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Mission Impossible? Linking humanitarian assistance and Development aid in political emergencies in Southern Africa: the case of Mozambique between 1975 – 1995.

A research report submitted to the School of Government of the University of the Western Cape for the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Public Administration degree.

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DECLARATION

I declare that, *Mission Impossible? Linking humanitarian assistance and development aid in political emergencies in Southern Africa: the case of Mozambique between 1975 - 1995,* is my own work and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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Thokozani Sibusiso Vusumuzi Thusi
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this Dissertation to my dearest Mother, **Sizakele S Thusi**, who has been my pillar of strength, a source of hope and inspiration, from the cradle to the present, and without whose attention, love, care and guidance I would never come this far-Mphemba, Ndlela Ka Sompisi.

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Lastly, this work is also dedicated to the millions of men, women and children who are, today, still victims of war and genocide. For they are killed and maimed in wars though they never declare any, for **they have no one to declare them to** – being villagers wielding only **spears**, **words** and hope. May the world not forget the victims of **genocide** in **Rwanda** and the rest of Africa.

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Mission Impossible? Linking humanitarian assistance and development aid in political emergencies in Southern Africa: the case of Mozambique between 1975 – 1995.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Acronym	Definition	Notes
ACNUR	Alto Commissario das Nacoes Unidas Para Refugiados	English: UNHCR
AMODEG	Associacao Mocambicana dos Desmobilisados de Guerra	Veterans' NGO
AWEPA	Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa	
BPD	Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento	People's Development Bank
CAII	Creative Associates International Incorporated	Consultant
CCF	Cease-Fire Commission	Commissao do Cessar-Fogo
CCFADM	Joint Commission for the Formation Of the Mozambican Defense Force	
CENE	Commissao Executiva Nacional para	Government body for emergency coordination
CFA	Council for Africa	in Norwegian: Fellesradet for Afrika
CIVPOL	Civilian Police	
CAN	National Commission on Administration	
CNRS	National Commission for Social Insertion	
COMPOL	National Police Affairs Commission	
CORE	Reintegration Commission	
CSC	Supervision and Monitoring Commission	Commissao de Supervisao e Controlo in the United Nations Management Services
DDSMS	Department of Development Support	Secretariat
CPEs	Complex Political Emergencies	
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs	in the United Nations Secretariat
DNE	Direccao Nacional de Estatistica	
DPCCN	Direccao de Prevencao e Combate as	

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	Calamidades Naturais	
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	
DTU	Demobilisation Technical Unit	
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility	
EU	European Union	
FADM	Mozambican Defense Force	
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	UN agency
FLNA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola	
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique	
FUMO	Frente Unida de Mocambique	political party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	
GPA	General Peace Agreement	
GTZ	Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons	
IGOs	Intergovernmental Organization	
ILO	International Labour Organization	
IMF	International Monetary Fund	
INDER	Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento Rural	National Institute for Rural Development
INEFP	National Institute for Employment and Vocational Training	
INPF	Instituto Nacional de Planeamento Fisico	National Institute for Fiscal Planning Reintegration Operation
IRS	Information and Referral Service	
ISCOS	Instituto Sindicale Cooperazione Sviluppo	Italian NGO
LINK		NGO co-ordination Body
MCTC	Mine Clearance Training Center	
MFA	(Norwegian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
Mt	Meticais	sing. metical
MNCs	Multi-National Corporations	
MSF	Medicines Sans Frontieres	
MULEIDE	Mulher Lei Desenvolvimento	Women's rights org.
NAR	Nucleo de Apoio aos Refugiados	Govt. refugee agency
NEC	National Election Commission	
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations	
NOK	Norwegian Kroner	sing. Krone
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation	
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid	in Norwegian: Norsk Folkehjelp

|		
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	in Norwegian: Flyktningeradet
NRP	National Reconstruction Plan	
OIM	International Organization for Migration	
ODA	Official Development Aid	
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development	
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan	
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief	
PDP	Priority Districts Programme	
PESU	Programa de Emergencia Sementes e Utensilios	seeds and tools distribution programme
PFP	Policy Framework Paper	CG meetings' Document
PNUD	Programa das Nacoes Unidas para o Desenvolvimento	English: UNDP
PPI	Plano Trienal de Investimento Publico	10 year Indicative Plan
PRE	Programa de Reabilitacao Economica	Structural Adjustment Programme
PRES	Programa de Reabilitacao Economica e Social	Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme
PTIP	Plano Trienal de Investimento Publico	3 year Public Investment Plan
QIP	Quick Impact Projects	
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana	National Resistance Movement (MNR)
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front	
RSS	Reintegration Support Scheme	
SDR	Survey, demolition and reconnaissance	demining operations
SGS	Gurkha Security Guards	
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency	Aldo Ajello's title
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (of the United Nations)	
SPLA	Sudanese Peoples Liberation Front	
UN	United Nations	
UNAMEV	United Nations Verification Mission for Angola	
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	
UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Office	
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	
UNOHAC	United Nations Office of Humanitarian	

	Assistance Co-ordination
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNSCERO	United Nations Special Co-ordinator for Relief Operations in Mozambique
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front

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Map of MOZAMBIQUE

ABSTRACT

The aim of this research is to highlight both the conceptual and practical factors that constrain attempts to link humanitarian assistance and development aid in political emergencies in Southern Africa by using the case study of Mozambique in the period between 1975 – 1995. Extensive use and reference to Norwegian relief and development Aid during the abovementioned period is made. Although cross-reference is made to other donor countries such as the Like-minded Group (comprising of Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland) and UN agencies that supported Mozambique's transition from war to peace, the major focus is on Norway as she has traditionally been the sixth largest bilateral donor by the early 1990s and incorporated long-term development priorities in her programs.

The research stresses the problems associated with conceiving of humanitarian assistance and development aid as distinct from each other by highlighting the historical normative biases prevalent in both relief and development discourses. Furthermore, the research points out the practical factors that militate against attempts at linking relief with development aid by referring to, inter alia, issues relating to capacity building, the political economy of aid in conflicts, the violations of international humanitarian law as a reflection of insecurity in emergencies, and post-Cold War ideological influence on the NGO sector (both humanitarian and developmental), the influence of the structures of the international political economy and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and World Bank on the principles and practices of both forms of aid.

Thus the report argues that although the "continuum" is both feasible and appropriate in the long term, its conceptualization is inadequate due to its emphasis on linearity and has become redundant as a result of the rise of Complex Political Emergencies after the end of the Cold War. The "continuum" thesis needs to incorporate some of the analysis provided by the *Capacities and Vulnerability Analysis (CVA)* perspective in order to highlight that the complexity of emergencies does allow for the linkage to occur during and/or after the crisis and that the most important thing is to understand the

interdependency between donor and agency programs and broader political, economic and cultural forces that impact on the achievement of the continuum.

For example, the *CVA* perspective has provided a comparative framework between Capacities and Vulnerabilities and delineated the relationship under three categories. These are the material, the social and the attitudinal. The aim is to demonstrate that any humanitarian and/or developmental activity or intervention that encompasses dimensions of such variables as gender, age, ethnicity, and socio-economic status of aid recipients differentiate and affect the relationship between capacities and vulnerability. Thus any emphasis on one variable over another (i.e. gender by designing programs that favor males over females) affects the outcome of the broader programme (such as the status, identity and the capacities of women to confront their humanitarian and developmental vulnerability). This means that, therefore, any attempt to link humanitarian assistance and development aid should be self-conscious of the fact that these two forms of aid are intrinsically linked with other social, political, cultural, economic, and socio-economic processes that at times fall outside the realm of the nation state.

Key words: **Humanitarian Assistance, Development Aid, Complex Political Emergencies, Political Emergencies, Capacity building, Aid Coordination.**

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Humanitarian Assistance and Development Aid in Historical Perspective

Since about 1700 there have been 471 wars, resulting in an estimated 101 – 187 million deaths. More than 90 per cent of these deaths have occurred in the twentieth century. [1] This unparalleled level of violence in the previous century resulted in the evolution of equally unparalleled international institutional, legal instruments, and specialized agencies aimed at regulating the conduct of war and to mitigate its human costs. Responses aimed at mitigating the effects of this conflict have traditionally comprised of of a dichotomous relationship between relief and developmental interventions.

However, with changes in the character of humanitarian emergencies the line between these two has been blurred. By the 1980s the context of conflict-induced emergencies has seen a dramatic rise in emergency relief amounting to $353 million or 2 per cent of total ODA, by 1994 this increased to over 10 per cent equivalent to more than $3 billion. [2] Thus the conceptualization and practice of aid had to adjust accordingly to new challenges and problems.

As protracted complex political emergencies intensified in the 1990s (and the role of humanitarian NGOs becoming complex and diversified), there have been increasing calls for the establishment of a closer linkage between relief and development in the context of these emergencies. Some have argued that since both interventions have a component of welfare, there is a need to establish a continuum that constitute, inter alia, of material assistance for immediate need (e.g. provision of food), material assistance for intermediate needs (e.g. provision of seed), through provision of social services (e.g. primary health-care education), single component interventions (e.g. micro-credit), integrated interventions (e.g. sub-sector promotion or micro-enterprise credit), to

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[1] Quoted from Zwi and Ugalde, *"Towards an epidemiology of political violence in the Third World"*, Social Sciences and Medicine, 28 (7), 633 – 642.

[2] See, Development Assistance Committee, DAC, *Annual Report*, 1995, OECD, Paris.

development or self-reliance dominant programs via capacity building of new community networks and norms such as building new forms of social capital.[3] However, despite the operational usefulness of the continuum thesis in the context of protracted emergencies, various questions that include the construction of the discourses of both forms aid and the resulting tensions have not been answered.

Although for most part of the post-second world war period world humanitarian assistance and development aid have become analogous to the imaginary of discourses that juxtapose North and South whilst negating historicity and normative bias in such intellectual activity.[4] Both forms of aid constitute an integral part of western discourse where the South is imagined as being backward, chaotic, in crisis and underdeveloped whereas the North is progressive, orderly, and developed. Within this picture the former becomes an arena where intervention to provide the necessary public goods to limit the impact of famine, poverty, war and disease is a noble duty of the latter. This kind of thinking is in turn legitimized by the discourses and narratives that both forms of aid use in order to justify their actions and maintain their own perceptions of societies they operate in whilst silencing opposing views about both the nature and solution to social crisis.

As will be demonstrated in this report, discourses on both relief and development are part of larger machinery that the Northern countries use in order to portray, control and regulate the Southern experience in ways that do not destroy or challenge the global status quo. Development discourse, for instance, despite claims to the contrary, is constituted and reproduced within a set of material relationships, activities and powers – social, cultural and geopolitical that in turn determine its operations.

This report will analyze both forms of aid keeping this conviction in mind in order to demonstrate the need of critical awareness about the fundamental role of these forms of

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[3] Buckland, J, (1998), "From Relief and Development to Assisted Self-reliance: Non-Governmental Organizations in Bangladesh", 1998, August.
[4] Crush, J. (ed.) (1995). "Imagining development", in Crush, J. (ed.), The Power of Development, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 6.

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aid and their relationships with the broader political economy before calling for their conceptual and practical linkage in situations of Complex Political Emergencies (CPEs), focusing largely at the post-cold war emergencies but highlighting the nature of political emergencies during the cold war, since it was mostly these that were either resolved or intensified.. [5]

The complexities in the nature of crisis that soon followed the end of the Cold War have resulted in increased demands for humanitarian intervention. The last four decades of the twentieth century were marked by severe crisis ranging from economic collapse, institutional collapse, man-made famine, ethnic cleansing and conflict, hunger and abject poverty, epidemics and pandemics to mass starvation, especially in the countries of the south. These and other humanitarian disasters prompted various institutional and organizational responses from the international humanitarian community. Furthermore, these responses which ranged from humanitarian military intervention to more limited and traditional forms of humanitarian assistance to more overtly political/ideological forms, in turn resulted in challenges to some of the sacrosanct ideas that have dominated most part of the post-World War II world such as the inviolability of the principle of sovereignty. [6]

The fact that the collapse of the Berlin Wall intensified 'new' kinds of conflict, which in turn resulted in profound changes to humanitarian principles and doctrines thus illustrated and revealed the political dimensions of relief aid. [7] It was solely due to this latter fact that the failure on the part of many humanitarian practitioners to understand the underlying

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[5] Complex Political Emergencies are said to result from such inter-locking causes as the, collapse of political institutions, the phenomena of 'failed states', civil and ethnic strife, famine, displacement of people, disputed sovereignty, the breakdown of national governments and the decline of national economies. See, Harris, J. (ed.) (1995). **The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention**, London: Save the Children Fund, Pinter, p. 1. However, it should be noted that for the purposes of these study the term Complex Political Emergencies (CPEs) is used inter-changeable with Political Emergencies since the author is convinced that humanitarian emergencies during the Cold War were complex as well. This is illustrated by the debates whether Mozambique is a complex emergency or merely a simple political emergency.

[6] Macmillan, J and Linklater, A. (eds.) (1995). **Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations**, London: Pinter, 4.

[7] The legacy of the secessionist war in Biafra in the late 60s and early 70s taught the humanitarian Community invaluable lessons about the political dimensions of relief intervention.

political nature of providing humanitarian assistance resulted in humanitarian assistance intervention producing mixed results. The failures associated with humanitarian assistance following the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda prove testimony to the negative impact of relief aid. However, the evolution of humanitarian assistance has a history that somehow resembles that of development aid (as this report will demonstrate), both in evolution and practical consequences.

Much of the doctrines and practices of humanitarian assistance within the Westphalian state system came under increasing scrutiny after the Second World War. The middle 70s were a period of increasing intervention by the 'international community' in the countries of the south under various civilizing missions that were nothing but a proxy strategy in the ideological war between the then superpowers.

The middle 70s further saw a dramatic and phenomenal increase in the involvement of the voluntary community in the provision of both relief/humanitarian and development aid to the countries of the south. The First Development Decade (1961-1970) envisaged a situation where the "Third World", which has just emerged from decolonisation, will be provided with appropriate resources and other policy intervention measures which will in turn ensure that these countries achieve high levels of economic growth like their Northern counterparts. On the other hand the more philanthropic and altruistic form of aid that humanitarian assistance has been portrayed to be was perceived as a distinct and temporary form of aid (separate from development aid in both purpose and consequence) solely aimed at ensuring that, in times of disaster, these 'disaster prone' societies are provided with such necessities as food and medicine in ensuring their movement back to more 'normal' forms of development.[8]

Both forms of aid were thus separately conceived and perceived to be synonymous with the provision of basic social services (albeit in different circumstances) in societies in distress. The emphasis was on self-help and sustainability (i.e. in refugee situations) and

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[8] de Waal, A. (1997). **Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa**, p. 1. Here de Waal argues strongly against the portrayal of famine as a natural catastrophe in need and points out the

mutual aid in order to reduce vulnerability in the recurrence of humanitarian disasters. Providers of these forms of aid perceived the sources of vulnerability in most "Third World" countries as stemming from the apparent failure of post-independence governments to live up to their duty of ensuring the provision of basic socio-economic goods through high growth rates in order to satisfy the needs of their people.

Thus the decline in the pre-independence living standards in many of these countries saw a rise in population risk and the corresponding rise in provision of aid. This was conventionally attributed to the impact of tradition in hindering modernization.

Famine (which was itself inaccurately perceived as a purely 'natural' catastrophe), drought, conflict induced emergencies and as well as other forms of man-made disasters were seen as temporary disruptions in a route to Rostowian paths to development and recovery which could be resolved with adequate provision of relief and development aid.[9]

This binary thinking is in itself a reflection of positivist forms of thinking that dominates much of western social science perceiving the world as being divided between extremely opposing dichotomies. This permeated the world of humanitarianism and resulted in a separation of relief (seen as a short-term intervention) and development (perceived as a long-term form of intervention) that dominated much of the thinking around aid for much of the post-World War II world in both international relations and International Relations (denoting the discipline). It is here that a closer look at the discourses on development reveals the historical construction of opposing worlds between the "First World" and "Third World".

Therefore, is seemed inevitable that development (just as other forms of knowledge) would be contested.

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underlying political causes of humanitarian crisis.

[9] Much of the literature on development that emerged from the 70s has argued strongly against the modernist notions of socio-economic progress and pointed out the historical and material conditions of those in the peripheries of global capital. This has been the central argument of the dependency school although it also suffered from linearity in a similar fashion as modernism. See, Mamdani, M. (1996). **Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism**, Fountain: Kampala,

'Development' Under Fire

There were various approaches that emerged outside the modernization paradigm of development. Some of these were morally aimed at being programmatic interventions against the effects of development perceived solely as industrialization, agricultural modernization and urbanization. The work of Latin American scholars such as Paulo Freire (1972, 1973) contributed to many other attempts (i.e. dependency theory) aimed at analyzing the effects of 'development' and suggest ways in which ordinary people could confront this process. [10]

Although the work of Freire (1972, 1973) was mainly about the role of the so called "Liberation Theology" as a tool of pedagogic empowerment for the poor, it nonetheless contributed to a focus on popular mobilization, the rise of grass-roots movements and an explicit biasness in favor of the poor.[11] In developmental practice the legacy of Freire is mostly related to capacity building (a point this report focuses on when discussing the Mozambican case), and empowerment.

Thus during the early 80s many NGOs in the development field started to argue that there is a need for a shift towards a focus on recipients as people whose knowledge is central to development, to an understanding that self-awareness, learning, self-esteem, and the capacity for political action are mutually reinforcing, and lastly that the poor and marginalized people have the right and capacity to organize and challenge authority in order to create a society based on justice and freedom.

However, despite the endurance and positive contribution of this kind of thinking on the whole development industry (as more organizations begun focusing on the empowerment of the poor and understanding the role of unequal power relations amongst groups of the poor), the development 'machinery' continued to come under attack, especially during

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p. 3-34.
[10] Eade, D., (1998). **Capacity-Building: An Approach to People-Centered Development**, OXFAM: United Kingdom.
[11] Ibid, p. 10-11.

the early 90s. Scholars and activists such as Robert Chambers, James Ferguson (1990), (1995), Samir Amin (1990) Jean Parpart (1995), Mahmood Mamdani (1996), Arturo Escobar (1995), amongst others, challenged the development enterprise for what they perceived as an "impasse". They argued for a "post-development era", since much of development has failed in its claims.

In different ways these scholars argue that the Western model of development is intrinsically unsustainable and undesirable. For Escobar (1995), this is so because the development industry is simply a representation of a post-1945 construct within which the West shape and manage relations between nations and peoples. Development is thus, *"... an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies".*[12] It is within this context, according to Escobar (1995), that global institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, the UN, the regional development banks, as well as bi-lateral agencies – and indeed most NGOs operate within and reinforce a world view that regards development as, *"... paving the way for the achievement of those conditions that characterize Western rich societies such as industrialization, agricultural modernization and urbanization".*[13]

Others have taken the argument further and focused on the language of development as a tool within which we can understand the persistence of its dominance. These analysts have questioned the persistence of development despite the obvious truth that it does not 'work' – or at least with the consequences intended or the outcomes predicted. They point out the power of the language of development and the manner in which it produces the "Third World" (in need of its services) and how the latter in turn reproduces itself through conforming to developmental language. This language depicts the "Third World" as being existing outside modern history, its past impervious to change, traditional, ahistorical and space-insensitive whereas the "First World" is forward looking and

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[12] Escobar, A., (1995), *"The Making and Unmaking of the Third World Through Development"*, this comes from an abridged version extracted from Chapter 2 of, *'The Problematization of Poverty: The Tale of Three Worlds and Development'*, of Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton University Press, 1995, appearing in, The Post-Development Reader, p. 85-93.

progressive thus in a better position to provide the necessary stimuli and intervention for growth in the former.

However, exploring the discourse on development reveals a language constructed by history and aimed at ensuring the control and dominance of the non-western experience. Development as discourse legitimizes certain forms of intervention and voices whilst excluding others. Clearly this is not a benign but fundamentally historical and political process.

Thus some scholars have stated that when, "... *conceived of as a discourse, development is seen to manifest a set of languages and practices which reflect relations of power as much as they attempt to address poverty, economic growth and so forth*", according to this view development discourse refers to, " ... *the manner in which it makes its arguments and establishes its authority, the manner in which it constructs the world (which) are usually seen as self evident and unworthy of attention*", whilst narratives refer to, " ... *the language of development (which) constantly visualizes landscape, territory, area, location, distance, boundary, and situation ... one of the primary elements in the development narrative is the setting of the geographical stage*".[14] As a result many interventions are executed using these parallel binaries, which view the other experience as a reference and panacea for the other.

However, the increase in the amount of development aid to the countries of the South without corresponding successes resulted in unprecedented introspection on the part of providers and practitioners within the aid industry alike. There emerged doubts as to the validity of some of the claims (i.e. that development was synonymous with economic growth) and assumptions of development. The apparent failures of both the fundamental discourses and practices of development has been a subject of volumes of books and

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[13] Ibid, p. 86.

[14] Crush, J. (ed.) (1995). *"Imagining development"*, in Crush, J. (ed.) (1995). **The Power of Development**, London: Routledge, quoted from Thompson, L and Tapscott, C, (1998). *"Thinking beyond the discourse: towards alternative to development in southern Africa*", unpublished paper presented at the International Seminar on Development, Democracy and Aid", School of Government, University of the Western Cape, Bellville, 22-23 November 1999, p. 1.

other studies and should thus not be repeated here. Suffice to mention that the emergence of such critical (albeit limited) perspectives and paradigms as "Alternative Development", "Post-Development", and the radical "Anti-Development" perspectives illustrate frustration with the assumptions of the development project.

The above perspectives although mostly concerned with the general shortcomings of development as practiced in the so-called "Third World" (and not necessarily concerned with the link between development and relief aid as this report does), nevertheless profoundly highlighted the poverty of the discourse as practice since the late 1970s.

Since the late 1970s neo-liberal discourse and narratives have continuously come under increasing scrutiny as it emerged that, since they are both part of the political processes that constitute the fundamentals of knowledge construction (in a neo-Gramscian sense), they are biased towards certain forms of 'knowledge' and discard others. The emphasis on economic growth as a major indicator of development has been analyzed in its relation to the normative biasness of the discourses and narratives on development. Furthermore, the inclusion and exclusion of other aspects of socio-economic and political variables and the relegation of other experiences in favor of others, explains why development discourse is deliberately silent on issues of asymmetrical power and gender relations that permeate the development enterprise.[15]

This dichotomous type of thinking further dominated much of the late 70s and early to the mid 1980s in terms of both perception and prescription. It was a kind of thinking based on a biased form of an 'Anti-Politics' discourse that was self-serving and devoid of any form of normative scrutiny. It was self-consciously reinforced by donor agencies that allocated funds for programmes and projects in accordance with whether they were 'developmental' or 'relief' orientated. Indeed some programs were refused funding on grounds that they were "too developmental".[16]

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[15] Parpart, J. l. (1995). *"Post-Modernism, Gender and Development"*, in Crush, J. (ed.) (1995). **The Power of Development**, London: Routledge, p. 256.
[16] Commins, S. (1996). *"In the line of fire: development in conflict"*, in Eade, D (ed.) (1996). **Development in States of War**, Oxfam, p. 8.

