


LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM PROGRAMME  
(FTLRP) IN UMGUZA RESETTLEMENT SCHEME IN ZIMBABWE

A research mini-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the  
Magister Philosophiae Programme in Land and Agrarian Studies

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## DECLARATION

I, Nqobile Zulu declare that 'Local perceptions of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in UMguza resettlement scheme in Zimbabwe' is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other University, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Nqobile Zulu

**Signed: N. Zulu**



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May God’s blessings shower all your lives in every way.

## **Abstract**

Fast track land reform in Zimbabwe has caused a raging debate drawing a lot of attention to the re-distribution programme. The invasion of commercial farms had a bearing on agricultural production, food security, security of tenure, rule of law and respect for property rights. This thesis examines the implications of such a frayed land reform resulting in strained donor and government relations. The crux of the argument is that land reform is harmful and damaging when the rule of law is flouted, directly impacting on social and power relations at grassroots level. These strained relations result from a lack of commitment by government, external donors and white commercial farmers to correct land injustices from the colonial period and ineffective agencies of restraint. This thesis will test these perceptions and views basing on the experiences of the grassroots people. It will also attempt to test whether the land question in Zimbabwe has finally been resolved or there are still aspects to it that need attention, since land reform is often viewed in moral and political terms. Was poverty alleviation prioritized in fast track land reform by giving land to the landless poor; to help redress population imbalances or meant to reward those who struggled for liberation? The thesis attempts to answer the question of 'equity' or restructuring of access over production and ownership of land. It then questions the equity trump card as touted by the government. Did the government commit another injustice while trying to redress past injustices by overlooking the rightful claimants in favour of entrenching state power? This thesis contributes to the raging debate on fast track land reform in Zimbabwe, using the case study of UMguza resettlement scheme.

## List of abbreviations

ARDA: Agricultural Rural Development Authority

AGRITEX: Agriculture Research and Extension

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

CFU: Commercial Farmers Union

DDF: District Development Fund

ESAP: Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

GMB: Grain Marketing Board

GOZ: Government of Zimbabwe

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change

ORAP: Organisation for Rural Associations for Progress

SADC: Southern African Development Community

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

Zanu PF: Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

PF Zapu: Zimbabwe African People's Union Patriotic Front

Zipra: Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (the armed wing of PF ZAPU)

ZCTU: Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions



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# **LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM PROGRAMME (FTLRP) IN UMGUZA RESETTLEMENT SCHEME IN ZIMBABWE**

## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.0 Introduction**


It can be argued that land apart from water is the most important resource for any society. This is because it constitutes an imperative need for its people, the most basic need for food which is the basis for survival of all human beings. It is in this context, therefore that any land redistribution is inevitably contentious and politically complex (Adams 2001, Kinsey 1999, Moyo 2001). Land redistribution is contentious and politically complex because it affects people's livelihoods and could be said to threaten their very existence (Lahiff 2003, Marongwe 2002 and Villiers 2003). Thus in these terms then, any land reform will be subject to contestations with politics, power relations and socio-economic factors playing a part in who receives land, how much land and who gets deprived of their land. In this regard, any land reform process emerges as a high stakes game with stakeholders who have a lot of vested interests in the outcome.

In a social context dominated by differential access to the state administration, concern abounds that the adjudication or registration process will be manipulated by the elite to their advantage. Experience with land registration and titling schemes has shown that well informed, powerful and educated individuals often compete successfully for land not registered in their own name, while the mass of the rural people are generally unaware of the new land provisions or do not grasp the implications of registration (Platteau,1996).

It is often the ability to use both statutory and customary law that enables powerful individuals or groups to enhance their interests. Given the high politicisation of wealth allocation and the highly unequal chances of accessing strategic information or influencing bureaucratic and judiciary decision making; registration can be said to supply a mechanism for transfer of wealth in favour of the educated, economic and political elite (Kinsey 1999, Marongwe 2002). Land titling opens up new possibilities of conflict and

insecurity as it encourages the assertion of greedy interests with powerful backing and rewards the cunning. This evolution can have disastrous consequences for vulnerable sections of the population if loss of land is followed by outright eviction (Platteau, 1996).

Opposition from landowners and other interests can stall the process or result in excessively high compensation costs. Success requires long-term commitment and strong political management; but where governments, landowners and peasant farmers have remained divided, land has continued to be a source of conflict, as in Brazil and Southern Africa (Bernstein 2002, Cousins 2004 and Van der Brink 2002). In these countries, reform programmes have been only partially successful. Difficulties are greatest where there are demands for restoration of land rights alienated in the past or where land has become part of a wider struggle over social inequality (Kinsey 1999, Lahiff 2003, Palmer 1990). Failure to address such powerful political motivations effectively can derail processes of land reform and economic development. In the worst case scenario, such pressures can lead to overzealous land reforms which undermine livelihoods creating conflict as with Zimbabwe's 'fast track' land reform programme (Walt 1999:11).



So much can be written about the land reform process in Zimbabwe, but this mini-thesis will limit its focus to the last phase of the reform process; commonly referred to as 'fast track'. This will be done through an expose` of the process with the major focus being the local perceptions of fast track resettlement. Such focus is informed by a case study of Umguza, a peri-urban settlement just outside Bulawayo, located in Matabeleland North in Zimbabwe. At this juncture, it is important to note the point raised by Marongwe (2004:223) that:

...most land occupations took place in commercial farming areas in predominantly rural areas close to communal areas, there was also steady movement into and occupation of various forms of urban and peri-urban areas as the landless urban people also took the opportunity and exploited the chaotic situation created by farm occupations countrywide

Umguza resettlement area falls into this latter category of a peri-urban area where fast track land resettlement occurred. Even the state itself had acknowledged the importance

of peri-urban settlement in the country's land reform process through gazetting the 'Inception Phase Framework Plan' as part of its land policy (GOZ 1998:27). One of its stated objectives was to manage peri-urban areas as zones of transition, maximizing the benefits or advantages of positive elements of both town and country. This rural-urban nexus thus presents an important area for policy analysis and research with regards to the dynamics of development in both urban and peri-urban areas (Marongwe 2004). It is some of these dynamics that the study of Umguza aims to replicate. Dynamics like tenure security, criteria of land allocation, infrastructure development, support services and quality of life among other issues. Through this, an attempt will then be made to assess the fast track land reform programme basing on data gathered from this study.

Following on from the above paragraph, a word of caution ought to be sounded that; 'the full impact of resettlement can only be assessed over a relatively long time horizon.... in a generation' (Kinsey 1999:27). Despite this assertion by Kinsey, this mini-thesis will attempt a preliminary assessment based on the perceptions of local actors around Umguza on the benefits of the programme on their livelihoods. To put fast track into context, the mini thesis will discuss some moot or major points of post-colonial land reform in Zimbabwe. To do this effectively, only a limited review of the literature over the period will be undertaken, unlike the extensive coverage that has been done elsewhere by Kinsey (1999), Palmer (1990), Moyo (2001), Sachikonye (2002) among many others, but it will nonetheless refer to the period for contextual purposes.

## **1.2 Definition of terms**

Before settling into the main discussion, a description of terms is necessary at this point. Land reform is generally understood to mean restitution, redistribution and or confirmation of rights in land to the benefits of the poor and dispossessed (Villiers 2003:1; Adams 2001:1). Similarly, Griffin *et al* (2002:280) refers to land reform as a programme to redistribute land ownership from large private land owners to small peasant farmers and landless agricultural workers making it a redistribution of wealth. On the other hand, land tenure reform is 'a planned change in terms and conditions on which land is held, used and transacted...can include confirmation of rights in order to verify

and secure sound land titles for those who have already a demonstrable claim to that land' (Adams 2001:1). Emerging from these definitions is the issue of social justice, a means of righting a wrong in society by interventions in aid of the powerless and helpless. This would entail giving such land to those in most need of it such as women, young people and the displaced or overcrowded in communal areas. It has been claimed that land reform's major goal has been the restructuring of access and ownership of land resource and agricultural production relations for the purpose of correcting historical injustices (GOZ, 2000). One is then left with the question, was all fast track land reform emanating from a strong belief in social justice? The findings in the study will put the above into perspective based on the observations that will emerge.

Restitution, as a means of land reform entails 'a limited process with a limited lifespan, aimed at specific parcels of land to specific people from whom it had been taken in terms of racially discriminatory laws or practices' (Walt 1999:5). In contrast to restitution, redistribution of land 'is a wider project aimed at rectifying (some of) the inequalities in current land redistribution patterns.' It is 'aimed mostly at those who did not have land before and still do not have (sufficient) land' (Walt 1999: 6). These definitions still project that social justice issue, an element reminiscent and which can be linked or associated with other programmes in different parts of the world namely South Africa, Kenya, Namibia, Brazil, Bolivia and China to name just a few (Van der Brink 2002). Despite these associations, there are terms peculiar and unique to the Zimbabwean situation. Among these would be 'fast track' and 'resettlement'.

To begin explaining these terms, one could start with a dictionary definition of their import. The Oxford English dictionary defines fast track as the practice of making use of a process which is accelerated in comparison to the one in typical use in other words 'the quickest and most direct route to the achievement of a goal'. Resettlement is defined as the 'act of settling again' or the 'state of being settled again.' in some way, resettlement is the final step in the process of land distribution. It takes place after an applicant has successfully taken a number of steps that have determined his/her eligibility. This will then lead to the applicant being finally allocated his/her area as a result of random

selection among other successful applicants or a negotiation with the former owner of the land or the relevant government institution (UNDP 2002).

The above definitions offer interesting insights when juxtaposed with the Utete (2002:18) report which claims that:

“Fast track was designed to be undertaken in an accelerated manner and with reliance on domestic resources. It was a fundamental departure from previous philosophy, practices and procedures of acquiring land and resettling people. Fast track sped up the identification for compulsory land acquisition for resettlement of not less than 5million hectares of land. It accelerated the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler placement on this land and the provision of limited basic infrastructure and farmer support services.”

The above shows the rapidity and speed with which this programme was implemented which could have invited the wrath of critics because of the seemingly haphazard manner in which this whole exercise was carried out. At what cost then were these goals achieved in settlements of landless black Zimbabweans? This then is what the mini-thesis will attempt to answer through the respondents perceptions of the programme.

### **1.3 Background**

A brief history is provided in order to situate the dynamics underlying Zimbabwe’s current land reform. In 1980, when Zimbabwe attained its independence from its former colonial rulers; land distribution was highly skewed in favour of white farmers. Large scale commercial farmers consisting of less than one percent of the population owned forty five percent of the agricultural land. More than half of these farms were located in parts of the country with high rainfall where the potential for agricultural production was high (UNDP 2002). Thirty five percent of the large scale commercial farming land was unutilized or under-utilised and yet indigenous populations were located in marginal lands in the low potential agricultural zones (UNDP 2002).

A dualistic system existed in the pattern of land ownership and tenure, as was common among African countries that were former colonies or had white administration such as Kenya and South Africa (van der Brink 2002). Through this, the largely black indigenous population were confined to the less fertile and marginal, unproductive areas in communal areas, while the white farmers had the most favourable regions in high rainfall areas with very rich soils and highly productive in terms of agricultural potential (UNDP 2002, Utete 2002). It needs to be pointed out here that Zimbabwe's agricultural land (close to 32.2 million hectares of it) is divided into V (five regions) or natural ecological zones. Natural regions I, II and III (about 12,6million hectares) are more suitable for agricultural production as they have rich soils, high rainfall and lush vegetation in abundance. In contrast, natural regions IV and V (which includes around 19.6 million hectares) have low rainfall, scant vegetation with soil properties having low inherent fertility (UNDP 2002). Although, very slight variations can be discerned from these broad categories, the study area Umguza falls under the latter regions.

Despite this, thirty five percent of this fertile land in large scale commercial areas was either unused or under-utilised (Mbaya 2001; UNDP 2002). Such a situation was highly unjust and could not be tolerated forever. Therefore, it is not surprising that when Zimbabwe attained its independence; the government had to be seen to be restoring the land rights of the majority of the population, who are black people, by redressing the colonial injustices of the past through land redistribution.

An examination of Zimbabwe's land reform programme post 1980 can be categorised into three different time phases, each with distinct features associated with it. Beginning with the period 1980-1990, the phase after the Lancaster House agreement; the process was 'market-driven' through a 'willing seller-willing buyer system' with the objective being to redistribute land in an equitable yet transformative way that would not disrupt commercial farming (Kinsey 1999, Lahiff 2005). During this period, most of the land that was redistributed was marginal and under-used land (Utete 2002). 48 000 families were resettled by 1989 in Regions III and IV mostly under Model A, the villagised (people were resettled into organised, orderly villages) variant of the four resettlement models.

This figure (48 000 families) represents thirty percent of the envisaged total of 162 000 families that had been set as a resettlement target in 1980 (Chitsike 2003, Sachikonye 2002). There were other models too, such as Model B, C and D which were designed to suit the different agro-ecological regions of the country. Briefly, Model D was applied in Natural Regions IV and V, the drier areas of the country suitable for livestock ranching. Model C for specialised crop farming of sugar, tea or tobacco was applied in a variety of Natural Regions. Lastly, Model B, that of cooperative farming proved unsuccessful early on and was abandoned in the 1990s (Rowntree 2006). It is important to note that in this period, donor funds were made available to assist the reform process.

The first phase of land redistribution was followed by the period 1990- late 1999 which saw some economic decline and recurrent drought. A characteristic of this period was the issuing of 99 year leases which were meant to be an improvement from the permits of Phase I which were seen as insecure and providing no protection to settlers (UNDP 2002). Coupled with this was the reduction of donor funds linked to the increased allegations of nepotism in land allocation. During this period, real distribution was seen to be well below target leading to increased farm invasions and occupations (Kinsey 1999; Marongwe 2004). Compared to the targeted number of 91 000 families to be settled on 5million hectares; only 4 697 families were settled in 145 000 hectares (UNDP 2002). The number of families settled fell far short of the intended target and also of the earlier objectives of the whole process, when Zimbabwean government's objectives are taken into context which among others included the following:

- a) Reducing the extent and intensity of rural poverty among rural families and farm workers through provision of adequate land for agricultural production.
- b) Reducing population pressure in communal areas.
- c) Developing and integrating small-scale farmers into the mainstream of commercial agriculture.
- d) Creating conditions for sustainable economic, political and social stability.(UNDP 2002:12)



The third phase is the land invasions and occupations that began in 2000 to the time of writing. This was a 'radical' redistribution of land characterized by 'a general absence of a clear and sustainable land reform policy' (Villiers 2003:22). With the government legalising expropriation, the international community in retaliation froze the flow of international aid to Zimbabwe. In response to this the government tacitly and sometimes in not so subtle ways encouraged land invasions through the statements and actions of politicians, state agents and individuals well connected to the ruling party.

The above briefly summarises the land reform process in Zimbabwe by examining the phases which characterised the process during its twenty five years of independence. This will assist in situating the 'fast track' land reform as the last phase of reform.

#### **1.4 Research objectives**

Basing on the objective of the study, the overall aim is to outline the perceptions of various stakeholders in relation to fast track resettlement in the Umguza area. This will be done with the following specific objectives in mind:

- To describe how land reform has shaped the livelihoods of stakeholders (beneficiaries and non beneficiaries);
- To identify the opportunities and constraints found in Umguza resettlement scheme;
- To identify current governance practices towards fast track resettlement in terms of tenure system, technical support, infrastructure and capital;
- To investigate the socio-economic and political factors affecting the land reform programme in relation to restructuring of access and ownership of land as a resource for empowerment and agricultural production;
- To draw attention to policy implications of the research findings.

#### **1.5 Key Research questions**

The following are the main research questions that guided the study:

- How much land was transferred to beneficiaries in the Umguza area?
- What is the demographic composition of beneficiaries of fast track land reform in

Umguza resettlement scheme?

- What social, political and economic relations govern recipients' access to land?
- What are the challenges, opportunities and constraints of fast track land reform to rural development?
- What are the perceptions of different stakeholders with regards to Umguza fast track resettlement scheme?
- What are the wider policy implications of the research findings on Umguza fast track resettlement?

### **1.6 Research methodology**

As an empirical study, qualitative methods were largely relied on, with some quantitative methods being used where necessary as in statistics on assets and livelihoods and socio-economic differences for case study households. The study used qualitative in-depth interviews to overcome the complexity of the research variables to make the study researchable. An actor-oriented approach was adopted which helped to provide a conceptual framework for understanding processes by which social arrangements emerge and are consolidated, conveying the idea of contested arenas, acknowledging multiple 'social realities' (Long 2002:71). The theory provided a more open-ended way of looking at interventions, scenarios and inter-locking arenas pertinent to development, which is the social process not merely the structural outcomes (Long 2002:72). In a longer study with more resources and time this approach could be used solely and relied on as it allows for knowledge and insight generation from the social actors involved in the land reform process, but here it was used as a guide or parameter with which to examine the processes under study.

To complement the above, semi structured interviews were conducted with key informants like the district administrator, local councillor and traditional authority figures in the resettlement and surrounding area. Literature was also reviewed as secondary material (journals, research articles, books and government publications) to offer comparatives of similar studies conducted elsewhere. Participant observation was conducted to create a social map of the area by outlining the spheres of influence.

Participant observation allowed the presence of an observing and thinking researcher on the scene of the action who noted the empirical observations and made interpretations thereof. The research used the triangulation approach. Triangulation is the use of multiple methods in the same study to enhance validity and reliability in qualitative research (Babbie and Mouton 1998: 275,293-4).

### **1.7 Rationale of the study**

Over the last few years, much has been written about Zimbabwe's land reform especially the 'fast track' resettlement model. However, most of the material has focused on the northern and eastern parts of the country favoured with a better climate, soils, and better crop production prospects. These are also home to some well known game parks and very lucrative conservancies. Authors like Chaumba *et al* (2003), Lahiff (2003), Marongwe (2001), Moyo (1999, 2000, and 2001), Rutherford (2001), Sachikonye (2002) and Scoones and Woolmer (2002) among others have all contributed to an appreciation of fast track land reform in the northern and eastern part of the country. Where mention is made of Matabeleland, it is only in passing. Despite this, other studies focusing on Matabeleland cannot be ignored like Jocelyn Alexander's (2001) analysis of the elections aftermath and the consequences thereof on land reform. This mini thesis is intended as a small way to contribute to literature with a deliberate focus on Matabeleland North and Umguza in particular. The research focus aimed to investigate the socio-economic and political factors affecting fast track land reform programme and the perceptions thereof of the people in this region. Questions were asked on their views and opinions both as participants in the exercise and as concerned observers.

Fast track land reform has been viewed as being chaotic and a disaster; hence this particular attempt to analyse the politics behind land distribution, the dynamics and outcomes of such policies especially with regard to Matabeleland. This then is what the research will interrogate. The reason behind the adoption of a capitalist mode of production although applying a socialist framework? At stake here is the issue of redistribution of large tracts of land to black individuals amidst the claim of righting some past injustices. The study will interrogate whether these injustices have been


righted as far as the people of Matabeleland are concerned or not? It will examine whether redistribution was just another case of history repeating itself with regards to marginalization of heirs to the land? Through interviews with key informants, the answers to these questions might emerge. At this juncture, the perceived marginalisation of the people in this region because of their long-standing political affiliation ought to be taken into context, thus a profile of beneficiaries may go a long way into explaining a few pertinent issues. Since independence, people in this part of the country have consistently voted against the ruling party, a trend which has seemingly continued even after the two major parties (ZANU PF and PF ZAPU) merged after the unity accord. With the emergence of the MDC, Matabeleland has remained one of the opposition strongholds, an indication of disgruntlement with the ruling party.

### **1.8 Significance of the research**

This study aims to provide further understanding and appreciation of fast track land acquisition in Zimbabwe and in Matabeleland in particular. Alexander and McGregor (2001:514) describe Matabeleland occupations as being less violent and attracting a smaller communal constituency which they attribute to the attitude taken by the war veterans. Where violence occurred, it was associated with war veterans brought in from other parts of the region. They make the point though, that in this area there was no historical claim from people who were forcibly removed. The authors describe a mix of motives for the large scale occupations in Matabeleland that includes 'more fertile and well watered soils than those in the neighbouring communal areas'. I will argue that this compares favourably when one contrasts Tsholotsho communal lands, a dry arid area, with Umguza which lies along the Zambezi water aquifer. This then makes the choice land reform or redistribution for Umguza as a case study. In addition to the above, it has to be borne in mind that not everyone has equal access to all production options. Therefore, agricultural and animal husbandry options are mediated by structures of social difference and power relations as well as economic, demographic and ecological parameters. Opportunities and constraints for differing farming strategies or the perceived opportunities and constraints depend on farmer's wealth, gender, age, class and ethnicity (Scoones 2002). By interrogating the differing perceptions of the respondents, it is hoped

that answers to the issues raised will be revealed.

