Law Centre makes the following observation:

Because of the crucial role that the party is made to play in the choice of candidates, these candidates, who are too often unknown to their localities, labour to appease not their constituency but the political party that fielded them (Community Law Centre, 2008, p. 12).

This is therefore clear that the electoral system bring about certain gaps with regards to accountability.

Thirdly, the Municipal Systems Act determines that “councillors must be accountable to local communities and report back at least quarterly to constituencies on council matters ...” (Municipal Systems Act, Schedule 1). The Community Law Centre notes something very interesting in this regard. According to them:


It is not, however, clear how the report-back obligation applies to PR councillors. This has to do with the fact that PR councillor’s constituency is not clear as the election does not directly link them to a constituency (Community Law Centre, 2008, p.17).

Once again it highlights some of the shortcomings of the local government legal framework to enforce accountability amongst political office bearers. It is an open secret that PR councillors are accountable to their political parties and not to the broader community. According to Smith (2007, p.13) “[w]hat is clear is that there is a need to improve contact

between councillors and citizens.” But with political parties calling the shot this will not happen soon.

Lastly, there are formal complaint, appeal and petition procedures. According to section 62 (1) a person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by any office bearer in the municipality “may appeal against that decision by given written notice of the appeal and reasons to the municipal manager ...” In addition to this section 5 (a) (ii) states that members of the community have the right to “submit written or oral recommendations, representations and complaints to the municipal council or to another political structure or a political office bearer or the administration of the municipality.” The Community law Centre

raises the following point:



The effectiveness of the right to petition and complain depend on the manner in which the municipality gives effect to it ... Submissions from the public may thus feature at a council meeting depending whether the Speaker chooses to place them on the agenda (Community Law Centre, 2008, p. 18).

This signals that the complaint, appeal and petition procedure does not carry a lot of weight and is an inefficient mechanism for holding the council and the municipal administration to account.

3.3.3 Shortcomings of Accountability in South African Local Governance

Apart from the shortcomings outlined above, a study conducted by Memela *et al* (2008) on South African local governance found a number of shortcomings to accountability at the local level. Firstly, there is a poor flow of information from municipal councils to citizens on matters that directly affect them. According to Memela *et al* (2008, p. 7), “[t]he lack of a good performance monitoring system in most municipalities makes it difficult for councillors and CSOs to monitor progress and therefore to hold the administration accountable.”

Secondly, civil society organisations are also to blame because they “don’t make full use of existing mechanisms to hold the council accountable, partly because most they have a humanitarian objective and are not strong in advocacy and lobbying” (Memela *et al*, 2008, p.8). Thirdly, most municipalities do not have mechanisms in place “for citizens to review council resolutions or to lodge complaints. If such mechanisms do exist they do not function properly as complaints are not dealt with systematically” (Memela *et al*, 2008, p. 8).

Fourthly, municipal users are not aware of the service standards that customers are entitled to, “which makes it difficult for the customer to hold the [service] provider accountable” (Memela *et al*, 2008, p. 8). Lastly, Memela *et al* (2008) also found that ward committees do not function properly as communication channels between the council and the community. They report that the cause for is that “in most instances [there are a] ... lack of proper organisational structures in the speakers’ offices to support the ward participatory system” (Memela *et al*, 2008, p. 8). These shortcomings signal that representation needs to be done

urgently to reform the South African local governance system.

3.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to determine specific reforms in terms of participation, representation and accountability at South Africa local governance. The South African Constitution lays the foundation as to how participation, representation and accountability must take place. The White Paper on Local Government, the Municipal Structures Act, the Municipal Systems Act and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act provide more detail as to how participation, representation and accountability must work. It must be noted that more empirical research was conducted on participation at local governance level in comparison representation and accountability. The chapter also highlighted the mechanisms and forms of participation that have been applied in the South African local government system. These forms of participation have been ineffective so far and this has resulted in communities protesting for better service delivery.

Furthermore, in terms of representation the chapter have indicated that the number of women councillors in local councils has increased and this is mainly due to the ANC's gender quota system. This chapter also indicates that traditional leaders ward committees, civil societies are representative of communities. However, the quality of representation in representative structures at local governance level is poor. In addition, the chapter also indicated that ward councillors are more accountable to their political parties than the communities that elected them and this is mainly due to the electoral system. It also shows

that measures of accountability must be extended to ward committees and traditional leaders.

Furthermore, most research currently on local governance is reiterating the findings of research prior to it and therefore more research need to solution driven. The current state of local governance needs solutions especially in terms of representation and accountability. However, this can only be done if more research is conducted on cases where accountability, representation and participation seem to be working. Lessons from those cases can inform solutions to the existing system. Given this, the research assessed the VPUU methodology in Harare Khayelitsha in democratic terms. The VPUU methodology show promises in many regards and the next chapter will focus on this in more depth.



Chapter 4 - The Case of VPUU in Harare Khayelitsha, Cape Town

4. Introduction

The overall argument of this research is that local governance needs to be reformed in terms of accountability, representation and participation to strengthen the system of participatory local governance. Chapter two argued that democratic deficits relating to participation, representation and accountability are common in democracies in the global North and the global South. Chapter three established that South Africa's local governance needs to be reformed in terms of participation, representation and accountability as the mechanisms for these are currently inadequate. This chapter aims to investigate the VPUU methodology in democratic terms as it appears as a successful model of participation, representation and accountability. In so doing, it will seek to investigate the methodology for practices of participation, representation and accountability. This chapter is divided into two sections: the first explores literature on VPUU and the second investigates the VPUU methodology empirically.

The first section specifically illustrates how the township of Khayelitsha was established and intentionally underdeveloped to contextualise the environment in which the VPUU operates. It continues to show how and under what circumstances the VPUU came about in Khayelitsha. Thirdly, it discusses the VPUU methodology, as outlined in theory and it will show how participation, representation and accountability are conceptualised in the project. The second part is discusses the empirical findings and looks at the actual practices of

participation, representation and accountability in the VPUU methodology. Some findings include the SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park were not elected but co-opted, the SNAC is not accountable to the larger community but to the VPUU management and that politics in Khayelitsha is substantially and diversely contested.

4.1 Background of the Khayelitsha Township

To understand the underdeveloped nature of Khayelitsha, it is necessary to explore its history and its development since 1994. Khayelitsha was established to remove black people from Cape Town to the Cape Flats and to provide housing to residents of overcrowded townships of Gugulethu and Nyanga (Ndiganye 2005, Zonke 2006 and Sawyer 2007). Furthermore, the comprehension of certain historical facts is necessary regarding the underdevelopment of Khayelitsha. In the 1950s, the National Party Government created the policy of apartheid. Apartheid was an ideological project that was created to showcase white supremacy (Pienaar and Monteith, 2006, p. 12). It was firmly believed by the National Party that 'black' people in South Africa are different nations divided by their different ethnicities. By dividing South Africa along racial and ethnicity lines it ensured that white people were the political majority and through this the National Party was able to pass a number of policies to entrench apartheid.

The aim of these laws was to segregate South Africa in all aspects of life. Chief amongst these laws were the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, the Population Registration Act and the Immorality Act (Pienaar and Monteith, 2006, p. 44). The Population Registration

Act (no. 30 of 1950) classified South Africans into four categories: white, black, coloured and Indian. The aim of this act was to create a political, economic and social hierarchy with 'white' people at the top of the hierarchy and 'black' people at the bottom of the hierarchy. Economic resources were also distributed along this particular hierarchy, with the 'white' people receiving the bulk of the resources and the rest very little.

In addition, black, coloured and Indian people were not allowed the right to vote or participate in any form of government. Furthermore, the Bantu Education Act (no. 47 of 1953) ensured that 'white' people received the best education whilst the majority received education that made them mere tools for 'white' people's usage (Kallaway, 1984). In addition to the Bantu Education Act, the Immorality Act (no. 23 of 1957) made it illegal for interracial relationships and marriages. 'White' people were supposed to marry 'white' people and 'black' people were supposed to marry 'black' people. The Group Areas Act (no. 41 of 1950) reconstructed the physical space of which South Africans lived in. Geographic areas were identified for different race groups and it was expected for these racial groups to stay in their allocated areas. 'Black', 'coloured' and 'Indian' people who lived in 'white' declared areas were forcefully removed and relocated to the areas that was allocated to them. The story of District Six in Cape Town is an applicable example of these forced removals. This Act allowed 'white' people to live in the best developed areas whilst 'black', 'coloured' and 'Indian' people were moved from the CBD to the outer skirts of the city (Trotter, 2009). Furthermore, a number of laws controlled the movement of black labour across South Africa which included the Group Areas Act and the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. During the 1980s, the Western Cape was declared as Coloured Labour Preferential Area. This led to an influx of 'black' people to Western Cape from the former homeland

Transkei and the overcrowding of townships such as Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu (Ndiganye, 2005, p.2).

In February 1983, residents of the overcrowded townships occupied a piece of land between Nyanga and Gugulethu opposite New Crossroads. According to Zonke (2006, p.2) it was “[t]he proliferation of squatting around Crossroads [that] resulted in the establishment of Site-C transit camp in 1983-1984.” The establishment of Khayelitsha was announced in 1983 by Dr Piet Koornhoff, former Minister of Plural Relations (Ndiganye, 2005). Consequently, the place was named Khayelitsha which means ‘new home’. Initially, numerous individuals rejected the move to of Khayelitsha from Crossroads (Sawyer, 2007). Individuals who desired to move were either forced to stay or killed by a small group of vigilantes (Zonke, 2006). While this fighting continued in Crossroads, residents from Gugulethu, Langa and Nyanga moved to a new development near Swartklip, and since then Khayelitsha has expanded rapidly into the massive township it currently is. According to Zonke (206, p.4) “[f]rom 1982 to 1990 other areas such as site B, Green Point, Macassar, Town Two and Harare was established mainly in terms of shacks.” Additionally, from 1999 until 2001 Kuyasa was created.

The discrimination against ‘black’ people in general and the underdevelopment of Khayelitsha resulted in serious socio-economic problems. According to Thompson and Nleya (n.d), the top three problems facing Khayelitsha are unemployment (59%), housing (52%) and crime and security (41%). Furthermore, according to the City of Cape Town Urban Renewable Report (August 2006, pp. 1-17), the population of Khayelitsha is estimated at about 500 000 of which 91 per cent is African and 95 per cent speak isiXhosa. Furthermore,


45 percent of the households are headed by females, 75 percent of the population is under the age of 35 and 29 percent of the population is younger than 14 years.

The 1996 Census painted a picture of a very underdeveloped Khayelitsha. *Statistics South Africa* reported that 40.2 percent of the population was unemployed, 80.6 percent were living in informal dwellings, 73 percent had access to piped water, 70.2 percent had access to flush or chemical toilets, 67.1 percent had access to electricity, 75.5 percent to refuse removal and 10.6 percent to telephones. Since 1996, the situation improved in certain instances and worsened in others. According to the 2007 report of the Department Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 71 percent of the population live below the poverty line, 24 percent are without electricity, 17 percent are without piped water, 60 percent are without telephone services, 5 percent are without waste removal, 7 percent of the residents have no education, 3 percent have tertiary education, 25 percent of the population is infected with HIV/Aids, 32 percent live in formal houses whilst 39 percent live in shacks. This not only paints a picture of an environment ridden with socio-economic problems but it also highlights the government's struggle to render service delivery.

4.2 The Role of Civil Society in Khayelitsha's Development


Civil society played a significant role in championing the development of Khayelitsha, most notably South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF). SANCO is a national civic structure that was established in 1992 during the negotiation process in Uitenhage. Its current membership is estimated at 6.3 million, with

4300 branches in 56 regions (Zuern, 2006). It is a unified structure of all the civic organisations that had been part of the internal front of the ANC during the struggle for a democratic South Africa. The ANC needed its voice during the negotiation process and it also helped drafting the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). It is largely perceived as an ANC-based organisation and due to its link with the ANC, in 2008, with the recall of former president Thabo Mbeki, SANCO in Khayelitsha was divided into two sides with the one supporting COPE and the other supporting the ANC (Thompson & Conradie, 2010, pp. 7/8). This is also perceived as SANCOs biggest weakness. According to Thompson and Conradie (2010, p.8) the current status of SANCO “is that of an organisation struggling to define a role for itself that is distant enough from government to be able to be critical of it.”