It is important and instructive to note that issues of asymmetrical power and gender relations are central to lives of thousands of millions of people (most of them women) whose experiences are marginalized both at the level of thinking and policy intervention, subjecting them to lives of permanent misery and humanitarian crisis. Any attempts at linking humanitarian assistance and development aid (as this report seeks to do) should thus take into account these biases. It is the same biases that have resulted in most refugee camp projects being silent on issues of asymmetry, difference, culture, locality and gender imbalances and thus proposing policy interventions that perpetuate inequalities amongst groups of vulnerable communities.

Various theories such as Critical Theory and Feminism (of whatever ideological orientation) have pointed out the biasness of development discourse in terms of both its class and gender analysis. Although these approaches in themselves do not necessarily focus on these biases in situations of humanitarian disasters, they nonetheless point out that these discourses reflect global hegemonic structures of power based on positivist and modernist patriarchal, and indeed monetist interpretations of how the world 'is' and operates.[17] The influence of these global hegemonic understandings and interpretations is in turn illustrated by such processes as globalization, the nature of the relief industry in terms of priority in project funding, and consequently sets the agendas of aid (both developmental and humanitarian) as practiced in the South through such institutions as the IMF and the World Bank.

With regard to relief aid or humanitarian assistance, the period from the late 70s up to the middle 80s was characterized by profound difficulties and challenges for humanitarian missions. Most of these challenges were related to the dynamic and complex political environment within which humanitarian assistance was provided. Some of these were evident in humanitarian operations mounted in such diverse areas as Biafra, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador.[18] The problems associated with and

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[17] Thompson, L, (1998).
[18] Commins, S. (1996), op. cit., p. 9.

experienced during these missions prompted calls for critical reflection and review of the manner in which humanitarian assistance was conceptualized and practiced.

There were increased arguments against what was perceived as a misplaced kind of dichotomous thinking in the fields of humanitarian assistance and development aid.[19] This was due to, inter alia, the fact that despite massive provision of aid (both humanitarian and developmental) there was very little to show in terms of positive and sustainable results. Towards the end of the 1980s it was becoming clear that humanitarian assistance has had negative impacts on the lives of communities living under conditions of semi-permanent emergency, which included capacity to prolong conflicts (by providing resources that could be fought over) and generally entrenching the cycle of violence and dependency on the part of 'victims' or recipients.[20]

The increase in the complexity of humanitarian disasters/emergencies during the closing years of the Cold War and the corresponding inability to influence them, prompted the United Nations specialized agencies to devise 'new' (albeit ill-conceived as it turned out) means of dealing with these emergencies. Thus the recognition by the UNHCR that its traditional rural settlement model was no longer viable and universally durable in refugee situations resulted in the former establishing a framework of co-operation with the UNDP in order to increase, " ... *co-operation with regard to development activities affecting refugees and returnees*".[21] In 1990 the UN Secretary General granted official status to the UNDP to co-ordinate the organizations humanitarian responses. These changes were also in part due to the changing context within which humanitarian assistance was provided as a result of the end of the cold war.

The end of the cold war challenged hitherto sacrosanct ideas in international relations such as the principle of sovereignty. As more "humanitarian space" opened there was operational room for humanitarian organizations not only to articulate but to

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[19] Ibid, p. 9.
[20] Prendergast, J. (1996). **Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa**, p. 9-12.
[21] Sollis, P. (1994). *"The Relief-Development Continuum; some notes on rethinking assistance for civilian victims of conflict"*, Journal of International Affairs, winter 1994, Issue 2, p. 451.

operationalise 'new' approaches towards emergencies since these now demonstrated a complexity that required emphasis on such things as conflict resolution, capacity building, peace-building, rebuilding of infrastructure and the increase in calls for respect of human rights and international humanitarian law norms during conflict induced emergencies.

The changes that were induced by the post-cold war world did not only occur at the level of the UN and its specialized agencies. Various NGOs diversified their work in line with the recognition that separating relief work from development and vice versa, especially in conditions of semi-permanent emergencies, was both unsustainable and counter-productive.[22] This realization influenced relief organizations such as OXFAM to change some of their basic approaches, especially in refugee situations. When OXFAM-Great Britain started working with refugees from south Sudan since 1994, they established the Ikafe/Imvepi settlement where they attempted to integrate camp projects with long-term development needs of the local Ugandan structures.[23]

However, in general, the persistent and continued failure of societies under emergencies to return to "developmental normality" in spite of massive resource investment renewed calls for new approaches that went beyond the dichotomy between humanitarian assistance and development aid.

These calls were based on a perspective or paradigm referred to as the "relief-rehabilitation-development continuum".[24] The "continuum" approach, as it came to be known, has been proposed as the most appropriate conceptual and practical model aimed at achieving a workable linkage between relief and development, especially in times of humanitarian emergencies.

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[22] See, Gundel, J. (1999). **Humanitarian Assistance: Breaking the Waves of Complex Political Emergencies-A Literature Survey**, p. 32.

[23] Payne, L. (1998). **Rebuilding communities in a refugee settlement: A Casebook from Uganda**, OXFAM publications.

[24] For a discussion on the "continuum" see, Gundel, J. (1999), op. cit., p. 32.

The "continuum" thesis argues that there exists a conceptual and practical overlap between and within relief, rehabilitation and development. In other words there is a mutual reinforcing relationship between these three aspects of intervention and activity in societies whose social, political and economic fabric has been disrupted by either natural disasters or conflict induced humanitarian disasters. This means that operationally when implementing projects relief agencies should do so in a manner that encourages recovery and re-establishment of long-term sustainable live hoods for the target population.

Such an approach is viewed as being crucial to long-term interests of a society in need of addressing problems such as poverty alleviation, and rebuilding of social infrastructure resulting from war induced humanitarian disasters. This approach has far reaching implications for the post-conflict 'sustainable' development path a society takes. This is not to negate the influence of the external environment (i.e. global financial institutions) has on such a project but rather to highlight that development and recovery should be incorporated in relief interventions because the end goal of humanitarian aid is not to encourage conditions of permanent emergency. Thus development planning cannot wait till the emergency is over, so argue the "continuum" protagonists.

However, although this report concurs with some of the assumptions of this approach it will be argued that there is a need for caution before one arrives at unsound and premature conclusions as to the feasibility of such an approach. This is so because the complexities of political emergencies (let alone those associated with the nature of both types of aid regimes) requires us to consider issues of agents, global political environment, institutional capacity, and fundamental power relations between various actors.

For example, since the continuum debate acknowledges a "gray area" between relief and development by implication there is a need to identify agents to fill this "gap". The argument is for the empowerment of recipients and local agents through capacity building in order to enable them to manage and take over these projects to their end once the

conflict is over. However, a cursory look at the current literature on capacity building within the aid industry in general leaves much to be desired.[25]

The strength of local/indigenous organizations with maximum recipient support can be a major contributing factor in shaping the direction and impact of humanitarian responses and as well as showing that humanitarian disasters can be mediated. Thus attempts can be better mediated by embarking on a much broader vision and strategy that links various forms of aid, approaches and strategies in an attempt at addressing the initial underlying economic and political causes of humanitarian disasters. Unfortunately the process of capacity building as proposed in situations of emergency such as in refugee camps, in the context of repatriated refugee groups and returnees, and various communities of the internally displaced, proves very illusive for many relief agencies forming part of the humanitarian international.[26]

Furthermore, it is also important to highlight that much of what has rekindled the continuum debate has been influenced by such environmental factors as the changing nature of emergencies since the end of the Cold War. The multi-dimensional, multi-causal and multi-mandate nature of complex political emergencies in the decade 1989-1999 increasingly compelled the humanitarian community to admit that, issues of conflict resolution, peace-building, long-term poverty alleviation, gender biases in resource access and allocation, social justice, institutional building and reconstruction, as well as local capacity building form part of the problem and solution. All these form an integral part of a comprehensive and long-term sustainable approach towards addressing humanitarian crisis, during and after the emergency.

Thus post-Cold War complex political emergencies characteristics imply that, at another level, a movement towards post-conflict reconstruction involves rebuilding infrastructure

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[25] In a preliminary study on local capacity building in NGOs in Tanzania and Kenya, Cornelissen, S and Ngoma, N. (2000), *"Non-Governmental Organizations and Capacity Building in Complex Political Emergencies: A Case of Kenya and Tanzania"*, the authors found a very depressing scenario where there was lack of consensus between INGOs and indigenous NGOs as to the meaning, let alone the practice, of capacity building.

[26] Cornelissen, S and Ngoma, N. (2000), op. cit.

and 'micro-economies', absorbing and addressing the impact of traumatic changes as well as pressures on social relations, and rehabilitating every level of society such as households, communities, civil groups, professional associations, and governmental institutions. All this being done with a clear grasp of the kind of dynamics that influence social relations (such as power) in humanitarian emergencies in order to avoid reinforcing those aspects of life that promote inequality or deepen marginalisation during and after a conflict induced emergency.

However, despite the positive connotations (both conceptual and practically) associated with the "relief-rehabilitation-development continuum" there have been some critical studies that have highlighted the limitations of this approach. Although there is an emerging consensus that potentially the continuum approach can, under certain conditions, improve the efficacy of relief provision in situations of semi-permanent and protracted complex emergencies, there is a need for caution.

Critics have pointed out that the "continuum" argument is more appropriate and useful as a tool of analysis and strategic approach in situations of humanitarian emergencies such as those caused by food insecurity and drought, but less so in the too often complex conditions of violence induced complex political emergencies.

In the abovementioned situations of food insecurity and drought, critics point out that, what are apparent is that the "gap" between these two forms of aid along one of the continuum has been substantially altered and that the occurrence and attainment of the linkage depends largely on some environmental factors that are beyond the typology itself.[27] Thus the environmental factors within which both forms of aid occur (i.e. extreme violence, the global international economic discourse) determine and shape the attainment and practicality of the continuum. This means that we first need to determine whether both the international political economy and the discourses it uses and interventions it promotes (in the case of development) and as well as the conditions under

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[27] Commins, S. (1996). Op. cit., p.8.

which complex political emergencies occur in fact renders the attainment of the continuum practical and moves it beyond its apparent sound conceptual basis.

Contributing to the evaluation of the practical dimensions of the continuum under violence induced complex political emergencies; Bradbury (1997) has questioned the wisdom of establishing such a linkage under conditions of protracted and semi-permanent emergencies. He argues that, at a practical and operational level, there need to exist three conditions that can render the continuum possible. These include, inter alia, that:

- There must be a minimal level of security, respect for human rights and humanitarian access must exist;
- There must exist an availability of empirical evidence suggesting that the emergency is really over;
- Lastly, moving from relief to development aid programming is contingent upon donor governments accepting the legitimacy of national governmental structures as well as the rebel movement.[28]

However, a cursory look at some of the features of today's complex political emergencies raises some skepticism about the feasibility of attaining the continuum linkage in the typology suggested above. This is serious and deserves attention since there is always a tendency to confuse desirability and possibility in debates about linking humanitarian assistance and development aid.

The issue of security and humanitarian access has been central and as well as contentious for both relief agencies and belligerents alike. The former has emphasized unlimited access in pursuit of the "humanitarian imperative" (at times the reality being that they simply "throw" food at political problems) whilst the latter insist upon sovereignty and political control. These tensions continue to limit the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance interventions.

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[28] Gundel, J., (1999). Op. cit., p. 35.

For example, in Angola two UN aircraft were shot down near Huambo on 26 December 1998 and the 2nd of January 1999 respectively. [29]The latter, therefore resulted in the death of 15 passengers and eight crewmembers. In Uganda on several occasions relief organizations such as OXFAM Great Britain have been forced to suspend (and at times totally cease) operations as a direct result of insecurity, as was the case in April 1996 after alleged rebels of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) begun emerging from their hideouts in Sudan and attacked northern parts of the country targeting the organizations personnel, property and supplies. [30]

There are dozens of other cases where humanitarian assistance has been subjected to repeated attacks thereby prompting some agencies to call for the UN to ensure the establishment of safe operations as was the case in the period immediately after the end of the cold war in operations mounted in Kurdistan, Somalia and Bosnia.

However, some critics have argued against emphasis on the protection of humanitarian assistance rather than its recipients stating that:

> " The main achievement of humanitarian law lies in the protection
> afforded to non-combatants: civilian property and objects may not
> be attacked. The UN resolutions adopted in connection with the
> flight of the Kurds and the Yugoslav and Somali conflicts all refer to
> the protection of aid convoys – a new doctrine in humanitarian
> action – while not one mentions the protection of the victims. The
> civilian population is regarded solely as the recipient of aid, which
> is lavishly provided with the best of intentions, even if it never
> reaches its intended target. Preoccupation with logistics eclipses
> concern for human beings, as if soap or milk powder could prevent

[29] Vines, A. (ed.) (2000). *"Angola: 40 Years of War"*, Track Two, Occasional Paper, Vol. 9, June 2000.
[30] Payne, L. (1998)., op. cit., p. 29.

bombs from falling on hospitals, or generosity could offer protection against murder and expulsion". [31]

The above otherwise justifiable view misses the point around issues of humanitarian assistance inviolability. The point is that although relief agencies and practitioners emphasize the protection of humanitarian assistance they are nonetheless equally concerned about issues of safety and immunity granted to their 'clients' by international humanitarian law. Indeed part of the current problems surrounding the relief industry is the very dichotomous view of issues. Issues of humanitarian assistance protection cannot be separated (although legally they currently are) from issues of international humanitarian law that protect victims of violent conflict. [32]

Furthermore, since the post-cold war humanitarian emergencies are multi-causal, relief agencies have begun to adopt more broader and multi-dimensional strategic responses that, inter alia, incorporate issues of advocacy for the well-being and protection of themselves, their partners, relief supplies and humanitarian victims.

The point being illustrated and made here is that, issues of security for humanitarian aid stem from the widespread insecurity that this kind of aid has been subjected to under the context of complex political emergencies. Empirical evidence as quoted above validates Bradbury's (1997) concerns (but by no means accepts the entire typology or its assumptions) over the feasibility of the continuum under such conditions.

However, although situations of complex political emergencies do demonstrate the nexus between security and 'long-term' integrated (development) planning, relief agencies have in fact adopted various, albeit controversial, measures such as hiring guards in order to protect relief supplies and thereby minimizing the disruption that comes with attacks on

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[31] Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier, (1993). *"Peacekeeping operations above humanitarian law"*, in African Rights, 1994, p. 8.
[32] De Waal, (1994), "Humanitarianism Unbound: Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies", London: Africa Rights, Discussion Paper, No: 5, Novermber, 1994; de Waal (1994), shares this view in this seminal work referred to here.

aid. Whether these or other measures are sufficient to render the continuum feasibly is still a subject of controversy as will be shown by this report.

The second determinant of successful establishment of the linkage between relief and development in complex emergencies in the above typology relates to the existence of evidence that suggests that the emergency is really over.

Identifying a clear threshold with maximum precision as to the point of the cessation of hostilities is extremely difficult. The threshold between war and permanent peace is often a complex phenomena and task made more difficult by the notorious violation of ceasefire agreements that characterize much of complex emergencies, especially in Africa. This has been the case in Angola (after the collapse of the 1992 Bicesse Accords), Somalia, Sudan, the DRC, and in most parts of the Great Lakes region where no less than five countries are at war. Therefore, the ability to verify whether the emergency is over is illusive in most African complex emergencies, a situation exacerbated by the failure of the UN (or any other sub-regional or multi-lateral organization charged with the ensuring and provision of public peace), to effectively ensure long-term peaceful and sustainable political transitions from war.

Lastly, Bradbury (1997) argues that the continuum is likely possible if the international community gives due recognition to the legitimacy of the belligerents. However, like in other political aspects in international relations the asymmetrical relations that currently characterize the humanitarian regime (where aid moves from the North to the South) geo-political considerations often encroach and influence the behavior of the dominant members of the international community, especially those who have a historical influence on a particular region under emergency.

Western governments and donors alike have demonstrated a selective approach towards their recognition of different governments and rebel forces. This is a similar pattern they follow when giving priority to one crisis above others of a similar nature and proportion. In some cases the recognition is determined by the politics of the historical relationship

that is in existence between the main actors in a given conflict vis-à-vis western governments. This shows that in most cases humanitarian objectives are compromised and are inevitably conditioned by the political considerations of western powers in a given conflict.

Today there have emerged phenomena of "forgotten wars" as is the case in the Angolan conflict and Sudan (although Operation Lifeline Sudan-OLS still provides some help) whilst at the same time focus (coupled with extensive media coverage) has shifted towards the former eastern block countries such as in the Kosovo crisis. This is an interesting and very curious observation to note since it highlights the asymmetry and humanitarian biases that characterizes the relief industry. This deliberate selectiveness renders the principle of altruism and the nobleness of the 'humanitarian imperative' very dubious.

The so-called "Fashoda Syndrome" crisis that erupted between France and the RPF demonstrated how deep historical considerations influence western humanitarian responses.[33] When the RPF took over power from the genocidal Hutu regime in Rwanda in July 1994, the French government refused to grant it diplomatic status viewing the new government as a British force aimed at reducing the French influence in the Great Lakes. This was quite ironical given the historical role of France in arming the genocidal regime that was overthrown by the RPF.

As was demonstrated in the Rwandan crisis regarding the legitimacy of the new RPF government, the lesson is that indeed such attitudes have the potential of delaying the disbursement of funds aimed at rebuilding a country emerging from conditions of emergency. Thus there is a need to be aware of the limiting role that various powers in the international community do play in constraining the positive impact of both relief and development aid.

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[33] Fashoda is a small southern Sudanese village, where, in 1898, the eastbound French forces of Captain Marchand met southwards-moving British army of Lord Kitchener. The Cape-to-Cairo and Dakar-to-Djibouti dreams were in collision. The result was nearly a European war. See, Prunier, G. (1995). **The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide**, Columbia Press, p. 105.

Another critique of the simplicity of the "relief-rehabilitation-development continuum" thesis is that it ignores, quite significantly, the possibility that just as relief aid does in some cases exacerbate conflict, the history of development aid proves that it is also capable of having negative impacts on its targets. This has been the case in the context of socio-economic dislocations arising from SAPs.

As will be demonstrated elsewhere in this report, humanitarian assistance can be misused by the belligerents either directly as an instrument of war (as was the case in Biafra), as a cause of conflict, or indirectly by providing the necessary resources to keep the conflict going, development aid has similar consequences (albeit in different circumstances) of either being an object of conflict or perpetuating the status quo. For example, in refugee camps situated in conditions of semi-permanent emergency, development aid intervention has the potential of fuelling conflict between the local population and refugees as it provides opportunities and resources the former feels entitled to as well. According to others, this situation can also be found in the humanitarian crisis in the context of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).[34]

Furthermore, developmental programming requires that providers of assistance must work with governmental authorities or where applicable work with rebel leaders, both of which can contribute to insecurity. This is why engaging either of the two rather important actors in the conflict through the provision of public welfare and to organize the means of production may imply the violation of humanitarian principles and would mean ignoring the role of existing governments in disaster creation. Thus to provide resources to illegitimate regimes implies an implicit condoning of political violence and increases the ever present risk that international humanitarian resources will be used against the interests of war-affected victims.

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[34] For this point I am indebted to Professor Lisa Thompson, of the Center for Southern African Studies (CSAS), School of Government, University of the Western Cape. See also, Thompson, L., (1998). *"The Bpath between the Eeart and Eand: the 'fit' between the Politics and the conomics of Eumanitarian Aid"*, unpublished paper prepared for the Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa Programme under the theme, *"The political economy of Eumanitarian Assistance"*.

In addition both relief and development aid can lose their fundamental principle of neutrality and become targets of attack from belligerents who can justify their actions by claiming that aid agencies are biased.

At a more significant and macro-political level, continuum thinking seems to be silent on the linkage between humanitarian assistance and the broader global economy on one hand and the negative impact of developmental programming and discourse on the countries of the South.

The apparent deliberate silence on the part of both academics and relief agencies on the constraints (as evident in the Bradbury typology), that shape and influence attempts aimed at establishing the continuum from relief-rehabilitation to development should be a subject of thorough study. This is so because although continuum thinking represents a progressive attempt at maximizing the impact of humanitarian assistance in the long-term and potentially contributes towards the sustainability of peace through the incorporation of long-term developmental needs of post-war society, there are still unanswered theoretical and practical questions regarding the continuum.

As a result of some of the apparent gaps in the conceptualization of the "continuum", there was an attempt from what has been referred to as the "Capacities and Vulnerability Analysis" or CVA. [35]

The *Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis* argues that there is a need to demonstrate a shift from the perceived relationship between development and crisis. [36] An analytical framework that locates 'development' within three assumptions could do this. These are that:

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[35] For a thorough discussion on the contribution of this perspective in both strengthening some of the shortcomings of the continuum thesis emanating from the latter's redundancy due to the rise of complex political emergencies, see, Eade, D., (1998), **Capacity-Building: An Approach to People-Centered Development**, OXFAM: UK, p. 13-14.
[36] Ibid.

- Development is a process by which *vulnerabilities* are reduced and *capacities* are increased. This means that as most types of development (whether neo-liberal inspired or people-centered) have as their goal equality and equity as goals of development, then it follows that interventions (whether relief or developmental) should address the *underlying causes of people's vulnerabilities* and as well as identify their *strengths*. The former means that there is a possibility that such causes may be structural and located outside the nation state and as such NGOs should be aware of this and design programs that are both responsive and reflective of this. Ironically, this may imply a conflict of interests as some NGOs may be forced to challenge some powerful donors such as the IMF and the World Bank on whose partnership they depend.

- No one 'develops' the other. This means that although due to resource constrains, Northern actors (such as bilateral and multi-lateral donors and other INGOs), may be the ones at the forefront of development projects, people and societies develop themselves with or without the help of outside intervention.

- Relief programs can never be neutral in their impact and consequence. This means that those involved in the provision of any form of aid should be aware that any programme that does not consciously advocate vulnerability reduction and capacity enhancement consequently and potentially increases vulnerability. Thus the aim should be to engage in those initiatives that reduce the long-term vulnerability of the recipients by devising programs that take into account the broader context within which both relief and development interventions occur. [37]

The major contribution o the CVA perspective has been on its ability to highlight the fundamental factors that determine the interaction between capabilities and vulnerabilities through the emphasis on the impact of structural categories such as the material conditions of recipients, the social condition and status, and as well as their overall attitudinal condition. This means that any emphasis or lack thereof, on variables

such as gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status in donor agency programs have a direct impact on other variables such as material status, social condition and attitudinal responses on the part of recipients. For example, a programme that favors men over women in say tasks such as food distribution in an emergency has a direct impact on the status and attitude of women as a vulnerable group. It is thus clear that the major contribution of CVA has been on its reminder that attempting any developmental activity in an emergency (meaning also linking development with relief aid) should be done in a manner that links the two with the broader structural and environmental variables that go beyond the individual and the nation state.