It has been noted that land occupations heralded an era of opportunity for those who were enterprising enough and willing to take their chances. Access to substantial plots, especially under the A2 model, relations of patronage and a host of other non-agricultural opportunities like shebeens (illegal liquor outlets) and protection rackets are mentioned in other studies of fast track land reform (Chaumba *et al* 2003:10) Hence this research will examine who the beneficiaries are and their perceptions of fast track land reform. Stemming from the political dynamics referred to above, other stakeholders besides the beneficiaries will be given voice to air their views to cross check issues of empowerment or marginalization of the local populace (indigenous Matabeleland people). This will help to inform academics and the world at large of the dynamics involved, shedding some light on the question of integration and development in Zimbabwe. In this way, it will contribute towards ‘a more permanent arrangement to learn continually from people and involve them in reforming the land tenure system’ (Rukuni 1999:27) for government, policy makers, researchers, donors and other stakeholders.



Lessons derived from this mini thesis might help policy makers to plan programmes in future in Zimbabwe and elsewhere allowing for a review of institutional arrangements. This study could help determine the de-facto and de-jure rights of access of beneficiaries through gathering information about their perceptions and perspectives. This review essentially seeks an understanding of interventions as interpreted and implemented within specific socio- economic, cultural and political contexts in Zimbabwe.

Worthy of note is the fact that Umguza resettlement area lies along an aquifer (water belt) that provides a green belt for agriculture. A lot of Bulawayo (Zimbabwe’s second city) market gardening needs have been supplied by farmers in this area. With the proposed Matabeleland Zambezi water project, this area stands directly in line to benefit, becoming a perennial haven for agricultural wealth. Its strategic location makes it a prime target for those eyeing the lucrative possibilities offered by this area marking it as a potential area

for conflict. Any of the A1 or A2 farmers in this area could have had this in mind when they settled on this land. It would be interesting then to explore the links between land rights, social rights and historical territorial rights and the implications of such rights for development in resettlement areas.

### **1.9 Ethics statement**

The basic tenets upon which the study was premised demands a researcher who will be aware of the potentially sensitive nature of the information. To achieve this, ethical research practices recommended by Babbie and Mouton (2001) were followed. Prior to the research taking place, permission had to be sought to conduct the interviews from the authorities concerned. The administrative influence of former university colleagues who now worked in the civil service was used to gain access to the study field, with the relevant authorities approached to grant the necessary permission. Letters were written to the individuals involved, while permission was sought from the interviewees concerned. An explanation of the purpose of the interviews was made clear before the interviews. From then on, the respondents' informed consent was sought prior to the interviews. Informed consent implies that 'adequate information on the goal of the investigation, its procedures, the credibility of the research and the possible dangers to which the respondents may be exposed be rendered to potential subjects' (Williams *et al* 1995:30). Thus informed consent meant giving an explanation of the purpose of the research; that, it was for academic purposes only and the respondents' right to decline or accept taking part in the research would be respected.

To counter this fear from the respondents, their identity was protected by maintaining confidentiality throughout the research process and in writing the thesis. Confidentiality of respondents was respected following applied regulations and ethics of research. Secondly, informed consent was gained from both local authorities and the respondents to conduct the research. Informed consent would include giving an explanation of the purpose of the research, that it was for academic purposes only and that the respondents' right to decline or accept taking part in the research would be respected. To support this, their identity was protected through maintaining confidentiality throughout the research

process and in writing the thesis. Therefore, all the persons interviewed did so freely, knowing that the information they gave was for academic purposes. In this regard, ‘informed consent becomes a necessary condition rather than a luxury or an impediment’ (Hakim 2000:143). The real names of interviewees were not used to preserve anonymity and protect the individuals’ privacy.

## **1.10 Thesis Structure**

### Chapter One

In this chapter the study has been introduced together with a brief overview of the land reform process in general showing the three different stages that characterized Zimbabwe’s land reform. The chapter also explored briefly the dualistic nature of land tenure. This was done by showing the unequal distribution of land between the white commercial farmers and the rest of the African population in Zimbabwe soon after independence right up to the period of fast track land reform. Key words and terms that are particular to the case study and that occur frequently in the study will be defined to help the reader put them in perspective. Following that will be a look at the research objectives with the key questions being laid out. The research methodology, rationale and significance of the research will be briefly put into context in this chapter. Lastly, the chapter provided a look at the ethics statement that guided the study.


### Chapter Two

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide background to fast track land reform. To do this, contextualisation of land reform in Zimbabwe will be undertaken featuring the historical, political, economic and social factors affecting the process leading up to fast track land reform. A brief discussion of the history of land reform in Zimbabwe, the different phases and time zones will be undertaken. To do this, there was a focus on factors that slowed the pace of earlier land reforms in Zimbabwe, the reasons for fast track land reform with emphasis placed on the turning points. Among the contributory

factors to be mentioned will be the economic, social, political and legal environment that was prevailing at the time. A look at the regional and international dimensions will also be done to try and see where Zimbabwe's experience measures up with the rest of the world. This chapter will also review some other studies done on Zimbabwe's fast track land reform and the insights that can be drawn from them.

### Chapter Three

In this section, an explanation of the methodology used in the research will be provided. This will be done by providing a detailed presentation of the techniques used in the study. Following up on this will be a discussion of the data analysis that was done. Included in this chapter are the limitations of the study and a discussion of the ethical issues surrounding the study. The rest of the chapter focuses on the case study details including the setting of the settlers. To be tackled here will be a brief description of the resettlement area and the settlers themselves.



### Chapter Four

This chapter places its focus on the research findings surrounding local perceptions of fast track. The findings are guided by the research questions around each of the main objectives of the study with the questions that were asked being discussed in sub-sections. To be dealt with are the issues of perceptions from the stakeholders of Umguza resettlement scheme. Among the issues to be discussed will be the following; a profile of the beneficiaries who they are and where they come from, their education level, the gender and age factors which are important in any discussion of the viability of land reform. Linked to this will be a discussion of the size of households, their economic profile and the livelihood strategies that they have adopted to survive in the prevailing deteriorating macro-economic environment that Zimbabwe has had to contend with especially after Fast-track land reform. The respondents' fears, opinions, issues of tenure and how their livelihoods have been affected will be discussed including an examination of the beneficiary selection process.



## Chapter Five

In order to bring out some conclusions to the study some questions are raised in relation to what different stakeholders are saying and the direction which Fast Track Land reform will take. Some recommendations are also suggested regarding the future settlements. At the same time some conceptual issues raised earlier are returned to. It will also give an indication of the direction/s to take plus the student's own views on the topic. It provides a summary of the mini thesis together with recommendations for policy makers on the way forward for future developments on resettlement.



## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the background of fast track land reform in Zimbabwe will be explored and explained. This will be done through looking at the historical context from the period of the struggle for independence with land as a major push factor which led up to the taking of arms. The failure to address this injustice in land allocation/distribution even after independence will be examined together with the consequences of such failure. Other factors will also be explored, factors like the economic, political and the prevailing conditions at the time that contributed to fast track land reform becoming a reality in Zimbabwe. In addition, this chapter will also examine theory very briefly to try and put fast track land reform in a conceptual framework.

### 2.1 The context of land reform in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is seen as an exceptional case in Southern Africa by having put a 'radical' land reform programme back on the political agenda (Lahiff 2003:3). Malawi, Namibia and South Africa as countries in Southern Africa, share a history of colonial occupation that has resulted in racially skewed land distribution systems, dual tenure systems, and severe degradation of communal areas as Zimbabwe (Hall 2003, Saruchera 2004). Worthy of note is the fact that these countries' land reforms have not been as 'radical' and violent as the latter.

Land has long been a contested issue in Zimbabwe dating back to the 1890's with the arrival of white settlers who successfully pushed off indigenous people off large tracts of prime land to pursue agriculture. Land then was one of the major driving forces behind the liberation war in the 1960's and 1970's (Marinda 2006, Moyo 1995). It was the rallying cry of the liberation movements as understood in the terms of *'umntwana wenhlabathi'* (Ndebele for 'son of the soil') which is associated with the form of greeting used by ZIPRA (the armed wing of PF Zapu) cadres. Similarly, *'mwana wevhu'* (Shona for 'child of the soil') a slogan associated with the Shona; was a familiar refrain during public meetings and political rallies (Utete 2002). From the above, it becomes apparent

that a lot of expectations stemming, from the post war period therefore hinged around the land issue (SAFIRE 2004:1). This echoes the refrain or phrase common to other countries that have waged wars of liberation like Kenya and Nigeria whose literature reverberates with “a son of the soil”(Ngugi Wa Thi’ongo) depicting a close link or attachment and connection to the land. It is in reference to these expectations that fast track land reform was justified in some sections of government and landless masses of Zimbabwean society as will emerge in this study.

At independence in 1980, a land reform programme was immediately set in motion amidst rather stringent conditions set out in the Lancaster House agreement of 1979 which included adherence to the ‘willing buyer and willing seller’ condition (SAFIRE 2004:1; Moyo 2001:317;Palmer 1990:168).There was some significant progress in the resettlement programme during the first few years after independence. By 1990, 52 000 families had been resettled with 3 million hectares having been acquired; that is, 16% of land formerly held by white commercial farmers (de Villiers 2003:10). Productivity was increased on these farms since they had largely been unutilised. Agricultural support through government extension services mostly benefited the small elite group of ‘master farmers’ (Rowntree 2006). Overall, the whole programme is generally viewed as having failed to meet its targets during the first decade after independence (Palmer 1990, Kinsey 1984, 1995 and Moyo 1999). In general terms, this can be viewed as being a failure on the part of government to reach its goal and objective in resettlement numbers and de-congesting crowded communal areas.

## **2.2 Factors slowing the pace of reform**

A number of explanations or reasons could be put forward explaining the slow pace of land reform in the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence. This first phase of land reform soon after independence was market driven by the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ process with adequate compensation going to the farmers who were willing to sell off their land to government (de Villiers 2003:16).Critically important at this stage to mention is that this concept of ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ had its basis rooted in the Lancaster House agreement of 1979 (Kinsey 1984, Moyo 1995). These were conditions

insisted upon by World Bank policies of encouraging 'free markets' were prices were determined by the markets. Productive land in the hands of white farmers could only be acquired if the state was willing to pay a 'market price'. The state was not obliged to purchase any property that was offered but was granted first refusal on all land sales. The landless (the intended beneficiaries) were not directly involved in the transaction thus could not constitute a 'willing buyer'- a role reserved for the state alone (Lahiff 2005:1). It is important at this stage to mention that the reform process guaranteed property rights even for those lands which were under-utilised (de Villiers 2003:9). Therefore the process was skewed in favour of land owners. Compounding the issue was the high cost of land resulting from political and economic stability leading to price stabilization and hence increases in land prices (Kinsey 1999).

On the other hand, bilateral agreements with Britain requiring government to match donor funding could not sustain the land acquisition programme; the exchange rate was escalating against the local currency (Kinsey 1999). Meanwhile, other social, economic and welfare needs became of primary importance at this time for example, education, health and housing gained prominence during this period. Droughts and severe budgetary restraints limited government options on land acquisition. Furthermore, a haphazard acquisition guided by land offers on the market which was not good quality land but mostly unproductive areas dented the faith placed in the programme. This situation was further worsened by the corruption in land allocation to underpin political support especially in the second phase of the land reform process (de Villiers 2003:12-13; Adams 2001:42; Moyo 1995:4; Moyo 2001:317). Government bureaucracy also contributed to the slow pace of land reform. Undertaking land reform took a longer time than necessary with the process involving about 25 ministries leading to things getting easily bogged down in the process. Provision of infrastructure like roads, clinics, schools was very slow and minimal if any leading to the failure to train newly resettled farmers (Mahuku 2005, Marinda 2006). In other words, the government did not have administrative capacity and ability to implement a sustainable land reform such that:

“From 47 million pounds that the British government released for land reform, 3 million

pounds was returned unspent, showing government was not taking land reform seriously despite the occasional rhetoric.” (Mahuku 2005:17)

It is not surprising then; with hindsight, that the fast track land reform was then cited as a solution to circumvent some of the hurdles faced in the first and second phases of market based land reform.

### **2.3 Why fast track?**

An examination of the policy framework for the period of fast track land reform might be able to provide some insights. Consistent with previous policy pillars, it was derived from the pressing national economic and social imperatives of poverty eradication and faster economic development. Land was viewed as the engine for economic growth with agriculture as the cornerstone of the country’s economy. This then could help explain the popular slogan at the time which was ‘land is the economy and the economy is the land’ (Utete 2002:19). In other words, fast track policy was formulated with the intention of redistributing wealth which was in the form of land lying in the hands of white people. The mantra of ‘land is the economy and the economy is the land’ definitely gives this association or connotation with wealth, a suggestion carried through by the expectations of the resettled farmers. With the government’s touted aim of establishing an indigenous farming sector, it was hoped that this would be the vehicle to drive that economic growth. In addition to the economic aspect, fast track land reform was also intended as a means of de-congesting the overpopulated communal areas thereby presenting an opportunity to address an element of government social responsibility (Marinda 2006).

Meanwhile, events were happening on the political and economic arena which it could be said that in some way forced the ruling party to show its hand. As will be shown below, it has been argued that three factors combined and converged which led to the Zimbabwean government embarking on fast track land reform. These were:

1. Spontaneous, largely peaceful land invasions which started in 1998 in Mashonaland east province.

2. There was a lack of donor support for Phase two and three of the land reform and resettlement programme.
3. The ruling party was defeated in the 2000 referendum with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerging as a powerful political rival threatening the hegemony of the ruling elites.

Several authors have referred to the above including among many others, Chaumba *et al* (2003), Human Rights Watch (2002), Sachikonye (2002) and Sithole *et al* (2003). Despite the above assertion, at the beginning of the Fast track land reform programme there are claims that the 'first invasions started in Nyamandlovu and not in Svosve' as widely reported in 1998 and they were 'politically instigated' as reported by The Independent ( December 2003). In other reports, it is mentioned that Obert Mpfu the governor of Matabeleland North led the campaign in the Nyamandlovu area of Matabeleland North with 18 properties invaded by settlers (Telegraph August 2000). In reports on the situation in Bubi/Umguza it emerged that at Redwood farm, 100 farm invaders burnt 58 ostriches to death while threatening the farm owner with death. They are also alleged to have 'fired' farm workers from the farm (<http://www.hrmforumzim.co.zw>, 2001). These events suggest that the issue was not about decongesting communal areas but politically motivated to reverse the dwindling fortunes of the ruling party. This is supported by the governments own assertion that:

“The rejection of the Draft Constitution strengthened the Government’s resolve to embark on an accelerated land reform programme.” (Utete 2002:16)

Furthermore, it should be noted that:

At the start of fast track resettlement in 2000, land occupations were clearly an illegal process according to the legal framework that prevailed at the time. This included the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Land Acquisition Act and the Zimbabwe Government Policy on illegal settlements, which all recognized the supremacy of private property rights. For various reasons, the Government embarked upon a total revamp of the legal and judiciary framework in an effort meant to

*'normalise'* the situation created by farm occupations and fast track resettlement... (Marongwe 2002:223).

From the above it becomes apparent that the laws were put in place after the event; fast track resettlement, rather than the law coming first as is normally the case/practice. For example, the legitimization of land occupations by the Rural Land Occupiers Act which protects occupiers who were settled on the land by the first of March 2001 (Marongwe 2002) thus nullified and abolished property rights of farm owners.

When linked to the failure of the Government's Draft Constitution during the referendum, it only then becomes logical to associate this enactment of laws after the event, with the fast track resettlement and the apparent attempts to speed up the process as Nelson Marongwe (2002) above rightfully points out.

It is undeniable that there existed an uneven and unfair land ownership pattern in the country biased in favour of the white minority population as has been referred to earlier (Kinsey 1999, Moyo 1995). On the one hand, the Zimbabwean government used this leverage to gain some political mileage through needs and grievances it had failed to adequately address in all its years in power;

*.....political* issues of concern in redressing colonial grievances arising from land expropriation, inequitable and unjust land redistribution have tended to be limited by nationalist discourses which restrict the claims to land to the 'indigenous' or those who are 'citizens' or 'members of the community' based upon a narrow definition of these concepts (GOZ:1998:13).

As most scholars would agree, the first phase of land reform after independence did not achieve much in terms of families resettled on commercial farming areas (Palmer 1990, Kinsey 1999, Moyo 2001, UNDP 2002, de Villiers 2003). Significantly too, there was not much change in the pattern of land ownership. Of fundamental importance is the fact that farms obtained under the 'willing seller' and 'willing buyer' principle largely came from the lower potential Natural regions III, IV and V

(Rowntree 2006) areas which were not the best commercially viable places for settling large masses of displaced people.

It could then be argued that the government could only resettle very few people in terms of numbers resettled as they had to be careful to strike an 'ecological' balance with the demand for land (Kinsey 1999, Moyo 2001). Given that the available land did not provide much room for settlement of a huge number of the black population needing land, therefore, it could be claimed that white commercial farmers had not been forthcoming and honest in their dealings with government in making available enough good quality land for redistribution. In addition, the number of farms put on offer by large scale commercial farmers for government acquisition, decreased significantly (Utete 2002). To circumvent this, the government ended up enacting the Land Acquisition Act in 1992 which made it possible to facilitate land delivery for subsequent reform processes through compulsory land acquisition (UNDP 2002) although the good policy was hampered by lack of funding.

In the later stages of the second phase and the period leading up to fast track land reform, complicating the problem was the legal maze the government had to wade through. This legal maze was used by the white commercial farmers to stall the process while the number of legal challenges to land acquisition increased overall. For example, Justice for agriculture (JAG) a very radical group of commercial farmers; emerged in June 2002 opposed to agreements with government and at the same time mounting challenges to the land reform process (Utete 2002) through the courts. It has to be borne in mind that since 1980, when Zimbabwe attained its independence, security of tenure had been assured for commercial farmers with the law enshrining, protecting and guaranteeing property rights. These were the same laws and guarantees which the white commercial farmers under the auspices of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) used to full effect to frustrate and challenge the Zimbabwean government in the 1990's leading to that slower pace in the land reform process (Moyo 2000, Palmer 1990, Kinsey 1999, Utete 2002). When it came to fast track land reform, many were of the view that the white commercial farmers had no



protection and recourse to the law which would guarantee their rights to the land they were settled on as had been the case in the past.


#### **2.4 The turning points**

During the first quarter of 2000, there was massive occupation of a huge number of farms by angry ex-combatants. This followed the country's rejection in February 2000 of a new draft constitution which included a critical clause on compulsory land acquisition (Moyo *et al* 2000:183). It has to be mentioned at this juncture that white commercial farmers might have unwittingly brought this fate upon themselves. This they did by blatantly supporting the opposition (MDC) through funding and other logistics in the campaign against the draft constitution. In their quest for self preservation, the clause on land acquisition was a real threat to the prevailing status quo, the white commercial farmers forced the ruling party's (ZANU PF) hand, leading to the no holds barred, gloves off approach taken by the state in dealing with intransigent farmers during this phase of fast-track land reform. From inundating the state media with images of commercial farmers donating to the opposition, the very public image was created on issues of 'sell-outs' thus stoking the flames of hatred for the white commercial farmers and all that they stood for whether "British" or returning the country to white rule. Thus, when the rallying call for land invasions was made, there was no shortage of willing people to join in despite the fact that some of these land invasions were stage managed by war veterans and party loyalists as a show of support for the Zimbabwean President (Chaumba *et al* 2003).

At the same time or in conjunction with the above, parliamentary campaigns were violent and full of intimidation. Government then passed enabling legislation after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) had already begun as the ruling party sought to appropriate and legitimise the process. Sithole *et al* (2003:11) summarized the process as follows:

While the early spontaneous invasions by the peasants were hailed as the unfolding of a genuinely people-centred story on land reform, the later invasions by war veterans were a politically motivated story crafted by the state.