The KDF on the other hand is a localised structure that was established in 1992. It currently consists of about 100 NGOs working on community development, empowerment and capacity building. KDF also has a number of sub-structures that focuses on business, disability, education, health, human settlements, sport, religion, safety and security, social development and youth. The KDF also has two arms: the Khayelitsha Development Trust (KDT) and Khayelitsha Community-Based Development Company (KCBDC) (Thompson & Conradie, 2010, pp. 9). In addition to this, KDF is also divided into sectorial forums and ward development forums (WDFs). According to Thompson and Conradie (2010, p.9) sectorial forums are established in a number of areas such as business, disability, education, health, human settlements, religion, safety and security, social development and youth. The aim of these forums is to support the executive committee of KDF. Furthermore, WDFs were established in the 12 wards of Khayelitsha. Each WDF consist of 15 members who meet on a weekly basis around Khayelitsha (Thompson and Conradie, 2010, p.9).

The KDF has aligned their governance structure with that of the CoCT to ensure they are part of the decision-making. The governance structure of the City of Cape Town can be divided in a super structure and a lower structure. The super structure consists of the City Council, Executive Mayor and the Mayoral Committee, and the lower structure consists of the sub-councils, councilors and the ward forums (ward committees). According to the City of Cape Town Council Overview (2011, p.9) the City of Cape Council “is governed by a 221-member City Council, which elects the Executive Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Speaker.” Furthermore, “[the] Council elects the Executive Mayor, the Executive Deputy Mayor, the Speaker and the chairs of section 79 committee, and appoints the City Manager, the Chief Whip, and the Section 57 managers” (City of Cape Town Council Overview, 2011, p.10).




In addition, the mayor is appointed as the head of the City of Cape Town and hence the title Executive Mayor. As Executive Mayor, he or she is elected for five years and has statutory powers and functions (City of Cape Town Council Overview, 2011, p.10). Moreover, the Executive Mayor has the power to appoint members of the Executive Mayoral Committee (Mayco). The Mayco “exercises the powers, functions and duties designated to it by Council and delegated by the Executive Mayor” (City of Cape Town Council Overview, 2011, p.10). In addition to this, the Mayco is divided into Portfolio Committees called section 79 committees (Municipal Structures Act of 1998).

Furthermore, as part of the lower structure of the Cape Town City Council there are the sub-councils, the councilors and the ward forums (ward committees) (Thompson and Conradie, 2010, p.12). According to the CoCT website

<http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/subcouncils/Pages/Home.aspx>) the City has 24 sub-councils. Khayelitsha falls under two of these sub-councils; sub-council 9 and 10. Given this, KDF has aligned their WDFs with the structure of the City of Cape Town; KDF has a WDF in every ward of Khayelitsha to ensure that they advance the development agenda of Khayelitsha. However, since 2005, the City of Cape Town is running a Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading project to upgrade the infrastructure in parts of Khayelitsha to make public spaces safer. The VPUU and the City of Cape Town have partnered with KDF to implement the project in Khayelitsha.


4.3 The Case of VPUU in Harare Khayelitsha



From the onset the researcher must clarify the issue of Harare and Monwabisi Park. The researcher mentioned in Chapter one that he had a meeting with Mr Benu (chairperson of KDF) and that he was asked by Mr Benu to include Monwabisi Park in the study as Monwabisi Park is considered as part of Harare by the people of Khayelitsha (personal communication, May 31, 2012). However, technically Monwabisi Park is not part of Khayelitsha but part of Mitchell's Plain. According to the Municipal Demarcation Board (August 2009, p. 29) Monwabisi Park, Tafelsig and Eastridge are part of ward 99 and this makes Monwabisi Park part of Mitchell's Plain. It is important to raise this as the people of Khayelitsha consider Monwabisi Park as part of Harare but the government and VPUU see it otherwise. For the sake of clarity the researcher must mention that VPUU have establish a SNAC in Harare and one in Monwabisi Park. The researcher where it is necessary will make

comparisons between the Harare SNAC and the Monwabisi SNAC, but essentially the research is about the Harare VPUU project.

Harare is home to Khayelitsha's middleclass and is urbanised but regardless of this, it is also crime ridden. Bliss and Zagst (2011) reported that before the VPUU project was launched in Harare, murder robbery and domestic violence was the top three crimes committed in Harare. In addition, Everatt and Smith (2008, p. 91) indicates in their report to the Department of Social Development that the most vulnerable groups in Harare and Monwabisi Park were unemployed youth (young women), the aged (women) people living with HIV/Aids, seasonal workers and informal traders. Clearly, crime prevention and development are needed in Harare and VPUU was initially piloted in Harare to actualise these needed changes.




The Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) Project started in September 2005 in Harare Khayelitsha but as an idea it can be traced back to 2001. It is a co-operative agreement between the City of Cape Town and the German Development Bank and it is also co-financed by the City of Cape Town and the Federal German Ministry for Economy and Development. The goal of the project is to achieve a demonstrable and sustainable increase in the safety of the residential population (Giles and Marco, 2008, pp. 1-2). Furthermore, according to Pollack (28 May 2009) safe public spaces such as a library, a youth centre, sport facilities, toilets and pedestrian walkways were created to increase the safety Khayelitsha's population.

VPUU as an idea started when the City of Cape Town applied for donor funding from Krefitanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Kfw). The VPUU project ties into two bigger policies: (i) Khayelitsha Urban Renewal Programme and; (ii) the National Urban Renewal Strategy. This led to a feasibility study in 2002. German Financial Cooperation Funding (FinCoop) contributed R60 million and another 60 million was made available from the City of Cape Town, the Western Cape Provincial Government and the National Government and local NGO funds (Executive Summary Feasibility Study, 2002).

Kfw Entwicklungsbank has been co-funding many programmes similar to VPUU since the 1990s. Kfw's work proceeds from the following assumption: poverty causes social issues such as poor housing, ill health and increasing levels of violence, which in turn create a fear of certain public spaces. With this in mind the ultimate goal "is to achieve socially inclusive and sustainable development" (Bauer, 2010, n.p). The approach is, therefore, poverty-orientated and uses participatory urban development projects to overcome the culture of violence. Kfw also make sure that programmes funded by them "are implemented in cooperation with local partners" (Bauer, 2010, n.p). A criterion set by Kfw is that municipalities are the prime partners and act as project executing agencies, managing and coordinating the implementation of the programmes, hence the CoCT's involvement.

The VPUU claims that since its inception in 2006 in Harare and site C Khayelitsha crime has reduced by 33 percent, and the murder rate in particular has declined by 20 per cent (Ndenze, May 04, 2011). According to Krause (April 20, 2011, vodcast) VPUU started with three sites in Khayelitsha namely: Harare, site C and Kuyasa. Since then the funding has increased from R120 million to R 494.5 million (De Lille, May 03, 2011) and the project


added three sites in Khayelitsha which are the TR section, Monwabisi Park and BM Section. The VPUU was expanded to Hanover Park and Mannenberg in 2012 (Krause, April 20, 2011, vodcast). The VPUU claims that these projects are not state-driven but it includes the advocacy for and mobilisation of community-based groups to ensure that the community actively participate in securing their rights. In this regard, VPUU makes three claims: (1) VPUU successes are contributed to their community participation model (Graham and Krause, 2007); (2) they have “a representative leadership forum [which] aims to integrate the wealth of social capital in an area” (Krause, 2012, p. 3) and; (3) one of VPUU’s guiding principles is accountability (Krause, 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, VPUU specifically focuses at violence prevention on three levels namely: (1) situational violence prevention; (2) social violence prevention; and (3) local governance promotion.



Situational violence prevention focuses on the physical infrastructure. The aim is to make unsafe public spaces safe, as Bauer (2010) put it “... the recovery of public spaces.” By this it meant to eradicate existing crime hotspots through improving the existing infrastructure or to improve the “general access to basic infrastructure ...” (Bauer, 2010). Since the start of the project in Harare a number of public facilities were constructed for this purpose (Bliss, n.d). So far VPUU built a football pitch for the youth at Kwam Fundo School, the Love Life Centre in Harare Square, the Harare Library and an Active Box which includes mall shops rented out to street traders (Bliss, n.d).

Social violence prevention aims to community involve in the project. According to Bauer (2010, n.p) “... the success and sustainability of programmes is contingent upon community involvement in decision-making, implementation and operation and maintenance.” This is

done through cooperating with the support of non-governmental organisations; by supporting initiatives of community education in neighbourhoods; and by operating demand-oriented funds for small upgrading projects, administered and managed by the community (Bauer, 2010). In terms of social crime prevention, the project is financing smaller community based organisations' projects. The project trained about 420 volunteers in conflict prevention and so far between 250 and 300 volunteers is taking part in unarmed citizen patrols. In addition, there is an Anti-Rape and Gender Violence Project which entails NGOs working together to support victims of rape and gender based violence. VPUU also has a strategic partnership with the University of the Western Cape to provide legal aid to families who have legal problems (Bliss, n.d).



Institutional crime prevention or “local governance promotion first and foremost aims at mainstreaming principles of good governance in public administration” (Bauer, 2010, n.p). This is to “... to increase the institutional capacity of public authorities and encourage active participation of civil society organisations in decision-making process.” A key feature of financial cooperation projects is to enable the “active involvement of the target group in political decision-making by introducing and consolidating legitimate, elected structures in the neighbourhoods” (Bauer, 2010, n.p). In addition, local governance promotion focuses on strengthening the participatory processes by involving community leaders in municipal and national structures (Bauer, 2010). Currently in Harare, the project promotes local economic development, skills training, the management and maintenance of spaces and places. For local economic development, the shops at the Khayelitsha Metro Station are a way to promote economic development for street traders. Moreover, through skills training they are able to employ individuals from the community permanent to run the public facilities

(Bliss, n.d). Most projects funded by the German Development Bank must adhere to this model of violence prevention. The financial cooperation project in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, uses the same model of violence prevention.

Furthermore, the implementation and the successes of this project would not have been possible without VPUU's network of stakeholders. VPUU has a range of stakeholders such as the City of Cape Town, the German Development Bank, the Khayelitsha community, ward committees, SAPS, ward councilors, the community policing forum, the WDFs, 28 non-governmental organisations, the Khayelitsha Development Forum, the Western Cape Government, the National Treasury, the Legal Aid Clinic of the University of the Western Cape, the University of Cape Town, Simelela and the Development Bank of South Africa (Mtwana, October 2007, p. 22; Graham & Krause, October 2007, pp. 6-8 and Bliss and Zagst, 2011, p.4). Apart from VPUUs stakeholders and their three pronged model of violence prevention, VPUU has a specific methodology for implementing and managing a project.

4.4 The VPUU Project Methodology and Principles

The City of Cape Town appointed AHT Group AG as consultants for assistance with the implementation of the project. The City also established a special Project Management Unit that is headed by Alastair Graham (Bliss and Zagst, 2011, p.4) who is co-managing the project with Michael Krause. The VPUU project methodology was developed by AHT Group AG to make the financial cooperation model of violence prevention (situational violence

prevention, social violence prevention and local governance promotion) possible. The VPUU methodology has nine main stages:

- i. Formation of Representative Community Structure (SNAC)
- ii. Baseline Survey
- iii. Development of Local Strategy (CAP)
- iv. Prioritising Interventions
- v. Design Interventions
- vi. Implementation of Interventions
- vii. On-going Monitoring and Evaluation
- viii. Operation, Maintenance and Management (Krause, 2012, p. 3).

In addition to this, VPUU are guided by the following principles: (1) people-centred development; (2) trust; (3) accountability; (4) a participatory approach; (5) voluntarism; (6) sustainability; (7) process of integrity; and (8) partnerships (Krause, 2012, p. 3). The project methodology and the principles of the project inform a great deal of the VPUU community participation model.

4.5 VPUUs Community Participation Model

Upon investigation, of the VPUU 'community participation model', the model is theoretically a merger of two models. The first model VPUU borrows from is John Turner's Housing model of 1976. Turner argues that there are essentially two models for housing development. The first was the central administrative system and the second was the local autonomous

system. According to Krause (October 2007, p. 20) VPUU are heading towards the 'local autonomous system' where "the community is taking charge most of the planning, implementation, and most importantly, the management." The second model that VPUU uses is Abbot's model of community participation. Abbot's model of community participation has three levels of community participation, namely: (1) empowerment; (2) community development; and (3) negotiated development.