The above last point is important to note since it touches directly at some of the broader environmental context that confronts NGOs and other stakeholders in post-Cold War world of complex political emergencies. It is a context that affects both humanitarian and developmental responses, as will be highlighted in the discussion on post-war Mozambique.

The context the report is referring to is the era of neo-liberalism and globalization. It shapes and permeates the ethos and practice of both developmental and humanitarian NGOs and determines the capacity of the state to be actor in these processes.

The neo-liberal and globalization era has been intensified by the end of the Cold War and now shapes global economic policy. It is a process associated with the "rolling-back" of the state (in some instances resulting in critical scholars arguing that it is a process simply hastening the collapse of government in many states in the first place!). This rolling back of the state has increased the role that NGOs play in both relief and development provision.

The neo-liberal era of globalization is an epoch of privatization and 'out-contracting' for NGOs and governments as well. Undoubtedly NGOs have become prominent channels

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[37] Eade, D., (1998) (op. cit.). p. 13.

for bilateral and multi-lateral donor funders as the former is said to be closer to the 'people' and is both responsive and accountable.

Although the current role of NGOs and their proximity to the dictates of global financial institutions is still a subject of debate (certainly beyond the scope of this report), it is submitted here that there seems to be some consensus that the former is under pessure to account to the donors that pay the bills rather than the intended recipients of aid. This is so because NGOs have become channels for ODA that goes to the countries of the South. Moreover, the world of NGOs and aid (both relief and developmental), has become a world of "survival of the fittest" where their ability to stay operational depends on the their ability to appease donor countries.

Noting the above is important because, apart from highlighting the need to problematize the role of NGOs in the development process in general (and more in attempts at linking relief with development) and how these relate to the broader global aid processes, the above insight relates to issues of capacity building as well. If Northern NGOs operational ethos is geared towards the fulfillment of donors demands there is a need for some caution about what type of capacity might be transferred in the continuum.

Indeed some have pointed out that, *"Some Northern agencies clearly include within capacity building the skills that they require within Southern agencies, so that the agency stuff can meet the Northern agencies' requirements for reporting and accounting. More fundamentally, there are also concerns that the types of issues and questions raised within capacity building ... are all Northern perceptions of Southern needs"* [38] Thus continues the patrimonial that has characterized the relief and developmental fields for decades!

Without confronting the above issues, as will be argued in this report, attempts at linking humanitarian assistance and development aid (however desirable and possible they may be) run the risk of perpetuating the status quo in the field by not questioning the

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[38] Bebbington and Mitlin. (eds.) (1996), p. 16, in Eade, D., (op. cit.) (1998), p. 18.

conceptual bases of Northern practices and structural relations existing between these discourses and the actual practice currently dominating the aid industries.

This report will seek to avoid such silence on the nexus between aid and the broader environmental forces that shape its thinking, practice, response and relationship with the South.

This will be done by exploring the possibilities of establishing the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development aid in conditions of semi-permanent political emergencies by focusing on, inter alia, issues of security, respect for human rights and humanitarian access, cessation of hostilities, and the impact of International Financial Institutions (IFIs). For example, international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank is setting macro-economic frameworks that either facilitates or obstruct the realization of the continuum, and the relationship between global hegemonic discourse on both forms of aid and its impact on the realization of the continuum. This will be done with reference to the Mozambican case study from 1975 – 1995.

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
Statement of the Problem

This report has two objectives. The first is to analyze and explore the practical feasibility of establishing the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development aid in complex political emergencies by using the case study of Mozambique in the period between 1975 and 1995. Although the initial phases of the war induced emergency in post-independence Mozambique owed much of their causes to post-World War 11 Cold War and regional politics, it could be argued that by the middle 1980s the emergency reflected some of the features of a complex political emergency.

The second, broader aim is to draw out generalizations with regard to Mozambique's move along the "relief-rehabilitation-development continuum" through reference to the role of the international donor community in the peace building exercise within the context of an external defined macro-economic framework for peace.

The internationally assisted Mozambican transition from war to peace has been hailed as a successful case demonstrating the positive role that the international donor community can play in assisting a country move from war to peace. However, given the fact that relief and development channeled to Mozambique during and after the emergency occurred under IMF and World Bank inspired conditionalities it becomes interesting to evaluate the impact of these institutions in setting an appropriate environment for the linkage between relief and development.

The literature on humanitarian assistance argues that one of the best ways of improving the efficacy of relief aid under conditions of protracted complex emergencies is through going beyond the current dominant trend of conceptually dichotomizing relief as short term and distinct from development aid which is perceived as long-term in intention and in impact. Contrary to this view is the abovementioned "continuum" thesis that argues that conceptually and practically these two forms of aid are mutually reinforcing and are thus to be analysed as such.

The "continuum" thesis envisages a linear situation where a society under emergency is provided with aid resources and interventions that will ensure that it moves from relief-through-rehabilitation-to development. This implies that during an emergency the provision of humanitarian assistance should be carried out in a manner that incorporates and takes into account the broader developmental needs of a society under distress.

However, despite the seemingly convincing manner that the "continuum" thesis presents its case there have been various reservations and critiques as to its conceptual and practical feasibility, especially in conditions of complex political emergencies. Some have argued that both the dichotomy and the continuum obscure more than they illuminate, especially when the latter is applied in the world of semi-permanent and protracted complex political emergencies.

For example, since the "continuum" thesis is too linear and thus fails to capture some of the dynamics of political emergencies (complex as they always are), as pointed out by the CVA approach discussed in the first chapter which argues for broadening the perspective, simply both argue that, development, initiatives cannot wait until the emergency is deemed over.

This research aims *at establishing the minimum conditions under which humanitarian assistance and development can be linked in complex political emergencies.* Emphasis will be on both internal (i.e. structural dimensions of the conflict) and external (global actors) factors that either promote or obstruct the realization of the continuum.

Significance of the Study

As complex political emergencies continuously proliferate and endure into the 21st century the need for humanitarian assistance would continue to increase. This means that the current accumulation of the small but rich series of literature on the impact of humanitarian assistance in complex political emergencies is a positive step at providing

critical reviews as to the nature and impact of humanitarian assistance on both victims of emergencies and the context of these crises.

Thus, a study that aims at analyzing the possibilities of linking relief with development aid in political emergencies is significant in the sense that, the latter type of aid (if properly conceptualized and practiced) has the potential of eradicating some of the underlying causes that influence the eruption of complex political emergencies.

Such analysis has also the potential of positively contributing to the intellectual search for viable and appropriate interventions that can influence the provision of humanitarian assistance and development. Any movement from war to peace requires solutions that are far removed from the conventional but that encompass comprehensive solutions that take into account the impact of global forces that can help facilitate or destroy attempts at sustaining the peace momentum through long-term development.

Research Strategy and Methodology

This research report primarily makes use of primary and secondary sources and basis its analysis on these. The report will largely concentrate on providing a critical review of the literature on the discourses on both relief/humanitarian assistance and development aid. The main focus here is to provide alternative critical perspectives and approaches that go beyond the normative biasness currently permeating these two forms of aid. This will be done with the full knowledge that Critical approaches are deliberately biased in an attempt to point out some of the major shortcomings within mainstream theory.

Furthermore, primary data will be used and will largely include original documents such as government reports and appraisal studies and other reports of various donor and relief agencies. These will be mainly used in order to highlight some of the shortcomings that these agencies have identified in their own work. However, it should be noted that such appraisal studies should be treated with caution since at times they contain organizational biases.

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Secondary sources and data will largely consist of books, journal articles, newspaper items, conference and seminar reports and presentations, as well as Internet based articles and other documents.

Structure of the Analysis

This study comprises of four chapters and is organized in the following manner:

- **Chapter One.** This chapter will provide a tentative background of the study with particular focus on the conceptual debates around the possibilities of linking humanitarian assistance with development aid in political emergencies. The chapter also includes the research design.

- **Chapter Two.** In the light of the theoretical approach outlined in chapter one this chapter provides a critical review of the rise of the humanitarian assistance regime. This includes the rise of the humanitarian international, the practice of humanitarian assistance during the cold war, and finally the effects of the end of the cold war on humanitarian assistance. Cross reference is made to the manner in which the post-second world war of development discourse based on positivist interpretations of social life have resulted in biases in relation to other aspects of the aid industry and actors.

- **Chapter Three.** In this chapter the report provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of relief and development aid during and after the emergency in Mozambique. The aim is to determine the conditions under which both forms of aid contributed in helping Mozambique to move from war to peace given her own internal conditions and as well as the existence of macro-economic policies that were determined by global forces.

- **Chapter Four.** This chapter synthesizes the major issues raised by the study. This chapter attempts to provide conclusive remarks about the possibilities of linking relief with development aid in protracted political emergencies in Southern Africa in an attempt to influence policy and raise issues for further research.

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Chapter 2

The Rise of the Humanitarian International: the dynamics of the evolution of humanitarian assistance and development aid

"I have seen a man on the bank of a river buried up to his knees in mud and some men came to give him a hand and help him out, but they pushed him further in up to his knees"-Abba Paphamutius

"If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life for fear that I should get some of his good done to me"-Thoreau

The virtue of altruism as that human disposition of concern for others as a principle for action is as old as human society itself. Both humanitarian assistance and development aid are based on a kind of altruism where the North does 'good' for the South, albeit in different circumstances and pretences. Although this seems desirable given the historical status of the latter, this report will demonstrate the manner in which both forms of aid do the reverse of what they claim to do.

Much of what can be called modern humanitarianism, as we know it today has been located within the realm of the Westphalian nation state.[39] Conceptually the state can be argued to be a socio-political construct that has historically been shaped by its location and politics of power. The implications that this has for humanitarianism is that the external environment within which it has been practiced shapes it. Thus the rise of the present humanitarian assistance regime has to a large extent been shaped by norms that have governed the rise of the modern state system.

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[39] Slim, H. (2000). *"Fidelity and Variation: Discerning the Development and Evolution of the Humanitarian Idea"*, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 24, No: 1, Spring 2000.

There is, as a consequence of the above, a need to conceptualize modern humanitarianism by reflecting on how the modern state system and the politics thereof, has influenced the former.

The Westphalian State and modern humanitarianism: Red Cross Tradition

Although the history of humanitarian action is as long and complicated as the history of humanity itself, deducing from the above we can then use the rise of the modern state to trace its genesis and evolution. This should, however, not be taken to imply that both public and private humanitarian action never existed outside the history of Europe where the idea of the state originated. Since the rise of the modern humanitarian regime is located within the west European Westphalia state, this history has given us different phases characterized by distinct institutional and operational norms.[40]

The major contributor to the manner in which the humanitarian assistance regime evolved was the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC).

On 24 June 1859 in Northern Italy, a young Swiss businessman named Henri Dunant found himself attending to the wounded at the battle of Solferino.[41] It was during the war of Italian Unification where Franco – Sardinian forces clashed with Austrian troops near the small town of Solferino in Italy. Although on personal business to Napoleon III on the eve of battle Dunant found him in the village of Castiglione, where he and several village women tended to the wounded providing them with water, wash and dressing their wounds. This was at a local church called Chiesa Maggiore.[42]

Clearly, central to Dunant's concern for the wounded in battle was not only that they be treated equal and in a humane and non-discriminatory manner, but that there should be some restrain in the conduct of warfare. In the latter context, the Red Cross movement is credited with the institutionalization of international norms governing conduct of warfare

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[40] de Waal, A. (1997). op. cit., p. 67.
[41] Slim, H. (2000). Op. cit.

and treatment of both combatants and non-combatants in the form of the IV Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977.

However, it is in the humanitarian assistance field where the Red Cross movement as envisaged by Dunant has played a vital role in shaping the doctrines and practices governing the provision of relief aid or what others refer to as the "humanitarian idea".[43]

This idea has changed over time but essentially remains the same. Current and emerging changes of the humanitarian idea have been due to its interaction with other ideas, new political structures and new realities of the conduct of warfare in the nineteenth century. This as will be shown later in the report, has been at the center of the debates with regard to the tensions that changes in warfare and its conduct bestowed upon the classical idea of pure humanitarianism.

The basic idea or principle of the Red Cross movement regarding humanitarian action was based on the conviction that humanitarian assistance or relief aid provision should be provided to victims in a neutral and non-discriminatory manner.

Indeed as Paul Grossrieder has pointed out that, Dunant's real contribution was to realize that, "the victims, all the victims are neutral", and that respect was due to their humanity, regardless of their status as enemies or allies.[44] The importance of this conviction, conceptually, is that the rise of the humanitarian idea emerges as a philosophical ethic of restrain in war implemented as impartial assistance and protection for all those non-combatants who are in danger or affected by it.

This means that the fundamental basis of the humanitarian idea were that if there are to be wars or as long as they go on it is certainly better for the warring parties (and perhaps humanity at large) that the belligerents observe some form of prohibitions and restrains on how they conducted war amongst themselves and those in the vicinity of the

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[42] See, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), at: www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5845147
[43] Slim, H. (2000). op. cit.

hostilities. This is how the Red Cross came to play such a fundamental and central role in the rise of international humanitarian law.

At an operational level, Dunant's subsequent concern with the question of how to put the humanitarian idea into practice led him to ask the question of whether, would it not be, *"... possible in time of peace and quiet to form relief societies for the purposes of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified volunteers?"* [45]Dunant further asked military authorities of various countries whether they could formulate, *"(...) some international principle, sanctioned by a convention and inviolate in character, which, once agreed upon and ratified, might constitute the basis for societies for the relief of the wounded in the different European countries?"* [46]It was thus this idea and the vision for its operation that provided the basis for neutrality as a principle for action in humanitarian disasters for decades after the battle of Solferino.

The above idea was premised upon recognition that humanitarian assistance provision occurs within politically charged environments and that, as a principle of practice, relief organizations should be neutral – in the sense of maintaining a calculated distance from the political goals of either party to a conflict. Ironically, it has been the ignorance of the politics of humanitarian assistance that led, during Cold War, to vicious attacks on the Red Cross's idea of "Pure Humanitarianism".[47] This type of humanitarianism dominated much of the post-second world war period.

The above type of pure humanitarianism was concerned mainly with issues of access and security. However, interesting enough these issues were also tied to questions of sovereignty. This type of humanitarianism defined permissible humanitarian assistance as, *"... the provision of food, clothing, medicine and other humanitarian assistance"*.[48]

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[44] Ibid, p. 7.

[45] Henri Dunant (1862), raised these questions in his book based on the experiences of Solferino entitled *"A Memory of Solferino"*, published in 1862.

[46] Ibid, 1862, also: www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5845147

[47] Suhrke, A. et. al., (1997). **Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict: Report prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, Bergen, p. 10.

[48] Kalshoven, Frits, (1989). "Assistance to the Victims of Armed Conflict and other Disasters: Introduction to the Conference Theme", paper delivered at the International Conference on Humanitarian

Deliberately sidelining the vague "other humanitarian assistance part" of the previous definition of traditional humanitarianism, it becomes clear (from the rest of the definition) that those orthodox operational doctrines of relief narrowed both the scope and the role of this type of aid in alleviating human suffering. As this became clear after various pure humanitarian interventions the irony was that, far from achieving its basic goal of saving lives (save in a few cases), this type of humanitarianism failed to minimize suffering.

With the benefit of hindsight and when analyzed historically, the Red Cross doctrine had faced serious conceptual and operational challenges (many linked to the political context of rendering relief and the political nature of the modern state), that have been partly answered.

The Eastern Crisis and the challenges to the Red Cross

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) resolved questions related to territorial boundaries and sovereignty but failed to ensure that the state that arose out of the Treaty would ensure peace. There emerged a number of wars that included the Battle of Solferino, the German – Danish War (1864), the Austro – Prussian War (1866), the Franco – Prussian War (1870), the Serbo – Bulgarian War (1885 – 1886), the Balkan Wars (1912 – 1937), and the so-called "Eastern Crisis" that broke out between 1875 – 1878.[49]

The latter followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which led to the emergence of nationalist movements in the provinces of the Balkans. In August 1875 a rebellion broke out in Herzegovina followed by Bosnia then Bulgaria. The bloody suppression of these rebellions led to massive movements of Christians to Montenegro and Serbia. As a result of this, in 1876 two principalities declared war on the empire but by autumn they were

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Assistance in Armed Conflict, The Hague, 22-24 June, 1988, Martinus Nijhoff: London, 1989, p. 13, quoted from UN **Souvenir De Solferino**, Geneva, 1862, pp. 102-113, the English version quotes are from Boissier, P, From **Solferino to Tsushima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross** (translation form original French version), Henri Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1985, p. 21.
[49] See, www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5845147.

both defeated. However, Russia became an ally of Montenegro and Serbia and sent troops to the Balkans resulting in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

However, the outbreak of the Eastern Crisis soon challenged some of the operational principles of the Red Cross in the context of war. The significance of the Eastern Crisis for humanitarian crisis is that it was a test of whether the belligerents were prepared to observe their obligations under the Geneva Conventions (since both Russia and Turkey had rectified them). These conflicts brought to the fore the ideological and philosophical foundations of the modern state and how the latter interacts with relief provision.

Thus for example, the Ottoman side in the Russo – Turkish conflict informed Switzerland, as the depository of the 1864 Conventions, that although it would respect the sign of the red cross protecting enemy field hospitals, it would, in future adopt the red crescent on a white background as its own emblem for its hospitals. [50]

The above incident forced the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to respond in an article published in the January 1877 issue of the *Bulletin International des Societes de la Croix - Rouge*, in which it stated that if signatory states to the 1864 Geneva Conventions wished, " ... *that the humanitarian principles they profess gradually infiltrate all peoples, whatever their religion, a question of external form should not be an insurmountable obstacle to spreading these principles to non – Christian peoples. The adoption of an international sign is indispensable, but agreement on this point would not perhaps be incompatible with tolerance regarding a few variations of detail ...* "[51]. Although the major concern was about safeguarding and protecting the wounded between Russian and Ottoman forces, there was a major philosophical and ideological implication below the surface.

By bringing the issue of religious biasness in the initial emblem of the Red Cross, the Ottoman empire exposed the link between humanitarianism and various other ideas and

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[50] See, icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5845147.
[51] Ibid.

ideologies. At a much broader level, this reflected how the foundations and manner in which humanitarianism is conceived and practiced affect states. Thus from the outset it becomes clear that the moral basis of the humanitarian idea profoundly affected the way it interacted with various secular philosophical and operational implications of and/or the context within the idea itself was practiced.

Perhaps this is understandable given the fact that although founded on a rather big idea, in itself the humanitarian idea is rather a small idea. [52]This is partly due to the very simple truth that it is an idea that is unlike those others such as human rights, democracy, socialism, peace and social justice. In other words the former is essentially an idea, which uses the foundational idea of essential human dignity (which is also foundational to other bigger ideas of human justice) in order to simply generate an interim ethic of restraint to one of the most devastating of human tendencies namely, the resort to violence.

The above narrowness (or so it appears) of the humanitarian idea has resulted in an inability to adjust to changing political doctrines and environments, practices and the conduct of warfare whilst remaining essentially the same idea. This has been further aggravated by the fact that historically the humanitarian idea as we came to know of it is a European idea tied to certain cultural understandings of political, social and economic life.

This should not be taken to mean that there are no historical trans-cultural norms of restraint in war but rather to highlight how the evolution of the idea in a particular epoch in European history has resulted in a failure to adequately adapt to change whilst remaining essentially the same. This has been partly due to the compartmentalization of knowledge and experience in the European history of positivist science.

It is also important to highlight that the Red Cross doctrine of humanitarian neutrality has historically been tied to the rise of the Westphalian state in Europe. Since as mentioned

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[52] See, Slim, H., (2000). " Fidelity and Variation: Discerning the development and evolution of the humanitarian idea""", The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 24, 1, Spring 2000.

earlier the humanitarian idea has European origins (at least in its modern form), philosophical ideas about appropriate forms of power distribution have had influence on the rise of doctrines about relief. This comes as no surprise since altruism itself is inevitable expressed within different socio-political settings. As a result of this the principles of state sovereignty as expressed in Westphalia have had considerable influence in shaping the scope and space within which the humanitarian idea receives expression. [53]

Much of the global politics in the 20th century have been shaped by the idea of the sovereign state.[54] This is not to deny that other processes and actors such as INGOs and MNC have shaped modern (or post-modern?) politics, but it is rather to admit that the state or its idea still plays a prominent role in regulating power distribution, and consequently politics. Thus the humanitarian idea has been profoundly affected by this dominance of ideas of statehood. This dominance has defined both the successes and failures of humanitarian assistance.

Operationally, the doctrine of humanitarian neutrality and impartiality has meant that issues of consensual access became paramount due to the respect accorded to state sovereignty, at times inaccurately so. During most part of the post-world war two periods or what became known as the Cold War, the doctrine of humanitarian neutrality as propagated by the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies came under heavy criticism.

The politics of the post-second world war and the subsequent cold war influenced the manner in which the humanitarian idea was expressed and defined. In other words the entire evolution of the humanitarian international as we came to know of it has been shaped by the changes that have occurred during and after the cold war.

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[53] Prince, Cathryn. J, (et. al.). *"World's Aid Groups Find Neutrality Badges Tarnished"*, Christian Science Monitor, 12/8/95, Vol. 88 Issue 10, p. 6.
[54] Clapham, C. (1996). **Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival**, Cambridge University Press, p. 3.

The two traditions or doctrines of humanitarianism were to a large extent shaped by the challenges exerted to the idea of statehood during this 'war'. The type of humanitarian emergencies (which were also very complex in nature – albeit in a different way), together with the ideas of sovereignty and ideological alignment with Cold War superpowers influenced the variations and challenges to the humanitarian idea.

Thus the Cold War *realpolitik* provided the humanitarian community with both opportunities (such as exploiting the predictability and clear demarcation of rules of humanitarian intervention – although as limiting as these were) and constraints (such as those associated with the apparent conflict between principles of neutrality vis-à-vis sovereignty).

It is, however, interesting to note that the adherence to the principles that permeated humanitarianism as practiced by the Red Cross (despite various challenges due to the changes in the nature of conflict) still persist today.

For example, at the Spring conference of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other NGOs, in Madrid in 1995, the Code of Conduct further endorsed the view that aid will be given, " ... *regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients*".[55] It further states that, "*We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed*".[56] However, many authors have argued that although this aspiration is a laudable standard to aspire to, it is nevertheless bounded by the circumstances in which aid organizations operate.

Recently, the dilemma faced by the Red Cross movement (in the post-Cold War context) has been echoed by the President of the organization when he stated that, " ... *The term humanitarian action has come to have wide meaning ... There is increasing uncertainty and confusion about (our) roles and responsibilities in the international community.*

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[55] Taylor, S. B, (1996), "*The Myth of Neutrality*", Peace Review, December 1996, Vol. 8 Issue 4, p. 521.
[56] Ibid.

Some clarity is needed". [57]Unfortunately, these circumstances have impacted negatively on the operation and provision of humanitarian assistance. This point will be demonstrated elsewhere in this work.