Merber (2001) also claims that the frustration of parts of the population was abused by government as an attempt to maintain political power. The land issue thus became a vehicle and tool to channel conflict over an unresolved issue into gaining political support while at the same time being used to mete out violence to the opposition. The same government that had failed to adequately address the issue in earlier times now sought popular support by advocating militant ways of land redistribution. The state blatantly ignored the rule of law it had established at independence. In some ways this could be viewed as populism at work. Before the June 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU PF leaders were calling for a speedy reclamation of land from the 'whites' and instigated as well as supported the land occupations while the MDC called for a transparent market driven process of land acquisition (Moyo 2001:314). This clearly points to the fact that the neo-populist stance adopted by ZANU PF of fast track resettlement was a political ploy of survival in the context of a very serious threat to its hold on power.



The Fast Track Land Reform Programme has allowed the government to acquire more farms cheaply, quickly (table 2.1 below) and in a less tedious manner than they would have if they had followed a market based system (Moyo 2001:330; Villiers 2003:207). In some ways, this could be viewed as a success on the part of government when taken in the context of black economic empowerment or affirmative action. In terms of numbers of the resettled, fast track land reform figures appear to be impressive despite the skewed and haphazard nature of the redistribution. Approximately 300 000 families were resettled on approximately 11 million hectares by 2003 while the large scale commercial farming sector had shrunk down to 1 million hectares from the 15.5 million hectares of 1980. When these numbers are compared to the 1980 numbers of 162 000 families targeted for resettlement with only thirty percent of these resettled amounting to 48 000 families, the latter pales into insignificance (Sachikonye 2002). It has to be stated though that the criteria for the selection of settlers were drawn up long after many farms had been invaded. Thus the touted 'decongestion of communal areas' as the basis of land reform could not stand up to the test. In addition, 'the selection mechanisms by which

households were selected as beneficiaries were subjective, that is dependent on local level variations' (Fox *et al* 2006:6).

**Table 2.1:** Progress in land redistribution as at October 2002

Resettlement phase	Families resettled	Area (ha)
1980-1998	71 000	3 498 444
1998-June 2000*	4 697	144 991
Fast track A1	160 340	7 269 936
Fast track A2	27 854	1 680 197
Land still to be planned and allocated		1 562 454
Total	232 738	14 156 022

*Source: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement.* \* Phase is referred to as the beginning of fast track resettlement

As argued by Moyo (2003:330,313) fast track land reform in Zimbabwe has shown that 'the neo liberalist policy framework can be challenged' since in the 'past twenty five years, attempts to resolve the land question by means of market instruments have failed to redress the colonial legacy of grossly inequitable land ownership.' Certainly, Zimbabwe has provided and sounded a warning to other countries like South Africa and Namibia on how best to structure their land reform process. Zimbabwe's experience to a major extent has encouraged greater cooperation and honesty in the manner in which South Africa for example has handled its land reform process.

The Zimbabwean government adopted a neo- populist ideology of dealing with the land reform programme. The neo-populist framework tends to adopt a redistributive land reform that transfers property rights to overcome inequality by expropriating land from large land owners to redistribute to poor peasants (Byres 2004: 24). In the Zimbabwean situation, this could apply to the A1 model of farms that were distributed under the fast track land reform programme to many households. Redistribution of land has also been granted under the 'highly individualised (relatively secure) model used for redistribution since 1980 using large individual holdings under the A2 model that consolidates notions

of private property' (Lahiff 2003:4) as the table below indicates:

**Table 2.2** Resettlement and land redistribution status (A1 & A2) since inception of fast track land reform programme as at February 2006

Province	A1 resettlement			A2 Resettlement		
	No. of farms	Area (ha)	Beneficiaries	No. of farms	Area (ha)	Beneficiaries
Manicaland	240	215 427	11 921	211	102 215	1 040
Mashonaland Central	340	568 197	14 939	319	259 489	2 243
Mashonaland East	446	437 269	26 027	370	314 233	4 512
Mashonaland West	772	811 033	25 501	665	873 111	4 269
Masvingo	219	750 563	26 400	166	341 000	1 160
Matabeleland North	263	520 214	8 311	142	259 659	230
Matabeleland South	226	383 140	9 839	145	288 239	574
Midlands	240	451 242	17 760	262	243 611	828
Total	2740	4 137 085	140 698	2 208	2 681 642	14 856

*Source: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement*

The figures cited in the table are impressive when compared to the earlier figures quoted during the first phase of land reform soon after independence. The numbers of people resettled were much higher than had been the case earlier. Generally, the two Matabeleland provinces contributed the least number of farms for both A1 and A2 in comparison to the other provinces. Under A1 resettlement, Matabeleland North contributed 263 while Matabeleland South contributed 226 farms while on the A2 resettlement, Matabeleland North was lower with 142 with Matabeleland South bringing in 145 farms.

Two resettlement models were used as the table shows, Model A1 and Model 2. Model

A1 was intended at decongesting communal lands whose carrying capacity for both human and livestock requirements had been exceeded. It was for the generality of landless people, with a villagised and self-contained variant. It has to be noted that A1 farms typically include a small area of arable land, at least 3 hectares, but sometimes more depending on the agro-ecological zone. A much larger area of communal grazing land could provide a total area of as much as 70 hectares, depending again on the agro-ecological zone (UNDP 2002). Model A2 on the other hand, was aimed at creating a new cadre of black commercial farmers with the scheme comprising of small, medium and large-scale commercial settlement. The latter was based on the concept of full cost recovery from the beneficiary (Utete: 2002) supposedly targeting people with capital assets, agricultural skills and entrepreneurial abilities. Average farm sizes were 45, 34 hectares for farms that were planned and pegged with farms that were settled on averaging 38, 08 hectares (UNDP 2002).

## **2.5 The role of war veterans**

The war veterans played a significant role in leading and organizing the land invasions that took place around Zimbabwe (Chaumba *et al* 2003). Basing on claims that land reform is almost always a political process especially where it seeks to address demands for land restitution from dispossessed groups (Walt's 1999); the role of war veterans then comes under close scrutiny. The question to be answered is what political role these former liberators played? During the height of fast track land reform, those leading the clamour for land were war veterans who succeeded in capturing the symbolic apparatus of the liberation struggle by embracing extreme nationalism, militarism and the return of the land to the dispossessed. While this happened, government seemingly lost control as more and more invasions took place across the country (Lahiff 2003). This loss of control showed when war veterans challenged the nationalist government's commitment of improving people's livelihoods and reducing poverty. The war veterans did this by pressing for financial compensation for their role in the war of liberation. When the government relented by giving a once-off gratuity payment of Z\$50 000 and Z\$2 000 monthly payment for life, picking up the cause for land became a natural progression for these former liberation heroes (Chaumba 2006, Human Rights Watch 2002).

It has to be pointed out that these invasions to a greater extent were led and organized by war veterans in defiance of the government and the ruling party in particular. Alexander in Hammer *et al* (2003:73) observes that:

...politicisation and autonomy of land committees was particularly stark in Matabeleland where ZANU PF had been resoundingly beaten (in elections) in both urban and rural areas. In Matabeleland North, provincial, Governor Obert Mpfu provoked massive protest when he said that 'only ZANU PF and war veterans qualified for fast track land.

The statement above when examined would lead one to concluding that it was only war veterans and party loyalists who were the only people deserving of land resettlement suggesting politics of patronage as key to land resettlement. For example, of all A1 designated farms, a quota of twenty percent was specifically set aside for war veterans while some Resident Ministers also set aside the same twenty percent quota for A2 farms despite the latter not being government policy (Pazvakavamba 2006). This does validate the point that war veterans were seen as a special class of people deserving of land resettlement. The above statement then seemingly goes hand in hand with the claim from the South African conference policy paper which states that:

“Unmet demands for land rarely result in violence, but when violence does arise it is usually the peasantry who is victimised and rendered powerless in the face of entrenched elites or the powerful new elites created by policy interventions”. (Sue Mbaya 2001)

In this instance, the war veterans become the 'new elites' together with ruling party officialdom and because of their association or link with violence, (refer to the death threats and alleged firing of farm workers in the earlier section 2.3), they wield power to assert themselves and hold dominion over the weak. Similarly, Walt (1999:12) claims that movements of the poor spearheading demands for redistribution become subject to political manipulation which could lead to violent conflict in the worst case scenario. It is in this context then that the research gives reference to the deaths of Martin Olds and Gloria Olds in the fast track land reform contest that took place in Bubi/Unguza. There were alleged shootings between the farmer and the war veterans which led to the

subsequent deaths of the two named parties in two separate incidents (Human Rights Watch 2002). In the same vein, Marongwe (2003) argues that transfer of power from government departments to rural district councils to war veterans made the whole process of land redistribution and resettlement less transparent. Thus it was undemocratic resulting in the elite and supporters of the ruling party benefiting most from the chaos.


Finally, while land reform is generally accomplished under pressure from those demanding redistribution usually the landless poor, it can also be used as a counter revolutionary strategy (Chaumba *et al* 2003). This is done in the hope that people will be content with the token changes to the land tenure system for example and put aside their other demands (Chaumba *et al* 2003) just what the Zimbabwean government hoped would be the case. This could explain the treatment of white farmers as the enemy (supporters of the opposition) while the war veterans energies had to be channelled towards land expropriation to avoid them being a real threat to the ruling party politically.

## **2.6 The macro-economic environment**

To a large extent, the economic conditions prevailing in the country had a major contributory role in the events that led up to the fast track land reform programme. With the introduction of the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1991, the government at a very fast pace, liberalised the agricultural sector by championing an all-out production-for-export drive removing export promotion measures which had existed since the 1980s. Liberalisation of trade followed together with the de-controlling of the foreign exchange market while import licenses and tariffs on imported goods were removed. In addition, tariffs on imported inputs were raised to a point where by 1995, tariffs on inputs were generally higher than those on finished products (ZCTU 1996, HDR 2003).

Such a harsh macro-economic environment of high interest rates, low domestic demand, devaluation and loss of external markets especially affected the agricultural sector. This resulted in increasing re-organisation of large-scale agriculture leading to a change in the employment conditions of farm workers as a result of shifts in land-use towards more

intensive export crop production. The deterioration in employment conditions saw an increase in the percentage of casual workers from 20% to 45% while the real value of their wages became less than it was in 1976 (ZCTU 1996; Moyo 2000). Basing on figures from the Human Development Report of 2003, structural unemployment was estimated to be above 60%. In addition, between March and December 2003, the Zimbabwean dollar lost 360% of its value against the United States dollar (HDR 2003). This was the culmination of a spiralling economy which had been on a downwards roller coaster ride since the infamous once off Z\$50 000 dollar payout each, to war veterans for their participation in the war of liberation. This money was paid out in November 1997 which became infamously called 'black November' leading to the first real crash of the Zimbabwean dollar which has been in a free fall ever since. The situation was made worse by the Z\$ 2 000 monthly payments for a lifetime that were to follow after the gratuity payout (BBC 2006, Chigumira 2006). In a country that was already straining from the burden of domestic and foreign debt, Zimbabwe could not afford such a huge dent on the fiscus.



The gratuity payout occurred in an economic climate of an increasing budget deficit since 1997 and which continued unabated. Inflation had spiralled out of control leading to a shrinking economy. Diminishing exports caused a decline in foreign currency earnings. Furthermore, reductions in aid inflows and foreign direct investment resulted in little money for buying agricultural inputs or ensuring food security by importing to make up production shortfalls. Since 1999, real gross domestic product (GDP) has been contracting by over 4% with the BBC in April 2006 reporting that the figure had reached 1 043% (BBC 2006, Chigumira 2006, Save the Children Fund 2002). **Table 3** below highlights two of the key economic indicators, real Gross Domestic Product and annual inflation illustrating these points.



**Table 2.3:** Selected economic indicators 1995-2000

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Real GDP %	0.2	9.7	1.4	0.8	-4.1	-6.8	-9.5	-14.7	-14.0	-8.2	-7 (est.)
Inflation %	22.5	21.7	18.9	31.7	58.5	55.9	71.9	133.2	365.0	419.9	585 (est.)

*Source: Chigumira 2006*

Thus it is under such conditions of high unemployment, shrinking wages and a shrinking economy that fast track land reform took place. Avenues had to be opened to absorb the increasingly restless and impatient masses for who the liberation promise was becoming a very bad dream. The resuscitation of the war veterans as a force to be reckoned with threatened the political elites; thus the harnessing of this new force to lead another revolution against former colonialists who in this case were the white commercial farmers (Chaumba *et al* 2003a, Mahuku 2005, Marinda 2006). It is in this context then that fast track land reform occurred though it brought about unintended consequences as table 4 below shows. Invasions resulted in a huge drop in four main commercial crops grown for export in large scale commercial farms. Inadvertently, this reduced Zimbabwe's foreign earnings worsening an already precarious existence for many especially commercial farm workers and casual labourers among others while the government lost out on much needed revenue.

**Table 2.4:** Declining production of four main commercial crops from the Large Scale Commercial Farming Sector in tonnes

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Maize	648 000	810 000	384 000	185 400	80 000
Tobacco	191 500	232 250	197 200	159 360	60 520
Soya beans	150 000	169 000	65 000	35 000	30 000
Wheat	281 250	225 000	282 000	115 000	24 200

*Source: Chigumira 2006*

The above table shows the declining production levels from the periods at the beginning of land invasions to the period when fast track land reform had been in practice for a period of time. For example, Maize production in 1999 was 648 000 tonnes but in 2003 that had significantly reduced to 80 000 tonnes. Such a huge drop of 568 000 tonnes affected the country's food security as the same reductions in production occurred in Soya beans and Wheat though not in the same levels but a contributory figure to the food security of Zimbabwe.

## **2.7 From Neo-liberalism to Neo-populism**

This section focuses on conceptual ideological issues underlying fast track.

It might be argued that Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform is a reaction against the neo-liberalist tenets of liberalisation and privatisation. This is justified as it came after the failure of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, a World Bank initiative. It is contended that the government's failure to establish a flourishing and viable agricultural sector in the 1990's could be partly attributed to ESAP policy, which undermines targeted support to vulnerable groups (ZCTU 1996:2). Following from this, it may be argued then that there was a development ideological shift from neo-liberalism to neo-populism 'in favour of redistributive land reform as the best means of eradicating rural poverty and securing rapid agricultural growth in contemporary poor countries' (Mkandawire 1996:338). The example of Taiwan serves to underline the point of a successful redistributive land reform (Byres 2004). The Zimbabwean scenario called for an alternative agricultural policy to change the situation hence the adoption of fast track resettlement to counter this failure and create 'desirable agrarian change' (Byres 2004). Such an agrarian change would entail; 'A land reform which expropriated from the large landowners and redistributed (land) to the poor peasants would remove at a stroke the major cause of factor market imperfections in agriculture' (Byres 2004:35). It has to be noted that expropriation and appropriation were some of the tools used in Zimbabwe's fast track land reform programme with compulsory acquisition of land largely from white commercial farmers being undertaken without any payment of compensation.

Part of this shift came from the recognition of the failure of neo-liberal market economy

solutions to generate recovery and growth in poor countries and the calls to 'get governance right' (Mkandawire 1996:338). As will be shown, the failure of the earlier model of 'willing buyer, willing seller' to generate enough land for resettlement was an indictment on the Zimbabwean government. The market based model was premised on the notion that 'whites who wished to keep their farms were free to do so and only under-utilised land would be acquired by the government...to be paid for immediately and at full market price remittable in foreign currency' (Palmer 1990:4). The land made available was inadequate, marginal, unproductive land which could not suit the government's needs leading to envisaged targets not being met. Such failure called for 'appropriate action' to be taken which would 'require a thoroughgoing redistributive land reform which would transfer property rights in cultivable land from landlords to small peasants and landless labourers' (Byres 2004). For the Zimbabwean government, this became the justification for the state to take action through fast track land reform.

With regard to getting 'governance right' this proved to be untenable in the case of Zimbabwe, given the growing discontent threatening the ruling party's political dominance. Faced with such a scenario, the ruling elite used the political trump card of 'land to the tiller' the rallying cry of many liberation movements (Moyo 2003) that would bring in the political support despite the obvious economic ramifications associated with such a policy. Therefore, 'land to the tiller' may be 'championed by anti-colonial nationalists, agrarian populists, bourgeois modernisers and socialists in particular conjunctures of social and political struggle' (Bernstein 1996:33). The adoption of neo-populism invariably a 'potent, seemingly radical appeal since its concern is with the poor and it argues for egalitarian, redistributive measures as the means of eradicating poverty' through 'massive state intervention' (Byres 2004:47).

Land reform is often viewed in moral and political terms as a necessary means by which land may be redistributed to the landless and the poor to help alleviate poverty. To use Scott's (1977:244) argument in Byres;

In the agricultural sectors of most countries, there is a highly unequal distribution of land and hence of other productive resources and political power. This gives rise to factor market imperfections in the allocation of resources in rural areas which allow one to characterise the existing systems of land tenure and present government policies as both inefficient and inequitable. (Byres 2004:46).

This was the situation for Zimbabwe as well. Politically, land resettlement was used as a reward for struggles for liberation that could help explain the part played by war veterans in Zimbabwe's fast track land reform. Thus their feeling of entitlement to the land and their forcing of the government's hand in speeding up the pace of land reform can also be viewed as politics of power at play.

Berry (1993:69) also makes the point that even where private property rights in land in sub-Saharan Africa exist *'de jure'*, it is typically impossible to protect them against *'de facto'* customary claims. This could explain the justification for squatters and settlers when they occupied land farmed by white farmers as they felt they had a legitimate ancestral right to the land. Such justification was solidified by the tacit backing of organs of the state.

Moyo 2001 (314-316) explains it thus:

The prospects of democratisation and egalitarian land reform in Zimbabwe diminished as a result of the change in policy thrust from socialism to Neo-liberalism. Issues of redistribution and state interference in land markets were overshadowed for some time by macro economic reforms in the context of structural adjustment. After the failure of structural adjustment to live up to its rural development policies' promises, the land question resurfaced as the legitimate item on the poverty reduction agenda of the World Bank while at national level, the same failure made demands on the ruling party to redeem its liberation promise.

As such the neo-populist stance adopted by ZANU PF, of fast track land resettlement was a political ploy of survival in the context of a very serious threat to their hold on power. Observations from a conceptual standpoint assert that 'politics of belonging and exclusion from programmes emphasising social justice, basic human rights and social

security for the weak has in itself weakened the constituency for land reform in Zimbabwe' (Moyo 2000:188). This is because of the exclusive and arbitrary nature of the way fast track land reform was conducted in Zimbabwe. Through the government's tacit failure to observe the rule of law and respect property rights of white commercial farmers, the whole process has been viewed as a vindictive and vengeful act on the part of the ruling party. This view is also supported by the observation made by Walt (1999:12) when he states that 'land reform programmes led by the State can become tools for patronage and a different kind of political manipulation.'

To conclude this section, it has to be pointed out that land reform can take several possible forms apart from the redistributive element that has been associated and linked with the Zimbabwean programme. It can be based on market principles as the World Bank aligned 'willing buyer; willing seller' programme was or it can take the form of restitution as is the case of South Africa. In addition, it can take the form of community assisted land reform as happened in some parts of southern Africa.


## **2.8 International and regional dimension to land reform issues**

However egregious the fast track land reform programme in Zimbabwe has been, in terms of human rights violations, and scale of state-supported violence, the action of the state to curb the market power of large scale land holders is not inconsistent with similar policy thrusts observed in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America and Asia (Byres 2004, Mbaya 2001). Expropriation of large land holdings for settlement by smallholders has been attempted in many countries. There have been great successes, notably in Japan, Korea and parts of West Asia, and partial successes in some Latin American countries. However, there have also been significant failures some of these countries experienced (Walt 1999). Redistributive land reform programmes implemented in Central America and Asia in the 1950s through the 1970s included strong arm tactics to help "force" land redistribution from elites to poorer citizens (Mbaya 2001).

Measures differed from country to country but included inter- alia expropriations, land taxation, and limits on number and size of land holdings by vested elites. For most, the

proclaimed objective in specific contexts and instances was to boost small farmer productivity and efficiency in combination with poverty reduction (Mbaya 2001).