According to Krause (2007) VPUU has adopted the local autonomous system of participation. In order to ensure it becomes the permanent model of participation, VPUU has identified levels in community development. These levels can be seen as stages. The first level will be community empowerment, the second level is community development and the third level is negotiated development. It can be conceptualised as follow.




Diagram 4.5-1: John Turner's Housing Model

According to VPUU, a Baseline survey via a participatory Rapid Urban Appraisal methodology is a form of empowerment. Secondly, interactions with community base organisations are a form of community development and lastly, the Reference Group of VPUU, where different stakeholders of different levels engage around development and what is best for the

community is negotiated development.

Piper (2012) critically takes this model apart after a number of interviews with Krause. Piper (2012) proceeds by outlining the VPUU model of decision-making and according to him, Krause has indicated that there are generally six stages. The first stage would be to develop a Safe Nodal Area Committee (SNAC). According to Piper (2012) the objective of the first step as outlined by Krause is to establish an inclusive and non-partisan leadership. The SNAC ought to consist of representatives who are 50 percent from civil society and 50 percent from government and political parties. In addition, the process of establishing a SNAC is as follows: (1) VPUU will conduct an audit of local organisations to develop a knowledge base, to identify potential leadership and to inform local organisations of the project; (2) invite all relevant organisations to submit nominations of candidates to serve on the SNAC and will be 15 members strong of which there will be a chairperson, deputy chairperson, a secretary and 12 functional position; (3) all vetted organisations in the area will be invited to an electoral meeting and it is here where the election of the 15 members would take place (Piper, 2012).

The second stage involves Saturday training sessions for the newly elected SNAC leadership. The training includes topics such as leadership skills, how to build trust, monitoring and evaluation techniques, financial management, accountability, etc (Piper, 2012). Piper (2012, n.p) notes that this particular process “is an explicit socialisation into some key practices and norms of mainstream developmental governance.” The third stage is a visioning exercise by the SNAC leadership and this particular process will eventually inform the developmental project (Piper, 2012). The visioning exercise is usually a two day workshop and aims to

develop a wish list with short-term, medium-term and long-term goals. Once the visioning exercise by the SNAC leadership and the project management staff is complete, the project management will run a 10 percent household survey. The results of this survey will be synchronised with the vision of the leadership into a manageable action plan called the Community Action Plan (CAP) (Piper, 2012).

The fourth stage is to garner municipal support for the CAP. This stage includes getting the buy-in of line manager and reaching an in-principle support for the plan. In addition, VPUU will also consult the community at a public meeting, and once this is done VPUU will ask the mayor to sign this plan publically (Piper, 2012). The fifth stage is the implementation of the CAP and the SNAC is tasked to drive this process in the community. However, the VPUU appoint community liaison officers who are skilled professionals and are tasked to assist the establishment and working of the SNAC. This stage also consists of quarterly community meetings, monthly SNAC meetings and the Reference Group (Piper, 2012). The final stage involves working with the City of Cape Town. The involvement of the City of Cape Town in the decision-making process of VPUU is more ad-hoc and there is no regular meeting around VPUU in the City of Cape Town. Most of the decisions are made on a one-on-one basis and quarterly at the Executive Management Team (Piper, 2012).

It is important to note is that VPUU is driven and designed by a private consulting company. In the first five stages, the City of Cape Town plays a very minimal role. It appears as if the most strategic decisions are taken by the VPUU professional team. Piper (2012, n.p) notes that “the VPUU methodology is one of building a particular kind of elected trustee who is responsible to the project outcomes rather than local preferences.” This is important to note

because the next section reveals the actual forms of democratic practices which have been documented so far in VPUU literature.

4.6 Actual Forms of Participation in VPUU

To inform their actual practices of participation and render them meaningful, VPUU has established a number of objectives for community participation. These objectives amongst others are the following:

- To promote democratic values and decision-making processes by engaging all relevant stakeholders from within Khayelitsha with special focus on the identified Safe Node Areas;
- To communicate the goals, principles, instruments, and of VPUU to the broader community of Khayelitsha including its leadership; and
- To enable the broader community and its leadership to engage in a dialogue with both the AHT Khayelitsha Consortium consulting team and the VPUU project management unit of the City of Cape Town on the needs of the community in relation to safety and violence prevention issues (VPUU Website, September 09, 2012).

There is limited information on the actual forms of community participation in VPUU literature. According to Piper's (2012) interview with Michael Krause, participation in the VPUU process takes place on a monthly and quarterly basis. There are internal SNAC meetings and the Reference Group that are happening on a monthly basis. The SNAC

meeting is not open to the public and can be considered as a “closed” space. The aim of this meeting is to review the CAP and where they can engage the community (Piper, 2012).

Furthermore, the Reference Group consists of a wide range of stakeholders such as representatives from KDF, councillors and other stakeholders that operate in the area. The initial representative group that was formed was the Inception Group and it was an advisory group which consisted of stakeholders in Khayelitsha (Krause, 2007). The Reference Group is the VPUUs pride in terms of community participation. According to Graham and Krause (p.7, 2007) “[c]ommunity participation has been embedded in the programme through regular meeting with community representatives”, this amongst other includes the Reference Group. “The Reference Group is made up of representatives of the Khayelitsha Development Forum, the councillors from the areas, and representatives of groups operating or with an interest within the four Safe Node Areas” (VPUU website, September 09, 2012). In addition, Piper (2012) indicates that the Reference Group takes place once a month with all VPUU stakeholders across all projects and about 100 to 150 people present. Piper (2012) further point out that it is used as a decision-making structure where only members of VPUU have voting power.

Moreover, there are also quarterly public meetings. According to Piper (2012) the aim of these meetings is to report back on the progress on the CAP. This is the opportunity to share information with the broader public and it is the duty of the SNAC to lead and organise these meetings. According to Piper (2012), Krause indicated that there are cases where these meetings are not held as the SNAC looks hide behind technocrats to avoid being held

accountable for poor progress. The second part of this chapter will investigate these forms of participations further.


4.7 Actual form of Representation: Safe Nodal Area Committee

Representation of the community in the VPUU operations is manifested through the Safe Nodal Area Committees (SNACs). According to Graham and Krause (2007, p.6) “VPUU implements an integrative strategy combining social, situational and institutional crime within four designated areas called Safe Node Areas (SNA)”, and they created SNACs to oversee the implementation of the project. According to the VPUU website, the SNAC members are elected from community organisation and not by the broader community. In additions, a SNAC consists of 15 members of which 50 percent of the representatives are from elected civil society and the other 50 percent from government structures and political parties. Since the first conception of the SNAC, they currently consist of the following portfolios:

- Chairperson
- Deputy Chairperson
- Secretary
- Portfolio Head Public Relations/Communications
- Portfolio Head Social/Cultural Interventions
- Portfolio Head Early Childhood Development/Youth Development
- Portfolio Head Safety and Security
- Portfolio Head Economic Interventions

- Portfolio Head Skills Development
- Portfolio Head Facility Management Committees
- Portfolio Head New Infrastructure – Construction of Community Facilities
- Portfolio Head New Infrastructure – Bulk Infrastructure
- Portfolio Head Operation and Maintenance
- Portfolio Head Monitoring and Evaluation
- Portfolio Head Social Development Fund Interventions (see Appendix 4).

According to Krause (2007) “representatives are tasked to disseminate information to the broader community, explaining their decisions and raising concerns in the participatory process.” Therefore it is the responsibility of SNAC members to keep the community up to date with the progress of the project and also be accountable for the decisions that were taken. The second part of this chapter will discuss the SNAC in more-depth.



4.8 Establishing a Frame of Reference

To establish a frame of reference the researcher asked participants about the history of VPUU. This served as an indicator of the participant’s knowledge about the practices of VPUU. Most participants have indicated that the VPUU project has its roots in the Urban Renewal Strategy that was announced by President Thabo Mbeki in 2001. According to Beja (personal communication, July 27, 2012) Khayelitsha is “an area that has been declared in the urban renewal programme by the then President, president Thabo Mbeki [and] it means [that] all the government departments need to prioritise Khayelitsha.” It was after the Urban Renewal Strategy was announced that the “South African government through the office of

the president and the office of the premier” (Beja, *ibid.*) approached the German Government for funding. Before the funding was availed, they identified Harare as a potential site for a project. According to participant 9 (personal communication, July 26, 2012) “they started at Harare doing their work” and the aim was to decrease crime in Harare. Participant 2 (personal communication, March 04, 2012) was one of the initial fieldworkers and “was the one that showed them the hotspots because Harare was a well-known area that has high rate of crime.” Furthermore, according to participant 9 (*ibid.*) and participant 2 (*ibid.*) the aim was to start in Harare and later to move to site B and site C. Furthermore, Beja (*ibid.*) indicates that the project has mainly three sponsors: KfW bank in German, the National Treasury and the City of Cape Town, and each donated a R60 million towards the project. To operationalize VPUU in Harare, “they also select[ed] some of the groups ... and then they partnered with KDF” (participant 9, *ibid.*). The groups mentioned by participant 9 are called Safe Nodal Area Committees (SNACs). Participants were also engaged about the democratic practices of VPUU and the following sections will discuss the actual forms of representation, participation and accountability.

4.9 Representation: Establishing a SNAC – the Ideal Situation

As mentioned earlier, the SNAC is a representative structure of VPUU. In Harare, Khayelitsha this structure consists of civil organisations and politicians. Krause (personal communication, January 26, 2011) indicates that they have a particular process of establishing a SNAC. Firstly, “[VPUU] get [their] information from the sub-council database because in theory all the organisations should register with the sub-council” (Krause, *ibid.*). Secondly, they would

invite “all the organisationsif they can prove in some sort [of way that they are an organisation and] ... if it is a one man show [VPUU] basically say sorry” (Krause, *ibid.*). These organisations can be “a crèche, a sports club, ... a dancing club, a stokvel, etc.” (Krause, *ibid.*). Thirdly, ward councillors are also invited but have to serve ex-officio on the SNAC once elected. Therefore, “no individuals except for the councillors” (Krause, *ibid.*) are to be included in the SNAC.

Membership is, therefore, is only extended to civil society and political representatives. This means “50 percent can come from political organisations ... and 50 percent need to come from NGOs and CBOs” (Krause, *ibid.*). Krause states that (*ibid.*) “in Monwabisi Park we got four sections, we say four can come from SANCO, four can come from the WDF, four from [political] parties and eight have to come from other areas. The area committees are basically represented by one representative [and] we got 4 areas [so] they can send one area representative [each].” The next step would be the formation of the SNAC. According to Krause (*ibid.*) an election would take place and those stakeholders will be invited to having a chance to elect a SNAC. To this election “only the stakeholders [are invited because] ... it is a delegated election [and] it is not a mass [election] otherwise [they would be] contesting the ward” (Krause, *ibid.*). It is crucial for Krause to emphasize that the election for the SNAC is not open to the broader community as it might be perceived that VPUU is contesting the ward. In democratic terms the member on the SNAC would be a trustee rather a delegate. According to Rehfeld (2009, p. 218) a trustee is a representative that should be the ultimate judge of what constitute good, whereas a delegate must remember that his or her constituent are the source of judge (Rehfeld, 2009, p. 218).

4.10 Representation: Establishing a SNAC – In Practice

In Harare this process is not exactly the same as outlined above and deviates somewhat from the ideal. Firstly, like in the ideal situation membership is extended to organisations and political representatives. Participant 1 (personal communication, February 08, 2012) has observed that organisations need to be registered on the sub-council database. He has also confirmed that only organisations can be part of the SNAC and that VPUU look at the competencies of these organisations for them to be part of the SNAC. In addition to this, Participant 5 (personal communication, May 07, 2012) indicated that the “SNAC is coming from the stakeholders ... [and] ... SNAC is from the Harare stakeholders such as NGOs and SANCO.” A Harare SNAC member has indicated that no individuals are part of the SNAC. “For SANCO you must have two members, WDF must have two members, my project has two members that is how we get that together” (Participant 8, personal communication, July 09, 2012). Beja explains why only structures and not just any individual can be part of the SNAC. “We want people that are accountable to people. You cannot just go there and say you want to be elected. No matter how eloquent or how sophisticated you are you must be a member of a structure or else the community must appoint you and inform you that based on your expertise we want you to be there on that particular day” (Beja, *ibid.*).