Private Humanitarianism

In the history of Europe (just like in the history of other societies) various private institutions have been involved in attempts at alleviating the impact of both natural and man-made disasters on the victims. In Europe, religious orders of diverse persuasions have rallied around the suffering, the hungry and the destitute. In other cases large-scale appeals for famine relief were mobilized. For example, United States citizens sent relief to Ireland in 1847, British people contributed to missionary famine relief funds for China in the 1870s and other Western countries sent relief aid to Russia in 1921-22.[58]

Furthermore, the emergence of such organizations as the Save the Children Fund and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (later OXFAM) and as well as CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere), all as private humanitarian actors was based on the need to rise up to the obligations of the humanitarian imperative by helping victims of war induced suffering. Indeed it might be justified to argue that the rise of the humanitarian assistance regime or the humanitarian international has been shaped mostly by the history of warfare.[59] However, although many dilemmas faced the Red Cross and subsequent private charity and relief organizations, many of these challenges and problems became more evident during the cold war, as discussed below.

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[57] This statement is by Cornellio Somaruga, the president of the ICRC, SEE, Prince, C. J, (et. al.), op. cit, p.1.

[58] de Waal, A. (1997). op. cit., p. 67-68.

[59] For the purposes of this paper, the "Humanitarian International" refers to the international elite of the staff of international relief agencies, academics, consultants, specialist journalists, lobbyists and also, to a certain extent, 'conflict resolution' specialists and human rights workers. For a discussion on the nature of the "Humanitarian International", see, de Waal, A. (1997). **Famine Crimes: Politics &**

The Cold War: Linking Humanitarian Assistance and Development Aid

When dealing with the manner in which cold war politics affected and influenced the rise of the humanitarian international, it is important to dispose, from the outset, the myth that only conflict induced humanitarian disasters dominated this period. Both natural and conflict induced humanitarian emergencies occurred and, more or less, similarly shaped the kind of doctrines and practices that evolved during this period. Thus the existence of the often-misplaced consensus in some academic circles that complex political emergencies only started after the collapse of the Berlin wall should be forthright rejected.[60]

Experienced development and humanitarian agencies are aware that emergencies have always been complex and political. [61]Even those that have been called natural disasters such as famine have political roots and implications.

Almost twenty years ago, the 1976 earthquake that devastated Guatemala exposed that country's deep-seated social, economic, and cultural rifts that made the provision of relief aid a complex process that was undertaken under a chain of events that opened that country's most violent military repression.[62]This resulted in the disaster being viewed in some quarters as an 'unnatural disaster'. Very few people can concur with the views that can label such humanitarian operations as the Palestine crisis in 1948, the war in Biafra in 1968-70, Cambodia in 1979, or Ethiopia in 1974 and 1986 as less complex humanitarian emergencies.

The point being made here is that although what became known as "complex political emergencies" at the corridors of the United Nations after the end of the cold war does possess significantly distinct features, humanitarian emergencies during the cold war also had complex variables such as the targeting of relief supplies that had to be dealt with.

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[60] This is aptly and succinctly argued by Commins, S., (1996). *"In the line of Fire"*, in Eade, D. (1996). **Development in States of War**, OXFAM, UK, P. 9.
[61] Taylor, S.B, (1996),　　op. cit., p.1.

Humanitarian assistance during the cold war was marked by both institutional and operational developments of unprecedented magnitude. At an institutional level this was marked by the development of the United Nations specialized agencies with a purely humanitarian mandate. In the aftermath of World War II, the UN set up these institutions with a short-term relief and rehabilitation mission. Thus we witnessed the birth of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO), amongst others. [63]The demands on these agencies saw most of them establishing specialized co-coordinating offices by the beginning of the 70s.

In 1971, UNICEF created a special emergency co-ordination office. Soon the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO) followed suit in 1974 and 1975 respectively.[64]

Since then there has been a proliferation of various UN specialized agencies concerned with different aspects of global human welfare. In the field of relief, UN specialized agencies boast of an unfortunately dismal record. As the last decade of the Cold War came to an end it was becoming clear that the UN in general and its relief agencies in particular, have failed victims of humanitarian disasters, especially those which were violence induced.

As mentioned earlier, the 1968-70 Biafran civil war was a watershed in the history of the humanitarian international and impacted heavily upon humanitarian practice in ways that have not been adequately understood today. This war and the accompanying humanitarian tragedy that soon followed changed both the principles (or rules of engagement) and practices of aid as orthodox humanitarianism failed to provide a proper response.

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[62] Ibid, p. 9.

[63] Froyland, A., (1998). *"Developing norms for a humanitarian regime: defining policy norms for humanitarian intervention at the UN"*, workshop on "Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa", Arusha Tanzania, June 27 – 29, 1998.

NGOs who participated in the Biafran effort provided an unprecedented chapter in the relief industry where it proved to be the first humanitarian effort to be dominated by these organizations. Aengus Finuncane writes that:

> "The JCA (Joint Church Aid) airlift into Biafra has never been fully recognized for what it was. Recalling it now helps to put the belated and pathetic attempts to get assistance to Somalia in perspective ... as many as fifty flights a night flew to Uli. Not all were JCA flights, but, for example, on the night of November 19, 1969, JCA landed 376 tons of relief supplies to Uli! The nightly average in April 1969 was 70 metric tons (mts), in August, 150 mts, and in December, 250 mts. ... Fuel, tires, and spare parts were also flown in during the hours of darkness and under fire. It was a marvelous ecumenical cooperative effort". [65]

Biafra was extraordinary not only in terms of the operational principles it later gave birth to nor about the magnitude of its operation but more significantly because it marked the beginning of the proliferation of relief NGOs as central actors and pace setters in the field of humanitarian assistance. Although prominent organizations such as Eglantyne Jebb's Save the Children Fund started in 1919 and OXFAM begun in 1942, thus preceding Biafra, it was the latter and the context of the post-World War II worlds that gave rise to the growth of NGOs in the humanitarian sector. [66]

The Rise of Humanitarian NGOs in the 1980s

The 1970s saw a dramatic rise in the number, operations and influence of humanitarian NGOs. After Biafra, the early 70s saw the occurrence of complex, political and devastating emergencies as was the case in Bangladesh

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[64] de Waal, A. (1997). op. cit., p. 68-69.
[65] de Waal, A. (1997). Op. cit., p. 73.

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during the cyclone of September 1970 and the 1971-72 war of independence, which in itself was accompanied by its own humanitarian crisis. After this came Ethiopia as well as the West African Sahel crisis. As early as this period it was slowly becoming increasingly clear that much of the principle and operational problems that were experienced in Biafra a decade previously were likely to stay with the humanitarian NGOs for a long time.

For example, during the defeat of the Khmer Rouge government by the Vietnamese in Cambodia there were tensions between the UN and humanitarian NGOs. These manifested themselves in the kind of *Realpolitik* that dominated much of the cold war world. This was due to the fact that western governments did not recognize the new Cambodian government then they did not provide enough resources for the crisis in that country instead diverted their attention and resources on refugees and fugitives in Thailand who received almost US$ 300 per head as compared to US$ 4 per head granted to the former.[67] This illustrates the kind of politics that dominated humanitarian assistance during much of the cold war period.

There were also tensions related to questions of national sovereignty that erupted between NGOs and governments. This question has largely remained unresolved since it suffered setbacks after the post-cold war crisis of humanitarian intervention that resulted from the 1993 Somali crisis.[68]

The humanitarian international was, however, transformed in the 1980s. This was due to several ideological factors. Chief amongst these was deregulation and decentralization in the relief industry (as part of the neo-liberal discourse of the Reagan and Thatcher years). Charitable organizations and NGOs, although not the same, showed similar operational problems in much of the 1980s. These were, inter alia, associated with lobbying, fundraising,

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[66] de Waal, A. (1997). op. cit.
[67] de Waal, A. (1997). op. cit.

professional ethics and accountability.[69] The question of professionalism still cuts across debates about which the 'real' NGOs or 'societe civile' is.[70]

Further problems associated with field operations that humanitarian NGOs faced in the 80s involved issues of professional rules of entry and exit, absence of generalized rules such as in provision of health services, lack of co-ordination, and the lack of standardized evaluation and assessment criteria. These problems profoundly affected the manner in which these organizations worked and ways in which relief was provided. In most cases failure to confront these problems resulted in a situation where relief organizations found themselves doing the reverse of what they set out to do.

Moreover, the nature of Cold War politics put enormous strain and limited scope within which relief organizations could operate. It has often been said that humanitarian assistance during the Cold War was "straight jacketed".[71] The Cold War was a time of vicious proxy wars fought with the backing of the "superpowers". The central role the superpowers in many of these conflicts defined political scope and space during which international relations occurred, including humanitarian assistance. The political scope of the Cold War revolved around strong and centralized states. Humanitarianism occurred within the territories of these states that in turn defined the operational scope and conduct of relief agencies.

During the Cold War relief agencies operated under severely restricted space. During this period a small and sharply circumscribed space was labeled 'humanitarian'.[72] This space limited ways in which relief agencies could engage with the broader ideological concerns such as development, social

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[68] Ibid, p. 179.

[69] Human Rights Watch.

[70] Pottier, J. (1996). *"Relief and Repatriation: Views by Rwandan Refugees; lessons for Humanitarian Aid Workers"*, African Affairs, 95, (1996), p. 406.

[71] African Rights, (1994). *"Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies"*, Discussion Paper, No: 5, 1994, p. 3.

justice and universal human rights. The ideological room within which Cold War politics allowed to shape the articulation of these politics in turn shaped the outcome of interventions.

It is within the context of the abovementioned struggles to achieve some of the goals alluded to above that humanitarian NGOs operated. They had to mitigate natural and man-made humanitarian disasters where different actors on either side of the ideological divide struggled for recognition, legitimacy and political control, including control over aid. [73]

The humanitarian space created by these struggles was indeed small. Most organizations were forced to operate in an enforced (for a selected few such as MSF) silence as witnesses to political crimes in order to defend their calling and not risk encroachment to 'domestic' affairs of sovereign states.

This happened in Biafra in the late 1960s and 70s and again in Uganda under Idi Amin. Since the Biafran war some organizations have taken a broader political and developmental mandate that is based on the admission that aid, of whatever nature, occurs within very contested and complex political environments. It was they that were to suffer the most from Cold War politics with its emphasis on the inviolability of sovereignty.

For these organizations political restrictions were intolerable and they found themselves at loggerheads with governments and an 'international community' that has imposed upon them a strictly defined narrow framework of operation. In conflict induced emergencies these so called "solidarity" NGOs had to choose between two main options. One was to complain publicly about both governmental and rebel abuses and consequently accept expulsion or to overtly become political and take sides with rebel movements who were claiming to

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[72] Ibid.

fight injustice in the name of human freedom and social justice. Some indeed chose the latter option and supported various types of 'liberation movements'. MSF-France opted for the first option when it spoke out against the human costs of the Ethiopian governments costs of resettlement programme. When the MSF spoke out against this and other abuses by the Ethiopian government they were ordered out of the country in 1985. [74]Others opted for the second option as was shown by the launch of various solidarity NGOs to fight apartheid in southern Africa.

Although the dilemmas facing relief agencies were enormous and often counterproductive to humanitarian objectives and basic aims of humanitarianism as envisaged by Dunant, the positive aspect of the humanitarian space provided by the Cold War lay in its predictability. There were clearly defined rules of engagement and well spelt out penalties for transgression.[75] Unfortunately this was at times to the detriment of the humanitarian idea as some NGOs were forced to abandon their operations.

Ironically the other negative aspect of the predictability of the humanitarian space during the Cold War lay in the fact that although these NGOs were forced to a limited space by notions of statehood these very concepts were at a time under increasing pressure from such forces as neo-liberal discourses and the rise of globalization. Indeed some of the proxy wars being waged by superpowers in different locations of the South included a strong element of contested meanings of statehood, as was the case in Angola.[76]

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[73] See, de Waal, A., (1994). *"Humanitarianism Unbound: Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies"*, **African Rights**, Discussion paper No. 5, London, November 1994.

[74] Rieff, David, (1999). *"The Good Doctors: humanitarianism at century's end"*, **New Republic**, 11/08/99/, Vol. 221, Issue 19, p. 23.

[75] For an argument on the disappearance of humanitarian 'Front-Lines' after the end of the cold war, see, Prince, C., (1996). op. cit.

[76] Most discussions on the root causes of conflict in Angola have overlooked the fact that the emergence of various 'liberation movements' such as the FNLA, UNITA, and the much older MPLA, were all based on certain ideological convictions about the nature of the post-colonial state.

The operational problems facing humanitarian agencies during this period were fundamentally as a result of the close proximity between humanitarian assistance and politics, especially in violence induced humanitarian emergencies.

Firstly, this was due to the fact that any involvement in a conflict by international humanitarian NGOs brought in the existing political equation resources (in areas where these were already scarce), which immediately became part of the dynamics of the violence. [77] Thus the search for a complete apolitical/anti-political and neutral humanitarian space became a futile exercise. Recognizing or conceding to this does and should not imply a fatalistic acceptance that relief aid will necessarily become part of the dynamic of violence and abuse but to highlight that there is a need for caution about the negative potential of aid to more harm than good. [78]

During insurgency and counterinsurgency and conflict-induced emergencies during the Cold War, humanitarian assistance could become intimately involved in the dynamics of conflict, violence and its politics by:

- *Providing material assistance*. Directly or indirectly providing material assistance to the authority controlling the operational area. This can include; directly providing food or medicine to the controlling authority or the rebel movement; tolerating a certain rate of material diversion by the controlling authority; and providing income into the conflict (i.e. by means of renting vehicles, premises, staff and guards).

- *Providing strategic protection*. This often occurs when the strategic needs of the belligerents coincide with the logistical demands of the humanitarian operation. This could be done by maintaining supplies to

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[77] Taylor, S.B., (1996). *"The Myth of Neutrality"*, Peace Review, Dec 1996, Vol. 8 Issue 4, p. 521.

garrison towns-cum-relief shelters that could otherwise remain unsupplied and thus vulnerable militarily, keep roads which could otherwise have been closed open, and by providing ditto for airfields, ports and other strategic installations that can potentially have both a civic and military use.

- *Providing legitimacy to the belligerents.* By providing for the presence of relief agencies alongside controlling authorities and rebel movements gives either of the party's humanitarian credentials and legitimacy they may otherwise not deserve. Also elements of a counterinsurgency operation can be disguised as a humanitarian relief operation as it normal happens with forced relocations, which are often justified as gathering people in feeding shelter. Furthermore, relief operations may obstruct legitimate military aims of the opposing force when both military and relief demands require the use of similar infrastructure, and the former may lose credibility on grounds of obstructing humanitarian relief efforts.[79]

The above operational dilemmas and problems associated with providing relief during the Cold War clearly demonstrated the intimacy between relief aid and conflict induced emergencies. It was a world which whilst providing predictability on rules of engagement did in fact provide little room for humanitarian NGOs to challenge the negative implications of the narrowness of humanitarian space.

In the above context humanitarian assistance did more harm than good, albeit not solely due to the Cold War but to seemingly narrow room that the ideological war provided for the challenge of some of its untenable aspects

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[78] This is thoroughly discussed in John Prendergast seminal work entitled, " **Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa**", (1996), Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
[79] African Rights, (1994). op. cit, p. 4-5.

such overemphasis on sovereignty. This world slowly changed by the events between 1989 and 1991 as the Cold War came to an abrupt end.

The end of the Cold War, Complex Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Assistance

> " ... to anticipate the prospects of global governance in the decades ahead is to discern powerful tensions, profound contradictions and perplexing paradoxes. To search for order in disorder, for coherence in contradiction and for contradiction in change. It is to confront processes that mask both growth and decay. It is to look authorities that are obscure, boundaries that are in flux, and systems of rule that are emergent. And it is to experience hope embedded in despair"[80]

The above somewhat pessimistic statement eloquently captures the mood that permeated the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War profoundly affected the doctrines and practices of humanitarian assistance and development aid. The fall of the Berlin wall promised the rise of the 'New World Order'. As almost four decades of the Cold War came to an end, it left a legacy of contradictions and unpredictable trends in international relations.

These contradictions manifested themselves in often-explosive intra-state conflicts that soon followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Unpredictable levels of humanitarian disasters accompanied these post-cold war conflicts or "complex political emergencies" as they came to be known. Although not new in character and consequence, these emergencies possessed unique features such as massive refugee movements across borders with spillover effects, Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs), and other vulnerable social groups became a constant feature in these crisis. Refugee populations, which were around

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[80] Rosenau, J. (1995). *"Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century"*, <u>Global Governance</u>, 1995, pp. 13-43.

eight million at the end of the 1970s, reached 17 million by 1991.[81] This crisis left two challenges for the humanitarian community: a strong sense of humanitarian responsibility as well as a feeling of moral culpability as humanitarian interventions produced mixed results.

Burdened with a post-Cold War proliferation of complex political emergencies and a corresponding duty to fulfill the obligations of the "humanitarian imperative", the humanitarian community intervened in these conflicts with a mixture of both positive and negative results.

The fall of the iron curtain was a turning point in humanitarian terms. Operation Provide Comfort was mounted following the end of the Gulf War (which placed limitations on Iraq). This international military 'humanitarian' intervention challenged the basic sacrosanct ideas of sovereignty and promised a new era of "humanitarian order" in the "New World Order". However, this controversial optimism that accompanied the end of the Cold War (as more humanitarian space opened) soon vanished following the events of autumn 1992 in Somalia that brought the "New World Order" to a drastic end.

The events in Somalia, like those in Biafra more than two decades earlier, clearly demonstrated the incapacity of the international humanitarian community to deal with post-Cold War emergencies. It was on Somalia where the humanitarian community was accused of having set a dangerous precedent of what de Waal (1997) has referred to as "humanitarian impunity". de Waal (1997) was concerned about the impunity that the humanitarian community enjoyed despite its ambiguous and controversial policies such as when the UN and other humanitarian agencies have failed to intervene during the famine of middle 1992 only to militarily intervene in a sovereign country a

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[81] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (1999). *"Half a Century on the Humanitarian Frontlines"*, Lecture by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, delivered at the Graduate Institute for International Studies, Geneva, 25 November, 1999, http://www.unhcr/refworld/unhcr/hcspeech/991125.htm.

embarrassingly late, with tragic consequences for the humanitarian aid regime. This was largely due to the failure of the aid agencies to separate their humanitarian objectives from the emerging post-cold war strategic interests of US foreign policy.[82] Due to this, Somalia will forever remain a tragic failure in the history of the relief industry and the United Nations.

Some of the apparent failures of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War were partly attributed to a humanitarian landscape characterized by:

- African states that no longer exercised centralized control and authority as during the Cold War and those that have virtually ceased to be part of the "myth statehood";

- Political emergencies have become more frequent and long lasting, and many relief agencies are obliged to operate in them,

- Partly in response to the above, the links between conflict, human rights abuses and humanitarian crisis are publicly recognized, and responsible relief agencies are no longer able to ignore the political context of their operations;

- There is open violation of national sovereignty in pursuit of humanitarian objectives;

- Some UN agencies, notably UNICEF, are becoming more "NGO-like" in their style of operations, and in general the degree of respect for NGOs by multilateral agencies has increased;

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[82] de Waal, (1997). op. cit, p. 179.

- Since the end of the Cold War there has been decline in both strategic and commercial interests of Western countries in Africa, resulting in the former channeling funds for relief programmes through NGOs as opposed to governments. This strategy is perceived as high profile, flexible, short-term and demands little accountability.[83]

All of the above characteristics posed numerous challenges to the humanitarian community, some of which they lacked capacity and vision to deal with.

Thus towards the end of the 1990s it was becoming a self perpetuating truth to acknowledge that, multi-mandate humanitarian assistance missions in complex political emergencies have positive as well as negative effects. These were evident in successive crises in the Great Lakes where the withdrawal of UN troops from Rwanda in April 1994 occurred at a time when genocide was well underway. [84]Subsequent events following the genocide that occurred in 'refugee camps' in Eastern Zaire (now the DRC) resulted in relief agencies being accused of rearming and feeding Hutu militiamen and former soldiers that had just committed a crime against humanity.

In the above case the humanitarian agencies failed to separate armed elements from bona fide refugees. This affected the intended recipients and also had negative effects on the dynamics of the conflict itself. Various explanations have been suggested to explain why humanitarian assistance in general fails to achieve its objectives in complex political emergencies. This situation is grossly unfortunate if we consider the fact that four decades after Biafra and one decade after the Cold War some of the problems that faced the humanitarian community then are still with us today.

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[83] African Rights, (1994). op. cit., p. 6.
[84] Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, (1996), Copenhagen; DANIDA.

Some scholars such as Prendergast (1996) argue that since relief aid is provided in a highly political charged environment and is consequently political, it is inevitable that it will be caught in the dynamics of violence. Humanitarian assistance under such conditions is rarely neutral as proven during the Cold War. This is so because, "... *the humanitarian motivation of giving aid to save lives and reduce humanitarian suffering is not invalidated by the fact that relief aid, once it assumes massive proportions, constitutes an intervention that is rarely neutral in its effects on the conflict".*[85] Beyond simply "saving lives", it is increasingly becoming recognized that humanitarian assistance can have profoundly negative consequences in the ever-unpredictable world of complex emergencies.

Despite the rise of the post 60s concept of "Aid without Borders" and "humanitarian solidarity" the above problems facing the relief industry have continued to the 21st century and have resulted in many questions being asked. These include, inter alia, whether:

- Can complex political emergencies be prevented?

- Given the magnitude and proliferation of relief agencies in a given conflict, can humanitarian assistance be effectively coordinated?

- Given that protracted and semi-permanent conflict requires a different approach than the immediate emergency responses, how can humanitarian assistance make better use of local resources and strengthen local capacities?

- Are the aid agencies able to support a transition from relief to development when such opportunities arise? If there is a "gap" to be

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[85] Pausewang, S. (1998). *"Humanitarian Assistance during Conflict in a State-less Society: the case of Somalia"*, unpublished paper presented at the workshop on *"Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in*

used to link relief and development, who should fill it and how? and in what relationship to the government and local authorities?[86]

Thus the above questions are a direct result of a combination of factors. These include unprecedented expansion of a humanitarian regime that is worth US$ 57 billion a year[87] (where "soft" interests are at odds with "hard' humanitarian interests), the proliferation of NGOs in a given emergency (bringing issues of coordination into the center of operations, changing norms at the UN, the rise of protracted and semi-permanent emergencies and as well as the apparent failure of humanitarian assistance to mitigate conflict and reduce suffering.

Furthermore and of interest to this report, is the question of how a transition from relief to long-term development can be achieved in order to make humanitarian assistance more effective in both containing negative consequences of emergencies, and more importantly contribute to a movement from war to peace.

In other words, this report concurs with the assumption made by the protagonists of the continuum thesis (that there is "gray area" that can be filled by linking the two forms of aid), on the feasibility of linking the two forms of aid (at least in theory), but at the same time cautions against unfounded optimism about such a possibility. The need for such caution, this report argues, is necessary since in most of the literature on the feasibility of the continuum there is still lack of a comprehensive and sound theoretical base in which we can assess the linkage whist at the same

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Africa: A Nordic-Africa Dialogue", June 27-29, Arusha, Tanzania, 1998, p. 1.