Expropriation has resulted in the state taking and handing over, to the poor or majority of the population, farms that were derelict or under-utilised from mostly absentee landlords or land speculators residing elsewhere (Hall 2003, Palmer 1990). Land taxation entailed putting a heavy tax on land to discourage the land speculators and those holding on to too much land so that if there was no productivity they would be forced to sell to government and others who would put the land to good use (Lahiff 2003, 2005). Limits on number and size of land holdings aimed at boosting the numbers of small farmers basing on the argument of the farm size-efficiency relationship. Generally, the thinking is that smaller farms are more efficient than their larger counterparts and more labour intensive in their mode of production (van Zyl 1996). Running parallel and complementary to such initiatives, there was the imperative to resolve and pre-empt rural sources of social unrest and political disturbance. South Africa and Brazil including some countries in Central America to a limited extent provide recent and current examples (Bernstein 2002) of such efforts.



A new trend emerged in the 1980s. This trend saw a shift in energies away from land reform efforts on a global scale. It marked the beginning of the movement away from redistributive land reform to market-assisted land reform (1990s) and currently to community-assisted land reform (Bernstein 2002). The reasons for this policy shift are multiple and complex but at least three factors played a role:

- 1) The after effects of the Arab Oil embargo in the late 1970s and a shift in policy focus to structural adjustment programs to curb macro-economic imbalances,
  - 2) Sagging support for land nationalizations in donor countries; and
  - 3) Redistributive reforms proved too bureaucratic, cumbersome, slow, and costly.
- (Rogier van den Brink 2002).

Land reform policy in Southern Africa has been shaped from lessons learnt from the Central American and Asian countries. Although for the most part Zimbabwe has

provided a source of reference on how not to conduct a chaotic land reform to the other countries. Its example also serves as a spur to steer progress in land reform used by certain groups threatening expropriation to farmers unwilling to cooperate. In Namibia, the government threatened to employ the same tactics to put pressure on recalcitrant farmers while local communities led by the Landless People's Movement have threatened to follow suit in South Africa when land reform seemed to have stalled (Marinda 2006, de Villiers 2003).

On several occasions key policy makers from Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe proclaimed "...willing seller – willing buyer approaches may be obsolete for the needs of rapid land redistribution and poverty alleviation." (Lahiff 2005; Mbaya 2001; de Villiers 2003). Governments are already pursuing a variety of mechanisms to increase the ability of the state to redistribute land from large-scale sectors to the poor as seen by efforts in Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Potential funders and donors need therefore support to seriously reconsider their policies against paying for land purchase and increase funds for resettlement costs. Whether future land policy emphasizes redistributive land reform or community-assisted land reform, the facilitation costs to recreate capacity in local communities and empower them to govern and assume control over their livelihoods will be gigantic. Yet, set against the political instability and future violence of slow-paced land reform, it is in the interest of all parties to work on ways to reduce land inequality.

Of late, there has been a shift in policy with governments now involving a number of stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of their policies. South Africa, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Uganda have involved civil society, former colonial governments and churches including people at the grassroots levels leading to popular participation in the shaping of land policy (Hall 2003). A huge departure from policies of the past where political expediency was the norm with decisions being centralised and handed down to the communities affected. Economic considerations, issues of social justice and equity have all contributed to the shift in current policies. Recognition of customary rights to land in new tenure laws in South

Africa, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania can be linked to the issues of social justice (Hall 2003). Encouragement of agriculture in towns and cities as in Zambia and Namibia which provides secure land tenure rights for informal urban settlers is recognition of the urban poor's right to use unutilised land to subsidise their incomes (Palmer 1990; Toulmin 2000).

Benefiting from hindsight, South Africa's land reform policy attempted corrective measures to those disastrously applied in other African countries. Kenya's competent small-holder farming has influenced South Africa's black commercial farmer's policy, with the intention of creating a new class of commercial farmer acceptable to the political dispensation (van der Brink 2002). World Bank linked market reforms have helped shape this cautious restrained approach, underpinning the export oriented, intensive production aimed at maximising export earnings while meeting home consumption needs (Lahiff 2001; de Villiers 2003).

Other forms of land reform have been observed in South Africa taking various forms. For example, a 'cash for claims' (*Restitution*) policy of paying land claimants in cash instead of land is a departure from most African government policies (Mbaya 2001, de Villiers 2003, Van der Brink 2002). Through this policy, South Africa has prioritised food production over popular politics. Secondly, engagement with both white and black commercial farmers in policy formulation as opposed to disengagement of the former reveals the government's pre-occupation with capitalism as opposed to populism for its sake. Thirdly, adopting a rights-based approach that restores rights of indigenous people living on state lands has been balanced by the discouragement of informal urban settlers like those of Bredell, Khayelitsha and other would be squatters who the government has dealt with strongly (Marinda 2006). However, this has not prevented the landless from resorting to covert resistance by garnering micro victories without challenging the status quo. Through encroachment on individual farms, people overtook legal processes by occupying the land they claim under restitution, peri-urban squatting and through theft from the white farming community (Ruth Hall in Mbaya 2001) have been some of the ways of undercutting government and the rule of law. Such covert means have been used



by the weak to assert their agency to the state and land owners. This action becomes a weapon of the weak in a silent but effective war that involves direct action by the powerless.

## **2.9 Perceptions of fast track land reform**

This section will now link the above international and regional dimensions of fast track land reform to an examination of the perceptions. Literature review shows that in Zimbabwe, beyond the political pronouncements and apparent enthusiasm for the redistribution of land, there were other perceptions from different groupings in Zimbabwe. The majority among the international community including civil society groupings and non-governmental organisations were of the opinion that the implementation process was not broad-based and thus not sustainable (Alexander and McGregor 2001, Chaumba *et al* 2003, Mahuku 2005, Marinda 2006). It was felt that the programme needed the participation and involvement of all stakeholders. Compromise was needed from all parties with the government needing to formally incorporate the divergent contributions of internal and external stakeholders in the implementation process. With the accompanying political rhetoric, threats of a return to war and actual violence from state organs and war veterans, the process was clouded with suspicion, mistrust, animosity and in some worst case scenarios outright anger and warring conflict (Chaumba *et al* 2003). In such a polarised atmosphere, the perception of land reform as a two way battle between government and large-scale commercial farmers, with all stakeholders reduced to spectators in a wait and see attitude/mode (UNDP 2002, Hammer *et al* 2003 and Human Rights Watch 2000) grew and could not be easily dismissed.

Justifying the above perception was the involvement of Provincial Governors/ Resident Ministers in the fast track land reform process (the case of the Matabeleland North Resident Minister Obert Mpofu has been cited earlier in the section on war veterans). This added an unprecedented political flavour to the whole process, an aspect that had been missing in the earlier phases of land reform. Prior to fast track, considerations were more technically and professionally biased with a focus on maintaining agricultural production trends. Dictating the pace of land redistribution were experts in different

fields making the whole process technocratic and orderly. On the other hand, fast track resettlement witnessed an absence of an agreed policy and procedure resulting in varying perceptions in different provinces depending on the political thrust in the province (Chaumba *et al* 2003, Marimira 2006). Thus some provinces depending on the strength and organisation of the local war veterans were slow in uptake as opposed to other more militant and active war veterans associations.

This absence of agreed policy consequently saw all land regardless of its status targeted for redistribution. Therefore, land that had previously been exempt from the redistribution programme suddenly became available again including land under Bilateral Protection Agreements (Pazvakavamba 2006). For countries like Britain and other European countries including multi-nationals like Anglo-American and LONRHO, whose lands were ceased despite the prevailing agreements; the perceptions varied from seeing these acts as diplomatic gaffes to seeing them as acts of retaliation by a government under siege and looking for a scapegoat.

## **2.10 Conclusion**

This chapter has tackled the process of land reform by providing the background to it. Through pointing out some of the factors which slowed down the earlier phases of land reform, it points us to the causes of fast track land reform. Among the factors discussed was the major role played by war veterans linking the land reform to the struggle for liberation and election promises made. The dire macro-economic situation that was prevailing in the country also contributed to the push for land reform. Theories of neo-liberalism and neo-populism are used to explain the process which leads to look at the international and regional dimension of land reform and how it relates to the situation in Zimbabwe. A brief look at perceptions based on literature review ends the chapter to shed light to the study on Umguza.

## CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND UMGUZA DISTRICT PROFILE

### 3.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the author will discuss the research methodology used in the study. The sample will be described followed by the data collection method and analysis in order to answer the research questions. Also included will be an explanation of the ethical protocols adhered to in undertaking this study. A brief description of the respondents who took part in the survey will also be given.

The selected study area represents an area which was involved in violent skirmishes in the early phases of the fast track resettlement, as has been referred to in Chapter Two. The selected study site represents an interesting continuum of the rural-peri-urban environment, with Bulawayo being the second city in Zimbabwe. The specific study sites are Umguza Estate and Hilda's kraal in Umguza which were former large scale commercial farms. Both were settled under A1 self-contained, villagised and small-scale commercial type farms under fast track resettlement scheme.

### 3.1 Methodology

Qualitative methodology was used in the study due to the researcher's exposure and familiarity with methods in this field. It was also felt that such methodology would provide depth to a study of perceptions. In addition, limited time and resources were also key factors considered before the selection of the methodology. To supplement the in-depth interviews, secondary data was also used in the study. This took the form of an analysis of some previous studies done on the same topic of land reform (not just fast track land reform) by other authors. Such literature helped the researcher to explore the different schools of thought on land reform in Zimbabwe whilst prodding the writer's own thoughts on the subject. As expressed by Leedy (2001:8) that:

“Research is rarely conclusive. In a truer sense the research cycle might be more accurately conceived of as a *helix* or spiral of research. In exploring an area, one comes

across additional problems that need resolving. Research begets more research.”

Therefore, this research as part of that spiral will contribute its own small portion to the whole in order to further enlighten and add to perceptions on the subject of the fast track land reform programme. In order to produce ‘rich thick’ information (Babbie 1995, Long 2002), the design of the study was more than descriptive; it also combined elements of an exploratory and narrative text at the same time. This enabled the researcher to tell the story of the respondents. It was thus seen as practical and relevant to use qualitative in-depth interviews as the data collection method in order to understand the facet of fast track land reform as it affects people in Matabeleland with special focus on the area of Umguza. Qualitative research for this particular study was also used as the approach is a less structured, non restrictive way of collecting data allowing the researcher to gain insights not offered by quantitative research (Mouton and Marais 1990; Reid and Smith 1981).

### **3.2 Research design and scope**

The research has limited its focus to a documentation of fast track land reform in Umguza resettlement scheme as seen through the eyes of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the area. Only specific informants were interviewed to highlight their understanding of interventions within specific socio-economic and political localities in Umguza. Qualitative research methods were used mostly as they give an insider perspective allowing one ‘to view the world through the eyes of the actors themselves’ (Babbie and Mouton 2001:271). Qualitative in-depth interviews bring an expose` of the fast track land reform programme (FTLRP) allowing for depth in information gathering. Key informant interviews were conducted with authority figures in the area to get official viewpoints of issues. Interviews were audio taped, with the interviewee’s consent having been obtained first, in order to capture their statements and perceptions accurately for the write up. These were later transcribed with the resulting texts used for analysis purposes to facilitate the emergence of insights which would otherwise have escaped the interviewer in the interview process.

### **3.3 Overall design**

A small sample of respondents, 80 in number, was chosen as the target of study in Umguza. Because it was designed to be an intensive study, qualitative in-depth interviews were used to gather pertinent data in line with the research. The reason for choosing this method of study was based on the premise of qualitative research which claims that the research provides for an understanding of people from their own worldview (Long 2002, that is allowing one 'to view the world through the eyes of the actors themselves' (Babbie and Mouton 2001:271). Qualitative research mainly aims to understand social life and the meaning that people attach to everyday life. This is done through eliciting participants accounts of meaning, experiences or perceptions producing descriptive data in the participants own words; a process which includes identifying the participants beliefs and values (McRoy 1995).

### **3.4 Key informant interviews**

Key informant interviews were carried out on authority figures (5 people) in the area to get an official viewpoint of fast track land reform in the area. These interviewees included the deputy District Administrator, Land resettlement officer, the local headman of the area, a war veteran leader and the opposition candidate for Member of Parliament. These interviews were conducted to gain insights from people directly involved and affected by fast track land reform in Umguza. The Deputy District Administrator and the Land Resettlement Officer would give the official perspective. From these two interviewees would emerge the policy position and the administrative capacity of the Zimbabwean government in relation to the fast track land reform programme. The responses would indicate how far the government had prepared for the fast track land reform process, how different it would be from the land reform processes earlier; criteria used for selection of land recipients and other pertinent points which only officials could give answers to.

The other interviewees would give the local perceptions of fast track land reform. The local headman would give the traditional authority version of events and the perceptions thereof. This would help indicate how far involved traditional figures and structures were

in the fast track land reform process and also indicate what administrative role they played. War veterans were important role players in fast track land reform as indicated in other studies on fast track land reform in Zimbabwe; hence it was important to see the role they played in Umguza. The interview with the local opposition candidate for Member of Parliament was conducted as a measure of balancing perspectives and getting the other view not influenced or tainted by government ruling party lines as the other interviewees might be.

Interviews were audio taped with the interviewee's consent so that respondents' statements and perceptions could be captured accurately for the write up. These were later transcribed with the resulting texts used for analysis purposes to facilitate the emergence of insights which might have escaped the interviewer's attention during the interview process.

### **3.5 Target population**

The process of data collection entailed in-depth interviews with the district administrator, one councillor, five waiting list applicants and five land beneficiaries to fully cover the issue from formulation to implementation. These people then formed the researcher's unit of analysis. Two interviews were done with the district administrator as he was seen as a key informant and official government spokesman in the district. The district administrator was more than willing to participate in the study and particularly helped to secure the participation of the other respondents. As it was, he was responsible for the finalisation of the land claims with all the land disputes pertaining to the area falling under his jurisdiction. In this regard, he became an invaluable asset to the research as he was able to provide much of the background regarding the area and the local politics whilst providing a vital link to the contacts necessary to carry forward the data collection part of the study. Thus, it seemed logical that he was in a better position to answer the key research questions: whether the process was transparent or not, whether it was a politically driven process or an administrative process and if it had any real value to the beneficiaries rather than as just a reward for party loyalty.

The respondents were targeted for the varied voices which it was felt their views would represent. By also including the non-beneficiaries of land reform, the idea was to hear the other side of the story something that could be juxtaposed with the land reform beneficiaries. While the councillor is purely a political figure through and through, it cannot be denied that land reform in its very nature is a political process thus the voice of the governing party through its very own representative becomes necessary. In this way, the researcher could be able to gain an insight of what the ruling party thinks through its party functionary about the implementation of fast track land reform in Umguza. The councillor would be the best placed person besides the district administrator to answer the question of politicisation of land reform in his area.

### **3.6 Description of Settlers**

The settlers were a mixed lot, made up of mostly civil servants, a few ex-farm workers, a large number of war veterans mostly ex-officio army officers and some top ranking party officials belonging to the districts or branch levels of the ruling party, ZANU PF, in Bulawayo (the second city). Among these were a variety of business people with links to the ruling party in one capacity or the other. There was a sprinkling of people drawn from the nearby communal area of Nyamandlovu but even these on closer inspection, it emerged that some had links to the ruling party in one way or the other. As has been mentioned most of these beneficiaries came from Bulawayo and included a few headmasters, senior teachers, railways workers and professionals from different fields of government.

There were some people among these professionals and business people whose origins were from as far afield as Mashonaland. This was not well received by the predominantly Ndebele speaking people of this locality, even among the beneficiaries themselves. They felt that they would not have stood the same chance had they too applied for land in Mashonaland basing on their origin and language. Actually one of the beneficiaries, a serving member of the national army confessed that he had to give up his claim in Mvuma because of the language barrier and the fact that he was made to feel unwelcome at that resettlement leading to the situation becoming untenable and unbearable. Another

interesting feature of these recipients was the age range which began from the late-forties going upwards, which could point to the fact that most were war veterans of the liberation struggle. Another likely explanation could be the fact that most young people, under forty, in this area (mostly in Matabeleland) work in South Africa as migrants and as such were not involved in land reform programme.

There were very few women among the beneficiaries, with the majority of these coming from single-headed households. This too could be explained by the strain and toil it took to successfully lay claim and settle in fast track resettlement which most married women could not go through. This was not aided by the violence which preceded fast track while the rumours and stories about the goings on in these resettlement schemes were not acceptable to any self respecting married woman or even single mature woman.

The small number of women land recipients can be explained by the socially embedded nature of land as a resource and the power relations that govern land allocation in societies. Therefore, the mutuality and inter-dependence between men and women needs to be recognized when it comes to land issues. Consequently, more than gender identities, it is other cross-cutting identities of ethnicity, kinship relations and marital status that both motivate women to stake their claims as well as oppose the claims of other women and men (Nitya 2005). Secondly, women's land claims seem to have a chance of becoming effective only if they have male support. Therefore, rather than aligning with other women, those serious with their claims seek to build alliances with men particularly those able to influence their claim to land. Because women's land claims are a gender issue, women are unwilling to mobilize around this issue despite the enhanced resistance from men (Nitya 2005). As a result the profile given with regards to the gender numbers of the land recipients shows a disproportionately high number of males compared to women.

### **3.7 Methods of data collection**

For the purposes of data collection, there was only one instrument chosen - the questionnaire, which was in the form of a structured set of questions to guide interviews




and maintain consistency. It can be argued that for all intents and purposes, it was the most practical, feasible tool for the research considering the limited resources, the nature of the mini thesis and the student's limited experience with other tools of research. The study adopted the guidelines of the 'strategic triangle' Moore (1995) as the model of policy assessment that directed and shaped the collection of data. For example the following guidelines were adhered to in this strategic triangle:

The first core issue was the test of legitimacy and political sustainability. This examined government support in implementing fast track land reform and problems thereof linked with the programme. In other words, what was being investigated under this section were questions that link the politics of land reform tying them together with legitimate concerns for addressing inequalities and injustices of the past period of colonialism. The second test of administrative and operational feasibility considered vision and mission of government structures, organisational structure, management problems related to the operations and management of land reform. Some of the issues under exploration or scrutiny in this section were support services provided by government and the general readiness of government to implement the process in terms of infrastructural provision and management of the whole fast track land reform process. Finally, under substantive value, factors that enhance the value of life of beneficiaries were examined. This incorporated needs of subsistence, protection and sustainable livelihoods and security of tenure to mention just a few. The issue of fast track land reform adding substantive value to recipients' lives is what was being put to the test in this section of the questionnaire.

Data gathered through the questionnaire survey was complemented by a thorough analysis of available literature on the case studies and documents at district level. Primary data gathered from the field was then analysed after the base from the secondary data had been laid. District level documents were collected during visits to the study area from such institutions as Agricultural Rural Extension Services (AREX), District Development Fund (DDF), the War Veterans Association and Umguza Rural District Council.

### **3.8 Conducting the interviews**

Filling in and completion of the questionnaire was done by the researcher. The reason for this was that the researcher felt that it would be easy to redirect questions and repeat where necessary where there might be feelings of inadequate answers or answers that might have missed the question. A better way of conducting the research than sending the questionnaire and allowing the respondents to fill it in themselves. This then combines the advantage of observation as a research tool in combination with the written questionnaire. In this way, some terms could be clarified right there on the field, rather than waiting to hazard a guess as to what the respondent might have intended from an unclear or ambiguous written response. Interviews took between two to three hours following the structured questionnaire. The structured interview was divided into several sections covering the sub sections in the questionnaire. Open ended questions were used with the respondents which encouraged them to answer the questions in full whilst taking their time about it. This was to give the survey respondents an opportunity to state strong opinions, vent their frustrations about fast track land reform whilst letting the researcher know what had been overlooked (Salant 1994).



By directing the interview process, the researcher could pay more attention and explore in greater detail certain major issues that he felt needed further exploration. Therefore, the face to face interviews helped to overcome the fears and the unwillingness to respond that could have resulted from choosing any other method. By its very nature, the research into fast track land reform required trust between the researcher and the respondent to ensure confidentiality. This helped to make the questions less threatening, friendlier by the explanations that were given and the homily atmosphere created by the researcher during the face to face interviews. Discussions on violence and security of tenure took place during the informal sections of the interview which also incorporated issues on personal experience and predictions for the future of land reform in Zimbabwe.