Secondly, the formulation of the SNACs in Monwabisi Park and Harare was not done through elections but through co-option. Once VPUU has the names of the organisations they extend invitations to these organisations to form part of the SNAC. According to participant 3 (personal communication, April 12, 2012) “VPUU gives people the chance to apply to be a member of the SNAC. VPUU told them that each and every individual from any organisation

must apply, [their] application must be [accompanied] ... with an organisational letter, with a letter head [and must be] send to ... VPUU's office ...” Krause (*ibid.*) has indicated that sometimes “there is either an existing steering committee ... [because] ... the CDW has a committee, there is a ward forum, there is a [ward] development forum in Khayelitsha, etc. So, you [are] up against all sorts of things. So you are starting to make concession immediately. So basically we say we want to co-opt some members of you.”

Participant 7 (personal communication, July 07, 2012), a SNAC member from Monwabisi Park, has indicated that he was co-opted because “they only send [his] name [and] all [his] particulars [to VPUU] and after that VPUU call[ed] him.” Participant 8 (*ibid.*) recalled a similar process when the SNAC in Harare was established. According to him “[VPUU] told us what they actually wanted to do and they wanted all various stakeholders; the youth and some political organisations, etc. all those that they could get and they say that they are here to advance the community” (Participant 8, *ibid.*). Thereafter, “they decided that each project in the area should have two representatives to represent them at the meetings with VPUU” (Participant 8, *ibid.*). He further explains how the process worked in his case:

VPUU writes a letter to your particular organisation or project. ‘We would need two members to represent you in VPUU’s programmes.’ You send in the members you want with a letter [because they] want a letter with your stamp and everything ... You cannot just walk in you must be send by your organisation (Participant 8, *ibid.*).

The process outlined by participants 7 and 8 is not for an election but a process for co-opting members representing local civil society formations. However, co-option is not formal


democratic representation as a formally democratic representative must be elected to office. Thus, the SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park are not formal democratically representative structures.

Elections of other SNACs might have taken place elsewhere because Krause indicated that “nomination should come from ‘[organisations]’” (Krause, *ibid.*). Beja (*ibid.*) observed that in cases where there were elections VPUU would have:

... a meeting to prepare a stakeholders. [The] kind of meeting where everybody is going to be told what is going to happen in that particular ward ... and what are the credentials. The credentials will be explained to the structures of that particular ward so going to an election date everybody is aware of that and that take place approximately a whole month informing the structures about what is going to happen (Beja, *ibid.*).

Beja (*ibid.*) further notes that in cases where there was an election, “people will nominate a person for a certain position and then if that person accept that notion, a nominee will be call to go out of the venue and people vote democratically” (Beja, *ibid.*). However, this particular process was not followed in Harare. In democratic terms, representatives (whether they are delegates or trustees) must be elected (Pitkin, 1972). Therefore, if organisations are invited and individuals are nominated without an election took place they cannot be considered as formal representatives of any kind.

Furthermore, according to Krause (*ibid.*) the size of the SNAC must 16. However, the SNAC in Harare consists of 15 or less members (Participant 8, *ibid.*) and in Monwabisi Park it is 16. Moreover, the term of the SNAC is supposed to be two years (Participant 5, *ibid.* and participant 8, *ibid.*). However, according to participant 7 (*ibid.*) since the inception of the SNAC in Monwabisi Park in 2009, no other elections took place. Participant 5 (*ibid.*) also noticed that since March 2011 there were no elections for a SNAC in Harare. Besides presenting legitimacy challenges, without any elections the SNAC members cannot be considered as representatives of the community. In addition, any democratic structure must have regular elections to keep representatives accountable to their constituents and without any elections SNAC members cannot be held accountable.



Furthermore, once the SNAC is established VPUU would “give [them] training, training of leadership actually knowing how to lead the people and from there the SNAC members going to be solid until [they] know how to settle with the people” (Participant 7, *ibid.*).

Furthermore, Beja (*ibid.*) explains the role of the SNAC as follow:

WDFs are sub-sectorial structures of KDF which are responsible to act on the decision of the development of those particular areas. Then SNAC is the VPUU mouth piece of that area and the WDF assist in terms of informing – reaching out to other people that are not in reach in terms of the community because you must understand not everybody will be accepted. You must accept that some person out of this progressive movement [might] take part in terms of reaching out to other and as long as the role they play it is in line with moral and ethics of KDF we will partner with those people (Beja, *ibid.*).

It is important to note is that Beja referred to the SNAC a “mouth piece of VPUU” and this raises issues in terms of the autonomy of the SNAC.

4.11 Participation

There are mainly three types of meetings in the VPUU methodology that can be related to public participation. The first meeting is the SNAC meeting, the second is the community meeting and the third one is a multi-stakeholder meeting (the Reference Group) that takes place once a month. Each of these meetings has a particular aim. Furthermore, if one uses the framework of Cornwall (2002) and Gaventa (2006) the VPUU community meetings and the Reference Group are invited spaces of participation because VPUU invites the community and stakeholder to participate in these forums.

4.11.1 SNAC Meetings

SNAC meetings can be divided into two types which are a monthly meeting and a monthly mentoring session (Krause, *ibid.*). This means that every two weeks there is either a mentoring session or a SNAC meeting and it will “usually take place at six o’clock in the evening” (Participant 9, *ibid.*). Even though the project leader wants the SNAC to meet on a bi-weekly basis, it does not seem to be the case everywhere. According to a SNAC member in Monwabisi Park they have “a meeting each and every quarter as a SNAC” (Participant 7, *ibid.*). However, the SNAC in Harare “has fortnight meetings but ... [sometimes it is] ... so

much work [that they] would have weekly meetings” (Participant 8, *ibid.*). The frequency of internal SNAC meetings is, therefore, appears to depend on the amount of work the SNAC has.

Furthermore, according to participant 8 (*ibid.*) in the SNAC meetings “[they] discuss [their] different problems with the community, it might be gardens, it might be a crèche, it might be something.” If there is problem they would forward it to VPUU. Participant 7 (*ibid.*) has also indicated that in their SNAC meeting they would “discuss ... matters or go to call VPUU”. The mentoring session on the other hand consist of leadership issues and skills development. According to Krause (*ibid.*) the mentoring meeting was not part of the original model and it is something new in the pilot project. The monthly mentoring session is conducted by VPUU and also takes place every two weeks at six o’clock in the evening. If one applies Gaventa’s (2006) framework, this type of meeting is considered as a ‘closed’ space. These spaces are not open to external stakeholders and this is where most of the decisions are finalised.

4.11.2 Community Meetings

Both SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park do not hold community meetings on their own. The community meetings that they have are usually in conjunction with the VPUU management. According to participant 7 (*ibid.*) “[w]hen there is something of VPUU [they would] take that issue with VPUU [and they would] go to the hall.” He explains further “[they] are there as part of VPUU [because they] are between VPUU and the community.

[They] meet in each and every hall; Monday [they] there, Tuesday [they] there, Wednesday, all until [they] are finished” (Participant 7, *ibid.*).

These community meetings led by the VPUU management follows this process. According to participant 5 (*ibid.*) VPUU must have a meeting in the community through the ward councillor. Participant 5 (*ibid.*) explains further in practice VPUU must inform the councillor and they would have a mini-presentation first, and there after the information would be taken to the community. The reason for this is “VPUU is dealing with the stakeholders [civil society] ... [and the councillor] ... is dealing with the community” (*ibid.*). The ward councillor will then call a public meeting for VPUU. The process the councillor refers to is more a process of gatekeeping than participation. The councillor is clearly nervous about the effect VPUU might have on how the community might perceive him as the councillor and, therefore, he has to screen the information of VPUU and if he is comfortable with the information he will take it to the public.


Furthermore, it also became apparent that in order to setup a community meeting, most stakeholders will follow a particular process. According to participant 2 (*ibid.*) “the only specific way of informing the community is like what [she would] do. [She would] inform the SANCO executive and the ward development forum (WDF) and they will just call people because ... those executives ... are representative [of] the community.” She further explains that “in those executives there is a youth desk, there is a women desk, there is the ANC, the UDM, there is the DA, [and] there are NGOs ... All those forums, all forums are represented more especially in the WDF. All the structures are represented” (Participant 2, *ibid.*). In addition to informing KDF and SANCO, whoever calls the meeting would make use of official

notices, pamphlets and loud hailers to inform the community (Participant 1, *ibid.*).

Moreover, participants have indicated that the most appropriate times to have meetings are either over the weekend or in the evening after work. The meetings in the evening have pros and cons. According to participant 2 (*ibid.*) "... after working hours ... is good because they back from work but it is also not good because they [have to] hurry to cook for themselves and ... [it] is dark outside and for some people it is not easy to go out of their houses [because] they will get grabbed by the *tsotsi* (gangster or thug)".

Participants also observed that attendance to these meetings vary. Participant 7 (*ibid.*) estimates about 200 people attend the meetings in Monwabisi Park. Krause (*ibid.*) also indicated that sometimes "you end up with 18 or 20 people rather than 200". Participant 2 sheds some light on the fluctuation in the number of people attending the meetings. According to her "sometimes plus minus 20 turn out or plus minus 100 people turn out. So it differs on that particular day on how much people are busy" (participant 2, *ibid.*) This means that attendance will be affected by events or programmes in and around Khayelitsha. This situation might have implications for democracy because the number of people you reach in a democracy matters. If important decisions need to be taken on a day when most people are busy, the majority would not be happy with the outcome of that meeting. Providing that officials and politicians are aware of the pattern of community attendance they would be able to use it to manipulate decision-making.

Apart from the community meetings held by VPUU, SNAC members also use other local meetings to promote VPUU in the community. According to participant 8 (*ibid.*) in Harare “[they] have local meetings, [they] have street committee meetings, [they] have local meetings, [they] have SANCO meetings [and] that is where [they would] discuss and [they] preach and ... try selling VPUU to those that do not understand.” Participant 1 (*ibid.*) has also observed that sometimes SNAC members use street committees to have meetings. Furthermore, the representation at these meetings also varies. Participant 2 (*ibid.*) indicated that “some [parents] go there to represent their children; if the [children] are not there they can give them the information.” She also knows from experience that the meetings were fairly attended by both genders. Participant 5 (*ibid.*) also indicates that a variety of people attend the meetings. However, participant 1 (*ibid.*), who is not a resident of Khayelitsha, observed that meetings are mostly attended by women and individuals who are in their early twenties, mid-fourties, fifties and older.



The nature of these meetings is mostly defined by feedback from VPUU to the community. According to participant 7 (*ibid.*) his SNAC uses these meetings to report back on what they have done but they would not talk on behalf of VPUU as “VPUU must ... represent itself ...” According to him, VPUU management staff chairs these meetings. Participant 2 (*ibid.*) observed that “[t]he community is expected to say this is what [they] want [and] this is what [they] like. [They] are not happy with A, B, C, [or they] are happy with what [VPUU] have done ... It is more of a communication but an advisory thing at the same time people are raising their expectations.” Important to note is that even though the nature of the meeting is advisory it does raise the expectations of the community, and this contrary to what Krause wants. Krause wants the community to totally buy into the community action plan (CAP)


which is a plan drawn up by the SNAC and VPUU. In addition, she has also observed that it is similar to IDP meetings:

It is like doing an IDP as a government official you go to those people and listen to what they want to say and when you come back you have already gone through your budget and you know what you can do, at what time, for how long and then you know that the other ones that keep asking or keep expecting that you give the right answer for them ... 'I think it is going to be possible in 5 years to come' (Participant 2, *ibid.*).

This means that “they are going through their budget and give answers according to what they have and according to what they know is going to be done, although it is going to be [over] a long term” (Participant 2, *ibid.*). In addition, participants indicated that these meetings can be quite lengthy. Participant 1 (*ibid.*) observed that a formal meeting can take between four to five hours and participant 2 (*ibid.*) knows community meetings can take between two and four hours as she attends it on a frequent basis According to participant 2 (*ibid.*) “usually they would come with an agenda for a meeting that will take two to three hours.” Lastly, she also noticed that “if you do attend the meeting you are going to benefit [by establishing] your own business or starting your own organisation or you are going to get experience because VPUU also give out jobs to people” (Participant 2, *ibid.*). This shows that there are material benefits for attending community meeting, especially community meetings chaired by VPUU.