[86] For some of these questions I am indebted to the work of the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, entitled, *"Danish Humanitarian Assistance, UN and International Organizations"*, Arve, O (et. al.) (1999), p. 1.

[87] Estimate made by Edward Girardet in, Prince, C.J. (et. al.) (1995). *"Worlds Aid Groups Find Neutrality Tarnished"*, Christian Science Monitor, 12/8/95, Vol. 88 Issue 10.

time viewing it in a much broader context of North vis-à-vis South relations with regard to aid in general.

This is demonstrated by the CVA discussed in chapter one that attempts to link these two forms of aid to the material, social, economic and political context aid provision, beyond individual recipients and beyond the state.

For example, as will be shown in the Mozambican study, there is still lack of appreciation of the negative impact that the global political economy in the form of financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank can play in creating a macro-economic frameworks that is unsuitable for societies that have just emerged from a war induced emergency and thus block attempts at linking humanitarian assistance and development in a post-war situation. [88]

Thus the question that forms central focus of this report is to focus on whether is it possible (or not) to achieve the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development aid given the current nature of complex emergencies, the nature of North – South relations in the entire relief industry, and the impact of global economic institutions in shaping the developmental options of the South. The report will now turn to examining the status of development aid in the context of post-Cold War complex political emergencies.

The end of the Cold War, Complex Political Emergencies and Development Aid

As mentioned above the transformation that resulted from the end of the Cold War also affected the manner in which development aid was both conceptualized and practiced. There has been a corresponding shift in the role that NGOs play vis-à-vis donor

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[88] The effect of global financial institutions on development and rebuilding in the South forms part of Joseph Hanlon's book entitled, **Peace Without Profit: How the I.M.F Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique**, (1996), James Currey: Oxford.

countries. Today they are largely pawns of the latter in channeling aid, a situation that determines how NGOs prioritise their programs (in most cases in a manner determined by the donors).

The shits in thinking in the aid industry have been overwhelming (though not positive). Hence when presenting a document in a conference held in November 1999 in Addis Ababa, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), established the above alluded to linkage by stating that:

> "Over the last decades, the mandate of aid has been extended significantly. The end of the cold war brought about far-reaching political changes that culminated in a great rise in civil wars, especially in Africa and the former Soviet Union, as well as a willingness by the international community to promote democratic and peaceful change in those same countries. Thirty years of exploitation, poverty, dictatorship and mismanagement, however – usually with active backing from the same international community, in the name of the cold war politics – had left many places characterized by deep social division and weak governance. As a result, humanitarian assistance and development aid found themselves confronted with a great extension of their mandates, and this under increasingly difficult conditions". [89]

The interesting part of the above statement is its recognition of the mutual reinforcing nature of both humanitarian assistance and development aid in attempting to resolve some of the post-cold war humanitarian crisis. This is interesting since the history of development has been a history of dichotomy in relation to relief. However, the end of the cold war has brought new challenges to the development industry.

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[89] Norberg, C. (2000). *"Development Aid, Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief"*, in Cilliers, J and Norberg, A. (eds.) (2000). Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium, ISS

From the 1960s conceptualization of aid as being a fulfillment of the 'resources gap', the mid-1980s continued this trend. The policies that institutionalized this type of thinking were those promoted by the IMF and World Bank with conditionalities referred to as incentives and disincentives. The general aim of aid as it relates to conflict during this period and the immediate aftermath of the Cold War was to provide resources for post-conflict aid in support of post-conflict recovery. The objective is to avoid returning to pre-crisis conditions, but to lay down the foundations for peace and sustainable development. However, this still reflects the dichotomous binaries that juxtapose development against humanitarian assistance.

Ironically, as the 1990s approached and the Cold War ended with increased conflict and political and economic collapse, overall aid flows begun to stagnate. Surprisingly enough this decline occurred at a time when post-Cold War debates about aid revealed that in other situations such as complex political emergencies the linkage between humanitarian aid and other forms of aid was essential and crucial in addressing some of the underlying causes of conflict induced emergencies.[90]

The linkage was perceived to be urgent in the decade 1989-1999 when the phenomena of "failed states" increased in most parts of the developing world, especially Africa. Thus if, " ... *structures are weak, incoherent, and/or lack legitimacy vis a vis society, or there is no legitimate locus of authority, then clearly crises which threaten the lives of inhabitants will not be resolved by state intervention alone*".[91]

Although the above implies that there is therefore a need for foreign intervention in order to remedy the situation, some of the debates concerning aid have correctly asked the question why are there so many "failed" or dysfunctional states in Africa in the first place?[92]

Monograph Series, ISS, No: 46, February 2000, p. 20-21.
[90] Thompson, L. (1998), op. cit., p. 5.
[91] Jackson and Rosberg, 1989, de Waal, (1997), quoted in Thompson, L, (1998), Op. cit., p. 5.
[92] Thompson, L, (1998). op. cit.

Therefore, the argument goes that structural constraints that are historically linked to Africa's position in the global political economy results in the state being incapacitated and thus renders it a breeding ground for political instability. This leads to complex emergencies and further renders the state incapable of providing any positive and significant humanitarian aid during time of natural disaster.

Perhaps this explains why most states in Africa have taken decisions and political choices that have exacerbated rather than reduced the negative impact of natural disasters. In most cases these "fragile states" are faced with a political need to protect their narrow base of support and consequently use and/or misuse humanitarian aid to hang on to power. This was the case with the Sudanese famine of 1983-85 when president Nimeiri's anti-famine strategy was to simply deny that the famine existed![93]

The phenomena of "failed states" coupled with various other structural, economic, social and political problems have increased calls for more ODA to be channeled to developing countries in order to help address some of the underlying causes of poverty and conflict induced emergencies. However, there has been a lot of skepticism amongst scholars and activists about the role of relief and development aid in the post-cold war world.

Some have argued that ODA is simply used as a tool to avoid political responsibility that the North has towards the South. These changes result from structural changes resulting due to such processes as globalization. This is perhaps reflected by the fact that those countries most affected by these changes have not received priority and attention

Indeed, the trend has been the reverse of what has been argued to be a need for addressing Africa's crisis, namely increased ODA. Figure 1, For example, shows that in relation to Gross National Product (GNP), ODA has reached a record low level of 0.22

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[93] Nimeiri's government used this strategy in order to perpetuate itself in power. In one of the similar statements of denial the president state, *"The situation with regard to food security and health is reassuring"*, quoted from the *BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/7792, November 1984, in, de Waal, (1997), P. 91.

per cent, which is far below the target adopted by the United Nations of 0.7 per cent (see Figure 2).[94]

Figure 1: Overseas development assistance (ODA) net disbursements in US$ millions

Although the overall aid flows from OECD countries have increased from 0.57 per cent in the mid-1980s to 0.86 per cent in 1997, there are regional disparities.[95] In Africa ODA has decreased from US$ 25 597 million to US$ 18 529 million between 1990 and 1997, while private flows have fluctuated from negative in 1990 to a positive US$ 5 876 million in 1997.[96] This situation no doubt further renders the African states incapable of addressing some of the underlying challenges that potentially result in emergencies and which in reality have the potential to cause a recurrence of conflict.

However, since the very nature of aid relations between Northern and Southern countries reflects strategic and geo-political and economic interests, the trend of the decline in

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[94] Norberg, C, (2000). *"Development Aid, Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief"*, in, Cilliers, J, and Hilding, A, (2000) (eds.), *"Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium"*, ISS Monograph Series, No. 46, Feb. 2000. p. 18.
[95] Ibid, p. 18.
[96] Ibid, p. 19.

ODA can also be linked to the West's prioritization of the former Eastern block countries on the eve of the end of the cold war.

Further indicators show that as a share of GNP, ODA has declined even further in the post-cold war world thus depriving many governments in the developing world much needed capital for development and rebuilding (where societies have emerged from conflict).

Figure 2: ODA as percentage of gross national product (GNP)[97]

According to the 1999 *World Disaster Report*, the overall non-food emergency and distress relief disbursement have decreased from US$4 809 million in 1989 to a record low of US$ 3 468 million in 1994, and has declined to US$4 163 million in 1997. Perhaps this could be linked to the so called "donor fatigue" as Western countries became tired of financing endless conflicts in the developing world.

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[97] Norberg, C, (2000), op. cit, p. 20.

Figure 3: Total Aid Flows as percentage of gross national product (GNP)

Figure 4: Sub-Saharan Africa's share of ODA as percentage of gross disbursements

Furthermore, the above graph shows that Sub-Saharan Africa's share of the ODA is also declining. It has fallen from 31 per cent in the mid-1980s to 29 per cent in 1997. More

generally overall ODA from OECD countries to the Least Developed Countries group has decreased from 38 per cent in the mid-1980s to 31 per cent in 1997.

Thus by way of conclusion, Sub-Saharan Africa (where Mozambique as a case study is located) has experienced a decline in its share of ODA. This means that, as argued above, these countries are experiencing shortages in terms of much needed capital flows in order to stimulate development. This situation makes it even more difficult for those countries whose resources are already overburdened by political emergencies to link humanitarian assistance and development aid.

This means that although there is potentially a possibility that given the existence of certain conditions and specific policy frameworks, where humanitarian assistance and development aid can be linked in order to ensure a positive and sustainable outcome (in terms of mitigating the effects of complex emergencies on vulnerable populations), this is rendered more difficult by the decline in overall ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Concluding this chapter certain things become clear when we consider the relationship between humanitarian assistance and development aid, during and after the Cold War. Firstly, it is that there has been growing acknowledgement that there are structural problems that contribute to instability and result in complex political emergencies as the state becomes incapable of maintaining its legitimacy.

These structural factors, it is argued, can be better mediated by a deliberate attempt aimed at providing development aid in order to address these problems in the long-term and thereby reduce chances for instability. This means that humanitarian assistance is inextricably linked to other forms of aid such as development aid.

Secondly, despite the abovementioned importance of establishing a linkage between humanitarian assistance and development in order to limit chances of instability that contributes in the rise of complex political emergencies and/or assist those countries already on the path from war to peace, there has been a decline in overall aid flows to the

South, especially with regard to ODA. This it is submitted limits the capacity of dysfunctional states and those already experiencing emergencies to rebuild their societies through much needed development that can help be a deterrent to instability.

Developmental NGOs and the end of the Cold War

One of the most important, yet underplayed, aspects of the post-Cold War scene has been the quantitative and qualitative (in terms of influence) rise of the 'developmental NGOs'. [98] Although relatively few NGOs were engaged in the development field during the 1960s and 1970s, by contrast the 1980s has been often referred to as the 'NGO decade' in development aid circles. This decade was crucial and central in exporting the growth of NGOs from the Western welfare states to the remote corners of the developing world.

Today it is estimated that during the 80s the total funds transferred by and through Northern NGOs increased at twice the rate for international aid as a whole. [99] About 4,000 development NGOs in OECD member countries exist dispersing billions of dollars a year, were working with about 10,000 to 20,000 Southern NGOs who assisted about 100 to 250 million people.

It is, however, important to note that the rise of NGOs and their operational practices have been accompanied by strong ideological influences. These powerful ideological influences and language are used in order to imagine the operational landscape within which NGOs ply their trade. This landscape often uses an ideological language that defines the recipient's vis-à-vis the distributors of aid, justifies intervention, and finally helps in the imagination between the actors from the North and the beneficiaries from the South.

In line with changing global ideological trends and priorities in the donor countries (always found in the Western world), NGOs have adopted a changing set of theories and

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[98] See, Tvedt, T., (1998), **Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats? NGOs and Foreign AID**, James Currey: Oxford, p. 1.

practices within the development process. For example, terms such as 'comparative advantage', 'response to state and market failure', 'empowering the poor', 'grassrooting', 'capacity building', championing 'civil society role in development', and 'representing democracy and pluralism' have all been used in the last 10 years not only to reflect ideological changes in the development industry but also to perpetuate the role of NGOs in development in the South, whatever the consequences of such a role on the lives of people in the South. Thus development language reflects ideological influences that reflect structural power within the aid industry.

The importance of the above point is that it lies at the core of any attempts at evaluating the role of NGOs (especially those from the South) in serving the interests of the poor and marginalized within the context of globalization. This is crucial if we take a close look at the environment in which NGOs operate in the globalization era, since this environment inevitably impacts upon their role in development. This role is crucial argues this paper, in any attempts at linking humanitarian assistance and development aid in political emergencies.

During the mid-1990s there was an emergence of a new ideological context that has profoundly shaped the role of NGOs in development. This period was characterized by the collapse of the Soviet system and state-led one state command economies. The ideological triumphism that followed the collapse of the Soviet political and economic system was accompanied by ideological calls for the 'roll back of the state'.

As a component of 'civil society' (which was perceived as crucial for democratization), NGOs were given priority over the state and viewed as important actors in development within a paradigm of development that emphasized democratization and the free-market as vehicles for progress.

The other important aspect in the rise of NGOs as vehicles for development in the neo-liberal paradigm owes to the influence of International Financial Institutions, notably the

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[99] UNDP, 1993, P. 88, quoted in Tvedt, T., op. cit., p. 1.

IMF and World Bank. These institutions increased space for NGOs by arguing for a reduction in the role of the state. NGOs were not simply representatives of civil society but essential actors in the delivery of services where the states lacked the will or resources to do so.

It is because of the above point and scenario that NGOs have come to represent powerful political and ideological symbols of the triumph of the neo-liberal agenda in the post-Cold War world, with very profound and serious implications for the improvement of lives for millions of people around the world.

Many scholars have cautioned against the negative implications of the proximity between NGOs and the ideology of neo-liberalism. [100]First and foremost one of the most visible consequences of neo-liberal globalization has been the rise in poverty and suffering in much of the countries in the South.

The fact that economic liberalization has widened the gap between and within societies and communities is verified by statistics. Indeed, the UNDP argues that although minimal progress has been made in other areas, the gains have been unequally distributed. Although subject to contestation, estimates suggest that between 1987 and 1993, the number of people with an income of less than US$1 a day increased by almost 100 million to 1.3 billion people, amounting to one-third of the population of the 'developing world'.[101] This occurred whilst for the period 1989 and 1996, the number of billionaires increased from 157 to 447. [102]More alarming is the fact that the value of these billionaires combined assets exceeded the combined incomes of half of the poorest of the world's poor.

In addition it has been argued that since the early 80s more than 100 developing and 'transition' countries have experienced severe deterioration in living standards as well as

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[100] Holloway, E., (1999). *Freeing the Citizen's Sector from Global Paradigms and Trying to Get a Grip on the Moral High Ground*, paper presented at 'NGOs in a Global Future' conference, 10-13 January 1999, University of Birmingham.
[101] UNDP, 1997, p. 38.

failures of growth on a much-prolonged scale than anything experienced by the developed world during the 1930s Great Depression. [103]

Although the reasons for chronic poverty, economic collapse, environmental degradation, civil unrest and various other ills prevalent in the South have multi-faceted causes, it is clear that the current ideology of neo-liberalism and globalization results in further marginalization and poverty for these countries. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the role of developmental NGOs within this context if we are to justify their practice in the entire development process, let alone linking such development with relief.

Indeed some scholars have highlighted that the impact of the new 'Washington Consensus' on NGOs is such that the latter, *"Increasing interest and support for NGOs among official donor agencies may create a predisposition, or foster a shift, towards operational and organizational expansion. These incentives need to be treated cautiously, because decisions to expand with official finance may have various unwelcome consequences: for example, they may close off potential courses of action; or make NGOs feel more accountable to their official donors than to their intended beneficiaries; or imply support for policies of wholesale economic liberalization"* [104] Thus the dangers are such that NGOs may find themselves accountable to donors who set ideological and operational benchmarks for the disbursement of aid (relief and/or developmental) and consequently compromise their role as agents of social and economic change.

However, the other more serious implication for NGOs in relation to their role within the neo-liberal global order is with regard to perceptions they have assumed in the South. Most NGOs (North and South respectively) have sacrificed their hard won legitimacy built up after years of activity and advocacy and are today seen as agents whose main task is to pick up the social costs of global economic restructuring.

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[102] Ibid, p. 110.
[103] UNDP, 1997, P. 7.
[104] See, Edwards, M, and Hulme, D, (2000), *Scaling up NGO impact on development: learning from experience*, in Eade, D, (ed.) (2000), **Development, NGOs, and Civil Society**, OXFAM: GB, P. 19.

In another context, it has been revealed that;

"*In synthesis, the Promotion and Development NGOs are immersed in a social environment which shows interest in, and openness to, private institutions in the social field, but within a hegemonic ideological and practical model that does not prioritise social change nor see it as necessary. In other words, it is an environment (a 'market') which is basically interested in the more technical services of the Development NGOs (their services of financial intermediation or professional assistance) and not at all in their key social role of development promotion. This environment generates (via social recognition and financial opportunities) a strong tension in institutions, forcing them to convert themselves into successful 'enterprises or social consultancies' or to maintain and strengthen their promotional role without the resources to carry it out*".[105]

Although it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a thorough review of the appropriate role between NGOs and the global donor community, suffice to say that there is still a need for a scientific analysis of the role NGOs play in the current global economic order since this impacts directly upon the kind of choices that these organizations have in championing alternative notions of development.

Furthermore, such an assessment and focus on NGOs in a study about the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development aid since NGOs are the agencies currently delivering 'development' to the countries of the South. However, a cursory look at the relationship between NGOs and powerful donor governments and International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and World Bank suggests that the developmental NGO community, though diverse, is caught in a dilemma where by accepting the money from Western donors they indirectly submit to ideological requirements of these

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[105] See the study by, Felix Bambarolo, Luis Perez Coscio and Alfredo Stein: "*El Rol de las Organizaciones Populares en America Latina*", Buenos Aires ediciones FICONG (the Institutional Strengthening and Training Programme for NGOs in Latin America and the Caribbean), which defines the characteristic features of DNGOs: non-profit agencies, independent of the government, which promote democratic development, seeking to improve standards of living in the lowest income sectors, and generally operating with international cooperation funds.

organizations and thereby compromise their role as agents of social, economic and political change for the benefit of the poor and marginalized.

Therefore, in conclusion, it could be argued that the end of the Cold War has provided the aid industry with serious challenges. On one hand the proliferation of complex political emergencies means that humanitarian and development agencies will be increasingly intervening in these crisis. However, this also occurs at the same time that skepticism if not outright disappointment with both humanitarian and development aid interventions has led to calls to abandon the projects all together.

The growing trend towards increasing budgets for humanitarian as opposed to development aid is problematic in the sense that it might signal a tactical withdrawal by the Northern countries from any responsibility for the problems in the South. This situation is unfortunate in a globalizing neo-liberal world characterized by increasing poverty and income gap as well as profound structural constraints on the economies of the South (which in themselves are a recipe for further disaster and turmoil), in the sense that it could lead to NGOs and other important actors in the aid industry being just simple agencies whose main task is to take responsibility for the effects of globalization and economic restructuring in the South, without being agents of change. The patrimonial relations that are embedded within the aid industry make it almost impossible for NGOs to challenge the ideologies of their masters. Thus the post-Cold War aid landscape makes it difficult to link humanitarian assistance with development aid in a world whose ideologies and priorities have drastically changed, resulting in changes in the role of NGOs themselves!

Chapter 3

Establishing the linkage in Mozambique

The case of Mozambique

A combination of Cold War strategic interests, the quest for the defense of apartheid economic and political power inside South Africa, and the legacy of a distorted colonial economic inheritance plunged post-independence Mozambique into sixteen years of 'civil war'. Mozambique was for the most part of the 20th century a Portuguese colony.

The Portuguese initially established a colonial policy of economic activity that centered on trade in gold and ivory, taxes from the African population and increasingly from the slave trade. It is estimated that trading in slaves approximated 85 % of exports (by value) in ports of Quelimane by the 1920s.[106] However, as ivory and slaves declined central Mozambique increasingly turned to agriculture.

From the 1870s onwards the introduction of a 'free market' saw African peasants encouraged to venture into food and oil seeds production for sale. Small plantations producing opium and sugar soon emerged along the Zambezi River. These and coconut producing plantations were soon enlarged to the biggest in the colony.

When Mozambique later bowed to increasing pressure from other European countries such as Britain for a stake in the colonial economy African labor and crop produce were forcibly extracted to serve foreign concession companies. Forced labor in the southern part of the country was used to service the growing demand inside South Africa for the development of the latter's gold industry. [107]

Thus the economy of Mozambique became increasingly dependent on remittances from mines in South Africa. The African peasant societies were very distorted by this skewed

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[106] For a detailed discussion on the history of colonial Mozambique, see, Abrahamsson, H. and Nilsson, A., (eds.) (1995b). *Mozambique – The Troubled Transition*, Zed Books: London.

migrant system and the legacy of colonial forced labor and cultivation of crops further dislocated rural communities.

With a rural economy dominated by foreign owned estates and plantations as well as an industrial sector aimed at supplying the white minority with consumer goods, the distorted and skewed economic future of post-independence Mozambique was set in motion.

Thus it is clear that from the colonial period the Portuguese government deliberately - through policy interventions such as the granting of rights to British companies such as Sena Sugar Estates, geared the economy towards servicing European powers and South African white markets through the supply of goods and cheap labor. The contemporary railway system in Mozambique is a testimony to this.

The above picture was the kind of economic structure that confronted the post-colonial government led by the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique/Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) when it took over power from the Portuguese.

Gaining independence on the 25 of June 1975, Mozambique was soon to face various forms of assault on her independence.[108] The breakdown of the economy was one of the major challenges facing the new government. A chronicle of events that started, inter alia, with the settler shootings in the capital, the attacks by dissatisfied FRELIMO guerillas, the flight of skilled Portuguese settlers, the emergence of RENAMO and direct South African political and economic sabotage, Mozambique was soon plunged into a 'civil war' that lasted almost sixteen years.

At the center of this war were the counter-revolutionary forces of RENAMO who were created by both the South African and Rhodesian security forces from the former Selous Scouts after Zimbabwe's independence and transferred to Mozambique. This war was

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[107] Hanlon, J., (1986). *Beggar Your Neighbour's* , London: James Currey, 1986.
[108] Ibid,

fought with active support from apartheid South Africa under the pretext of fighting a "total onslaught" from black communist countries that were supporting the African National Congress (ANC). The regional content of the war also shaped prospects for peace in the country, almost two decades after independence.

The Humanitarian Crisis and Response during the emergency in Mozambique: linking Humanitarian Assistance and Development Aid

The humanitarian cost of the 'civil war' in Mozambique was very huge. It has been estimated by the United Nations that the country suffered economic losses of approximately US$ 15 billion between 1980 and 1988, a figure that is five and a half times the 1988 Gross Domestic Product (GDP). [109] By the end of 1988, 978 rural clinics – almost half the total in the country – had been destroyed or forced to close due to RENAMO attacks. For the FRELIMO government the strategic focus on the education and health infrastructure was ideologically motivated since the government perceived these as symbolic achievements of 'socialism' that they had initiated.