### **3.9 Data analysis**

Applying Moore's (1995) theory of a strategic triangle as a model of policy assessment was a great aid in the process of analysis. This was useful in the preliminary analytical

step before transcribing the recorded data. The researcher's analysis was guided by Miles and Huberman's (1994) approach to qualitative data analysis in this instance applied to the questionnaires that were used. This involved having a starting list of codes based on the theoretical themes emerging from the interview format.

This was done in the following way: Firstly, a thorough reading of all the interviews was conducted by the researcher as a familiarisation exercise with the data. This is important as a close reading of the data gives the researcher an opportunity to interact with the data as a whole (De Wet and Erasmus 2005). The second step in the process was to proceed to do what Miles and Huberman (1994) call first-level coding of the data. This involved data selection and assigning some labels to these pieces of information. On one hand, De Wet and Erasmus (2005) give credence to what Dey (1993) says about the process of selecting a bit of data and assigning it to a category which, out of necessity entails data fragmentation. In line with them, Miles and Huberman (1994:70) discuss 'first level coding as a device for summarising segments of data'. Furthermore, according to De Wet and Erasmus (2005:9) coding or assigning the labels to data is not done randomly, but 'codes are partly analytical as they link various segments of text to a particular concept.' Babbie (1995:366) states that the coding process helps 'to quantify the open ended interviews.....thus reducing a wide variety of idiosyncratic items to a more limited set of attributes comprising a variable.'

Given that earlier, Moore's (1995) strategic triangle had been adopted as a method of organising the data systematically and a way to rigorously analyse the data, codes were then developed into three theoretical questions following Miles and Huberman's (1994) recommendations. This data was then systematically grouped from codes into concepts and much broader codes, what Miles and Huberman (1994) call second level coding. In this phase of coding, data was grouped into codes or broader codes in order to come up with a hierarchy of codes; a process that researchers call "coding trees" (Babbie 1995:367). This systematic procedure helped to interpret the difficulties and /or success that government faced in trying to put fast track land reform into practice in Matabeleland. Additionally, the researcher decided to compare and contrast the codes to

see how they related to each other. Grouping together all those categories that related to each other, the researcher categorised them into a theme. For example, all the categories that were directly linked to social and ideological issues were grouped together under the theme or category 'Social and Ideological Factors', which in turn formed much of the broader theme "legitimacy, economic and political sustainability" drawn from one of the theoretical questions.

The next step of the analysis noted the relationships, patterns and explanations of the categories. It was noted for instance, how the codes of categories and their properties within the broader theme 'Beneficiaries' related to each other and how this second level code related to another second level code 'Ruling Party functionaries'. It was also noted how many respondents adopted more or less the same position with regards to explanations; for example beneficiaries and which ones adopted a different position for example non-beneficiaries. For an explanation of this discordance, the writer had to come up with what both Fielding and Lee (1998) refer to as a 'storyline' or explanation. An important point to note here is that 'the central phenomenon has to be given a name and as a category must gradually be related to other categories' (De Vos 2002:350)

For an illustration, the storyline which emerged from the theme 'Quality of life' was that fast track resettlement did not necessarily improve the quality of life of beneficiaries. Although the beneficiaries felt getting their own land was government's way of empowering its people; the lack of funds, inadequate farming expertise on their part and lack of any real extension support, would result in failures in the long term.

### **3.10 Challenges of undertaking research in a volatile situation**

By its very nature of delving into the politics of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, this research was bound to encounter obstacles. Foremost amongst these, were government institutions and officials who have a high suspicion of anybody investigating the land issue in Zimbabwe as this has become highly politicised. As has been mentioned in the literature review, the violence that accompanied fast track land reform in the late 1990's- 2000's polarised individuals into supporters and non supporters

of government. As Habakkuk (2005:4) asserts:

Land reform has become a scheme to line the pockets of fat cats and hangers on with no clue of agricultural production. This means that constitutional amendments pertaining to land may legalise official looting of land by party functionaries at the expense of deserving peasants and agricultural college graduates.

The study intended to investigate the extent to which this assertion obtained on the ground in Umguza. This would be done by focusing on in-depth case studies and the key informant interviews with people who benefited and those who did not from the fast track land reform programme. On the other hand, on the ground there was potential danger from the war veterans and supporters of the ruling party who were equally suspicious of outsiders (Hammer *et al* 2003).

Due to the polarized nature of the subject under study and the highly charged atmosphere of fast track land resettlement, the researcher had to be highly sensitive to the needs and demands of the respondents under study. Some topics or questions could not be pursued as long as the respondents felt uncomfortable with them, while others had to be asked in a round about way to get to the root of the story. It has to be mentioned that for most, fast track land reform was seen as a highly political issue which showed one's loyalties depending upon the individual's take on the subject matter. In such an environment, the researcher had to pay careful attention to the respondents political feelings whilst trying desperately to remain as objective as humanly possible.

Coupled with this was dealing with the spiralling economic situation prevailing in Zimbabwe. Having had experience with NGO's, most respondents expected monetary rewards for their information which made the task difficult when one had to explain to them that this was a study for academic purposes. It took great powers of persuasion to overcome this reluctance to volunteer information but the researcher's former colleagues who were now administrators helped a lot to provide that all important breakthrough. The economic situation also affected the researcher who had to ensure that his money was spread too thin to stretch through the entire research period. Lack of personal means of transportation led to the choice of the study area being the one accessible by road since

one could not go deeper into the areas without public transport.

### **3.10 (b) Limitations of the study**

Another obstacle to the study was the fact that not much literature has come out of Matabeleland with regards to land reform but especially on fast track resettlement. The mini-thesis does make use of studies conducted by Alexander McGregor but as has been made apparent in this study, most of the Zimbabwean literature comes from Mashonaland and Manicaland the crop producing areas of the country. Thus the dynamics tackled herein might not have an easy comparison to match or compare with. This is not to say that there were no similarities at all, but in one dimension, it presents challenges of a different nature which the researcher had to overcome on his own without referral to other precedents. As the work had to be done, this researcher had to be resourceful in overcoming these constraints and challenges.

### **3.11 Ethical issues**

The very basis of the research demanded a researcher who would be aware of the potentially sensitive nature of the research topic. To this end, ethical research practices recommended by Babbie and Mouton (2001) were followed. Prior to the research taking place, permission had to be sought to conduct the interviews from the authorities concerned. Relevant authorities were approached to seek the necessary permission to conduct the study. Letters were written to the individuals involved while permission was sought from the interviewees concerned. An explanation of the purpose of the interviews was made clear before the interviews. From then on, the respondents' informed consent was sought prior to the interviews. Informed consent implies that 'adequate information on the goal of the investigation, its procedures, the credibility of the research and the possible dangers to which the respondents may be exposed be rendered to potential subjects' (Williams *et al* 1995:30). Thus informed consent meant giving an explanation of the purpose of the research; that, it was for academic purposes only and the respondents' right to decline or accept taking part in the research would be respected.

Confidentiality of respondents would be respected following applied regulations and

ethics of research. To support this, their identity would be protected by maintaining confidentiality throughout the research process and in writing the thesis. Therefore, all the persons interviewed did so freely, knowing that the information they gave was for academic purposes. In this regard, 'informed consent becomes a necessary condition rather than a luxury or an impediment' (Hakim 2000:143). The real names of interviewees were not used to preserve anonymity and protect the individuals' privacy.

Finally, there is the situational atmosphere that faces the researcher in the politically volatile context of Zimbabwe. To navigate this atmosphere, the researcher took great responsibility to respect respondents and their opinions. What was given precedence was the respondents' well being rather than the academic gains of the researcher. As a result, fairness was sought in the research process by distributing equally the risk of participation for respondents and the need for gaining access to their information and knowledge. As such, findings from the study will be presented as accurately as possible to include opinions that are at variance with the researcher's propositions and expectations. Lastly, interviewees were assured that if they would want to see the results of the study, a report was going to be made available to them. The next section focuses on the profile of the study area.

### **3.12 Umguza district profile**

In this section, the district profile is given to situate the study. The area covers 837 478 ha with a population of 73 314 at the last census of 2002. Demographic data shows that there were 38 760 males and 34 554 females while there was a total of 16 031 households. It is one of seven districts making up Matabeleland North province. As the youngest or newest district, it has 18 wards and 108 villages with administration offices in Bulawayo. It shares borders with Umzingwane and Insiza in the east, Matobo and Bulilimangwe in the south, Tsholotsho in the west, Lupane and Bubi in the north with its environs surrounding Bulawayo. Its average rainfall is 450-600mm per year, typical of agro-ecological region IV with temperature ranges of 8.7-27.5°C making it very dry but very suitable for livestock and wildlife ranching. The major crops grown in the area are maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, round nuts and wheat. In winter, wheat is grown

with the water drawn from irrigation. The irrigation schemes face problems which include lack of up-to-date irrigation infrastructure, lack of skills for irrigation agriculture and shortage of agricultural inputs. Farmers in the area compete with the city of Bulawayo for water rights since Umguza lies in the Nyamandlovu aquifer. With some investment, the area can become a green belt of agriculture. There was a proposal to draw water from the Zambezi River, to adequately supply the city of Bulawayo when it was faced with serious water shortages. If this were to happen, Umguza would stand to benefit as the area lies along that particular route.

Table 3.1 below summarises the availability of water in the district

Water as a resource

<b>Functional dams and boreholes</b>	<b>Non functional dams and boreholes</b>
14 functional dams	2 that are non functional
256 functional boreholes	25 non-functional boreholes
75 awaiting drilling	
Total 270 functional dams and boreholes	

### **3.12.1 Economic Profile**

Umguza district has tourism potential since it lies in the Nyamandlovu aquifer. There is plenty of wildlife which includes Kudu, Impalas, Zebras, Elands and Warthogs. But like most fast track resettlement areas, poaching has become a huge problem since 2000. Forestry areas also present big commercial opportunities in Umguza with two small saw milling companies doing timber harvesting. Forestry land occupies 92 512ha that are protected and administered by the forestry commission. This forest land is to be found in Umgusa, Chesa, Insezi, Umzibani and Insuza Extension.

In relation to agriculture, the area has large scale commercial farming, small-scale commercial, resettlement and communal areas. Small-scale commercial farmers used to occupy a greater part of the district, covering 397 844ha. The general produce is chicken, pigs, vegetables, potatoes and tomatoes. Farmers employ a large number of people in the



district and market their produce in Bulawayo. There are a small number of farmers who practise market gardening and also supply Bulawayo with fresh produce on a daily basis. As for the large scale commercial farmers their focus is cattle and wildlife ranching and employ a sizeable number of people. Umguza has 290 farms, of these, 209 were gazetted for resettlement leaving out only 23 white owned farms plus 35 farms that were either owned by social institutions like churches or fell under bilateral trade relations with other countries. Sixty seven of those that were gazetted were then de-listed according to the department of Lands office records. Communal areas cover 42 635ha and include Fingo and Ntabazinduna. Crops grown include maize, the country's staple food which is grown seasonally. The average population density is 10.9 per square kilometre which is a very high population density by Zimbabwe standards. The total population was estimated at 18 000.

### **3.12.2 Resettlement areas**

Resettlement areas are divided into different sections some with Model A schemes having 33 self-contained units and 54 villagised units. Model A schemes include Insuza, Igusi and Nyamandlovu. These Model A schemes are the old type schemes from the early phase of resettlement soon after independence and they cover an area of 64 838ha. The new resettlement area covers a total of 196 120ha under A1 and 28 052ha under A2.

Resettlement has created a demand for education and health facilities resulting in satellite schools and clinics. Currently there are 13 satellite schools with no sanitary facilities whilst rural electrification is incomplete in most schools.

### **3.12.3 Water**

The district has little surface water but a lot of underground water as in the Nyamandlovu aquifer which is benefiting Bulawayo and some of the newly resettled farmers on irrigation schemes. As the statistics below show, irrigation is the backbone of agriculture in this area with the largest number of irrigation schemes being found in the A2 resettlement with 57 followed by commercial farming areas with 14. Small scale commercial farms and communal areas have four each, while the A1 has 7 and the old resettlement has 2 irrigations schemes.

**Table 3.2** Water availability

Irrigation schemes		Dams	
A1	7	Functional	14
A2	57	Non-functional	2
Commercial	14	Total	16
Small-scale commercial farms	4		
Communal areas	4		


There are a total of 16 dams with 14 being functional and only 2 being non-functional. The water situation in Umguza is an advantage which has to be fully exploited when considering the agro-ecological zone in which the area lies.

#### **3.12.4 Agricultural production**

Agricultural production for the 2002-2003 season was low for a number of reasons. Firstly, the previous 2001-2002 season had been a drought year and as such farmers did not anticipate a better season. Secondly, the two seasons were at the height of the land invasions and the uncertainty surrounding the whole process meant that the newly resettled farmers were not sure of the permanency of their stay in the allocated farms. The fact that some newly resettled farmers lost their pieces of land after having been allocated land in the first place because of the confusion with the gazetted lists of names added to the uncertainty of fast track land reform. Other factors contributed too like the availability of only 90 MT of seed which was inadequate for the 18 wards. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA) provided fertilizer, some 120 MT Compound D and Ammonium Nitrate. The uptake for the fertilizer was low due to the poor season previously thus it was not used adequately to benefit agricultural production. Draught power was being offered by the District Development Fund (DDF) tillage tractors but it was inadequate to cover the whole area (information gathered from key informant interviews with the deputy district administrator). The other point to be made is that the whole process of allocating the

tillage tractors was decided upon on the strength of one's political connections and not on fair allocation of 'first come first serve' therefore becoming inconsistent and thus unreliable. In addition, machinery such as combine harvesters and planters were inadequate for use by every farmer in the resettlement area. As first time farmers, of which most of the land recipients belonged to that category, they did not have adequate inputs on their own to successfully farm commercially and their lack of agricultural skills combined to contribute to this decline in production levels.

Food prices in the district reflected the economic situation prevailing at the time with those having resources taking advantage of those who did not have. For example, Maize cost Z\$6 600-8 000<sup>1</sup> per 50kg bag at the time while cattle cost Z\$800,000-1,000,000<sup>2</sup> per head depending on the size of the beast. Goats cost Z\$150,000-200,000 (2005 figures) depending on the size of the goat and the month of the sale. If the period of selling was closer to schools opening or the festive season, prices went up in the same manner that prices went up if the sale was between a local farmer and an outsider like teachers or visiting business people (information obtained from key informant interviews with the area councillor).



### 3.12. 4.1 Agricultural data

The next section will compare agricultural data over three different seasons, from 2000-2001 right up to 2002-2003 seasons using the following given statistics:

<b>Total Cultivated Land</b>	<b>2000-2001 season</b>	<b>2001-2002 season</b>	<b>2002-2003 season</b>
Large scale commercial farming	30 000ha	6 500ha	5 000ha
Small scale commercial farming	3 800ha	4 100ha	2 800ha
Communal areas	4 100ha	3 140ha	4 220ha

<sup>1</sup> 1US\$1 = ZW\$825 in 2003


<sup>2</sup> 1US\$1 = ZW\$61,040 in 2005

Resettlement area	23 000ha	24 500ha	19 500ha
Resettlement area A1		4 800ha	3 800ha
Resettlement area A2		750ha	850ha
Total	60 900ha	42 340ha	36 170ha
Area under Cereals			23 318ha
Average yield			1 tonne/ha

From the given statistics, there is a noticeable decrease of total cultivated land from large scale commercial farming from 30 000 ha in the 2000-2001 season to 5 000ha in the 2002-2003 season. This translates to 25 000ha of large scale commercial farming land not cultivated, a significant figure in lost agricultural production. The decrease is not gradual but a huge drop even when compared to the figure for the season in between, that is the 2001-2002 season where total cultivated land for large scale commercial farming is 6 500ha. This is a difference of 23 500ha of uncultivated large scale commercial farming area. Even when comparing the totals for the three seasons, the same pattern emerges of lost production land that was not cultivated. The statistics show that in the 2000-2001 season a total of 60 900ha was cultivated, whereas in the 2001-2002 season a total of 42 340ha was cultivated, whilst in the 2002-2003 season only a total of 36 170ha was cultivated. The total lost land that was not cultivated amounts to 24 730ha when you subtract the total of the cultivated land for 2000-2001 season with that of the 2002-2003 season.

A possible explanation would be that this is the land that was taken up for resettlement as the two seasons after the 2000-2001 season show by the two additional columns of resettlement area A1 and A2. But then the figures do not add up as the totals above show. To highlight this fact further, in the 2001-2002 season, resettlement area A1 has 4 800ha while resettlement area A2 has 750ha under cultivation which when added together gives 5 550ha, a figure too small to make up the difference of land unaccounted

for in the column of large scale commercial farming. Under this column, large scale commercial farming has only 6 500ha under cultivation when compared to the earlier figure of 30 000ha in the 2000-2001 season. The other columns like small scale commercial farming though showing an improvement from 3 800ha in the 2000-2001 season to 4 100ha do not account for this missing hectarage. The same could be said about the other two categories, communal which actually show a decrease while the resettlement area only has a slight increase of 1 500ha. One can go on, but the most plausible explanation is that of fast track land reform beginning to seriously affect large scale commercial farming. Commercial farmers abandoned or fled their farms while the new farmers because of lack of inputs and the confusion surrounding allocation, could not adequately fill the gaps left by these farmers. The figures then tell a story of lack of production and the costs associated with inadequate capacity in terms of resources and skills.



All farmers cultivated an average of 0.5ha each during the 2002-2003 agricultural season because they did not clear their fields on time. This had resulted from the confusion created by the circulation of new government gazetted lists of names of land recipients some of which did not resemble the original lists containing the names of the land beneficiaries. Also adding to the confusion was the tussle between the rural district council and the war veterans association. The latter wanted to play a major role in determining who got access to land and who was denied while the former fought to make it a purely administrative process not influenced by party politics. Compounding this was the case of seed and draught power shortages which badly affected the new farmers in the fast track land reform programme as they did not have adequate resources to be self-reliant but were mostly dependent on government parastatals for inputs.

### **3.12. 5 Social infrastructure**

The following section will discuss the social infrastructure of Umguza district as at the time of the research. As can be seen from the table, the primary schools are 42 in number, most of these being satellite schools that have been opened to accommodate the children of land recipients. The plan was to reduce the distance the children would have to walk

from home to school to something less than five kilometres for every child especially the grade ones. The same was attempted in as far as healthcare is concerned with 12 clinics which included those that were privately run by commercial farmers in their farms meant to reduce the number of off days for workers. Some of these offered very basic treatment for common ailments while there were 2 satellite clinics which were mobile around the less accessible areas.

**Table 3.3** Social infrastructure

Boreholes		Dip tanks		Schools	
Functional	256	Functional	30	Primary schools	42
Non functional	25	Non functional	14	Secondary schools	12
Awaiting drilling	75				
Total	356				

### 3.12.6 Coping strategies

Gold panning is rife in the eastern side of the district where the mineral deposits are to be found. This is the area too where there are abandoned mines which the mining companies felt were not productive enough. In the western side of the district, people survive through the selling of firewood some of which they poach from the forestry land bordering their resettlement. Women survive and earn an income by the selling of thatching grass used to roof the granaries and the mud huts. As the table below indicates, there are food distribution programmes supported by non-governmental organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Organisation for Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP). These distribute food in schools as supplementary feeding schemes for children to prevent malnutrition and also to very desperate households. These food programmes become a coping strategy for some of the poorer resettlement farmers and even for their relatives or employees who man the fields and occupy the plot or household while the land beneficiary is away in town or at their formal employment.

**Table 3.4** Food aid programmes

Name of NGO	Programme	Area
WFP/ORAP	School Feeding Programme	Total schools 89,1mt
WFP/ORAP	General food distribution	Wards 3, 4,5,10.12,13,14,16

### 3.12.7 Wards description

As was mentioned earlier in the section on Umguza district profile, the area has 18 wards each with a councillor as the representative authority although there is a headman in especially the communal areas. The wards which were the focus of the study were ward 8 under J. Zinyemba which was A1 self contained and large scale, ward 9 under Mrs. S Mpofu. The non respondents were sampled from wards 4, 5 and 6 which were communal areas surrounding the resettlement scheme.