In summary, it seems that the councillor feels threatened by VPUU and therefore screens the information of VPUU and thereafter he calls a public meeting of which he chairs. This enables him to censor the information that is shared with the community. In addition, the community have certain patterns of attending public meetings and attendance usually depends on which events are happening in and around Khayelitsha. Politicians and public officials are aware of this and can exploit this as an opportunity to run unpopular decisions past the community. Furthermore, the nature of these meetings is information sharing and no real decisions are taken in these platforms.

4.11.3 The Reference Group




The Reference Group is a monthly multi-stakeholder meeting that takes place in the KDF boardroom on the first Saturday of every month. Attendance is extended to all VPUU stakeholders and the larger public. According to Krause (*ibid.*), the Reference Group is created for “representatives of NGOs and beneficiaries of VPUU”. According to Participant 2 (*ibid.*) “each and every month they have a plenary meeting where they invite all the people of Khayelitsha, all the stakeholders from Khayelitsha not necessarily the ones staying in Harare.” Participant 8 explains this in more detail:

VPUU has a monthly Reference Group where all our representatives are there, councillors, ward councillors etc. all the different stakeholders and the various organisations and all these various small townships. I am talking, about organisations. You know you will found that Harare have organisations there [there


are] ... crèches, the gardens, sowings, etc. all these people have their representatives that meet with VPUU because VPUU want to get involved in every sector of the community (Participant 8, July 09, 2012).

Participant 2 (*ibid.*) also observed that “the faith organisations are represented, your SANCOs are represented, your WDFs are represented.” Furthermore, all VPUU Projects are there every month. Stakeholders from VPUU projects in Gugulethu, Mannenberg, Site A, Site B and Site C (Participant 5, Participant 7, Participant 8 and Participant 9) are also presented. Apart from these stakeholders, the Reference Group is also attended by the various SNACs (Beja, *ibid.*) and by the patrolling neighbourhood watch and general workers. It is evident that the Reference Group is a multi-stakeholder platform for all “those that belong to VPUU” (Participant 8, *ibid.*)



Notably, in order to be part of the VPUU, an organisation must somehow be a beneficiary of VPUU. Krause (*ibid.*) explains that a Social Development Fund was created to fund social networks or NGOs or community groups. This has certain implications for democracy if only those organisations that belong to VPUU are the beneficiaries of the VPUU. It is not hard to imagine how this dependence might undermine the democratic potential of the decision-making process. Furthermore, even though the Reference Group is open to the public, it is only VPUU structures and beneficiaries that can vote and discuss matters pertaining Khayelitsha’s development. According to Participant 8 (*ibid.*) “you can come in if you apply and say you would like to come and observe ... but you do not debate.”

Moreover, the size of the reference group is formidable. Participant 8 (*ibid.*) estimated that about 200 people attend the Reference Group on a monthly basis. Beja (*ibid.*) has indicated that it is a “full house” and participant 7 (*ibid.*) also indicated that “it is full.” Krause (*ibid.*) said that the Reference Group is currently about “a 100 to a 150 ... [and have asked] ... the community facilitator to bring in more consistency”; referring to number of people that consistently attend the Reference Group. Furthermore, the nature of the Reference Group is to provide feedback about the progress of the VPUU Projects. It is important to make this distinction because the participants - even those on the SNAC - refer to the VPUU as something they are not part of. For example, “VPUU consults all these various stakeholders ... VPUU gives report as to what they are doing among ourselves” (Participant 8, *ibid.*). Also:




Michael Krause, he is one of the main characters of VPUU and [he usually bring] interpreters ... So [he] is talking on behalf of all these areas. Now if there is a need for one of the SNAC members to appear on something that was done by VPUU in the area, he is the one that is going to stand in front and tell the people ‘OK on behalf of the SNAC VPUU have done this and this in that area’ (Participant 7, *ibid.*).

Likewise, participant 8 (*ibid.*) sees it as the place “where VPUU give a review of all the work that VPUU is doing in Khayelitsha.” Essential to note is how participant 7 and 8 who are SNAC members alienate themselves from VPUU even though the SNAC is a VPUU structure. So even though autonomy is not granted, they see themselves autonomous from VPUU. Moreover, Krause chairs the Reference Group and that the Reference Group is no elected structure (Participant2, *ibid.* and Beja, *ibid.*). Krause explains:

OK, I am chairing that meeting. It is very much my baby but I think the reason why I am chairing; there were attempts by other organisations to take over and I was thinking about, I mean, I asked a number of people should I hand over the chairmanship and everybody said no. 'You are politically seen as a foreigner, you are white and you are not from the community so you do not have a vested interest' (Krause, *ibid*).


Evidently, the Reference Group is driven by Michael Krause, the project leader of VPUU and who represents the interest of the donors and the CoCT. Without Krause, it is unlikely that the Reference Group will survive as it does not have an elected structure with a chairperson, a secretary, etc. Krause represents the interest of VPUU and not that of the community and this might have potential implications for democracy, as the community's voice is marginalised in the Reference Group.



This gives one an indication that the nature of the Reference Group is about feedback and not about decision-making. Participant 9 (*ibid.*) indicates that "since VPUU was said to work in Khayelitsha, [they] invite those particular areas to come to [the] Reference Group to report ... and ask questions". In addition, participant 2 (*ibid.*) observed that "the representatives are expected to report about the programme, the progress ... and about the problems they have encountered. What are they proposing and what are they suggesting that should be done ..." For example, "let say [they] plan to go to ward 99 [because] maybe there is a project and VPUU was there without [KDF], and now there is a conflict. So [KDF] will ask them in the Reference Group and address that ..." (Participant 9, *ibid.*). In addition to this, participant 7 (*ibid.*) will have to "go to represent [the SNAC] ... at the Reference Group

[and] ... have to say what [was] done [in] ... Monwabisi Park.” Lastly, another SNAC member explains that sometimes “the people ... think they do not understand but when [they] get there VPUU explains to the people what they want and the people go back to VPUU and say what they want and also [the representatives] go back to [their] various projects and discuss matters” (Participant 8, *ibid.*).

In applying the framework of Cornwall (2002) and Gaventa (2006) the Reference Group qualifies as an invited space. Cornwall (2002) has showed that power pervades any space of participation and the party that demonstrates the most power interests’ would be served. If one applies this framework, Krause would be representing and protecting the interest of VPUU, the donors and the CoCT.



The Reference Group meeting is very lengthy. Participants have indicated that it can take between 4 and 5 hours. It starts at 09h00 and usually either ends at 12h00, 13h00 or 14h00 (Participants 9, 7, Krause and Beja). However, the Reference Group is not without any shortcomings. According to Krause (*ibid.*) “people are coming for two meetings and they are dropping out and I say look if you want development in your area as a community facilitator you need to make sure you got a coherent consistent group.” Krause (*ibid.*) makes this point “the Reference Group should not be under estimated [because] it actually starts to level it through the different areas and you have a glitch in that one area and you can balance it out overall.” This simply means at the Reference Group, the different projects will use one another to benchmark their progress.

In conclusion, even though the Reference Group seems to be a good initiative for multi-stakeholders engagements, it has a number of shortcomings. Firstly, the Reference Group is an invited space which was created to protect the interest of VPUU and with Krause as the chairperson the interest of VPUU, the donor and the CoCT will be protected. This also shows that VPUU dominates this space and hence has the power to control the agenda. Secondly, it also marginalises the voice of the broader community because as participant 8 indicated the Reference Group is for “those that belong to VPUU”. However, one cannot take away the potential the Reference Group holds to reform some multi-stakeholder engagements at local governance level.


4.12 Accountability



Firstly, there are different levels of accountability in the VPUU project. For example, at the Reference Group the focus is horizontal accountability. According to Krause:

if there is a conflict [in Monwabisi Park] and everyone in the room knows there is an elephant in the room and somebody from another area say ‘You know guys you [are] not interested [because] we agreed on this process and if you not interested why isn’t VPUU coming to site C [because] we are moving forward in site C’ that is a wakeup call for the guys in Monwabisi Park (Krause, *ibid.*)

Here Krause uses the example of how SNACs keep one another accountable in the Reference Group. In addition to the SNACs, according to Beja (*ibid.*) VPUU is also horizontally accountable to KDF and *vice versa*. Furthermore, there is also an upwards or vertical accountability to the project sponsors. According to Beja (*ibid.*) SNACs are “accountable both to community and to VPUU.” However, participant 5 (*ibid.*) disagree that SNACs are accountable to the community and indicated that the SNAC is accountable to stakeholders. Beja (*ibid.*) further indicated that apart from vertical accountability between SNAC and stakeholders, “VPUU as a statutory body is accountable to the City of Cape Town, GTZ, KDF as its partner and the Treasury.” Participant 9 (*ibid.*) agrees with this notion as he indicated that “VPUU has done the report to the City of Cape Town, also to the National Treasury and also the German government and also to us.”




Secondly, according to the participants, SNAC is accountable to their member organisations and VPUU, and not to the broader community. This means that the broader community is not included in the decision-making and feedback processes of VPUU. The community is merely used for the ratification of decisions already taken by the project. The broader community also do not have a say in who are elected and who are not elected. This became evident when participants were asked to whom the SNAC report. Participant 8 (*ibid.*) explains that “SNAC members report back where they come from, their various organisations or projects ... [they take] the agenda of the meeting and [they] explain to the people ... If it is a SANCO member within a SANCO meeting [he or she would] report to SANCO. If it is the crèches [they] report back to the crèches.” In addition to, this participant 7 (*ibid.*) indicated “[they have] a chairperson [and] he normally on behalf of the SNAC report as a whole” to VPUU at the Reference Group. Participant 9 (*ibid.*) also point out that the

“SNAC ... report to VPUU.”

Thirdly, in terms of access to information, the findings indicate that not all of the participants know who the funders of the VPUU project are. The majority of them know that the German government and City of Cape Town sponsors the programme, but the majority of them do not know that the National Treasury is a partner too. For example, participant 5 (*ibid.*) was under the impression that the project was solely sponsored by the German government. Participant 2 (*ibid.*) “only know the Safety and Security, the City of Cape Town and the Germany Consulate.” Sadly, the Department of Safety and Security is not a sponsor of the project. Participant 2 (*ibid.*) can also re-call that “in their first meeting they told [the community] that the funding that they ... got is from Germany.” Participant 7 (*ibid.*) indicated that they were told the money was coming from VPUU but he does not know who the sponsors of the VPUU project are. The only participants who knew who sponsored the project was Beja, participant 8 and participant 9. According to participant 8 (*ibid.*) “the German government [has] put in money, the provincial government [has] put in money, [and] the City of Cape Town has put in money” in the VPUU project. Upon visiting the sites, it was found that the advertisements of the VPUU project only acknowledge the City of Cape Town and the German government as sponsors of the project (see Appendix 5).

Furthermore, participant 5 made it clear that access to information such as annual and financial reports was denied because they are official documents. According to him “you cannot get official information” (Participant 5, *ibid.*) because it is the responsibility of the ward councillor and the project coordinator to release that kind of information to the public. In addition, participant 2 (*ibid.*) also indicated that she does not know whether information

such as financial reports is accessible to the community. The researcher also found that most participants do not know how much money is invested in the project. According to participant 2 (*ibid.*) she “heard ... that VPUU got R5 million to upgrade ... Harare and other stuff.” Beja (*ibid.*) was the only participant that was able to give the researcher a breakdown of the amount of money that went into the project. According to him “Kfw bank has donated an amount of R60 million and the Treasury has donated R60 million and the City of Cape Town has donated that R60 million for this programme to be implemented in Khayelitsha.” It is sad that only one person know how much money are pump into the project as it is an indication that even SNAC members are not allowed to access certain types of information.⁵ From the above it is also clear that there are issues with access to information in the project.



Access to information is a cornerstone for any democratic practice and especially accountability. Where access to information is denied, democracy is limited (Schumpeter 1976 and Dahl 1998).

Lastly, it appears as if the SNACs shy away from direct interaction with the broader community. This might be because they know that politics and development is much contested in Khayelitsha. According to participant 7 (*ibid.*) “if [the SNAC] can see [the community] are not satisfied with ... some of the things ... VPUU has to go and represent themselves but actually it was the duty of the SNAC to delivery that information to the community.” Krause (*ibid.*) refers directly to this particular situation “We want a SNAC to lead them not us although in practice it annoys me. We obviously leading those but we

⁵ The participants who were most likely to know the amount of money that is spend in the VPUU project are the SNAC members, the ward councillor and the KDF participants. The VPUU is a special project of the CoCT and the budget thereof would have been discussed in council and sub-council meetings. KDF is a partner of the VPUU and they share information, and SNAC members participate in the Reference Group where this information should have been shared. If most of the participants do not know how much money is spent in the project it signals that this information is not made available to the public. This was confirmed by a conversation I had with a councillor of the City of Cape Town.

saying to the SNAC you should lead them and you can get us technical experts, you can rope us in, but you need to break the good or bad news to your constituency (sic).”