Furthermore, UNICEF has estimated that 494, 000 Mozambican children under the age of five died between 1980 and 1988 from war-related causes. [110] These were both direct deaths due to the effects of war and those due to indirect consequences of war such as increasing famine and disease. It has been estimated that during the emergency, Mozambique's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was only half of what it would have been without the war. [111] As a result of this huge humanitarian catastrophe the humanitarian community became involved in efforts ranging from reducing the negative impact of war (such as the provision of medicine, food and shelter), the rebuilding of infrastructure, to helping the country on a path to peace.

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[109] Hanlon, J., (1996). *Peace Without Profit: How the I.M.F Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique*, James Currey: London, p. 15.
[110] Hanlon, J., (1996), **Peace Without Profit: How I.MF. Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique**, James Currey: Oxford. p. 13.
[111] Ibid, p. 15.

Amongst the major relief and rehabilitation projects that the 'international community' was involved in included sectors such as transportation (ports, railways, roads, etc), energy, commodity aid and balance of payment programmes, the fishery sector, health, oil and gas exploration, agriculture and emergency food support.

These programmes and projects were intended for both short-term relief (i.e. food and medicine supply) and long-term development needs of the country, even at a post-conflict stage. However, as will be shown below this was easier said than done since there were a lot of institutional, conceptual, operational and security related problems that made the link between humanitarian assistance and development aid in Mozambique problematic. Some of these were associated with the broader regional dynamics (i.e. SADCC vis-à-vis national developmental priorities) in which Mozambique found itself.[112]

The Transportation Sector

The *transportation sector* was one area where the problems of linking relief and development projects in an emergency situation proved difficult. The colonial heritage in Mozambique left the country with an untenable situation where there are no roads connecting the north, central and southern parts of the country. Add to this the fact that during the emergency insecurity as a result of sabotage and destruction roads were difficult and costly to use, thus the government had to focus on the rehabilitation of the coastal transportation sector.

For example, according to the National Directorate of Roads and Bridges, of Mozambique's 29,000 km of roads the war made 8,000 km (28%) unusable, while 14,000 (48%) were in 'wretched condition'.[113] This means that a large part of usable roads were only accessible only during the dry season and with a large lorry or four-wheel drive

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[112] The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) was formed in 1980 by the Frontline States in order to reduce economic dependence on South Africa.
[113] Hanlon, J., (1996). **Peace Without Profit: How the I.M.F Block Rebuilding in Mozambique**, James Currey: Oxford, p. 39.

vehicle. Thus coastal transportation proved a very affordable and essential means of transport for the Mozambican economy.

During the emergency the importance of coastal shipping was reflected by statistics which revealed that coastal fleet in 1987 carried approximately 270, 000 tons for a total of 135 mil. ton-km (whilst the railroads transported 58 mill. ton-km of national transport). [114]There were various programmes and projects in which the government of Mozambique was engaged in with various donor countries and agencies in order to rehabilitate this sector.

Coastal Shipping

With regard to *coastal shipping*, the government of Mozambique was involved in projects that covered technical assistance, consultancies, and input supplies. There were projects in hydrography, rehabilitation of coastal terminals, personnel training and improvement of shipyards. The major area of focus within this sector was personnel. There was a need to transfer skills and thereby improve the capacity of Mozambicans to operate the sector such as taking positions in the fleet and maritime administration. Thus the *Maritime Training School (Escola Nautica de Mocambique)* became involved in a bilateral agreement with the Norwegian government for the training of ship officials and others associated with the sector.[115]

The government of Mozambique and donor agencies saw transferring skills through training as crucial in ensuring the concrete operationalization and adherence to principles of self-reliance in relief and development programs. With regard to this, donor support has resulted in an increased, albeit modest, rise in the number of Mozambican students trained as 2nd officers, 3rd officers, ship's masters and chief engineers.[116]

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[114] See, Brochmann, G. and Ofstad, A. (eds.) (1990). *Mozambique: Norwegian Assistance in a Context of Crisis*, Christian Michelsen Institute, CMI, Bergen, Norway, p. 71.
[115] Ibid, p. 72.
[116] Those trained included, inter alia, 16 2nd officers, 35 3rd officers, two uncertified ship masters, and two uncertified chief engineers of Mozambican nationality respectively. See, Brochmann, G. and Ofstad, A. , *Mozambique: Norwegian Assistance in a Context of Crisis*, CMI, Bergen, Norway, 1990, p. 72.

The modest rise in the number of trained personnel for Mozambique's coastal shipping has not been without problems. Despite the school having been operational since the mid-beginning of the 1980s, by the end of the same decade there was not much transfer of skills at higher levels of teaching. The school continued to depend largely on expatriate staff. This means that there was little 'counter-part' training that could enable Mozambicans to take over vital tasks and responsibilities related to teaching, training and management of the school.

This implies that during the emergency there was a lack of long-term clear policy with regard to transfer of knowledge, technology, and responsibility within the training component of the coastal shipping sector on the part of donors and aid agencies. This problem is at the center of the debates about capacity building during emergencies and the desire on the part of donors to promote this. As the war came to an end it was becoming clear that the Mozambican state has been de-capacitated instead of gaining much needed capacity.

The Coastal Shipping Company Navique

The other component of the shipping sector that received attention during the emergency was the coastal *shipping company* called *Navique*. As the only shipping company in the country serving eleven international, regional and local ports, there was a very urgent need to support the company during the emergency. This company urgently needed investment in skilled personnel and capital resources in order to assist the company to rehabilitate its fleet, and thereby increase its operational capacity to its maximum strength under the then prevailing conditions.

There were been various on and off agreements reached between the government of Mozambique and various donors with regard to restructuring and improvement of Navique to operational status during the emergency. Focus was more on training.

At the initial stages the company was faced with problems such as the relatively old fleet in poor condition, pilling up debt and operational deficit, poor maintenance, below required level availability of vessels, etc. However, the intervention of donor agencies and bilateral agreements and projects slightly improved the situation. For example, between 1985 and 1989, the amount of freight carried increased from 161,000 tons to 275 tons respectively. [117]The total value of goods carried during this period amounted to approximately above US$ 130 million. [118]

However, although 'developmental' aid projects by donor countries improved the operational capacity of Navique, there were various limitations and problems that constrained the impact of donor rehabilitation attempts. These included inefficient cargo handling routines in ports. This inefficiency is responsible for the vessels only spending 15 – 20 per cent of its technically available time at sea. Thus there was a need for the rehabilitation of coastal terminals, including both Maputo and Beira, although priority was given to the former. This in turn gave rise to other complications such as the coordination of activities between those belonging to SADCC rehabilitation and country priorities, as will be shown below.

Energy Supply Sector

The other sector that was central to attempts at socio-economic rehabilitation during the emergency in Mozambique was the *energy supply* sector. Mozambique has had a vast energy potential whose capacity was strongly limited by the war-induced emergency. Lack of exploitation of energy resources was partly a direct consequence of war. Mozambique's huge energy resources included the huge Cahora Bassa hydropower complex on the Zambezi river in Tete province, which at the time of the emergency was producing at 1 per cent of its capacity because of sabotage activities by the then apartheid regime of South Africa. [119]

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[117] Brochmann, G and Ofstad, A., (eds.) (1990) (op. cit.), p. 74.
[118] Ibid, p. 74 – 75.

The other energy supply potential for the country was the Moatize coalmines in Tete province, which was also producing at low capacity due to the sabotage of railway lines. As a result of this economic sabotage the country had to import its electric power from South Africa for its Maputo region. Generally the periodic disruption of power supply during the emergency resulted in economic losses as production was often disrupted. Mozambique also possesses commercially exploitable gas resources, and possibly petroleum. However, due to the emergency energy needs of almost 90 per cent of the population were serviced by fuelwood or charcoal in rural and semi-urban areas.

Therefore, in the aftermath of independence, the government of Mozambique realized the importance of the energy sector in driving socio-economic development and industrial output. However, the general environment caused by the emergency together with the tactics of sabotage practiced by RENAMO and South Africa (aimed at crippling the general economy and vital economic outputs such as energy supply) resulted in drastic reduction of electricity generation for domestic and export purposes.

In the period shortly after independence Mozambique energy sector played a dominant role in the country's trade but this was dramatically reversed in the subsequent period between 1981 and 1986. The major production plant the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric supply line was reduced in 1981 and operations halted in 1984 due to the abovementioned sabotage of transmission lines.

During the emergency and the PRE programme the government committed itself to restore its capacity as a net exporter of electricity and thereby gain much needed foreign exchange. Although the PRE played an initial 'positive' role in boosting the Mozambican economy during the middle to late 80s, it was becoming clear that it was having other negative effects, especially in the energy sector. Although steady, there were increased tariffs for electricity consumption for "general users" such as small industries, businesses, and offices. This was, however, initially not the case at household level during the emergency. However, through aid the country managed to increase electricity

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[119] Hanlon, J., (1996). (op. cit.)

consumption, although there were problems. These related to donor and government prioritization and the programs ability to increase the capacity of local business that was incapacitated by decades of colonialism and war.

For example, although statistics from Mozambique's electricity board (the EdM) revealed that consumption increased in 1988 to highest levels ever since 1974, there was biasness towards the southern part of the country, which accounted for almost 70 per cent! [120]This clearly shows that aid support to this sector was not done in a manner that does not discriminate or incapacitate other provinces in the country. This increased instead or narrowing regional gaps, which in themselves intensified the conflict since RENAMO could rally communities around the point of neglect and biasness of the government towards other regions such as the Southern parts of the country.

Thus during the emergency some aspects of the aid program relating to the energy sector were not contributing positively to any equity based long-term vision for the development of the country. In other words within this sector projects were not integrated to a post-war vision of the country where equity and equality between people and regions constituted bases for equitable development.

The Bretton Woods institutions and macro-economic context during the emergency

It is not possible to fully grasp the conditions under which attempts were made to link humanitarian assistance and development aid during the emergency in Mozambique without highlighting the effects and impact of macro-economic reform on the entire aid machinery.

There were several interlinking factors that gave rise to the dominant role the IMF came to play in the developing world. After the 1973-80 oil price rise, there were huge surpluses in the banking system; developing countries were thus encouraged to borrow as there were huge surpluses in the banking system and real interest rates were negative.

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[120] Brochmann, G and Ofstad, A., (eds.) (1990) (op. cit.)., p. 82.

However, the spectacular 1978-80 oil price rise triggered a huge debt crisis. A consequent massive rise in interest rates resulted in increased debt repayments while the higher cost of importing oil caused an economic crisis and worsened terms of trade for many "Third World" countries. Many of these countries, including Mozambique, were unable to repay their loans. Thus, Mozambique joined her counterparts in the IMF and World Bank club.

During the early 80s World Bank and IMF were given new roles (shifting from their earlier conception at Bretton Woods), and became interventionist. These included:

- imposing policy changes that would ensure that developing countries repaid their debt;
- increase aid flows to developing countries (World Bank lending increased by 50 per cent between 1982 and 1988);
- take a more active role in the cold war and impose free market and monetarist policies.[121]

The various attempts and programs aimed at macro-economic restructuring by the Mozambican government and global financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank were as a direct result of both the war related emergency and the collapse of the post-colonial economy in the country.

Although it is not easy to clearly and precisely point out the exact factors leading to the economic collapse, it could also be added (to the preceding two), that some of the measures which could otherwise have been sustainable in the short-term soon acquired a permanence that proved unsustainable in the long term. This was true with regard to the governments need to maintain employment levels in industry as a temporary measure. However, when the strategy of maintaining a high work-force whilst production levels were dropping proved unsustainable, the government had to act in order to restructure the

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[121] Hanlon, J., (.....?). *"It's the IMF that Runs Mozambique"*, p. 18.

economy. Since these otherwise temporary measures continued beyond their rationality the result was a total breakdown of the economy.

The combination of, inter alia, food subsidies for urban consumers, subsidized housing, free education and health care, subsidized state-farms and heavy industries that produced at a loss resulted in the government running at huge and unsustainable deficits. Thus as a direct result of the situation outlined above, 1982 was the last year Mozambique was able to service her debt. Even the previous debt service was clearly not to be sustained very long since it consumed almost 100 per cent of all foreign exchange.

The signing of the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa signaled an attempt by the former to initiate regional, international and domestic changes that would significantly change the domestic changes inside the country. This was the same year that Mozambique joined the IMF and World Bank and concluded its first debt rescheduling with the 'Paris Club'. Although Mozambique did not achieve any level of commitment from the South Africans in terms of honoring the terms of reference of the agreement, the country did manage to become part of the global financial institutions and could thus access credit from these institutions. However, this meant a change in the whole principles governing macro-economics in the country.

There were, however, other factors linked to the Cold War that put more pressure on the Mozambican government to restructure her economy strictly according to the dictates of the Bretton Woods institutions. For example, although the government and the World Bank negotiated from 1984 through 1986, and by late 1986 the government was under enormous donor pressure, whilst at the same time facing a serious drought and a looming famine, the donors still could not provide food aid! The conditions under which the donors would provide this much needed 'humanitarian aid' was only if Mozambique would strike a deal with the bank.

The government's Economic Action Programme combined with the fresh inflow of foreign exchange, which followed debt rescheduling, and the IMF/WB agreement

produced a small about-turn in the economy in 1986, with a 2 per cent growth rate. The 1987 economic restructuring program of the government strengthened this.

Therefore, on the 14 January 1987 the Mozambican government unexpectedly introduced the PRE *(Programa de Reabilitacao Economica)* without prior approval of the Bretton Woods institutions.[122] The government, however, satisfied most of the institution's conditions such as huge currency devaluations (from 1 USD = 40 MZM to 1 USD = 400 MZM during the year), major cuts to price subsidies and regulations, a cut back to subsidies to state companies, and privatization of smaller state-controlled companies. [123]Although initially the government was able to maintain some of its own national program and priorities such as, subsidized food ration in Maputo and credit directed to productive industry, the Bretton Woods institutions were to further make subsequent demands regarding some aspects of the PRE that were to make the state increasingly dysfunctional in dealing with the effects of the emergency on its people.

The impact of the broader macro-economic environment on the Mozambican emergency and on attempts that the government made in order to initiate some form of long-term development planning could be assessed by focusing on a variety of programs that were carried out during the emergency. Since the major focus of the PRE was aligned towards a reliance on the market and a liberalized economy (with a limited role for the state), this was bound to have an impact on the state's capacity to deliver both humanitarian and development aid and on other donor projects. Since one of the major conditions of this neo-liberal program was a minimalist role for the state, this caused some disruption on the socio-economic fabric of Mozambique.

However, it is important to stress that there were both positive and negative aspects to the conditions set in motion by the PRE. On the positive side, the program increased grants into the country from US$ 60 million in 1980 and 1981 to 200 million in 1986, reaching

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[122] Ibid, p. 20.
[123] Ibid, p. 20 – 21.

US$ 400 million in 1988 and onwards. [124]Thus in the middle 1980s, western governments backed the demand that Mozambique join the Bretton Woods institutions. This resulted in a general increase in aid, which jumped from USS$ 250 million in 1983 to US$900 million in 1987 and to US$1200 million in 1991. [125]This resulted in imports of much needed goods into Mozambique rising quite dramatically. On the other hand this resulted in exports shrinking, thus widening the current account deficit. Due to this rise in external revenue the country was able to pay for imports of about US$ 1 billion in 1988.[126]

Although the PRE contributed positively to the overall picture of the economy during its initial phases it did affect the manner in which relief and developmental aid was provided and operationalized in Mozambique during the emergency. This was in two ways, the first was with Balance of Payment Support, and the second was the overall socio-economic impact of the programs under conditions of war and emergency.

Commodity Aid and Balance of Payment Support

This type of aid means that commodities that were needed during the emergency were procured by Mozambique from a bilateral donor. Most of these were initially intended as inputs for production in agriculture and industry (depending on the donor) but were later to include those intended for direct consumption such as food. However, most donors insisted that Mozambique list mostly those commodities that could be purchased from them. In this way commodity aid was included in bilateral programs as Balance of Payment Support, especially when it was in form of inputs needed for reconstruction of various sectors of the country's economy.

Secondly, the macro-economic framework as determined by the PRE also impacted upon these arrangements. This occurred because most of bilateral donor programmes aimed as part of import support (which in turn was initial aimed at intra-SADCC trade) became allocated to the overall Co-financing rehabilitation projects of the World Bank, resulting

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[124] Hanlon, J., (1996). (op. cit.)., p. 16 – 17.
[125] Ibid.

in the latter setting conditions for the government and relief agencies. These conditions were in most part in direct confrontation with conditions of emergency that the country was facing.

Socio-Economic Impact

On the negative side, the PRE resulted in the drastic increase in limiting effective demand that could be sustained by purchasing power. Huge devaluations together with major cuts in government spending resulted in drastic increases in prices of consumer goods, all this under conditions of semi-permanent emergency. Thus the scope for using government budgets for productive purposes and social spending was reduced by the PRE program, something that was unsuitable for a country under a political emergency.

For example, the prices for basic necessities such as housing, education, and medical care increased dramatically as a direct consequence of the PRE program. This means that some of the long-term effects of macro-economic restructuring during the emergency in Mozambique, especially in the period 1986-88, and perhaps beyond, were a major decline in the provision of socio-economic goods by the government.

Linking humanitarian assistance and development aid during the transition from war to peace: 1990 – 1995.

The second phase that this report focuses on is the 1990-1995 period when Mozambique signed the General Peace Agreement on the 4th of October 1992 to officially end the war induced emergency. This period is interesting, for the purposes of this report because it highlights the role that extensive involvement of the 'international community' can play in assisting a country move from a condition of protracted humanitarian and developmental emergency to a period of reconciliation, rehabilitation and development. However, as the report demonstrates, international humanitarian and developmental interventions are not without ambiguities, tensions, contradictions and failures.

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[120] Ibid.

The General Peace Agreement of 1992 that formally ended the war between RENAMO and FRELIMO, and constituted of seven protocols all of which were aimed at attempting to provide a comprehensive framework for sustainable peace by involving the 'international community' in a manner that ensures long-term removal of incentives for a return to war.

These seven protocols were:

- *Protocol I* (October 1991) on "basic principles" that obtained RENAMO recognition of Government authority and institutions and the latter's undertaking not to legislate on any important issue until after elections. It also established the principle of a Commission to supervise the peace process, with UN participation.
- *Protocol II* (November 1991) on the recognition of political parties.
- *Protocol III* (March 1992) on elections and press freedom.
- *Protocol IV* on military and related issues: the formation of the Mozambique Defense Force (FADM), the withdrawal of foreign troops, the functioning of the security and police services, and demobilization and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers.
- *Protocol V* on the election timetable and guarantees and the creation of the CSC.
- *Protocol VI* on cessation of the armed conflict and the creation of a Cease Fire Commission (CFC).
- *Protocol VII* requesting a donor's conference to mobilize funds for the humanitarian and electoral aspects of the GPA.[127]

The December 1992 Rome Conference that consisted of the EU, and the Commonwealth Secretariat that pledged US$ 450 million for elections, emergency and reintegration and the organization of refugee repatriation, aimed at helping Mozambique on her path from

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[127] Hallam, A., (eds.) (et. al.) (1997), *"Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique"*, CMI, Bergen, Norway, April 1997.

war to peace. The other meeting in Maputo in July 1993 produced a further US$ 70 million. [128]

Faced with some 3-4 million internally displaced and 1.8 million refugees, whose difficulties had been intensified by the 1991/92 drought (which fortunately was reversed by the return of good rains in 1992), the GPA had the following broad and general goals. The general goals of the GPA were in many ways aimed at incorporating some aspects of a long-term developmental focus on programs aimed at, inter alia, integrating people back into 'normal' productive life after decades of war.

These were:

- Demobilization
- Repatriation and reintegration (of refugees and internally displaced persons)
- Rapid rebuilding
- Demining
- Promotion of political pluralism (including guarantee and protection of human rights). [129]

The above broad goals could be said to have been in line with and closely related to those categories identified by the "War torn Societies Project" of UNRISD. This project has identified a four-fold broad categorization that include:

- Reforming security structures (e.g. demobilization);
- (Re) building political structures (e.g. towards political pluralism);
- Removing war-time distortions and rebuilding economic structures (e.g. demining and rapid rebuilding); and
- Reintegrating and *empowering* populations on the *local level* (e.g. through support for returnees).

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[128] Ibid, p. 9.
[129] Hallam, A., (et. al.) (1997).

Although formal peace was and is always easier to locate, the relief – development continuum also entails a continuous process that embraces, " ... *peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation*". Many organizations that constituted part of the broader donor community involved in the Mozambican transition were aware of the need to intensify the linkage between humanitarian assistance and long-term development since failure to do so could have resulted in the loss of the peace momentum and perhaps reverse the trend back to war. Thus Secretary General of the UN mission in the country remarked that, "... *without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall*".[130] Thus there was a need to work with maximum speed in coordinating humanitarian and developmental efforts, a task not made less easy by the fact that an incapacitated Mozambican government had to deal with no less than 170 NGOs at one point.

The broader complex and multi-faceted effort of the international community resulted in a situation whereby between October 1992 and December 1994 about 4.3 million Mozambicans moved back home (mostly through own means and spontaneously) and organized movements of demobilized soldiers that covered some 200,000 soldiers and their dependents and 300,000 refugees.

Furthermore, through support from the UNHCR and with additional bilateral donor contribution and under the overall coordination of the UNOHAC mission, resettlement programmes aimed to provide food aid, seeds, restore basic social services (health care, education) and repair basic infrastructure (water supply, roads and bridges) were underway In addition by 1994 about 500 quick impact projects were implemented and more than 30 NGOs launched area-based reintegration programs.

However, although most of the above 'achievements' look convincing there are many challenges, bottlenecks and various unanswered questions that resulted from the Mozambican humanitarian and developmental effort between 1990 and 1995. These are

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[130] Hallam, A., op. cit., p. 7.

both theoretical and practical The report will focus on some of the basic programs targeted by the GPA with the aim of assessing how the manner in which these were planned and executed promoted or hindered the linkage between humanitarian and development aid.

Demobilization

There seems to be some consensus in the literature about the importance of demobilization in any given peace process. In the Mozambican case this proved both a complex and sensitive process. The conceptual provisions in the GPA saw this process as a matter of simply pacification, entailing troop disarmament, documentation, initial dispersion through home transport, and a cash and goods take-home package. [131]

The other reason demobilization was essential owed to the fact that soldiers had a strong sense of entitlement and a corresponding potential for instability. This means that donor programs had to have a developmental rather than an emergency emphasis since the needs of demobilized soldiers were mainly about reintegration back into civilian life. In order to sustain peace, there was a need to make sure that there was external assistance aimed at ensuring that in the medium to long-term, demobilized soldiers were provided with socio-economic possibilities that would enable them easier adjustment into civilian life.