**Table3.5** Ward description

Ward	Councillor	Population (2002)	Ward description	Location
1	A.Mhlanga	4 237	Small scale & resettlement	Hope fountain, Gumtree, Douglasdale
2	K.C. Shirichena	10 523	Small-scale & commercial	Kensington, Springs & Heany Junction
3	T.M. Nyilika	3 888	Small- scale & commercial	Fingo & Mbembesi
4	M.Moyo	4 148	Communal	Ntabazinduna North
5	Mrs. V. Mangaba	3 540	Communal	Ntabazinduna South
6	Z.M.Bhozongwana	3 300	Communal	Ntabazinduna West
7	Mrs. E.Nyoni	4 228	Small-scale and large scale,A2	Montgomery, Imbesu Kraal & Fairbridge
8	J.Zinyemba	4 064	A1 self contained & large scale	Umvutsha, Umguza Estate, Helensvale
9	Mrs. S.Mpofu	5 332	A1 self contained villagised & commercial	Nyamandlovu farm, Hilda's kraal, Auchenburg

<b>Table 3.5</b> continued				
<b>Ward</b>	<b>Councillor</b>	<b>Population (2002)</b>	<b>Ward description</b>	<b>Location</b>
10	F.Sibanda	2 387	A1 villagised, old resettlement 7 forestry commission	Nyamandlovu farms, Hilda's Sawmills
11	Sigola	5 051	Old resettlement	Insuza
12	N.Ndlovu	1 795	Old resettlement	Igusi
13	C.Mathe	4 628	A1 villagised, self contained & large scale	Nyamandlovu, Red Bank, Teakdale
14	M.S.Khumalo	3 394	A1 villagised, self contained & large scale	Nyamandlovu, Chesa, Madlulane
15	D.Moyo	1 552	Urban, large scale & A2	Ngoma township, Nyamandlovu centre
16	H. Mathuthu	8 599	A1 villagised, self contained, plot holders, old resettlement	Rangemore, Mnundu, Woolandale
17	M.Siphuma	943	Small scale & old resettlement	Maraposa, Majindane
18	M. Khumalo	1 705	Forestry & old resettlement	Forestry commission, Lukukwe

### **3.13 Conclusion**

The chapter began with an explanation of the research methodology used in the study and ended up with the description of the coping strategies of land recipients together with a brief description of the wards. In the methodology, some of the sub sections explored focused on limitations of the study, target population and a description of how the interviews were conducted. In between topics that were covered included challenges of conducting the study in a volatile situation which was an attempt to put the politically



volatile situation of fast track land reform into perspective and how it might affect the study. There is also one section in this chapter which covers agricultural production and relates the discrepancies in total cultivated areas in three subsequent seasons. The section explains away these differences, especially in relation to large scale commercial farmers who were forcefully removed to be replaced by new farmers without the means to manage this hectarage that had been cultivated by white commercial farmers in the past season. Also the uncertainty of the new farmers at the permanence of fast track land reform contributed to their wariness and consequently their failure to adequately invest in a process which they did not have confidence in since they did not have titles to the land. Other issues discussed include social infrastructure found in Umguza and the water situation as it relates to agricultural production and irrigation schemes



## CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS

### 4.0 Introduction

This chapter will present the study findings as discovered during the research into fast track land reform in Umguza. This chapter examines the perceptions of land recipients and those who did not receive land. Of fundamental importance to the analysis is to test the position of whether the land question has been finally resolved to the people of Umguza. This will be done by examining the socio-political and legal environment together with prevailing economic conditions. This chapter attempts to give an insight on whether we will witness another land invasion experience in Zimbabwe in future given the circumstances under which resettlement was conducted. Would arbitrary disregard of the law, for the purposes of political gain and potential benefits, guide future land reform in Zimbabwe? These are questions that will be addressed in this chapter.

### 4.1. Socio demographic characteristics of the land recipient respondents

#### Gender

On the issue of gender, a huge majority of land recipients were male 90% (n=54), while women constituted only 10% (n=6). A likely explanation could be linked to the very conservative, patriarchal, traditional society of the Matabeleland people that stems from their cultural customs and practices. This practice sees women tending to take a back seat to matters political and economic, leaving such issues to the men. In spite of this, the generally low uptake is reminiscent of the situation that prevailed in the whole country with few women taking up land as opposed to men. This could also be explained by the fact that land invasions were violent and accompanied by abuse of women by war veterans and militias (Chaumba *et al* 2003). In such a scenario, very few women could be associated with the violence. Of the non recipients respondents, 60% (n=12) were male and 40% (n=8) were female.

**Table 4.1** Age of recipients

Age group	proportion
30-35	5% (n=3)
35-45	13% (n=8)
45-55	55% (n=33)
55+	27% (n=16)

Most of the land beneficiaries, 55% (n=33) were in the age group that ranged from 45-55 years, with 27% in the 55+ group and the least number were in 30-35 age range at 5%. Noticeably, there was a disturbing trend of very few (5%) young people in their mid-thirties and below who were beneficiaries. Partly true, but another plausible explanation could be linked to the high migration rates in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland in general with young people moving in droves to South Africa to seek greener pastures there.

**Table 4.2** Ethnic origins

Province/area	Proportion
Umguza/Nyamandlovu	25%
Matabeleland North	22%
Matabeleland South	19%
Manicaland	2%
Masvingo	5%
Mashonaland East	2%
Mashonaland West	0%
Mashonaland Central	7%
Midlands	18%

It became apparent from the surnames of the beneficiaries and their origins that despite the original aim of fast track land reform; that of returning land to local people, not all the beneficiaries were 'indigenes' (local people who can trace their ancestral roots in the

area/surrounding area) but people from areas outside of Matabeleland. Some came from as far afield as Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Central. This could partly be explained by the fact that most of these people were party functionaries employed in various positions in Bulawayo with most in the civil service. Despite that, some laid claim to having grown up in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second city and thus staking their claim to qualification for land allocation as other urbanites did. It was only 47% of the respondents who could trace their ancestral roots to Matabeleland North with the rest of the people coming from outside the province. From this 47%, only 25% of the total sample population came from Umguza/Nyamandlovu.

**Table 4.3:** Education level of respondents

Level of education	Proportion
Primary	12% (n=7)
Secondary	57% (n=34)
Tertiary	31% (n=19)

Fifty-seven percent of the fast track land reform beneficiaries had Ordinary levels or the Zimbabwe Junior Certificate. There were 7 (n=12%) respondents with primary level education. But even these were not many as some claimed to have supplemented their education, that had been disrupted by the war of liberation, soon after independence through night school. Thirty one percent had some tertiary education. It has to be pointed out that soon after independence, Zimbabwe embarked on a massive education drive which advocated for free schooling or minimal payments, a system that benefited the black majority.

#### **4.2 Socio economic profile**

A huge number, 58% of households, earned a monthly salary indicative of their being employed in various capacities. As has been indicated, there were a large number of civil servants from various ministries such as education, police and the security services. A small number came from several parastatals in and around the major city of Bulawayo. A few had additional income based on the monthly stipends earned by veterans of the

liberation struggle. Amongst the respondents, 60% kept cattle, 90% had goats and sheep and 85% had donkeys as domestic animals. All had traditional ox-drawn ploughs, with 5% (n=3) having tractors on their farms which had been allocated to the district for communal use. It is these people who had the biggest pieces of land with 10 hectares per person and above while the rest were averaging 0.5-5ha per person. Households with the smallest hectarage were focused on subsistence farming 53% (n=32) while the remainder, 47% (n=28%) were farming commercially through market gardening and cereal production. For households' decision on whether they were commercial or subsistence farmers, this was partly determined by their size of household, plot, input availability, draught power and economic profile.

**Table 4.4:** Profile of new farmers on FTLRP in Umguza:

categories	proportion
Land recipients in employment	58% (n=34)
Retired	3% (n=2)
War veterans	23% (n=14)
Businessmen/ women	8% (n=5)
Ex farm workers	5% (n=3)
Unemployed	3% (n=2)
Total	100% (n=60)




### **Livelihood strategies**

A few respondents in the sample, less than a quarter (22%) generated their income from the land reform projects. Of those households earning an income from the land reform projects, about 25% stated that this was where all their income came from. Among this

group were a few enterprising people who made a business out of supplying the needs of the land recipients and city residents. The huge majority of households 58% earned an income from wage employment outside of land reform (most were civil servants). There were those who derived their income from government transfer payments (pension with the major payment being gratuities to war veterans). Of those receiving transfer payments, about 23% indicated that most of their income came from this source while a few, about 20% received remittances from their children outside the country. Included among these were the retired and the unemployed.

### **4.3 Support services**

Government parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA), The Agricultural Rural Extension Services (AREX) and the District Development Fund (DDF) provided support services to land reform beneficiaries. Eighty percent relied solely on inputs from GMB and ARDA, 20% (n=12) had received formal training from AREX and only 5% (n=3) had received tillage equipment from the DDF.



### **4.4 Selection process**

Of respondents that were land recipients, 15% had applied through the formal process via central government, 40% were selected through the local and district offices and 45% were invaders whose ownership was legitimized when they were already occupying the farms. From an analysis of the findings, it emerges that the selection process of beneficiaries was clouded in controversy amidst the suspicion of cronyism and corruption. Even the 40% who were selected through local and district offices, 50% of these were referrals from war veterans and party officials. This becomes apparent from the profile of the respondents which shows that the very poor and landless did not quite benefit as had been intended by the policy document for resettlement (see Utete 2002).

The period of residence of beneficiaries varied with 47% (n=28) having been on the farms since 2000 when the land invasions first began in Umguza. The rest, 53% (n=32) had settled in the farms from 2001 onwards.

## **4.5 Perceptions of fast track land reform**

### *Perceptions about selection process*

Among the beneficiaries, 10% (n=6) felt that the process was not fair as some people got bigger and better plots of land. Thirty percent (n=18) did not express an opinion because of the politically sensitive nature of the topic. Sixty percent (n=36) were satisfied with the method of identifying and selecting land recipients. Varied opinions were expressed on why beneficiaries felt they deserved the land they received. Chief among the sentiments expressed was the view that the resettlement was balancing the injustices of the past as seen by the two contrasting responses that follow:

“Land was given to ZANU PF supporters who are paid up members of the party. For example, I am a loyal cadre of the party and hold a position in the local cell of the Umguza branch. This is a cell we created after invading the farms.”

For people in Matabeleland, Mugabe has not been a good ruler or President especially taking into account the Gukurahundi atrocities committed against our people. He might try to bribe us with land but this will not heal the wounds and scars we have. This land reform has been intended to make us forget, but some of us will never forget.

### *Perceptions of support services*

Eighty two percent (n=49) of the land beneficiaries were unhappy with the service they got from ARDA, AREX, DDF and GMB. They felt that it was only the influential people who got adequate inputs for their needs since only three people had access to draught power provided by DDF. With the inputs that they got, they had no say in what they could plant. One could only plant what they were given. Only thirty percent had received training from AREX. Access to finance was also a limiting factor with none of the beneficiaries having received financial assistance from financial institutions.

### *Perceptions of benefits from fast track land reform programme*

Although 60% (n=36) were happy with the selection process, 77% (n= 46) felt they did not have tangible benefits from having been resettled since they felt the maintenance of

the homesteads was costly. Twenty three percent (n=14) felt they had benefited from the fast track land reform process as they had acquired assets like farm houses, farm infrastructure and other inputs. These same people felt that their quality of life had improved as they were earning an extra income from their farm production activities either through market gardening or crop production. For these beneficiaries, their food security was assured considering the fact that they could afford to supply Bulawayo markets with their produce. Of the 46 people who were not entirely satisfied with the tangible benefits, 29 felt that they were subsidizing the farming production from their own incomes rather than it being the other way. For these beneficiaries, their economic opportunities had not improved but were moving towards the negative balance because of the extra expenses associated with an extra household.

#### **4.6 Descriptive summary of non-beneficiaries of the fast track land reform programme**

Most of the non-recipients respondents 75%, were people older than 55 years (n=15). They lived in the nearby communal lands with little education. Eighty percent of the non land recipients had had master farmer training from the then AGRITEX. Sixty per cent had gone up to Zimbabwe Junior Certificate level, and the rest had primary level education.

Thirty percent were not aware of the resettlement process before the redistribution process began. Fifteen percent feared the stress of moving, particularly among the older people. Forty-five per cent did not trust the fast track land reform process, thus adopted a wait and see attitude although 10% had later applied for resettlement in 2002. They were all subsistence farmers. Fifty-four percent had cattle, donkeys and goats, 18% had only donkeys and goats, 28% had goats only. The major crop produced was maize for family consumption with some production of ground nuts, millet and sorghum. The older respondents had no formal income mostly surviving on remittances from children while the younger respondents 45 years and younger (n=5, 25%) had previously survived on seasonal and permanent farm employment before the fast track land reform programme. Three of these were now employed as caretakers of those holdings whose owners lived



and worked in Bulawayo, the absentee land beneficiaries.

All the respondents in this category come from Umguza rural area close to the resettlement farms and felt they had a historical claim to the land. Fifty-five percent felt that the selection process had been conducted along political lines while 10% had no opinion on the selection process. Thirty-five percent felt that even if they had been allocated land they were now too old to use the land effectively.

#### *Support services*

All the non recipient respondents had received support from NGOs such as the World Food Programme and ORAP in the form of food and self reliance projects. There was dissatisfaction with DDF especially regarding issues to do with draught power. As for the seed input from GMB, it was often delayed while distribution was done by one of the land recipients; hence there was an element of unfair distribution.

#### **4.7 Perceptions of non-recipients of fast track land reform**

Eighty percent of the respondents felt that there were enough farms to allocate to those locals in need. This was because some farms were seen as being underutilized, while some farms were believed to be too big for one person. There was concern regarding the allocation of farms to people from outside Umguza as they felt that outsiders were benefiting at the expense of the locals. All the respondents complained that grazing land had been taken up by the resettled farmers.

The respondents felt that the chiefs and headmen should have been part of the official selection committee as they were aware of locals' needs for land. Sixty-five percent of the respondents were unhappy with the forced integration of outsiders into their communities and the fact that the new settlers had taken over and run down some of the infrastructure such as farm clinics. The younger respondents who had previously survived on seasonal farm labour felt that their means of livelihood had been taken away by the process of fast track land reform. Eighty percent of the non recipient respondents agreed with the principle of land redistribution to redress past imbalances while the rest felt it

was unnecessary to carry out the fast track land reform programme. One reason advanced against the fast track land reform programme was that it had taken away jobs from locals on the farms.

#### **4.8 Land as a sacred heritage**

When Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe skilfully situated the land question within the discourse of colonial land injustice in September 2002 in South Africa; he was applauded for capturing the mood of most developing countries' world leaders and the ordinary people. He shrewdly defended fast track land reform as a continuing struggle against colonialism, astutely arguing:

This land, this Zimbabwe, is a sacred inheritance from our forefathers; it was the *casus-belli* of our armed national liberation struggle. It cannot be, therefore that we have to beg a foreign power for and we say: hands off Britain! Hands off Britain..... so Blair keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe. (Mahuku 2005:13)

At the political rhetoric level, the land issue was used as a political tool to fend off growing discontent within Zimbabwe. At the local level in Matabeleland, the same sentiments were proffered to push forward another land reform agenda for the 'indigenes'. This is supported by the following observation made by one of the respondents who had this to say:

I worry that this (resettlement scheme) will not last for ever as there are rumblings from people who were not resettled. As someone not originally from this area, I come from Mashonaland province; I fear my plot will be taken away should the political environment change. There have been threats uttered to that effect and I sometimes fear for my safety and security.

The point being made here is that people from the local community might one day rise up to demand their heritage and lay claim to the anomalies created by the fast track land reform as having denied them their rightful inheritance. This could be a possibility considering the precedent that would have been set by fast track land reform where white commercial farmers were forcefully removed from their farms to be replaced by black land recipients.

From observations made elsewhere in the world and throughout history, it is apparent that redistribution of wealth or political power will not occur unless there is sufficient pressure on those who hold the balance of power to share their wealth with the powerless (Marinda 2006). This can be explained by the wars of liberation fought in colonised countries who after the attainment of their liberation, embarked on land redistribution. Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa can be cited as regional examples (Marinda 2006). This same war of liberation argument was used by war veterans to justify fast track land reform.

Not everyone shared the same views though. One interviewee had an interesting story to tell on his personal experience of fast track land reform. He made the following observations:

Some of us were willing to co-exist with the white farmers so that we could benefit from their experience and resources. I had arranged with the farm owner to split the farm into two, a portion for him and another for me. We were going to share the use of his resources while I also acquired experience from his guidance. Alas, the prevailing poisoned atmosphere made it impossible. The farmer fearing for his safety fled because I could not guarantee his security. I lost out in the end and was labelled a 'sell-out' because of my humanity towards this white man.

These words from a former ZIPRA commander who was a retired army general are sobering and revealing of the nature of fast track land reform. In any other circumstances, this private arrangement could have been lauded as being practical and reasonable considering the situation. But this was not to be as seen from the comments above.

The prevailing perception was still one of uncertainty despite all the talk of having repossessed the land as the rightful heirs to that land. The overriding feeling one got from this was that of uncertainty within the land reform process in spite of the assurances from politicians. This could stem from the fact that grassroots land invasions were not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe as they had occurred in the 1980's and early 90's. Of significance is the fact that in many cases, government security forces forcefully removed these people from the land. A well known example is that of Ndabaningi Sithole's Churu farm with the people who had resettled there forcefully removed by the Zimbabwean

government. The farm was then taken over by the government (Mahuku 2005). Another case in point is that of the Inqama settlers who had settled themselves at Cecil John Rhodes National park outside of Bulawayo in Matabeleland South. These too were forcefully evicted by security organs of the state under the guidance of Dumiso Dabengwa the then Minister of Home Affairs (Habakkuk 2005). It became a different issue altogether under a politically charged environment. When the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) took the farm invasions of 2000 issues to court, the then Home Affairs minister, Dumiso Dabengwa said

“The War Veterans have broken the law; I have therefore instructed War Veterans to withdraw from farms with immediate effect. I recognize that the owners enjoy as much rights to protection as any other citizen in this country.” (Mahuku 2005)

Nonetheless, farm invasions continued unabated with white farmers being labelled enemies of the state. No action was taken against illegal occupiers despite farmers having obtained High Court and Supreme Court declarations ordering their removal. The ruling party was not prepared to risk being unpopular with the war veterans and the ordinary people at this delicate stage (election year) of the fast track land reform programme.

The war veterans believed that by embarking on land invasions, it was a way of forcing the government to hasten the redistribution of land to peasants in order to meet liberation promises. It was a way of empowering the ordinary people by resorting to direct action as a weapon for the weak in relation to the powerful white commercial farmers. It has to be pointed out that this direct action also happened in an environment whose socio-economic context facilitated the actions. This economic situation became a variable that could not be easily ignored. The high level of unemployment, coupled with the deteriorating standards of living, with fewer opportunities for income generation, all contributed to land invasions. When worsening food insecurity is taken into account, land invasions were seen as creating opportunities for the poor by the poor in their direct action.

#### **4.9 Households**

Households followed the trend in most of Matabeleland with fewer families. For example, many of these consisted of the nuclear family with a mother, father and their children. Sixty percent (n=36) of the land recipients did not live on the farm permanently but had employed farm managers to manage the farm on their behalf. To maintain contact with these 'managers', they use cell phones hence the reference to 'cell phone farmers' as the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe once called them. Some homesteads were manned by employees of respondents, while the land beneficiary stayed in the urban area of Bulawayo with his immediate family. These farmers would then come to the farm over school holidays with the land owner paying regular monthly visits depending upon the need or his pocket to meet travelling expenses.

#### **4.10 Housing**

Sixty three percent (n=38) of the homes were made of cheap brick moulded in the vicinity, with a high number, 46% (n=28) made of mud brick and corrugated iron roof. There were a few, 12% (n=7) old fashioned mud and dagga huts typically found in most of the poor rural homes in Zimbabwe. Common among the homesteads too was the log and pole built granaries, 44% (n=26) for storage of maize and other grains after harvesting. The majority, 89% (n=53) of the households indicated that they used wood for cooking with paraffin being regarded as too expensive. The very few, 11% (n=7) who managed to move into the former farmers homesteads had access to electricity and piped water. Interestingly these very few were army generals (n=5) still serving in the Zimbabwean national army and some senior security service personnel (n=2) still in the intelligence unit.