In summary, there are horizontal and vertical forms of accountability taking place in the VPUU project. SNACs are reporting to their member organisations and to the VPUU management but not directly to the broader community. Furthermore, the VPUU project reports horizontally to KDF and vertically to the sponsors of the project. A possible explanation for this kind of accountability may be Cronin and O’Regan’s (2002) finding. They found that accountability in development projects in most cases is directed upwards to funders and not downwards to communities (Cronin and O’Regan, 2002). Therefore, this may explain the upward notion of accountability in the VPUU project. Furthermore, it seems that access to information in the VPUU project is restricted. Dahl (1998) has indicated that one of the requirements for any democracy is access to information and this is, therefore, an important requirement that is neglected in the VPUU project.

4.13 Community Contestations

Politics in Khayelitsha can be easily being described as vibrant but that would take the complex and contested nature of the local politics in Khayelitsha away. Initially the VPUU struggled to set-up a SNAC in Harare. The initial aim was to establish a SNAC within 18 months but it took them “three years or four years” (Krause, *ibid.*) because “KDF failed, the ward development forum failed. [They] very strongly challenged although [VPUU] made it clear that [they] do not want to contest KDF and the ward councillors felt challenged

because suddenly they see it as a process” (Krause, *ibid.*). In addition to this, “what [they] have in the past was that representatives of political parties would sort of come [with] a number supporters and destabilise meetings” (Krause, *ibid.*). Furthermore, there were also issues with the newly formed DA council in 2011. According to Krause (*ibid.*) “the DA councils felt they need to give [VPUU] instructions and public meetings and something like that and [VPUU] basically said [they] acknowledge the council but these are the rules and regulations here ... and that obviously frustrated them.” In addition to this, VPUU also had trouble with new political parties. According to Krause (*ibid.*) “you have a formation of a new party and suddenly the new party thinks which project can [they] hijack and that is reality.” VPUU also had problems with businesses. According to Krause (*ibid.*) some businesses “[will] basically muscle in their businesses and give unreasonable demands.” Apart from these tensions Krause (*ibid.*) has indicated that they “are struggling with the implementation phase [because] ... [they would] have a committee of sixteen people but [they] have about 3 people that are committed.”

Firstly, there is tension between the ward councillor and the SNAC. Participant 5 (*ibid.*) is “not happy with the way VPUU are working with the SNAC.” He further indicates that “[he] do not know what the role of the SNAC to VPUU is ... I cannot say the SNAC is playing an important role” (Participant 5, *ibid.*). According to him, “SNAC is supposed to fight the programme of the young people, old people, whatsoever. They must fight the programmes of the community, that is the task SNAC is supposed to do but [he] does not see them playing that role” (Participant 5, *ibid.*). Judging from Krause and the councillor’s statements about the SNAC, says it is clear that the SNAC is scared to face the larger community on their own. This might be due issues of legitimacy. According to Plano, Riggs and Robin (1982, p.

74) legitimacy is the “quality of being justified or willingly accepted by subordinates that converts the exercise of political power into ‘rightful’ authority.” Taking this into consideration, the SNAC cannot claim authority as it was not elected by the community.

Secondly, there is also tension at the SNAC level. According to participant 8 (*ibid.*) “at the present moment [they] discovered that some community members, leaders who disappeared from VPUU’s meetings for reasons [they] do not know, seem to be questioning the SNAC.” He further explains that “the problem is some people sometime are looking for quick solutions and once people cannot get what they want for their organisations they drop out. They do not think of the long term” (Participant 8, *ibid.*). Furthermore, at a SNAC level party politics also leads to tensions. According to participant 8 (*ibid.*) “coming to politics we had political guys within VPUU but I have discovered that it is slightly of a stumbling block because at the latest stage we start fighting over political ideologies (sic).” Participant 8 (*ibid.*) “has noticed whenever [they] form such an organisation ... [they] always end up fighting and [they] lose [their] focus” and they do not get the results they actually want. This indicates two things: Firstly, that the SNAC is not immune to party politics despite all the efforts of Krause to insulate the SNAC against party politics. Secondly, there is some level of conflict amongst SNAC members, and it might be due to this conflict that there are issues of commitment amongst SNAC members.

Thirdly, there seems to be tension between KDF and VPUU. According to participant 9 (*ibid.*) “the challenge is when VPUU went the other way to the sub-council meeting and present a project and then the councillor would come with his own view and find some difficulties ... because sub-councillors have their own way of running the development of Khayelitsha. And

we as KDF have volunteered; those councillors are working for the City of Cape Town. So that is our challenges that we have to sit down with all the time.” Fourthly, there is tension between KDF and ward councillors and the sub-council. According to participant 9 (*ibid.*), “[when] the sub-councillors ... have a meeting ... there is no need to take their own mandate, they must take the mandate from the KDF ... a mandate that was taken with VPUU and the sub-councillors so that they can work together.” In addition to this, Beja (*ibid.*) explain that:

the IDP for Khayelitsha has been hindered by political interference of some councillors of this particular area of not allowing democracy to take its place. One need to make mention of one issue that hindered this process of IDP. In this current year the role that has been played by the members of the community. People bus people from ward 95 and 96 to go and de-stabilize the IDP programme that has been visited by the mayor of the City of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille, where stakeholder of site C ... talked to the mayor about their IDP related matters. It has been jeopardized by people *toi-toiing* (Beja, *ibid.*).

It is interesting that KDF experiences tension at two fronts from VPUU and ward councillors. KDF has been on the scene longer than VPUU and for a long time KDF has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the CoCT. Therefore, given that VPUU is a project in the CoCT which achieved so many successes in a short period, it might threaten future funding for KDF and hence KDF’s defensive mode when VPUU does not comply with agreements (as alleged by participant 9). The second tension is towards councillors especially if they jeopardize the development of Khayelitsha which KDF has been mediating since the 1990s. KDF realises the importance of working with the party that govern but it is not a sentiment that ANC ward

councillors share.

4.14 'Development Trustees', Political Gatekeeping and Partisan Politics

Table 1 gives one an indication of how participation, representation and accountability work in the VPUU project. Firstly, in terms of participation, the community meetings and the Reference Group are the main forms of participation and it can be considered as invited spaces, if one applies the framework of Cornwall (2002) and Gaventa (2006). Secondly, the SNAC is considered by VPUU as a representative structure of all community organisations but the findings indicate that the SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park are not elected but co-opted. There is also no downwards accountability to the community and therefore agrees with the research of Cronin and O'Regan (2002) that in most cases accountability in development projects tend to upwards towards the funders or sponsors of the development project. Lastly, there are horizontal and vertical levels of accountability where SNAC members are accountable to VPUU and their member organisations.

Structure	Participation	Representation	Accountability
Safe Nodal Area Committee (SNAC)	<p>Forms of Participation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community meetings • Reference Group • SNAC meeting (internal) <p>Spaces of Participation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invited • Closed 	<p>No election took place</p> <p>Co-option of community organisations onto the SNAC</p> <p>Category of Representation – ‘development trustee’</p>	<p>Horizontal and vertical levels of accountability.</p> <p>SNAC members are accountable to VPUU and their organisations.</p> <p>VPUU is accountable to funders and KDF.</p> <p>Broader community cannot remove any SNAC member as power lies with VPUU.</p>

Table 1: Summary of participation, representation and accountability in VPUU

4.14.1 ‘Development Trusteeship’

The VPUU claims that the SNACs represent their communities. *Table 2* unpacks how representation works within the VPUU project. From the table, it is clear that the broader community does not have any power over the SNAC. Apart from councillors, no other individuals can be elected or co-opted into the SNAC. SNAC members must be delegated by their organisations. This means that those representatives may represent the interest of


their organisations in VPUU. It can be argued that a structure like the SNAC might be a representative structure as members represent organisations of the community however it fails to represent the broader community as this structure consists of community organisations and politicians. Ordinary community members cannot be elected to the SNAC and, therefore, the SNAC would ideally represent civil society in the community. Furthermore, SNAC members are being trained to think accountability is upwards to the VPUU project and not to their organisations or to the community.

Structure	Who is represented?	Representative	Whose interest is being served?	Setting
SNAC	Community based organisations Political organisations?	Delegate from community organisations	Community organisations and VPUU	Local government

Table 2: Making sense of representation in the SNAC

Furthermore, it is difficult to categorise the SNAC into any of the major categories of representation (Pitkin 1972 and Mansbridge 2003) as it falls short of all major categories. Firstly, it cannot be formalistic as the SNAC was not elected and this specific type of representation looks at the mechanism that brought the representative to power. Secondly, it is not descriptive as appearance is a very important qualifier for this type of representation. Thirdly, it cannot be symbolic representation because the qualifier here is what the representative symbolizes and it cannot be substantive as representatives are not

elected based on the promises they make. The closest fit by a long shot is Mansbridge's promissory representation. Promissory representation focuses on the idea that during campaigns representatives makes promises to constituents whom they then keep or fails to keep (Mansbridge, 2003, p.515). However, in this case there is no campaign but there are promises. VPUU through the SNAC promises the Harare and Monwabisi Park communities' development. This becomes trickier because the SNAC are not elected by the broader community. The reason for not considering the SNAC as representing the community is the following: "a representative is someone who has been authorised to act" (Pitkin, 1972, p. 39). In the case of the SNACs in Harare and Monwabisi Park the community did not elect them because the SNAC came about through a process of co-optation this means that the community has not authorised them to act on their behalf, as this process of authorisation can only take place through election.



Moreover, Beja (*ibid.*) refers to the SNAC "the VPUU mouth piece." A mouth piece is a tool and in this case a tool that VPUU utilises to spread information. The "mouth piece" also has another connotation, meaning it is owned by someone. In this case the SNAC is owned by VPUU and, therefore, another reason why SNAC cannot be considered as a representative structure of the community. Piper (2012) sheds light on this particular dilemma. According to Piper (2012), the model VPUU applies is anti-majoritarian, consociational and anti-partisan. He states that representatives are held accountable in instrumental terms linked to project outcomes and not whether they represent the views of the community, their organisations, or some higher principle. Piper (2012) terms this form of representation as a 'developmental trusteeship'. The researcher has to agree with Piper (2012) that the SNAC model can be considered as a 'developmental trusteeship' as the SNAC is entrusted with

power and resources to manage specific aspects of the VPUU project in Harare on behalf of the community. Considering that “trustees are representatives who follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue” (Dovi, 2006, n.p), the SNAC member becomes a ‘development trustee’ rather than a representative of the community. The SNAC develops a community action plan with the assistance and guidance of the VPUU management in order to implement this action plan; they receive training and a series of workshops. In this regard, the SNAC “follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue” (Dovi, *ibid.*).

But even here representation is closer to a form of co-option designed to assimilate community leaders in such a way they legitimises the project. According to participant 12 (personal communication, January 24, 2013) when “an organisation like VPUU (a resource-based organisation) which is bringing resources to an area like Khayelitsha where there are not any resources it is issue for representatives of communities to be co-opted and to become part of or assimilated inside an organisation with resources and for their agendas become VPUU’s agenda”. Participant 12 (*ibid.*) also noticed from a similar development project in Langa that “people do not trust HDA⁶ but then the task team that represents the community trust HDA as a result most of the people who are part of the task team which are the leadership are employed by HDA they are the facilitators, they are the developers, they are the project managers and so the agenda of the community becomes secondary to the agenda of the developer.” Their first aim was to find a suitable host that have popular legitimacy in the community which in case is KDF. Once it finds a host it extends employment opportunities to the community leadership to secure loyalty which gives VPUU

⁶ Housing Development Agency

carte blanche to decide on and drive the development agenda. It is clear that VPUU uses co-option as a way to 'buy' support amongst community leaders.