A special commission (CORE) was charged with the task of executing some aspects of the demobilization process. [132] Although at the heart of the establishment of CORE was the realization by the donor community in general, the Like-Minded Group specifically, that demobilization and reintegration were two distinct but equally significant contributors to lasting peace, there were different bodies created for different purposes, sometimes resulting in uncoordinated programs and redundancy.

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[131] Hallam, A., op. cit., p. 67.
[132] Hallam, A., op. cit., p. 68.

CORE was chaired by the head of UNOHAC responsible for economic and social integration of demobilized soldiers. However, it turned out that the former became ineffective in carrying out its mandate. This was partly due to the fact that CORE lacked executive functions and could thus only operate at a conceptual level (where its major occupation was about policy formulation), a level where it turned out that the commission differed with UNOHAC.[133] The latter favored a medium-term development related approach whilst most donors in the former preferred short-term programs with minimal government intervention.

UNOHAC generally played a role of coordinator for donor reconstruction-reintegration activities and managed funds for these (i.e. administering a multi-donor US$ 34 million Trust Fund in conjunction with the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).[134] The latter financed more than 60 NGOs and other community projects. The Demobilization Technical Unit (DTU) was the body charged with administering the successful operationalisation of the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), which was instrumental in ensuring that commitments made on paper were really fulfilled and that as a result demobilization went smooth.

The Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) formed one of the challenging aspects of the entire demobilization process. Since the broader aim of this project was to ensure a smooth transition back to normal civilian life for those mobilized, this program did not constitute a separate entity in the entire peace process but a concrete and integral scheme with which relief to development transition could be ensured. This is so because the program occurred at a time of serious economic constraints and its success entirely depended on its interaction with the entire socio-economic landscape of Mozambique at the time. The latter proved an obstacle rather than an incentive for the achievement of the former's goals.

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[133] Ibid, p. 69.
[134] Ibid, p. 70.

The RSS program was aimed at ensuring that demobilized soldiers went home to start productive lives and was thus faced with a challenge of offering them the basic necessities to do so. In order to fulfill the latter task, the RSS program offered an 18 month salary that was to be paid bi-monthly in order to extend benefits over time and encourage beneficiaries to settle in their home areas where payments were made (since one of the requirements at the DTU was for the ex-soldiers to state the BPD branch where they would receive their money.

There were a number of problems associated with the RSS program. Firstly, BPD staff lacked the training and capacity to deal with the procession of payments and other related activities such as explaining procedure to the former soldiers. The other difficulty was with the veterans themselves since most of them lacked formal education and made the job for the banks staff even harder. The situation was not helped by the involvement of USAID staff that provided backup as this simply perpetuated the common problem with aid programs namely, conflicting lines of command and orientations. [135]

Although many of the above problems were later solved, they nonetheless pointed to some fundamental conceptual and practical problems associated with the aid industry. For example, the second problem contributing to the frustration experienced by the ex-soldiers was related to the lack of infrastructure due to the emergency. Many of these soldiers had to travel very long distances only to find that the payment is fragmented and does not come as a lump sum, something that could have decreased the travel costs drastically.

Repatriation and Reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons

Repatriation and Reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons was identified as one general component of the GPA. This was due to the fact that the war-induced emergency has resulted in displacement of about a third of the Mozambican

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[135] This situation is further proof that although the Mozambican transition and donor involvement had some measure of 'success' in other areas, it also still suffered from age-old problems associated with the conceptualization of aid such as capacity, timing and conflict of interests and line of commands. In the

population, of which 3-4 million were internally displaced and 1.7 million had sought asylum in neighboring countries. Therefore, the reintegration of these people formed part of the general rehabilitation and rebuilding process in post-war Mozambique. Most of the refugees have spent many years outside the country depending largely on assistance rendered by the UNHCR.

Between October 1992 and the 1994 elections a large number of the estimated 1.7 million refugees had returned to Mozambique. However, most of these refugees and returnees were coming back to a country where the distribution and presence of aid was heavily skewed (i.e. spatially and regionally) and where local government and NGO partners lacked capacity (both human and material) to deal with a large number of people returning spontaneously (almost 80 % of the total) over such a short period. Now the major task was how to resettle them whilst at the same time providing them with the basic infrastructure and socio-economic needs in order to enable them to rebuild their lives.

In order to achieve the above task a variety of measures were undertaken by the broader donor community in conjunction with the Mozambican government. Programs consisted of, inter alia, the provision of hand-outs of basic needs items such as food, seeds, tools, household kits, material for shelter, and blankets), as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure such as wells and pumps (at times forming part of the UNHCR's Quick Impact Project), access to roads, school buildings, health posts, and the provision of school and health materials.

The UNHCR repatriation program was the largest in the organization's history and cost an estimated US$ 145 million for a planned period of three years. [136]The organization assisted communities in about 34 districts in seven of Mozambique's ten provinces. There were, however, a number of problems associated with the UNHCR's work.

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above case, however, many problems were mediated through the appointment of three United Nations Volunteers as RSS officers to assist the BPD.

Donors such as Norway (which was part of the Like-Minded Group and was the sixth largest) had programs that emphasized, inter alia, institution building and aid located along the relief-to-development continuum in activities relating to repatriation and reintegration.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) was amongst the most active NGOs participating in the programs aimed at assisting the refugees and the internally displaced. The Council's projects highlighted issues of institution building and aid provision along the so-called relief-to-development continuum. Examples included the support given to Nucleo de Apoio aos Refugiados (NAR), which was the government refugee agency; support given to LINK (which was the major NGO co-ordinating body; and as well as civil registration which served as NRC's conflict prevention and reconciliation activities. Although these activities formed part of the organization's contribution to the entire peace process, individually and collectively they illustrate a number of issues of concern to this report. One of these is capacity building through partnerships with local Mozambican NGOs.

The NAR project was a limited program where NRC agreed to channel funds to the Mozambican partner in order to allow the latter to assume a diverse number of activities related to repatriation and reintegration. The focus of the NRC and NAR project which emphasized locality rather than beneficiary groups successfully ensured that a large number of IDPs and as well as those locals who remained in the area benefited equal. This strategy helped reduced tension between groups targeted for benefit. There were however problems associated with the NRC – NAR project.

Firstly, since its formation early in the middle 70s to largely deal with refugees coming into Mozambique as a result of regional wars of decolonization, the NAR project lacked the capacity, experience and expertise to deal with a variety of tasks that the post-1992 period demanded. This was illustrated when audits carried out in 1993 into the affairs of the NAR proved that there was a lot of financial resource mis-management.

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[136] Hallam, p. 88.

When the abovementioned audit revealed that approximately US$ 12 000 was unaccounted for and that an estimated US$ 400, 000 or more had been transferred [137] without proper exchange rates estimates, the NAR complained that this was due to the fact that they were expected to engage into massive refugee rehabilitation projects involving massive sums of money without prior and adequate proper guidance, supervision, training of staff in accounting procedures, financial reporting as well as project implementation. Thus this was more of a problem related to neglect of capacity issues by a Northern NGO when dealing with a Southern counterpart.

The above observation need not be taken as a sweeping depiction of the manner in which the NRC dealt with the NAR on the repatriation project. Indeed the former did have some appreciation of the problems that will arise due to the latter's lack of capacity. This was reflected in the initial tension between the NRC and the UNHCR with regard to the conceptualization of the entire project in the first place. The NRC felt that theoretically they were helping a government agency with resources and much needed capacity to engage in a refugee repatriation program as 'equals' taking on a wide range of organizational and operational functions related to repatriation and resettlement, whilst the UNHCR argued that the NRC was simply creating a parallel structure (dealing with refugee issues an area where the UNHCR has the overall expertise and mandate) that would result in duplication.

The other aspect of refugee repatriation and resettlement that was seen as crucial was the *Civil Registration Project*. Modeled along the Latin American experience it was aimed at ensuring the restoration of returnee's sense of citizenship through granting them identification and registration that would enable them to reclaim their rights and obligations as citizens of Mozambique. Although this project became a 'success' (in terms of meeting its registration targets), it nonetheless raised some tensions in priority.

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[137] Hallam; p. 91.

Although most of those involved with the project agreed on its importance (especially since registration was essential in allowing people to reclaim access to basic services such as health and education), there were unfortunate tensions with regard to the goal of capacitating provincial government institutions.

The project used registrars from the ministry of Justice and Interior, which indirectly meant that at provincial level the government would in the long-term benefit from the documentation. However, since the political climate was not stable at the time, and also because of the fundamental political nature of aid interventions, RENAMO was able to exploit the registration process since it favored other regions instead of others, arguably due to limited resources.

There were other projects such as those that were directly dealing with unaccompanied children and women from RENAMO captivity that formed part of the broader activities directed at reintegration and resettlement of returnees. These aspects of the projects and others not discussed here highlight the cross-cutting and central themes that this report (i.e. capacity building, aid biasness, and donor priority tension, etc) has been attempting to deal with in order to demonstrate the multi-faceted nature and complexity of factors that determine the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development aid in societies emerging from political emergencies.

Rapid Rebuilding

The projects that were undertaken by donors under the "Rapid building" banner consisted mostly of short-term activities aimed at consolidating the peace process. These included, rapidly providing basic and economic services such as "seeds and tools", health, education and water facilities; and as well as basic infrastructure such as roads and bridges. [138]These activities are clearly mutual reinforcing since reintegration of people can never be sustainable if the returnees go back to areas where they still lack basic services. Thus for sustainable peace to be achieved donors and other NGO agencies saw

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[138] Hallam. op. cit., p. 91.

the need for short-term rapid projects crucial if the people were expected to feel any sense of change and benefit accruing from the peace process.

Activities defined as "Rapid Rebuilding" usually lie somewhere in the "gray zone" between short-term assistance and long-term development in the continuum thesis. [139] Although theoretical the direct impact of such projects on the entire peace process in a given conflict is not automatically clear, there is enough evidence suggesting that the linkage of short-term assistance (i.e. for returning refugees) and long-term developmental goals of these communities does provide people with both incentives and disincentives that impact upon the difference between sustainable peace and the possibility of a return to war and instability.

These projects were aimed at restarting the social and economic life of people whose existence has been disrupted by decades of war. The projects incorporated activities aimed at linking short-term relief projects with some requirements of the transition to peace and eventually with long-term developmental goals of the post-war Mozambican economic and political system.

Although there were many projects of this nature in the transition to peace, the report will focus on the following three. These are:

- Council For Africa (CFA) school rehabilitation project in Maputo;
- PESU – "seeds and tools" redistribution project;
- Rural Development Pogramme in Cabo Delgado.[140]

The major advantage of the peace process was that it allowed humanitarian and development activities to take place in the rural areas almost unhindered. However, there was also a need for a continued presence of operations in urban areas like Maputo where, due to the influx of people escaping the war from the countryside, many basic services

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[139] Hallam, A., op. cit., p. 97, for a discussion of the institutional, financial and managerial problems associated with these types of projects see, Marit Sorvald, (1995), in Norwegian.

had been exhausted and others destroyed by the war. Thus a focus on Maputo was essential.

The rehabilitation of schools in the country's capital in the period 1990 – 95 was mostly done with direct cooperation with the Directorate for Education and Culture of Maputo City. In the Council For Africa (a Norwegian NGO), project the purpose was to rehabilitate eight schools.

The general outcome of the project was that it was successful in so far as achieving the goal of repairing schools, and contributed to the security of both teachers and pupils. Clearly without this initiative these schools would not have reopened or renovated to acceptable operational standards again. The other positive spin-off from the project for the Mozambicans was that they gained experience in so far as contractual management such as bidding procedures is concerned. Capacity building was further enhanced through in-service training for technical staff.

However, despite some of the abovementioned positive aspects of the project there were problems around technical aspects. These related to repairing and maintenance of building both as recurrent costs and provision of personnel.

Interestingly enough the trade-off between short-term "hardware" rehabilitation vis-à-vis "software" needs went beyond the school project and showed the need of comprehensive approach to rebuilding as one aspect was interlinked with others in the whole aid industry. Thus although many people (e.g. Hanlon, 1996) have argued that part of the negative effects of economic and political change from the SAP's initiated in the middle 80s was the change in the attitudes of people towards their obligations as citizens.

However, although this was partly true of the attitude of people towards the schools project (as a 'government/donor' thing they had little to do with), this project also

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[140] Hallam., op. cit., p. 97.

revealed that rebuilding a war damaged economy is not only about peoples attitudes but more significantly is determined by structural conditions of aid provision.

Thus, for example, despite the fact that in Mozambique almost 70 to 80 per cent of GNP is donor funds, there was a lack of "public funds" in the education ministry to cover recurrent costs. This clearly shows the problem of aid dependency in the sense that despite the government's own assessment of its needs donors will always prioritise those that they deem deserving their attention, and tell the South what's best for them!

There were other ways, however, that the donors attempted to use aid in order to avoid building unused infrastructure. For example, the partnership between the CFA and Progresso made sure that from the start the schools they have helped rebuild were "maintenance free". This means that the responsibility of providing for recurrent costs lied with the relevant authorities.

The other project aimed at ensuring a smooth return to normal civilian life for the returnees was the PESU *"seeds and tools"* distribution program. This was an extension and adjustment of the Mozambican department of Agricultures programme started in 1987 aimed at improving agricultural production disrupted by the war. During the emergency Mozambique has become dependent on food aid for almost more than three-quarters of its cereal needs. Thus this programme was seen as very essential in the transition period since it would enable peasants to be able to restart their disrupted livelihoods.

Since the period 1991-92 was a period of drought in the country the program still had to focus on the provision of the then essential agricultural inputs that would enable rural people to produce enough to meet their basic food needs.

Although the direct impact of the PESU program to the peace process becomes difficult to isolate since its implementation during this period coincided with the return of good rains, it is clear, however, that the intervention reduced the previously overwhelming

number of people who were dependent on food aid. These numbers reduced from an estimated 3.5 million in 1993-94 to a projected under 1 million mark.[141] Furthermore, it was estimated that by June 1995 agricultural production would increase by 45 per cent from 1994 levels. Despite these huge improvements the PESU program has reflected certain shortcomings that are usually associated with many aid programs, be they relief or developmental in character.

One of the major problems identified in the program involved, inter alia, lack of a proper accounting system, inadequate and poor state of records, unclear contractual obligations with food suppliers, ineffective internal control over project funds, and inadequate bank statements. Typical of most aid programs (of whatever duration), these problems reflected a lack of commitment on the part of bilateral donors to devise systemic and appropriate

The audits that showed mismanagement of funds are partly due to the fact that there always has been a lack of serious conceptualization of the relationship between bilateral donors and implementing agencies (in this case the Mozambican government), in the sense that this reflected a lack of capacity on the part of government to properly manage the project. It is striking that those bilateral donors involved in the PESU programme (i.e. Sweden) for such a long time, could not anticipate problems inherent in making provision for short-term measures (or "emergency procedures"), in project management when dealing with weak governmental institutions expected to suddenly take control of large projects whilst they have themselves just emerged from an emergency. Thus, for a project that has been running since 1987 there should have been long established criteria and institutional provision aimed at minimizing risk for abuse, especially by improving the capacity of the Mozambican counterparts.

The last program of focus under rapid rebuilding is the *rural rehabilitation program* in Cabo Delgado. This program was aimed at generally stimulating production and

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[141] Hallam, A., op. cit., 100.

strengthening local government structures. The main regions of focus were in southern districts of Cabo Delgado namely; Balama, Namuno and Montepuez.

This project was a mixture of both rapid rebuilding and long-term development. It consisted of projects such as assisting women as a target group and rebuilding infrastructure such as "feeder roads", whilst institution building of local structures was conceived as a more developmental goal.

Generally, the rapid rebuilding of feeder roads as essential structures in aiding rural production by providing access to marketing progressed relatively well. These roads were labour intensive and remuneration was on the basis of "cash-for work". The longer-term aspect of the program consisted of agricultural rehabilitation, social action, public administration and support to planning at all levels of government. All these aspects were perceived to be mutually reinforcing. However, although the program emphasized capacity building through the establishment of a small management unit in INDER, after two years it was concluded that, although successful in terms of capacity enhancement, the program was too biased to institution building at national level. [142]

There were other problems associated with the selection of Cabo Delgado as a regional target and priority. For some such as UNOHAC, the area was the least affected by the war. However, for those agencies involved with rural development projects in the area they argued that the region contained refugees from areas like Nampula and as such the program aimed at integrating these groups as war affected groups through the provision of employment schemes such as the building of feeder roads.

Thus, in conclusion, although many of the aspects of rapid rebuilding were relatively successful in terms of addressing the immediate needs of a society recovering from decades of conflict (and had to settle a variety of previously displaced groups), and contribute to the recovering of socio-economic aspects of recovery, there were certain problems inherent in the various projects.

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[142] Hallam, A., op. cit., p. 103.

Most of these problems were associated with issues relating to the lack of adequate capacity on the part of the Mozambican authorities, something that ironically did not emerge during the transition period! As a matter of fact programs with such a long life span as the PESU were not supposed to experience problems of capacity, which resulted in mismanagement. Therefore, as has been highlighted elsewhere in this report, there is a need to conceptualize and operationalize issues relating to capacity building in linking short-term relief programmes with long-term development in political emergencies experiencing a transition from war to peace.

Demining

In a country that was devastated by decades of civil war that was characterized by a violation of the laws of war where mines were used as a deliberate and unrestricted tool of maiming civilian targets mine clearance was central to any reconstruction, especially in the country side where it would enable people to restart production in order to sustain themselves. To aid this process the international donor community was involved in a variety of initiatives.

One of the donor agencies involved in the demining project was the Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA). The task was not an easy one since landmines have been used by both sides during the conflict and have killed a large number of people. Moreover, demining was central to a host of activities that included, possibly limiting access to soldiers willing to be demobilized, preventing the return of 5-6 million displaced persons and refugees and economically affecting the peace process through preventing people to start living productive lives.

The NPA made contacts with UNOHAC in December 1992 since the latter was charged with the overall co-ordination and responsibility for mine clearance. NPA teams arrived in Tete province and trained 64 local sappers who were ready for deployment by July 1993. In order to be seen to have a fairly representative and legitimate program, the NPA

met with representatives of the Mozambican government, RENAMO, ONUMOZ, Norway, and UNHCR, and reached agreement on the modalities of the operations. [143]

Although much of the mine clearing was successful, there were problems the NPA had with other agencies involved with the mine clearing operation. For example, the UNHCR was responsible for pointing priority areas for demining by anticipating those areas likely to receive a large number of returnees.

However, the UNHCR provided the NPA with a list of priorities that was beyond the capacity of the later. This reflected lack of effective communication that was later lead to the UNHCR withdrawing from funding the NPA, albeit under different circumstances. This occurred during the visit of the UNHCR High Commissioner in March 1994 after she visited Tete province to find the Maputo office funding mine clearance! This incident highlighted lack of operational communication within the UN agencies. The withdrawal led to a shortfall in funds which, though latter addressed, nonetheless impacted negatively upon the operations of the NPA.

One of the major successes of the mine-clearing project was with regard to capacity building gained by the Mozambicans from earlier experiences. For example, the Mozambicans have had experience with mine clearance when they sent their trained dogs in Angola and in 1996 were twice sent to the UN missions in Bosnia. This reflected the fact that local partners and recipients of emergency assistance had to have the potential to enhance their knowledge and gain capacity that they can use to either help themselves or others.

Political Pluralism

Building sustainable peace requires a rebuilding of political structures and institutions that seek to accommodate diverse voices in the political process. The major aim of the international community was to ensure that RENAMO is kept in the political arena. This

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[143] Hallam, A., op. cit., p. 79.

was seen as essential following the experience of the Angolan peace process. There were many incentives provided to ensure that this and other goals related to political pluralism were achieved. These included, inter alia, providing for the UN Trust Fund for RENAMO, and other structures such as the electoral commission, and the UNDP Trust Fund for elections.

Although innovative and very controversial, the UN Trust Fund for RENAMO was seen to be essential in ensuring that RENAMO honors its obligations under the peace process. This was made even more urgent (and perhaps abused by RENAMO), when in 1993 the organization withdrew from Maputo citing lack of finance as the major reason. Since this withdrawal also affected the organization's participation in the various UN commissions supporting the peace initiative, it was correctly felt that there was indeed a need to establish a form of financial support for RENAMO in order to allow it to transform into a political party.

Thus on the 10th of May 1993 the Trust Fund was established under the Secretary General's office (and supported through a Special Representative in Maputo), and incorporated into the Protocol III (v) 7(b, c) of the GPA. [144]It was through this process that the continued cooperation and partnership of RENAMO in the peace process was ensured. This fund proved very significant if we consider that RENAMO as a guerilla movement did not possess any valuable resources such as control over mining deposits that other movements use in order to sustain themselves.

Therefore, it could be concluded that the establishment of the fund was crucial in ensuring the continued cooperation of RENAMO in the peace process. This contributed directly into the sustenance of the process, since without fundamental and meaningful peace, it is doubtful whether some of the above reviewed components of the peace process that were aimed at rebuilding through linking short-term relief with long-term development aid would have been possible.

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[144] Hallam, A., (et. al.) (op. cit.), p. 111.

The Bretton Woods institutions and the transition to peace

> *"Contrary to what we would like to believe, Africa belongs not to the various African states, not withstanding their proclamations of sovereignty and independence; nor to one or other of the former colonial powers. Africa belongs to the World Bank! Africa and Mozambique belong to the WB (and the IMF). Its program is to force Africa into the system of neo-colonial economics, without taking people's necessities into account. What counts is the free market and its god – money". – Vida Nova, November 1995.*

The above statement comprehensively captures both the programmatic approach of the Bretton Woods institutions as well as the outcome of their programmes. The preceding statement further highlights the power of these institutions vis-à-vis those of "Third World" governments. For example, in the case of Mozambique the decision not to build a hospital in Nacala was taken by the World Bank and not the Mozambican government, as much as it was the former who decided on the liberalization of the export of the raw cashew industry in 1994. Since the beginning of the 1980s global financial institutions have increasingly de facto taken over the setting and management of macro-economic policy in many countries of the developing world.

Furthermore, in the case of Mozambique the IMF plays a very crucial but destructive role by limiting the scope and options that the government has in terms of rebuilding a country that has just emerged from a prolonged war induced emergency. This is done through setting a macro-economic environment that targets things such as inflation reduction instead of prioritizing long-term socio-economic development of the Mozambican people by providing the government with incentives that it could distribute to the various sectors of the economy in order to stimulate "people-centered development".

IMF, World Bank and Rebuilding in post-war Mozambique

Although the World Bank initially played a prominent role for the large part of Mozambique's emergency (owing to the very nature of the emergency), the IMF later played an even more significant role in shaping the macro-economic context in which aid was provided, especially during the transition period and after. The IMF's role shaped and influenced both aid disbursement and prioritization in post-war Mozambique, thereby impacting upon attempts at rehabilitation and rebuilding of the country's economy.

IMF policy known as stabilization generally aims at entirely reducing inflation by means of controlling money supply. To achieve this the IMF (hereafter referred to as the Fund), demands that governments in developing countries where most of their programs operate drastically cut down on spending, increase taxes, put restrictions on credit provision, and apply rapid devaluations.