#### **4.11 Proximity to health services**

For the households in Umguza resettlement scheme, the nearest hospital is in Bulawayo, which is Mpilo hospital, a major referral centre for the surrounding districts. This is where they could also access a doctor or a quality health service. On the other hand, 4 clinics in the area which were formerly farm clinics are no longer functional, leaving 8 functional clinics. The local mobile clinics (2 satellite clinics) from the district are poorly

manned with limited stocks of medicines. These too are manned by nurse aides or auxiliaries, people from among the community. Thus for the households, it would take travelling to Bulawayo for major hospital referrals or serious treatment or to Nyamandlovu for treatments.

#### **4.12 Tenure security and perceptions on security of tenure**

As indicated overlapping claims and tenure insecurity will generate conflict in future as seen by the threats uttered by the 'indigenes' to those they consider not sufficiently local enough (*refer to section 4.8 above*). Moreover, the land invasions have not enhanced food security, nor have "invaders" been able to retain access to land. There have been cases where political notables evicted "land invaders" from farms in order for them to take over or as a ploy to later parcel out this same land to the favoured few. In addition, there have been cases where the first settler invader is not the original recipient of that land as the farm is given to somebody else. This happened from district to district with the names at the council offices not being the names at the resettlement scheme where the war veterans influenced who got what. Compounding the situation was the lack of clear-cut ownership and proper government policy that spelt out the lease period or gave a title deed to the new farm owners. Utete (2002) in his report of the Presidential land review committee on the implementation of the fast track land reform programme makes mention of these problems.

This led to the reluctance by some beneficiaries to fully invest their efforts in an enterprise they were unsure of, in terms of the future. Most were apprehensive that their ownership of farms would not last their lifetime believing that a change in government might bring about a reversal of fortunes. One respondent speaking on condition of anonymity said:

Without any legal protection for the land that we acquired, I don't feel secure. It's worse when I consider that these white farmers had 'big lawyers' and money but they still lost the land to us. I fear an MDC victory might reverse all these gains we have made; hence my reluctance to build a big house or to invest seriously on the farm.

If this trend continues, it could mean that land invasions would simply represent a

populist mechanism through which a change in the racial pattern of land ownership is effected but does not entirely address the needs of the poor as seen by the disgruntled non- recipients of land.

#### **4.13 Food security**

A fundamental premise of most land reform programmes is that the provision of land to the poor will result in greater food security. Regarding the study, a substantial portion of the land reform beneficiaries were engaged in food production for their own consumption. The interviews further revealed that upon accessing the land, beneficiaries were more likely than not to begin crop cultivation. Although this crop cultivation was at a smaller scale, it should be seen in the context of securing one's place and also revealing the limited capacity of the fast track farmers to go into full scale agricultural production.

In terms of non monetary benefits, the majority stated that these were food from the harvest. Crops planted were maize, the staple food crop with other grains, like wheat under irrigation and nuts like groundnuts and sweet potatoes. These beneficiaries also kept a few livestock ranging from two to five cattle per household on average, with a number of goats from five and above but not anything above fifty. These animals are kept mostly for milk and as a form of wealth creation while the smaller animals like goats are to be slaughtered on special occasions like Christmas and for those rare occasions when meat is essential. For food, these recipients eat what they can produce and subsidise that through groceries bought from the nearby city of Bulawayo.

Food security in Zimbabwe began to be a serious concern during the period from 2000 to 2001. Part of this shortfall could be attributed to vagaries of weather, especially the lingering impact of cyclone Elaine in 1999-2000 and the erratic rainy season of 2000-2001. These events resulted in two consecutive seasons of poor production in the most vulnerable areas of the country (UNDP 2002). Disruptions to the commercial farming sector caused by the fast track land reform programme have compounded the shortfalls as a result of cutbacks in areas planted to crops, particularly maize, during the 2000-2003 seasons (see section 3.12.4 Agricultural production). The expectations of some officials

who were implementing the Fast Track programme that the settlers' production would more than make up for shortfalls in production on commercial farms was overly optimistic. The District Development Fund (DDF) had a limited capacity to be of much help for the resettled farmers while the amount of land tilled by settlers was not known. Given that many settlers had been located on unused or even virgin land, without adequate implements to plough the land, there was insufficient time for them to clear and de-stump land for mechanized tillage. As mentioned earlier in this study, there were also serious concerns about the availability and distribution of farm inputs for the land recipients.

Fast track land reform therefore has led to Zimbabwe experiencing a lot of consequences chief of which has been a food crisis due to the considerable shortfall in food production among fast track land reform beneficiaries. The former bread-basket is now dependent on food imports and food handouts from donors and neighbouring countries.

#### **4.14 Poverty alleviation**

When examined in the current economic context, fast track land reform in Zimbabwe has not seriously alleviated poverty, especially rural poverty. Despite the government's touted policy of redistribution of wealth, restructuring access to land and economic development; poverty alleviation and food security have been failures. Several reasons can be put forward to explain this failure. Firstly, as alluded to in the study, fast track land reform did not benefit the most deserving rural landless. Instead it benefited party loyalists, civil servants and other elites who were not poor residents of over-crowded rural communities. Secondly, the few deserving land recipients were too poor to manage the farms enough to generate reasonable incomes for their sustenance and economic production like the white commercial farmers. Thirdly, the macro-economic environment prevailing in Zimbabwe, at the time, made it difficult even for those willing to try hard enough as there were no banks ready to offer loans to people without any collateral. This lack of tenure security contributed to the reluctance by the banks to commit finances to new farmers. Further, the government itself was in no financial position to provide assistance as shown by its failure to develop infrastructure for new farmers.



The violent nature of fast track land reform meant that mostly men benefited from the land redistribution as they stood a better chance in such power relations contest. Added to that, the patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean society disempowered women yet they are known to be among the most impoverished sector of society. In addition to this, evidence suggests that the major income generated by the recipients of land reform comes from outside their farming enterprises as suggested by the one respondent earning his living in neighbouring South Africa. With regards to farm workers, their plight has been worsened with very little having been done to improve their fate.

#### **4.15 Macro economic policy framework and environment**

As has been observed, fast track land reform occurred in the background of a dire economic environment in Zimbabwe which was crippling to the state and its people (Marinda 2006).

Unemployment was at record high of 80%, made worse by the acute economic deterioration. Chronic shortages of basic commodities led to many people in Zimbabwe doing their grocery shopping in neighbouring countries especially Botswana and South Africa. Recurrent fuel shortages and power shortages had become the norm. An influx of refugees and immigrants to Zimbabwe's neighbouring countries namely South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and overseas witnessed an exodus of young people that were economically active. All this could be attributed to or blamed on the ruling party that adopted a policy of survival at all costs, as has happened with the chaotic, lawless nature of fast track resettlement. Once affected by the macro-economic environment, the masses became a restive, disenchanted population. In a convoluted way, this economic environment made it impossible for fast track land reform to succeed as the government was crippled financially too. In this situation, government could not make provisions for infrastructure in the resettled areas or offer state support to land reform beneficiaries. There was no training offered to these small scale emerging farmers unlike the first phase of land reform which had master farmers (Kinsey 1999). With no concrete policy framework to guide fast track land reform such as determining agricultural prices,

encouraging food production and employment creation in rural areas, fast track land reform was doomed to fail (Mahuku 2005). The haphazard nature of the resettlement programme meant that even those efficient sectors of the white commercial farmers were swept away by the tidal wave of land invasions in a non discretionary manner (Moyo 2003).

#### **4.16 The role of the state**

The role of the state in land reform has to be an active facilitatory role if it is to meet its objectives of equity, rural development and poverty alleviation including food security (Byres 2002). The Zimbabwean government failed to provide financial and infrastructural support to the land beneficiaries. Support such as agricultural extension services, capital, credit, research, training services and agricultural equipment was not provided during the fast track resettlement phase as revealed from the case study of Umguza. In contrast, international examples suggest that successful land reform programmes feature strong state support for land reform beneficiaries including investment in infrastructure and social services (Marinda 2006). But with the Zimbabwean case it was a different state of affairs. Planning has not been very thorough as pointed out by government officials and through official documents such as the Utete (2002) report. This can be attributed to the fact that short term institutional processes failed to inspire innovations that were necessary for local development initiatives at the beneficiary level. On the other hand, the active participation of Governors in the land allocation process, as supported by Matabeleland North's Obert Mpfu's active role, meant that the state was fully involved in the fast track land reform process.

#### **4.17 Beneficiary participation**

Fast track land reform in Zimbabwe resulted from the political landscape of a state threatened by the emergence of a powerful political rival, a restive population, militant war veterans and an economy that had spiralled out of control (de Villiers 2003). War veterans and ruling party members and elements in the state organs influenced the direction that fast track land reform took (Chaumba *et al* 2003). It is these very same people who benefited from resettlement as they were closer to the action and by their

very connections could choose the land that they wanted. Thus, there was limited participation by other groups outside of these sections leading to views that the process was discriminatory and biased. There was the parcelling of land to people not originally from Umguza or Matabeleland North which was not well received by the locals from the area. Thus, the most marginalized and poor who were most deserving of land did not benefit from a supposedly equitable programme meant to redress imbalances.

Other countries like Tanzania had large-scale consultative campaigns and information dissemination efforts while Mozambique allowed more extensive beneficiary participation (Marinda 2006). This lack of participation by the intended beneficiaries saw 'chancers' who were trying their luck accessing land. These people became known as the 'cell phone farmers' therefore contributing to the failure of the programme. As has emerged from the profile of the beneficiaries, these were educated, mostly literate people with a reasonable access to resources marginalising women and the poor who could not successfully negotiate the power relations at play. The same goes for young people (both men and women) who could not benefit from resettlement as the process marginalised them too as suggested by the average age of the land beneficiaries referred to earlier in the chapter. This then shows that the demands and needs of beneficiaries were not taken into account in a politically expedient programme meant to assuage and protect the hold on power of the ruling party. Beneficiary participation was inadequate as seen by the lack of relevant farming skills among the beneficiaries of the fast track land reform programme.

The failure to take cognisance of the need for fairness as an important criterion in beneficiary selection might result in future dispossession, increased rural polarization and conflict.

#### **4.18 Impoverishment of communities**

Bringing about land reform however, does not necessarily translate into sustainable gains for the rural poor. In Zimbabwe, for example, a significant number of farm labourers have been displaced as indicated by one of the respondents quoted in the study.

“One wrong cannot be made right by another wrong. It is wrong to grab farms from whites who provided employment for some of us in their farms. Now we are left with no source of income. What do we do at our old age?”

Further, although the invasions were partly orchestrated, it was nevertheless a chaotic and unplanned resettlement process. It is very likely that resettled communities /individuals will not have access to sufficient state support to succeed (see the comments from a respondent above which supports this). One aspect that emerged from the interviews especially with certain officials and non beneficiaries of land was the issue of impoverishment of land reform beneficiaries. Fast track redistribution had become an expensive exercise which had done little to improve the lot of some beneficiaries' lives. The frequent travelling from their urban homes in Bulawayo, paying of salaries and the upkeep of employees or relatives who were left to guard the farms meant that recipients had to dig deep into their own pockets. The absence of post settlement support for agricultural production affected any farming enterprise that these people might have hoped to undertake. As the case study shows, some had left the resettlement scheme to seek a more viable livelihood opportunity in South Africa as explained by one of the land beneficiaries.

I took the land as an opportunity but with the worsening economic environment, I have had to rethink things. I am currently earning a living in South Africa and have left farming for now. When things become better in time, I will go back and hopefully earn a living through farming.

When the issue of housing is taken into consideration, the mud hut structures were a lowering of standards as most of these recipients were urban dwellers renting council owned houses with some even having built their own houses in town. Some of these people's dependence on remittances from their children also does reveal their dependent status showing that they were no better off than they had been in the beginning.

For the greater part, most of the respondents felt that it was imperative that government provide significant state support and investment for them to survive. The majority

expressed dismay at the lack of adequate support services with the blame being cast on some government institutions such as GMB and ARDA. There were also reservations on private sector support and NGO support with unease on the role these institutions should play in supporting the new farmers. It was felt that some of these institutions would not support a government led land reform as most had previously argued for the respect of property rights. On the other hand, rural livelihoods had been improved through NGO support for example ORAP and WFP who ran food distribution programmes in communal areas and thus some felt it was important to engage with the sector to improve and impact fast track land reform for it to succeed.

#### **4.19 Insights from other studies on fast track land reform**

This section provides insights from studies undertaken on fast track land reform. Despite its touted agenda to ‘contest the monopolistic privileges of white or corporate farming’ and ‘to create conditions for more diverse forms of commodity production’ (Cousins 2004:12) the programme cannot be seen as having addressed the ‘agrarian question of the dispossessed’ (Cousins 2004:12) though it claims to have done so. Contrary to the original objective of ‘one man one farm’, those with political clout and well connected to the ruling elite took full advantage to acquire more than one farm. This happened through an increasing tendency for self-settlement including multiple land ownership (Utete 2002). When linked to the initial limited government control over the whole process, perceptions built up over time to view the programme as chaotic, haphazard, technically deficient and politically motivated with predictions made that it was bound to fail (Habakkuk 2005, Moyo 2003). This is because the constituting of a ‘new class’ of emergent petty commodity producers from within the ranks of the desperately poor (Cousins 2004) did not become a reality as shown by multiple ownership of farms by a select few. With Zimbabwe’s fast track land resettlement, there were allegations of cronyism and general corruption levelled against the land allocation process. The overriding perception or feeling was that the programme was a means of rewarding the party faithful and civil servants for their support of the ruling party (Chaumba *et al* 2003).

Cousins (2004:14) observation in his statement that:

“International experience shows that elites tend to capture the benefits of land reform unless there are decisive shifts in power relations and a redistribution of political and economic power in favour of the poor.”

The above lends weight to the assertion of reward politics or the politics of patronage. In the same vein, the ZANU PF government has been perceived to be using land reform as a means of shoring up power in the face of an opposition that was becoming a real threat (Chaumba *et al* 2003). The loss of the February 2000 referendum about a new constitution marked the ushering in of the chaotic and violent land reform. As events in Zimbabwe clearly demonstrate, changes in the balance of political forces can dramatically alter the terrain of land reform policy. In addition, collective interests are not simply givens but have to be constituted by ‘political leadership and political choice’ (Bernstein in Cousins 2004:16). Lahiff and Cousins (2001:653) also validate this when they state that the violent and chaotic land seizures ‘were supported if not initiated by an embattled and corrupt political regime’. A political leadership and choice that is always meant to serve the needs and interests while also maintaining the dominion of the ruling elite.

Despite the explosive politics of fast track land reform, it had its supporters. The war veterans basing on the data or evidence presented already would be chief among its proponents. For some people in Zimbabwe, there was evident appreciation of the opportunities availed to them by fast track land reform including future prospects (Chaumba *et al* 2003). For these people, their main argument was that fast track land reform had been long over due as a process and they had waited for this to happen a very long time. As asserted in the Utete (2002) report, representatives of farmer’s unions (the black farmers), the financial services sector and agro-business generally perceived land reform as vital for the country’s political stability and economic development. However, they insisted on agriculture being placed on a properly planned and adequately resourced basis. This was not a far-fetched, ungrounded fear on their part, but a legitimate concern as demonstrated by the beneficiaries themselves who pointed to a general lack of

adequate service delivery by all government departments due to limited financial resources. Consequently, this impacted negatively on technical extension support services and provision of infrastructure (Marimira 2006). In such a state of affairs, even those respondents supporting fast track land reform would view the land reform in a negative or disapproving light.

A study of Goromonzi District in Zimbabwe done by Marimira revealed the following:

- 1) Due to accusations of corruption levelled against the local land committee, some informants complained that they could not access inputs.
- 2) The majority of informants reported that settlers on farms originate from far away places which could explain the formation of social clubs to meet their needs.
- 3) 75% of respondents reported that settlers were not overly keen to come together for communal projects; a limited social coherence factor that could be explained by their origins being mostly from the urban areas.
- 4) A huge majority of settlers in one area (Dunstan) perceive the new settlement just as a place/home for retirement as opposed to a commercial agricultural enterprise.
- 5) Overall, informants were unhappy at all with the level of interaction between land recipients and the government. As an example, more than seventy percent of the respondents were of the opinion that with the exception of the GMB, most government departments had not fulfilled their mandates. There was no consultation in decision making and implementation. The majority, sixty percent of the respondents were of the impression that officials had no knowledge about their problems because of the information gap between them and the government, Marimira (2006 :26)

Most of the sentiments expressed above can be found in the responses given by the respondents to the UMguza study.

The Utete (2002) report stated that beneficiaries generally expressed overall approval with the outcome of the programme implementation and the manner in which beneficiaries own lives were becoming transformed, dramatically in some cases.

Contrasted to this, unhappiness with fast track land reform was noted among those that were still awaiting resettlement when promises of land allocation by their local leaders failed to materialise. At the same time, some former white commercial farmers felt aggrieved and unfairly discriminated against as they were in compliance with the criteria set by government in the Land Acquisition Act, that of 'one man, one farm' policy, for retaining their land, yet had their farms being appropriated (Utete 2002). This implied that commercial farmers had no tenure security under fast track land reform as land could be taken away from them even if they complied with the terms of the 'one man, one farm' policy.

If the white commercial farmers could lose their land so easily despite their title deeds, what then for the resettled farmers who had no title deeds and acquired their land in an environment of uncertainty, fear, loathing and a great deal of mayhem. Despite the legitimisation of the land occupations by the Rural Land Occupiers Act, freehold title for rural land in Zimbabwe had become an insecure form of land tenure (Marongwe 2003). Remarkably, even among the resettled farmers themselves, the perception existed that they were only temporary, leading to the building of pole and dagga huts showing the presumed temporary nature of their stay (Chaumba *et al* 2003). Official documents also indicate this same trend of uncertainty and being unsure as reported by the Utete (2003) Commission which alluded to multiple farm ownership by certain individuals, low uptake by others, certain perceived shortcomings and disappointments with the A2 model as there were no immediate benefits. The study therefore sought to investigate and document what the perceptions of fast track land reform around Umguza would be in the light of the findings elsewhere.

#### **4.18 Conclusion**

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that fast track land reform has been plagued with problems. From its failure to produce a regulated, standard process to the haphazard nature of land allocation, this does not bode well for its success. It even failed to comply with the basic ingredient of success, which is equipping and 'skilling' those taking over from white commercial farmers.



## **CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.0 Introduction**

This study has explored why fast track land reform became necessary in Zimbabwe. It has documented how this reform was undertaken and in what conditions it occurred. This thesis has examined the relationship between fast track resettlement, livelihoods and socio-political factors. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to highlight those critical issues that underlie this relationship and provide a framework of how they could be analyzed. In this chapter, key issues relating to rural livelihood systems and their dependence on socio-political and economic factors are revisited and examined within local, national and global contexts. In this context, the chapter first provides a summary of the key findings of the thesis, before providing some recommendations which could be adopted around the land reform programme. The last part of the thesis then provides overall conclusions to the study as a whole. An examination is done regarding what can influence future land reform programmes in relation to sustainability within the context of agricultural production, restructuring of access and ownership of land.

### **5.1 Summary**

The chapter is based on the key arguments that were presented in the study. First, the study argues that there is an ideological way of analysing the fast track resettlement of people in Zimbabwe. The argument holds that the land reform programme was based loosely on neo-populism which was a movement away from the earlier period of neo-liberalism (market based system) that had been adopted during the time of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. Certain cross-cutting issues act as common reference pointing to this shift in policy. In brief these could be viewed as the macro economic environment of hyper inflation, an increasingly frustrated population, high unemployment, an increasingly radical group of war veterans and a growing opposition to the ruling party. Such a state of affairs did not necessarily lead to revolution and an uprising, but instead it provided mechanisms for unlocking the grip on power of the ruling party. Fast track land reform then became an essential tool for maintaining and keeping that grip on power.