Furthermore, evidence for 'buying' support would be the employment of KDF leaders of which the chairperson is the most prominent. Participant 11 (personal communication, January 24, 2013) noticed that there is an "overlap between the VPUU and KDF deliverables". Participant 11 (*ibid.*) is of the opinion that this happened when the KDF chairperson became an employee of VPUU because it was only after that, that she noticed "the VPUU and KDF agenda started to merge when it comes to development projects." Participant 11 (*ibid.*), however, does not "think it is a deliberate kind of favouring of the VPUU agenda but [she does] think it just happened by the fact that he [Benu] is working for both organisations." Presumably, it appears as if KDF might possibly be the driving force behind the merging of the agenda but what participant 11 (*ibid.*) gathers from other role players in Khayelitsha "it is more a VPUU agenda that is starting to overpower the more previously community generated agenda." Therefore, based on the argument above representation is best describe as a form of co-option.

4.14.2 Political Gatekeeping and Pseudo-Participation

The SNACs create two types of spaces: closed and invited spaces. The internal SNAC meeting is a form of closed space. This space is only accessible to VPUU and the SNACs. Furthermore, the community meetings and the Reference Group are examples of invited spaces. According to Ballard (2008, p. 180) inviting participation might allow an authority to claim

that there should be no need for anyone to operate outside of those invited spaces. With this in mind, evidently the community of Harare does not have real decision-making power as these meetings are merely a process of information sharing and feedback. Real decision-making power is in the hand of the SNAC, KDF and VPUU management as they are the only ones that have the power to vote at the Reference Group. In addition, through the leadership training workshop and the community action plan (CAP), SNACs decide which plan fits the community. Clearly, both spaces (community meetings and the Reference Group) are open to a fraction of the public and were created to legitimize the VPUU project.


Furthermore, participation in the VPUU project falls short of the criteria set by Midgley (1986). According to Midgley (1986, p. 25):



participation requires the voluntary and democratic involvement of people in (a) contributing to the development effort, (b) sharing equitably in the benefits derived therefrom and (c) decision-making in respect of setting goals, formulating policies and planning and implementing economic and social development programmes.

In applying this criteria to the VPUU methodology, it becomes clear that the community is not involved voluntarily and democratically in the development effort. Firstly, the community meetings and the Reference Group are merely information sharing sessions. Furthermore, the community is not directly involved in making decisions, setting goals and planning VPUU programmes. In this regard, the SNAC establishes the developmental vision and the community action plan and they use the community to ratify their plan. According to Midgley (1986) there is a difference between authentic participation and pseudo-

participation. Authentic participation will involve all three criteria that were set above but pseudo-participation will limit community involvement to implementation or to ratify decisions already taken by external bodies (Midgley, 1986, p.26). Pseudo-participation, therefore, best describes the type of community participation in the VPUU methodology. Participant 11 (*ibid.*) has noticed that VPUU's "structure of participation in terms of reaching communities, it is very top down". From the research done on KDF, participant 11 (*ibid.*) knows that "KDF's longevity in Khayelitsha is based on that it has managed to get approval from the community" and in this regard KDF's agenda is nominally shaped from below. If one considers this VPUU is not interested in a process of participation that is driven from below but rather one that is shaped from the top.




Furthermore, the Reference Group is the most successful forum of 'participation' in the VPUU project but even the Reference Group is mainly for feedback purposes and no real-decisions are taken there. According to Cornwall (2002) spaces that are made available by the powerful may be discursively bounded to permit only limited citizen influence, colonizing interaction and stifling dissent. Therefore, the agenda in the Reference Group is firmly controlled by the VPUU management and through this it is possible for them to assert power and ensure their interest are served. Additionally, even the community meetings are chaired by the VPUU management. Consequently, the terms and conditions for participation are clearly dictated by VPUU management.

It can be argued that the community meeting and the Reference Group is a form of political gatekeeping. Kurt Lewin first conceptualised the theory 'gatekeeping' and his theory was developed by scholars of communication studies. Gatekeeping refers to "the process of

culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of messages that reach people each day” (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009, p.1). According to Anokwa, Lin and Salwen (2003, p. 90) “the news media select and reject stories that the news audience receives. This selection and rejection process is media gatekeeping ... At each gate in this process a gatekeeper has the power to stop, alter, or reshape the news that will affect millions of people’s lives.” Shoemaker and Vos explain this by drawing on the period when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003:


few journalists from the mainstream American news media questioned their country’s actions. Those who did were reprimanded as unpatriotic by the government, as well as by audience members, and some lost their jobs (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009, p.1).



Evidently, individuals who disagree with ‘gatekeeping’ measures can be negatively affected and marginalised. Political gatekeeping occurs in public participation process of the SNAC and VPUU. The councillor clearly practices ‘political gatekeeping’ because the councillor holds popular support amongst the majority of voters. VPUU is aware of this and, hence, they need his cooperation in the community. Thus, as indicated earlier when it comes to community meetings, the councillor will first screen the information before it can go out the community. Here the councillor gladly demonstrates his power to determine which information the community does or does not receive, and to ensure VPUU does not put him in a bad light.

The same can be said about VPUU in the Reference Group. The action that occurs at the Reference Group is also practised at community meetings. The Reference Group is chaired by Krause. This enables Krause to manage the flow of information to the larger public. Krause also has the ability to decide who is getting what and when they are getting it. The aim of this process is also political as it ensures that VPUU is to a certain extent insulated by partisan politics as it can buy support amongst civil society in Khayelitsha. Clearly even though there are forms of participation where the larger public is involved, the flow of information is regulated by Krause and the councillor.

4.14.3 Limited Access to Information



While there seems to be some level of accountability within the VPUU project there is room for improvement. The Reference Group as multi-stakeholder forum allows for transparency and openness amongst VPUU stakeholders. There are also some sort of transparency and openness towards the community especially through the community meetings. However, access to information is difficult to access. Financial Reports are not available to the broader community and certain information is withheld from the community on purpose. For example, the National Treasury are not mentioned as one of sponsors on the advertising boards. Dahl (1998) has indicated that one of the requirements for any democracy is access to information and it is, therefore, an important requirement that is ignored in the VPUU project.

The SNAC is not accountable to the broader community but to their stakeholders. Apart

from the values of transparency and openness, it must also be possible for the public to remove non-performing SNAC members. Pitkin (1972) makes it clear that the ultimate way of holding a representative accountable is by removing him or her from office to remove them. In Harare and Monwabisi Park the SNACs were not elected and this makes it difficult. Regular elections in any structure ensure accountability because it is through regular elections that you can remove members that are not performing but this is not the case in Harare.

4.14.4 Partisan Politics and Community Contestations

At the heart of the current contestation in Khayelitsha is the ANC's defeat in the 2009 and 2011 elections. According to Beja (*ibid.*) "to be regarded as people that are delivering they [the ANC ward councillors] have to accept that ... the Western Cape Province is being ruled by the DA ... therefore they must change their mind-set and try to be accommodative in terms of the structures. They [ANC councillors] want people that are subordinate to them." Therefore, understanding the political environment VPUU operates in one has to take into account party politics and especially the political battle between the DA and the ANC in the Western Cape.

Furthermore, according to Krause (*ibid.*) "[VPUU] acknowledge the political dimensions the political context, but it is a development project and not a political project." The reality is politics cannot be divorced from development. Development can be seen a process whereby something is transformed from an undesired state to a desired state. This process of


transformation is very much political as it will require engaging different stakeholders with different vested interests. The ANC is aware of the threat that such a development project can pose to its existence in Khayelitsha, especially if the project is driven and endorsed by the DA in the Western Cape. In this regard, the DA went as far as claiming the successes of VPUU (De Lille, May 03, 2011). According to Barnard (August 29, 2010) “the DA-led City of Cape Town has reduced crime in Khayelitsha by 70%. A township once synonymous with violent crime, conditions in Khayelitsha have markedly changed since the introduction of the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) programme ...” This gave one an indication that the DA is claiming the VPUU project and the successes thereof.

Furthermore, the DA blame the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) for the recent protest marches in Khayelitsha and that it is part of the ANCYL’s ‘ungovernability’ campaign against the DA administration (Zille, H, August 26, 2012). The latest to the DA and ANC saga in the Western Cape is the inquiry into the inefficiency of the police in Khayelitsha. Essop (October 30, 2012) reports that the commission of inquiry was established by Zille in the wake of increased vigilante killings in Khayelitsha. This came after civil society organisations wrote to Zille to investigate police inefficiency in Khayelitsha.

Moreover, participant 12 (*ibid.*) also picked up a number of tensions between VPUU and the councillors. Participant 12 (*ibid.*) was in a sub-council meeting where VPUU gave feedback with regards to the progress of the project in the informal settlements. In this particular meeting, one of the councillors who lives in the area “felt that the changes that they [VPUU] mention is cosmetic and in his own words they have not seen any changes” (Participant 12, *ibid.*). This sentiment was shared by the Monwabisi SNAC member. Participant 7 (*ibid.*)

expressed that he felt ashamed because nothing so far had come from the VPUU plans in Monwabisi Park. Another tension in that particular sub-council meeting was with regards to accountability especially since the CoCT co-fund the project. A third tension is related to VPUU's community action plan is similar to the IDP of the CoCT as councillors were concerned with the overlapping of the developmental agenda. One needs to consider all of this to contextualise the volatile environment in which VPUU operates and, therefore, even though it is not a political project the undertone of project is political.

4.15 Conclusion



The aim of this chapter was to investigate the VPUU methodology in democratic terms, and it was to this end that it investigated the methodology for practices of participation, representation and accountability. It started by outlining how the VPUU methodology was theoretically conceptualised and once a framework was established the attention was turned to the empirical data. Empirically, researcher found that in the case of Harare SNAC members cannot be considered to be representatives as they were co-opted to form the SNAC and members of the SNAC are best described as 'development trustees'. Furthermore, the researcher also found that the SNAC is not accountable to the broader community but upwardly to VPUU and horizontally its member organisation. VPUU as a project is upwardly accountable to their donors and horizontally to KDF. In addition to this, the research found that 'political gatekeeping' and pseudo-participation best describe the nature of participation in the VPUU project. Community meetings and the Reference Group are used to inform the public and VPUU stakeholders of decisions already taken. Lastly, the research

found that partisan politics to some extent influence the project. Participants have reported tensions among SNAC members over political ideologies and there are tensions between the ward councillors, KDF and the SNAC. This is important because it contextualises the volatile environment in which the project operates, and helps explain the tendency to manage from above in a context of often vigorous contest from below.




Chapter 5: Lessons Learnt

5.1 Introduction

The main argument of this thesis is that urgent reforms are needed to deepen democracy in South African local governance especially in terms of participation, representation and accountability. The VPUU was launched in 2005, as a cooperative agreement between the CoCT and the German Development Bank, to prevent crime through upgrading public spaces in Harare and Site C Khayelitsha. Since its inception in Harare Khayelitsha, the VPUU has had a number of successes in its attempts to reduce crime in Khayelitsha and they claim they achieved this by operating in a participatory way. Since its implementation in Harare the VPUU claims to have reduced crime in the site by 33 percent and the murder rate in particular by 20 per cent (Ndenze, May 04, 2011). The VPUU methodology in generally appeared to yield better results in comparison to the local governance participatory model, hence the investigation. It was for this purpose that the researcher asked the following question: *Is the VPUU methodology of community participation, representation and accountability, a suitable model to reform the South African local governance model?* Firstly, the researcher established a theoretical foundation for the study and secondly conducted empirical research to answer the research question. Below follows the reflections on the outcomes of the research, the limitations and recommendations for further studies.

5.3 Weaknesses of Local Governance: Participation, Representation and Accountability

Chapter three indicated that a system of participatory democracy was introduced in local government by a number of policies such as the WPLG, the Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act. The investigation revealed that more focus is placed on participation in both practice and theory but literature and practices on representation and accountability is restricted, even though in theory participatory democracy is more than just participation as it extends to new forms of representation and accountability. The investigation also revealed that there are a number of weaknesses with regards to participation, representation and accountability.



In terms of participation, research indicates that ward committees have no clear role in local governance and ward committees do not have any real decision-making power to influence the municipal council. In addition, tensions exist between ward councillors and ward committee members as some members also aspire to become ward councillors (Buccus et al, 2007). In addition, research indicates that service delivery protest is often the preferred way of citizens engaging the state (Municipal IQ 2012, Jain 2010).