In the case of Mozambique, IMF's dominance begun when the Fund approved a US$ 142 million Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (which was a form of long-term loan conditional upon implementation of stabilization measures). Within this framework the goal was to reduce inflation. However, this was not achieved. Instead inflation rose during the 90s and the Fund imposed tighter "caps", which amounted to fifteen different targets in 1996 alone!

Furthermore, as part of IMF policy and the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) package, the Fund's restricts government spending by limiting credit to the economy (money lent by Banks to companies). This had very adverse effects on Mozambique's ability to socio-economic development as the government was operating under strict conditions that restricted its role as a provider of public goods and services. For example, due to the Funds insistence on limiting credit to the economy (which fell from US$ 438 million in 1990n to about US$ 150 million in 1995, the government had to cut civil servants wages. This increased vulnerability of this sector of Mozambican society as more and more of these workers were forced to live below the poverty line.

The other impact of IMF's emphasis on limiting credit in order to avoid inflationary pressure has been on sabotaging the country's ability to rebuild her economy and thereby sustain peace in the long-term. Initially donors used to fill the gap caused by some of IMF's policies on government by paying more the government's budget. However, with the end of the war in 1992 they shifted their priority to rebuilding and reconstruction of the country's economy and infrastructure. Unfortunately, and paradoxically (but not entirely ironical or surprising), the IMF argued that this tendency to provide additional spending to government by targeting rebuilding was inflationary!

As a result of this the Fund argued and successfully pushed for a budget target that effectively restricted donor spending on reconstruction and rebuilding through a policy called "Deficit Before Grant" (*defice global autes de donativos*). [145] This policy means the amount of money that donors give for such projects as school rebuilding and bridge reconstruction is calculated as, the difference between all government spending (capital and current, tax-funded and donor-funded) in relation to the governments income from taxes and customs payments.

The negative impact of this policy has been that it blocks rebuilding in Mozambique. More tragically, however, has been the tendency by the IMF to indirectly use the policy of deficit before grant in order to compel the Mozambican government to follow its prescriptions, no matter how dubious and disproportionate they were. For example, after the government unilaterally increased civil servants wages (following "troika" negotiations between government, business and labour), in 1995, the IMF threatened to declare the country "off-track". When it became apparent that this blatant assault was more controversial the Fund argued for a decrease in the deficit before grant, especially with regard to the World Bank's road-rebuilding programme.

It is also important to note that with regard to wages, IMF policy has failed in its own terms. The general purpose of the Fund with regard to inflation targeting was to decrease

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[145] Hanlon, J., (1996), op. cit.

money supply through cutting government spending and reducing credit. However, this policy has resulted in many hardships for the people of Mozambique. For example, by 1995 government's civil service wages were only one-third of the 1990 level; resulting in the UN estimating that two-thirds of all the civil servants had salaries below the poverty level. It is no exaggeration to argue that IMF inflation targeting has increased poverty in many sectors of the economy.

The decline in wages has affected the Mozambican government by encouraging donors to incapacitate it through the provision of extra payment and hiring of top civil servants. Some agencies have provided government employees with per diems for attending donor-funded conferences (thus allowing the workers to earn extra income), whilst others hire them to provide services privately. This results in a vicious circle where donors accuse the government for lack of capacity and portray themselves as better providers whilst they are the ones incapacitating the state!

The credit limitations imposed by the IMF also impact on foreign currency and reduce production. During the initial phases of the Mozambican economy donors provided the bulk of foreign currency (by means of cash donations and loans through such projects as 'import support' or 'balance of payment support'), tied to requirements specifying that use will only be limited to imports from the donor country or use in donor sanctioned projects. This was in contrast to the government's insistence on supplying the productive sector with capital rather importing goods and commodities that would be in competition with what was left of the countries very fragile industrial production.

Two problems arose from the above clash of priority. The first was that due to limitations on government credit provision, by 1996 local businesses did not have enough meticais to buy the dollars available on the market. Secondly, the unrestricted sale of dollars increased imports since it is more beneficial in the short-term to invest in import-export than production.

Furthermore, World Bank and IMF policy has resulted in a more structural and permanent neglect and lack of attention being paid to the rural peasants as an engine of growth and development. The colonial period in Mozambique denied the majority of the rural peasants any entrepreneurial skills and accumulation of capital. Although the initial PPI period (1978-1982) opened some for the peasantry as a productive and entrepreneurial force, the PRES (stabilization) period has closed the little room was there for the rural peasantry to play an active role in economic recovery.

The marginalization of the peasantry by denying them access to credit and markets for their products (and better terms of trade), in the post-war economy simply widens the gap between the poor and the rich and between the rural and urban areas. This is a very serious situation if we consider that the Mozambican economy 's markets are poorly functioning and highly cartelized.

Thus the IMF policies and aid provision hinder the recovery of the Mozambican economy rather than promote the necessary conditions conducive to sustainable peace through socio-economic advancement of those groups who were severely disadvantaged by war.

Developmental NGOs in Mozambique during and after the peace transition

Like in most "Third World" countries, Mozambique did not survive the tide of the privatization of charity through the phenomenal rise of NGOs. In Mozambique's case, these new 'angels of mercy' became very dominant in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Almost all sectors of socio-economic goods and services provision were taken over by donor agencies by the middle 1980s. By 1989 there were about a 180 agencies working in Mozambique and they pledged US$78 million in response to the emergency. Emergency appeals. have increased donor dependency on the part of Mozambique [146]However, it should be noted that this was aggravated by the former's reluctance to

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[146] Hanlon, J., (.....), "It's the IMF that Runs Mozambique.

improve the latter's capacity to administer and provide socio-economic goods to its people.

Thus the overall experience that emerges out of Mozambique during and after the emergency is that there was little or no effort made to strengthen the capacity of local Mozambican NGOs on the part of the donor community. Instead what happened was that IMF policies created a situation where the INGOs were simple contractors of financial capital ensuring the implementation of *benchmarks* that were inappropriate for a nation under a war induced emergency like Mozambique was at the time. Sadly this was the similar situation where policies of both the IMF and the World Bank prevent meaningful and 'people-centered' development in post-war Mozambique. Perhaps it is high time that NGOS (whether national or international) review their relationship with their sources of funds in order to determine whether are they agents of change that is beneficial to the power or are just pawns of global capital.

Beginning with the signing of the General Peace Accord in 1992, numerous international agencies such as NGOs underwent various changes. These included that they:

- Suffer a reduction in revenues and funds due to the end of the emergency situation;
- They concentrate their activities within more restricted geographical areas;
- They turn their programs from intervention to so-called developmental activities;
- They are seeking alternative partners to the traditional ones – government, Mozambican NGOs, etc;
- They are becoming more dependent on funds made available through the states and governments of their countries of origin. [147]

The immediate post-conflict NGO scene in Mozambique was reflective of the fundamental flaw that characterized the emergency period, namely the separation of

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[147] Yussuf Adam and Humberto Cimbra, *"Modern Messiahs Seeking New Lazaruses: NGOs in Mozambique – What Partnerships for Eliminating Poverty?"* date of publication unknown, p. 72.

emergency from development programs. The post-conflict period was marked by a more developmental orientation for NGOs. Although the NGO sector in Mozambique, like elsewhere, retains many aspects of diversity that require careful generalizations at the level of analysis, there are certain activities and factors that make it possible to evaluate the impact of their activities at a more general level.

With the 'drying-up' of funds brought about by the end of the emergency many of the NGOs continued with their work and forming new working partnerships and strategies in order to adapt to a changing scenario without proper and honest evaluation of the impact of their interventions on poverty and local realities. NGOs in Mozambique have continued with programs that disregard contacts with the local population in order to determine their real needs, disregard for greater adaptation of projects to the reality of each region serviced, and lack of serious concern for the poorest areas and the marginalized sectors of the population.

Indeed the above last points are contrary to what these organizations claim to do. For example, although most NGOs claim to be biased towards the poorest areas they in actual fact most prefer (and in reality do) working in areas with the best government infrastructure and services. This means that the richer the area (i.e. in terms of soil and water) the greater the presence of these NGOs resulting in further marginalization of areas long destabilized by years of war, famine and drought.

Chapter 4

Linking Humanitarian Assistance and Development Aid in Mozambique: problems identified

This report has been aimed at analyzing the possibility of linking humanitarian assistance and development aid in complex political emergencies in southern Africa by focusing on the case study of Mozambique. The Mozambican case demonstrates conditions under which a linkage between the two forms of aid can be made possible. The report argues that although the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development aid is theoretically and practically desirable and feasible, there are a number of outstanding issues that the "continuum" thesis fails to adequately address. The issues and problems that militate against attempts at linking humanitarian assistance and development include, inter alia, *issues of conceptualization and operationalization, capacity building, the effects of the international political economy, security, and co-ordination issues.*

- **Conceptualization and operationalization of the continuum**

One of the main problems this report has identified relates to the manner in which the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development aid is conceptualized. Although the reports concurs with the major assumptions of the continuum debate, namely that some of the problems caused by complex political emergencies can only be better resolved by responses that encompass humanitarian assistance and development aid, it is submitted here that there are, however, many problems relating to the modalities of achieving such a linkage.

One of the major problems with regard to the successful attainment of the linkage between these two forms of aid relates to issues of aid responsibility or 'actor ship'. The issue of aid responsibility is central to the whole aid industry (both humanitarian and developmental) since it reveals the asymmetrical relations that exist between those agencies form the North vis-à-vis the South. Indeed the aid regime is a regime of paternalism. Northern donor agencies and INGOs control

the disbursement and distribution of aid to the South. Obviously within such a context relations are rarely based on equity and mutual benefit. Furthermore, the aid industry is a multi-billion dollar industry where there is often a conflict of interests that sometimes undermine the very principles of altruism on which it is based.

Aid responsibility inevitably invites the issue of delegation. If the assumption and critique of humanitarian assistance also relates to its sustainability under protracted emergencies it follows that building capacity through delegation of responsibility becomes a responsibility of those in a position to do so. In this case it is mostly the Northern NGOs who have the funds and the expertise. However, since the issue of delegation and capacity building between unequal partners (and indeed within an industry with its own political economy as far as resources are concerned) is complex capacity building needs to be closely scrutinized.

Furthermore, since there seems to be an emerging consensus that the continuum paradigm is based on the conviction that relief and development aid are not only tools to save lives but by so doing they prevent the renewal of conflict, there is a need to identify the root causes of the conflicts. Unfortunately the continuum thesis is not explicit as to what are the major causes of complex emergencies and as to the interaction between various elements and forces (global vis-à-vis national).

It seems that the failure to highlight the often complex interaction of actors and forces that shape the root causes of conflict directly results to the silence (within the continuum school) to appreciate the impact of the global political and economic forces on both the root causes of conflict and their influence on the ability to allow post-war rebuilding that addresses these causes adequately. Indeed this has been evident in development where the focus has been on perceiving development as a means of preventing and solving conflict coincides with an increasing understanding that protracted complex emergencies result from a

profound structural change in the political economy of a society, and more often than not of entire regions.

The above sad state of affairs directly stems from the prevailing conceptualization within the broader aid industry where there is a silence about the interaction between the local and the international. Perhaps this is understandable given the fact that such a focus reveals the double standards that underlie the patrimonial aid regime.

Thus understanding the phenomena of both "failed states" and "quasi-states" reveals some misconceptions that permeate the continuum thesis. For example, for some state that if, "... *conventional wisdom has it that this divisive trend (of institutional breakdown and fragmentation) is a temporary phase in the process of development and transition towards liberal democracy. If this is wrong, however, instability represents the emergency of new types of socio-political formation (sic) adapted to exist on the margins of the global economy, then the implications are profound. Policy makers would not even be asking the right questions*".[148]

This means that the interrogation of the continuum and its feasibility should not only represent a quest for technical probability but rather a profound and intellectual exercise that seeks to analyze the interrelationship between both forms of aid and global structural power since the latter influences (if not determine) any progressive and sustainable linkage. Thus the role of development aid in a post-war transition should include analyses how the conceptualization (from narratives to discourses) on this type of aid form part of a global power structure that militate against attempts at establishing the linkage between relief and 'anti-neo-liberal forms of sustainable and people-centered development.

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[148] See, Mark Duffield, (1997), *"NGOs and the New Aid Paradigm"*, in **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 527 – 542, p. 529.

- **Capacity building for local actors: Mozambican government and local NGOs**

The issue of capacity building within the aid industry is dogged with controversy and uncertainty. More often than not there is always conflicting views about its meaning. Thus some have observed that, *"Our lack of an adequate theory of capacity building reduces our own capacity to engage in the practice. We lack the theory because we are not thinking through what we see before us. And we are avoiding thinking things through because to face the obvious will be to radically transform our practice. We are avoiding genuine accountability".[149]*

Others add that the problem is also due to the fact that we do not know, *"What is 'capacity building? That is the problem. It includes everything that was covered by the different definitions of 'institution building', and much more besides ... Aid agencies would be wise to have no truck with the new jargon of 'capacity building' and to insist on using language and terms that have identifiable and precise meanings".[150]* Although the many controversies and problems regarding the meaning of 'capacity building' across the aid industry in general remain, there seems to be some consensus regarding the need to strengthen the capacity of local actors that include both the state and the indigenous NGO sector and communities.

This consensus derives from the fact that capacity-building is seen as an integral part of development (in both theory and practice) and that failure to strengthen the capacity of vulnerable communities such as those living under emergency situations results in an increase in dependency and consequently further vulnerability. Thus it becomes more crucial for INGOs to devise self-conscious strategies aimed at strengthening the capacity of local people and local institutions in order to break the cycle of dependency and patrimonial relations

[149] Eade, D., op. cit., p. 1, quoting from CDRA, 1995.
[150] Moore, 1995, from Ibid, p. 1.

that currently permeates the aid industry. The need is to interrogate the relationship between local and global actors in strengthening capacities of institutions and actors incapacitated by emergencies.

The above conviction have led some to argue that the debate must move beyond technical and operative aspects and that it must incorporate an evaluation of such seemingly shared values as 'trust' and 'solidarity' and provide for new forms of imagining development. This will require that, "... *the NGOs of the North must in future define more clearly and seriously their role and responsibilities. Thus, they have to think beyond modernization in terms of strategic planning, management, monitoring and evaluation. It also implies establishing a substantive, horizontal dialogue with their counterparts in the South*". [151]

This is made even more urgent by the fact that the aid industry is an uneven one. Thus, "*No matter how understanding the donor may be, the fact that the Northern NGO is the one with the money means that the Southern NGO must be the one with the begging bowl. No matter how good the personal relationship between the Northern and the Southern NGO, the latter must accept the humiliation of being the receiver of charity. Perforce; there is a relationship of unequals. And inequality never built capacity*". [152]

So there is an urgent need to thoroughly interrogate how the relationship between Northern donor countries and their implementing NGOs vis-à-vis local institutions (be they government or NGOs) hinders efforts at enabling the South to give actual meaning to their own self conceived development. This is made even more urgent by the fact that the Mozambican study currently under review in this report demonstrate a disturbing trend where Northern NGO simple act as implementing agencies for their financial institutions in the West. This is a very

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[151] See, IFC3, "Capacity Building and Accelerated Change in Latin America NGOs", p. 2.
[152] See, Manji, 1997, quoted in Eade, D., op. cit., p. 9.

unfortunate but less puzzling situation since the policies of these financial institutions hinder rebuilding of countries emerging from war and emergencies.

The transition in Mozambique illustrate the lack a mutual relationship between INGOs and local partner NGOs.

- **The Role of International Political Economy and International Financial Institutions: The IMF and World Bank**

As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, debates about the feasibility of the continuum under conditions of protracted complex political emergencies have often overlooked the effects of the International Political Economic factors in shaping both the conceptualization and operationalization of humanitarian assistance and development aid. This is unfortunate because without paying attention to this factor it is difficult to understand the various interests and constraints that attempts at linking these two forms of aid are subjected to at a global level.

Since the report has highlighted the conceptual and normative problems associated with the language and discourse of development and humanitarian assistance (especially as produced and reproduced in the North), the focus here is on the role of International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and World Bank on attempts at linking humanitarian and development aid in the context of complex political emergencies.

Since the middle 80s both the IMF and World Bank have been instrumental in shaping the macro-economic policy framework in Mozambique. This report demonstrates that even during the emergency the policies of prioritizing · stabilization and adjustment above all else had negative effects in a country that was experiencing an emergency. A similar situation also applies in post-war Mozambique since the policies of these institutions limit any attempts towards

rebuilding by, inter alia, limiting the governments role in the economy (i.e. giving credit to rural peasants and providing much needed affordable services to the poor), and putting limits on government spending by such measures as the *"Deficit Before Grant"* benchmark.

• **Security**

One of the central and major issues that are important in ensuring long-term planning in situations of complex political emergencies is security. Needless to say that these kinds of emergencies are characterized by profound insecurity that often makes planning in the long-term almost impossible since any such attempts are disrupted by the fragility of the situation. In Mozambique, like in other emergencies such as Angola, the issue of security has had serious implications in the sense that those areas deemed more secure such as major capitals (i.e. Maputo) receive a disproportionate share of aid and resource allocation.

• **Aid coordination**

One of the other major problems that have been proven to have an adverse and negative effect on the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance is the issue of aid coordination during complex emergencies. This is very important when one attempts to link humanitarian assistance and development aid because there seems to be some consensus that one of the reasons that lead to ineffectiveness within the aid industry in general is the lack of programme coordination.

In Mozambique the magnitude of the emergency and the accompanying humanitarian response was so huge that it resulted in the fragmentation of aid programs. Although this was the case during the emergency, it became more problematic during the transition form war to peace and hindered some of the efforts at linking previous short-term relief projects with long-term development programs that the country needed in order to sustain peace.

Challenges and lessons for Southern Africa

One of the major challenges the humanitarian community is facing in dealing with semi-permanent and protracted complex political emergencies concerns the establishment of a workable relationship between humanitarian assistance and development aid in practical and sustainable terms. However, as this report has attempted to demonstrate that there are still various issues that need to be dealt with if such a linkage is to be feasible. The case of Mozambique demonstrates, albeit in different ways, the powerful constraints that such attempts face. Such constraints include, the underlying structural economic condition of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and how these renders them subject to control by multi-lateral financial institutions (which in turn limit options to these countries own development agendas that can be suitable to their own condition of moving away from war emergencies), the power of aid discourses in influencing development practice, the relationship between Northern NGOs and global political power structures, the capacity of national institutions to carry out programs aimed at aiding their countries to move along the peace continuum, issues of security during emergencies, and also the manner in which whole relief industry favors certain kinds of interventions and options as opposed to others.

Conclusion

This report concludes by submitting that although the belief that humanitarian assistance and development aid can be conceptually de-linked in emergencies is erroneous, there is a need, for analytical purposes, to interrogate each of these two fields in order to highlight how they relate to structures of global power and hegemonic knowledge as these processes inevitably impact upon the manner in which emergencies are mediated.

Thus although the report concurs with the view that both humanitarian assistance and development aid once properly executed does provide incentives and disincentives that can help reduce the negative effects of violence induced emergencies and promote 'development, there is, however, a need for caution if we are to adequately understand

the current processes that continue to shape the aid industry and be better informed about ways in which interventions could be enhanced.

The above is important even more in a world of globalization and neo-liberalism which is currently characterized by endemic poverty. This structural poverty contributes to increased instability in other parts of the world. This means that developmental and humanitarian NGOs will continue to play an increasing role in mediating the effects of instability. Current statistics depict a world characterized by further 'New World Disorder', especially in the South due to its peculiar economic vulnerable status.

The 1996 United Nations report on Human Development indicates that the developing countries represent 80 per cent of the human population but produce only a little over 20 per cent of the global gross national product. In the last three decades the income earned by the poorest 20 per cent of the population has fallen from 2.2 per cent of the world income to a mere 1.4 per cent while the richest 20 per cent have witness a share increase. This means that the structures of the global economy promote inequality between states and people. This more often than not contributes in increasing possibilities for instability and emergencies (be they 'natural' or man-made) in the South. This means that the provision of aid will still continue to dominate relations between the developed and developing worlds.

The need, therefore, is to come up with workable conceptual frameworks that can ensure that the desire and attempts to 'assist' these societies move from war to sustainable peace are not underlined by paternal relations of domination as currently is the case.

These unequal relations that permeate the aid industry in general shapes particular kinds of responses whilst silencing others, more often those that the people of the South themselves deem as suitable to their own condition. The attempt to reverse this situation, this report submits, should start with analyzing the relationship between dominant forms of knowledge in the aid industry and their resulting policy prescriptions (as they are practiced by such institutions as the IMF and World Bank) impact upon the kind of

options that the developing countries have in achieving the linkage as suggested by the continuum thesis.

Furthermore, since both humanitarian and developmental NGOs are at the center of the delivery of aid to the South, they constitute a crucial between the international donor community, their Southern counterparts, and more significantly with the recipients of aid. Although for the past four decades numerous studies have highlighted the intimate relationship between hegemonic discourses and knowledge structures with aid agencies, the current danger within the aid industry in general is that instead of being advocates for change, NGOs have become the 'delivery agency for a global soup kitchen'. The consequence of this is that NGOs are no longer perceived to be offering alternatives to the current state of poverty and marginalization but are instead seen as 'useful fig-leaves to cover government inaction or indifference to human suffering', in both economic restructuring and complex emergencies. With NGOs increasingly seen as taking the social costs of economic liberalization, there is a need to evaluate their role and consequences of their actions before we conclude as to the feasibility of the continuum.

The other important aspect that the continuum debate touches on is the question of the concept of development itself, both as an academic discipline and as a policy area. Since the debates around the meaning of development and its consequences has ran full circle, there is still a need to thoroughly interrogate the meaning of the concept within debates on the continuum if we are to avoid arguing for the linking of failed humanitarian assistance interventions with failed development paradigms, a catastrophe deplorable to imagine.

Lastly, and in summary, this paper submits that the Mozambican case presents a challenging but interesting case in which attempts at linking humanitarian assistance and development aid can be measured. This case clearly illustrate both the challenges and opportunities presented by the inter-linkages between such factors as International Financial Institutions, the global economic environment, protracted violence and (in) security, the local macro-economic framework and socio-economic recovery prospects,

issues of capacity building, and lack of synergy between emergency planning and long-term programming. All these issues are related and inter-linked at various levels of analysis but where causality proves adequate there is more insight into the challenges faced in attempts at linking humanitarian assistance and development aid in complex political emergencies.

Thus, although conceptually and practically there are overlaps and backward and forward linkages between relief and development aid in complex emergencies, the current lack of adequate understanding of the consequences (both theoretically and practically) of linking these two forms of aid, render the current uninformed attempts an exercise in futility that will simply perpetuate the status quo where aid interventions continue to perpetuate instability and entrench vulnerability in complex emergencies. Although some scholars have prematurely claimed that the movement of Mozambique from war induced emergency to peace was a direct result of the successful linkage between relief and development, this paper argues otherwise. This paper submits that although the intervention of the international community in the transition in Mozambique was vital for the sustenance of peace, the reasons for not returning to war thus lie somewhere else.

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