The purpose of this research was to address the questions raised in chapter one, about the history of fast track in Umguza, how land reform has shaped the livelihoods of stakeholders and their perceptions. Challenges, opportunities and constraints to rural development were also addressed. As shown in chapter two, debate still lingers on whether the ‘agrarian question of the dispossessed’ has been answered by fast track resettlement. Chapter three dealt with the methodology applied and their justification. It briefly introduced the case study area with a description of the settlers together with the profile of the district. Data analysis is dealt with here and a section is dedicated to revealing the challenges that were faced while undertaking this research. Chapter four discusses the research findings contextualizing them at the macro-level. This study shows that land redistribution is a controversial process whose intricacies may not be wholly understood through just focusing on production issues but also through realizing that there are a host of other factors that need to be considered. It ends with a brief look at insights from other studies on fast track land reform as they relate to the points raised in the study. In this last chapter (chapter five) consolidation and discussion of the findings will be done together with the recommendations for future land reform programmes.

This study shows that all land reform beneficiaries in Umguza rely on income outside of farming in their daily struggle to eke a living. The livelihoods of many land reform beneficiaries in Umguza resettlement scheme and residents of the surrounding communal areas abutting this scheme are dependent on other resources besides those that are found in the scheme. In some cases, survival strategies have enabled some households to cope with common stresses and shocks such as drought while in other cases some households have even used these resources as a basis for diversifying their livelihoods. When subjected to the onslaught of multiple stresses and shocks, vulnerable poor households in Umguza incorporate survival strategies in their strategies for coping with inadvertent risk. This confirms that correlations between the socio-political and economic relations play an important role in agricultural development (Kinsey 1999).

However, extreme and extraordinary stresses create constraints that undermine the relationship between people and the state, and in the process subdue livelihood sustainability. This is especially the case with shocks such as severe droughts (2000-2001) and the multiple stressors associated with Zimbabwe's worsening macro-economic environment. Livelihoods are sustainable when they are resilient and capable of being maintained or even enhanced without undermining the natural resource base (Chambers and Conway, 1992). In this context, a key issue that emerges from this research is that the complex relationship that evolves between resettlement and natural capital entails the need to employ an integrated approach for us to fully understand it.

Every political scientist and practicing policy maker knows that simply passing a law does not ensure the desired legislative goal (Williams *et al* 1995). Rather implementation is an arduous task which can be facilitated by a variety of factors such as adequate resources, vigilant oversight, and cooperation from all stakeholders, who comprise farmers, government, landless, academics, non governmental organizations and funders (Moyo 2003). The external forces for change, in this case the legislative mandate and stakeholders' participation play an important role although leadership within the country is very important in responding to those forces (Marinda 2006). In addition, a certain level of balance needs to be established with both a strong private sector and an equally strong public sector with a strong civil society acting as a countervailing force between these two (Marinda 2006). With such a scenario, the state can be prevented from dictating the terms of land reform and the same goes for powerful and wealthy land owners holding the state to ransom. This has the potential of stopping private (free enterprise/market economy) rather than state ownership (subversive socialism) and vice versa (Chambers and Conway 1992, Marinda 2006, de Villiers 2003) creating a reasonable balance.

Countries in which the legislature provided additional resources as incentives and in which farmers saw the mandates meet their own preferences had serious implementation efforts underway, a situation predicted by political economy literature (Adams 2001, Marinda 2006). Clear legislative goals, objectives and good consultation process were

important implementation activities. Continuous monitoring and adaptation/flexibility as in the South African model have proven to be very important in implementation and establishing a successful model (Mahuku 2005).

In conclusion, one can quote the words of Carl Jung in Marinda (2006) who said:

‘The foremost of all illusions is that anything can ever satisfy anybody. That illusion stands behind all that is unendurable in life and in front of all progress, and it is one of the most difficult things to overcome...’

The above quote aptly sums the feelings of people where land reform is concerned as it seems to be never enough to satisfy almost everybody without leaving one group disaffected by the experience. Usually there is one group that gains from the status quo while the other feels left out with solutions generated becoming the dominant cause of the consequences with which public policy must contend. For example, as seen from the effects of fast track land reform, an issue like the case of ex-farm workers becomes a sticking point. The issues of food security, security of tenure and technical support become other resultant effects which public policy has to contend with. Hence the problems found with most reforms implemented. In the end, there is a group of people left out who feel that they have been overlooked as the study has revealed. The storyline that emerged from the data laid bare the fact that the quality of life of beneficiaries had not significantly changed in ways that could lead to their classification as emerging black commercial farmers. This is despite all the rhetoric that has been placed in the public domain by politicians and government people toeing the ruling party line. As for most of the fast track land reform beneficiaries, a good number were still farming at subsistence level.

## **5.2 Land and the politics of patronage**

The elitism and cronyism of earlier land reform together with the chaos of fast track land reform call for an early redistribution that also takes cognisance of production factors and capacity. The Zimbabwean government was unable to improve the lives of ordinary people. Beneficiaries of fast track were avowed party loyalists and war veterans ahead of

the land hungry peasants. There was no serious commitment to land redistribution as shown by the lack of support structures, administration staff, budgeting and planning for resources. Therefore, this was a land reform programme that was not transparent and neither did it adhere to good political and economic governance principles and policies.

Not all individuals have equal access to all production options. Therefore agricultural and animal husbandry possibilities are mediated by structures of social difference and power relations as well as economic, demographic and ecological parameters. The opportunities and constraints for differing farming strategies or the perceived opportunities and constraints, depend on farmers' wealth, gender, age, class and ethnicity (Scoones 2002). Scoones and Woolmer (2002:26) also observe that 'in Zimbabwe, gender differences are important with women's strategies for managing small livestock as part of both an individual and household farming enterprise often underestimated'. A point that has been proven by the study which shows that women land owners had very little assets including livestock and thus stood at a disadvantage in terms of farming and being productive in their agricultural enterprise. It is because of these power relations that women and young people are in the minority as beneficiaries, a state of affairs that does not bode well for poverty alleviation and rural development.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

Zimbabwe needs to embark on a rule-governed land reform which has recognition from all the citizens and the international community to gain legitimacy. This will attract foreign investment leading to a build up in employment removing the void of disenchanted citizens who could boil over and destabilise the government. This leads to one of the recommendations suggested in this thesis, notably that in order to be successful, a land reform programme requires effective policies and relatively speedy implementation within a context of general economic development, and with particular emphasis on employment creation

Secondly a new constitution needs to be enacted that serves as a self-restraining mechanism for good governance both economically and politically. This will guard

against the misuses of donor funds meant for land reform being channelled to other areas as happened in the past (Marinda 2006). This goes hand in hand with adhering to the rule of law and earning political legitimacy which Zimbabwe badly needs.

Thirdly a sweeping review needs to be undertaken of the fast track land reform to rationalize the chaos obtaining around resettled farmers. A first step would be an honest, transparent process identifying who received what land and how much each individual got. After this period of reconciliation and going back to the drawing board, the policy of 'one person, one farm' for all should be diligently enforced without regard to the race of the individual or their political connections.

Fourthly, repossession and appropriation of land from the black farmers who have failed to be productive on the farms should be considered. In the same vein, creation of an enabling environment for the return of white commercial farmers, those who had been productive before the fast track land invasions, to some of these repossessed farms. Where possible, the government has to create an enabling environment allowing for cooperation and working together between white commercial farmers and their black counterparts. Those farmers who had established working relationships with the invaders could be encouraged to have a negotiated system that works for and benefits both parties. This could be touted as a model of reconciliation and unity between black and white in the country that could push agricultural development another notch. The advantages are obvious as experience and money is paired with the previously disadvantaged and marginalised instead of just dropping the black farmers into the deep end with no resources.

The fifth recommendation recognises that government needs to commit to land reform that is fair, equitable and not as cumbersome. This should be done by creating a relevant ministry or department specifically to deal with land reform as a matter of priority and urgency. This ministry or department would be run by qualified personnel in land issues with the necessary support of civil society and research institutions including universities. By having one dedicated ministry, it would cut down on government bureaucracy

allowing for a speedy implementation of the land reform programme.

A land tax could be introduced and enforced to help gather funds for land redistribution. This would be a home-grown tool for social transformation operational within the country's legal framework. By establishing a land tax, unproductive farmers and speculators would be weeded out of agriculture although the state has to be careful that it does not sweep away new and emerging farmers (Lahiff 2003).

Another recommendation is that the country needs to hold a national land conference with all stakeholders being invited to make a contribution to chart the way forward for Zimbabwe's land reform. This should include civil society, commercial farmers both black and white, external donors and representatives of the local population who are not members of traditional authority and non governmental organisations. Mass mobilisation should be encouraged together with the development of rural organisations that support rights and livelihoods education. An example of Bangladesh could be followed (Marinda 2006). Government needs to be more accommodative and desist from the politics of exclusion and patronage where party loyalty is rewarded with farms even if it affects agricultural production.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

“The history of land reform around the world demonstrates that land invasions, which the government then normalises through legal processes of expropriation and allocation, have been the most common and effective process of land reform”. Professor Johann Van Zyl in Marinda 2006)

The quotation above if it is to be believed suggests that direct action (including violent actions) can influence governments and landowners to embark on land reform programmes. An easier solution, as it simply legitimates the invasions allowing for redistributing the land in question to the occupiers. In this regard, an important aspect of land reform that is often overlooked in policy analysis is highlighted. This is the fact that spontaneous settlement or land invasions are sometimes more successful with regard to the amount of land redistributed and the numbers resettled when compared to the amount

of land redistributed through official land reform programmes. If the figures quoted by the government are to be believed, then this stands the test when compared to the earlier figures achieved during the first and second phases of land reform in Zimbabwe.

World Bank sponsored researchers and representatives have made similar observations and have argued that, in some cases, the logical approach to land reform would be “*to design programmes that provide regularisation of agricultural and selected infrastructure services to spontaneous settlers*” (Marinda 2006). A notable case is that of Zimbabwe in the early years during independence as has been indicated in the thesis. It has to be mentioned that there are advantages to spontaneous settlement or land invasions, as compared to planned land reform programmes. Spontaneous settlements can avoid some of the common problems associated with administered land reform. For example, the bureaucratic hassles of negotiating several ministries are done away with while the cumbersome process of 'willing buyer, willing seller' does not occur and the invaded land is prime land, not the marginal lands that was put on offer by the commercial farmers as a token of appeasing government.

As Gass and Sumberg (1993:5) point out:

Alternative pathways are particularly and will likely become increasingly important for women and other marginalized groups who generally have limited access to high quality and other productive resources. For these people, the intensification of livestock production outside the mixed farming model may be a critical element of a viable livelihood strategy.

The socially embedded nature of land as a resource makes for contestations and power struggles which lead to women and other marginalised groups aligning themselves with the powerful in order to protect their sustenance and livelihoods.

Women's land claims seem to have a chance of becoming effective only if they have some male support. Hence rather than aligning with other women, those serious with their claims seek to build alliances with men, particularly those able to influence the argument in their favour. Because women's land claims are a gender issue, women are unwilling to mobilise around this issue, but there is also an enhanced resistance from men (Nitya 2005:18).



This strategy of building alliances has proven true and useful in fast track land reform. This has seen women aligning themselves with base commanders and influential officials in the super seven committees and district officials, a means of acquiring male labour and networks (Chaumba *et al* 2003). This too serves to protect their interests in a male dominated potentially violent and explosive environment of fast track resettlement where showing any weakness can lead to loss of that land.

As a preliminary conclusion, the farm invasions suggest that there is a close relationship between direct action and land reform. Indications that emerged from the Zimbabwean situation indicate that, in some cases, land invasions are legitimated by the state and thus form an important part of overall land reform. Generally, for the spontaneous settlements to influence the outcomes of land reform, they should not have any political influence or motivation. The political elements in the fast track land reform programme in Zimbabwe have shown that political interference cannot yield the desired outcomes.

In a final analysis, it appears that neither state-led market reform, nor market based land reform will be successful unless the potential beneficiaries, particularly the most marginalized, have played an active role in policy development and implementation. It can be argued that success of a land reform programme depends to a large extent on the participation of the marginalized, dispossessed individuals and communities (Marinda 2006). Based on the findings in this research, one can say the same holds true for redistributive reforms in the form of fast track land reform programme. As has been proven by the statistics with regards to ownership of land, women and young people were marginalised in the process of land allocation together with former farm workers. In the same vein, a similar observation could be made for people originally from Matabeleland North who felt discriminated against from a process that happened in their backyards and yet they were not beneficiaries of that resettlement.

Finally, policies and programmes that do not take differentiation and local context into account will be inappropriate. For example, giving large tracts of land to people who do

not belong in that particular area or locality defeats the whole purpose of reducing communal congestion which was the proclaimed aim of land reform (Utete 2002). In this way, redistribution will probably not succeed as there will be bound to be clamours for land from those who feel they have been deprived of their inheritance in land. Therefore, tenure policies that fail to take into consideration political and economic differentiation may result in dispossession, increasing rural polarisation and conflict.

Moreover, tenure reform programmes that do not take account of the differentiated nature of land rights like the issue of secondary rights for women in particular, as well as conditions of landlessness for ex-farm workers for example, will provide tenure security only to elites and the powerful. Furthermore, policy developers and implementers should be discriminating when it comes to people driven reform like (fast track was claimed to be) because community driven programmes are quite possibly the perspective of the powerful or influential members of that community. For example, because individuals are members of particular social systems and operate within the confines of the relations of power within that system, therefore Zanu PF (as the ruling party) together with the war veterans managed to manipulate and determine due process within the reform programme. The failure to take this socio-political differentiation into account is one of the major causes for the exclusion of large groups for example, former farm-workers and those believed to be members of the opposition by those who had moved opportunistically, mostly war veterans and party loyalists.

The most striking example is the utter failure of the overall land reform programme, as well as its constituent parts and related aspects, to benefit women and young people. This failure is the result of policies and procedures that did not take account of the fact that young people and women's position in society is fundamentally weakened. This weakened position is influenced by the unequal division of labour, institutional violence, patriarchal patterns of land allocation and inheritance, cultural restrictions, lack of educational and training opportunities in rural areas.

This thesis evaluated fast track land reform in Zimbabwe basing on case study research of

Umguza. The factors examined include issues of 'equity' restructuring of access, security of tenure, food security, poverty alleviation and the sustainability of this phase of the land reform programme. To make the evaluation, the mini thesis draws on perceptions of people in and around Umguza resettlement scheme. The conclusion from this study is that none of the factors examined have been fulfilled as expected under the fast track land reform programme. The moral argument for facilitating the fast track land reform programme as presented in chapter one has similarly not been met.



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
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
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## APPENDIX I: STRUCTURED QUESTIONS THAT GUIDED THE STUDY

### A. Beneficiaries questions

#### *Demographic data*

1. Name of farm beneficiary.

Gender: male or female?

Age?

Ethnicity: Shona, Ndebele, Kalanga or other? Please specify.

Where do you originally come from? Umguza/Nyamandlovu or other e.g. Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South, Midlands, Mashonaland or Manicaland?

What is your level of education? Do you have any training in farming or some experience in agricultural enterprise?

What is your occupation?

How many people are in your household?



#### 2. Assets base

Size of plot

Size of land cleared/cultivated

What kind of crops are you growing?

Name all the farming equipment that you own?

What and how many animals do you have on the land?

How long have you been residing on the land?

What inputs do you buy? Fertilizer, seeds, insecticides? Any other not mentioned?

Do you have any other source of income besides your farm output? Yes or no?

If yes, what is this source of income? Does it constitute additional or it is the only means of livelihood?

2. b. Land use pattern- is it subsistence or commercial?

#### 3. Perception on selection process

How did you acquire your land? Did you formally apply for it or did you get it through some other means? Please specify.

Why do you think you were resettled? How do you justify being on the list of land recipients?

Were you the first to be offered land or was there someone offered before you?

Do you belong to any organization whether political or otherwise?

If so do you hold a leadership position in any structure of the organization?

#### 4. Support services

- a) Do you receive any kind of support whether it is technical, monetary, political and social or extension support? Yes/No

*Perceptions on support services*

- b) What do you think about these services?
- c) If they conflict, where is the conflict? The issue of power relations.
- d) In your assessment, are there some important services that are at the moment not being provided by government or NGOs in your area? If yes which are these?
- e) In your assessment, is government doing enough to support land beneficiaries? Yes/No
- f) If No, why do you say so?

#### 5. Perceptions on land allocation in Umguzu

Is the farm size adequate for you?

In your opinion, are there enough/ not enough farms or plots of land for all the people in your community who need land for farming?

In your view, was the method of identifying and selecting land recipients satisfactory? Yes/No.

If No why do you say so?

On fast track land resettlement in Umguzu, to what extent have you benefited?

- a) As an individual?
- b) As a community?

6. Perception/views on fast track land reform

In your view what should be done to improve fast-track land reform?

What do you think are the drawbacks of fast track land reform?

If you were involved in writing the fast track land reform policy, what priorities would you consider?

- a) As a person?
- b) As a community member?


7. Security of tenure

Do you think your rights to land ownership are protected/safeguarded?

What rights do you as beneficiaries have on the land? Can you freely transact in the land?

Can your land be inherited by your children after you die?

Do you as a beneficiary feel that you have enforceable and substantive rights to your plot of land?



8. Livelihood perception/ quality of life

Has there been an improvement in your household income because of your new status as a resettled farmer?

Do you feel you now have better food security than you had before resettlement? Yes/no?

Has your quality of life improved after fast track land reform?

**How far is your home from the following facilities?**

<i>Facility</i>	<i>Kilometres</i>	<i>Name</i>
Nearest health centre/Clinic		
Nearest water point		
Nearest Bank/POSB		
Nearest Primary School		
Nearest Secondary School		
Nearest Market		

Nearest Agricultural centre/Extension support		
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Has fast track created any economic opportunities for you?

**9. Conclusion**

Do you have any other comments or examples to give to add to what you have already said? Yes/No

If yes, please kindly make your contribution. Any comments you make are valid and important.



## **B. Non Beneficiaries**

### Demographic data

1. Name of respondent.

Gender: male or female?

Age?

Ethnicity: Shona, Ndebele, Kalanga or other? Please specify.

Where do you originally come from? Umguza/Nyamandlovu or other e.g. Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South, Midlands, Mashonaland or Manicaland?

What is your level of education?

What is your occupation?

How many people are in your household?

### 2. Assets base

What kind of crops are you growing?

Name all the farming equipment that you own?

What and how many animals do you have on the land?

Do you have any other source of income besides your farm output? Yes or no?

If yes, what is this source of income? Does it constitute additional or it is the only means of livelihood?

2. b. Land use pattern- is it subsistence or commercial?

### 3. Selection process

Did you formally apply for land resettlement? Please specify.

When did you apply for the land?

Do you have any historical claim to the land in Umguza?

Why do you think you were not chosen to be resettled?

How do you justify being/not being on the list of land recipients?

Do you have any training in farming or some experience in agricultural enterprise?

Were you the first to apply for land or were there others before you?

Do you belong to any organization whether political or otherwise?

If so do you hold a leadership position in any structure of the organization?

6. Support services

- j) Do you receive any kind of support whether it is technical, monetary, political and social or extension support? Yes/No
- k) If yes, is this support formal or informal?
- l) What do you think about these services?
- m) If they conflict, where is the conflict? The issue of power relations.
- n) In your assessment, are there some important services that are at the moment not being provided by government or NGOs in your area? If yes which are these?
- o) If No, why do you say so?

7. Perception/views on land allocation in Umguzu

In your opinion, are there enough/ not enough farms or plots of land for all the people in your community who need land for farming?

What is your view with regards to land allocation to people from different provinces outside of Matabeleland North?

In your view, was the method of identifying and selecting land recipients satisfactory? Yes/No?

If No why do you say so?

6. Perception/views on fast track land reform

In your view what should be done to improve fast-track land reform?

What do you think are the drawbacks of fast track land reform?

In your opinion was the Zimbabwean government justified in forcefully grabbing land or not from white farmers to redistribute it?

Is there any other that is not mentioned in the above list? Please specify.

7. Security of tenure

Should the government encourage or not encourage further land grabs?



**8. Livelihood perception/ quality of life**

Has your quality of life improved after fast track land reform?

Has fast track created any economic opportunities for you?

**9. Conclusion**

Do you have any other comments or examples to give to add to what you have already said? Yes/No

If yes, please kindly make your contribution. Any comments you make are valid and important.