Furthermore, pertaining to representation, it can be concluded that the role of ward councillors is ambiguous in that they are directly elected by the community but their political future is dependent on the political party. This research also highlights that a small number of women represented in local councils (Morna and Mbadlanyana, 2011) and ward committees are not representative of the whole community as set out by the Municipal Structures Act

(Smith and Visser 2009, Piper and Deacon 2008). Civil society is poorly if not represented at all in municipalities as the importance of civil society representation is not recognised by the Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act. The partnership between the CoCT and KDF is refreshing and more of these partnerships are needed between civil society and municipalities because community-based organisations in many cases know how best to facilitate or implement a particular intervention.

In terms of accountability, there are five major shortcomings at local governance level. Firstly, there is a poor flow of information from municipal councils to citizens on matters that directly affect them. Secondly, civil society in communities is weak and do not make full use of the existing mechanisms to hold the municipal council accountable. Thirdly, most municipalities do not have mechanisms in place to review council resolutions or to lodge complaints. Fourthly, municipal users are unaware of the service standards that customers are entitled to and this makes it difficult to keep service providers accountable. Lastly, ward committees do not function properly as the communication channel between the council and the community (Memela *et al*, 2008). In addition, it can be concluded that measures of accountability must be extended to traditional leaders and ward committees, as they are representatives of their respective communities. The current local government legislation only has measures in place for councillors and the municipal administrative staff.

Moreover, the weaknesses of local governance can be a result of extensive research that is focuses on reiterating the problems of local governance and limited research aimed at generating solutions to fix the current system. Government have responded positively to the crisis in local government. Evidently, since 2004 the government has released the *Project*

Consolidate (2004), the *State of Local Government in South Africa* (2009) and the *Local Government Turnaround Strategy* (2009) but nothing significant has come of these policy documents.

5.4 VPUU Outcomes

The empirical aim of the research was to assess the VPUU methodology that was applied in Harare Khayelitsha in democratic terms and to evaluate whether it could enhance the local governance model in terms of participation, representation and accountability. Firstly, this research found that no real representation is taking place in the VPUU model that was applied in Harare Khayelitsha. SNAC members were co-opted and no elections for SNAC took place and since it was established, no other elections have occurred. For any structure to claim that it is representative they must have regular elections and it must be done in a democratic manner. In Harare this was not the case. Piper (2012) initially argued that the VPUU's 'community participation model' is actually a form of representation (development trusteeship) – a notion which is validated. However, the SNAC representation is closer to a form of co-option designed to assimilate community leaders in such a way they legitimises the project.

The research reveals that the form of participation practised is pseudo-participation and that both projects and the councillors is using 'political gatekeeping' to regulate the flow of information to the community at large. Pseudo-participation is merely a necessity for

ratifying decisions that has already been taken. This is evident in this case as the real decision-making process happens in the SNAC meeting and the Reference Group and not in community meetings. Community meetings are used to inform the community about decisions already taken. Participation is also a top down driven process and not a bottom up process and this allows VPUU to firmly control the agenda and the terms of participation. However, the Reference Group to a certain extent promises a process of consensus-building and that is needed for the South African local governance model.

Thirdly, the research also found that the SNAC in Harare is not accountable to the broader community but to its member organisations and VPUU. In addition, the SNAC in Harare was elected but came into power through a process of co-option. In democratic terms, representatives must be elected and held accountable by those that have elected them. In the case of VPUU this did not happen. However, there is openness and transparency in some of the matters of VPUU although that access to information is limited. Financial Reports are not available to the broader community and certain information is withheld from the community on purpose. For example, the National Treasury is not mentioned as one of sponsors on the advertising boards.

Even though the VPUU methodology at face value appears to be a very successful model of participation, representation and accountability promises, in practice it is not the case. Consequently, the VPUU methodology cannot be used as a general template to reform or enhance representation or accountability at local governance level but some features or mechanisms of their community participation process can be adopted to enhance participation at local governance level, especially the Reference Group.

5.5 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Use the Reference Group to enhance participation at local governance level. There is a need for a multi-stakeholder engagement forum at local governance which ties all sectors of society together. It will be a useful platform to discuss matters of service delivery and development in the municipality. The researcher would suggest that this forum must be chaired by the Municipal Manager and not a political office bearer. So far, it has worked for VPUU as it is a platform where stakeholders not only have to account but to share in the successes and failures of one another.

Recommendation 2: Furthermore, empirical research is needed to find ways to enhance and reform local governance in South Africa. Most of the research that has been conducted on South African local governance is on participation. Scholars have neglected representation and accountability in particular. More empirical research is needed in terms representation and accountability.

Recommendation 3: Proposed empirical research must investigate cases where participation, representation and accountability are successful and to see whether it can be used to reform the current local government system. Promising in this regard are Equal Education, the Treatment Action Campaign and Section 27.

Recommendation 4: Local Government legislation must enhance the role of civil society in the decision-making structures of municipalities, as strategic partnerships with civil society are needed to facilitate development in communities. This enhancement of local

government legislation must safeguard these partnerships from covert interests. The current legislative measures do not protect the interest of communities as it is made clear by the small number of partnerships local government (municipalities) has with community-based organisations. This gap in the legislation allows external forces to take over community initiatives to drive their agendas.

Recommendation 5: Local Government legislation must extent measures of accountability to traditional authorities and ward committees. The current legislation do not have any measures of accountability in place for them.

5.6 Concluding Remarks



The VPUU started off as a project for the prevention of violence but developed to serve a bigger purpose. Clearly, VPUU has become synonymous with the development of Khayelitsha and it cannot be a responsibility that cannot be taken likely. The researcher's concern is the sustainability of the VPUU project. The top-down approach of the VPUU operational methodology in practice in this case begs a further question: What would happen if the funds dry up?

Based on how the SNACs are formulated, they would cease to exist once the project is done as the broader community will not take ownership of the SNAC as they did not elect them and the SNACs do not account to them. It would become another multi-stakeholder forum and it is to this end that the researcher does not see the SNAC existing alongside the WDFs.

WDFs are elected by the community and it is not a structure like the SNAC that shy away from community interaction. Furthermore, other development organisations in Khayelitsha are not viable because KDF has captured every sector of the Khayelitsha society and created WDFs to oversee the development in their wards.⁷

Moreover, the fact that none of the participants mentioned the ward forums (ward committees) signals the insignificance of ward committees to local governance and development in at least this section of Khayelitsha. Lastly, the most successful forum of participation is the Reference Group and this kind of forum might be ideal to incorporate into the local governance system.



⁷ Based on the interviews with participants and independent researchers from the African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE) it became apparent that KDF has captured every sector in Khayelitsha.

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
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
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
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
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Interviews

Laurence Piper	August 27, 2010
Michael Krause	January 26, 2011
Participant 1	February 08, 2012
Participant 2	March 04, 2012
Participant 3	April 12, 2012
Participant 4	April 12, 2012
Participant 5	May 07, 2012
Participant 7	July 07, 2012
Participant 8	July 09, 2012
Participant 9	July 26, 2012
Bubele Beja	July 27, 2012
Participant 11	January 24, 2013
Participant 12	January 24, 2013



Appendix 1 – Informed Consent

With your signature at the bottom of this page, this form has the power to protect your autonomy. Please read it in full, and if you understand and agree, sign below.

The purpose of this research is to explore the way the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project operates, especially with regards to processes of community participation, representation and accountability. The idea is to learn what the project does well, and assess whether this could be basis of a similar approach for other development projects.

Individually, you have been identified as a potential participant for this research because of your involvement in VPUU processes, and may have valuable insights for this research. All that is required is your participation in this interview which should last no longer than sixty minutes.

Please be advised that participation is voluntary. You are at liberty to withdraw from the research at any time without any negative or undesirable consequences for yourself. All responses will be treated confidentially and only used for references purposes. Anonymity will be ensured, and there are no limits to confidentiality, unless you are willing to be named. This research will be used for articles to be published in academic publications. The findings of the research will also be reported back to participants.

Yours faithfully

Jacob Cloete

Tel: 076 314 4908

Email: 2704645@uwc.ac.za



I..... (Full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT:

DATE:

Appendix 2 – Interview Schedule for Stakeholders

Questions

1. What work do you do?
2. How long have you been ward councilor/volunteer?
3. Have you been involved in VPUU?
4. If yes, in which capacity are you involved?
5. How did you get involved in VPUU?
6. Who do you represent in VPUU? Organisation? Ward Committee?
7. For how long have you been part of VPUU?
8. What does your organization do specific for the Harare/Site C community?
9. What is your role on VPUU?

Participation

10. How often does VPUU have community meetings?
11. At what time do these meetings usually take place? (Morning, afternoon or evening?)
12. How do you usually inform the community of the meeting? (Newspaper, community radio, posters, flyers, word of mouth, loud hailing) – Can I see some?
13. Who attends these meetings? (gender, age, race, unemployed)
14. How many people usually turn up at a VPUU meeting? (Give an estimate?)
15. What is the nature of these meetings? (feedback, decision-making, etc)
16. How long are these meetings usually? (An hour, 30 minutes)
17. What is the typical agenda of a VPUU community meeting? (Do you have a copy an agenda?)
18. Do VPUU keep an attendance register? (Is it possible to see it?)
19. What is expected of the community in these meeting?
20. Who usually speaks in these meetings?
21. Who usually take the decision in community meetings?
22. Does the community have a voice in these meetings? (Can they log complaints, concerns, etc) – Can I have some of your minutes?
23. Are there any other ways of involving the community in VPUU decision making? (apart from the URP and community meetings)
24. In what ways are the meetings important to VPUU?
25. Are there any challenges to get the community involve in VPUU?

Representation

26. What is a SNAC/Reference Group?
27. What is the role of the SNAC/Reference Group?
28. How does the election of the SNAC/reference group works? (Do you need a constitution, members, etc?)
29. How many committee members are on the SNAC?
30. What is the ratio gender representation on the SNAC/reference group?
31. How is civil society represented in VPUU/SNAC/reference group?
32. How is the broader community represented in VPUU/SNAC/reference group?
33. How many representatives of civil society attend these meetings?
34. Do you know anything about the *Inception Group*?

35. What was the *Inception Group* all about?

Accountability

36. Is there a relationship between SNAC/Reference Group and the community?
37. If yes, what is the nature of this relationship?
38. Do members of the SNAC/Reference group need to perform? (Yes/No)
39. Whose responsibility is it to ensure that members on the SNAC and Reference Group perform?
40. Can you remember of any instances where members did not perform?
41. What happen to this member?
42. How do you go about making sure that members do what is required of them?
43. If members are not doing what they are supposed to do, how do you deal with them?
44. How do VPUU account to the sponsors of the project?
45. What are some of the technical details that funders of the project need?
46. Do you report?
47. What is the nature of these reports?
48. Does this include financial reporting?
49. To whom do you report?



Appendix 3 – Interview Schedule for SNAC Members

Questions

1. How do you become a SNAC member?
2. Name a few of the organisations that are part of the SNAC?
3. What do you do on a daily basis?
4. How often do you have meeting with the community?
5. How do you inform the community about the meetings?
6. What do you discuss in these meetings?
7. What is the Reference Group?
8. What is the role of the Reference Group?
9. Who are the funders of the project?
10. To whom do you account/report?
11. How long to you hold office?
12. What is the Community Action Plan (CAP) about?
13. What are some of the challenges of the project?
14. What are the benefits of the project?

Appendix 4 – SNAC Composition

SAFE NODE AREA COMMITTEE - TERMS OF REFERENCE:

- Size of the Safe Node Development Committee
- The SNAC consists of at least 15 community members with following portfolios:
 - Chairperson
 - Deputy Chairperson
 - Secretary
 - Portfolio Head Public Relations/Communication,
 - Portfolio Head Social/Cultural interventions,
 - Portfolio Head Social Development Fund interventions,
 - Portfolio Head Early Childhood Development/ Youth Development
 - Portfolio Head Safety and Security,
 - Portfolio Head Economic interventions,
 - Portfolio Head Skills Development,
 - Portfolio Head Facility Management Committees,
 - Portfolio Head new infrastructure - construction of community facilities,
 - Portfolio Head new infrastructure - bulk Infrastructure,
 - Portfolio Head Operation and Maintenance,
 - Portfolio Head Monitoring and Evaluation,
- In addition following members are ex-officio:
 - Community Facilitator,
 - Administrator,
 - Project Manager, where applicable,
 - Councillor(s)

6

Appendix 5 - Photos



Front View of the Harare Library



Side View of the Harare library



Multi Purpose Flats at Harare



Advertising board of the VPUU project